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Although most of the records of the Stasis Main Directorate for Intelligence (the Hauptverwaltung
AufklrungHVA) have been destroyed, traces of the West-Arbeit can be found in domestic departments
of the MfS. Research into this branch of activities is all the more revealing because the files of the West
German intelligence and security services remain closed.
The West-Arbeit had a direct relationship to the domestic duties of the Stasi, because the enemy against
whom the operations were directed could be located abroad, among foreigners, or within the GDR
population itself. As can be deduced from the training manual of the Stasi, Ha auf den Feind (hatred of
the enemy) was the organizations all encompassing idea.
Established as the counterpart and junior partner of the KGB and staffed with communist veterans like
Erich Mielke, Ernst Wollweber, and Wilhelm Zaisser, the Stasi was a repressive institution from its
beginnings. Because communism was considered the logical and inevitable outcome of history,
shortcomings and conflicts within the system could only be caused by external factors, for example,
saboteurs inspired by the great class enemy in the West.
This definition of the enemy evolved over time, but it was still in place during the neue Ostpolitik of 1970
72 of West-German Chancellor Willy Brandt (196974). Brandts outreach brought the GDR considerable
gains: diplomatic recognition (and thus embassies) in the West, economic treaties, technological imports
(microelectronics, computers), and loans.
The gains also brought new dangers: East Germanys policy of Ab grenzung (the ideological, political and
geographical sealing off of the GDR from the West, in particular from the FRG) began to erode because of
the many contacts with the West established during this period. The increased percolation through the
Wall of Western influences was mirrored by the growth of the Stasi. The shield and sword of the party
had to make up for the new openness with a major expansion of its personnel, informal agents
(inoffizielle mitarb eiter), and duties. At the same time, the Stasi made good use of contacts fostered by
Brandts Ostpolitik and began new offensives against the West. These were directed mainly against West
Germany, but other West European countries, including the Netherlands, also were targetted.
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Intelligence Assets
East German intelligence in the Netherlands involved the use of open sources (OSINT) and technical and
human collection. OSINT was easy to come by: The Stasi collected newspaper clippings, official
(government) publications, and grey reports on GDR- or security-related issues. The MfS also made
good use of articles on Dutch military and security issues published by Dutch left-wing pacifist
organizations and parties. The Pacifist Political Party, the PSP, for example, exposed details of the
structure and activities of the Dutch security service (the Binnenlandse VeiligheidsdienstBVD). These
were immediately analyzed and sent to Berlin. [7]
With respect to technical collection, little is known from the existing files. There is some evidence that the
MfS made use of Dutch radio and telecommunications, including those of Dutch military radio and
satellite installations in Westerbork and Eibergen. [8]
Humint was the Stasis main source for West-Arbeit in the Netherlands. Before the Dutch officially
recognized the GDR in January 1973, the HVA made use of the handful of salesmen and church officials
who had established contacts in the Netherlands. Because of the proximity of the two countries, these socalled headquarters operations were relatively easy to set up. According to a former Dutch intelligence
officer, most of the West-Arbeit against the Netherlands was conducted through headquarters operations.
The agents participating in those operations could be East Germans, but sometimes they had Dutch
backgrounds. According to the same Dutch intelligence officer, most East German headquarters
operations used Dutch citizens who eventually were doubled by the BVD, [9] New Stasi files suggest this
is not the case.
From 1973 on, political and economic relations also provided up-to-date information. However, the MfS
was especially interested in non-governmental relations between protestant church congregations and
peace groups in both countries. Around 1978, some 100 parish contacts had been established, and by
1984 the number had grown to more than 150. By then, 9,000 to 12,000 Dutch protestants and peace
activists were participating in exchange programs. [10]
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Diplomatic recognition also enabled the MfS to place at least three legal intelligence officers at its
residentura in the embassy. [11] Although the BVD kept the GDR embassy under strict surveillance, the MfS
residentura was able to run several informal-agent operations from the embassy. The records reveal that
the following assets were recruited in the Netherlands (through headquarters operations or by legal
residents):
Three informal agents in the Dutch-East German Friendship Association (a subdivision of the
official Liga fr Vlkerfreundschaft)
One informal agent and one prospective agent from the Horizontal Platform, a Marxist-Leninist
offshoot of the Dutch Communist Party.
