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BAUTISTA - BISNAR - BOMBALES - FORTES - KUNG - MAGSUMBOL - PAJA - TABAG - YAP

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department
Section 1
A. Non-delegability
1. Rubi v. Provincial Board - BAUTISTA
Facts: Rubi and various other Manguianes, who are commonly known as Mangyans, in the province of Mindoro were
ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to change their dwellings from their native habitat. They were told to
establish themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, which is actually still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there. Non
compliance would mean that they would be punished by imprisonment. The Mangyans had been ordered to live in the
reservation to be cultivated, as the Mangyans were viewed as a non-Christian tribe of a very low culture.
One of the Mangyans named Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and placed in prison at
Calapan, for the sole reason that he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on his
behalf by Rubi and other Mangyans of the province. They allege that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of
Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145
of the Administrative Code was challenged; it states:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the
provincial board.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation.
2. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.
Held:
1. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative
Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine whether or not to execute the law
but the provincial governor. It falls upon the discretion of the provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances may
arise. Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class
legislation. One cannot say that the liberty of the citizen was unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
Mangyans is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say
that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of
the laws: there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped
with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Mangyans, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be
confined for a time, for their own good and the good of the country.
2. Among other things, the term non-christian should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it
was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term non-christian it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a
way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case,
the Mangyans were being brought to the reservation to promote peace and to put their seminomadic lifestyle to rest.

2. Pelaez v. Auditor General - BISNAR

From Sept. 4 to October 29, 1964, the President, claiming to act in accordance with Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code, issued several Executive Orders that led to the creation of 33 municipalities.
Sec. 68: The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries,
of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or
diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political
division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with
another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such
place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress
of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any
province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative
officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of
the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers
affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an equitable
distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as
may be recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-General)
President of the Philippines.

Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President, instituted an action against the Auditor General to restrain him from passing in audit
any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities.
He argued that the power of the President to create municipalities under Sec. 68 amounts to undue delegation of
legislative power.
Issue: Whether Sec. 68 was a valid delegation of power?

Ruling: No.
The power to create a municipal corporation is strictly a legislative function.
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that
said law:
1. Be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; and
2. Fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions.
Without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence
of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the
power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by
the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
Under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require.
The phrase "as the public welfare may require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place
to which the seat of the government may be transferred.
This fact becomes more apparent when we consider that said Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748, 3 which
provided that, "whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by executive
order," effect the changes enumerated therein (as in said section 68), including the change of the seat of the government
"to such place ... as the public interest requires."
It is also important to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative bills for the creation of the
municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress.
Section 10 (1) of Article VII:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over
all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as
may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well
as to act in lieu of such officers.

This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the
latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or
the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments.
Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of
their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had
thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take
appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council
within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official
of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding
provincial board.
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating
a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby
become vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually
creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of
control denied to him by the Constitution.

3. Cebu Oxygen v. Drilon - BOMBALES

Facts:

Petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees, Cebu Oxygen, Acetylene and Central Visayas Employees
Association (COAVEA) entered into a CBA covering 1986-1988

Pursuant thereto, the management gave salary increases

However, CBA also provides that this clause:

o
xxxx THAT THIS PAY INCREASE SHALL BE CREDITED AS PAYMENT TO ANY MANDATED
GOVERNMENT WAGE ADJUSTMENT OR ALLOWANCE INCREASES WHICH MAY BE ISSUED BY
WAY OF LEGISLATION, DECREE OR PRESIDENTIAL EDICT COUNTED FROM THE ABOVE DATE TO
THE NEXT INCREASE.
xxxxIF THE WAGE ADJUSTMENT OF ALLOWANCE INCREASES DECREED BY LAW, LEGISLATION
OR PRESIDENTIAL EDICT IN ANY PARTICULAR YEAR SHALL BE HIGHER THAN THE FOREGOING
INCREASES IN THAT PARTICULAR YEAR, THEN THE COMPANY SHALL PAY THE DIFFERENCE.

On December 14, 1987, Republic Act No. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage.

Section 8 of the implementing rules however prohibits the employer from crediting anniversary wage increases
negotiated under a collective bargaining agreement against such wage increases mandated by Republic Act No.
6640.

On February 22, 1988, a DOLE Officer, commenced a routine inspection of petitioner's establishment and based
on payrolls and other records, he found that petitioner committed violations of the law (UNDERPAYMENT OF BASIC
WAGE)

Petitioner protested claiming that Section 8 of the rules implementing the provisions of Republic Act No. 6640
particularly the provision excluding anniversary wage increases from being credited to the wage increase provided by
said law is null and void on the ground that the same unduly expands the provisions of the said law.
Issue: Whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) can provide for a
prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement.
Ruling: NO
It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to
implement. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases for
purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. 6640.

The implementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law.

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with
the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The law
itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

4. Chiongbian v. Orbos - FORTES - LEUNG

Congressman Chiongbian v. Exec. Secretary Orbos (1992)
Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed a law creating the ARMM composed of the 4 provinces which through a
plebiscite expressed their votes that they wanted to be included in the said region. A total of 13 provinces and 9 cities
participated in the plebiscite (as mentioned only 4 provinces voted to be included in the ARMM). As the said law that

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created ARMM also allowed the President (Aquino) to merge the provinces who voted NOT to be included in the ARMM to
be merged into existing regions, EO 429 was issued transferring certain provinces to other regions.
The transfer of these provinces was questioned, they alleged that Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional
because
1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the
existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and
2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.
ISSUES:

whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative or executive in character? - EXECUTIVE
whether Art. XIX, 13 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the President's discretion - to promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated
social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business.
HELD:
First issue:
Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative
regions in 1972.
PD 742 restructured the regional organization of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi
PD 773 further restructured the regional organization of Mindanao
PD 1555 transferred the regional center of Region IX from Jolo to Zamboanga City.
The choice of the President as delegate is logical
The division of the country intended to facilitate administration of local governments, direction of executive departments
which the law requires should have regional offices.
In Abbas, we said that power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution
BUT it is a power traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision
over local governments [see Art. X, 4 of the Constitution]."
Regions not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
but a "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes."
"administrative in nature"
Second issue:
Legislative standard may be expressed or implied
Need not be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the
challenged legislation.
As regards the questioned law, the standard is found in another law - R.A. No. 5435 (Original Law or Organic Law
creating the ARMM) of the power to reorganize the Executive Department
States that: standard is "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs
consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the
transaction of the public business."
Therefore, while non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the
Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the
exigency of administration may require

5. US v. Ang Tang Ho - KUNG

FACTS
The Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, which authorized the Governor-General, for any cause, or conditions
resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the
Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act.
Governor-General issued Executive Order No. 53, fixing the price at which rice should be sold at Php0.63 per ganta.
A complaint was filed against Ang Tang Ho for the violation of EO No. 53, for having sold to one Pedro Trinidad 1 ganta of
rice for Php0.80.
TC: found Ang Tang Ho guilty and sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and to pay Php500.
Issue: W/N Act No. 2868 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power

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Held: Yes. This question involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the GovernorGeneral to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with
the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to
issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very
terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The
Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall
issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued for any cause, and leaves the question as to what is any cause
to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary
rise in the price of palay, rice or corn. The Legislature does not specify or define what is an extraordinary rise. That is
also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General, with the consent of the
Council of State, is authorized to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of this Act. It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such
temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the
Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment and
discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not a cause, and what is or what is not an extraordinary rise
in the price of rice, and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the
Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price
at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may
not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency,
but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher
price, the seller commits a crime.
A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and
nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand.
The law is a general law and not a local or special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other and different
provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial
treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General, and
a delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who are hereby directed to communicate
with, and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper
enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities. The issuance of the proclamation by the GovernorGeneral was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that power.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the
crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole
discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not any cause for enforcing the act, and what was
and what was not an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, and under certain undefined conditions to fix
the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be
issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law
should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was any cause, or what was an extraordinary rise
in the price of rice, palay or corn, Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be
issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because
the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades
or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80)
which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.
Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing
the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the
proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.
6. Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority - MAGSUMBOL
FACTS: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong the Court held that the
confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be
imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI

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43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of
driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be
imposed by the Commission. The judgment became final and executory on August 6, 1990.
Subsequently, there are people complaining that they were stopped for alleged traffic violations and their drivers licenses
were confiscated by traffic enforcers in QC and Mandaluyong and one in Makati by a police officer. Hence, the CaloocanManila Drivers and Operators Association sent a letter to the Court asking who should enforce the decision in the abovementioned case, whether they could seek damages for confiscation of their driver's licenses, and where they should file
their complaints. A lawyer also complained of the removal of his license plate by a MMA officer and of the confiscation of
his license by a police officer.

The people complained of have the following defense:

One invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of driver's licenses and the
removal of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations.
One said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District
Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction under certain
conditions.
One argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of license plates and not the confiscation of driver's
licenses.
The MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."
The Court issued the following resolution:
The attention of the Court has been called to the enactment by the Metropolitan Manila Authority of Ordinance No. 11,
Series of 1991, providing inter alia that:
Section 2. Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound. The Metropolitan Manila Authority, thru the Traffic
Operation Center, is authorized to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned
motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.
The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar (as reported in 187 SCRA 432),
where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except only under the conditions
prescribed in LOI 43.

