Professional Documents
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Acknowledgments
List of Contents
Introduction
Key Definitions
10
13
Theoretical Framework
15
15
Theory Two
State" Thesis
The
"Crisis
of
-
23
28
34
Summary of Theories
44
Methodology
45
53
Introduction
53
54
Patriarchal
AuthorityandConstraints
60
in theMiddleEast
TheHistoricalExperiences
of theChurches
66
Summary
76
82
Introduction
82
in theMiddleEastandChristian
TheEmergence
of Nationalism
Involvement
83
TheEgyptianContext
89
Context
TheLebanese
92
in
TheShortcomings
of Nationalism
asa Strategyfor Christians
Era
theIndependence
94
TheEgyptianContext
97
Context
TheLebanese
99
TheChallenges
to Nationalismsincethe 1970sandtheimpact
104
onChristians
107
TheEgyptianContext
Context
TheLebanese
Concerns
TheContemporary
of theCopticOrthodoxand
113
MaroniteCommunities
in Egypt
ChristianConcerns
114
in Lebanon
ChristianConcerns
121
126
Summary
Orthodox
Patriarch
of Alexandria
Africa
All
and
135
Introduction
135
137
138
142
154
159
165
Summary
170
177
Introduction
177
178
TheEarlyYearsasPatriarch(1986-1989)
179
ThePost-WarSpiritualRenewalof theMaroniteChurch
181
186
TheResponse
to thePoliticalRoleof PatriarchSfeir
201
TheConsequences
of thePoliticalRoleof thePatriarchand
FutureProspects
209
Summary
214
218
Introduction
218
A Theoretical
Framework
of theDiaspora
219
TheHistoricalFormationof theDiaspora
219
ThePoliticalActivitiesof a Diaspora
220
221
223
224
226
232
240
Summary
242
247
Summary
247
Thesis
TheoryOne TheSecularization
263
265
Thesis
TheoryThree:TheGlobalization
268
TheoryFour- TheRationalChoiceThesis
270
Study
for
Future
Suggestions
Conclusion
and
273
Bibliography
278
Books
278
Journal Articles
304
Ph.D Theses
313
314
Electronic Sources
315
Interviews
317
320
Introduction
The objective of this study is to analyse the contemporary political role of Christianity in the
Middle East. This will be achieved by focusing on the office of the patriarch. In most of the
Eastern Christian churches, the patriarch is widely acceptedas the spiritual head of the
community and, throughout the centuries, this authority has often been translated into
temporal power. Although other communal actors have challenged the dominant position of
the patriarch, this dual role as spiritual and civil leader provides resourceswhich can be used
to strengthen the claim to be the political representativeat the expenseof lay rivals. The case
studies selected for this project - the Coptic Orthodox and the Maronite churches - share
several key characteristics. Firstly, both evoke a distinct identity on the basis of faith yet are
directly linked to a specific homeland - Egypt and Lebanon respectively. In contrast to
spiritual leaders of communities which are not concentratedin one particular country, the
Coptic Orthodox and Maronite patriarchs have the potential to become involved in national
affairs if desired. Secondly, both communities have pressing if different concerns as
indigenous Christians in a turbulent regional environment dominated by another religion
Islam. The vast majority of these relate to the position of the community in the homeland.
Thirdly, both communities have recently experiencedwidespread expansion outside the
traditional territory in the Middle East. This allows an examination of the impact this growth
has had on both the church and community at home and abroad. Fourthly, since becoming
the head of each church, Patriarch ShenoudaIII, Coptic Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria and
all Africa and Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, Patriarch of Antioch and all the East of the
Maronites, have proven to be charismatic and influential figures in church and national
affairs. They have clearly played significant parts in relations between the community and
statein the decadessince their election to office. Finally, the two case studies have been
selectedas they best representthe potential of Christian communities to have a political role
inthisregion.
VAiile the Copts constitute only a small proportion (5-10% depending on the
identity of the source) of the Egyptian population, they are still the largest Christian
community in the Middle East, numbering around 5-6 million!
are a small community in terms of size. It is estimatedthat there are no more than 600,000
Maronites in Lebanon. Yet within Lebanon, they still make up over 20% of the population,
2
have
impact
to
a significant
offering them a chance
on national affairs. This study proposes
that the patriarch exercisesa political role becauseof his position as the head of the
invoked
is
The
to reinforce this
tradition
the
constantly
community.
of
office
authority and
position. In the contemporary period, this can be attributed to the desire to fill the leadership
vacuum which exists amongst Christians in the Middle East.
In the twenty-first century, studies on Middle East Christians can offer a useful insight into
democratization,
in
issues
have
become
the
that
politics
e.
g.
world
priority areas
some of
development, security and terrorism. Although the Christian communities in the Middle East
may be small in size (especially relative to the Muslim majority), they still represent an ideal
in
to
the
towards
opportunity
examine
policies adopted
non-Muslims countries where Islarn is
the dominant religion. On the one hand, where conviviality is discovered, these examples
can provide lessons for communal relations between members of the two faiths in other
East
Middle
the
In
throughout
that
ages,
geographical areas.
particular, some argue
Christians have occupied a unique position in acting as a bridge between the Western and
Islamic worlds. 3 In the present climate of distrust and suspicion, global actors are in great
few
knowledge
The
academic
this
of policymakers and relatively
need of
service.
scant
be
for
highlights
to
this
type
the
undertaken.
these
of
work
need
contributions on
communities
identity and the factorswhich contributeto the decisionof the churchhierarchyto promote
Key Definitions
Before commencing this study, it is necessaryto clarify key definitions. Firstly, one must
determine what Eastern Christianity means. Initially, these churches were created
as a
consequenceof the spreadof the gospel from Jerusalemafter the death of Christ. The
division of the Roman Empire in 395 into two parts had a similar effect on the universal
5
church. The See of Rome was recognised as the head of the church in the Western Empire.
In the East, three seeswere influential - Alexandria, Antioch and Constantinople, the latter
becoming predominant as it was also the seatof the emperor. Consequently, the term Eastern
Christianity refers to the numerous branchesof the Christian faith that can be traced from the
churches formed within the historical borders of the Byzantine Empire. This includes
denominations on both sides of the theological divide after the Council of Chalcedon in 45 1.
Two of the communities associatedwith specific Eastern Christian rites are the focus of this
thesis - the Coptic Orthodox and the Maronites. Although the historical origins of these
groups will be traced in the next chapter, it is helpful to provide a brief overview of the
contemporary situation. The term Copt merely refers to the national identity of this
community as it is derived from the Greek for Egypt - aigyptos.6 According to the
government census,roughly 8% of the Egyptian population are Copts (five - six million).
This issue has proven controversial as academicresearchsuggeststhat they are only % of the
population while expatriates claim probably inflated statistics of 15-20%. Regardlessof the
exact amount, there is no doubt that the Copts are the largest Christian community in the
Middle East. They reside in all of the Egyptian regions and although there is a high
concentration of Copts in Assiut and Minya provinces in Upper Egypt, they are not a majority
in any area. Copts are still located in rural areasbut many have been affected by the trend in
Egyptian society of migration to the cities. Furthermore, Copts are found in all social
classes. Hence, in these ways, there are no obvious differences between Egyptian Copts and
Muslims. However, a distinct Coptic identity remains strong. According to Pennington,
"being a Copt is a characteristic virtually nobody who is born one casts aside'.97 This identity
is often accentuatedby using obvious Christian names and the tattooing of a cross on the right
wrist. There is only one communal institution which includes the entire Coptic community
and that is the subject of this study- the Coptic Orthodox Church. Itcanbetermeda
national church in the sensethat the vast majority of Egyptian Christians belong to it and
there are few adherentsoutside the country who are not of Egyptian heritage.
As with the Coptic community, there is wide debate over the actual size of the Maronite
community in Lebanon. The only official figures available for all the Lebaneseconfessions
are from the 1932 census. It is estimated that the Maronite community has declined to
8
largest
is
longer
in
(around
600,000)
Lebanon.
22%
the
confessional group
and no
around
Yet due to the historic relationship between the Maronites and Mount Lebanon, it would be
expected that they will continue to have a significant interest and influence on national affairs.
Unlike Egypt, there are areasin Lebanon that can be identified as predominantly populated by
members of specific groups. This was reinforced by events during the civil war which led to
the division between so-called "Muslim" West Beirut (although Lebanesefrom all faiths
continued to live there) and "Christian" East Beirut. While Maronite Christians can be found
in many parts of Lebanon, they tend to be concentratedin residential areassuch as Achrafiyeh
including
Mount
Lebanon
in
in
Gemmayze
Beirut
traditional
the
towns and
of
refuge
and
and
Metn.
Similar
Copts,
Jbeil
Kesrouan,
in
following
districts
to
the
the
and
villages
Maronites can be found in both rural and urban areasand arc spreadover a wide range of
is
based
In
the
on religious affiliation, it is
political system
a country where
social classes.
Church
Again,
Maronite
is
identity
the
the
that
strong.
confessional
remains
unsurprising
only credible institution which can unite the entire community. Although it is intricately
linked to Lebanon, it does not enjoy dominance over the vast majority of the Lebanese
Christian population as exercised by the Coptic Orthodox Church. Instead, several other
Christian communities of varying strengths, are found in Lebanon e.g. Greek Orthodox,
Greek Catholic and the Armenian Apostolic Church. However, the Maronite Church has
long been the defender of the community and it is this role which will be examined in later
chapters.
Researchmaterial on this field can generally be divided into the following categoriesthose which addressthe church from a historical and/or theological aspect,those which look
at the community in the context of Christian-Muslim relations, often set within a minority
discourse and finally, a small but growing proportion which analyse the political role of
Christian institutions in the region. Three important sourceswhich mostly fulfil all these
categoriesby providing a general survey of Christianity in the Middle East can be identified.
Jean-PierreValognes in Vie et Mort des Chr6tiens d'Orient (1994) provides an in-depth
discussion on the general situation facing Christians in the region by using a helpful structure
which allows him to focus not only on the different denominations but also on the
communities in each country. The edited volume by Andrea Pacini, Christian Communities
in the Arab Middle East: the Challenge of the Future (1998) offers an overview of the
Christian communities in the entire region, identifying several challenges including the
political situation, socioeconomic developments and emigration. Another edited work by
Anthony O'Mahony, Eastern Christianily: Studies in Modem HistoIL Religion and Politics
(2004) accentuatesthe need for an interdisciplinary approachto this subject in order to
achieve a true understanding of the situation of contemporary Christianity in the Middle East
today.
Material from the first category mentioned above focusesprimarily on the history, faith and
rite of the different churches within Eastern Christianity. On the Coptic Orthodox Church,
the numerous works authored by the late Otto Meinardus cover in great detail the life of the
church and its members e.g. Christian Egypt: Faith and Life (1970), Christian Egypt:
Ancient and Modem (1977) and Two Thousand Years of Coptic Christiani1y (1999). Matti
MoosainTheMaronitesinHisto
between the church and the community throughout the ages. The second category examines
the attempt of Christian communities to participate in the politics and society of the region.
The Copts in EMtian
full
Muslim
their
Coptic
to
this
by
the
aim
of
equality
with
achieve
community
employed
Nationalism:
The
Rise
Fall
Christian
in
Lebanese
Phares
Walid
and
of an
compatriots.
Ethnic Resistance(1995) explores the activities of the Maronites - the only Christian
demise
from
their
to
in
the
to
until
political
state
power
the
access
region achieve
community
Christian
literature,
In
the
communities are perceived as
some
civil war period onwards.
minorities living in a region dominated by another religion - Islam. For example, the study
in
State
Minorities
Gabriel
Ben-Dor,
the
the Arab World
by
Ofra
Bengio
and
and
edited
(1999) includes a chapter each on the Coptic Orthodox in Egypt and the Maronites in
Lebanon.
The final category examines the relationship between the churches and their relevant
hierarchy
in
the
that
exercise temporal as well as
church
some cases,
communities, suggesting
CentuOL-Lon
in
Eg3mt:
Modem
Muslims
the
In
Christians
versus
spiritual authority.
Struggle for Coptic Egualit (2003), SS Hasan provides a fascinating account of the
by
influence
Church
illustrating
the
Orthodox
Coptic
the
enjoyed
church
contemporary
hierarchy, especially Pope Shenouda,over the community. The unpublished Ph.D thesis by
David Kerr, The Temporal Authori! y of the Maronite Patriarchate 1920-1958 :A Study in the
Relationship of Religious and Secular Power (1973) makes crucial observations about the
political role of the Maronite patriarch which are still relevant today. While works on these
issuesare increasing, this area of study is still severely under researched. The majority of the
literature on these communities in the present day tends to focus on specific aspectse.g.
communal relations in Egypt or the consequencesof the Lebanesecivil war on the Maronites.
On the whole, referencesto the role of the church hierarchy in the community dwell on the
spiritual dimension. Due to the sensitive nature of the subject area, some sources lose
credibility as a result of partiality towards a certain group or vision of the future situation of
the Christian communities.
This study aims to redresssome of these gaps. Firstly, it is hoped to achieve an accurate
depiction of the situation of Christian communities in the Middle East, specifically the Coptic
Orthodox and Maronites. In order to do so, the role of the church hierarchy must be
analysed. This work seeksto develop further the contributions of the literature placed in the
third category, focusing primarily on the political role of the patriarch in these Eastern
Christian traditions. Recognition of fundamental changessuch as emigration and the growth
in
has
been
Furthermore,
little
be
diaspora
there
this
the
context.
also
examined
must
of
attempt to connect this example of politicised religion to the wider issues concerning relations
between religion and politics. By using this as a theoretical framework, it is hoped that
Christianity in the Middle East can be rightfully introduced in to this ongoing debate.
10
the identification of the enemy as evil and the ability to motivate adherentsby appealing to a
divine authority can lead to prolonged conflict, justify inhumane acts and provide severe
obstaclesto lasting peace.
Yet not all involvement of religion in politics leads to conflict. Bruce suggeststhat moral
authority, lack of self-interest, use of symbolism and the ability to be "honest brokers", allow
10
They can
religious actors to make a positive contribution to the political environment.
inspire and in some caseslead the opposition against repressive and authoritarian states.
Liberation theology can be deemedan "extreme" illustration. A less controversial but
equally significant example is the Zimbabwean Bishop of Bulawayo Pius Ncube who speaks
out publicly against the policies of PresidentRobert Mugabe. Hence in recent times,
religious institutions have clearly been involved in campaigns for democracy e.g. Catholicism
in Latin America and Poland while individuals have played key mediating roles including
11
Jnr.
Dr
Luther
King
Thegrowing
Mahatma Gandhi, Archbishop Tutu and
Martin
significance of human rights and social justice in the international arena- important elements
in many faiths - also ensuresthat religious actors feel compelled to participate in these
matters. Islamic movements stressthe importance of social justice and highlight the
suffering of fellow Muslims in conflict zones such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, West Bank
12
Gaza.
Statementsfrom the Vatican, World Council of Churches and various national
and
issues
from
ranging
globalization to
political
churches offer a critical voice on contemporary
conflict. Although there is no guaranteethat other political actors will heed these appeals,
this still illustrates the willingness of religious institutions to undertake one of their traditional
it
discussion,
is
From
this
the
the
the
clear
weak.
concernsof
political roles articulation of
that the political role of religion is "double-edged" - it can be the source of division or in
13
integrate
contrast, serve to
society and uphold values. Casanovasummarisesthe
face,
its
Janus
"religion
as the carrier not only of
contradictory attributes of religion,
showed
11
exclusive, particularist, and primordial identities but also of exclusive, universalist, and
transcending ones".
14
In the geographical area selected for this study the Middle East the social significance of
religion remains strong in the twenty-first century.
Islarn remains influential
sharia (Islamic law) is enshrined in the constitution as a key source of legislation while in
Iran, clerics occupy several key positions in the political system. Islamist movements such as
the Muslim Brotherhood aim to participate in the electoral system while almost all political
actors emphasise their Islamic credentials in order to gain legitimacy.
also the birthplace of two other world faiths - Judaism and Christianity.
to be intricately linked with national politics in Israel.
Unsurprisingly
founded as a homeland for the Jewish people, religious parties have an influential role.
The
future of important Jewish sites such as the Temple Mount area has an impact on the peace
process between Israel and the Palestinians.
in
holy
Jerusalem.
issues
is
the
to
places
concerning
political role
normally confined
In the
These
by
Vatican
Western
the
these
states.
and
several
past,
were addressed exclusively
in
denominations
different
joined
by
the
have
been
the
situated
of
representatives
actors
now
Holy Land.
However, the political role of Christianity in the region does not need to be
in
in
different
indigenous
the
Christian
The
states
to
this
communities
aspect.
restricted
region also interact with political actors.
