Angushawkins

British Parliamentary Party Alignment and the Indian Issue, 1857-1858
Author(s): Angus Hawkins

Source: Journal of British Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring, 1984), pp. 79-105
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The North American Conference on
British Studies
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British Parliamentary Party Alignment

and the Indian Issue, 1857-1858
ANGUS HAWKINS
During the unusually hot summer of 1857 English society was shocked
and outraged by reports of atrocity and mass murder. News of the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny reached London on June 26, 1857 and, during
the succeeding months, tales of massacre and torture followed.' Polite
Victorian society was incensed.2 This article examines Parliament's
response to this crisis. It reveals that there exists no simple relation
between events occurring outside Westminster and the response within.
Parliamentary perception passes through the medium of public rhetoric,
established policy, party circumstance, and the private concerns of
prominent personalities. This creates less a refractive distortion of events
than a new aspect to their understanding. Issues such as India acquired
significance within a continuing context of parliamentary circumstance
long preceding the immediate cause of substantive concern. This article,
then, is not about India as such, but about the particular form the Indian
question assumed within Westminster. This is a significant concern in
itself because of the insight preoccupation with India provided into the
tensions, antagonisms, aspirations, and hopes shaping party alignment
during the mid-nineteenth century.
A further aspect of this translation of external circumstance into parliamentary perception is that an issue only became the occasion of crisis
when it was portrayed as critical. Once again, there existed no simple
relation between external events and the response within Westminster.
Popular moral outrage over native atrocities became a political crisis over
administrative reform. This particular parliamentary response was
Mr.Alan Beattie, Dr. AndrewJones, Mr.Stephen Lawrence,and ProfessorJohn
Vincent advised, cautioned, and encouragedme during the writing of this article.
Anything of worth owes much to them. I am also grateful to the Social Science
Research Council for the grant that made the research upon which this article is
based possible.
'National Register of Archives, London, Palmerston Diary, June 26, 1857,
BroadlandsMss. D/4. I am grateful to the Trustees of the BroadlandsArchiveTrust
forpermissionto quote fromthis collection.Throughoutthis article I have referred
to the events in India during 1857-8 as the Mutiny.This was the term within which
events were perceived in Britain, despite Disraeli's unsuccessful attempt in July
1857 to broaden the terms of debate. Note should be made of the fact that some
historians of India prefer to speak of a war of independenceor rebellion.
2A parliamentarian who gave eloquent expression to popular outrage was the
seventh Earl of Shaftesbury. See Edwin Hodder The Life and Work of the Seventh
Earl of Shaftesbury K. G. 1 vol. ed. (London, 1887) pp. 544-47.
80
JOURNAL OF BRITISHSTUDIES
neither necessary nor inevitable. The recognition of crisis and the particular crisis perceived are themselves historical events that require
explanation.
As the nature of the parliamentary response to the Indian issue during
1857-58 is neither simple nor self-evident this article examines the
complexity of that political concern. It reveals that a response expressed
in administrative terms was conducive to Palmerston's parliamentary
anxieties. Moreover the administration of India provided an opportunity
for the Conservative party to substantiate a redefinition of rhetorical
purpose, while the same issue vividly advertised deep divisions within
Whig-Liberal ranks made manifest in the bitter antagonism between
Palmerston and Lord John Russell. In short, the complexity of the Indian
issue came to express the intricacy of party calculation and, for a few
months, the subtle purposes of the preeminent.
I
Despite symptoms of military unrest during the preceding months
British authorities in India were caught by surprise when, on May 10 at
Meerut, native troops mutined and killed British officers and their families. The mutineers subsequently marched on Delhi and seized the city.
On June 7 a native siege of Cawnpore began and, by June 26, the British
had surrendered to Nana Sahib who promptly broke his word and murdered his prisoners. On June 30 the city of Lucknow was put under siege
by the mutineers.3 The Mutiny, fragmented in effect and largely nostalgic
in origin, was a traumatic and anguished protest against the westernizing
policies of the British authorities. Military revolt came to provide a focus
for Muslim and Maratha revivalism and agrarian grievances.4 Because of
the profoundity of these tensions the fighting occasioned great ferocity
and savage reprisals by both sides. Such extremity of emotion was echoed
in England when reports of massacre and murder were received. The
country, Lord Minto observed in October 1857, "is running wild ... with
passion and regards the natives of India (the few allowed to survive) as
monsters only to be held in slavish subjection by the sword."5
In contrast to popular outrage Lord Palmerston's government paraded a
3Fordetailed studies of the Mutiny in its military and Indian contexts see G. B.
Malleson'sstandardHistory of the Indian Mutiny (1878-80); and the more recent
studies ofS. N. Sen 1857 (1957);ChristopherHibbertThe GreatMutiny;India1857
(London,1978). For a perceptiveIndian viewpoint see S. AhmadKhan TheIndian
Revolt (London,1873). Other works of interest are Thomas R. Metcalf The Aftermath of Revolt:India, 1857-1870 (Princeton,N.J., 1965);S. B. Smith Life of Lord
Lawrence(London,1883);J. L. MorrisonLife ofHenryLawrence(London,1934);M.
Maclagan ClemencyCanning (1962); and S. B. ChadhuriEnglish Historical Writings on the Indian Mutiny (Calcutta, 1979).
4See Peter Spear A History of India (London, 1970), 129-44.
5PRO,Minto to Russell, October31, 1857, Russell Mss., 30/22/13/D fol. 209.
PARLIAMENTARY
PARTYALIGNMENT
81
calm confidence.6 Cabinet attitudes towards the Mutiny were characterized by an inability immediately to influence events, the fact that
intelligence took six weeks to reach London from the subcontinent, and a
confident optimism about the final result.7 Only Clarendon, as Foreign
Secretary, and later the Duke of Argyll as Lord Privy Seal emerged as
dissentient voices within the Cabinet.8 Their foreboding made little
impression upon those ministers directly, if distantly, involved with the
Mutiny: Palmerston as Prime Minister, Vernon Smith as President of the
Board of Control, Lord Panmure as Secretary for War and Sir Charles
Wood as First Lord of the Admiralty.9 Throughout the crisis Palmerston
was confident that "the Mutiny [would] be put down, and [British] authority more firmly established than ever."10Clarendon feared that "Palmerston believes all he wishes, and [he] therefore believes all that Panmure
tells him" and that consequently Palmerston would not countenance the
possibility of "a great disaster."" On July 12, the Cabinet dispatched Sir
Colin Campbell to India as Commander-in-Chief and on July 25 sent a
number of troops by steamer and sailing ship (rather than the swifter
6"TheQueen, the House of Lords,the House of Commons,and the press, all call
out for vigorous exertion, and the Government alone take an apologetic line,
anxious to do as little as possible,to wait furthernews, to reduceas law as possible
even what they do grant, and reason as if we had at most only to replace what was
sent out." The Queen to Palmerston, August 22, 1857, cit. H. C. Benson and
Viscount Esher (eds.) Queen Victoria'sLetters (hereafter Q.V.L.) (London,1907)
1st. series. III, 309-10. For a more sympathetic biographicalassessment see H. C.
Bell Lord Palmerston (London1936) II. 172-75.
7Palmerston to the Queen, June 26, 1857 Q.V.L., III, pp. 297-98.
8NationalRegister of Archives,London,Clarendonto Palmerston,September11,
1857, BroadlandsMss. GC/C11087. See also Clarendonto his wife, October1, 1857,
cit. Sir HerbertMaxwell The Life and lettersof GeorgeWilliamFrederick,Fourth
Earl of ClarendonK. G., G.C.B. (London,1913) II, p. 153.
9Palmerston'scabinet colleagues, with a few notable exceptions,emphasizedthe
2nd XI aspect of "Palmerstonianism."Vernon Smith was "very unpopular and
totally useless."(B. L., Greville Diary, February25, 1855, Greville Mss. 41121). cit.
H. Reeve (ed.) The Greville Memoirs (London, 1888) VII, 251.) One colleague
thought him to be "a fool, a damned fool."(PRO,Granville to Canning, March10,
1857, Granville Mss., 30/29/21/2 fol. 7) Lord Panmure, "one of the dullest men
Granville ever knew," was "prejudiced,slow and routiner."(BL, Greville Diary,
August 21, 1855, Greville Mss. 41121, cit. GrevilleMemoirsVII, 288.)
'?BodleianLibrary, Palmerston to Clarendon,September 17, 1857, Clarendon
Mss., C. 69 fol. 494. I am grateful to LordClarendonfor permissionto quote from
this collection.
"PRO,Granville to Canning, September9, 1857. GranvilleMss., 30/29/21/2fol.
32. Clarendonfearedthat "ifgreat disasters occur... the first thing that John Bull
will as usual do is to look for a victim and that victim will be the governmentwho is
moreto be chargedwith want of energy and forhaving laggedbehindpublicopinion
and for not having availed itself of the readiness which the country has manifested."National Register of Archives, Clarendon to Palmerston, September 1,
1857. Broadlands Mss. GC/CL 1083. Argyll feared that sufficiently active and
vigorous measures were not "beingcarried into effectwith the necessary expedition."Argyll to Palmerston. September 29, 1857. BroadlandsMss. GC/AR16.
82
JOURNAL OF BRITISH STUDIES
screw vessels) to the troubled sub-continent.12 Other troops, on their way

to China, were diverted to India. With this the majority of the Cabinet
firmly maintained that all that needed to be done had been done. Wood,
imparting a callous nuance to such confidence, had no "very serious
apprehension for the present. It may be shocking to contemplate a prolongation of the horror of things as they are, and the murder of Europeans:
but one or two bodies of unfortunate people will not turn the scale of
events."13
Two other concerns influenced Palmerston's response to the situation in
India. First, Palmerston harbored "the suspicion . . . that our Indian
disturbances were not without some Russian origin."14In October he
conveyed to Lord Canning "some information . . . received from a secret
agent as to Russian intrigues in India as to the names of persons engaged
in plots and as to certain hidden stores of arms and ammunition at
Calcutta, held ready for insurrection. ..."15 Palmerston also received
information of a possible imminent insurrection in Ireland.16 For this
reason the Irish militia were stationed in England, "away from the
influence of Priests and Traitors," and the Guards regiment, a "sufficient
Anglo-Saxon" force to quell any "Celtic movement," was not sent to India
so that "the best troops could be kept in England to form the foundation of
an Irish force in case of need."1
The immediate causes of the Mutiny and the measures taken to suppress it occasioned little debate in Parliament during 1857. The cursory
discussions that did occur were occasioned by opposition enquiry and
quickly curtailed by ministerial assurances.18 The government consistently sought to exclude the question of the Mutiny in India from the
arena of political controversy. Among the opposition only two Conservatives, Lord Ellenborough in the Lords and Disraeli in the Commons,
attracted notoriety by attacking what they saw as the government's
complacent response to the revolt.19 Without a committed personal folchoice of vessels for conveying the re-enforcementsalso came to cause
12Wood's
much concern. Prince Albert commented bitterly upon Palmerston's "juvenile
levity."cit. Bell Palmerston II, 173.
'3NationalLibraryof Scotland,Woodto Ellice, October6, 1857,Ellice Mss. 15060,
fol. 180. I am grateful to the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland for
permission to quote from this collection.
'4BodleianLibrary,Palmerston to Clarendon,July 12, 1857, ClarendonMss. c.
69, fol. 346.
'5LeedsRecordOffice,Palmerston to Canning, October11, 1857, Canning Mss.
2/10.
"6Scottish Record Office, Palmerston to Panmure, October 5, 1857, Dalhousie
Mss. GD45/8/50 fol. 93.