MMA defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392.
It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its governing body) the responsibility among others of:
1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination or consolidation for the Authority; and
2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application, approval of a code of basic services
requiring coordination, and exercise of its rule-making powers. (Emphasis supplied)
The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was meant to
supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was
invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The Authority also
pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity.
ISSUE: W/N there was a valid exercise of a delegated legislative power?
HELD: No.
The MMA sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, under the specific authority conferred upon it by EO 392, while
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local
Government Code. It is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort and convenience of the
public and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of traffic rules.
The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the
requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation;
and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard.
Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the
delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion to

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determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the
case at bar.
As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of
which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent the delegation from running riot." This
requirement has also been met. It is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and
passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority.
But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve
is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature.
Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such
acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by
the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion
because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of
license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is
nothing in the provisions of the decree authorizing the MMA to impose such sanctions. In fact, the above provisions
prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and
otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by
the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be
imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's
license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the MMA and all other local political subdivisions
comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong.
The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions
are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except
only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution
itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the
Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the
case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has
the force and effect of a statute.
The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting. Curiously, it is the measure itself,
which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the
questioned sanction. The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose
sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in
effect partially repeal the law.
At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the
imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed by
the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.
It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either
directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila.
Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles
(except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan
Manila.

7. People v. Dacuycuy - PAJA

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have
been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the
length of service of a term of imprisonment that must be encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by law.

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The absence of designated limits will constitute an undue delegation, if not an outright intrusion into or assumption, of
legislative power. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither
a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given too much
latitude in its discretion to fix the term of imprisonment. Without the benefit of any sufficient standard, a judge may be
allowed to fix the duration within the range of one minute to the life span of the accused. Thus, Section 32 of the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers was declared unconstitutional (without prejudice to other constitutional provisions).
Nature of the case: criminal case
F: Private respondents were charged for violating Republic Act No. 4670 otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers. Private respondents alleged, among others, that Section 32 of said law, is unconstitutional as it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the
discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government. The disputed section of Republic
Act No. 4670 provides:
Sec. 32. Penal Provision. ___ A person who shall willfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the
exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to defeat any of the
provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one
thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. (Italics supplied).
I: Whether or not a law that gives the court the discretion to impose a sentence of imprisonment without limits is a valid
delegation of legislative power?
H: NO
R: An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative authority to the courts exists in cases
where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It is clear, however, that when the courts are to exercise discretion, it must
be a mere legal discretion, which is exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law and which, when discerned, it is
the duty of the court to follow. So it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the principle of separation of
powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence or the amount of fine between
designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of a crime.
In the case under consideration, the respondent judge erronneously assumed that since the penalty of
imprisonment has been provided for by the legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or
period of imprisonment. We cannot agree with this postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where
no points of reference have been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an
exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific or
designated limits provided by law, the absence of which designated limits will constitute such exercise as an undue
delegation, if not an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power.
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a
minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of
discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration
thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this
cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this
case, does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time,
the presumption of constitutionality has to yield. On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause
in Section 34 of Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be, as it is
hereby, declared unconstitutional.

8. Abakada v. Executive Secretary - TABAG

FACTS: On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before the law took
effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of
petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: That the President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%,
after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and
four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);

9
or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1%)
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is an abdication by
Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They
argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be included within the purview of
tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the
government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause,
influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no
guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on
account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative
power? NO.
HELD: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and
exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be delegated is the authority to make a complete lawcomplete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency of
its enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise which determines
the validity of its delegation.
The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies
For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement
and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12%
rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation
of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the
President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use
of the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent
with the idea of discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the
conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose
the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact--- whether by December
31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government
deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1%. If either of these two instances has occurred,
the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President.
In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance
is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative
department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance
becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all
the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is
to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by
Congress is present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must
do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative
process can go forward.

10
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.

Note: Section 1 focuses on Non-delegability, but this case has several procedural and substantive issue. Just in case,
these issue include:
(Procedural) Violation of exclusive orgination of revenue bills (from Congress) - no violaiton
(Procedural) Violation of non-ammendment rule in transmitting bills from Congress to Senate - no violation, changes
introduced by the bicameral conference commitee were only meant to reconcile disagreeing provisions in the bill
(Substantial) Uniformity and equitability of taxation - VAT even if anti-thesis of progressive taxation is valid because the
mandate to Congress is NOT to prescribe to EVOLVE a progressive system of taxation
(Substantial) Violation of due process and equal protection clause reflected in the provision on input and output taxes provision is valid, State has power to make reasonable and nautral classificaitons

9. Belgica v. Executive Secretary - YAP

Facts:

There were 6 whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of
pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs.

Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging 5 lawmakers for Plunder, and 3
other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the
heads and other officials of 3 implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.

Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off
Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.

Several Petitions has been lodge to declare the Pork Barrel unconstitutional

Petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel among others, the 2013 PDAF Article "wrecks the
assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators to
interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed."

Respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the President maintains
"ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the
legislators proposals.
Issue: WON there was undue delegation of legislative powers.
Ruling: YES.

The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government.

Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter,
Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following
the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except
in accordance with an appropriation made by law.

Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there
the Executives role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries
between them, Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the Executive.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed
from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4.
o Special Provision 1 - allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified
project falls under a general program listed in the said menu
o Special Provision 2 - implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to
Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and submitted by implementing
agencies from which the legislator may make his choice. It also authorizes legislators to identify PDAF
projects outside his district for as long as the representative of the district concerned concurs in writing
o Special provision 3 - PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified by legislators" and thereunder
provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator
o par 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the project identification "shall be
submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable
endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be."

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene
and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution

The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated from the moment the law
becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the

11

implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.
Furthermore, respondents admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement
before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the
entire budget execution process, hence not merely recommendatory.

Section 3
A. Imposition of other qualifications
10. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board - BAUTISTA
Facts:
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated
December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to
those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No.
6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for,
elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165
and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision
in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional.

Held:
1. No. Pimentels contention is valid. Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative
rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic
law to which all laws must conform. No act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution; whatever limits it imposes must
be observed.
The provision which states that no person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test is not valid as it expands the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing
and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications
on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet this additional qualification, the COMELEC is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the
democratic process of election should not be challenged by unnecessary requirements which are not specified in the
Constitution.

Section 5
A. Apportionment
11. Mariano, Jr. v. Comelec - BISNAR

RA 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be Knowns as the City of Makati)
was enacted, Sec. 52, Art. X of which provides:

12

Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two
(2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic
Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held
after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in
lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district.
Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the law arguing that:
1. It increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision
requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every
census;
2. the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of
the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000; and
3. the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill.
Issue: Whether RA 7854 is constitutional?
Ruling: RA 7854 is constitutional.
1. In the earlier case of Tobias v. Abalos, it has already been ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made
through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city.
The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members,
unless otherwise fixed by law.
The Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law.
This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative
district.
To hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative
districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.
The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.
2. The Constitution provides that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least
one representative.
Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000).
3. Finally there is no merit in the contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have been
expressly stated in the title of the bill.
The Court favors a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation.
The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its
details.
It is sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general
subject."
12. Montejo v. Comelec - BOMBALES
Facts:
Province of Leyte is composed of 5 districts:

13

In 1959, RA 2141 was enacted and Biliran made its sub-province: Almeria, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan,
Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein
In 1992, when LGC took effect, the sub province of Biliran become a regular province
It was as approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held
As a consequence: 3rd district was reduced to 5 municipalities only.
Clubian, Leyte, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba with a total population of only 145,067.
To remedy the inequality On December 29, 1994, it promulgated Resolution No. 2736 it transferred the municipality of
Capoocan of the 2nd District and the municipality of Palompon of the 4 th District to the 3rd District of Leyte

Petitioner, representing the First District of Leyte, prays for the annulment of Sec1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the
COMELEC, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation.
To remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the 2nd of the
province.
Intervenor Apostol, representing the 2nd District, opposed the inclusion ofTolosa in his district.
Respondent Commission denied the motion ruling that:
(1) its adjustment of municipalities involved the least disruption of the territorial composition of each district; and
(2) said adjustment complied with the constitutional requirement that each legislative district shall comprise, as
far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
Petitioner however insists that Sec1of Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of equality of representation ordained in
the Constitution. Citing Wesberry v. Sanders, he argues that respondent COMELEC violated "the constitutional precept
that as much as practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's."
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, concurred with the views of the petitioner.
The intervenor, however, opposed the petition on two (2) grounds:
(1) COMELEC has no jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736; and
(2) assuming it has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in accord with the Constitution.
Respondent COMELEC filed its own Comment alleging that it acted within the parameters of the Constitution.
Issue: W/N the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment?
Ruling:NO, Sec1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of Capoocan Palompon the 3rd District
of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside.
Records reveal that this issue was resolved by the Constitutional Commission which denied to the COMELEC the major
power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the
COMELEC "to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made."