Christianity
demonstrate
intends
of
to
role
communities, this study
an alternative political
the Middle East. Before the political role of the two patriarchs can be explored, one must
examine theoretical approaches to the relationship between religion and politics.
12
in
The secularization thesis has long been the dominant theory in the social sciences in
conceptualising the relationship between religion and politics.
into two strands. According to the Weberian perspective, the exposure of religion to reason
erodes the power and influence of religious institutions.
explores the impact this had on religious institutions in his article, "Secularization :A MultiDimensional Concept" (1981). While remaining a proponent of the functional differentiation
approach, he stressesthat laicization will not necessarily follow a uniforin pattern but may
Steve
has
Bruce
depending
the
context.
authored numerous books on
vary
on
cultural
secularization.
of religion declines due to three aspects of the modernization process. These are social
differentiation, societalization and rationalization.
willing to accept that in certain circumstances namely cultural defence and cultural transition,
religious institutions may retain short-term relevance. Expanding on this, Jose Casanova in
Public Religions in the Modem World (1994) examines the different sub-theories of the
secularization thesis, demonstrating that the deprivatization of religion is a recurrent theme
despite the secularization process.
However, traditional secularization theories have recently come under attack in the social
sciences. Global events highlight that religious values and organizations are still prominent
in many societies. Thus, several propositions have been developed to provide an explanation
13
for the continued role of religion in politics. The crisis of state thesis provides an explanation
for the apparent absenceof the secularization process in parts of the developing world.
Several stateshave delivered neither economic development nor meaningful political
participation.
to their citizens. These problems are consideredto allow religious institutions to remain at
the heart of society. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart in their influential contribution to this
field, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (2004), argue that there is a direct
correlation between feelings of insecurity and the significance of religious beliefs and
institutions. The effects of the globalization processon the developing world have also raised
questionsregarding the role of religion. It is argued that globalization stimulates local
identities and can revitalize religious institutions which are seento be the main representatives
of indigenous culture. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1998)
by Samuel Huntington is renowned for its claims that culture has become a major feature of
the post-Cold War era, leading to the predominance of civilizations primarily identified by
religious values at the potential expenseof the nation state. The economic rational choice
model can also contribute to this debate. Proponentsof this theory propose that the
modernization process is irrelevant concerning religious vitality.
In "A Supply-Side
14
Theoretical Framework
15
institutions, and the Church an organisation among others".' 8 According to the Weberian
view, scientific knowledge in conjunction with industrialization and the modernization
processoffered the massesalternatives to the other-world explanations of events given by
religious leaders. Furthermore, Berger suggeststhat the Judeo-Christian religious tradition,
particularly Protestantism, actually encouragedthe secularization process as these faiths
distinguish the sacredsphere from the secular.19 The Protestant Reformation can be viewed
as extremely destructive to the political power of religion. This process undermined the unit,
destroyed
Church
the medieval Christian
the
the
and
as
a
result,
and
one
universal claims of
system. This desacralisedidea of the world allowed the two main spheresof modem society
20
The
Westphalian
dominance
the
to
of
religion.
at
expense
states
gain
and
markets
Settlement of 1648 aimed to end the destructive religious wars by adopting the principles of
21
The rise of the
state sovereignty and endorsing the separationof religion and politics.
from
local community to
the
of
social
relations
structure
modem capitalist economy changed
society where emphasiswas placed on the individual rather than collective. Bruce argues
that as religion draws its strength and resourcesfrom the community, the eclipse of the
22
in
Europe
By
has
the
century,
nineteenth
at least,
on
religion.
community
effect
an adverse
religious institutions were perceived as having lost their dominance in the economic, political
due
to this process of
Thus,
thesis
that
the
claims
core
secularization
and social spheres.
in
has
declined
the
authority
modem society.
of
religious
modernization,
social significance
Several other propositions are also associatedwith this theory. Casanovacategoriscs these
ideas into two subtheories- the decline of religious beliefs and practices and the privatization
belief
in
that when confronted with
Enlightenment
Inherent
the
thought
was
of religion.
rationalism, religion would lose its appeal to the individual. A combination of scientific
breakthroughs and mass education would provide alternative explanations for events rather
than those offered by religious institutions which tended to concentrateon mystic elements.
16
17
of a clear separation between public and private is also a contentious issue. While this may
be possible in theory, it is much more difficult to attain in reality. Instead, all the spheres
tend to influence and affect each other, often sharing a symbiotic relationship. According to
Beyer, "institutions in the public spherehave privatized features and those in the private
26
have
sphere
public ones". However, many of the activities undertaken by religious
institutions tend to be campaigns in aid of "secular" causese.g. combating poverty, ending
conflict etc. Wilson suggeststhat this indicates that religious institutions have "given up on
27
different
to
to
these
prayer alone" and are willing
use a variety of means achieve
goals.
Involvement in the political spherealso affects the religious movement. As Casanovastates,
"The more religion wants to transform the world in a religious direction, the more religion
becomes entangled in "worldly" affairs and is transformed by the world". 28 Hence, this
increasedpublic role for religion can in fact, be seen as contributing towards secularization.
Once again, it is important to note that the secularization thesis does not assertthat
privatization of belief must occur or that it is irreversible.
Unsurprisingly, representativesof many of the world faiths have been amongst the main
critics of the secularization thesis. One point of contention is that key ideas are shapedby the
Enlightenment critique of religion. The overwhelming assumption of this period was that the
power of religious institutions would erode once their beliefs were exposed to reason.
Modernization tended to be equatedwith secularism and backward traditionalism with
religion. This approachwas continued by later thinkers such as Marx who described religion
by
to
the
"sigh
the
the
experienced
suffering
consolation
oppressedcreature" -a
as a
of
29
masses. Hence, most religions tend to reject aspectsof secularization which are traced
directly to the hostile ideas of some liberal thinkers.
Furthermore, although the secularization thesis may appearto provide an accurate account
does
in
in
Europe,
declining
this
the
not seem to have been
role of religion
political matters
of
18
replicated in other parts of the world. Yet as many believe that modernization has occurred
on a global scale, one would consequently expect the secularization process to be universal.
One of the faiths which challenge this assumption is Islam. Indeed, Zebiri statesthat
Muslims see secularism as a Christian/Western phenomenon. It is argued that some
characteristics of Christianity including monasticism, a clear division between the possessions
of God and Caesarand the division of the community into clergy or laity, combined with the
historical context of religious intolerance and hostility to intellectual discoveries has left it
susceptibleto the secularization process. In contrast, Islam is not affected by these problems
as the sharia the Islamic legal code regulates all aspectsof life and does not recognise the
30
Consequently, Muslims tend to reject any
separationof politics and religion.
in
includes
Yet
this
separation.
reality, this apparent duality of
modernization process which
religion and politics can be disentangled. Although the Prophet Mohammed establishedboth
follow
it
does
that these are the same
not
necessarily
religious and political communities,
31
be
Islamic
An-Naim
the
that
the
state
can
contested as it is not a
of
concept
entity.
argues
theocracy but instead the human interpretation of divine sources. "It is, rather, a human
32
Islamic history
attempt to apply religious values to political, social and economic affairs".
also shows a clear divide between political rulers and the caliphate, which was often
manipulated to suit the needsof rulers. If based solely on the belief that there is no
separation of religion and politics, claims that Islam unlike Christianity is not susceptible to
the secularization process may turn out to be mistaken. However, it is clear that this view is
is
frequently
in
held
Muslim
used to explain why the
and
society
widely
contemporary
secularization thesis seemsto be confined to the Christian West.
If, as the proponents of the secularization thesis believe, Christianity is powerless when
confronted by the secularization process, can there be any alternative to churches losing social
have
does
Judaism,
Christianity
Unlike
Islam
a rigid and coded
not
and
significance?
19
religious law that governs the conduct of believers. Instead, the teaching of Jesus,"Give to
Caesarwhat is Caesar's, and to God what is God's", (Matthew 22:2 1)33is seento indicate that
Christianity can co-exist with any political system as long as the practice of the faith is not
threatened. Furthermore, Bruce arguesthat the early Christian experience of persecution
34
Christianity
Roman
Empire
the
the
to
under
allowed
separation of church and state.
accept
Yet, not all branches of Christianity have sharedthe same experiencesas the Western
churches. Eastern Christianity underwent a very different historical process- one which
denied it political power but allowed it to remain a key aspect of identity for Middle East
Christians. Christianity in the Middle East enjoyed only a short period of power - when it
in
fourth
Empire
Roman
declared
the
the
the
century until the Arab
was
official religion of
35
Conquest in the early seventh century. Even during this time, the damaging theological
did
in
East
Middle
Christians
the
the
that
not associatetheir church with
splits meant
many of
the ruling Byzantine power. Instead, those opposedto the teachings of the Council of
Chalcedon were frequently persecuted. The Arab conquest effectively halted the ability of
Eastern Christianity to seekpolitical power as the new empire was based on another religion Islam. The separation from the Western church was so severethat Gregory III argues that
Middle East Christians could be called the Church of Islam, in the sensethat their historical
36
Islamic
Even
during
history
the
the
empires.
of
with
entwined
experience was very much
in
foothold
did
the
this
Christianity
Western
to
region,
a
not
able
regain
was
periods when
translate into political power for the Eastern churches. For example, during the Crusader era,
from
benefits
the change of
favoured
Rome
Christians
experiencedany
who
only those
37
history
Kingdoms
Crusader
that
the
The
the
meant
of
short-lived successof
rulers.
Christianity in the Middle East was essentially one of religious communities living under a
political system based on the values of another overtly political religion.
20
The millet system used by Islamic rulers to govern non-Muslims, allowed the Eastern
churchesto retain control over all aspectsof life for their communities. Individuals were
only recognised by the state through their belonging to a group. The ethnic groups
categorisedby their religion were defined as millet. The term strictly meant nation but did
38
have
instead
being
not
any political connotations,
used as an organisational structure.
Originally, three millet were formed - Muslim, Christian and Jewish. The patriarch was the
natural choice to be the head of the Christian group. However in keeping with the dhimmi
system, the Muslim millet was by far the dominant one. Eastern Christians never
experiencedthe absolute political power enjoyed by Westem Christianity in medieval Europe.
Even in the case of the Maronites who gained accessto political office, this was still in
coexistencewith Muslims. Thus, they had no possibility of attaining the extent of state
power acquired by the church in Europe and thus escapedthe consequentrevolt against the
church state system. There has been debatewithin the Christian communities over the
political role of the church hierarchy but the privatization of the Christian faith in the Middle
East did not occur as was widely experiencedin the West. Instead, patriarchs from some
traditions were able to retain aspectsof civil authority over their communities e.g. jurisdiction
in
for
the
the
as
spokesman
group
representing
and
recognition
over personal status courts
their interests to the ruling authorities.
The uneven process of modemisation in the Middle East has not been accompanied by a
clear separation of religion and politics. Concerning the two casestudy countries, certainly
Both
be
defined
Lebanon
Egypt
theocracies.
goverriments exist separately
as
can
neither
nor
from religious institutions and mostly consist of lay figures. Clearly, religious leaders,
in
be
the
ruling
political
within
system
categorised
as
actors
cannot
of
affiliation,
regardless
the sensethat they are not invited to take policy decisions on all goveniment matters. Any
leader
because
involvement
takes
their
of a religious community.
as
place
of
role
political
21
22
Using the secularization thesis, it might be expectedthat the political role ofthe patriarch
would decline with a corresponding increase in the benefits derivedfrom the modernization
process. If these benefits have not been widely experienced,the secularising impact is likely
to be minimal, thus allowing the patriarch to retain his historical role as the spiritual and
civil representative ofthe community.
23
resulted in questions of meaning and identity being given as much importance as material and
economic issues. This affects both the developed and developing world.
To many, Western
society has become synonymous with violence, poverty, injustice and the breakdown of the
family.
corrupt, decadent,
42
immoral".
To those in the developing world, this situation is often ascribed to the
and
consequences of secularisation.
unite the community and provide social order, avoiding the problems experienced in the
West. 43
Yet, it is clear that the developing world also suffers from a crisis of state although this
takes a different form from those experiencedin more developed countries. The failure to
deliver development and democracy is widespread,particularly in Muslim countries.
Economic development has failed to keep up with population growth, leading to increasing
domestic inequality. The state tends to be bureaucratic, inefficient and unable to respond to
theseproblems. Modernization has not resulted in the expectedbenefits. According to
Murden, "For far too many Middle Easterners,modernization meant an urban experience of
44
few
housing
prospects". This social
and services, and
poverty, underemployment, poor
Instead,
failure
has
been
to
these states
the
provide
political
participation.
crisis
coupled with
are often characterised.by authoritarianism, patrionionialisin and corruption.
Norris and Inglehart expand on these ideas in their hypothesis of secularization based on
Existential Security.45 They argue that individuals expect the provision of "human security"
to be a key achievement of the state. Human security is defined as the lack of immediate risk
to personal safety e.g. violence, natural/mamnadedisasters,diseaseand poverty. In poorer
However,
in
these
threats.
to
the
vulnerable
are
of
population
proportion
states,a significant
in
improve
the
vulnerable
most
groups
even
as
post-industrial societies, conditions greatly
While
by
health
economic
to
services.
and
social
extent
society are covered some
24
25
26
According to the crisis ofstate approach, in this context ofa 'failed environment", it would
be expected that Christian institutions wouldfill the vacuum left by the state by addressing
Christian
identity
through
theirpositions
of
asprotectors
spiritual andpractical concerns
andprovidersofservices.
27
crises affecting the region would be likely to create an environment where secular lay
leadership could re-emerge at the expenseof thepatriarch.
The ongoing multilayered process of globalization can also be held accountable for the
continuanceof politicised religion, especially in the developing world.
Scholte defines
detached
from
became
"processes
relatively
globalization as
whereby many social relations
territorial geography, so that human lives are increasingly played out in the world as a single
47
from
distinguishes
is
deterritorialization
It
this
trend
globalization
which
of
place".
is
It
internationalization.
forms
closely connectedto the modernization thesis
previous
of
technology
due
to
the
and
will
capitalism
of
that
spread
change
suggesting
radical social
including
in
impact
in
These
society
all
areas
of
type
processes
result a new
of society.
has
been
the
The
nation
state
severely
of
authority
exclusive
economic, political and cultural.
challenged by the global economy and the widespread availability of communication and
information technology. Non-state actors are able to take part in areaspreviously reserved
for the state including not only healthcarebut also high politics such as war and peace.
Furthermore, the abundanceof transnational organizations is claimed to restrict the
independenceof the nation state. The globalization processappearsto have heightened and
highlighted the inequality gap both within countries and between different areasof the world.
In the developing world, the pursuit of market capitalism often destroys local economies and
illustrates the inability of governments to pursue policies that aid their citizens. There is also
imperialism
form
Western
just
is
of
and
another
widespread concern that globalization really
hostility
The
towards
the
identities
indigenous
some
of
cultures.
to
and
threat
poses a severe
ills associatedwith globalization - both material e.g. unemployment, wage cuts and cultural
28
e.g. influx of Western products and lifestyle - meansthat the periphery in this globalised
world tries to respond to these challengesby turning to institutions which are seen as the
opposite to the dangerousWestern influence and instead representtheir indigenous culture.
Frequently, religious movements undertake this role.
Globalization has had a major impact on the ability of religious movements to play a more
public role. It encouragesmultiple identities. This allows a member of a specific faith
community to accentuatethis identity while remaining loyal to the nation state. These links
can strengthen weak statesby connecting them to powerful networks. In other cases,
religious movements will be regarded as a rival to the state. This can lead to open
competition with the state or compel the government to use religious institutions to maintain
legitimacy for their rule. The ability of religion to provide a collective identity as well as the
universal appeal of many faiths, ensuresthat religious communities are one of the oldest
transnational actors. Allegiance and activity is on a global scale rather than confined within
specific territorial boundaries. Examples include the Vatican, Islamic organizations e.g.
Islamic Conference, religious NGOs and different denominations of world faiths.
Religious movements have also been key beneficiaries of some of the major tools of
globalization - communications and information technology. It is this element of the
globalization process which clearly distinguishes it from other historical eras. In the twentyfirst century, developments in transport have made frequent travel possible for many while the
information revolution has ensuredthat through television and the internet, events in one part
dispersed
in
in
by
"real-time"
the
while
region
groups
of
citizens another
world are viewed
can keep instantly in touch by electronic mail and internet chat sites. People quickly become
for
from
fate
their
the
the
call
a
response
and
co-religionists
world
aware of
of
around
fellow
Muslims
from
international
to
their
Discussing
aid
appeals
actors.
national and
believers in conflict zones such as Palestine, Bosnia and Chechnya, Piscatori assertsthat we
29
In
independence.
the
predominantreactionof
to
general,
achieving
greatly successfully
has
been
to
by
the
to
the
process
act as
globalization
raised
challenges
religiousmovements
the defenderof the specificculture.