Several contact persons (not quite informal agents but something less committed) inside the
Stop-the-Neutron-Bomb campaign and other left wing peace groups.
At least two informal agents not affiliated with left wing organizations, but recruited because they
sought adventure or had financial needs.
The MfS was not allowed to recruit members of the official Dutch Communist Party (they could only be
used as contact persons, not as informal agents). Most informal agents and other sources were
nevertheless drawn into its service through their sympathy for communist ideals or through their
progressive political convictions, as Stasi chief Erich Mielke phrased it. As late in the Cold War as
September 1988, the resident was complaining about the large number of Dutch citizens who were
showing up at the embassy to offer themselves to the service. [12]
On the whole, informal agents like these volunteers were of limited utility as sources. The members of the
Friendship Association (the informal agents Aorta, Arthur, and Ozon, for example) or members of
other GDR-affiliated organizations were either too old, unemployed, or too suspect to get anywhere near
interesting military or political information. The resident came to the same conclusion: Their assets were
too leftist and attempts to broaden the contact scope did not produce many results, he lamented in
1988. [13]
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According to the MfS residentura in The Hague, the BVD conducted so many unfriendly acts of
surveillance and recruiting activities against the embassy, against East German citizens in the
Netherlands, and against friendly organizations, such as the Friendship Association GDR-Netherlands
(Vriendschapsvereniging Nederland-DDR), that they threatened to obstruct the positive effect of the
socialist detente politics concerning disarmament questions. That is, the Stasi blamed the BVD for
deteriorating East-West relations and troubled disarmament talks. [15]
However, at least one Dutch informal agent of the 1980s, whose codename was Abruf (on call) was not
discovered. Abruf was run by a case officer codenamed Hilmar, who was a member of the legal
residentura of the military intelligence department of the East German Army and worked in close
cooperation with the MfS staff at the East German embassy. Hilmar had recruited Abruf in November 1983
at a meeting of the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) that he, as a comrade and embassy
official, could legally attend.
Hilmar described Abruf as young, unemployed, unhappy with the perceived rightist policies of the Dutch
government, frustrated by the NATO-modernization decision, and a staunch supporter of communism.
Hilmar played into this zeal and general disaffection with the capitalist environment and had no difficulty
recruiting the young man. [16]
As his codename implied, Abruf was used as a freelance agent. He received instructions to photograph
Rotterdam Harbor, the Schiphol and Zestienhoven airports, industrial plants in the region, and military
compounds. He also collected material on NATO Exercise REFORGER in 1985. After 1985, he was told to
move to Woensdrecht, a site then being prepared to receive new NATO missiles.
Abruf received payments of 100 Dutch guilders for every task he carried out. Contact with his case officer
was made through dead drops and in short meetings (after long, frantic diversions and smoke screens)
in crowded places, such as the Jungerhans department store in Rotterdam. To some of these
rendezvous he brought his girlfriend. [17]
Abrufs employment ended after three years, in 1986, after an assignment in 1985 raised suspicions. In
that year, he was ordered to Coevorden, Ter Apel, and Vriezenveen, where he was told to locate military
depots, and to Woensdrecht, where he was to photograph the deployment site. On 25 February 1986, the
BVD paid him a visit and asked about the trip to Vriezenveen and about his contacts with the GDR
embassy. The BVD had stumbled across Abruf while they were following Hilmar. At the time, Dutch
security did not seem to know much about Abrufs history and actual activities as an agent. Hilmar had
already been replaced by an MfS case officer codenamed Haupt. The BVD visit alarmed both Abruf and
the residentura, and the relationship was mutually terminated two days after the inquiry.
Informal agent Abruf had provided the Stasi with useful reconnaissance material on Dutch military and
economic capabilities centering around the Rotterdam region. His cover was never really blown, and the
BVD did not uncover his real activities. After 1989, he left the Netherlands and disappeared.