Accordingly, minor adjustments would mean: the authority conferred would be on minor corrections or amendments,
meaning to say, for instance, that we may have forgotten an intervening municipality in the enumeration, which ought to
be included in one district. That we shall consider a minor amendment.
Clearly, the excerpts from the discussion provides that:
o THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Romulo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
o MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
o
I was about to ask the committee the meaning of minor adjustment. Can it be possible that one
municipality in a district be transferred to another district and call it a minor adjustment?
o MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done, Mr. Presiding Officer. Minor, meaning, that there should be no change
in the allocations per district. However, it may happen that we have forgotten a municipality in between
which is still in the territory of one assigned district, or there may be an error in the correct name of a

14
particular municipality because of changes made by the interim Batasang Pambansa and the Regular
Batasang Pambansa. There were many batas pambansa enacted by both the interim and the Regular
Batasang Pambansa changing the names of municipalities.
o
MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor adjustment may be made only if one of the municipalities is not
mentioned in the ordinance appended to, and it will be up for the COMELEC now to adjust or to put such
municipality to a certain district.
o MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. For instance, we may not have the data regarding a division of a
municipality by the interim Batasang Pambansa or the Regular Batasang Pambansa into two
municipalities, meaning, a mother municipality and the new municipality, but still actually these are within
the geographical district area.
o MR. DE CASTRO. So the minor adjustment which the COMELEC cannot do is that, if, for example, my
municipality is in the First District of Laguna, they cannot put that in any other district.
o MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor correction. It is a substantive one.
Lastly,consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give
the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The
power granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities)
13. Aldaba v. Comelec - FORTES - LEUNG
Doctrine: A city which has reached 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the immediately following
election after the attainment of the 250,000 population. Therefore, not as soon as it attains the 250K population.
Note: Each province, irrespective of number of inhabitants is entitled to at least 1 representative

FACTS:
Original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional RA 9591
RA 9591 created a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan
petition alleged RA violated the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
Congress relied on a certification issued by a Regional Director of NSO
Projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of
3.78 between 1995 to 2000
OSG contended that Congress use of projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on the wisdom
of the standard adopted by the legislature to determine compliance with a constitutional requirement
ISSUES:
WON RA 9591 creating a separate legislative district of Malolos City is constitutional - NO
Whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating
a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections? -NO
HELD:
RA 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district it must have a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because
Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification.
The certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the
National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB).
Certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer.
Intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.
As the Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic projections he certified have been
declared official by the NSCB. Records also do not also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based
on demographic projections declared official by the NSCB.
The Certification, which states that the population of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010, violates the requirement
that intercensal demographic projections shall be as of the middle of every year. In addition, there is no showing that
Regional Director Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic
projections in Region III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be
given credence by this Court.

15
B. Party List System
14. BANAT v. Comelec - KUNG
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the
winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from
party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes
cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats this
is pursuant to the2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if it garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the partylist election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the
proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is
void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in
the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to
meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying
vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower
house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA
7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections
or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one
seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250
members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from
party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the
lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May
2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55
seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number of party-list representatives
shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20%
shall be filled.

16
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which
garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further,
the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court
explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the
party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55
seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list
seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not
qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats
in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats
are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded
in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which
garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats
given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists
were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats.
(Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the
additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2%
of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The
product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit
rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for
the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a
guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes
cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats,
those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until
all the seats are occupied.

17
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc)
from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA
7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word party was not qualified and
that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in
the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect
participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people
defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution
and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections.
Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.

15. Atong Paglaum v. Comelec - MAGSUMBOL

FACTS: These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list
groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying
them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the
party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.

Guys, I cannot put everything kasi 54 resolutions siya but here are some of the reasons why their registrations were
cancelled:
The "artists" sector is not considered marginalized and underrepresented;
Failure to prove track record
Failure of the nominees to qualify under RA 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani.
A non-stock savings and loan association cannot be considered marginalized and underrepresented; and
The first and second nominees are not teachers by profession.
Failure to establish that its nominees are members of the indigenous people in the Mindanao and Cordilleras sector that
the party seeks to represent;
The sector it represents is a specifically defined group which may not be allowed registration under the party-list system;
and

ISSUES:
1. W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration
under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations?
NO
2. W/N the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections? NO
HELD:
1. We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this Court in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts
in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system,
thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the
COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list
system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this
Decision.
2. The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list system is
intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to
win seats in the House of Representatives.The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for
his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice.
For the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually
envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

18
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the
COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do
not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates
in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is
linked to a political party through a coalition.
Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined
political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns
of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that
lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies,"
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these
two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector
they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties
they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also,
petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they
may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been
disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one
or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As
discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Present petitions were remanded to the COMELEC.

Section 6
A. Residence qualification
16. Romualdez - Marcos v. Comelec - PAJA

1. Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: Residence, for election purposes, is used synonymously with domicile. Domicile
includes the twin elements of the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently. Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. If a persons
intent is to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.
Thus, it is perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only
have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of
choice. It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement. The Supreme Court
reiterated the following from Larena vs. Teves: First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. Second, domicile of

19
origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1) an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; 2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and 3) acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the following facts did not
constitute intent to abandon her original domicile or at least proved that she had chosen her original domicile as her
present domicile: 1) having been a registered voter for several years in the past in San Juan, Manila; 2) having different
residences in Metro Manila, Ilocos, etc.; and 3) Mrs. Marcos marriage to Mr. Marcos.
Nature of the case: election case
F: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte. The pertinent entries are as follows:
7.RESIDENCE (complete Address):Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES:
Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8.RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ Years and SevenMonths.
Based on the above the incumbent representative of the First District of Leyte filed a Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification with the Commission on Elections alleging that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitutions one-year residency
requirement for candidates to the House of Representatives. In that same petition, it was also alleged that Mrs. Marcos had
been a registered voter in San Juan, Manila and resided in different locations with her late husband for several years in the
past.
Mrs. Marcos filed a petition to Amend/Correct Certificate of Candidacy but the same was denied by the
Commission on Elections for being filed out of time. In her Answer to the Petition for Disqualification, Mrs. Marcos
alleged that her entry of the word seven was the result of an honest misinterpretation. She alleges that her interpretation
of the provision was that it asked for the time she had lived in her actual residence and not how long she had been
domiciled in the district where she seeks to be elected. COMELEC disagreed and granted the disqualification. Having
garnered the most votes, she filed a petition on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
I: Whether or not the petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of at least
one year as provided by Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution?
H: YES
R: The Supreme Court ruled that the Commission on Elections had confused the concepts of domicile and residence in
election law. Residence, for election purposes, is used synonymously with domicile. So settled is the concept (of domicile)
in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual
from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
Domicile includes the twin elements of the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the
physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country.
The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when
the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure,
business, or health. If a persons intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his
purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in
various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons
his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement. The said statement
becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which

20
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly
make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting down the word seven
in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned
entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual
stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First District, which was since childhood in the space
provided. Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of
petitioners claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her actual residence in a
space which required her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item
8the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicilecoupled with the circumstances surrounding
petitioners registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be
disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if
such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
In Larena vs. Teves, we stressed:
First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents; and
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness
required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed
occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioners former domicile with an intent
to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of
her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or
under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is
concernedaffecting the rights and obligations of husband and wifethe term residence should only be interpreted to
mean actual residence. The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is
that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home,
not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new domicile after her marriage and only
acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioners acts following her return to the country clearly
indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of
law) as her domicile. This choice was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
petitioner sought the PCGGs permission to rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte . . . to
make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland. Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brothers house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention
clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it
was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her homes and residences following her arrival
in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or actual residences, not domicile. Moreover, and
proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of
origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she
cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where
situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
17. Aquino v. Comelec - TABAG
FACTS: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of
candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm
Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Aquino also indicated in his CoC that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 and a resident of the
same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. His certificate also indicated that he was a registered voter of the

21
same district. Thus, from the data furnished, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin
of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
Aquino, however, allege that his connection with the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo,
Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than
one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1
year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed
Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order
suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections
found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.
ISSUE: W/N Aquino established a domicile by choice in Makati as to qualify him as a candidate for Representative of the
Second district of Makati City. NO.

HELD: The term residence has always been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous
constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. And Aquino has NOT established a domicile of choice in the district he
was running in.
While property ownership is not and should never be an indication of the right to vote or be voted upon, the fact that
petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be
a resident in Makati indicate that the sole purpose of petitioner in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a
new residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City. The
absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions, the lack of
identification with the area and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie
petitioners claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Manila.
Petitioners submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency in newly created political
district is specious and lacks basis in logic.

18. Domino v. Comelec - YAP

Facts:
Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone legislative district of the
Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2
months.
Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino,
contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of
Sarangani where he seeks election.
COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the
lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered
the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy based on his own Voters Registration Record and his address indicated as
24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.
Petitioner claims that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement and even presented a copy of the
contract of lease to prove that he has been residing in Sarangani.
Issue: WON petitioner has complied with the 1 year residency requirement.
Ruling: NO.

22

The term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same
thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other
reasons, one intends to return.
Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new
domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the Third
District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his
residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.
A persons domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose.
The contract of lease of a house and lot does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be
indicative of Dominos intention to reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of ones original domicile.
The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it
does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani
cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.
Further, Dominos lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as
voter in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence
especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.
B. Citizenship qualification

19. Co v. House Electoral Tribunal - BAUTISTA

Facts:
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was held. One of the candidates is the respondent, Jose
Ong, Jr. The respondent was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
Petitioners questioned the citizenship of the respondent since his father was only a naturalized Filipino citizen. They also
questioned Ongs residency qualifications since he does not own any property in Samar.
Issues:
1. Is the decision of HRET appealable?
2. Is the respondent a citizen of the Philippines?
3. Is the respondent a resident of Samar?
Held:
1. Yes. The Constitution explicitly says that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. Considering the facts, the Court finds no reckless use of power, and no denial of due process on the
part of the HRET, which will make the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court necessary.
There is another reason why HRET cannot be declared as having committed manifest grave abuse of discretion. The
same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the
Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of
the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
2. Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose Ong Chuan, respondents father, an immigrant from China was declared a Filipino citizen
by the CFI of Samar. At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then was a minor of 9 years, was
finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. Hence, there is no ground to deny the Filipino citizenship of
respondent Ong. Respondent Ong was also born of a natural born Filipino mother, thus the issue of citizenship is
immaterial.