30
This is mainly due to the perception that indigenous cultures are under threat from a new
Western onslaught - one which posesmore long-term damagethan the traditional methods of
colonialism - invasion and occupation. Through television, tourism, films and music, the
ability to maintain separateidentities is greatly challenged. The growth in the international
human rights discourse adds to the belief that the West is continually intervening in affairs of
sovereign states in other regions. As the globalization processoriginated in the West, many
non-western societies have felt unable to distinguish between modernization and
Westernization and frequently view it as yet another aspectof imperialism. Disenchantment
with the costs (especially cultural) of the material benefits of globalization has become a
factor in the rejection of Westernization and the search for a more authentic culture. A
concerted effort has been made to resist Western cultural hegemony. Religion can emphasise
a collective identity by dividing society into insiders and outsiders. Another argument
frequently used is that the so-called moral decay of the West has been prevented elsewhere
due to fidelity to religious values. In some cases,this has been ascribed to the superiority of
the other religion by its followers e.g. Muslims commenting on the role of Islam. Although
contradictory to the above argument, cultural relativism has also been used by the ruling elite
of particular cultures as part of their resistanceto Western universalism. They highlight their
different religious experiencesto justify values which are different from those respectedby
the West e.g. a particular view of human rights. For example, some Muslim countries claim
to derive their values from the sharia - Islamic law. Western values are perceived as rooted
"
in
in its secular heritage and applicable only that region.
ideas
justify
leaders
to
in
Some
these
this
repression within their
use
weaknesses
argument.
state while there is also debate regarding the origins of so-called religious traditions. In the
Islamic case,many values held can be traced to the traditional heritage of each region rather
than the actual tenets of the faith. However, it is certain that these claims are widely
31
respectedin the specific regions. Religion has been able to reassertitself in the identity
struggles which are being experiencedin this era of globalisation. This has led commentators
such as Kepel to claim that, perhapscontrary to what was initially expected, globalization has
in fact stimulated the public role of religion and that what he terms the "revenge of God" can
be viewed as a side effect of modernization.53 However, others including Bruce regard this
role as protector of a specific culture as a short-term phenomenonwhich will decline once the
threat has either conquered or been defeated.54 While this may indeed be the case,the
struggle certainly appearslikely to be ongoing in the near future.
A key work regarding the relationship between religion and culture is Huntington's Clash of
Civilizations.
societies in the post Cold War era. Thus, the power of nation stateswill increasingly be
directed towards a wider culture i. e. they will act as "agents of Civilizations". 55
Consequently, realignment in international alliances will occur to reflect these changes.
Huntington divides the world into civilizations including Western, Islam, Confucian and
Orthodox. While some of his categorieshave been criticised, the above mentioned do appear
to give credenceto this theory. What is certain is that the specific religious heritage in these
regions can be seento have influenced society and politics. Consequently, this will
frequently result in confrontational relations, particularly as co-operation within civilizations
increases. Huntington suggeststhat this will include "civilizational rallying" when members
of one civilization aid their coreligionists who reside within another civilizational group. An
example is the aid given by some Muslim statesand organisations to their coreligionists
in
Lebanon,
Bosnia,
Chechnya
Palestine,
in
as
such
engaged conflicts against non-Muslims
56
its
According
traditional ties to a
Kashmir.
to
this
maintain
approach,religion will
and
leading
in
take
the
the
can
a
civilizations,
role in
case
of
non-Western
particular culture, and
the struggle to assertan authentic culture separatefrom the West.
32
belonged
different
fault
line
to
in
Lebanon
the
participants
a
war
where
civil war
as
57
does
in
East
Middle
Christianity
However,
West
Islam.
the
the
not
and
civilizations naturally fall into one civilization.
West, while others, particularly the Oriental and Orthodox churches could be viewed as part
of the Orthodox civilization.
Western
like
Churches
their
Eastern
helpful.
The
oriented
and
are not necessarily
support
58
identity
from
West.
the
Muslim neighbours, are keen to keep an authentic cultural
separate
It can be argued that on matters of culture, some Eastern Christians actually identify with the
59
it
is
Thus,
historical
Islamic civilization as they sharethe same
possible that
experiences.
their religious identity as Christians can co-exist with their cultural attachmentsto the Arab
from
different
In
from
the
culture.
a
than
co-religionists
aid
requiring outside
world, rather
in
Christian
behalf
the
intervened
have
Western
communities
of
supposedly on
powers
past,
but
"civilizational
Huntington's
be
to
This
rallying"
of
representative
region.
would appear
diaspora
is
likely
to
communities rather than states.
occur amongst
now more
Clearly, religious identity has maintained its importance in the Middle East, regardless of
the specific affiliation.
be
the
the
loyalty
incompatible
to
the
being
expense
as
at
of
can
seen
state
with
necessarily
Likewise,
Maronite
failing
the
is
the
community.
of
needs
as
state which generally perceived
Maronite
has
Christian)
the
Muslim
(both
from
allowed
also
the
and
ruling elite
alienation
Churchto challengethe authorityof the state. Although both denominationsareclosely
due
dispersal
to
the
be
transnational
termed
they
of
cannow
connectedto a specificcountry,
followers to all areasof the globe. As will be exploredin ChapterSix, diasporagroupsmake
technological
The
highlight
recent
their
of
to
use
cause.
useof modemcommunications
33
Using the above approach, it would be expectedthat the backlash to the globalization process
would allow the church to lead the responseof the community as it is thefocalpoint of
communal identity. The tools ofthe communications revolution would also serve to revitalise
the church, allowing the patriarch to retain control ofthe entire community regardless of
geographical location. Accordingly, the identification ofthe church with the indigenous
durable
to
temporal dimension
thepatriarch
the
sustain
a
culture of
community would enable
to his position.
34
to Iannaccone,people "approach all actions in the same way, evaluating costs and benefits
960
benefits'
When making a decision concerning their
and acting so as to maximise their net
.
for
in
The
the
the
that
motives
religious adherence
guarantee
outcome.
risk
sense
one cannot
are divided into two categories- distant rewards (i. e. in the afterlife) and compensators(i. e.
highlights
This
that
benefits
both
approach
religious
and
material).
supernatural
present
friendship,
by
is
least
status, senseof
e.
g.
gains
material
at
motivated
affiliation
often
partly
belonging or social services. This also means that social sanctionswill be influential in
belief.
For example,
depending
than
on
religious
solely
ensuring continued allegiance rather
35
leaving a religious institution will have a major impact on the life of a person whose social
network is almost entirely related to this group. Similarly, in some communities, the loss of
statusassociatedwith leaving could have an adverseeffect on personal and business relations.
Thus, these potential consequencesare likely to be taken into consideration by an individual
when deciding on their future involvement with a religious institution.
This approach is criticised by scholarswho object to explaining religious participation
solely as a logical decision by an individual and thus ignoring the importance of religious
beliefs. According to Bruce, its main presumption is that people "do not turn to
62
9
in
He argues
their pursuit of material rewards'
transcendental concerns unless thwarted
.
that many religious believers cite spiritual reasons for their involvement in religious
institutions.
Young also adds that non-rational experience is at the heart of all religion. 63
This is illustrated through the use of symbolic rites and belief in the supernatural. The ability
of individuals to freely choosetheir religion is also questioned. For many people, their
it
in
is
difficult
birth
identified
is
to
their
many
cultures,
at
and
religious affiliation
already
64
in
Decisions
this
a vacuum.
are
not
made
about religious choice
change
membership.
Both personal beliefs and the cultural environment are likely to be influential.
While
(and
help
benefits
to
a
specific
religious
group
also serve
attract
people
certainly
material
may
to maintain their loyalty), spiritual reasonsare still acknowledged as the main reason for
religious participation by most individuals.
Another feature of the rational choice approach is to examine religious vitality from the
is
It
led
demand
than
the
proposed that contrary to the
approach.
normal
supply side rather
key proposition of the secularization thesis, modernization does not adversely affect religious
institutions. Instead, demand for religion dependson market conditions. Continuing with
firms
"Religious
firms.
institutions
defined
language,
are social
as
are
market
religious
enterprises whose primary purpose is to create, maintain and supply religion to some set of
36
37
religious vitality while liberal variations will decline in popularity. According to Collins,
"Liberal religion is constantly dying, while conservative religion is being reborn". 69
Several criticisms have been made of these assertions. Firstly, the suitability of the
methodology used by rational choice theorists has been questioned as too limited.
The
majority of studies focus on specific communities in the United Statesand Europe and
concentrateon the nineteenth and twentieth century. Thus, there is doubt as to how relevant
these findings are to the wider debate on religious vitality.
evidence does not necessarily support some of the claims made by proponents of rational
70
Secondly, various studies have demonstratedthat religious pluralism is not a
choice.
significant factor in explaining religious participation. In his study of the Baltic states,Bruce
illustrates that a combination of cultural pluralism and minimal state interference can lead to
less not more interest in religion. 71 ResearchingEuropean post-industrial countries with a
Catholic heritage, Norris and Inglehart found that religious participation was higher in Italy
and Ireland where the Catholic Church enjoys a monopoly compared to the more pluralist
societies of the Netherlands and France - completely contrary to the predictions of the supplydemand approach.72 Furthermore, history has shown that some religious institutions have
survived, even thrived, during times of hardship and persecution e.g. the early Christian
73
church. Thus, the existence of a monopoly does not mean that other groups will not be
is
beneficial
it
in
Thirdly,
as
not
always
competition
can
successful attracting members.
leading
fewer
in
institutions
duplicate
inefficiency
to
their
adherents for
services,
result
as
74
institutions to change their ideas and policies in order to retain competitiveness and attract
by
hugely
belief
their
is
limited.
"Religious
constrained
own
are
organizations
members also
75
lose
it
is
In
that
sight of the cultural and social
not
clear
one must
systems".
conclusion,
context when exploring religious vitality.
38
39
The cultural context is extremely important when examining Christianity in the Middle East
from the supply-side. The ability of individuals to make a "rational choice" regarding their
religious affiliation is clearly restricted. In this region, conversions from one faith to another
are often viewed as proof of the superiority of that particular faith. Conversions from
Christianity are made more painfiil due to the small numbers of Christians in comparison to
the Muslim majority.
means that rumours abound that Coptic girls are kidnapped and forcibly converted when in
fact many have chosen to do so when marrying a Muslim man. In Lebanon, it is generally
believed that if one of the religious communities attempts to proselytise, this negatively
affects harmonious relations between the confessions. While it is not prohibited to
proselytize in either country, it is clearly not encouraged. Thus, there is huge pressure on
both sides (Muslim and Christian) to remain in the faith community of birth. These cultural
factors can be seento account for religious vitality in this region rather than religious
denominations
individuals
to
Consequently,
to
the
are
restricted
pluralism.
choices available
rather than faiths.
Living in a predominantly Muslim region meansthat realistic competition is confined to the
limited
"market",
it
identified
Christians.
Within
this
the
can
section of
as
population already
be noted that competition has resulted in increasedvitality for many of the churches. This is
particularly true of the Coptic Orthodox Church. Like many of the ancient Eastern churches,
it has had to compete with Catholic and Protestant challengers. The clerical hierarchy tend to
divide
to
the
already
to
these
only
serving
and
requirements
regard
as
surplus
competitors
fragile and disunited Christian community. Despite this hostility, the Catholic and Protestant
missionary movements were able to attract followers from the existing churches, especially in
the nineteenth century. This was partly due to the contrast in the style of worship including
sermons and more participation by the laity which attracted the well-educated elite who often
40
76
ignorant.
backward
The non-religious
regardedthe clergy of the ancient church as
and
services of the Catholic and Protestant churches also served as an attraction such as education,
social services and contacts to the West. In responseto this competition, the ancient
churchesinitiated reforms. For example, the Coptic Revival led by Patriarch Kyrillos IV in
the mid-nineteenth century, involved introducing sermonsin Mass, opening new seminaries
for priests and building new educational institutions. 77 In communion with Rome, the
Maronite Church avoided Catholic competition. However, they were not immune from
Protestant missionary work. In the educational field, this competition led to the founding of
two influential institutions in the late nineteenth century - the Syrian Protestant College (now
the American University in Beirut) in 1866 and the Jesuit University of St. Joseph in 1875.
Hence, it would appearthat both the Coptic Orthodox and the Maronite churches were able to
act as a monopoly but were forced to implement reforms and undergo a period of
revitalisation in order to compete with other Christian denominations.
While both of the casestudy churcheshave remained dominant within the Christian
in
The
for
is
longer
the
taken
it
is
past.
as
this
granted
that
position no
community,
evident
Awareness
keen
the
hierarchies
to
adherents.
number
of
possible
maximise
respective
are
that the community expects that the church will play a leading role in all aspectsof life institution
has
become
that
the
temporal
as
an
church
means
spiritual, material, cultural and
for
increases
its
followers.
It
the
life
the
involved
in
daily
opportunities
the
also
of
more
for
become
the community.
leader
the
to
spokesman
political
religious
The cultural environment also affects the church-staterelationship. According to the
have
is
likely
to
institution
that
strong
monopoly
enjoys a
supply-side approach, a religious
links with the state. The patriarchs of both churches are recognised as spiritual and
do
the
However,
they
by
share
same
leaders
not
their
communal
respective governments.
faith as the majority of the population and have not exercisedpower in the same way as
41
42
is more likely to exercise his temporal authority. The domestic environment influences the
extent of political participation by church leaders. When the ruling authorities are perceived
as being indifferent to the problems facing the Christian communities, especially if this is
accompanied by a significant upsurge in political Islam, a proactive approach is likely to be
taken as was pursued by Pope Shenoudaduring the Sadatyears. However, if Christians are
treated in a similar manner to other citizens, the need for active political representation by the
church is not as necessarye.g. in Syria and Jordan. The international environment is also
likely to affect the responseof the church to specific issues. As will be explored in Chapter
Six, the activities of lobby groups formed by expatriate Copts and Maronites influence the
situation at home. The attitude of other countries, especially the only superpower, the United
States,may also count as a factor in deciding the political approach of the church. Again, it
is important to note that any decision will be influenced and perhaps constrained by nonhead
due
the
Firstly,
to
the
to
the
as
of the church, the
patriarch
power
given
rational aspects.
important.
Secondly, the teachings and traditions of
is
leader
the
personality of
extremely
be
drawn
factor.
There
that
three
be
can
are
propositions
each church will also a contributory
from the rational choice approach.
Firstly, religious institutions offer rewards and compensatorswhich in this context, could
lead
This
to their
identity
could
the
strengthen
and cohesivenessofthe community.
willingness to delegatepolitical representation to the patriarch.
Secondly, the existenceofa monopoly would suggest that the religious institution benefited
from a privileged relation with the state. Mle
43
Airdly, it would be expectedthat the attitudes of the ruling authorities and society influence
thepolitical strategy pursued by the religious leader, resulting in a more assertive approach
when the community is perceived as endangered.
SummarvOfTheories
From this discussion, it is clear that throughout the world, contemporary religious
institutions continue to possessthe capacity to be politically active. Thus, the political role of
four
All
theories suggest
be
in
East
Middle
anomaly.
the
an
as
regarded
should not
patriarchs
that the political role of the church is closely connectedto its ability to provide its followers
with a distinct identity, senseof belonging and security, social networks and welfare services.
If the church can fulfil these functions, this would appearto translate into acceptanceof a
temporal dimension to the office of patriarch. This tendency to perceive religion as fulfilling
has
led
to
transcendental
the
being
criticism
than
with
solely
concerned
other purposes rather
that political activities are undertaken at the expenseof spiritual matters. However, the early
in
involvement
life.
Therefore,
the
political sphere
of
areas
church was concerned with all
can actually be seen as the return of authentic religion.
This thesis proposes that the crisis of state approachwhich relates the political role of
Patriarchs
best
the
role
of
heightened
political
explains
perceptions of vulnerability
religion to
Shenoudaand Sfeir. However, the debateregarding the historical experience of Christian
East
did
in
Middle
Christianity
the
As
important.
is
not
in
communities the region also
is
it
in
West,
to
the
the
more
accurate
fundamental
church
the
which
affected
changes
undergo
"the
III,
Gregory
by
in
church of
term
the
the
coined
context of
examine these churches
Islam". They have been greatly affected by this Islamic environment, allowing the church
leaders to retain predominance over the community at the expenseof the laity. It would
44
Various resourceshave been used to compile this examination of the political role of the
have
Published
in
Coptic
Orthodox
Maronite
traditions.
the
sources
provided
patriarchs
and
have
backgound
historical
Internet
to
topic.
this
also been used
resources
useful
and
guides
to gather information, particularly on the churches and 6migr6 groups. Due to the subject
As
to
coverage
of
events.
the
up-to-date
a
matter,
study relies on newspaper articles ensure
into
insight
I
the specific
field
Lebanon,
Egypt
to
trips
gained
and
consequenceof my
interviews
from
in
has
Information
the
two
obtained
countries.
situation of each community
been used to illustrate the varied opinions on the political role of the patriarchs. Visits to
45
1) Yhe tradition and authority invested in the patriarch ofa specific tradition
When this is strong, it is more likely to lead to an active political role of the religious
leader.