What Abruf provided was typical of the many reports on Dutch military matters, sometimes via open
sources, sometimes of obscure origin, found in Stasi files. One of the showpieces is a detailed
description of the organizational structuretelephone numbers includedof the intelligence department
of the Dutch land forces. [18]
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The opposition spawned new opportunities for Soviet and Warsaw Pact leaders, and the official
communist World Peace Council and its suborganizations were used to wage open and covert
campaigns to capitalize on the protests. [19] Between 1977 and 1979, the ruling East German Socialist
Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei DeutschlandsSED) and the peace council were responsible,
among other things, for financial and logistic support of the Stop the Neutron Bomb campaigna Dutch
communist front organization that cost East Berlin around 120,000 Dutch guilders (110,000 West German
DM). [20]
In addition, the Stasi influenced the foundation Generals for Peacea well known and respected antinuclear peace organization of former West European generals, with Dutch General Michiel von Meyenfeldt
(former chief of the Dutch Royal Military Academy) as secretary. To support its perspectives, the Stasi gave
it 100,000 West German DM annually. [21]
Even more potentially useful, it seemed to the Kremlin and East Berlin, was the expansion of the support
base of the peace movement in the Netherlands to include churches and the Dutch Interchurch Peace
Council (Interkerkelijk VredesberaadIKV), which had started a campaign for unilateral atomic
disarmament in the Netherlands. All influential Dutch churches participated in the IKV, and the
organization succeeded in mobilizing large parts of Dutch society. [22] East German leader Erich
Honecker believed that the Dutch religious powers were the main cause of turning the anti-nuclear
campaign into a mass movement, [22] and invitations would follow to a variety of church officials to visit
like-minded groups in East Germany.
However, Stasi sympathy for the Dutch peace movement started to turn sour after 1981. After Polish
government repression of the independent trade union Solidarity in Poland and after exchanges with
members of the Czechoslovak dissident group Charter 77, the IKV radically altered its positions and
began to target not only NATO missiles but those of the Warsaw Pact and demanded that all member
countries start dismantling nuclear missiles on their own territories rather than pointing fingers at other
nations. In effect, this meant the end of a purely anti-NATO campaign. [23]
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A leaflet of the IKV illustrating the cooperation betw een it and East German and Hungarian organizations.
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To make matters worse for the communists, the IKV extended its contacts with dissidents throughout
Eastern Europe and declared that repression in the East was a major political cause of the arms race
and not the other way around. The IKV planned to organize a peace movement from below to confront
b oth superpowers at grassroot levels. [24]
With its change of position, extant church contacts within the GDR became especially interesting for the
IKVand troublesome to the MfS. Most inviting was an independent peace movement that appeared in
East German protestant churches in 1978 called Swords Into Plowshares (Schwerter zu Pflugscharen).
The IKV followed up and sent emissaries to various peace groups in the GDRas tourists, or under the
umbrella of church exchangesand eventually announced the formation of a joint Peace Platform with
East German dissidents in the summer of 1982.
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The Stasi read about the development in a Dutch newspaper and went on red alert. Honecker himself
ordered the official state Secretariat for Religious Matters (Staatssekretariat fr Kirchenfragen) to exert all
means of influence to eliminate these divisive forces (Spalterkrfte). [25]
A four-part campaign against the IKV was begun. First, the Stasi activated its church agents to force the
abandonment of the platform. [26] Second, it started a smear campaign against the IKV. IKV Secretary
Mient Jan Faber and other officials of his group were registered as persons of criminal intent. [27] Party
and state officials, newspapers and front organizations were instructed to depict the IKV as a divisive force
within the West European peace movement and Faber as an arrogant bully. [28] Third, Faber himself was
barred from entering the GDR. [29] And finally , the existing contacts between Dutch reformed parishes and
East German congregations were threatened. The Dutch working group within the East German churches
was told that the obstructions were caused by the states misgivings about the IKV. Several visits of Dutch
delegations to East Germany and vice versa were cancelled. [30]
These measures were informed by the strategy of differentiation (Differenzierung), which was a very
subtle method of alienating divisive and negative elements from their own base. [31] The Stasi sorted out
which IKV and church members disliked Faber and invited them to East Berlin. It succeeded in
manipulating the president of the IKV and reformed church official Jan van Putten, General von Meyenfeldt
he was also an advisor to the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands and a board member of the IKV
and lower-ranking IKV members. [32] IKV officials, Dutch church groups and journalists were led to believe
that the IKVs secretary was no longer in favour in East Europe or with the protestant churches in the GDR.
[33]
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A page from the file of Mient Han Faber.