17Scottish RecordOffice, Palmerston to Panmure, October11, 1857, Dalhousie
Mss. GD45/8/50 fol. 95.
18Granville, 3 Hansard CXLVI:1331-1333 (July 13, 1857). See also, Palmerston,
3 Hansard CXLVI:1367-1371. (July 13, 1852).
"9On
June 9, 1857, Ellenborough,speaking in the Lords,had drawnnotice to the
apprehensionfelt among the native troopsin India that the Governmentintended
to interferewith their religion, warning that if this was attempted"themostbloody
PARLIAMENTARY
PARTYALIGNMENT
83
lowing both men pronounced a distinctive line that others might choose to
follow.20Other members of the opposition, however, were content to await
events. Lord Stanley found the debates "unsatisfactory and purposeless."21
"Palmerstonian" argument suggested that the crisis demanded a "patriotic," non-partisan confidence in the government.22
With the Indian Mutiny the government faced what it presented as a
"national crisis" because too few of importance wished to make it the
occasion for a "political crisis." The "national crisis" prompted by the
Crimean War in 1855 had occasioned the downfall of the existing ministry: Palmerston's appeal to "patriotic duty," though his rhetoric did not
acknowledge it, was not a prescriptive political right. That, in July 1857,
it might be automatically understood as such was a tacit yet powerful
comment upon political circumstance within Westminster.
Initially, Palmerston had hoped to keep Parliament sitting until some
decisive news arrived from India;23a "general desire" prevailing that "the
grouse [could] wait for a fortnight."24 However, on August 5, 1857, the
Premier informed the Speaker that he wished "to wind everything up,
allowing ample time for the Divorce Bill in Committee, and [to] prorogue
on the 20 or 22...."25 At the end of the session Granville felt confident that
"the Government [was] safe for a time ... "26During the recess Cabinet
confidence was evident in ministerial absence. In September Dallas found
revolution would occur."Ellenborough, 3 Hansard CXLV: 1393-1396 (June 9,
1857);see also, Ellenborough,3 Hansard CXLVI:512-520 (June29, 1857).Disraeli
argued that the forcible destruction of native Princedoms,the disturbanceof the
traditional settlement of propertyand interferencewith the religion of the people
had prompted"a national revolt"which the Governmentinsisted on regardingas
merely a military mutiny. Disraeli, 3 Hansard CXLVII:440-481 (July 27, 1857).
See also commentaryin W. F. Monypennyand G. E. Buckle The Life of Benjamin
Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield. (London, 1910-20) IV 83-94 and Robert Blake
Disraeli (London,1969) pp. 375-7.
20EdwardLaw, second Baron Ellenborough (1790-1871) had been GovernorGeneral of India from 1841 to 1844, but because of his rather stringent and
summary manner the East India Company requested his resignation and he
returnedto England and a place in Peel's cabinet in 1844. Thereafter,as a Peelite in
outlookbut a Conservativeby habit, Ellenboroughconcernedhimself with Indian
military affairs and education.Disraeli throughoutthe 1850'swas always anxious
to instigate new initiatives and strategies. See John Vincent Disraeli, Derbyand
the ConservativeParty: the Political Journals of Lord Stanley 1849-69 Hassocks,
Sussex, (1978).
2'LiverpoolCity RecordOffice,Stanley Diary, August 11, 1857, Stanley Mss. 920
DER (15) 46/1.
22Baring,3 Hansard, CXLVII:542-543 (July 27, 1857). See also Palmerston, 3
Hansard CXLVII:543-545 (July 27, 1857).
23National Library of Scotland, Denison to Ellice, August 6, 1857, Ellice Mss.
15012 fol. 5.
24Dallasto Cass. August 7, 1857, cit. G. M. Dallas Lettersfrom London Written
From the Years 1856-1860. (London,1870) I, 191.
25NationalLibrary of Scotland, Denison to Ellice, August 6, 1857, Ellice Mss.
15012 fol. 5.
26PRO,Granville to Canning, August 26, 1857, Granville Mss. PRO 30/29/21/2
fol. 2.
84
"[n]ot a single member of the Ministry in town; unless he had strayed in

for a few hours to or from scenes of social enjoyment."27Four weeks later
Parkes was still able to report that "[n]ot a Minister was in London."28
II
It was moral outrage that constrained the variety of possible political
responses in Britain to the news of the Indian Mutiny during 1857. The
outbreak of the Mutiny was never granted credence as a critical parliamentary issue. This was a direct result of political circumstance within
Westminster itself.
The general election of March 1857 had done little to stablize the
unsettled state of parliamentary parties that had existed since 1846.
Palmerston remained Prime Minister as temporary arbiter of a transient
accommodation of political aspiration. Palmerston's age (he celebrated
his 73rd birthday in October 1857) was recognized as sufficient to deny
permanence. Moreover, the results of the 1857 election were of sufficient
ambiguity so as to allow credibility to differing expectations and hopes.29
Palmerston's government welcomed the return of a majority of avowed
"Palmerstonians" but recognized that avowed loyalty concealed a diver27Dallasto Cass, September 14, 1857, cit. Dallas Lettersfrom London I, 201.
28NationalLibrary of Scotland, Parkes to Ellice, October20, 1857. Ellice Mss.
15042 fol. 80. By September 1857 the cabinet was beginning to be "assailed for
absenting themselves on grouse plains, stalking moors and watching places, at a
moment when the Empire was being shaken to its foundations."(Dallas to Cass.
September 14, 1857, cit. Letters from London I, 201.) Those outside the cabinet
noted and repeated Clarendon'scomplaints "of a want of energy and exertion."
(University of Nottingham Library,Aberdeento Newcastle, September15, 1857,
Newcastle Mss. NeC, 12, 450,) Russell observed that Palmerston "thoughtlittle
evidently of the danger."(PRO,Russell to Dean of Bristol, October1, 1857. Russell
Mss. 30/29/21/2fol. 29.) Dallas perceived"mucheffort and dexterity in preventing
really bad news from striking too suddenly uponthe publicmind."(Dallas to Cass,
October5, 1857, cit. Dallas Lettersfrom London I, 210.) The Cabinet's"puzzled"
rejoinderthat "the India business had not yet reached a stage at which anything
couldbe attributedto the fault of the Home Government"was soundingdistinctly
lame. (BL, Argyll to Aberdeen, September3, 1857, AberdeenMss. 43199 fol. 95.)
29Thegeneral election of 1857 has been conventionallyperceivedas a triumphant
'plebiscite'in supportof Palmerston'spremiership.The Annual Registerprovided
the first and most uncompromisingstatement of later orthodoxy:The Annual
Register for 1857 chapter IV, 84. See also P. Guedalla, Palmerston, pp. 391-92;
Monypennyand Buckle Disraeli IV, 74. and the narrative histories of Molesworth,
Paul and Walpole.Recent scholarship,however,has revealed such a view to be too
simple and often plain misleading. See John Vincent'scommentsuponthe election
in The Formation of the British Liberal Party 1857-1868 (London, 1966). Also, R.
W. Davis Political Change and Continuity, 1760-1885: A Buckinghamshire Study
(London, 1966). Also, R. W. Davis Political Change and Continuity, 1760-1885; A
Buckinghamshire Study (London, 1972); T. J. Nossiter Influence, Opinion and
Political Idioms in Reformed England (London, 1975). See also an important
unpublished LondonUniversity Ph.D. thesis, 1949, by J. K. Glynn "ThePrivate

Memberof Parliament, 1833 to 1868."Certainly the correspondenceand private
opinionsof parliamentariansrevealed a wide variety of differingviews and interpretations of the election results.
PARLIAMENTARY
PARTYALIGNMENT
85
sity of opinion and allegiance. The issue of parliamentary reform, in