46
It would be expectedthat this would decreaseif therewas a low senseof identity and
the communitytraditionally pursuedan integrationistapproachtowardsthe majority
group.
47
48
49
the emergenceof rivals to the role of the patriarch as the civil representativein the form of
6migregroups. Finally, Chapter Sevenwill presentthe conclusion to this study. After
summarisingthe key findings, thesewill be analysedin the context of the theoretical
framework developed in Chapter One.
29 lbid
p. 34
30Kate Zebiri. "Muslim anti-secularist discourse in the context of Muslim-Christian relations" Islam
and
Muslim-Christian Relations 90) 1998 p. 52-55
Said Amir Arjornand, "The Emergence of Islamic Political Ideologies" in James A Beckford and
50
Thomas Luckmann (eds) The Changing Face of Religion (London, Sage Publications Ltd, 1991)
P. 109
32Abdullah A
"Political Islam
33The Holv Bible, New International Version, (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1992) Matthew 22 21
v
P. 991
34Bruce, Politics
57 Ibid
p. 256
58Samir Khalil Samir, "Presence et Temoignage des Chretiens dans le monde arabe" aroche Orient
Chr6tien 52(1-2) 2002 p. 56
Gregory 111,
"The Situation of the Christians in the Middle East" p. 12
80Laurence R lannaccone, "Voodoo Economics? Reviewing the Rational Choice Approach to
Religion" Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 34(1 1995 p. 77
61Laurence R lannaccone, "Rational Choice: Framework for the Scientific Study of Religion" in
51
Laurence A Young (ed) Rational Choice Theory and Religion : Summary and Assessment (London,
Routledge, 1997) p. 30
62Steve Bruce, Choice and Religion :A Critique of Rational Choice Theory (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1999) p. 37
63Laurence A Young, "Phenomenological Images of Religion and Rational Choice Theory" in
Laurence A Young (ed) Rational Choice Theory and Religion : Summary and Assessment (London,
Routledge, 1997) p. 136
64Bruce, Choice and Reliqlon :A Critique of Rational Choice Theo p. 126-7
65Rodney Stark and Laurence R lannaccone, "A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the "Secularization"
of Europe" Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 33(3 1994 p. 232
66lannaccone, "Voodoo Economics? Reviewing the Rational Choice Approach to Religion" p. 77
67Roger Finke, "The Consequences of Religious Competition : Supply Side Explanations for
Religious Change" in Laurence A Young (ed) Rational Choice Theory and Religion : Summary and
Assessment (London, Routledge, 1997) p. 52
Stark and lannaccone, "A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the "Secularization" of Europe" p. 231
69Randall Collins, "Stark and Bainbridge, Durkheim and Weber: Theoretical Comparisons" in
Laurence A Young (ed) Rational Choice Theory and Religion : Summary and Assessment (London,
Routledge, 1997) p. 176
70Bruce, Choice and Religion :A Critique of Rational Choice Theory p. 123
71Ibid p. 100-120
72Norris and Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide p. 100-1
73Bruce, Choice and Religion :A Critique of Rational Choice Theory p. 47
74lbid p. 51-52
75Ibid
p. 126
76Valognes, Vie
52
Introduction
The explanations for the involvement of religion in politics detailed in the introductory
chapter are based on the assumption that religious institutions can undertake the
representation of the community by directing their substantial resourcestowards this aim. In
the Eastern Christian tradition, the office of patriarch is a key resource. The patriarch is more
than the head of the church. He is the father of the flock, symbol of the faith and figurehead
of the community. In short, the patriarch can be perceived as the personification of the entire
church. This thesis proposesthat the status of this office endows the patriarch with
further
dimension
be
temporal
to
the
the
can
used
which
substantial authority over
community
of the office. While this is true to a certain extent of all Eastern Christian traditions,
patriarchal authority in the two churchesused as casestudies, can be regarded as amongst the
Coptic
developed.
the
The
the
the
of
sees
and
origins
of
patriarchal
most
establishment
Orthodox and Maronite patriarchs will be examined. Their authority will be discussed,
Constraints
law
tradition.
through
to
the
the
and
canon
patriarch
emphasising
power given
Holy
the
including
be
the
this
of
role
requirements,
on
electoral
power will also explored
Synod, laity and external actors. For the Coptic Orthodox, this refers to the Egyptian
in
tempering
Vatican
in
Maronites,
the
role
a
major
the
the
plays
caseof
government while
the power of the patriarch. By establishing the extent of authority ascribed to the patriarch, it
has
desires,
if
he
the resourcesto act as the civil as
be
demonstrated
that
the
so
will
patriarch,
well as the spiritual representativeof the community.
53
The historical experience of Christianity in the Middle East has also proved influential in
maintaining patriarchal authority. In contrast to the situation in Europe, the Arab conquest in
the seventh century deprived the Christian churchesof direct political power through control
of the state. Yet, Islamic rule ensuredthat the patriarchs retained aspectsof their civil
authority. As will be explored, subsequentregimes in the Muslim world allowed the heads of
the different Christian churches to exercise temporal power over their community in return for
acting as the liaison between the community and the ruling authorities. The consequent
absenceof the secularization process as occurred in the West has presented the current heads
in
in
Middle
East
to
to
the
the
enjoy
civil
authority
a
of churches
with
opportunity continue
manner rarely seen elsewhereby Christian religious leaders. It is clear that the political
dimension of the patriarchal office has remained significant throughout the centuries and
certainly should not be perceived as a recent development. This will be explored by a brief
examination of the initial period after the Arab Conquest to the Ottoman era when this
political role became institutionalised through the millet system. Finally, attention will be
both
Coptic
history
in
the
the
of
to
the
modem
given
political activities of previous patriarchs
Orthodox and Maronite churches. This will illustrate that there is a strong precedent
(particularly in the Maronite example) of political leadership by the patriarch and also offer
the opportunity to highlight the personal influence of the two present leaders- Pope
Shenoudaand Patriarch Sfeir.
The Origins of the Patriarch in the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite Traditions
The term patriarch which is used to describe the head of many Eastern Christian churches
father,
Greek
Latin
from
patria meaning
meaning
and
originates
a combination of
-pater
'
leader
lineage, race, people, nation and lastly, archos meaning
or chief. Originally, it was
54
Rome.
it
in
to
the
Constantinople
381,
of
see
only
of
was confirmed as second
Alexandria
intellectual
developed
St.
Mark
the
and
as
an
and
of
was associatedwith
martyrdom
6
School.
The growth of the
Cathetical
theological centre including the Didascalia - the
Christian faith was regarded as spreading from Antioch - an early centre of evangelisation,
following on from the work of the apostles.7 The fifth seeJerusalemwas actually the least
important to the early church and was not designateda patriarchal seeuntil the Council of
Chalcedon in 45 1.8
55
century, the church leaders still deemedit vital that the church pursued a common theological
doctrine. Although the beginnings of national identities within specific regions were
acknowledged e.g. Armenia, Persia and Egypt; it was still expectedthat the decisions of
bishops in one region would affect the universal church. For example, the Egyptian
Patriarchs of Alexandria played key roles in international church affairs, particularly
"
doctrinal
issues.
concerning
the wider church through the writings of the desert fathers. Furthermore, there was rivalry
between the patriarchs as each one wished to preside over the leading see.
The unity of the early church was shatteredby doctrinal controversies in the fifth century.
As this discussion is confined to the formation of the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite
churches,it will focus primarily on the Councils at Ephesusand Chalcedon. ln431, under
the direction of Cyril, the Patriarch of Alexandria, the Council of Ephesuscondemned the
christological stance of Nestorius, the patriarch of Constantinople and engineeredhis
deposition. Nestorius was identified with teaching that objected to Mary being called
theotokos- the bearer of God - as he argued that shewas the mother of Jesusbut not the
12
God.
This complex christological dispute was renewed under Patriarch
mother of
Dioscorus who controlled the second Council of Ephesusin 449 - the so-called Robber
Council - and deposedthe patriarchs of Antioch and Constantinople. However, the power of
the Egyptian church was challenged two years later when these rulings were repudiated at the
451 Council of Chalcedon. The Council defined that Christ possessedtwo natures, divine
13
in
Egypt,
Syria
human,
joined
in
However,
theologians
many
and
one person.
which were
had
been
Nestorius
ideas
Armenia
to
too
the
this
which
rejected at
and
of
similar
regarded
as
the previous council. Instead, they agreedwith the definition given by Cyril, Patriarch of
Alexandria, "single nature of the Word of God made flesh". 14 Hence, the church in Egypt
adheresto the teachings of the first three ecumenical councils only.
56
57
usedthe Coptic language. The term Copt comes from the Greek for Egypt - aigyptos.20 In
this sense,the Coptic Orthodox Church can be regarded as the Egyptian national church. It is
clear that a senseof national identity already existed. This was heightened by the
appointment of a Chalcedonian Patriarch who was regarded as a foreigner. Given both civil
and religious power, Cyrus attempted to quell the rebellion through force ranging from
imprisoning and killing non-Chalcedonian believers, attacking monasteries and even
21
brother
Patriarch
However, this violence appearedto have the
murdering the
of the
.
opposite impact on Egyptian Christians. Even by this early stage,the Egyptian church had
22
witnessed substantial persecution. For example, many thousandswere killed from 303AD
under the orders of Emperor Diocletian. According to Meinardus, "National feeling in Egypt
was so intensely opposed to the Chalcedonense,which had become the Imperial Creed, that
shortly before the Arab Conquest in the VIIth century the Melkite or Chalcedonian Patriarch
of Alexandria had but 200,000 Greeks and officials for his adherents,whereas as many as six
million Egyptians acknowledged the non-Chalcedonian faith. 9,23 The Arab conquest
signalled the end of Byzantine persecution and the beginning of a new era.
The Council of Chalcedon had a major impact on the universal church. The pattern of the
duplication of patriarchs emerged. The pro-Chalcedon church continued to appoint
patriarchs to other seeseven although some had few followers such as in Alexandria. This
need for a patriarch was the fundamental factor for the founding of the Maronite church. The
term Maronite is derived from a fourth century hermit Maron whose ascetic life attracted
disciples who founded a monastery in his memory - Beit Maroon. 24 Although there is
Chalcedon
Council
in
doctrinal
beliefs
the
these
the
of
after
controversy regarding
monks
of
45 1, the Maronite Church firmly statesthat they adheredto the Chalcedonian Christological
definition of one person in two natures.25 As this doctrine was rejected by many in Syria and
Egypt, the monks of Beit Maroon were subject to persecution including the massacreof 350
58
26
in
followers
by
Churchhistoriansclaim that
517
Patriarch
Severus
Antioch.
monks
of
of
becausethe last OrthodoxPatriarchin Antioch diedin 609 anddueto the Arab conquest,later
in
in
Constantinople,
Maronite
the
was
gave needof a leader.
patriarchsresided
community
Thevacantseewas filled in the late seventhcentury.27 in this way, the Maronite monastic
28
into
its
hierarchy
communityevolved
andecclesiasticalautonomy.
a "church" with own
Giventhe title of MaronitePatriarchof Antioch andAll The East,the first patriarchJohn
Maron is regardedasthe founderof the MaroniteChurch. Having lost Byzantineprotection
eitherdueto electingtheir patriarchwithout the consentof the emperor,or assomehistorians
claim, dueto their following of the compromiseMonothelitistdoctrine,JohnMaron was
29
creditedwith winning a decisivebattle againstthe Byzantinearmy. Continualconflict
resultedin wavesof emigrationto the safetyof Mount Lebanon. The attachmentto this area
identity.
While
Maronite
is
homeland
historic
territorial
of
a strongcomponent
asa
and
Mount Lebanonhaslong beenregardedasa refugefor variouspersecutedminorities e.g.
Druze,Shiites,Maronitesparticularlyemphasised
the mountainastheir havenfrom the
in
Here,
Islamic
by
the
world.
Islamic
oppressive
rule experienced non-Muslimselsewhere
the Maronitesdevelopedtheir own ecclesiasticalandcommunityidentity, resemblingwhat
Salibi termsshab (people)whereinthe patriarchwas seenasthe tribal chief ratherthanjust
the headof the church30 The arrival of the Crusadersin the late eleventhcenturyhaltedthe
.
isolationof the communityandallowedlinks with the CatholicChurchto be re-established.
In 1215,PatriarchJeremiasal-Aanshittiwas the first MaronitePatriarchto visit Rome,
1A
in
1439.3
gradual
attendingthe Council of LateranIV andrelationswerereaffirmed
"Latinization" policy was encouragedwith the foundingof the Maronite Collegein Romein
1584 andculminatedin the 1736 Synodof Mount Lebanonwhich undertookvast
from
1562
the
Roman
in
Church
Maronite
practices
with
accordance
restructuringof the
Council of Trent.32
59
The extent of patriarchal authority in each rite is derived from a combination of canon law
andtradition. In the Coptic Orthodox Church, the Bishop of Alexandria is recognised as the
patriarch and head of the church. This authority is derived from the scriptures, teachings of
the church fathers and canon law. The apostolic origins of the church ensure that the writings
of the early theologians, such as those in the Didascalia are followed regarding disciplinary,
33
spiritual and moral matters. The canonsassertthe importance of the leadership of the
church and thus, great attention is given to the criteria that must be satisfied to become
patriarch. The candidate must be celibate and while lay representativeshave been patriarchs
in the past, normally a monk would be chosen. Bebawi statesthat the "Coptic Church, the
mother of monasticism, seesin the monk the ideal Christian: and it is the ideal Christian who
34
be
be
bishop".
The church canonsclearly reject the idea of a bishop
should chosen to
becoming patriarch. A bishop is appointed for life and is expectedto devote the rest of his
ministry to his diocese. By becoming patriarch, he would be regarded as having been
consecratedtwice. A useful allegory is to compare the elevation of a bishop to the patriarchy
35
her
Yet in several instances, a
"a
leaving
her
to man marrying a girl then
to marry
mother".
bishop has been elected as patriarch. Three of the five patriarchs of the twentieth century
were diocesan bishops. In fact, the troubles of the church during their reign were interpreted
by some Copts as punishment for breaking the canons.36 The position of general bishop (i. e.
without a diocese) establishedby Pope Kyrillos VI has intensified this debate as the present
instrumental
in
layman,
General
for
Bishop
Education
was
as
a
yet
patriarch was previously
37
head
of the church.
condemning the Holy Synod when bishops were elected as the
60
61
issuing decreesand encyclical letters, ordaining bishops within the territorial boundaries and
presiding over the Synod. He is also the highest juridical authority for the community
43
Although bishops must resign aged seventy-five, this is
laws.
concerning personal statute
not applicable to patriarchs, hence illustrating the importance of the position. Faris statesthat
"The patriarch neither functions in his church as a little pope, nor is he merely a first among
44
in
Synod
The CCEO clearly emphasisesthe predominant position
equals the
of Bishops".
of the patriarch as the head of the church. According to Marini, "He representsin his person
the entire Maronite Church, and he is the principal representativeand spokesmanfor the
Maronite Church and for all Maronites everywhere".45
The patriarchal authority addressedby the CCEO is reinforced by the historical leadership
role played by the patriarch since its conception in the seventh century. As has been seen, the
Maronites can be identified as a tribal group with their religious head simultaneously
Maronite
leader
the
the
"The
Patriarch
Labaki
of
was
occupying a civil position.
asserts,
46
Beggiani
Furthermore,
him".
from
beginning
the
states
nation, which
always rallied round
that, "The identity of the Maronite Church is inseparablefrom the role of the Patriarch" and
furthermore, "the patriarch is the embodiment of Maronitc history and Maronite identity". 47
62
Consequently, the patriarch enjoys authority over the community which is extremely difficult
for other leaders (religious or civil) to challenge.