23
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the
principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend
himself? A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to
perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were
this matter to be made a central issue in this case.
The issue is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan but to determine whether or not the HRET
committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship
through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine
whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both
mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally
renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality.
3. Yes. The framers of the Constitution followed the earlier definition given to the word residence which is considered to
have the same meaning as domicile. The domicile of origin of the respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is
fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to what the petitioner is claiming, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned his said domicile. It
has not changed even up to the present. Therefore, the residency of respondent Ong was sufficiently proved.

Section 7
A. Term and tenure
20. Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr. - BISNAR

Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative of the 2nd District of Lanao del Sur.
He took his oath and thereafter, performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges pertaining to the office.
He filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Upon being informed that Dimaporo filed a Certificate of Candidacy, the Speaker and Secretary of the House of
Representatives excluded his name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, as provided in Sec. 67,
Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one in which he is holding in a
permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of certificate of candidacy.
When Dimaporo lost in the autonomous region elections, he sent a letter to the Speaker expressing his intentions to
resume performing his duties and function as an elected member of the Congress.
Dimaporo failed to regain his seat, resulting to him filing the present petition, questioning the removal of his name from the
Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.
Issue: Whether Dimaporos removal from Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he filed his certificate of
candidacy for Regional Governor of the ARMM was valid?

Ruling: Yes. When an elective official files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut
short his tenure, not his term.
Term is different from tenure.
Term of office - prescribed by the Constitution, may not be extended or shortened by the legislature.
Tenure - the period during which an officer actually holds office, may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the
power of the said officer.
It may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. But these situations will not change the duration of the term of
office.
There are 4 grounds in Art. VI, by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened:
Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,
Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
This list of grounds is not exclusive. It does not preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds.
The filing of a certificate of candidacy for another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office
presently being held.

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Section 10
A. Salaries
21. Philconsa v. Mathay - BOMBALES
Facts:

Philconsa filed a suit against the former Auditor General of the Philippines and Jose Velasco (auditor of Congress)
seeking to permanently enjoin these officials from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries
authorized by RA 4131 to the Speaker and members of House of Reps before Dec 1969.

RA 4134 (approved 1964) increased the salaries of the Senate President and House Speaker from P16k to P40k and the
senators and representatives, from P7,200 to P32k each

It further provides that the salary increase of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall take effect on the effectivity of the salary increase of Congressmen and Senators.

The Budget for the Year July 1 1965 to June 30, 1966 (RA 4642) it contained the ff:
o Speaker
From July 1 to Dec 29, 1965

16,000
From Dec 30, 1965 to June 30 1966

40,000

o Members
From July 1 to Dec 29, 1965

103 members @P7,200

From Dec 30, 1965 to June 30 1966

103 members @32,000

o Senate President= P16,000
o 23 Senators @7,200 each= P165,600

Thus showing that the 1965-1966 Budget (R.A. No. 4642) implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives set by Republic Act 4134 which was only approved in 1964.

The petitioners contend that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, as amended in
1940, that provides as follows:
o
SEC. 14. The Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise
provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including
per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of traveling expenses to and from
their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of Representatives, and to and from their
places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in
said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of ALL the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such, increase. Until otherwise provided by law,
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an
annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.

It should be noted that term of the eight senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of Republic Act No.
4134, will expire only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the
approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.

Previously, there was actually a written protest given by PHILCONSA which was later endorsed to Secretary of Justice but
before the Secretary of Justice could act on it, respondent directed his representative in Congress, respondent Velasco, to
pass in audit and approve the payment of the increased salaries within the limits of the Appropriation Act in force; hence
the filing of the present action.
Issue: W/N the expiration of the term of the members of the House of Representatives who approved the increase suffices
to make the higher compensation effective for them, regardless of the term of the members of the Senate.
Ruling: NO

In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully
effective, the constitutional provision refers to "all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives" in the
same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them.
This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the "expiration of the full term" of the
Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form, and not the plural, despite the
difference in the terms of office (six years for Senators and four for Representatives thereby rendering more evident the
intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word

25
"term" in the singular, when combined with the following phrase "all the members of the Senate and of the House",
underscores that in the application of Article VI, Section 14, the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all
members of the Legislature that enacted the measure (whether Senators or Representatives) must have expired before
the increase in compensation can become operative.
Dispositive: Writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby granted, and the items of the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year
1965-1966 (RA 4642) purporting to authorize the disbursement of the increased compensation to members of the Senate
and the House of Representatives even prior to December 30, 1969 are declared void, as violative of Article VI, section
14, of the Constitution
Section 11
A. Privilege of speech and debate
22. Jimenez v. Cabangbang - FORTES - LEUNG
Col. Jimenez v. Congressman Cabangbang (1966)

Facts:
Petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Cabangbang caused to be published an open letter to the President of the Philippines alleging that there are alleged
operational plan by the military and civilians in order to have then DND Secretary Jesus Vargas be elected as the next
President of the Philippines
Cabangbangs open letter further alleged that Col. Jimenez is among those who are being manipulated and controlled by
the plotters
Col. Nicanor Jimenez and 2 others filed a suit for damages against Cabangbang for the publication of allegedly libelous
letters
Cabangbang interposed the defense that:
At the time of the publication of the letters he was a member of the House of Representatives
The letter was not libelous and was privileged communication
1935 Constitution states:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning
from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section
15.)
WON: The publication of the open letter of then Cong. Cabangbang falls within the purview of the phrase
"speech or debate therein" - NO

HELD:
Speech or debate therein means: utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in
Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and
of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts
in question
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category.
It was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not
in session
Defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about
said date.
It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a
member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof.
Also the letter was not libelous as it clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said coup d' etat,

B. Privilege from arrest

23. People v. Jalosjos - KUNG

26
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant
filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the
basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges
and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision
of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence
is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than
six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all
the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that
of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Section 14
A. Prohibitions
24. Puyat v. De Guzman, Jr. MAGSUMBOL
FACTS:An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation,
was held. There were two factions in the group of directors (6 directors are called as part of Puyat Group while directors
comprise the Acero Group). The Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.
The Acero Group instituted at SEC quo warranto proceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning
the election of May 14, 1979. The Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted.
The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice
Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel
for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973
Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body",
and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite.
The cited Constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent
Acero.
When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that 1) Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from Augusto
A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI upon request of respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director,
2) the deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and was sought to be registered on said date, 3) on the
day following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention
in the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation.
One Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case against N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior De Maas and the ACERO
group to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to respondent Acero. In that case, Assemblyman Fernandez
appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, we ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as counsel in a
case originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such situation the Court would be one "without appellate
jurisdiction."

27
Assemblyman Fernandez wanted to intervene but there was a TRO issued.
ISSUE: W/N Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case without violating
Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution (or W/N, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect,
appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.)
HELD: No.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel.
Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His
appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in
litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected
counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He
had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He
acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the
quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case
before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to
appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the
validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.
And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for
defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect "appearance as
counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition (see section 11, Article VIII of [i think] 1973 Constitution). The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable
him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable
him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be
pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.

Section 16
A. Congressional Officers
25. Avelino v. Cuenco - KUNG
FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the rightful
Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanadas request to deliver a
speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the
Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his
speech. The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12
Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed
as the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.
HELD:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature and in doing so, the court will
be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.

28
192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president,
which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera
case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A
fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves
who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to
be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in
the Supreme Court.
2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being
confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in
the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with
Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being
essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure
of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen
or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the
benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts
and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
26. Santiago v. Guingona - PAJA

Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All
that the Charter says is that [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. 4 To our mind, the
method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by
the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this
Court. Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there
an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the
holders thereof. In the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis
upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept
of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of
courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or
irregularity tainted Respondent Guingonas assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader.
Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
Nature of the case: quo warranto
F: Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad (Petitioners) instituted an original petition for quo
warranto seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of
Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
Petitioners contend that the constitutional provision requiring the election of the Senate President by majority
vote of all its members carries with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of majority and minority, as well as
who may elect a minority leader. They argue that majority in the aforequoted constitutional provision refers to that
group of senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee chairmanships.
Accordingly, those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships comprise the minority, to
whom the right to determine the minority leader belongs. As a result, petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be
the legitimate minority leader, since he voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the members of
the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not belong to the minority, having voted for
Fernan and accepted committee chairmanships.
I: Whether or not Section 16 of the Constitution provides the method upon which the Senate minority and majority leaders
are to be elected?
H: NO

29
R: The term majority has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or
aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. The plain and unambiguous
words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one
half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the majority, much less the
minority, in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual
meanings of these terms. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote
for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation
states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
Majority may also refer to the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes, not necessarily more than
one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is a group, party, or faction with a smaller
number of votes or adherents than the majority. Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the
greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than
two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the
minorities. In a government with a multiparty system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves),
there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the dominant minority party
for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to
different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribes which of the many
minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says
is that [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. 4 To our mind, the method of choosing
who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power to determine the rules of its
proceedings. Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal affairs. Notably, the
Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause
providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At
any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the
internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing
the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate
as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.
The specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position
has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Absent
any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingonas assumption
and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been
shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

B. Internal discipline
27. Osmena v. Pendatun - TABAG
FACTS: On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to the Supreme Court a verified petition for
"declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and
fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.
He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked,
principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the
portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition that if he
failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.