particular, offered an immediate threat to the very fragile unanimity of
ministerial support.30
Lord John Russell, former Liberal Prime Minister and former party
leader, saw advantage for his own position in an imminent disruption of
the "Palmerstonian" backbenches.31 Around an issue of obvious Liberal
rectitude, such as parliamentary reform, a realignment of Whig, Liberal,
Peelite, and Radical party connection might, once again, focus upon the
leadership of Russell. By April 1857 Russell had decided to passively
await an inevitable dissolving of"Palmerstonian" party connection. This
would avoid the taint of collusion which might compromise his subsequent candidacy for prominence.32 Lord Derby, as leader of the Conservative opposition, saw Conservative opportunity in Whig-Liberal
differences. With "two rival [Liberal] chiefs in the field" opposition strategy appeared "obvious"; "to wait till both [Palmerston and Russell had]
committed themselves to some course."33
Thus emerged, between the political leaders of differing sections, a
consensual strategy of inaction. Palmerston favored inactivity as the
safeguard of "Palmerstonian" unity and the deferment of concern with
reform. Russell favored non-commitment and inactivity so as to allow
time to act as a catalyst for an imminent and favorable realignment of
party connection. Derby favored inactivity in the expectation of Liberal
division and Whig acquisitions to Conservative ranks. Watching and
waiting proffered a positive strategy in the expectation that others would
be forced to act. Those uncertain and insecure in their political positionPeelites such as Sir James Graham, Lord Aberdeen, and Gladstone or
Conservatives such as Disraeli-found themselves forced to acquiesce in a
consensual inactivity that sustained a variety of differing expectations
among the preeminent. Thus the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny did not
occasion a domestic political crisis because the politicians of influence
preferred calm.
An absence of political initiative, however, became an increasingly
difficult stance to maintain, particularly for a government that, in May
1857, had pledged itself to a Reform Bill the following year.34Because of
this pressure, Palmerston began to consider bringing forward the ques30PRO,Palmerston to Granville, March25, 1857. GranvilleMss. 30/29/19/22fol.
13. See also, Bell Palmerston II, 170.
31PRO,Clarkto Dean of Bristol, n.d. (April, 1857)Russell Mss., 30/22/13/Cfol. 19.
See also, University of Nottingham, Newcastle to Hayward,April 20, 1857, Newcastle Mss. NeC 12,369: PRO,Russell to Dean of Bristol,April 8, 1857. Russell Mss.
30/22/13/Cfol. 201.
32PRO,Russell to Dean of Bristol, n.d. (April, 1857) Russell Mss. 30/22/13/Cfol.
223. See also, National Libraryof Scotland,Russell to Ellice, April 7, 1857. Ellice
Mss. 15052 fol. 191:Dallas to Cass. April 7, 1857, cit. DallasLettersfromLondonI,
149.
33Bodleian Library, Derby to Disraeli, April 24, 1857, Hughenden Mss.
B/XX/S/148.
34Palmerston.3 Hansard CXLV:65-68 (May 7, 1857).
86
tion of India in such a way as to elicit support and defer division. During
October 1857 the Prime Minister tested Cabinet reaction to the immediate abolition of the East India Company and the establishment of a new
administrative system in India, thus concentrating political interest upon
administrative and constitutional amendment rather than military and
security difficulties. Granville discerned Palmerston's motives to be, first,
"to do something great which [might] distinguish his premiership", and
second "to have something that [would] act as a damper to reform."35
Clarendon, with what was dismissed as characteristic gloom, urgently
objected to the notion of proposing change in the government of India
before the insurrection had been suppressed.36 Palmerston, however,
became increasingly committed to the issue of reforming the government
of India as an alternative political concern to domestic reform.
Whigs, Liberals, and Radicals antagonistic to Palmerston's leadership
gave much consideration to parliamentary reform during the recess of
1857. Earl Grey published an essay on the subject.37The Radical M. P.
Roebuck (with Cobden absent from the Commons and Bright seriously ill)
sought to rally radical opinion under his own auspices.38Lord John Russell
privately devised various reform schemes, tested sources of potential
support, and remained insistent that Palmerston could not "swamp"
reform with the government of India question.39 Yet, even on the possibility of achieving a unity of opinion over changing the government of
India, those outside the ministry became sceptical. Russell, it was suggested, would "chuckle at his possible change out of the new rupee."40
Derby sensed the danger not only to Palmerston's support, but also to
Conservative unity. For that reason his son, Lord Stanley, feared "hasty
35PRO,Granville to Canning, October24,1857. GranvilleMss. 30/29/21/2fol. 41.
By bringing forward the Indian issue in the form of administrative reform Palmerston may also have been hoping to associate his governmentwith the moodof
post-Crimeanliberalism as revealed in the crisis of February 1855; a moodmuch
preoccupiedwith administrative reform.
36NationalRegister of Archives, Clarendonto Palmerston, September23, 1857,
BroadlandsMss. GC/CL1096: see also, Clarendonto Palmerston, September28,
1857. BroadlandsMss. GC/CL1099.
37Henry,2nd Earl Grey The Reformof Parliament (London,1858). Grey'sessay
was "not a plan, but rather an attempt to show what ought not to be done."PRO,
Grey to Russell, November 24, 1857. Russell Mss. 30/22/13/D fol. 262. See also,
University College London, Grey to Brougham, September 30, 1857. Brougham
Mss. 7084: Grey to Brougham, October22, 1857. Brougham Mss. 14566.
38BL,Morleyto Cobden,June 17, 1857. CobdenMss.43669 fol. 158. Fora reportof
a Radical meeting chaired by Roebucksee The Times November 18, 1857, p. 7.
39Towardsthis end Russell, in public meetings at Sheffield and Birmingham,
emphasizedthe need forparliamentaryreform.S. H. WalpoleTheLife ofLordJohn
Russell (London1889) II, p. 292 cites the commentof the Spectatorthat there was
"reviving interest" in Russell personally. "He finds himself still recognizedand
welcomed,and is evidently inspired with new life."See also, C. S. ParkerLife and
Lettersof Sir James Graham, 1792-1861 (London,1907) II, 313-320.
40NationalLibraryof Scotland,Parkes to Ellice, November28, 1857. Ellice Mss.
15042 fol. 94.
PARLIAMENTARY
PARTYALIGNMENT
87
legislation about India even more than apathy."4' Once again Disraeli
favored an initiative; but as before, Derby suffering from gout, preached
the merits of inaction.
A momentary scare prompted an emergency session of Parliament in
December 1857. The government front bench concentrated debate on the
commercial crisis while reform and the government of India were scarcely
touched upon. The brief session in December and the weeks before Parliament met again in February 1858 did reveal, however, that some
legislative initiative would be demanded from the government and that
any initiative would be received by an increasingly hostile Parliament.
The injudicious appointment of Lord Clanricarde as Lord Privy Seal in
December 1857 added to the ministry's unpopularity. Granville came to
"dread" the approaching session "as a great breaker up of parties and
making the future very difficult."42Cabinet apprehension was a sincere
acknowledgment of Russell's predicament: "waiting for an inheritance at
66 years of age is a sorry game."43
Those, such as the celebrated diarist Charles Greville, who interpreted
the parliamentary calm after May 1857 as testament to Palmerston's
political ascendancy neglected the acquiescence of "anti-Palmerstonian"
sentiment. By February 1858 such compliance had ended and the vulnerability of the government's position was to be ruthlessly exposed. During
January 1858 an increasing number of the Cabinet came to question the
wisdom of legislating upon the government of India, the particular bill
devised during the recess and, by implication, the adequacy of Palmerston's leadership.44 Indeed, Sir Richard Bethell as Attorney-General,
for whom "the Indian Bill [had] absorbed almost [his] whole time and
attention", came to regard the bill as "a suicidal measure."45Nevertheless,
Palmerston remained committed to the notion that by introducing the
India Bill at the beginning of the session, discussion of parliamentary
reform would be postponed until at least after Easter.
Vernon Smith's introduction of the "East India Loan Bill," on February
5, 1858 to raise monies to meet the expenses occasioned by the continuing
Mutiny, was only agreed upon after prolonged clause by clause debate.46
The government's motion on February 8, to move a vote of thanks to the
military and government officers in India for the energy and ability so far
4"BodleianLibrary, Stanley to Disraeli, October 10, 1857, Hughenden Mss.
B/XX/S/630.
42PRO,Granville to Canning, December23,1857. Granville Mss. 30/29/21/2 fol.
72. See also, PRO, Bessborough to Granville, December (1857). Granville Mss.
30/29/23/10 fol. 729.
Grahamto Cardwell,December13,1857. CardwellMss.30/48/8/47fol.39.
43PRO,
44BL,Greville Diary, February3, 1858. Greville Mss. 41122 cit. GrevilleMemoirs
VIII, 162. See also, Bodleian Library, Argyll to Clarendon,January 19, 1858,
ClarendonMss. C82 fol. 204: National Register of Archives, CornewallLewis to
Palmerston, January 2, 1858, BroadlandsMss. GC/LE109.
45BodleianLibrary,Bethell to Clarendon,January 29, 1858. ClarendonMss. C82
fol. 244.
46Seethe report of the debate in 3 Hansard CXLVIII:780-794 (Feb. 5, 1858).
88
shown in suppressing the insurrection, revealed further diversity of

opinion.47 On February 18, after two nights of Commons' debate, the
government's India Bill passed its second reading, despite Conservative
opposition, because of Russell's qualified and independent support. Russell's speech, however, obscured that which was left unsaid.48 After the
division Bethell, well aware of the perilous condition of the government
majority, advised Palmerston that, like a Roman Consul at a Triumph, he
should be attended by a slave to remind him that he was "a Minister
mortal."49The next evening the government's Conspiracy to Murder Bill,
opposed by Russell, Radicals, Peelites, and most Conservatives, was
defeated on its second reading and Palmerston immediately resigned.
Lord Grey, with characteristic indiscretion, reminded Russell of 1852,
"when Palmerston had tripped up Lord John's heels ... saying [Russell]
had now paid Palmerston off-a joke [Russell] by no means like[d].""0
Palmerston's resignation should not be accepted as dutiful compliance
with the verdict of what was, he insisted, a chance defeat. The adverse
vote came as a surprise to the government whips.51 At the close of the
debate Palmerston "lost his temper"52and "actually shook his fist at the
Manchester clique."53 The act of resignation, in such circumstances,
assumed the character of a deliberate attempt to embarrass the "accidental combination of parties" opposing the ministry.54 As Lady Palmerston
observed to her husband:55
The House has behaved so abominably that I am glad they should
find the difficulties of what they have done, and you go out on a
subject to which no blame attaches, merely a sham reason and an
excuse used by the crafty to catch the fools. In my belief I think
Derby will not be able to form a Government that will stand, and,
if they try a dissolution the cry will be Palmerston and no base
coalitions.
Derby confessed to the Queen his fear that "the resignation of the Palmerston Cabinet might only be for the purpose of going through a crisis in
47Seethe report of the debate in 3 Hansard CXLVIII:810-931. (Feb. 8, 1858).
48Russell,3 Hansard CXLVIII:1687-1696 (Feb. 18, 1858).
49NationalRegister of Archives, Palmerston Diary, February 18, 1858, Broadlands Mss. D/18.
50Universityof Durham, Grey Diary, February 20, 1858, Grey Mss. C3/20.
51BL,Greville Diary, February 20, 1858, Greville Mss. 41122 cit. Greville
MemoirsVIII, 167. See also, University of Durham,GreyDiary, February20, 1858.
Grey Mss. C3/20.
52Kent County Archives, Knatchbull-HugessenDiary, February 19, 1858, Braborne Mss. F. 29.
53Earlof MalmesburyMemoirsof an Ex-Minister:An Autobiography(London,
1884), II, 96.
54PrinceAlbert Memo, February 21, 1858, cit. Q.V.L. III, 337.
55LadyPalmerston to Palmerston, February21, 1858. cit. TreshamJ. Lever (ed)
The Letters of Lady Palmerston, London,(1957) pp. 352-3.
PARLIAMENTARY
PARTYALIGNMENT
89
order to come back again with new strength, for there existed different
kinds of resignations .. .56 If such expectations lay behind the unanimous
decision of Palmerston's cabinet to resign they were to be disappointed.57
III
The Conservative ministry formed by Lord Derby in February 1858 and
the general policies it immediately espoused were a conscious repudiation
of that which Whigs and Liberals held to be true. After 1846 "Liberals
regarded themselves in some degree as the heirs in fee simple of power."58
It had become a Whig truism, little contradicted by the experience of 1852,
that the Conservatives, shorn of Peelites, lacked the talent, experience,
and ability to form an effective government. Such a belief, accompanied by
a fear of the unrespectability of Radicalism, granted Whigs and Liberals a
common attitude of mind that purveyed a unity of purpose. This, in turn,
concealed the absence of common or coherent principle. The Conservative
government consciously sought to subvert and deny such attitudes of
mind. "[T]here can be no greater mistake," Derby informed the Lords,
"than to suppose that a Conservative Ministry necessarily means a
stationary ministry,"59 and he "relaxed the rigid character of his Conservative party by defining it as ready to introduce safe improvements of
every sort."60Disraeli taunted Whigs and Liberals with their pretence to
be the monopolists of all plans for the amelioration of society.61 Such
statements echoed Peel's "Tamworth Manifesto" of 1835 in their appeal to
the maintenance of order and good government. Their purpose, in 1858,
was the same: to identify the Conservative party as the source of efficient
and "safe" government rather than reactionary prejudice, and intelligent
"moderation" rather than atavistic bigotry.62
56PrinceAlbert Memo, February 21, 1858. cit. Q.V.L. III, p. 337.
57NationalRegister of Archives, Palmerston Diary, February 20, 1858, Broadlands Mss. D/18.
58Count Vitzhum St. Petersburg and London in the years 1852 to 1864: the
Reminiscencesof Count CharlesFrederickVitzhumvon Eckstaedt(London,1887)