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In line with this strategy, the Stasi also tried to recruit agents in the Netherlands. IKV Secretary Janneke
Houdijk, IKVs coordinator for East Germany, was approached in vain. She did not recognise the
attempts for what they were and remained loyal to Faber. [34]
In the end, however, the efforts bore fruit. East-German churches detached themselves from their IKV
contacts and froze most exchange activities. In the Netherlands, many Dutch church leaders and local
groups were convinced that Faber was a threat to stability and East-West relations. [35] Faber was
threatened with dismissal. Local IKV groups and parishes sent angry letters to IKV headquarters and
demanded that Faber stop meddling in internal East German affairs, let alone lead a campaign for
human rights. [36] The envisaged Peace Platform never came into being, frustrated in advance by the
Stasi, which was helped, knowingly or unknowingly, by Dutch and East German church leaders.
Ironically, after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union, Marxist-Leninist enmity towards a
democratization approach faded away. The new leadership in the Kremlin even developed sympathy for it,
and, in 1988, Faber and British peace activist Mary Kaldor were invited to Moscow to observe the
dismantling of SS-20 rockets. The same year, an IKV delegation visited Moscow, invited by the Kremlin
itself. [37] The GDR, however, stuck to its rigid policy. The Stasi was appalled by the tolerance of Soviet
communists toward Dutch peace activists and did not adapt itself to the new liberalism. Indeed, it
continued the struggle against the IKV and even started a new action against it in 1988. Operations were
only aborted after the Berlin Wall came down in November 1989.
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A member of the Peace Shop in Groningen and an East German dissident exchange personal peace treaties.
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Such activity fit perfectly in the communist vision of class enemies conspiring from outside the system to
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create domestic unrest, and the bicycle tours thus became objects of intensive surveillance. In 1983, the
Stasi started several Operative Vorgange (intelligence operations aimed at arresting dissidents) against
former Bausoldaten who had participated in the tours. HA XX recruited several East Germans as informal
agents mit Feindkontakt (in contact with the enemy), who reported on all the meetings and preparations.
[42]
Although bicycle tour participants kept their distance from IKV officials, HA XX and the HVA nevertheless
increasingly suspected them of being partners of the IKV and executors of the IKVs grand strategy of
developing a pseudopacifist, bloctranscending peace movement. By way of confirmation of this, one
Stasi report quotes a Dutch activist as saying When there are no soldiers on both sides, there will be no
weapons used. [43]
In the belief that the Peace Shop was helping dissidents, the Stasi was not mistaken. The activists had
indeed given their East German contacts a typewriter and helped finance Bausoldaten activities with
2,000 Dutch guilders.
With growing Dutch contacts in the so-called Political Underground Forces (Politische Untergrundttigkeit
PUT), which the East German authorities saw as a threat to communist rule, increased international
pressure on the GDR, and a perceived potential for embarrassment during Erich Honeckers planned
June 1987 visit to the Netherlands, the MfS tried to obstruct and manipulate cross-border exchanges. HA
XX began an Operativer Vorgang against the Dutch organizer of the bicycle tours, Bert Noppers, who was
described as the inspirator and organisator of the PUT tours.
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Demonstrators by a cardboard "Berlin Wall" built through Groningen in 1987.
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As part of its attack on Noppers, HA XX used a letter from Noppers to an East German friend in which he
wrote that Dutch intelligence had tried to recruit him in 1983 to report on his East German contacts.
Although Noppers stated in his letter that he refused, the HA immediately listed him as a probable foreign
intelligence agent. It then attempted to collect evidence to indict Noppers for hostile agitation against the
East German state and for disseminating information to foreign intelligence agencies or other foreign
organizations to discredit the GDR. If convicted, he faced two to 12 years of imprisonment. [44]
Nothwithstanding such threats, the Peace Shop organized a protest against East German border controls
in 1987, building a model Berlin Wall of cardboard boxes through Groningen and drawing media attention
to the condition of their dissident friends in the GDR. Although the peace activists also criticized the West
European and Dutch contribution to the armaments race, these acts had no impact on the activities of
HA XX. [45]
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Stepped-up HA XX activities included the recruitment as informal agents of three GDR participants in the
Peace Shop exchanges. Codenamed Karlheinz, Betty, and Romeo, they reported all of their activities to
HA XX. Romeo was sent abroad to visit the Peace Shop in Groningen in July 1988. However, the
department could not find enough evidence to prosecute the East German participants or arrest the Dutch
organizer.