30
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, where it was stated that Sergio Osmea, Jr., made a privilege
speech entitled a Message to Garcia. There, he claimed to have been hearing of ugly reports that the government has
been selling free things at premium prices. He also claimed that even pardons are for sale regardless of the gravity of
the case.
The resolution stated that these charges, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth, would constitute a
serious assault upon the dignity of the presidential office and would expose it to contempt and disrepute.
The resolution formed a special committee of fifteen Members to investigate the truth of the charges against the President
of the Philippines made by Osmea, Jr. It was authorized to summon him to appear before it to substantiate his charges,
as well as to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it, and if he fails to do
so he would be required to show cause why he should not be punished by the House. The special committee shall submit
to the House a report of its findings before the adjournment of the present special session of the Congress of the
Philippines.
In support of his request, Osmea alleged that the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity
for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly
objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides
that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to
answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
The Supreme Court decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer, without issuing any
preliminary injunction.
The special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Congressman Osmea a chance to defend himself,
found him guilty of serious disorderly behavior and acting on such report, the House approved on the same day House
Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.
The respondents filed their answer where they challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended
the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension and then invited attention to the fact that Congress
having ended its session, the Committee had thereby ceased to exist.
After the new resolution, Osmena added that the House has no power under the Constitution, to suspend one of its
members.
ISSUE: W/N Osmena can be held liable for his speech? YES.
HELD: YES. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators
or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." The provision has always been
understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the
members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's
power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity whose purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one it may offend."
It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil
actionsbefore the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming a member.
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been censured, committed to prison, and even
expelled by the votes of their colleagues. This was the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary
action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. For instance, the Philippine Senate, in April
1949, suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the
Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.

31
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against him, because after his speech it
had taken up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, that
such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may
done by unanimous consent.
Granted that the House may suspend the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or renew its rights to
take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws extending the period of limitation of actions and making them applicable to
actions that had lapsed. At any rate, courts are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them. Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action taken by a deliberative body
when the required number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
28. Pimentel, Jr. v. Senate Committee - YAP
Facts:

Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which directed the Senate Ethics Committee to investigate the
alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator Manny Villar into the C5 Extension Project.

After the election of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate President, the Ethics Committee was reorganized, but
the Minority failed to name its representatives to the Committee, prompting a delay in the investigation.
Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee.

In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the Senate, and not with
the Ethics Committee.

Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved that the responsibility of the Ethics
Committee be transferred to the Senate as a Committee of the Whole, which was approved by the majority.

In the hearings of such Committee, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to
the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also questioned the quorum, and proposed amendments to the Rules.
Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the need to publish the rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.

Issue: WON the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of the majority
quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution.
Ruling: YES.

The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and
affirmed by this Court. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: "Each House shall determine
the rules of its proceedings."

This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the House of Congress
in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. The only limitation to the power of Congress to
promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these
requirements are complied with, the Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules.

In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of the Senate since
the proceedings involve the Senates exercise of its disciplinary power over one of its members. Clearly, the Rules
of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate. However, Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules of
the Senate Committee of the Whole provides:
o Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation.

Respondent cannot dispense with the publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee
had already been published in the Official Gazette.

Incidentally, we note that Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is an exact
reproduction of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges which states that
the Ethics Committee shall be composed of 7 members, contrary to the fact that the Senate Committee of the
Whole consists of all members of the Senate. In addition, Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole is an exact reproduction of Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on
Ethics and Privileges which states that only two members of the Ethics Committee shall constitute a quorum,
contrary to respondents allegation in its Comment that eight members of the Senate Committee of the Whole
shall constitute a quorum.

However, if the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a majority of the Senate is required to
constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Otherwise, there will
be a circumvention of this express provision of the Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of

32
the Senate Committee of the Whole require modification to comply with requirements of quorum and voting which
the Senate must have overlooked in this case. In any event, in case of conflict between the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole and the Constitution, the latter will of course prevail.
C. Journals
29. United States v. Pons - BAUTISTA
Facts:
Sometime in 1915, Pons, Beliso and Larsarte were charged with the crime of illegal importation of opium punishable
under Act 2381. Pons and Beliso were tried separately. Each were found guilty of the crime charged. Counsel of Pons
contends that the last day of the special session of the Phil. Legislature of 1914 was on the 28th day of Feb. that Act 2381
under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th day of Feb. but on March 1
and that therefore the same act is void.
Counsel of Pons further alleged that the assemblys clock was stopped on Feb. 28 at midnight and left so until the
determination of the discussion of all pending matters, amongst which Act 2381. To prove such allegations, counsel
argued that the court should go beyond the proceedings of the legislature as recorded in the journals.
Issue:
Whether the court may go beyond the recitals of legislative journal for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment
when such journals are clear.
Held:
From their very nature and object, the records of the legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquire
into the veracity of the journals when they are as we have said clear and explicit, would be to violate both letter and spirit
of the organic law by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of legislature.

D. Enrolled Bill
30. Casco v. Gimenez - BISNAR

The Central Bank issued RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law) imposing a 25% margin fee on the foreign
exchange transactions.
Casco Philippines Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glue used in bonding lumber and
veneer by plywood and hardwood producers.
It bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde, which were raw materials in the production of
glues.
For those transactions, it also paid a margin fee.
Casco, claiming exemption under Sec. 2 of RA 2609, which exempted from margin fees the sale of foreign exchange for
the importation of urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users, sought a refund of the amount it had paid as margin fees.
The Auditor General refused to grant the refund, claiming that Casco was not covered by the exemption as what was
exempted was the importation of urea formaldehyde, not urea and formaldehyde.
Casco, on the other hand, countered that that the term urea formaldehyde appearing in the provision should be
construed as urea and formaldehyde.
It further claimed that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction and between the terms urea
and formaldehyde, and that the Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential
elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", citing in support of this view the
statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.

33
Issue: Whether Casco is covered by the exemption?

Ruling: No.
Whereas "urea" and "formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, Urea
formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite
proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This
produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use
in the manufacture of plywood.
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea" and
"formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde".
The individual statements made on the floor of the Senate during the consideration of the bill, do not necessarily reflect
the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives.
The enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon
the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by
the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not
by judicial decree.

31. Astorga v. Villegas - BOMBALES

Facts:

On March 1964 HB 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Reps.

It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964 thus the Bill was sent to Senate for
concurrence
o It was referred to the Senate Committee headed by Senator Roxas.
The committee recommended approval with a minor amendment: that instead of the City Engineer
it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in
case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.

When the bill was discussed on second reading, substantial amendments to Section 1 were introduced by Senator
Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate.

HOWEVER, the amendment recommended by Senator Roxas DOES NOT appear in the journal of the Senate
proceedings as having been acted upon.

On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Reps that HB 9266 had been passed by the
Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments."
o Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment: The one recommended by Senator Roxas and
NOT the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate.

The printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, Speaker of the
House, Senate President and was subsequently signed by the President. Thus, the BILL become RA 4065.

Respondent immediately issued a press statement saying that the enrolled copy of HB 9266 signed into law was a wrong
version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by Tolentino and
approved on the Senate floor

With this, the Senate President sent out a letter addressed to the President explaining that the enrolled copy of the Bill
signed was not the Bill duly approved by the Congress. This the signatures are invalid and of no effect.

The President subsequently sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress informing he was
officially withdrawing his signature on HB adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy to convert into law
what was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress."

Petitioner, then Vice-MayorAstorga, filed a petition for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the
Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members of the
municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.

Respondents' claim that the RA 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that
the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
Issue: W/N RA 4065 was duly enacted?
Ruling: NO . RA 4065 has not been duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not require the
presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the following provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal."

34

o
o
o
o
o

Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its
final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the President shall
have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof
shall be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered on the Journal."
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is
true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in
this case.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of HB 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text
passed by both Houses of Congress.
Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the
purpose.
And since the journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the
Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him.
And also since both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein.
Thus, the court denied the petition for ruling otherwise would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.
Lastly, the SC emphasized that the rule that the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that
may be provided for in the Congress (may be proved) by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by their order; provided, that in
the case of acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is in existence a copy signed by
the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and of the
due enactment thereof is is the very basis of the ENROLLED BILL THEORY.
E. Quorum

32. Datu Abas Kida v. Senate - FORTES - LEUNG

Note: This digest focuses only on the issue of quorum

Facts:
Constitutionality of RA 10153 which:
Postponed the regional elections in ARMM which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011 to the
second Monday of May 2013
in order for the ARMM elections to be synchronized with Philippine national elections
Recognized the Presidents power to appoint OICs (governor, etc) to temporarily assume these positions upon the
expiration of the terms of the elected officials
Datu Kida, et al, alleged that RA 10153 is invalid because it did not conform to the voting requirements set forth by RA
9054, the organic act which created the ARMM, which states that:
Art. 17, Sec1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the
Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate voting separately.
This means that the law that created the ARMM may be amended or revised only upon 2/3 vote of the Congress and
Senate
SC declared the 2/3 vote requirement or the supermajority requirement is unconstitutional as only a majority vote is
required by the Constitution for Congress to have a quorum and to pass, amend, revise law
ISSUE: WON the 2/3 voting requirement set forth by RA 9054 is unconstitutional? - YES

HELD:
Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable law
Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere majority vote, provided there is
quorum.
In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting requirement than the Constitution provides
(2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which we sought to establish in
Duarte.
To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures
Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 erects a high vote threshold for each House of Congress to surmount, effectively and
unconstitutionally, taking RA 9054 beyond the reach of Congress amendatory powers.