While both denominations acknowledge the patriarch at the head of a hierarchical structure,
this does not necessarily lead to blind acceptanceof his decisions. Several constraints have
been placed on the patriarch. In the Coptic Orthodox Church, the authoritarian almost
monarchical structure is surprisingly coupled with a strong populist tradition. Hasan states
that "from time immemorial, it has seen,despite its authoritarian hierarchic structure, an
inordinate amount of lay involvement in church affairs". 48 To a certain extent, the patriarch
has to take into consideration the opinions of the community, especially regarding the
in
late
institutionalised
This
the
dioceses.
bishops
nineteenth century
to
was
placement of
instigated
by
(community
was
the
the
council)
which
al-majlis al-milli
with
establishment of
the laity elite who wished to gain control of the financial and administrative affairs of the
his
to
V
Kyrillos
these
However,
Pope
authority over
a
challenge
as
reformers
saw
church.
the church and the community. As Meinardus suggests,"patriarchs always looked at the
49
Under
their
republican
authorities".
restricted
majlis al-milli as an organization which
in
favour
been
have
the
1952,
the
of the
weakened
council
activities of
governments since
but
in
included
the
Representatives
committee
members voted on to
electoral
are
patriarch.
50
Therefore,
hierarchy,
the
differ
the
patriarch.
especially
the council rarely
church
with
Church,
in
Coptic
Orthodox
important
the
tradition
laity
such
while
participation remains an
activities cannot be described as effective constraints on patriarchal authority.
Occasionally, the Egyptian government has also limited the extent of patriarchal power. In
in
1954
For
invitation
when
the
has
example,
the
church.
of
general, this
occurred at
kidnapped
Patriarch
Nation)
Yusab
Coptic
(The
Umma
al-Qibtiya
members of a radical group
II in an attempt to forcibly deposehim due to the rampant corruption under his reign, the
51
63
community, the authorities acceptedthe request of the Holy Synod and the majlis to relieve
him of his powers. Pennington statesthat "The formula is significant in that it legitimized
government intervention in patriarchal appointments, albeit with the support of the
52
large".
Another illustration was the government postponement of patriarchal
community at
elections after the death of Yusab II. Internal disagreementbetween the Synod who wanted
another bishop as patriarch and the reformers who wished to return to the tradition of
53
The
became
decision
be
government
choosing a monk, meant that a
could not
reached.
involved in the process of electing a new patriarch by appointing a patriarchal representative
to promulgate electoral laws. In most instances,once the patriarch is elected, the authorities
have little involvement in church affairs. However, the patriarch must obtain recognition
from the president and in extreme circumstances,this can be revoked as will be explored later
regarding Pope Shenoudain 1981.
Similarly, there are several constraints on the Maronite patriarch. Unlike the Oriental
Orthodox churches where the patriarch is recognised as the head of the church, final authority
in Eastern Catholic churches lies with the Pope - the supremehead of the universal church.
This means that the Vatican is involved in all aspectsof church affairs. The Pope must be
informed of a vacant seeand patriarchal elections. The Pope also has the final decision
regarding the candidate in the sensethat to gain legitimacy, the patriarch must receive
54
law
Although
from
the
Pope.
the
statesthat the patriarch
canon
ecclesiastical communion
is elected solely by the Holy Synod, the Vatican also enjoys influence. While the patriarch in
bishops,
laws
this
in
has
Synod,
electing
Holy
and
passing
the
autonomy
conjunction with
(excluding liturgical laws) applies only within the patriarchal territory. In common with
Maronite
to
the
Christian
Eastern
church
adherents
of
churches, a substantial proportion
most
i.
East.
During
Middle
the
territory
defined
in
longer
the
e.
the
patriarchal
as
no
region
reside
final
decision
The
debate.
fierce
issue
CCEO,
this
raised
process of codification of the
64
retained the historic principle of territory, thus restricting patriarchal power. Pastoral care of
Maronites in the diaspora is provided by the Congregation for the Eastern Churches, part of
the Roman Curia. The pope appoints bishops in eparchiesoutside of the patriarchal territory
although there is some contribution by the Maronite Synod who present a list of three
55
candidates. The patriarch is recognised by the community as the head of their church but
the bishop is under the direct authority of the Vatican through the Congregation for the
Eastern Churches. While there has been an increasein co-ordination between the two, this
issue negatively affects the ability of the patriarch to claim to representthe entire Maronite
community when in reality, this is proven only within patriarchal territory.
Another constraint on patriarchal authority is the role of the Holy Synod. The CCEO has
also recognised the Eastern tradition of Synodal governanceand ensured that the patriarch and
the synod are interdependent. The patriarch has the executive role as he convokes and
56
judicial
legislative
The Synod
Synod
Synod
and
presides over the
power.
enjoys
while the
also performs an important function in conducting the elections of patriarchs and bishops.
Regarding the vacant patriarchal see,the Synod members enjoy the exclusive right to elect the
57
Since the twentieth century, the laity have no longer exercised their
new patriarch.
traditional involvement in the electoral process. However, laity participation in church
affairs is provided through the patriarchal assembly, a consultative group which includes two
lay representatives from each eparchy amongst the predominant clerical group. This body
cannot set the agendabut it does at least ensurethat the laity can have some influence on
58
into
Maronite
hierarchy
does
the
take
community
church
popular opinion among
consideration. In conclusion, it is clear that both patriarchs enjoy substantial authority over
their community. As this is derived from canon law, the patriarch enjoys legitimacy to an
65
Since the beginning of the institution of the patriarch, a political dimension has been
involved. In contrast to the process experiencedby the church in Europe, Christianity in the
Middle East was only associatedwith state power for a short period. Yet, the temporal role
of the patriarch was ironically reinforced through centuries of Islamic rule as the patriarch
was identified as the civil leader of their community. The Arab conquest heralded a new
political system in the Middle East - one basedon Islam. Although the Muslim rulers
initially favoured the Christian communities who had been persecutedby the Byzantine
authorities, the fact that the majority of the population of the new empire were non-Muslim
meant that a standard approach to non-believers had to be devised. Islam divided the world
into dar al-Islam (house of Islam) and dar al-harb (house of war). The existence of nonMuslims within dar al-Islam resulted in the need to find a compromise solution. Due to their
possessionof a written revelation from God, both Christians and Jews were termed ahl alkitab (People of the Book). 59 As members of this group, Christians were given three choices
fight
to
Islamic
tributes
to
the
to
through
or
of
against
paying
convert, submit
political rule
MUSliMS.60 The idea of a covenant with non-Muslims was pioneered by Muhammad at
Medina with a Jewish tribe in 623 and at Najran with a friendly Christian community in
636 61 These treaties guaranteed freedom of person, property and religion in exchange for the
.
payment of thefizya (poll tax).
62
people.
66
The different Christian communities were treated as groups who were defined by religion.
According to Masters, these groups can be called taifa (collective group). Once established,
a taifa had a set of rules regarding membership and leadership and could ask Islamic rulers to
63
in
internal
disputes.
As the head of this community, the patriarch was held
mediate
responsible for the conduct of the whole group. In general, the patriarch continued to enjoy
authority over the internal affairs of the community on condition that taxes were paid and that
there was no interference in Islam - the state religion. 64 In order to collect taxes, the
patriarchs were given positions in the administrative system and allocated "civil coercive
65
Although the following statementby Atiya concerns the Assyrian
to
this.
authority"
attain
Church of the East, it can be applied to other headsof churches. "The patriarchs were
beginning to look like civil servantsas much as ecclesiastical dignitaries". 66 Several
patriarchs were sent as envoys on behalf of Islamic rulers. In the ninth century, Coptic
Orthodox Patriarch Josephwas sent to mediate between the Christian king of Nubia and the
Muslim rulers of Egypt while Patriarch Siyus becamethe emissary of the Caliph to the
Byzantine Empire in 1280.67 In exchangefor religious freedom in Lebanon, Maronite
patriarchs used their connections with the Vatican and European Catholic countries to aid the
Druze emirs of Lebanon. Patriarch Yuhanna Makhluf was an adviser to Emir Fakhr al-Din II
and instrumental in securing trading relations and an alliance against the Ottomans, between
the emir and the Grand Duke of Tuscany.68
However, relations were not always cordial. In the medieval era, Coptic Orthodox
patriarchs were often imprisoned by caliphs for ransom money becauseof the initial wealth of
69
Similarly, in times of crisis, the Maronite patriarch became a target for the
the church.
Islamic authorities. For example, Patriarch Daniel was killed in 1282 after resisting the
Marnluks while in 1367, Patriarch Jibrail was burned at the stake 70 In fact, Labaki asserts
.
that the capture of the Patriarch was more prized by enemiesthan the capture of a town. 71
67
Under this system, there was little challenge to the temporal authority of the patriarch. Not
only was the patriarch recognised by the Islamic authorities as the head of the community but
also, there were few opportimities for Christians to attain the statusrequired to rival this
recognisedcivil representative. Non-Muslims were prohibited from political and military
occupations. Their influence was confined to public administration and medicine. Bosworth
concludesthat although Christians were tolerated for their skills, they were still clearly
identified as second class subjects.72 Hence, the ability to acquire a power base independent
from the patriarch was severely limited.
Non-Muslims were given autonomy within the Islamic empire after the Arab Conquest but
it was not until the Ottoman Empire was establishedin the mid-fifteenth century, that this
systembecame institutionalised through the millet system. According to Pacini, "The
religious authorities of each millet acted both as representativesof the members of their millet
73
in
intermediaries
latter
between
the
and as
and central power administrative matters".
Aware that a substantial proportion of the population of the Ottoman Empire was Christian
due to the fall of the Byzantine Empire in 1453, the Ottoman Caliph Mehmet II was keen to
integrate the Christian groups into the administrative system of the empire. Identifying the
Pope as the enemy of the empire, the caliph was favourable towards the Orthodox church.74
In 1454, the Greek Orthodox millet was established,theoretically uniting all Eastern
Christians under one religious authority. The Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Constantinople
was responsible for all religious, civil, legal, educational and financial affairs in the Christian
75
This
the
Consequently,
the
within
millet.
was
status
millet .
clergy enjoyed a privileged
aided by their economic power over church property. Therefore, Betts suggeststhat the
76
It is clear that the Greek Orthodox Patriarch benefited hugely from this official recognition.
However, other headsof churches were also able to securetheir position as the civil heads of
68
their communities. The religious heads (excluding the Maronite patriarch who relied on
French protection) were given a berat legal recognition of their position. 77 This served to
reinforce the legitimacy of their authority. Due to their historical identity as a national
church, the Armenians were granted their separatemillet in 1461and were able to run their
internal affairs outside of Orthodox control. 78 Yet the geographicaldistance from
Constantinople to Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, allowed the Coptic Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox
and the Maronite patriarchs to continue to exercisede facto control of their community with
little external interference from the Greek Orthodox.
In the Egyptian case,the development of an indigenous millet system illustrates the close
connection between the Coptic Orthodox community and the Egyptian nation state.
Although nominally part of the Ottoman Empire, due to geographical location, the rulers of
Egypt tended to enjoy autonomous power to a certain extent that allowed the notion of a
distinct Egyptian identity to remain.79 Consequently, it was natural that the figures of the
Sultan and the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople would be replaced by the
Egyptian ruler and the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch - the leader of the vast majority of
Christians in Egypt. In contrast to the formal establishmentof other millet e.g. those formed
in the nineteenth century to accommodatethe Eastern Catholic branchesof the ancient
churches, there is no precise date of the recognition of the Coptic Orthodox as a separate
in
developments
in
it
have
the formation
Instead,
to
with
millet.
appears
evolved conjunction
of the Egyptian state to become the present millet system that is in operation in contemporary
Egypt.
In contrast, the Maronites did not live under strict millet conditions. This is mainly due to
their isolation in their remote homeland of Mount Lebanon. Similar to Egypt, Mount
Lebanon was officially part of the vast Ottoman Empire. Yet, Ottoman authority rarely
its
due
its
to
tradition of
into
due
deeply
to
this
remotenessand partly
penetrated
area,partly
69
providing a safe haven for different minority groups e.g. Maronites and Druze. Thus,
individual rulers remained relatively independent and in some cases,were favourable to the
Maronite community. 80 The patriarch did liase between the ruler and the community but
Thus, Labaki states
without the senseof inferiority that was inherent in the millet system
.81
that in Mount Lebanon, "They had the constitutional elementsof a nation with its necessary
organization under the leadership of the church headedby the Maronitc Patriarch. They were
82
by
laws".
their
As will be seen,this situation has changed as a
even ruled
own civil
consequenceof the LebaneseCivil War and has evolved into what Rowe terms a "neomillet
system", resembling the situation of other Christian communities in the region. 83 In
conclusion, it can be seenthat centuries of Islamic rule maintained and perhaps enhancedthe
civil authority of the Christian religious leaders in this region. This claim is reinforced by
examining the political activities of previous patriarchs in both case studies.
In the modem era, the temporal authority of the Coptic Orthodox patriarch was still
conditioned by relations with the individual ruler. The reign of Patriarch Peter VII (18091852) coincided with that of Muhammad Ali.
protection from the Russian Emperor, Mohammed Ali rewarded him by easing restrictions on
Christians. The short patriarchy of Kyrillos IV (1854-1861) was more controversial.
Known as the "father of Coptic reform", Kyrillos IV enactedvarious reforms in the fields of
education (both clerical and secular), administrative, church building and the purchase of a
84
printing press. While these had a major impact on the internal affairs of the church and can
be regarded partly as a reaction to increasedCatholic and Protestantmissionary activities, the
Patriarch was also active in more political issues. Kyrillos IV was instrumental in restoring
the exemption that Christians traditionally enjoyed from conscription to the armed services.
This had been changed as part of the reforms implemented by Mohammed Ali to provide
equality for all Egyptians regardlessof their religion. The patriarch also tried to increase the
70
71
However, class
conflict between the feudal lords and peasantsallowed the patriarchate to reclaim temporal
(1854-1890),
Masaad
Boulus
by
Patriarch
Led
by
the
the
authority
mid-nineteenth century.
72
However, the patriarch was also wary of the popularity of the leadersof the revolt, especially
Yusuf Karam whom he regarded as a rival for Maronite political leadership. The church
leadershippursued a path of mediation between the two groups,in order to illustrate that
Maronite political unity vital for the survival of the community could only be achieved
through the patriarchate.96 The defeat of the charismatic Karam who was persuadedby the
patriarch to accept exile in order to ensure peace in Mount Lebanon, eliminated a major
competitor to the temporal authority of the patriarch. This was enhancedby the simultaneous
decline of the Maronite feudal aristocrats. Patriarch Masaadwas also involved in the
tensions leading to the 1860 massacres. He encouragedthe Maronite peasantsin the South to
imitate their co-religionists in the north and rise against the feudal lords. However, as the
notables in this region were predominantly Druze, this action were interpreted as an attempt
by the patriarch to asserthis authority throughout the whole area and consequently, was a
factor in the ensuing conflict. The new political order of the mutasarrijiya, guaranteedby
foreign powers, allowed Patriarch Masaad and his successorsto consolidate temporal power. 97
The patriarchy of Elias Hoyek (1899-193 1) illustrates the political dimension of the office.
During the wartime Ottoman occupation, the patriarch becamea target of the rulers who were
determined to restore their authority over the region. Although finally forced in 1916 to
had
been
Sultan
from
the
legal
the
which
thefirman
accept
community
recognition of
by
Hoyek
Patriarch
the
by
Maronite
efforts
continual
resisted
avoided
previous
patriarchs 98
from
his
this challenge,
him.
Having
to
government exile
safely safeguarded community
the patriarch attended the 1919 Versailles PeaceConferenceas the head of the Lebanese
delegation. His impassioned pleas for an independentLebanon as opposedto incorporation
73
74
In particular, Meouchi played a major role in the 1958 crisis over both
the pro-Western foreign policies of President Chamoun and the attempts of the president to
gain a second unconstitutional
demonstrated his awareness of the tense regional environment which was dominated by
Nasser's Arab nationalism and ensured that the conflict did not divide along sectarian lines.
During a 1956 visit to Basta, a poor Muslim suburb of Beirut, the patriarch reiterated that
Lebanon was for its entire people and placards welcomed the "patriarch of Lebanon". 104
Qubain states that while Meouchi was still a fierce protector of Lebanese independence, he
was aware that cordial ties with neighbouring Arab states were vital, "now that the days of
French protection were over". 105 According to Frankel, it appeared to some worried
Maronites that their Patriarch was the "leader of the predominantly Muslim opposition". 106
The Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) witnessed the collapse of patriarchal temporal
authority.
stay out of politics, stating "In the past the Maronites were alone and the Patriarch was
everything.
When we gained our republic, the function and role of the Patriarch changed I
...
107
Head
Church
Similarly, he explained that "We in the
the
am
of a
not of a community".
Patriarchal Seat (Bkerke) have no deterrent military force.
108
have
in
As the state had disintegrated, many
Lebanon".
the
we
engaged
service of
Maronites still looked to their church to provide leadership, especially in times of crisis.
Few
Maronites agreed with the assertion of the patriarch that he had only moral and not temporal
authority.