Trans. E. F. Taylor, ed. H. Reeve. I, 235.
59Derby,3. Hansard CXLIX:41 (March 1, 1858).
60Dallasto Cass, March 5, 1858, cit. Lettersfrom London I, 262.
61Disraeli,3 Hansard CXLIX:198 (March 15, 1858).
62LordDerby's leadership of the Conservative party and his second minority
ministry, 1858-59, warrant historiographicalconsideration.During and after his
lifetime Derby was ill served for posterity by hostile contemporariessuch as
Greville (BL., Greville Diary, March 20, 1858, Greville Mss. 41123 cit. Greville
MemoirsVIII. p. 182), excluded subordinatessuch as LordHenry Lennox (Bodleian, Lennoxto Disraeli, January 7, 1857, HughendenMss. B/XX/LX/86)and Tory
historians creating a Beaconsfield tradition such as T. E. Kebbel, A History of
Toryism(London,1886) chap. VII, 332). W. D. Jones in his study LordDerbyand
Victorial Conservatism,(Oxford, 1956), used a number of Mss. collections other
than Derby's own. After the mid-1840s Jones creates a portrait of Derby as an
uninteresting politician uninterested in politics. This was the view of Knowsley
fromHughendenwith seclusion compoundingseclusion.Jones'sdull portrayalwas
affirmedby J. B. Conacher's"Party Politics in the Age of Palmerston"in 1859:
90
Palmerston's resignation seemed to promise that realignment of party

connection expected in differing forms by various politicians. Derby, as
Prime Minister, envisaged Whig-Liberal disarray and the establishment
of the Conservative party on a wider basis with acquisitions from "Palmerstonian" opinion.63 Indeed, courted by the centrist rhetoric the Conservative government espoused, Palmerston and a number of Peelites and
Whigs such as Clarendon, Newcastle, Argyll or Lord Grey were credible
candidates for adhesion. Derby, in February 1858, unsuccessfully invited
the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Grey, and Gladstone into the government: an
attempt to induce "a new division of parties, with the old-fashioned Whigs
... or at all events the moderate Liberals on one side, and the Radicals on
the other."64
The differing realignment of Whig, Liberal, and Radical connection
envisaged by Palmerston and Russell emphasized differences in timing.
Palmerston favored an immediate offensive against the new government
before his credibility as a focus for centrist allegiance became dissipated
by opposition disorder and Conservative policy.65 Russell favored the
toleration of a short-lived Conservative government that would allow
time for the realignment of Whig, Liberal, Peelite, and Radical connection
under his own auspices. Though he saw no immediate prospect of a union
of the Liberal Party Russell predicted in six months "a union of the Liberal
party which [would] be a foundation for the future."66In the meantime
Russell intended to "keep below the gangway that [he might] not appear
Entering an Age of Crisis (London,1959) Appleman, Maddenand Wolff (eds.), p.
166. More recent scholarship has confirmed those fewer, but better informed,
contemporary sources that reveal Derby to be an astute and committed, if
ultimately skeptical, player of the political game. Even when he felt the "gamewas
lost"he remaineddeterminedthat "it ought to be played and that he wouldplay it
out to the last."(LiverpoolCity RecordOffice, Stanley Diary, December28, 1852,
Stanley Mss. 43/2). See Lytton Memo, n.d. (?1869)HertfordshireCounty Record
Office,LyttonMss. c. 13 fol. 21:W. PollardThe StanleysofKnowsley(London,1868)
p. 177: Malmesbury Memoirs of an Ex-Minister, p. 33 and p. 360: see also the
authoritative insight of Derby'sson, LordStanley, in Vincent, Disraeli, Derbyand
the ConservativeParty. In essence detractorsfailed to appreciatethe very positive
and creative advantages Derby often perceivedin inaction. Derby'ssecondministry is also often dismissed. But such retrospectivewisdomis to distortthe variety of
expectations entertained in 1858. Professor Gash, in Solon January, 1970,
observed that despite differing myths, the Conservatives in power have "almost
invariably been Peelite" in practice. Derby'ssecondministry was not only Peelite
in practice,but Peelite in rhetorictoo. This was a strong pose to adoptin the face of
Palmerston'srapid demise and Russell's re-emergence.See LordButler (ed.), The
Conservatives:A History from their Origins to 1965 (London,1977). Best of all are
Robert Stewart The Foundation of the ConservativeParty 1830-1867 (London,
1978) and, once again, Vincent, Disraeli, Derby and the ConservativeParty.
63Dallasto Cass, March 26, 1858, cit. Dallas Lettersfrom London II, 7.
64Universityof Durham, Grey Diary, February 22, 1858, Grey Mss. C3/20.
65BL,Greville Diary, March6, 1858, Greville Mss. 41122, cit. GrevilleMemoirs
VIII, 177.
66PRO,Russell to Dean of Bristol, February 23, 1858, Russell Mss. PRO
30/22/13/E fol. 238.
PARLIAMENTARY PARTY ALIGNMENT
91
to compete for the load with Palmerston" while contemplating the "fretful
existence" of Derby's ministry.67 Palmerston sensed the imperative need
for immediate action. Russell perceived contingent opportunity in
deferred activity. These divergent strategies determined the disrupted
nature of Whig, Liberal, and Radical opposition to Derby's fabian and
centrist Conservatism.
The issue of reforming Indian government, left in legislative limbo by
Palmerston's resignation, was the first major executive challenge to the
new Conservative cabinet and their first opportunity to translate "moderate" rhetoric into "responsible" legislative detail. The bill the government proposed revealed the extent to which they were willing to
substantiate rhetorical assertion. It also bore the marks of its author, the
new President of the Board of Control, Lord Ellenborough. Ellenborough
had an air of enlightened opinion and administrative efficiency marred by
a putative weakness ofjudgment.68 The scheme he proposed abolished the
existing system of "double government," and substituted a Minister of the
Crown occupying the rank of a Secretary of State and serving as President
of a Council of India made up of eighteen members. The composition of the
Council and the introduction of the elective principle into the nomination
of this executive characterized Ellenborough's design. Half the Council
were to be appointed by the Crown with the moiety elected. Originally
Ellenborough intended to grant three elected members to large cities in
India, but, upon Lord Stanley's advice, five members were granted to
urban constituencies in Britain.69 The remaining four elected members
were to be chosen by a constituency formed from those resident in India for
at least ten years as either members of the Civil Service or as proprietors
of at least ?2,000 of stock: a constituency estimated at about 5,000
persons.
An enlarged council of eighteen with nine of its members elected-and
little relation to
five of those by popular urban constituencies-bore
Incredulous surof
a
Conservative
scheme.
parliamentary expectation
prise typified reaction when Disraeli introduced the bill into the Commons on March 26, 1858.70Bright, neither wanting to revive Palmerston's
India Bill nor Palmerston's prestige, urged the government to reconsider
their measure and, in private observed that the bill resembled
Ellenborough: "all action and no go."7 Roebuck decried the bill as "a
67PRO,Russell to Dean of Bristol, 26 February 1858, Russell Mss. PRO
30/22/13/E fol. 238.
68Oftenself-willed, vehement and impatient of checks and contradictions(see
footnote19 above)Ellenboroughmaintained a strong convictionin his own opinion
that renderedhim either an unmanageable colleague or valuable ally.
69Carnavon
Memo. 1858, cit. Sir A. HardingeLife ofH.E.M.Herbert,FourthEarl
of Carnavon 1831-1890 (London, 1925) I, 115. See also, PRO, Ellenboroughto
Derby, March 29, 1858. EllenboroughMss. 30/12/9/ fol. 1891.
7Disraeli, 3 Hansard CXLIX:818-833 (March26, 1858).
7Bright, 3 Hansard CXLIX:843-845 (March26, 1858). BL, Bright to Cobden,
March 31, 1858. Bright Mss. 43384 fol. 121.
92
sham."72Despite Ellenborough's belief that the bill would be "a great