Even by the standards of the East German Penal Code, the activists were just not subversive enough. The
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(/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-52-no1/images/Vredeswinkel.jpg/image.jpg)
The Peace Shop, on the corner, in Groningen.
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Dutch activists did not advocate open criticism or revolution. As Noppers put it during an interview in 2006,
If the East Germans wanted to topple the regime, they had to do it by themselves. We came from abroad
and did not want to tell them what to do. And although we were no friends of communism, we had enough
criticism to pass on capitalism and materialism at home. [46] Moreover, the East German government did
not want the MfS to make random arrests, since that would cause too much damage to the economic and
political relations the GDR had established by then.
Nevertheless, MfS surveillance continued. HA XX ordered continuation of the operations against Noppers,
inspired by the same suspicions against the Dutch activist. [47] Although the MfS knew that Moscow had
shifted policies and now aimed at cooperation with the IKV and other West European peace
organisations, HA XX was still plotting in April 1989 to use intercepted inquiries by the Peace Shop to
members of the East German network to recruit more informal agents. [48]
Only in October 1989 were the Operativer Vorgange against the East German Bausoldaten and against
Noppers called off. They ended partly because of a lack of evidence and partly because the Stasi had
already begun cleaning up its files in the face of growing unrest and pending revolution. On 24 November
1989, 15 days after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Stasi finally closed its files on Noppers. [49]
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into these differences and only uttered the usual clichs about peace-loving socialist countries. To him,
the Netherlands remained part and parcel of the imperialist block. [50] Painfully collected and sound
intelligence was made useless by incapable and ideologically deformed party leaders.
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Footnotes
a. The BStU (Die Beauftrgte fr die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik) is responsible for preserving the records of the Stasi, which had
responsibility for both external and internal security. The files on Kohl suggested he had taken bribes from
major firms on behalf of his party, the Christian Democratic Union. The BStUs functions are described on
its Web site, www.bstu.bund.de.
b. Knabes 1999 study was reviewed by CIA historian Ben Fischer in Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 2
(2002). It offers a useful overview in English of East German intelligence.
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cards, not a file. In June 1982 Stasi started an Operativ Vorgang (file) on Mient Jan Faber and Wolfgang
Mller.
28. Report of the HA XX/4, Interkirchlicher Friedensrat der Niederlande, October/November 1982, BStU
MfS HA XX/4 1917, 15; In the mid-1980s, IKV was mentioned in a list of approximately 1,000 Zielobjekte
(targets) of
the Stasis Reconnaissance Service, the Hauptverwaltung Aufklrung. Zielobjekte der HVA alphabetische Liste, BStU ASt Gera BV Gera/Abt. XV 0187, 2139, in Knabe, West-Arbeit des MfS, 518
54. See 537.
29. Vertreter hollndischer Friedensbewegung drfte nicht in die DDR, ADN-Information, 29 July 1982,
BStU MfS HA XX ZMA 1993/4, 13.
30. Office of the East German Churches (BEK-Sekretariat), Arbeitsbeziehungen zwischen dem Bund der
Ev. Kirchen in der DDR und dem Raad van Kerken in den Niederlanden und einzelnen Gliedkirchen und
Gemeinden,
November 1982, LDC NHK ROS 735.
31. Clemens Vollnhals, Die kirchenpolitische Abteilung des Ministeriums fr Staatssicherheit. BF
informiert 16/1997 (Berlin 1997). Concerning the strategy of differentiation, the following orders were
relevant: Richtlinien zur Bearbeitungs Operativer Vorgnge (RL 1/76), Operative Personenkontrollen (RL
1/81), Direktive zur IM-Fhrung (RL 1/79).
32. East German Peace Council, Manahmeplan, Berlin, April 1981, 4, BArch SAPMO DZ 9 K295.1578;
East German Peace Council, Aktivitten der Rstungsgegner im Monat November 1981, Niederlande,
23, BArch
SAPMO DZ 9 450.2354.