35

One Congress cannot limit or reduce the plenary legislative power of succeeding Congresses by requiring a higher vote
threshold than what the Constitution requires to enact, amend or repeal laws.
No law can be passed fixing such a higher vote threshold because Congress has no power, by ordinary legislation, to
amend the Constitution

Section 17
A. The Electoral Tribunal
33. Robles v. House Electoral Tribunal - KUNG
DOCTRINE: It is an established doctrine that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of the parties
but continues until the case is terminated. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the
Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a
party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired.
FACTS: Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for the position of
Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City in the last May 11, 1987 congressional elections. Petitioner Robles was
proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987.
On January 5, 1988, Santos filed an election protest with respondent HRET. He alleged that the elections in the 1st
District of Caloocan City held last May 11, 1987 were characterized by the commission of electoral frauds and
irregularities in various forms, on the day of elections, during the counting of votes and during the canvassing of the
election returns. He likewise prayed for the recounting of the genuine ballots in all the 320 contested precincts.
On January 14, 1988, petitioner filed his Answer the protest. He alleged as among his affirmative defenses, the lack of
residence of protestant and the late filing of his protest.
On September 8, 1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision and on September 12, 1988, Santos filed a
Motion to Withdraw Protest on the unrevised precincts.
No action on Robles' motion to suspend revision and Santos' motion to withdraw protest on unrevised precincts were yet
taken by respondent HRET.
It is petitioner's main contention in this petition that when private respondent Santos filed the Motion to Withdraw Protest
on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing dated September 12, 1988, respondent HRET lost its
jurisdiction over the case, hence, when respondent HRET subsequently ordered the revision of the unrevised protested
ballots, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the protest, it acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: W/N HRET still maintains its jurisdiction over the case/protest?
RULING: The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without any action on
the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction, once
acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.
Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when
the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired.
We hold therefore that this Tribunal retains the power and the authority to grant or deny Protestant's Motion to Withdraw, if
only to insure that the Tribunal retains sufficient authority to see to it that the will of the electorate is ascertained.
In the absence of any clear showing of abuse of discretion on the part of respondent tribunal in promulgating the assailed
resolutions, a writ of certiorari will not issue.

36
Further, petitioner's objections to the resolutions issued by respondent tribunal center mainly on procedural technicalities,
i.e., that the motion to withdraw, in effect, divested the HRET of jurisdiction over the electoral protest. This argument aside
from being irrelevant and baseless, overlooks the essence of a public office as a public trust. The right to hold an elective
office is rooted on electoral mandate, not perceived entitlement to the office. This is the reason why an electoral tribunal
has been set up in order that any doubt as to right/mandate to a public office may be fully resolved vis-a-vis the
popular/public will. To this end, it is important that the tribunal be allowed to perform its functions as a constitutional body,
unhampered by technicalities or procedural play of words.
The allegation of petitioner that he was deprived of due process when respondent tribunal rendered a partial
determination pursuant to Section 18 of the HRET rules and found that Santos made a recovery of 267 votes after the
revision of the first twenty-five per cent of the contested precincts has likewise, no basis. The partial determination was
arrived at only by a simple addition of the votes adjudicated to each party in the revision of which both parties were
properly represented.
It would not be amiss to state at this point that "an election protest is impressed with public interest in the sense that the
public is interested in knowing what happened in the elections" (Dimaporo v. Estipona, supra.), for this reason, private
interests must yield to what is for the common good.
ACCORDINGLY, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal in issuing the assailed resolutions, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

34. Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal - MAGSUMBOL

FACTS: This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition
and their Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed.
The petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by
the COMELEC. Senator Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal were being asked to inhibit themselves in hearing SET
Case No. 002-87 as they are considered interested parties, therefore leaving the Senate Electoral Tribunal senateless,
and all remaining members coming from the judiciary.
The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process
imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be the
foundation petition of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both practicable and constitutionally
unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest
being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the
adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the
remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt
resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.
ISSUE: W/N the SET can function without Senators
HELD: Sec. 17.
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal hall be its Chairman.
It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and
Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial' and 'legislative' components
commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition when it held that said provision "... is a
clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests ... shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators')

37
peers in that Chamber are represented." 1 The other part, of course, is that the constitutional provision just as clearly
mandates the participation in the same process of decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.
In short, SC dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the Tribunal to not let
Senator-Members to inhibit or disqualify himself, rather, just let them refrain from participating in the resolution of a case
where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial
judgment.
35. Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal - PAJA

Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, No. L-84297, December 8, 1988

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters
within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power
necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. Thus, it is well within the power of the HRET to
prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on historical precedents and
jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself. The power granted to the Electoral
Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any
wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the same. So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, any
final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. Only in
cases where grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the HRETs judgment. In the instant
case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Courts corrective power, since no grave abuse of discretion that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for has been clearly shown.
Consequently, private respondents election protest having been filed within the period prescribed by the HRET, the latter
cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.
Nature of the case: election law
F: Resolution of the instant controversy hinges on which provision governs the period for filing protests in the HRET.
Should Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code be held applicable, private respondents election protest would have been
filed out of time. On the other hand, if Section 9 of the HRET Rules is applicable, the filing of the protest would be timely.
Succinctly stated, the basic issue is whether or not private respondents protest had been seasonably filed. This special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/ or restraining
order seeks the annulment and setting aside of the resolution of the HRET, which had held that the election protest filed
by private respondent had been filed on time.
I: Whether or not the HRET Rules prevail over the Omnibus Election Code as regards the prescriptive period of filing an
election protest? Whether or not orders or decisions by the HRET may be reviewed by the Supreme Court?
H: Yes; Generally, no
R: The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on time and, hence, the HRET acquired jurisdiction over it.
Petitioners reliance on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code,
ceased to be effective under the 1987 Constitution. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and the
legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by
constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to election regional, provincial and city offices and its appellate
jurisdiction to those involving municipal and barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].
Petitioner makes much of the fact that the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on the conduct of the election
were generally made applicable to the congressional elections of May 11, 1987. It must be emphasized, however, that such
does not necessarily imply the application of all the provisions of said code to each and every aspect of that particular
electoral exercise, as petitioner contends. On the contrary, the Omnibus Election Code was only one of several laws
governing said elections.

38
An examination of the Omnibus Election Code and the executive orders specifically applicable to the May 11,
1987 congressional elections reveals that there is no provision for the period within which to file election protests in the
respective Electoral Tribunals. Thus, the question may well be asked whether the rules governing the exercise of the
Tribunals constitutional functions may be prescribed by statute. The Court is of the considered view that it may not.
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction,
including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from
the general power granted it by the Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in the landmark case of Angara v.
Electoral Commission where the Court, declared: . . . [T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted (sic) to its cognizance
should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating
to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
The new Constitution has substantially retained the COMELECs purely administrative powers as well as its rulemaking power. In this sense, and with regard to these areas of election law, the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
are fully applicable, except where specific legislation provides otherwise. But the same cannot be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC to hear and decide election contests. The 1987 Constitution, while lodging in the
COMELEC exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of municipal
and barangay officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)], expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective
Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. Therefore, it is well within the power of the HRET to prescribe the period within which
protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on historical precedents and jurisprudence but, more importantly,
on the clear language of the Constitution itself. Consequently, private respondents election protest having been filed
within the period prescribed by the HRET, the latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.
So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter
within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. As stated earlier, the power granted to the Electoral
Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any
wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the same. As early as 1938 in Morrero v. Bocar, the Court declared that [t]he
judgment rendered by the [Electoral] Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference, except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will
constitute a denial of due process of law. Under the 1987 Constitution, the power granted to the Court includes the duty
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government [Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the HRETs judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for
the exercise of the Courts corrective power, since no grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for has been clearly shown.
36. Bondoc v. Pineda - TABAG
FACTS: Petitioner, Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc (NP) and Respondent, Marciano M. Pineda (LDP) were rival candidates for the
position of Representative for the 4th District of Pampanga in the 1987 election. Pineda was the proclaimed winner.
Bondoc filed a protest to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET was composed of Justices
Herrerra (HRET chairman), Cruz and Feliciano, 5 LDP members (among who was Representative Juanita G. Camasura)
and one NP member.
On October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won by a margin of 23 votes. Not satisfied with the
outcome, the LDP members demanded a recount, which resulted in an increased lead of Bondoc by 107 votes. LDP
member Camasura consistent with truth and justice and self-respect made a conscience vote favoring Bondoc, naturally
infuriating his party-mates. Upon learning this, LDP members plotted to neutralize the Pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal

39
by expelling Camasura from the party, consequently relinquishing his position in the HRET. The Notice of Promulgation of
Decision was on March 14, 1991, during which Bondocs proclamation would be formalized. LDP, however, informed
Speaker Mitra and Justice Herrerra that the party had withdrawn the nomination and rescinded the election of
Congressman Camasura to the HRET. The Tribunal issued a resolution canceling the proclamation of Bondoc due to this
development. Without Camasuras vote, the decision lacked the concurrence of 5 members as required by Section 24 of
the Rules of Tribunal.
Bondoc filed a petitition for certiorari and prohibition and mandamus on March 21, 1991 asking the Court to annul the
decision of Camasuras expulsion ordering him to reaussume his post in the Tribunal and to prevent the designation of
Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in Camasuras place.
Respondent Pineda plead for a dismissal of the petition arguing that the Congress is the sole authority that nominates and
elects its members.
Court ruled in favor of Bondoc. Camasuras expulsion was declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the
Constitution. The Court declared the cancelled proclamation duly promulgated.
ISSUE: W/N the House can interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the
ruse reorganizing the representation in the tribunal of the majority party? NO.
HELD: NO. The ouster of Camasura was a blatant attempt of LDP to influence the decision of the HRET by manipulating
its membership.
The Tribunal should not be hampered in the performance of its constitutional function by factors which have nothing to do
with the merits of the cases before it. The political factors are blocking the constitutionally mandated task of the HRET.
The HRET of the Senate and Congress were created by the Constitution as special tribunals to be the SOLE judge of all
contests relating to returns and qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and as such, are independent bodies
which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and control them, without legislative
interference. To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the HRET must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and
decide congressional election contests is not to be shared with the Legislature NOR the Courts.
The independence of the HRET, so zealously guarded by the framers of our constitution, would be a myth and its
proceedings a farce if the HR, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political component of the
Tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power. The Resolution of HR removing Camasura from the Tribunal for
disloyalty is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the HRET, to be the sole judge of the election contest
between Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction such interference by the HR in the work of the HRET would reduce the Tribunal
to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP). Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of
membership in the HRET. The Tribunal must be non-partisan, in that members discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality and independence (especially from the political party they belong to). Membership in the HRET
may not be terminated except for just causes, such as, the expiration of congressional term, death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the Tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for
other valid cause.
37. Guerrero v. Comelec - YAP
Facts:
A petition was filed to disqualify respondent Farias as a candidate for Congressman of first district of Ilocos Norte was filed
with the Comelec on the ground that he was campaigning although he had not filed a certificate for candidacy.
Three days before the election, respondent filed his certificate of candidacy as substitute for another candidate who
withdrew.
The petitioner argued that the substitution was fatally defective since the replaced candidate was an independent and the
respondent ran as candidate for a political party.
Respondent was proclaimed winner and assumed office.
COMELEC dismissed petition on the ground that the matter is now within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal.
Issue: WON COMELEC has jurisdiction over said petition.
Ruling: NO

40

Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to
the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives.
Once a winning candidate has assumed office as a member of the House of Rep, the jurisdiction of Comelec over his
qualification ends and jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal begins.
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not limited to constitutional qualifications only. The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a
statutory qualification.

38. Layug v. Comelec - BAUTISTA

Facts:
Petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as a taxpayer and concerned citizen, filed a Petition to Disqualify
Buhay Party-List from participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike from being its nominee. He argued
that Buhay Party-List is a mere extension of the El Shaddai, which is a religious sect. As such, it is disqualified from
being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, as well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of
RA No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Neither does Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire
real estate businessman and the spiritual leader of El Shaddai, qualify as one who belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector xxx, as required of party-list nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807.

COMELEC denied the petition and, there being no motion for reconsideration filed within the reglementary period, said
Resolution was declared final and executory. MR having been denied; hence, this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
where respondents assail the jurisdiction of the Court arguing that, with the proclamation of Buhay Party-List on July 30,
2010 and the assumption into office of its representatives, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng, it
is now the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over questions
relating to their qualifications.
Issue:
Whether the HRET has jurisdiction.
Held:
No. Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies who the "members" of the House are: (1) members who shall be elected
from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations. In this case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House that went to its
first two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being
the fifth nominee, did not get a seat and thus had not become a member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, the
HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's qualifications. Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the
qualifications of Buhay Party-List, as it is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC. Thus,
it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the COMELEC provided under Section 7,
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that has jurisdiction to
hear the instant petition.

Section 18
A. Composition of the Commission on Appointments
39. Daza v. Singson - BISNAR

After the 1987 congressional elections, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the
Commission on Appointments among the political parties represented in the that chamber, including: Lakas ng Bansa,
PDP-Laban, NP-Unido, Liberal party, and KBL.
Raul Daza was among those chosen, a representative of the Liberal Party.
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized, resulting to 24 member resigning from the Liberal party and
joining LDP.
Members of the LDP increased to 159 while the Liberal party was reduced to 12.
The House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments.
The seat occupied by Daza was withdrawn and given to the LDP.

41

Luis Singson was the additional member from the LDP.

Daza challenged his removal from the Commission on Appointments.
He argued that the LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated in the Constitution because it was not
registered.
He further argued that LDP has not yet achieved stability and suggests that it might be no different from several other
political groups that have died a-bornin, like the UNA, or have subsequently floundered, like the UNIDO.
Issue: Was the reapportionment of seats in the Commission on Appointments valid?
Ruling: Yes.

Sec. 18 (Art. VI). There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman,
twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within
thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
The House of Representatives has the authority to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time
the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent
and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and
permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to prove its permanence is not acceptable.
Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not
be entitled to representation in the Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged."
The Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created in December 1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party
that seceded therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. 12
The Liberal Party won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the
Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in both chambers of the
Congress.
The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House of Representatives and 6 members
in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the Philippines and its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took
over recently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra.
It is true that there have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements among its members, but these are to be expected in any
political organization, especially if it is democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist Party in a number of socialist
states has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be considered still temporary because of such
discord.
If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of Representatives would have to be denied
representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which
the petitioner says is now "history only," should also be written off. The independents also cannot be represented because they belong
to no political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of its seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of
the House of Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.

40. Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr. - BOMBALES

Facts:
o After the May 1987 elections, 11 seats for the Commission on Appointments were filled by 11 out of 12 congressmen.
o Later that year, upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader, the House elected Honorable Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, as the
12th member of the COA representing the Coalesced Minority in the House.
o In 1988, COA had to be reorganized
o Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the
COA Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal.
o Her request was endorsed by 9 congressmen
o Subsequently, House membership in COA was revised to conform with the new political alignments.
o Again, Honorable Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, was retained 12th member of the COA representing the Coalesced Minority in the
House.
o Thus, in February 1, 1989, Coseteng, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (which may be considered as
a petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying this Court to declare as null and void the election of respondent
Ablan, Verano Yap et al as members of the COA to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other
respondents from recognizing them as members of the COA on the theory that their election to that Commission
violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation because:
o 1) the New Majority (158 LDP members out of the 202 members of the House) is entitled to only nine (9)
seats out of the twelve to be filled by the House
2) the members representing the political parties, or coalitions thereof, must be nominated by their
respective political parties or coalitions;
3) the nomination and election of respondent Verano-Yap by the respondents as representative of the
minority was clearly invalid

42
4) that similarly invalid was the retention of respondent Ablan as Minority member in the Commission
because he was neither nominated nor elected as such by the minority party or parties in the House
o Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the COA as a representative of the Minority
because she has the support of nine (9) other congressmen and congresswomen of the Minority
o In their collective Comment, the respondents alleged:
o (1) that the legality of the reorganization of the COA is a political question, hence, outside the jurisdiction of
this Court to decide, and
o (2) that in any case, the reorganization was "strictly in consonance with Section 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution" i.e., on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties, considering the
majority coalition "as a form of a political party"
Issue: Whether the members of the House in the COA were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties?
Ruling: YES. SC held that the petition should be dismissed, not because it raises a political question, which it does not,
but because the revision of the House representation in the Commission on Appointments is based on proportional
representation of the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitutionwhich reads:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, asex
oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a majority vote of all
the Members.
There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded
out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which
may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP.
o The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in
the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House.
Thus, there is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done
"on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein."
o The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is presumably a member also
of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's choices.
o Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only
.4% or less than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the
Commission on Appointments.
o
To be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission on Appointments, a political party should
represent at least 8.4% of the House membership ( it should have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or
congresswomen)
Lastly, there is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the Commission on Appointments should
have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated
by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in Section
18, Article VI of the Constitution.
41. Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales - FORTES - LEUNG
Teofisto Guingona v. Senate President Neptali Gonzales (1992)

Facts:
At issue in this case is the proper distribution of the membership of the Commission on Appointment among the different
parties of elected senators
In determining the membership of the CA, the senators agreed to the following formula:

43

Political Party/Political
Coalition

Members

Proportional Membership

LDP

15

7.5

NPC

2.5

Lakas- NUCD

1.5

LP-PDP-Laban

0.5

Because the numbers are not nice and round, the Senators could not agree how many to assign from each party, until . . .
Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed a compromise to the effect that Senate elect 12 members to CA:
8 from LDP
2 from NPC
1 from LP
Note: i dont know why none from Lakas
with the understanding that there are strong reservations against this proportion
and that if the Court finds any party to have a deficiency in representation, that party will be entitled to nominate and have
elected by this body its additional representatives.
prohibit respondents Senator Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Taada from sitting and assuming the position of members of
the Commission on Appointments (CA)
Senator Guingona for and in behalf of Lakas filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prohibit Sen. Romulo
(8th senator from LDP) and Sen. Tanada (1 from LP) from sitting in the CA
Guingona: proposed compromise of Senator Tolentino was violative of the rule of proportional representation
Sen. Guingona furthers asserts: the right of the minority political parties in the Senate, consistent with the Constitution, to
combine their fractional representation in the Commission on Appointments to complete one seat therein, and to decide
who, among the senators in their ranks, shall be additionally nominated and elected thereto
ISSUES:
What to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled?
As Sen. Tanada is the sole elected senator of his party is the party entitled to be represented in the CA consistent with the
provision and spirit of the Constitution and would be in full accord with the principle of republicanism that emphasizes
democracy? -NO
HELD:
The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Taada as members of the Commission on Appointments by the LDP
majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The Constitution does not contemplate that the Commission on Appointments must necessarily include twelve (12)
senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives.
What the Constitution requires is that there be at least a majority of the entire membership.
THE COURT LAID DOWN THE RULE: A political party must have at least two senators in the Senate to be able to have a
representatives in the Commission on Appointments, so that any number less than 2 will not entitle such a party a
membership in the Commission on Appointments
A political party/coalition with a single senator in the Senate cannot constitutionally claims seat in the Commission

Section 21
Negros Oriental v. Sangguniang Panglungsod
A. Legislative investigations