success" Greville noted that it was received "with general aversion and
contempt."73The government discovered that the translation of rhetorical
assertion into credible legislation was a difficult process in the face of
opposition hostility and disquiet among their own back benches. That
same evening the Commons adjourned for the Easter recess.
Palmerston saw in the government's India Bill the cause he required for
an immediate attack upon the ministry. "Pam [was] both willing and
anxious to turn [the government] out immediately. This [was] of course
his best, if not only, chance of a return to office."74On the morning of
March 29 a meeting was held at Cambridge House attended by Palmerston, Lansdowne, Clarendon, Cornewall Lewis, Labouchere, Granville, and Vernon Smith. Most declared themselves ready to oppose the
bill vehemently with Granville, Lansdowne, and Labouchere appearing
to be rather more "timid."75Russell's exact intentions were crucial to the
securing of a majority opposed to the second reading of the bill. Cornewall
Lewis was therefore authorized to communicate with Pembroke Lodge.
Russell, however, continued to perceive patience as the best safeguard of
his own future prospects. Lord Aberdeen, Newcastle, Graham, and Gladstone advised against hastily destroying the Conservative Bill and thus
reviving Palmerston's scheme and its author.76At a party on the evening
of March 31 held for the purpose of bringing Russell and Palmerston
together, Russell made it clear that he was "[flearful of turning the
government out if he succeeded in throwing out their India Bill." Palmerston ruefully observed that Russell "was not so squeamish when we
were in."7
The critical reception given to their India Bill drew a practical moral to
the attention of the government. "It would be damaging to the government to withdraw or change their Bill, but it would be fatal to the
government and to the party to run the risk of its rejection by the House."78
Agreeing with Derby that the five popularly elected members of the
Council formed the weakest part of the bill, Ellenborough reduced their
number to two.79Derby also opened private communication with Radical
72Roebuck,3 Hansard CXLIX:842-843 (March26, 1858).
73BL,Greville Diary, March30, 1858, Greville Mss. 41123, cit. GrevilleMemoirs
VIII, 185.
74Universityof Nottingham Library, Newcastle to Hayward, April 3, 1858,
Newcastle Mss. NeC 12, 372.
75NationalRegister of Archives, Palmerston Diary, March30, 1858, Broadlands
Mss. D/18.
76BL,Aberdeento Russell, March 30, 1858, Newcastle Mss. 43192 fol. 207. See
also, University of Nottingham, Newcastle to Hayward,April 3, 1858, Newcastle
Mss. NeC 12,372; B.L. Russell to Aberdeen,April 1, 1858,AberdeenMss.43068 fol.
293.
77NationalRegister of Archives, Palmerston Diary, March31, 1858. Broadlands
Mss. D/18.
78Bodleian,Earle to Disraeli, March 28, 1858, Hughenden Mss. B/XX/E/34A.

79PRO,Ellenboroughto Derby, March 29, 1858. EllenboroughMss. 31/12/9 fol.
1891.
93
opinion, using Bulwer-Lytton as an intermediary.80 Radicals such as

Milner Gibson, the government discovered, felt unable to support the
Conservative scheme but at the same time objected to the notion that they
should be "made use of to give Palmerston a political triumph over
Derby-perhaps even to restore the former to office."81Bulwer-Lytton's
communication of the government's readiness to modify and change their
scheme, Milner Gibson assured Bright, would "extricate [the Radicals]
from the Palmerston danger."82
On April 3 Milner Gibson informed Russell that the Radicals "would
like to be invited to a course which would avoid any sanction to Lord
Derby's Bill, preserve them from a Palmerston restoration, and offer a fair
chance of a good Bill for India."83Disraeli subsesquently received from
"the Independent Liberal Party" a clandestine suggestion that, in order to
prevent the defeat of the government, "some person of commanding
position" move a series of resolutions as to the opinion of the Commons
over the principles of a satisfactory India Bill.84 Disraeli believed Russell
was both the prominent person referred to and the anonymous source of
the suggestion. On April 5, in a speech at the Mansion House dinner,
Derby announced his Cabinet's readiness to modify the proposed Indian
scheme and a wish to raise the question of Indian government above "the
sport of political parties or the battlefield of rival disputants."85The speech
was a public invitation to cross-bench compromise, and offered an opportunity to Russell to assume a nonpartisan prominence.
When Parliament reassembled on April 12, 1858 what had emerged as
the plan of conciliation, with Stanley negotiating directly with Russell,86
was acted out. Disraeli briefly opened the debate proposing the second
reading of the government's India Bill.87 Immediately after Disraeli had
finished speaking Russell suggested the withdrawal of all earlier schemes
and that resolutions, as a basis for an India Bill, be discussed in a
Committee of the Whole House.88 It was desirable, Russell maintained,
that the question be discussed without raising a party debate. As Disraeli
reported, Russell, "wishing to defeat the prospects of Lord Palmerston"
and hoping "himself to occupy a great mediatory position," announced his
intention "to propose the mezzotermine of Resolutions."89
80Bodleian, Bulwer-Lytton to Derby, March 3, 1858, Hughenden Mss.
B/XX/S/166A.
81BL,Milner Gibson to Bright, April 1, 1858, Bright Mss. 43388 fol. 75.
82BL,Milner Gibson to Bright, April 4, 1858, Bright Mss. 43388 fol. 77.
83PRO,Milner Gibsonto Russell, April 3, 1858, Russell Mss. 30/22//13/Ffol. 13.
84Disraelito Derby, n.d. (April4, 1858) DerbyMss. 145/5, in the possessionof the
Earl of Derby, Knowsley, Prescot.
85Derbyat the Mansion House, April 6, 1858, The Times. See also, PRO,
Ellenboroughto Derby, March 29, 1858. EllenboroughMss. 30/12/19 fol. 1891.
86Bodleian,Stanley to Disraeli, n.d. (April?, 1858),HughendenMss.B/XX/S/662.
87Disraeli,3 Hansard CXLIX:857. (April 12, 1858).
88Russell,3 Hansard CXLIX:858-861. (April 12, 1858).
89Disraelito the Queen, April 12, 1858, Q.V.L. III 354.
94
Disraeli swiftly accepted Russell's proposal, but Wood, from the "Palmerstonian" benches, denied Russell the full fruits of victory. Wood
expressed himself astonished that a subject of such importance should be
left in the hands of a private member and perceived it as an abdication of
its duties by the government.90 Disraeli saw Wood's speech as an attempt
"to deprive Lord John of the mediatory position" and, despite Russell
being "greatly mortified," Disraeli found himself able to accept responsibility for the proposal without grounds for the charge of"arrogance and
intrusion" into Russell's personal initiative.91 With a copy of the resolutions already privately received from Russell, Disraeli agreed to move
the resolutions from the Treasury Bench.92 Bipartisan compromise suddenly assumed the appearance of Conservative rather than Russellite
enterprise and, though denying Palmerston prominence, Russell also
found himself denied the opportunity to advertise his own statesmanship.
It was only left to Palmerston to jeer that Disraeli "like Anthony came to
bury his bill and not to praise it," while it appeared that Disraeli had been
"assisting at a sort of Irish Wake."93
Between April 12 and 28, 1858 the Cabinet decided upon the precise
form and wording of the resolutions that might stand as proof of the
"perserverance of [their] intentions once announced."94 Subsequent
debate of the resolutions in Parliament revealed that the "Liberal party in
the Commons resemble[d] a pack of hounds in full cry when the huntsmen
and the whipper-in [had] been thrown at a fence or immersed in jumping a
wide brook."95Indeed, further discussion only served "to strengthen the
roots of dissension among the Liberals."9 What was apparent was that
"the breach between [Russell] and the Palmerstonian Whigs [was] much
widened, and [had] become more difficult to heal."97Russell conjectured
that "[flifty lies, 300 invectives and 900 lashes from The Times" would be
"ordered as a fit punishment" for his apostasy.98 What Russell did ensure
was that during discussions he be seen to play the part of"umpire," rather
than becoming "a party in the suite," it being prudent not unnecessarily
"Wood,3 Hansard CXLIX:864-866 (April 12, 1858).

9lDisraelito the Queen, April 12, 1858. Q.V.L. III 354.
92Disraeli,3 Hansard CXLIX:873 (April 12, 1858).
93Palmerston,3 Hansard CXLIX:871-873 (April 12, 1858).
94Bodleian,Derby to Disraeli, April 30, 1858, Hughenden Mss. B/XX/S/171.
95UniversityCollege London,Parkes to Brougham,May 3, 1858, BroughamMss.
20080.
96Dallasto Cass, May 7, 1858, cit. Letters from London, II, 17. See also, Palmerston, 3 Hansard CXLIX 1673-1680 (April 26, 1858); Russell, 3 Hansard
CXLIX: 1673-1680 (April 26, 1858); Russell, 3 Hansard CXLIX: 1695-1701;
Horsman, 3. Hansard CXLIX: 1710-1713 (April 26, 1858); Vane, 3 Hansard
CXLIX:2016-2023 (April 30, 1858); Palmerston, 3 Hansard CXLIX:2038-2041
(April 30, 1858).
97BL,Greville Diary, April 16, 1858, Greville Mss. 41123, cit. GrevilleMemoirs
VIII, 189.
98PRO,Russell to Dean of Bristol, April 28, 1858, Russell Mss. 30/22/13/Ffol. 62.
PARTYALIGNMENT
PARLIAMENTARY
95
"to show [his] hand and to lay [his] cards on the table."99The essential
political truth was this: "though party objects [were] universlly disclaimed, yet in reality it [was] a struggle for power."'00
IV
Cabinet strategy was to emphasize opposition division through Treasury Bench concession. Disarray might, in turn, throw loosened talent
and votes into the ministerial orbit. This created the intended impression
that "a positive conflict upon a cabinet question" would be "hard to bring
about."''? The limits to such concession, however, existed in executive,
rather than legislative, decision. On April 12, Lord Ellenborough received
from Lord Canning the draft of a proclamation to the People of Oudh that,
with certain exceptions, "the proprietry right in the soil of the province
[was] confiscated to the British government."'02Canning, however, as yet
unaware of the change of ministry, sent the explanatory letter accompanying the draft to Vernon Smith in the belief that he was still the
responsible minister. Vernon Smith, consistent with earlier behavior,103
failed to forward this vital letter to Ellenborough. Ellenborough thus
received the apparently punitive draft with an incomplete understanding
of its purpose and character.
Ellenborough's reaction to the proclamation was as severe as his literal
understanding of its intent. Arguing that threatening the disinheritance
of a people would create almost insurmountable difficulties in reestablishing peace in India, Ellenborough forcefully rebuked Canning for
castigating, "with what they [would] feel as the severest punishment, the
mass of the inhabitants of the country."'04The rebuke was sharp, severe
and, in retrospect, might be seen as heavy handed. On April 17, the day
after the Cabinet had discussed the matter, Derby approved Ellenborough's
reply "saying 'it was very proper and not too strong for the occasion."'0"
Disraeli, Sir John Pakington and Lord John Manners also individually
endorsed the reply, but pressure of business prevented Ellenborough submitting it to the whole Cabinet on April 24: nor was the despatch submitted
for the approval of the Queen. Misjudgment compounded procedural oversight when Ellenborough sent, in anticipation of approval, copies of his
despatch to Lord Granville and John Bright. At once publication became
inevitable and the whole episode was exposed to hostile political scrutiny.106
99PRO,Graham to Russell, April 25, 1858, Russell Mss. 30/22/13/F fol. 58.
"1Ibid.
?'Dallas to Cass, April 30, 1858, cit. Lettersfrom London II, 15.
02The draft of the proclamationwas printed in The Times, May 6, 1858.
I03PRO, Granville to Ellenborough, February 23, 1858, Ellenborough Mss.
30/12/9 fol. 276.
04Ellenborough's dispatch to Canning was printed in The Times, May 8, 1858.
to Derby,May 13, 1858, cit. Monypennyand BuckleDisraeli, IV,
"05Ellenborough
141.
06SeeMonypennyand BuckleDisraeli IV, 141-143: W. D. Jones LordDerbyand
VictorianConservatismchap. IX, pp. 234-235. See also, The Queen to Derby,May
9, 1858, cit. Q.V.L. III, p. 358.
96
Ellenborough's severe, if partially uninformed, despatch provided the