33. E.g., Ton Crijnen, Waarom Mient Jan Faber niet welkom is in de DDR, De Tijd, 31 December 1982.
34. BStU MfS Abteilung Rostock, OV Integration 3/92.
35. Verslag van uitspraken van bisschop W. Krusche op de bijeenkomst met de Raad van Kerken te
Amersfoort d.d. 7-9-82, Series 3, Nr. 32, Utrecht County Archive, Reformed Churches in the Netherland,
General Diaconal
Council (Het Utrechts Archief, Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland, Algemeen Diakonaal Beraad); Letter,
Prof. Berkhof to Vorsitzender des Bundes der Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR (Krusche), 26 Juy 1982,
Amersfoort,
Rep. B3 Nr. 711, Archive KPS Magdeburg; Letter, Prof. Berkhof to Faber, 2 July 1982, Amersfoort, LDC
NHK ROS/IKV Box 15.
36. All letters at the (Dutch) International Institute for Social History (IISH) in Amsterdam, Box IKV 455;
Verslag Oost-Europadiscussie op de Campagneraad van 26 februari, in Kernblad 3, March 1983, IISH
Box IKV 453.
37. Interview with Mient Jan Faber, 10 September 2001, The Hague.
38. Interview with Bert Noppers (former participant in these contacts and supporter of the Peace Shop), 20
March 2006, Utrecht.
39. Network News, in: Peace Magazin, 1 (December 1985): 1, 30.
40. Uwe Koch, Das Ministerium fr Staatssicherheit, die Wehrdienstverweigerer der DDR und die
Bausoldaten der Nationalen Volksarmee. Eine bersicht ber den Forschungsstand. Die
Landesbeauftragte fr die Unterlagen des
Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR in Sachsen-Anhalt und Mecklenburg- Vorpommern,
Sachbeitrge 6 (Magdeburg 1999); Robert-Havemann- Archiv (ed.), Zivilcourage und Kompromiss,
Bausoldaten in der DDR 1964 1990, Bausoldatenkongress Potsdam, 3.-5. September 2004 (Berlin
2005).
41. Vredeswinkel Groningen, Schrijf een brief!!!!![write a letter!!!!!], around January 1984. Matthias
Domaschk Archive Berlin, Box Erik de Graaf.
42. OV Schwaben. BStU MfS BV Frankfurt (Oder) AOP 1430/89; Abteilung XX/4, Information ber
feindlich-negative Aktivitten zur Organisierung und Inspirierung politischer Untergrundttigkeit, Frankfurt
(Oder), 22 March 1985. BStU MfS OV Radtour, 1091/87, Anlage I, 8486.
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-52-no-1/west-arbeit-western-operations.html
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43. OV Schwaben. BStU MfS BV Frankfurt (Oder) AOP 1430/89; Abteilung XX/4, Information ber
feindlich-negative Aktivitten zur Organisierung und Inspirierung politischer Untergrundttigkeit, Frankfurt
(Oder), 22 March 1985. BStU MfS OV Radtour, 1091/87, Anlage I, 85.
44. Abteilung XX/4, Erffnungsbericht zum OV Radtour, Frankfurt (Oder) 3 September 1987. BStU MfS
OV Radtour, 1091/87, Anlage I, 712.
45. Abteilung IX/2, Strafrechtliche Einschtzung zum operativen Ausgangsmaterial Radtour der
Abteilung XX, Frankfurt (Oder) 10 September 1987. BStU MfS OV Radtour 1091/87, Anlage I, 2223.
46. Interview with Bert Noppers, 20 March 2006, Utrecht.
47. Abteilung XX/4, Sachstandbericht zum OV Radtour, 1091/87, Frankfurt (Oder), 22 July 1988. BStU
MfS OV Radtour, 1091/87, Anlage II, 4751.
48. Abteilung XX/4, Dienstreisebericht, Frankfurt (Oder), 20 June 1988; Abteilung XX, Information zur
Ost-West-Gruppe Groningen (Niederlande), Frankfurt (Oder), 5 April 1989. BStU MfS OV Radtour
1091/87, Anlage II, 1821 and 131133.
49. Abteilung XX/4, Abschlussbericht zum operativ-Vorgang Radtour, Reg.nr. V/1091/87, Frankfurt
(Oder), 24 November 1989. BStU MfS OV Radtour, 1091/87, Anlage II, 189192.
50. Information ber aktuelle Aspekte der Auen- und Innenpolitik der Niederlande im Zusammenhang
mit dem offiziellen Besuch des Genossen Honecker vom 3.-5.6.1987, 21 May 1987. BStU MfS HVA 47,
8591.
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