Consequently, power within the church shifted from the patriarchate to the
Maronite monk orders. Monks such as Sharbel Kassis and Abbot Boulos Naaman were key
contributors to Christian "ethnic" nationalist ideology that stressed the Islamic threat to
Maronite identity. 109 Thus, the reign of Patriarch Khreish was a sharp contrast to the political
roles undertaken by his predecessors.
75
From this discussion, it can be seenthat on the whole, the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch has
been regarded by the different authorities in Egypt since the Arab Conquest to the present
day, as the religious and civil head of the community. The ability of the patriarch to defend
his community has mostly dependedon his relations with the ruler. In general, successive
patriarchs have aimed to co-operate with the Muslim rulers in order to secure the survival and
in
been
have
While
the
the
a position to enjoy temporal
presenceof
never
church.
patriarchs
authority in Egypt -a predominantly Muslim country, the status attachedto the position has
ensuredthat for the Coptic community, the patriarch can lay claim to both spiritual and
have
Maronite
leadership.
In
always enjoyed more overt
political
patriarchs
contrast,
heads
Christian
is
than
This
other
of
temporal
pronounced
more
elements of
much
authority.
churches in the Middle East due to the unique historical circumstances of the Maronite
leaders
have
it
is
However,
that
in
true
Mount
Lebanon.
always
secular
also
community
divided
forces
When
these
or contained as occurred
to
this
are
provided a challenge
role.
from the era of Patriarch Masaad, the patriarch remains the only figure who can unite the
be
better
their
that
if
can
provided
In
needs
the
community.
community perceives
contrast,
by secular leaders, then the patriarch resemblesmore of a symbolic figurehead than an active
political leader.
SUMMAI:
y
76
political authority, successivepatriarchs have been able to use the moral power of their
position to publicise their views on national affairs and exert the ruling elite to act according
to these interests. The Maronite casecan be regarded as a more overt example of the
temporal authority of a patriarch. However, this role is also undertaken by the Coptic
Orthodox Patriarch. Several patriarchs have taken advantageof the undisputed jurisdiction
over the spiritual affairs of the community to exercise authority over the Copts in civil matters
as well. This chapter has demonstratedthat a political dimension to the patriarchal office has
long been recognised by both the communities and rulers. Thus, the discussion on the
political role of Patriarchs Shenoudaand Sfeir must acknowledge this context and
demonstrate the ways in which they have continued and at certain times, transformed this
tradition.
77
I Aziz S Atiya, The Coptic Encyclopaedia (New York, MacMillan Publishing Co, 1991) 1909
p.
2 Wilhelm de Vries, "The origin of the Eastern Patriarchates
and their Relationship to the power of
the Pope" in Thomas E Bird and Eva Pidducheshen (eds), Archiepiscopal and Patriarchal
Autonom (New York, Fordham University, 1972) p. 14
3 Catholic International 6(8) "Our Patrimony of Patriarchs" p. 365
John D Faris, Eastern Catholic Churches : Constitution and Governance (New York, Saint Maron
Publications, 1992) p. 4
5 Francis John Marini, The Power of the Patriarch : An Historical-Juridical Studv of Canon 78 of the
Codex Canonum Ecclesiarurn Orientalum (Rome, Pontificium Institututurn Orientale Facultas luris
Canonici, 1994) p. 39
Otto Meinardus, Two Thousand Years of Coptic Christianity (Cairo, American University in Cairo,
1999) p. 37
7 Jean Corbon, "The Churches of the Middle East: Their Origins and Identity from their Roots in the
Past to their Openness to the Present" in Andrea Pacin! (ed), Christian Communities in the Arab
Middle East: The Challenge of the Future (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998) p. 93
de Vries, "The origin of the Eastern Patriarchates" p. 19
Corbon, "The Churches of the Middle East" p. 94
10 Aziz S Atiya, A History of Eastern Christianity (London, Methuen & Co Ltd, 1968) p. 44
11 Antonie Wessels, Arab and Christian? Christians in the Middle East (Kampen, Kok Pharos
Publishing House, 1995) p. 126
12 William Montgomery Watt, Muslim-Christian Encounters : Perceptions and Misperceptions
(London, Routledge, 1991) p. 5
13 Faris, Eastern Catholic Churches : Constitution and Governance p. 15
14 Andrea Pacini (ed), Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East: The Challenge of the Future
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998) p. 348
15 Ibid p. 348-349
Ronald Roberson, The Eastern Christian Churches :A Brief Surve (Rome, Edizioni, Orientalia
Christiana, 1999) p. 23
16 See Otto F. Meinardus, Two Thousand Years of Coptic Christianity (Cairo, American University in
Cairo Press, 1999) p. 7
Yet, under Patriarch Shenouda, the Coptic Orthodox Church has rejected reconciliation with the
Assyrian Church of the East and blocked its attempts to gain membership of the Middle East
Council of Churches.
See John H Watson, "Christianity in the Middle East" in Anthony O'Mahony and Michael Kirwan
(eds), World Christianity: Politics, Theology. Dialogues (London, Melisende, 2004) p. 217
17 Joseph Maila, "The Arab Christians : From the Eastern Question to the Recent Political Situation
of the Minorities" in Andrea Pacini (ed), Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East: The
Challenqe of the Future (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998) p. 31
18 Wessels, Arab and Christian? Christians in the Middle East p. 127
9 Theodore Hall Partrick, Traditional Eastern Christianity: A Historv of the Coptic Orthodox Church
(Greensboro, Fisher Park Press, 1996) p. 38
20 Atiya, A History of Eastern Christianity p. 16
21 Partrick, Traditional Eastern Christianitv :A Historv of the Coptic Orthodox Church p. 48
22 Saphinaz-Amal Naguib, "The Era of Martyrs: Texts and Contexts of Religious Memory" In Nelly van
Doom Harder and Kari Vogt (eds), Between Desert and City : the Coptic Orthodox Church Toda
(Oslo, Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 1997) p. 124
23 Otto Meinardus, Christian Egypt : Faith and Life (Cairo, The American University of Cairo Press,
1970) p. 201
24 Elias el-Hayek, "Struggle for Survival : The Maronites of the Middle Ages" In Michael Gervers and
Ramzi Jibran Bikhazi (eds), Conversion and Continuity: Indigenous Christian Communities in
Islamic Lands Eiqhth to Eiqhteenth Centuries (Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies,
1990) p. 408
25 Roberson, The Eastern Christian Churches :A Brief Surve p. 23
28 George T Labaki, The Maronites in the United States (Beirut, Notre Dame University of Loualze
Press, 1993) p. 6
27 Faris, Eastern Catholic Churches : Constitution and Governance p. 50
28 Shafiq Abouzayd, "The Maronite Church" in The Blackwell Dictionary of Eastern Christianity
(Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1999) p. 305
29 Jean-Pierre Valognes, Vie et Mort des Chretiens d'Orient (Paris, Fayard, 1994) p. 371
78
44 Ibid p. 218
45Francis J Marini, "The Role of the Patriarch Outside the Middle East" Journal of Maronite Studies
5(1)2001
www. mari.orq/JMS/*anuarvOl/The Role Of The Patriarch.htm
Labaki, The Maronites in the United States p. 19
47Beggiani, "The Patriarchs in Maronite History"
48SS Hasan, Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt: The Century-Lonq Struggle for Co1)tl
Equality (New York, Oxford University Press, 2003) p. 236
49Meinardus, Christian Egypt : Faith and Life p. 25
50Paul Sedra, "Class cleavages and Ethnic Conflict: Coptic Christian Communities in Modern
Egyptian Politics" Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 10(2) 1999 p. 228
51Partrick, Traditional Eastern Christianitv :A History of the Coptic Orthodox Church p. 156
52JD Pennington, "The Copts in Modern Egypt" Middle Eastern Studies 18(2) 1982 p. 163
53Meinardus, Christian Eqvr)t: Faith and Life p. 138
54Code
of Canons of the Eastern Churches p. 33
55 Ibid
p. 69
56 Antony Valiayavilayil, "The Notion of Sul luris Church" in Jose Chiramel and Kuriakos
Bharanikulangara (eds), The Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches :A Study and Interpretation
(Alwaye, St Thomas Academy for Research, 1993) p. 72
57 Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches P. 29
00 Faris, Eastern Catholic Churches : Constitution and Governance p. 342
59 Betts, Christians in the Arab East p. 8
60 Youssef Courbage and Philippe Fargues, Christians and Jews under Islam (London, 113
Tauris
Publishers, 1997) p. 2
79
61 Ibid
p. 21
62 MA Muhibbu-din, "Ahl
al-kitab and Religious Minorities in the Islamic State: Historical Context
and Contemporary Challenges" Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 200) 2000 p. 115
63 Bruce Masters, Christians
and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World : The Roots of Sectarianism
(Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 2001) p. 63
64 Maurice Assad, "The Coptic Orthodox Church" in Ion Bria (ed), Martyria Mission The
Witness of
:
the Orthodox Churches Today (Geneva, World Council of Churches, 1980) p. 183
Faris, Eastern Catholic Churches : Constitution and Governance p. 7
66 Atiya, A History
of Eastern Christianity p. 272
67 Linda S Northrup, "Muslim-Christian Relations During the Reign
of the Marnluk Sultan al-Mansur
Qalacoun AD 1278-1290" in Michael D Gervers and RamzI Jibran Bikhazi (eds), Conversion and
Continuitv: Indiqenous Christian Communities in Islamic Lands Elqhth to Eiqhteenth Studies
(Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1990) p. 258
68 Matti Moosa, The Maronites in Histo (Syracruse, Syracruse University Press, 1986)
p. 281
69 Partrick, Traditional Eastern Christianity
:A History of the Coptic Orthodox Church p. 56
70 Valognes, Vie
et Mort des Chretiens d'Orient p. 373
el-Hayek, "Struggle for Survival : The Maronites of the Middle Ages" p. 419
71 Labaki, The Maronites in the United States
p. 19
72 CE Bosworth, "The Concept
of Dhimma in Early Islam" in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis,
(eds), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The functioning of a Plural Society (London,
Holmes & Meier Publisher Ltd, 1982) p. 49
73 Pacini, Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East
.5
74 Kamal H Karpat, "Millets and Nationality:
The roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the
Era" in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, (eds), Christians and Jews in the
post-Ottoman
Ottoman Empire : The functionina
of a Plural Society (London, Holmes & Meier Publisher Ltd, 1982)
p. 145
75 Pacini,
80 An
example
See Moosa,
The
of favourable
relations is the rule of Emir Fakhr al-din 11the Great (1590-1635).
The Maronites in Histo
p. 281-3
Lebanon
patriarch
during
See
Engin
Ltd,
1993)
Deniz
War
Akarli,
suggests
Maronite
exercising
leadership
in the
that
Patriarch
Long
Peace:
United
politicians
was forced
Lebanon
Ottoman
Hoyek
P. 15
of the mandate
able to represent
Comparative
The
IB Tauris
and the
Cannuyer,
were
head
of a neomillet
system
of secular
did not
which
in Lebanon
Christian
Groups
and Egypt in
and the Goats?
(ed), Nationalist
Identities
in Islamic
in Maya Shatzmiller
and Minority
McGill-Queen's
Copt
Press,
University
p. 100-101
2005)
ibn Egypt
Coptic
Egypt
Muslim
1906-1919"
: The
Christians
World
of the
Nile
75(2)
(London,
1985
Church
p. 128
of Nation-building
p. 110
Thames
& Hudson
2001)
p. 101
88 Partrick,
Traditional
& Co
years of civil
the church
"Class
Muslim
87 Christian
in 1916.
(London,
p. 224
cleavages
and Ethnic Conflict"
Partrick,
Orthodox
Traditional
Eastern
Christianity
:A Historv
of the Coptic
Air! Tamura,
"Ethnic
in the Course
Consciousness
and its Transformation
Sedra,
firman
Sheep
Perspective"
(London,
the
state of Lebanon
until the last
the community
and prevented
However,
the collapse
system.
authority
associated
millet
with a traditional
itself at the
has allowed
to position
the church
"The
to accept
1861-1920
States
the formation
since
secular
exist previously.
See Paul S. Rowe,
Societies
One,
The
p. 165-174
The Maronites
2 Labaki,
3 Rowe
war,
World
Eastern
Christianity
:A
History
80
of the
Coptic
Orthodox
Church
p. 165
Ltd,
89 John H Watson, Among the Copts (Brighton, Sussex Academic Press, 2000) p. 46
90 Meinardus, Christian Eqvpt: Faith and Life p. 49-50
91 Sedra, "Class cleavages and Ethnic Conflict" p. 225
92 Meinardus, Christian Egypt: Faith and Life p. 464-465
93 Pennington, "The Copts in Modern Egypt" p. 168
94 Richard
van Leeuwen, The Political Emancipation of the Maronite Church In Mount Lebanon Lt73L1842) (Amsterdam, Middle East Research Associates Occasional Paper No. 8,1990) p. 7
95 Antoine Abraham, "Lebanese Communal Relations" Muslim World 67(2) 1977 p. 91
96 Akarli, The Lonq Peage: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920 p. 164
97 Samir Khalaf
and Guilain Denoeux, "Urban Networks and Political Conflict in Lebanon" in Nadim
Shehadi and Dana Hoffar Mills (eds), Lebanon :A History of Conflict and Consensus (London, 113
Tauris & Co Ltd, 1988) p. 129
Picard, "The Dynamics of the Lebanese Christians: From the Paradigm of the Ammiyyat to the
Paradigm of Hwayyek" in Andrea Pacini (ed), Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East: The
Challenqe of the Future (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998) p. 215
Akarli, The Lonq Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920 p. 180
loo Philip Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate (London, 113
Tauris & Co Ltd, 1987) p. 452
101 Stephen H Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate (New York, Octagon Press, 1972)
p. 205
102 Moosa, The Maronites in History 296
p.
103Paul A Jureidini and James M Price, "Minorities in Partition : The Christians of Lebanon" In RD
McLaurin (ed) The Political Role of Minority Groups in the Middle East (New York, Praeger
Publishers, 1979) p. 170
104Ephraim A Frankel, "The Maronite Patriarch : An Historical Review of a Religious Za'im in the 1958
Lebanese Crisis" The Muslim World 66(3) 1976 p. 223
105Fahim I Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington, Middle East Institute, 1961) p. 44
106Frankel, "The Maronite Patriarch : An Historical Review of a Religious Za'irn in the 1958
Lebanese Crisis" p. 213
107Picard, "The Dynamics of the Lebanese Christians" p. 212
108Moosa, The Maronites in History p. 301
logWalid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon : Confrontation In the Middle East (Cambridge,
Centre for International Affairs, 1979) p. 70
Raymond G Helmick, "Internal Lebanese Politics : The Lebanese Front and Forces" in Halim
Barakat (ed), Toward a Viable Lebanon (London, Croom Helm, 1988) p. 312
81
Introduction
The previous chapter has illustrated that since the birth of Christianity, the patriarchal
churches in the Middle East have enjoyed significant temporal authority. Although
individuals were able to attain key positions in the administrative system of the various
Islamic empires, responsibility for the political representationof Christians was conceded to
the church hierarchy. However, this exclusive role has been challenged by other members of
the community. The key priority was to discover a strategy where they could be fully
involved in society as equals with their Muslim compatriots, thus not needing to resort to
religious protection. From the late nineteenth century to mid-twentieth century, nationalism
was perceived as the best approach. For the purposes of this study, a distinction can be made
between Arab nationalism (acknowledging the existenceof an Arab nation), Egyptian
nationalism (restricted to Egyptian national identity) and Lebanesenationalism (more overtly
Christian with less focus on Arabism).
Christians throughout the Ottoman Empire were able to take advantageof the opportunities
offered by the tanzimat reform process. The tanzimat introduced the notion of citizenship
regardless of religious adherenceand opened up possibilities for Christians to escapetheir
historical dhimmi status. This led to their active participation in the development of the
nationalist currents that became popular in the region from the early twentieth century
onwards. However in the independenceera, the shortcomings of nationalist ideologies were
exposed. In short, regimes failed to permanently transcendreligious identities and unite all
citizens as equals under the banner of nationalism. Lacking legitimacy partly due to the
82
The reforms undertaken by the Ottoman authorities in the nineteenth century had an
important impact on the Christian communities in the region. The modernization measures
83
championed by Muhammad Ali, known as the founder of modem Egypt who ruled the
country from 1801-1851, proved to be the catalyst for this process. Underhisregime,
qualified Christians were allowed to achieve high positions in government. Betts argues that
"During his long administration, Copts rose to positions of great authority both privately and
within the government and in a relatively short period came to form the backbone of the
Egyptian civil service". ' This opennessencouragedmany Christians to emigrate to Egypt,
2
in
in
Christian
flourishing
Cairo.