opposition with an opportunity for "positive conflict." The elemental roles
chracteristic of moral polemic were eagerly and easily cast. Canning
emerged as an abused martyr to ministerial folly and Ellenborough stood
as the personification of Conservative ineptitude. Enmity and rectitude
were further inflamed when, in early May, different versions of
Ellenborough's despatch were put before each House.107The City and the
Directors of the East India Company went into "a state of frenzy" and
"[a]ll the Government people," Granville noted with satisfaction, "say it is
a very bad case."'08At a meeting in Cambridge House on May 9 Palmerston and Granville decided to move a motion attacking the government's treatment of Canning which, on Granville's suggestion, was given
to two "independent" members: Cardwell in the Commons and Shaftesbury in the Lords.'09 The limited terms of the motion revealed the
desired focus of the debate. No reference was made to the character of
Canning's proclamation; no comment was passed on Canning's policy of
confiscation; no allusion was made to Vernon Smith's withholding of
information received from Canning. What might be conveniently avoided
in the composed form of a written motion, however, was little safeguard
against the unpredictable course of a parliamentary debate.
Of more immediate significance was the timing of the occasion for
"positive conflict." The ten weeks that the Conservatives had been in
power was sufficiently short a time for Palmerston to believe he was
acting before his prestige and authority were irretrievably dissipated by
severance from office and internal division."0 It was, however, sufficiently
long a time for Russell to believe that it was an opportunity to assert his
studiedly high-minded and uncompromised preeminence over a leaderless and demoralized opposition."' Such contingent ambiguity tolerated
those contrary and incompatible intentions that came to underlay ostensibly concerted opposition maneuver. Covert differences were implied in
Lord Henry Lennox's report to Disraeli, on May 1, that "no arrangement
had been entered into by Palmerston and John Russell except their simple
vote for Cardwell.""' Russell was subsequently "irritated" by Bright's
suggestion, in the Commons, that "a renewed political alliance" existed
between Palmerston and Russell and was only dissuaded from making a
public denial by it being pointed out "that it would be very far from being
for his interest to do so.""3
Debate of Shaftesbury's motion in the Lords, on May 10, focused on
Ellenborough's putative misjudgment and Vernon Smith's laxity. On May
11 Ellenborough announced his personal responsibility for the whole
'0MalmesburyMemoirs,May 8, 1858. II, p. 11.7.
108PRO, Granville to Canning, May 10, 1858, Granville Mss. 30/29/21/2 fol. 118.
0lgIbid.
"?SeeBell Palmerston II, 187-188.
"'See John Prest Lord John Russell (London,1972), p. 382.
"2Bodleian,Lennox to Disraeli, May 1, 1858, Hughenden Mss. B/XX/LX/109.
"3Universityof Durham, Grey Diary, May 24, 1858, Grey Mss. C3/21.
PARTYALIGNMENT
PARLIAMENTARY
97
episode and his resignation from the government in the hope, as Derby
informed the Queen, that an act of self-sacrifice might prevent debate of
Cardwell's motion in the Commons.14 On Lord Grey's insistence Shaftesbury persevered in his motion which, in the event, was defeated on May
14 by a majority of nine.15 In the Commons, though some ministers
affected "to regard the self-immolation of Ellenborough as an adequate
atonement," the government's "great hope . .. seemed to be the extreme
difficulty, if not impossibility, of combining a sufficient number of Radical
votes with the Whigs.""6 Derby also came to appreciate the deterrent
effect of"a march to the last Tory pitched battle," a dissolution which, only
twelve months after the previous election, was calculated to excite pecuniary and local anxieties among many Whig and Liberal back benchers
uncertain of re-election and anxious to avoid the expense of the
hustings."7
On May 11 Derby enquired whether, in the event of a government
defeat in the Commons, the Queen would grant a dissolution. Lord
Aberdeen, to whom the Queen turned for advice, provided a portrayal of
affairs that revealed much about Peelite intentions. If Derby went, Aberdeen asserted, Palmerston would have to be recalled."8 Aware of the
Crown's dislike for Palmerston Aberdeen ignored his own hope, a RussellPeelite collaboration appeasing Radical sentiment, because he believed
an immediate government defeat too precipitant for the realization of that
hope. Derby's immediate survival was, in Aberdeen's mind, Russell's
future opportunity.
Despite Ellenborough's resignation, Palmerston retained a determination to persevere with Cardwell's motion. But "a numerous and
noisy""9 meeting of the opposition at Cambridge House, on May 14,
revealed to Palmerston that if he returned to the premiership his ministry
would have to be on "a broader basis, and more liberal measures should be
adopted" than before.'20Such realization was also an acknowledgment of
Russell's future opportunity in being able to coalesce a broader basis of
support, and advocate more liberal measures with greater credibility,
than Palmerston.
"4Derbyto The Queen, May 10, 1858, Derby Mss. 184/1 fol. 151. See also,
Ellenboroughto The Queen, May 10, 1858, cit. Q.V.L. III, 358.
"University of Durham, Grey Diary, May 13, 1858, Grey Mss. C3/21.
"6Dallas to Cass, May 14, 1858, cit. Lettersfrom London II, 20.
"'See LordE. FitzmauriceTheLife of SecondEarl GranvilleK. G. (London,1905)
I, 308-9.
"'PRO,Granville to Canning, May 17, 1858. Granville Mss. 30/29/21/2fol. 124.
See also, Prince Albert Memo. May 11, 1858, cit. Q.V.L. III, 359-60. For a discussion of Prince Albert's position see C. H. Stuart "The Prince Consort and
Ministerial Politics, 1856-90, in Hugh R. Trevor-Ropered. Essays in British
Historypresented to Sir Keith Feiling (London,1964) pp. 247-70.
"9SomersetCounty RecordOffice, Fortescue Diary, May 14, 1858. Carlingford
Mss. DD/SH 358.
'"2NationalRegister of Archives, Palmerston Diary, May 14, 1858, Broadlands
Mss. D/18.
98
The effectiveness of government speeches, especially from Sir Hugh

Cairns, and divergent opinion expressed from the opposition benches
began to further compromise Palmerston's position. Observing this, after
the first night of debate on May 14, Disraeli decided to prolong the debate
until May 21:121"everyday [the government's] prospects as to the division
appeared to be mending and public opinion more and more inclining
against the Opposition and the Proclamation, though still blaming
Ellenborough's letter."22 Finally, on May 16, after her consultation with
Aberdeen, the Queen informed Derby that a dissolution would be granted
to him if he asked for it.123The discreet dissemination of this assurance
further undermined the cohesion of "Palmerstonian" purpose.
The second and third nights of debate on May 17 and 20 betrayed
increasing opposition dissension. The Radical Roebuck delivered "a violent speech against Cardwell and the Whig party."124Bright, deriding
Cardwell's motion as a party maneuver, poured bitterness and sarcasm
upon the "arcana" of the "Palmerstonian" Whigs.125Cornewall Lewis'
defence of the motion126was, in turn, countered from the benches behind
him by Sir Arthur Elton who believed Ellenborough's despatch, though
deficient in courtesy, was "substantially right."127Graham's statement,
which had "very great effect,"'28provided confirmation of"some solvent at
work that [was] rapidly disintegrating the Opposition."12 It also confirmed the growing agreement among those sympathetic to Russell that
Derby's defeat would be synonymous with Palmerston's success. Graham
prefaced his speech with a declaration of attachment to the notions of
Liberalism as evinced by Russell. It was, Fortescue shrewdly noted,
Graham's "hatred of Palmerston" that "decided his course.""' On behalf of
the Peelites (with the exception of Herbert13")Graham declared Canning's
proclamation "impolitic" and Ellenborough's reply merely indiscreet.l32
Graham's statement was complemented by the arrival, that same day, of
further mail from India revealing that Sir James Outram, Chief Commissioner of Oudh, had expressed a decided disapprobation of Canning's
proclamation. Derby immediately authorized the new despatches to be
'21Disraelito Derby, May 16, 1858, Derby Mss. 145/5.
122BL,Greville Diary, May 23, 1858. Greville Mss. 41123, cit. GrevilleMemoirs
VIII p. 200.
'23PhippsMemo. n.d. (May 15, 1858) cit. Q.V.L. III, 363-366. See also, Prince
Albert Memo. May 16, 1858, cit. Q.V.L. III, 367-368.
'24BL,Broughton Diary, May 18, 1858, BroughtonMss. 43761 fol. 84.
"2Bright,3 Hansard CL: 959 (May 20, 1858).
126CornewallLewis, 3 Hansard CL: 831-840. (May 17, 1858).
'27Elton, 3 Hansard CL: 974-976 (May 20, 1858).
128Disraeli to The Queen, May 21, 1858, cit. Q.V.L. III, 368-369.
'29W.White The Inner Life of the House of Commons (London, 1897) ed. J.
McCarthy,I, 73.
"30Somerset
County RecordOffice, Fortescue Diary, May 20, 1858, Carlingford
Mss. DD/SH 358.
31BL,Herbert to Gladstone, May 17, 1858, Gladstone Mss. 44211 fol. 10.
32Graham,3 Hansard CL: 985-1003 (May 20, 1858).
PARLIAMENTARY
PARTYALIGNMENT
99
laid before the Commons133which, he believed, "exercised a powerful