44
42. Arnault v. Nazareno - KUNG
FACTS: In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought
two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000
was paid for the first sum and P 500,000 to the second sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his two
attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates respectively. However, Ernest H.
Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He bought the first from San Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the
Philippine trust company. In both instances, Burt was not able to pay the necessary amount of money to complete his
payments. As such, his contract with said owners were cancelled.
On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural
Progress Administration by an abolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. The Philippine Government
then, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished
the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to investigate the
transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee created by the resolution called and examined various
witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to
resolve was the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Governments paying to Burt the total sum of
P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long
before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon of
October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine
National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he drew on
said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the
Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present
case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the senate then approved a resolution that cited him for
contempt. It is this resolution which brought him to jail and is being contested in this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom
he gave the P440,000.
2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which
ended on May 18, 1950.
3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.
HELD:
1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the
investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of
course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to
make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to
expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material
or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct
relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is,
that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined

45
by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information
elicited from a single question.
2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or
of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where
that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond
its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are disregarded, Court
isalways open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.
3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the name of that person to
whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should
reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable
that he gave P440,000 to a person to him unknown. Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a
refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable. Since
according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in
compliance with the latters verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the
name of that person might incriminate him.
43. Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee - MAGSUMBOL
Taken from: http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/11/bengzon-v-senate-blue-ribbon-committee.html
FACTS: Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government with the Sandiganbayan for the
alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romualdez of several government corporations to the group of Lopa, a brother-in-law
of Pres. Aquino.
By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the transactions, an investigation was
conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to
appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez."
At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in civil
case before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry was beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. He
contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. One of the
defendants in the case before the Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention. The Court
granted it and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention.
ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation
HELD: No.
There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted is not related to a
purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, it was conducted to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino,
particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019 in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the Constitution. As provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due
process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to probe and inquire into the same
justiciable controversy would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had already earlier
set in. The issue sought to be investigated has already been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to

46
continue would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between the legislative committee and a judicial
tribunal.
Finally, a congressional committees right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on
governmental action including the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. One of these rights is the right of an individual
to against self-incrimination. The right to remain silent is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only
if it partakes of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. Hence, the petitioners may not
be compelled by respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it only because the inquiry is not
in aid of legislation and if pursued would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and
the judicial departments of the government as ordained by the Constitution.
44. Negros Oriental v. Sangguniang Panglungsod - PAJA

Negros Oriental v. Sangguniang Panglungsod, No. 72492, November 5, 1987

DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: While the Constitution does not expressly vest Congress with the power to punish nonmembers for legislative contempt, the power has nevertheless been invoked by the legislative body as a means of
preserving its authority and dignity in the same way that courts wield an inherent power to enforce their authority,
preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and ensure the effectiveness of the administration of justice. The exercise
by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of the government vested with the
legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt
power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis; local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess them for the
same reasons that the national legislature does. The power attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but
to the character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government. The contempt
power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power.
Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or
administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers. Thus, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete, much less its Ad Hoc Committee did not have
the authority to order the subpoenas in this case, which are null and void.
Nature of the case: certiorari; orders of subpoena by local legislative body
F: Petitioners, Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac, Chairman of the Board of Directors and the General Manager,
respectively of petitioner Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative (NORECO II) assail orders by the respondent Ad Hoc
Committee of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete punishing Torres and Umbac for legislative contempt due to
their failure to appear at their investigation in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public
utilities and their alleged use of inefficient power lines. Petitioners contend that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Dumaguete is bereft of the power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to order the arrest
of witnesses who fail to obey its subpoena. It is further argued that assuming the power to compel the attendance and
testimony of witnesses to be lodged in said body, it cannot be exercised in the investigation of matters affecting the terms
and conditions of the franchise granted to NORECO II which are beyond the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Respondents, for their part, claim that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in
inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction
I: Whether or not local legislative bodies have the power to punish for contempt and subpoena witnesses in relation to
their investigations in aid of legislation?
H: No
R: A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository of the legislative power under the
Constitution, and those that may be exercised by the legislative bodies of local government unit, e.g. the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dumaguete which, as mere creatures of law, possess delegated legislative power. While the Constitution
does not expressly vest Congress with the power to punish non-members for legislative contempt, the power has
nevertheless been invoked by the legislative body as a means of preserving its authority and dignity in the same way that

47
courts wield an inherent power to enforce their authority, preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and ensure the
effectiveness of the administration of justice. In Arnault v. Nazareno, and Arnault v. Balagtas, the Supreme Court ruled
that the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy and is implied or incidental to the
exercise of legislative power.
The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of the
government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes
contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis and local legislative bodies cannot
correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons that the national legislature does. The power attaches not to the
discharge of legislative functions per se but to the character of the legislature as one of the three independent and
coordinate branches of government.
The same thing cannot be said of local legislative bodies which are creations of law. To begin with, there is no
express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) granting
local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a
constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of
asubpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be deemed
implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of
a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the
performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers
without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within
the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each departments authority to be full and complete,
independently of the others authority or power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act
of refusal every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial
department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts
committed against its authority or dignity
In addition, the type of investigation which may be conducted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod does not include
within its ambit an inquiry into any suspected violation by an electric cooperative of the conditions of its electric
franchise. The power to inquire into the efficiency of the service supplied by electric cooperatives is within the franchising
powers of the NEA. In the exercise of this power, the NEA may conduct hearings and investigations, issue subpoenas and
invoke the aid of the courts in case of disobedience to its subpoenas (Sec. 47 & Sec. 54, P.D. 269). Clearly, then, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete cannot look into any suspected failure of NORECO II to comply with the
standards of electric service prescribed by law and in its franchise. The proper recourse is to file a complaint with the
NEA against NORECO II if there be sufficient basis therefor.

45. Senate v. Ermita - TABAG

FACTS:
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This
prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in
the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak
before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the
said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter.
Drilon, the senate president, accepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already
made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the
department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the
judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the
presidents approval.

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The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to excuse
themselves from attending the inquiry. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel
attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without
her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court
martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of
Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: W/N EO 464 is Constitutional? Partly, Sec 1 and 2 are valid, the rest are NOT.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC
sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is
expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution
expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it
may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as
to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary
to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative
power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members
of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of
legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of
legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the
House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was
meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22,
therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same
power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to
elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the
objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to
compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the
principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by
refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact
that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based
on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of
government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under
Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of
the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot,
however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping
with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the
same reasons stated in Arnault.
46. Philcomsat Holdings v. Senate - YAP
Facts:
PHILCOMSAT is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), a
government organization which the PH Govt holds a 35% interest in shares of stocks.

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Petitioner PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC), is a private corporation and a holding company whose function is to
collect the money market interest income of PHILCOMSAT.
Petitioners Locsin and Andal are both directors of PHC and both nominees of the govt. to the BOD of both PHILCOMSAT
and POTC.
From 1986 to 1996, PCGG regularly received cash dividends from POTC. In 1998, POTC suffered its first loss. In 2004,
PHC sustained a P7 million loss attributed to huge operating expenses. Huge losses were continually incurred over the
following years.
In view of said losses, Locsin and Andal were invited to a legislative inquiry headed by Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago. 11
public hearings were conducted.
Respondent Senate Committees submitted Committee Report No. 312, where it noted the need to examine the role of the
PCGG in the management of the POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC. After due proceedings, the respondents Senate
Committees found overwhelming mismanagement by the PCGG and its nominees over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC,
and that PCGG was negligent in performing its mandate to preserve the government's interests in the said corporations.
In sum, Committee Report No. 312 recommended, inter alia, the privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction over the
shares of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office (PMO) under the
Department of Finance (DOF) and the replacement of government nominees as directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT.
Issue: WON the respondent Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in
approving Committee Resolution No. 312

Ruling: No.
The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been upheld in the consolidated cases
of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio,which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution,
as follows:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case
the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge.
On this score, the respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional
mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the respondent Senate be faulted for doing so on the very same day that
the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries has
long been settled, otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless.

47. Neri v. Senate - BAUTISTA

Facts:
On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the
NBN Project in the amount of nearly Php 6 billion and was to be financed by the Republic of China. Several
Resolutions regarding the investigation and implications on national security and government-xto-government
contracts regarding the NBN Project were introduced in Senate. Respondent Committees initiated the
investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project.
Petitioner was summoned to appear and he testified to the Committees for eleven (11) hours, but refused to
answer three important questions, invoking his right to executive privilege. For failing to appear in the other
days that he was summoned, Neri was held in contempt.
Issues:
1. Can Neri can invoke executive privilege?
2. Does the invocation of Executive Privilege violate Sec. 28, Art. II and Sec. 7, Art. III?
3. Whether the Committees gravely abused their discretion by holding Neri in contempt.
Held:
1. The communications elicited by the three questions are covered by executive privilege. Despite the
revocation of E.O. 464, there is a recognized claim of executive privilege. The privilege is said to be a

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necessary guarantee of presidential advisors to provide the President and those who assist him with freedom
to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many
would be unwilling to express except privately. The claim was properly invoked by the letter provided by
Executive Secretary Ermita stating the precise and certain reason that the said information may impair the
countrys diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Republic of China.
2. The petitioner was able to appear in at least one of the days where he was summoned and expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those
covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to public information and full public disclosure of
transactions, like any other right, is subject to limitation. These include those that are classified by the body of
jurisprudence as highly confidential. The information subject to this case belongs to such kind.
3. The Committees violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution for having failed to publish its Rules of
Procedure. Inquiries are required to be in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure. Without
these, the subject hearings in aid of legislation are procedurally infirm.