Western influence on
resulting a variety of
communities
the Ottoman Empire also hastenedreforms. By the eighteenth century, the European powers
had proclaimed that safeguarding the Christians of the Ottoman Empire was a primary foreign
policy concern. However, this interest in Eastern Christians can be seenmerely as an
extension of the great power rivalries during this era. In the nineteenth century, the growth of
British and French demandsthat full equality be granted to Christians can partly be attributed
to their desire to ensure that Russia had no excuse to militarily intervene on behalf of
Orthodox Christians. 3 Ottoman officials were also in favour of reform as not only were they
wary of European intentions, they also believed that if the empire was to survive, it would
4
institutions
Western
to
the
need adopt
model of a nation state with strong
and an army.
Consequently, the Sultan instigated the tanzimat (reform) process.
The Gulhane decreesproclaimed by Sultan Abdulmekid in 1839 were the first changesto
the political system. These tried to introduce the concept of Ottomanism where all were
5
equal subjects regardlessof religion or language. All individuals were made directly
responsible for paying tax and military service. Thus, one of the major historical
6
support these reforms, they were rarely implemented at the local level. The next stage was
the Hatti Humayun decreesin 1856. These proclaimed that as all subjects were equal,
Christians were now citizens of the empire. Discrimination on the basis of religion would no
84
longer be tolerated, Christians would be eligible for military service and legal discrimination
7
be
would
abolished. These proclamations can be regarded as revolutionary. For the first
time, an Islamic state had tried to abolish the ideas inherited from the Covenant of Umar,
proposing instead that all citizens were equal. These measuresreceived a hostile reaction
from many Muslims.
past, this had usually been tempered by awarenessof their dhimmi status. Courbage explains
the difference that the tanzimat brought. "When political equality was suddenly proclaimed,
economic inequality became a provocation, andjealousy was no longer balanced by
,8
compassion'.
the fundamental values of the Islamic state as the inequality between believers and nonbelievers preached in the Quran was no longer practised. Consequently, there were several
incidents of sectarian violence, particularly in the geographical region of Syria. One notable
example was in Mount Lebanon where communal violence between Maronites and Druze
erupted in 1860. In only four weeks, 12,000 Maronites were killed, over 3000 died of
starvation and disease, 10,000 were made refugees and many churches and Christian villages
9
burnt.
This conflict spilled over into Damascuswhere the placement of a large bell on
were
a church apparently acted as the catalyst for the Muslim population to set fire to the Christian
85
86
Muslim acceptance of its role. 20 These activities culminated in the first Arab Congress held
in Paris in 1913 which was attended by both Christians and Muslims.
Its resolutions
included the recognition of the Arab people, proportional representation in the central
administration,
official language.
Empire. 21
The outbreak of World War One had a major impact on the movement. The arrest and
execution of leading activists during 1915-1916 by the government proved the catalyst for the
1916 Arab Revolt. 22 Guaranteedan Arab Kingdom by the British, Sharif Husain of Mecca
led an uprising against the Ottomans. This was the first united action taken by the Arab
nationalists and turned their causeinto a populist movement. However, the long sought after
Arab state failed to materialise due to the division of the Ottoman Empire into mandatesby
the European powers. Defeat for Turkey meant that Ottomanism was no longer a viable
Arab
Consequently,
Arabs
the
to
the
support
movement - even
came
option.
majority of
23
its
demise.
The founding doctrine of the
those who had been loyal to the empire until
history
language,
land,
due
to
and culture, Arabs
a shared
movement remained constant were a nation and thus should be politically representedthrough their own state. According
to Tibi, disillusionment at the colonial regimes resulted in the loss of liberal elements of the
frequently
into
developed
"It
and
populist
reactionary,
an
apologetic,
aggressive
movement.
ideology". 24 Nuseibeh statesthat Arab nationalism was mostly basedon negatives - defined
87
88
Consequently,although Islam was a major component in Arab nationalism, the belief that a
common languageand culture also contributed to Arab identity, meant that this nationalist
movement provided the first opportunity for Eastern Christians to participate on equal terms
with Muslims concerning their political future.
The EgvDtian
Context
89
90
41
system".
Ghali
42
The first Wafd cabinet included two Coptic ministers Murqus Hanna and Wasif
-
The popular support for the Wafd also meant that Coptic candidateswere able to
win in predominantly Muslim districts e.g. Makram.Ebeid in the Cairo area of Sayyida
43
Zaynab
.
victorious. For example, 16 were electedin 1924 and 1926, which then rose to 20 in 1936.44
Furthermore, the Wafdist Copts were eagerto be seenas Egyptians rather than being
identified by their religion. When devising the 1923 Constitution, few objected to Islarn
being described as the statereligion becauseother articles declared equality for all. 45 They
also rejected to being classified a minority group. Instead,they argued that the only
difference was religion. Egyptian Copts and Muslims sharedthe same language,ethnicity,
culture and traditions. Consequently,most Egyptians acceptedthat Copts were only a
minority in a strictly numerical sense. The majority of Coptic activists in the Wafd were
strongly against including legislation to protect minorities, especially through the use of
reservedseats. They arguedthat this was an attempt by Britain to remain involved in
Egyptian internal affairs and would result in a permanentdivide on religious lines. Instead,
they were confident that Copts would be able to enjoy full participation as Egyptian citizens.
The fact that Coptic candidatesactually won more seatsin 1924than would have been
possible under a proportional representationsystemwas seenas proof of their successin
achieving equality in Egyptian society.46
However, the high expectationsraisedby the Wafd were not fulfilled.
47 makram
drastically weakenedafter the deathof Zaghlul which led to a successionCriSiS.
Ebeid's decision to form a splinter party al-Kutla also intensified internal disunity. 48
Although this era is regardedas the Golden Age of communal relations, simultaneously,the
underlying Islamic current in Egyptian politics becameprominent once more with the
founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. Wafd commitment to Coptic equality declined
91
and in order to gain votes, the party allied with the Muslim Brotherhood in 1950 with only
49
Coptic
seven
candidatesenjoying success. Consequently,the Coptic community believed
that their best opportunity to attain equality and participation in the Egyptian statehad passed
by without achieving adequateresults. Nisan concludesthat "Tbe struggle for an egalitarian
pluralistic polity had been a Wafd ideal but not an Egyptian reality" 50
.
The LebaneseContext
In contrast to Christian support for Arab nationalism in Greater Syria, the Maronites in
Lebanon developed their own form of nationalism. Amongst some Maronite circles, a strong
attachmentwas formed to the idea of a separatenation with Mount Lebanon as the historical
homeland. In order to justify theseclaims, intellectuals stressedthe separateethnic identity
of the Maronites. One influential approachwhich beganin the late nineteenth century was to
link the Maronites of modem Lebanon with the Phoenicians the ancient Lebanesetraders,in
order to illustrate that their origins were not found in Arab or Islamic civilization. Both
functioned as a trading and intellectual centre for the region and cover the samegeographical
areae.g. Tyre, Sidon and Byblos. The Phoenicianmovementwas primarily an intellectual
one led by figures such as Charles Corm, Michel Chiha (ChaldeanChristian) and Said Aql
who founded Phoenician clubs andjournals.51 This heritagewas used to justify Lebanese
Christian demandsfor a separatepolitical state. Salibi criticises this approacharguing that
there are no direct factual links betweenthe Phoeniciansand modem Lebanese,and even if
thesedid exist, it would not exclusively apply to the Maronites but instead affect all
Lebanese.52 Another rejection of Arabization was the claim that the Maronites are
descendants of the Mardaites, a tribal group used by the Byzantine rulers to resist the Arab
53
conquest.
92
Areas
with a significant Muslim population such as Tyre, Saida and the Beqaa Valley were annexed
into the new state.55 Consequently,the 1932 censusillustrated the slight majority enjoyed by
Christians. Out of a total of 793,426citizens, 28.7% were Maronite, 9.7% Greek Orthodox,
5.9% Greek Catholic with a total of Christian citizens of 51.3%. Sunnis were 22.4%, Shiites
19.6% and Druze 6.7% with a total of 48.8%.56 Although the Maronites dominated the
mandatestate,hostility from many Muslims who had been forcibly incorporated into what
was perceived as a Maronite Christian state,meant that they were almost solely dependenton
French authorities to ensurethe survival of their state. The Maronite community was still
split betweentwo trends. The National Bloc led by Emile Edde regardedLebanon primarily
as a homeland for Middle East Christians and supporteda specialrelationship with France.
In contrast,the Constitutional Bloc led by Bishara al-Khuri advocatedfull collaboration with
other communities in order to attain independencewhich was regardedas necessaryto pursue
93
their common political and economic interests.57 With increasedSunni political participation
since the establishmentof constitutional governmentin 1926, the secondoption gained
ground. In the immediate period of independence,it was hoped that Lebanesenationalism
could expand to incorporate membersof all the confessionsrather than be restricted solely to
one group - the Maronites. Yet it was clear even at this stage,that there was a crucial dispute
regarding the identity of Lebanon. Was it to be a country where members of different
confessionscould coexist or would it be, in essence,a Maronite state?
One of the key aims of the nationalist movements- independence- was attained as a
consequenceof World War Two. In return for support against the Axis powers, Britain and
Francepromised immediate independenceonce hostilities ended. Owen statesthat although
Arab governmentswere not really ready for independence,the colonial powers fulfilled their
58
promises. However, the granting of independencedid not achieve the Arab nationalist
dreamof a pan-Arab state. Instead,the creation of new "artificial" statesensuredthat this
ambition remained unfulfilled as the populations gradually transferredtheir loyalty to the
individual Arab countries. The newly independentgovernmentswere immediately faced
with challengesassociatedwith developing states. For example,population figures increased
at a higher rate than economic growth leading to unemployment,poverty and struggling
welfare systems. Post-colonial governmentsdevelopedinto authoritarian,often military
regimesthat tended to have a charismatic leaderand developeda one party monopoly. A
seriesof military coups occurTed:the overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy by the Egyptian
Free Officers in 1952,military rule in Syria since 1949culminating in the seizureof power by
94
the Ba'thist party in 1963 and the 1958Revolution in Iraq against Hashemite rule which
also
led to Ba'th rule in 1968.59
Arab nationalist rhetoric was used as a legitimising tool in order to gain support from the
people. The idea of a united Arab statewas still proclaimed by the new leaders. The
populist pan-Arabism favoured by the Egyptian leaderGamal Abdel Nasserwas attractive to
many. Similarly, the Ba'thists clearly statedthat loyalty to Arab unity - al-qawmiyYat alarabiyya should be prioritised over patriotism to a specific state- wataniyya.60 However, the
Arab nationalist regimes were unable to make a significant material impact, leading to
situation which can be describedas a crisis of state. Continual population growth and
urbanisation resulted in huge unemploymentand housing shortages.61 The widening gap
betweenthe wealthy few and the impoverishedmassesbecamemore apparent. Corruption
among the ruling elite was rife, illuminating economic incompetence. Arab nationalism was
now identified with socialist principles but was unable to solve the political, economic and
social problems affecting the region. The failure to attain socioeconomicgains never mind
the lofty goal of Arab unity led to the erosionof legitimacy for the Arab nationalist
governments. Instead,regimes becamesingle party stateswith little political participation.
Political power in the military stateswas concentratedin the position of president and
supportedby the judiciary, military, police and intelligence services.62 The loss of populist
suPPortwas a factor in the increaseduseof repressionas the main meansof retaining power.
Arab nationalism was also adverselyaffected by the rivalry betweendifferent movements
eagerto take the lead role in the region. This was particularly true of Egypt and Syria - the
two main state instigators of Arab nationalism. Although the majority of Arabs continued to
seethemselvesas "one cohesivecultural entity", in practice, attachmentwas given to the
individual states.63 This was illustrated in 1958with the creation of the United Arab
Republic (UAR)
between
disagreements
Syria.
The
between
Egypt
the two
union
and
-a
95
parties over Egyptian domination were a major causeof its dissolution in 1961. Thissplit
highlighted that Arab nationalism had splintered into different ideologies that were closely
connectedto a specific state. It also confirmed that identification with the so-called artificial
nation stateshad been achieved to a certain extent. By this stage,pan-Arab nationalism
could no longer be considered a practical political policy for the region but was instead
reduced to solely rhetorical claims.
A further blow to the Arab nationalist vision was the failure of the Arab statesto defeat
Israel after its creation in 1948. While concern had grown regarding Jewish immigration to
Palestine in the early twentieth century, it was not until the actual establishment of a Jewish
statethat the fate of the Palestiniansbecamea rallying point for Arabs. As the majority of
the regimes which fought Israel were dominated by the armed forces, the lack of military
successundermined their credibility.
nationalism was the humiliating Arab defeat in the Six Day War in 1967. Not only did the
Israeli army rout Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian forces but their successalso allowed them to
64
expand their territory to include the holy city of Jerusalem. This illustrated that the Arab
leaderspursued policies perceived to be in the interests of the individual state rather than
those of the entire Arab nation including the Palestinians. Furthermore, it was also an
irrevocable blow to the once dominant Arab nationalist movement and cruelly highlighted
that this long proclaimed myth had been shattered. Kramer notes that in the end, Arab
65
"produced
little
liberty,
nationalism
very
equality or even revenge". The ideological
movement which had been championed as an indigenous solution to multiple challenges
instead,
led
to a crisis of state environment.
to
to
the
proved unable rise
complex situation and
In contrast to the earlier phasesof the Arab nationalist movement, few Christians were
actively involved in the military regimes, primarily due to the absenceof high ranking
Christian military officers. 66 Yet as the founding constitutions still stressedthe equality of
96
citizens regardless of religion or ethnicity, many ordinary Christians were initially favourable
towards the nationalist revolutions in the hope that they would provide the framework for
equal participation in Arab society. However, the versions of Arab nationalism followed by
the independent statesproved remote from Christian aspirations. The authoritarian nature of
the nationalist regimes did not provide the liberty and equality sought by Christians. Some
regimes attempted to highlight the Islamic heritage of Arab nationalism in order to deflect
criticism concerning the political and economic performance of the government. Although
the majority of the Arab nationalist statescould still be described as "secular" during this
period, it can be argued that the constitutional guaranteeof full equality regardless of religious
affiliation was not fully implemented. As the casestudy of Egypt will demonstrate,
Christians became disillusioned with the path taken by the ruling Arab nationalist regimes.
By discarding dhimmi status, the founding laws and constitutions of the Arab nationalist
regimes did offer Christians some protection from the Islamic system of managing other faith
communities which they had lived under from the days of the Arab conquest. However, in
practice, these regimes failed to fulfil the perhaps lofty ambitions that Christians had come to
associatewith Arab nationalism.
During this phase of the Arab nationalist ideology, developments in Egypt mirrored those
described above. The 1952 Free Officers Revolution abolished the monarchy and ascribed
political power to the military.
67
Yet
due
intelligence
by
to his
the
services.
president, supported
military, police and
charisma, Nasser did enjoy initial populist support for Pan-Arabism, especially after his
Suez
Canal in 1956.
Israel
the
in
France
Britain,
over
perceived success challenging
and
97
This proved short-lived as Nasser the champion of pan-Arabism could not deliver the
socioeconomic benefits desired by the Egyptian population, failed to achieve victory in the
Arab-Israeli wars and apart from the temporary union with Syria, achieved little concrete
successin furthering moves towards Arab unity.
The formation of the military regime also had a significant impact on the Christian
community in Egypt. Although officially proclaimed a secular ideology, the links between
Pan-Arabism and Islam were extremely strong in contrast to the situation at the turn of the
century. Following the precedent set during the Wafd era, freedom of religion was
constitutionally guaranteedbut Islam as the religion of the vast majority of Egyptians was
acknowledged as the state religion. The lack of Coptic figures in the upper ranks of the
military excluded close involvement in the new regime. A by-product of several policies
followed by the government was the decline of influence of the Coptic elite. Their status in
the community was adversely affected by the abolition of the al-majUs al-milli (community
68
As described in Chapter Two, the al -majlis al -milli had long been a source of
council) .
body
by
between
the
the elite to exert
the
the
used
main
and
was
conflict
elite
church and
their influence over both the church hierarchy and the community. Nasser was keen to
disband any independent organisation that could have the capacity to become the focus of
opposition to the regime. In 1955, a presidential decreedismantled the separatereligious
courts (a residue of the millet system) and unified the personal status laws. As the council
presided over these courts, its influence diminished. The Coptic elite was dealt a fatal blow
with the resolution of the waqf (land which provided income for the church) problem. As
land
its
had
the
church
over two hundred
confiscated
part of
nationalization policy,
regime
feddans. Not only did this deprive the church of important revenues,it also further curtailed
the authority of the elite by threatening its involvement in the financial affairs of the
69
In 1960, Nasser agreedto allow the patriarch to take control of the remaining
community.