influence" on the opinion of the House.'34
On the morning of May 21 Disraeli received a letter from Cardwell
requesting permission to withdraw his motion.'13 Disraeli refused the
request: the opposition's abandonment of the motion would have to be
public, protracted, and self-avowed. At a meeting on the morning of the
21st attended by Palmerston, Wood, George Grey, Cornewall Lewis, and
Russell it was decided to continue with the motion unless "the temper of
the House [was] against doing so."'36What "Palmerstonians" feared was
the "particularly mortifying" spectacle of Palmerston involved in "inevitable defeat, and without the power of rallying a second time."'37The
course of debate on the evening of May 21 realized exactly those fears and
Disraeli's wish to maximize opposition embarrassment. During the evening a steady succession of opposition back benchers pressed Cardwell to
withdraw his motion. Finally, as "the whole of the Opposition benches
became one great dissolving view of anarchy,"'3 Palmerston asked Cardwell to withdraw the motionl39 and Cardwell agreed to do so.140
The withdrawal of Cardwell's motion was a watershed for the Derby
ministry: the "affair [had] been the battle of Marengo of political
warfare."'14 Gathorne Hardy rejoiced that the opposition "bubble [had
been] burst."'42Disraeli excitedly reported that when "the very heat of the
battle was to rage, the enemy suddenly fled in a manner the most
ignominous! Never was such a rout!"'43Derby found the debate analogous
to "the explosion of a well constructed mine under the feet, not of the
assailed, but of the assailants."'44 Nor was this merely the selfcongratulation of the victors. Broughton, attending a party at Cambridge
House on May 22, found it "pretty well attended, but very different from
the gay happy circle of a week before."'45Knatchbull-Hugessen saw the
withdrawal of Cardwell's motion as "a great triumph to [the] Ministers
33Derbyto Jolliffe, May 20, 1858, Derby Mss. 184/1 fol. 158.
'34Derbyto The Queen, May 21, 1858, Derby Mss. 184/1 fol. 159.
135 BL, Greville Diary, May 23, 1858, Greville Mss. 41123, cit. GrevilleMemoirs
VIII 201.
'36NationalRegister of Archives, Palmerston Diary, May 21, 1858, Broadlands
Mss. D/18.
'37BL,Greville Diary, May 23, 1858, Greville Mss. 41123, cit. GrevilleMemoirs
VIII 201.
138Disraeli at Slough, The Times, May 27, 1858.
39Palmerston,3 Hansard CL: 1040-1042 (May 21, 1858).

3 Hansard 3rd CL: 1042 (May 21, 1858).
406Cardwell,
'4'BL,Greville Diary, May 23, 1858, Greville Mss. 41123, cit. GrevilleMemoirs
VIII 201.
142EastSuffolk RecordOffice, GathorneHardy Diary, May 24, 1858, Cranbrook
Mss. T501/291 fol. 142.
'43Disraelito Mrs. Brydges Willyams, May 22, 1858, cit. Monypennyand Buckle
Disraeli IV, 149.
44Derbyto The Queen, May 23, 1858, Derby Mss. 184/1 fol. 165.
'45BL,Broughton Diary, May 22, 1858, Broughton Mss. 43761 fol. 86.
100
[which] strengthened their position for a time."'46Palmerston himself,

without qualification, recognized the debate as "a great triumph for [the]
Government."147Lord Grey found among the members of Brooks "a general feeling that the party had received a most mortifying defeat, and that
the business had been deplorably managed."s48Graham predicted that
"the faction fight," which had "ended in a farce," would "carry Derby over
the session if [the premier made] no great mistakes. At all events the
danger of [Derby] being trodden down by his own 'wild elephant' [was] at
an end; and Johnny [would] think twice, if he ever [thought] twice, before
he embark[ed] on a second Cambridge House foray."'49
V
Parliament's concern with the question of India during 1857 and 1858
revealed many of the underlying tensions, antagonisms, and aspirations
shaping party politics during the 1850s. It also revealed what many
expected to happen, what nearly did happen, but what in the event did not
occur."50First, it revealed the conscious and earnest attempt by the
Conservative party, under the leadership of Derby, to establish itself as a
credible, moderate, and responsible party of good government: Derby
sought to achieve in the 1850s what Peel had achieved in the 1830s. After
the failure of Cardwell's censure "the Government floated on top of the
wave. [They] suddenly found [them]selves in the confidence apparently of
the country, the newspapers, and the House of Commons, where [they]
hardly ever" during the rest of the session "met with defeat."'51The
resumption of the Indian debate in June provided further demonstration
of Conservative ascendancy and Whig-Liberal differences so that, by July,
Lord Lyndhurst observed the "Tories [were] getting on admirably" with
"nothing to oppose them, and majorities in every division."'52
Disraeli pronounced that "seldom [had there] been [a session] in which a
greater number of excellent measures [had] been passed than the present."'3 As well as a new India Act the Conservative government safe146KentCountyArchives, KnatchbullHugessen Diary, July 30, 1858, Brabourne
Mss. U951, F. 29.
147NationalRegister of Archives, Palmerston Diary, May 21, 1858, Broadlands
Mss. D/18.
'48Universityof Durham, Grey Diary, May 20, 1858, Grey Mss. C3/21.
Graham to Aberdeen, May 28, 1858, Aberdeen Mss. 43192 fol. 218.
149BL,
"50Ithas often been an assumption underlying received narrative that Derby's
second ministry, because it was in a minority, was inevitably destined to a shortlived existence and that the consequentLiberalconsolidationthat occurredin 1859
was thus a natural outcomeof party feeling. This is to ignore much contemporary
speculation. Palmerston'sascendancyby the summer of 1859 was neither certain
nor necessary.
"'CarnarvonMemo. 1858, cit. Hardinge CarnarvonI, 115.
152UniversityCollege, London, Lyndhurst to Brougham, July 23 (1858) Brougham Mss. 13317.
'53Disraelito Mrs. Brydges Willyams, July 26, 1858, cit. Monypennyand Buckle
Disraeli IV, 168.
PARLIAMENTARY
PARTYALIGNMENT
101
guarded a bill abolishing the property qualifications for M.P.s and legislation allowing practising Jews to sit in the Commons: a bill G. I. T.
Machin considers "the most symbolic religious liberty measure of the
1850's."'54 During the recess of 1858 Derby's Cabinet framed a Parliamentary Reform Bill that was more "liberal" than the bill favored by
Palmerston a year earlier."'55This was legislative substantiation of the
government's studiedly fabian rhetoric:'56
Lord Derby has shown wisdom, tact and statesmanship, far
beyond what was expected of him, and the natural result is a
corresponding triumph over public opinion. The spirit of exterior
conciliation is quite distinct. He soothes and satisfies everywhere. ... At home he has ceased to fight with the age [and]
concedes more liberally than he ever promised.
This, in turn, substantiated the Conservative leadership's strategic
aspirations. "We are now endeavoring to reconstruct the party on a wider
basis and trying to lay the foundation of a permanent system."157
The resumption of the Indian debate in June 1858 also threw public
attention onto that individual member of Derby's cabinet who most
effectively represented intelligent and moderate probity: the Prime Minister's son, Lord Stanley. As Ellenborough's successor at the Board of
Control Stanley successfully steered the Indian resolutions through the
Commons.l58Disraeli came to regard his thirty-two year old colleague as
"a source of great strength and popularity" and "a man of first rate
abilities and acquirements'159 Making more frequent extra-parliamentary
speeches during the 1850s than either Cobden or Bright, Stanley discerned
that "Tory Democracy" which Palmerston subsequently left as a legacy to
MachinPolitics and the Churchesin GreatBritain,1832 to 1868 (Oxford,

54"G.I.T.
1977) p. 292. Derby'sgovernment also passed Acts facilitating the drainage of the
Thames,reformingmunicipalgovernmentand conferringself-governingstatus on
British Columbia. See Stewart The Foundation of the Conservative Party
1830-1867, pp. 318-21.
H. C. Bell, "Palmerstonand ParliamentaryRepresentation,"TheJournal
"55See
of ModernHistory 4 (June, 1932), 186-213, and Bell PalmerstonII, 178-180. For
details of the ConservativeReformscheme see Disraeli, 3 Hansard CLII:966-1005
(Feb.28, 1859). See also, R. W. Davis Disraeli (London,1976)pp. 128-37, although
allowance should be made for the natural biographicaloveremphasisof Disraeli's
part in framing the scheme at the expense of others, in particular Derby. See C.
SeymourElectoralReformin England and Wales(London,1915) pp. 234-79, for a
discussion of the 1859 Bill and other schemes of the period,although Palmerston's
proposedmeasure of 1857 is not considered.
56Dallasto Cass, August 13, 1858 cit. Dallas Lettersfrom London II, 44.
"7Disraelito Derby, August 13, 1858, Derby Mss. 145/5.
15Carnarvon Memo. 1858, cit. Hardinge CarnarvonI, 115.
I59Disraelito Mrs. Brydges Willyams, August 28, 1858, cit. Monypenny and
Buckle Disraeli IV, 175.
102
Disraeli.160Increasingly after 1854 Stanley came to represent scrupulous

public integrity as "a calm philosophical statesman" never inclined to give
"to party what [was] meant for mankind."'61Such a guarantee of integrity
was the perfect complement to Derby's conciliatory progressivism. By the
end of the 1858 session Stanley seemed "completely the man of the present
day, and in all human probability [was] destined to play [an] important and
conspicuous part in political life."'62
In September 1858 the Duke of Bedford, Russell's elder brother,
believed that the political future would "all depend on a chapter of
accidents, and that those accidents are as likely to be in favour, as against,
the government.""63In the event, by June 1859 the particular alignment of
circumstance associated with the Reform issue and the Italian question
prompted the defeat and resignation of Derby's government. Thus, by no
means predictably, Derby's government and the tenure of office of members of his Cabinet such as Stanley came to an abrupt end.64 Also, once in
opposition, Derby swiftly resumed his strategy of masterly inactivity, so
that between 1859 and 1866 the Conservative leadership patiently waited
"6Stanley'sjournal provides important insights into his perceptionof a broadened Conservativeappeal. In 1853 Stanley visited Bury and "foundremaining an
almost feudal respect for our family, which has not been duly cultivated."He met
with self-made industrialists of the town: "theirforceand shrewdnessof character
greatly impressedme:in these requisites forsuccess no class that I knowin English
life equals them. The contact of this visit fixed me in a purpose which general
considertionshad prompted:that of shaping my political course so as not to lose
their support,if it can once be gained-and I think it can.... They seemed to have,
except in Churchmatters, many Conservativetendencies,but are kept aloofby the
mingledtimidity and prideof the countrygentlemen."LiverpoolCity RecordOffice,
Stanley Diary, November22,1853 Stanley Mss. 920 DER(15)43/3 cit. Vincent (ed.)
Disraeli Derby and the Conservative Party. p. 112. This was the same snobbish
flunkeyism Cobden despised in Palmerstonianism, and the audience Disraeli

sought in the 1870s. For Stanley's speeches duringthe 1850s on the merits of study
for working men, the needs of the great towns, MechanicsInstitutes and women's
work see Baron Sanderson and E. H. Roscoe (eds.) Speeches and Addresses of
Edward Henry, XV Earl of Derby, K. G. (London, 1894)
161WhiteInner Life of the House of Commons I, 79. See also Vincent (ed.) Disraeli,
Derby and the Conservative Party pp. 142-47.
"62BL,Greville Diary, November 4, 1858 Greville Mss. 41123 cit. Greville

MemoirsVIII, p. 216.
"63UniversityCollege London, Bedford to Brougham, September 30, 1858,
Brougham Mss. 30406.
"64SeeD.E.D. Beales England and Italy, 1859-60 (London, 1961). See also,
Monypenny and Buckle Life of Disraeli IV, 178-253: J. Morley Life of Gladstone
(London,1903) I, chap. XI, pp. 621-28: H. C. Bell LordPalmerston(London,1936)

chap. XXVIII, pp. 202-19: W. D. Jones Lord Derby and Victorian Conservatism
(1956) chap. IX, pp. 241-58: John Prest Lord John Russell (London,1972) chap.
XVI, pp. 382-84. See also A. B. Hawkins, (Ph.D. thesis, University of London,
1980),"BritishParliamentaryParty Politics, 1855-1859,"pp.411-54. In December
1858 the Radicaland well informedCharlesVilliers observed:"TheLiberalpartyis
too muchdividedand scatteredat present to offerthe least expectationof returning
to powernext year, and the peoplewho are now in must be great blunderersif they
cannot at least secure themselves for another year or two."(BL,Villiers to Bright,
December 8, 1858, Bright Mss. 43389 fol. 224).
103
for Whig, Liberal, and Radical differences to instigate a more stable

realignment of party connection. As between 1853 and 1858, the Conservative front bench attempted to prove to Whigs and moderate Liberals
that their real friends sat opposite them, rather than alongside them, in
the House of Commons.l65 Both these developments served to obscure
Derby's aims and achievement: the rehabilitation of the Conservative
party after 1852, shorn of Peelites, as a party "steadily supporting the
moderate policy recommended by the educated caution of the soberest
men of both parties."166
The parliamentary debates over India during 1858 also affirmed that a
determining tension in mid-nineteenth-century party politics was the
rivalry between Russell and Palmerston, and their respective perception
of Whig, Liberal, Peelite, and Radical alignment. The antagonism
between these two men dominated the party politics of the 1850s. After
the withdrawal of Cardwell's motion, in May 1858, the resumed Indian
debate in June 1858 only served to advertise their animosity:'67
When Lord John proposed that the number of the Council for
Indian Affairs should be 12 instead of 15 ... many Liberals ...
voted with the Government, and he was beaten by 50 or 60 votes.
When in committee Lord Palmerston proposed that the clauses
relating to the Council should only be in force for 5 years... Lord
John opposed him and the result was that 25 Liberals followed
[Russell] and the Government had a majority of 34 against Lord
Palmerston. And when, on the same evening, Russell proposed to
negative the clause which provided that secret orders might be
sent out without the knowledge of the Council. Lord Palmerston
opposed him - was followed by about 30 Liberals and the
government had a majority of 173 to 149 upon a point which...
should have united all Liberals against them.
Such a spectacle only enforced Herbert's reluctance to compare "the faults
of possible prime ministers. There [was] too much material of that kind to
make it either difficult or pleasant."'68 By July 1858 Wood was eloquent
about "the miserable condition of the [party] and condemned Palmerston's
recent conduct." 69Graham intoned in January 1859 that the "broken
fragments of the old Whig party [were] so shattered that they [could not]
i65Itis this particular strategic impulse that led to the years 1859-1865 being
referred to as a period of 'party truce' or 'party logomachy' as Lord Campbell
describedit.
"66Walter
Bagehot "LordSalisbury on Moderation,"cit. E. I. Barrington(ed.)The
Life and Worksof WalterBagehot (London,1915) IX, p. 174.
"67Kent
CountyArchives, KnatchbullHugessen Diary, July 30, 1858, Brabourne
Mss. U951 F. 29.
to Argyll, March 15, 1858, cit. Argyll Autobiographyand MemoirsII,
"68Herbert
121.
'69BL,
Broughton Diary, July 6, 1858. Broughton Mss. 43761 fol. 104.
104
be pieced together again. The old stagers [had] known each other too long
and too well; and they disliked each other too much."70 To many there
seemed no prospect "of the formation of an efficient party, let alone
government, out of the chaos on the opposition benches.""'7
The rivalry between Palmerston and Russell for Whig-Liberal preeminence disrupted the last years of Russell's first ministry, the Aberdeen
coalition, Palmerston's first ministry, and the opposition to Derby in 1858.
In May 1858 it appeared that Palmerston had lost the struggle. Becoming
"greatly disliked by a number of Liberal M.P.'s"172it seemed that "Palmerston [had] lost his chance."'73Wood was convinced "that P. would never
again be prime minister."'74Despite Palmerston's enfeebling loss of credibility and the concern with the issue of Reform in 1859, however, Russell,
because of Conservative concession, Radical reticence, and Palmerston's
patience, failed to affirm his authority over former Peelite, Liberal, and
Radical sentiment. Russell's failure proved to be Palmerston's opportunity and Russell had to wait for Palmerston's death in 1865 to acquire
his inheritance. The fact remains, however, that one of the most surprising political events of the 1850s was the alignment of Whig, Liberal,
Peelite, and Radical party connection under the leadership of Palmerston
rather than Russell, in 1859, with the consequent repudiation of the
alternative aspirations of Derby, Russell and a wide variety of seekers of
realignment including Disraeli, Stanley, Aberdeen, Graham, Gladstone,
Clarendon, Cornewall Lewis, Bright, Cobden, and Lord Grey.'75
The Indian debates during 1858 revealed the potential alignment of
party sentiment sought by an important few and expected by many others:
that Palmerston would become leader of the Conservative party in the
Commons under the moderate centrist leadership of Derby; that fabian
Conservatism and Whig realignment would, in turn, be challenged by a
consolidation of Liberal, Peelite, and Radical sentiment under the "progressive" rectitude of Russell. Little expected, and sought by very few, was
Palmerston's recovery of his personal pestige by June 1859 so as to provide
a credible focus for centrist alignment while, at the same time, acquiring
nominal Peelite and Radical allegiance. In turn, Palmerston's political
style, an emphasis on executive rather than legislative activity and, in
consequence, a preference for domestic quiescence to allow prominence to
foreign affairs, came to characterize the mid-nineteenth-century political
scene.
On July 8, 1858 peace in India was proclaimed. Lucknow was finally
'70NationalLibraryof Scotland, Grahamto Ellice, January 7, 1859, Ellice Mss.
15019 fol. 46.
to Graham,January 10, 1859, cit. LordStanmoreSidney Herbertof
'71Herbert
Lea: A Memoir (London,1906) II, 25.
'72LeedsRecordOffice, Clanricardeto Canning, May 9, 1858, Canning Mss. 4.
73BL,Forster to Goderich,May 23, 1858. Ripon Mss. 43536 fol. 142.
'74BL,Broughton Diary, July 6, 1858, Broughton Mss. 43761 fol. 104.
175See Hawkins, "British Parliamentary Party Politics, 1885 to 1859." pp.
411-541.
PARLIAMENTARY
PARTYALIGNMENT
105
recaptured and Gwalior regained. On August 3, the last day of the 1858
session, the Government of India Bill received the Royal Assent and
passed into law. The Act created a Minister of the Crown, responsible for
Indian affairs, assisted by a Council. The Council was to number fifteen
members who held office for life. Seven members were to be elected by the
Court of Directors of the East India Company, the remaining eight
members to be nominated by the Crown. On matters requiring secrecy the
Minister was empowered to create a Secret Committee while Indian
financial accounts were to be periodically laid before the Commons.
Furthermore, at Lord Derby and Lord Stanley's insistence, the scientific
sections of the Indian Army were made open to competitive examination.
In this form the parliamentary concern with India prompted by the
Mutiny, in terms of legislation and policy, came to an end. The administrative character of that concern; the reformist nature of the Conservative response; the bitter divisions within Whig-Liberal ranks; the
withdrawal of Cardwell's motion in May; and subsequent parliamentary
debate, however, betrayed those preceding and persistent political concerns that shaped transient legislative preoccupation with the Asian
subcontinent.
LOYOLAMARYMOUNTUNIVERSITY,
LOS ANGELES

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British Parliamentary Party Alignment and the Indian Issue, 1857-1858

Author(s): Angus Hawkins

British Parliamentary Party Alignment

5PRO,Minto to Russell, October31, 1857, Russell Mss., 30/22/13/D fol. 209.

JOURNAL OF BRITISH STUDIES

screw vessels) to the troubled sub-continent.12 Other troops, on their way

Mss. GD45/8/50 fol. 93.

"[n]ot a single member of the Ministry in town; unless he had strayed in

unpublished LondonUniversity Ph.D. thesis, 1949, by J. K. Glynn "ThePrivate

sity of opinion and allegiance. The issue of parliamentary reform, in

JOURNAL OF BRITISH STUDIES

shown in suppressing the insurrection, revealed further diversity of

Reminiscencesof Count CharlesFrederickVitzhumvon Eckstaedt(London,1887)

Palmerston's resignation seemed to promise that realignment of party

PARLIAMENTARY PARTY ALIGNMENT

sham."72Despite Ellenborough's belief that the bill would be "a great

77NationalRegister of Archives, Palmerston Diary, March31, 1858. Broadlands

78Bodleian,Earle to Disraeli, March 28, 1858, Hughenden Mss. B/XX/E/34A.

PARLIAMENTARY PARTY ALIGNMENT

opinion, using Bulwer-Lytton as an intermediary.80 Radicals such as

"Wood,3 Hansard CXLIX:864-866 (April 12, 1858).

Ellenborough's severe, if partially uninformed, despatch provided the

The effectiveness of government speeches, especially from Sir Hugh

laid before the Commons133which, he believed, "exercised a powerful

39Palmerston,3 Hansard CL: 1040-1042 (May 21, 1858).

JOURNAL OF BRITISH STUDIES

[which] strengthened their position for a time."'46Palmerston himself,

MachinPolitics and the Churchesin GreatBritain,1832 to 1868 (Oxford,

Disraeli.160Increasingly after 1854 Stanley came to represent scrupulous

flunkeyism Cobden despised in Palmerstonianism, and the audience Disraeli

"62BL,Greville Diary, November 4, 1858 Greville Mss. 41123 cit. Greville

(London,1903) I, chap. XI, pp. 621-28: H. C. Bell LordPalmerston(London,1936)

PARLIAMENTARY PARTY ALIGNMENT

for Whig, Liberal, and Radical differences to instigate a more stable

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