98
waqf land. The Coptic Orthodox Waqf organization was created and its members were
chosenexclusively by the patriarch. The decline of the elite hindered their ability to fulfil
their traditional role as liaison between the church and state. Thus, this constant source of
communal tension was eventually resolved in favour of church dominance over the
community.
The political influence of the Coptic elite also diminished at the national level. The
traditional method of political participation for the Coptic elite halted when the new regime
banned all political parties.70 Land reform and the nationalization of companies had a severe
impact on the Christian elite who tended to invest in land and business,partly due to their
71
but
While certainly not
economic success
also as a meansto ensureprotection and power.
directed solely against Christians, this loss of power and prestige meant that a significant
number of the Christian elite, particularly the younger generation, began to emigrate from the
1960sonwards.72 However, Nasser did ensurethat Coptic representation was maintained in
parliament and the Cabinet by appointing additional members to supplement the Coptic
including
Copts
in
Cabinet.
two
The
tradition
the
the
of
presence.
continued
also
president
According to Nisan, "Nasser traditionally appointed one or two Coptic ministers to the
73
cabinet, a political crumb with no concomitant poweeg. The main impact of the 1952
Revolution on Christians was to deprive the traditional elite of their prestige and power and
allow only a token political participation.
The LebaneseContext
99
100
movement acceptableto all groups increasedthe likelihood that national unity would
disintegrate whenever challenged.
A major test was experienced with the 1958 crisis. The pro-Western foreign policy of
President Chamoun culminating in acceptanceof the Eisenhower Doctrine was perceived as
deviating from the provisions of the National Pact which stressedthe need for strict neutrality.
Under Chainoun, Lebanon was the only Arab country not to sever diplomatic ties with France
over the 1956 Suez invasion. While the personal rivalry between Chamoun and the Egyptian
President was a factor, this incident also illustrated the different views of the confessional
communities in Lebanon towards regional developments. LebaneseMuslims, like their
coreligionists throughout the Arab world, were drawn to Nasser's pan-Arabism. However,
some of the Maronite elite viewed this doctrine as a challenge to Lebaneseindependence.
Contrary to the National Pact, they turned to the West for protection. 78 In this context, the
attempt by Chamoun to amend the constitution in order to extend his presidential mandate
proved inflammatory. This move also alienated several influential Maronite actors as well as
members of the Muslim communities and prevented the unrest denigrating into confessional
conflict.
Two to four thousand people were victims of a civil war that also had a significant
impact on the econoMy.79 The elite were able to halt the violence by choosing the next
president, General Fu'ad Shihab, the army commander who had refused Chamoun's orders to
crush the uprising. On this occasion, Lebaneseidentity survived the challenge but it
illustrated that national unity was extremely fragile.
Similar to other countries in the region, post-colonial Lebanon also satisfied the crisis of
state criteria. The laissez-faire economic policies followed by successivegovernments, with
the exception of the Shihab years, contributed to substantial wealth inequality. Uneven
development resulted in Greater Beirut and parts of Mount Lebanon prospering, while the
North, South and Beqaa with significant Muslim populations, were mostly ignored by the
101
102
The mythologiesmentionedearliere.g.
justify
land,
Phoenicianism.
to
the
to
this stance.The
the
used
were
and romanticattachment
to reachout to all Lebaneseascitizensof
somewhathalf-heartedattemptsinceindependence
failed
with the outbreakof a long and
onestateandmembersof onenationcategorically
tragic civil war in 1975.
103
104
(religion) but instead, din wa dawlah (way of life). 88 Mawlana Ala Mawdudi, an influential
twentieth century Islamist, preached that Islam was a self-sufficient ideology which covered
all aspectsof life. As sovereignty comes from God alone, the separation of state and religion
is deemedimpossible. An Islamic system was championed as the only means to provide
a
favourable environment for Muslims. The problems faced by Muslims in the twentieth
century were blamed on the failure of the umma to be faithful to the teachings of Islam.
Muslim power and status would only be regained by returning to the correct path sirat al89
mustaqim. The implementation of sharia law is regarded as vital by Islamists as it is a fully
comprehensivecode of conduct regarding all aspectsof life and the only meaningful law for
Muslims. Esposito describesit as "a set of divinely revealed general principles, directives,
90
Consequently, theseobjectives of political Islamists raises questions regarding
and values".
the status of non-Muslims in an Islamic state.
The ambivalence inherent in the Quran regarding this subject is replicated in the framework
offered by Islamists. In general, cordial relations are advocatedbetween Muslims and
Christians. Islamists tend to promote the history of Muslim tolerance towards other religious
91
in
Western
Jewish
the
to
communities, especially contrast
experience of
persecution. There
is also common agreementthat Muslims can respect the rights of others without giving
credenceto their beliefs. Shad should only be waged against those who actively oppose
Muslims. Yet, the ambivalence of the Quran regarding Christians means that more radical
theorists such as Sayyid Qutb argue that Christians cannot be shown friendship as this would
92
Islamists acknowledge that an Islamic state
amount to recognising another religion.
discriminates between believers and non-believers as preached in the Quran. Citizenship is
basedon membership of a religion. Outlining his vision of the Islamic state, Mawdudi
envisagedtwo types of citizenship - one for Muslims who took responsibility for the state and
93
for
be
loyal
the other
to the state. Islamist activists tend to
non-Muslims who agreedto
105
94
Christians
to
Kramer states that
refer
as muwatin meaning compatriot rather than as citizen.
the main purpose of the Islamic state is to pursue the interests of the umma through the sharia.
The refusal of non-bclicvers to observe all aspects of Islamic laws, means that they cannot be
involved with decision-making and implementing policies. 95 The main limit on Christians in
a modem Islamic state is political.
97
Yet,
not envisage a situation where Christians would enjoy equal participation in all aspectsof
in
Islamic
Christian
including
an
communities
state would
society,
religion and politics.
inequality
historical
dhimmi
the
back
and challenges that
to
to
all
with
status,
appear revert
the term implies. At present, the existing regimes have defined Islamist movements as the
main threat to their rule and accordingly have adoptedrepressivemeasurestowards them. It
is also unknown whether political Islam would deliver its promises once in power or prove to
106
An examination of Egypt illuminates the influence of political Islam and the impact this has
had on the Christian population. Historically Egypt has been at the forefront of any emerging
trends in the Arab world. It is no surprise that the Muslim Brotherhood - the prototype for
Islamist movements - was founded in Egypt by an Egyptian schoolteacherHassan al-Banna
in 1928. The movement became the target of successivegovernments, resulting in mass
imprisonment and the execution of leadersincluding the influential theorist Sayyid Qutb.
For example, over 1000 Islamist activists were arrestedin 1954, followed by over 27,000 in
1965 as part of a wider crackdown on opposition to the regime. ' 00 However, once Anwar
Sadatbecame president, the Muslim Brotherhood was effectively given a new leaseof life.
Facing opposition from left-wing movements, he turned to Islamists to counter this threat.
SadatreleasedIslamist prisoners and tolerated their social work and presencein universities.
He also tried to gain their support by amending the constitution to ascribe a greater role to the
101
in
Egyptian
law.
On a personal level, he adopted Islamic rhetoric in his speeches,
sharia
102
himself
'.
However, the use of Islamist movements to
"The
Believer
Presidenf
and called
balance political power had its own consequences. All these groups denounced the 1977
peacenegotiations with Israel. There was also an increasein militancy as some Islamists
advocated the use of violence against the regime.
A significant consequenceof this Islamization processwas the increase in incidents against
Christians. It must be noted that Sadatwas not specifically anti-Christian. In fact, some
107
108
113
for
It was not until the
licenses
nationalising mosques and making
preachers.
mandatory
mid 1990s that the government tackled the militants largely responsible for attacks on the
Copts in Upper Egypt. This was primarily due to a change of tactics by the militants who
beganto target the security services and tourists in order to inflict maximum damage on the
for
The
these movements, especially
support
state.
economic consequencesalienated public
'
14
killed.
Government
Egyptians
4
58
1997
Luxor
tourists
the
were
and
after
massacrewhen
in
including
succeeded
crushing these
mostly
action
mass arrests and violent confrontation,
groups and consequently, militant attackson Copts decreasedmassively.
Under the Mubarak presidency, the Muslim Brotherhood has opted for political
Due
to the prohibition of parties
is
to
approach.
participation and committed a non-violent
basedon religious lines, the movement has enteredelectoral alliances with other parties.
This allowed it to become the largest opposition group with nineteen seatsin 2000 (although
by
the
their
independents
due
placed
to
the
participation
on
restrictions
running as
'
15
Islamist
in
2005
the
This
when
candidates
elections
successwas continued
government).
dramatically increasedtheir parliamentary representationto around ninety seatswith almost
40% of votes cast.116 These achievementshave been attained despite being banned and
have
been
hinder
laws
Electoral
to
harassment.
frequent
small
changed
suffering
government
introduced
in
1987,
For
system
was
representation
a complex proportional
example,
parties.
in
be
in
to
8%
threshold
represented
order
to
which required parties poll over an
'
17
in
Brotherhood
Muslim
participation civil society through professional
parliament.
intervene
judiciary
to
to
1995
In
the
given
powers
been
was
has
targeted.
associations
also
in
lawyers
1996,
the
and
and
Brotherhood
Muslim
as
candidates
standing
members
prevent
18
in
down-'
Even
their
by
success
the
state and closed
engineers syndicateswere taken over
de facto political participation is temperedby the strength of the ruling party. In the same
109
2000 elections mentioned above, the NDP not only polled 353 seatsbut also 35 independent
119
joined
the
candidates
governing party.
In this period, the Muslim Brotherhood has tried to stressthat it is committed to full rights
for all Egyptians regardlessof religion. 120 For example, Coptic candidateshave been
selectedas electoral candidates. Yet there is still wariness among Copts (and many Muslims)
as to how genuine theseproposals are and how they would be guaranteedin practice. The
Muslim Brotherhood has also continued its social work including clinics, schools and charity
services,often in contrast to the failure of the state to provide these services. Furthermore, as
theseservices are usually channelled through the mosque, the organization has been able to
12
1
its
Hence,
through
the
the
the
visible presence,the
make
community.
mosque
centre of
Muslim Brotherhood illustrates the strength of political Islam in Egyptian society.
However, the Islamic revival in Egypt as in other countries has not been exclusive to
Islamist movements. The government has also sought to promote mainstream Islam as a
institutions
increased
has
finance
to
State
Islamist
to
the
such as al Azhar
counter
current.
and the Higher Council for Islamic Affairs.
evident today. Regarding the impact of Islamist activists on popular culture, Gerges declares
122
illustration
debate".
A
lost
but
the
the war
that "they
major
of this Islamic cultural
won
revival is its increasing visibility.
become the norm for Muslim women, and men often grow beards as a sign of their beliefs.
Islamic symbols and religious "noise" such as the recital of the Quran, are frequent in shops
123
bulletins
increased,
has
Mosque
offices
government
and
and
news
and offices.
attendance
halt for the call to prayer.124 Religious programmes are frequent on radio and television and
bestselling books tend to be tafsirs (commentariesof the Quran). It is clear that Islam in
Egypt in the late twentieth century enjoyed a cultural revival that has once more put it at the
it
try
to
how
hard
to the
No
the
may
others
contain
and
government
centre of society.
matter
110
cultural sphere only, Islam will continue to have an impact on the Egyptian political system.
Thesedevelopments have increasedChristian vulnerability as they become increasingly
aware of the more fervent religious environment.
The LebaneseContext
The failure to establish an inclusive Lebanesenationalism was vividly illustrated during the
civil war (1975-1990). This conflict not only proved that confessional identity remained the
primary tie in Lebanesesociety but also intensified the divide between confessions. Power
lines)
(mostly
to
the
on
confessional
which were employed
organised
shifted
various militias
by communal leaders to expel members of other groups from their territory leading to de facto
125
Atrocities were committed by all sides and renewed mutual suspicions.
cantonization.
One notorious act was the revenge killings after the assassinationof the President-Elect
Bashir Gemayel, committed by the Maronite Kataib militia in September 1982 in the Sabra
is
disputed
(mainly
Shatilla
The
women
and
children)
of
victims
number
and
refugee camps.
Committee
Kahan
Israeli
from
700-800
to
the
while other sourcesraise
and ranges
according
this figure to 1500-2000.126 In general, the Maronite community felt particularly vulnerable
during the civil war period. A significant proportion of the estimated 25% Lebaneseaffected
by forced displacement were Christian. 127 For example, the 1983 Mountain War resulted in
28
Christians
killed.,
1400
Lebanese
from
Chouf,
Christians
the expulsion of
the
with over
from all confessions chose to emigrate during the war years. However, roughly 75% of those
29
figure
68%.,
later,
the
was
emigrating in 1975 were Christian and six years
Many Maronites believed that they were fighting to ensurethe survival of a Lebanesestate
To
in
fully
secure this, some
them
to
affairs.
national
participate
which would allow
Christian nationalists advocatedthe creation of an overt Christian state or a fcderal system
ill
where Maronites would enjoy political autonomy in their own area. Support from certain
Maronite circles for an alliance with Israel, particularly during the Israeli occupation of
Lebanon, did little to enhancerelations with other communities. 130 The radicalization of
someLebaneseMuslim groups also raised concerns for Maronites. Iranian influence was
instrumental in the founding of the Shiite movement Hizb'allah which in its charter, discloses
its eventual aim of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon. For the moment, Hizb'allah has
decided to participate in the confessional political system. While political Islam may not
presentthe same threat to Christians in Lebanon as it does in other parts of the Arab world
due to the size of the community and the presenceof other confessional groups, it still adds to
Christian perceptions of vulnerability.
As a consequenceof the 1989 Taif Accord, hostilities finally ceasedseveral months later.
In one sense,the Lebanesenation was made whole again but ironically, considering the
struggle for independence,under Syrian tutelage. The Lebanesenationalist current which
had recognised that its Christian past was an active contributor to national identity was no
longer predominant. Maronites were concernedthat in post-war Lebanon, their interests
would not be adequately representedthrough the national framework alone. Although the
Taif Accord continued to grant the presidency to the Maronites, the powers of the next two
offices - Prime Minister (Sunni) and Speakerof Parliament (Shiite) were increasedwith all
31
'
Continuing the tradition of strong communal leadership,
three enjoying the right of veto.
leaders from each confession gained official positions in the Taif system and theoretically
representedthe interests of their group. However, by the end of the war, the Maronite
leadership was weak and divided.
Like most groups, internal factionalism led to periodic intracommunal conflict.
damaging schism occurred in 1989. Under General Michel Aoun, the army had been revived
as a state institution and attempted to establish law and order within the Christian enclave.
112
This chapter has argued that religious identity in the two casestudies has proved too strong
to allow nationalist strategiesto satisfy all parties. The Egyptian version of nationalism did
attempt to incorporate Christians in to the nation state as equal citizens with their Muslim
compatriots. However, it can be argued that it did not deliver its promises of equality and
citizenship to the extent expectedby Egyptian Christians. In contrast, Lebanesenationalism
was too closely linked to Christian interests to attract widespread Muslim support and instead,
identity remained primarily at the confessional level. Although different development
strategieswere employed, both the statist and laissez-faire approacheshave failed to deliver
113
ChristianConcemsin Egypt
114
community that while a Coptic party could be successfulat raising issuesthat are mostly
ignoredby mainstream parties, this would be at the cost of inviting hostility upon the
community.
Like many Egyptians, Copts can also be accusedof apathy towards politics, especially at
electiontime. For example, voter turnout for the 2005 parliamentary elections was a pitiful
20%.139 This tendency amongst Copts has been criticised by Coptic intellectuals who urge
the community to solve their problems by becoming proactive in political affairs instead of
continuing the widespread withdrawal that has become common. After the 2005 elections,
Dr. Nabil Luqa Babawi dismissed the existing political approachof the community as merely
comprising of "weeping and wailing" and suggestedthat it was not surprising that the
140
However, many Copts (and indeed Egyptians)
community was politically marginalised.
in
little
figures
Egypt
difference
to
the
to
this
that
make
would respond
as elections
accusation
or policies of the government, there is little incentive to participate. Copts would also cite the
abovearguments concerning the difficulties experiencedby Coptic candidates as further
reasonswhich dissuadeinvolvement in the political system.
However, there has been some recognition of the problem regarding Coptic political
participation. In the run-up to the 2000 elections, many influential figures stressedthe need
141
life
Consequently, 75 Coptic
in
to entice Copts to participate the political
of their country.
candidatesstood for election, mostly businessmenrunning as independents. The WafJ party
42
4
NDP
9,
Tagammu.
banned
3.1
Forthe
(Islamists)
12,
Labour
Party
the
and the
nominated
first time since 1952,3 Copts were elected, Youssef Boutros Ghali (NDP), Ramy Lakah an
independentwho resigned due to holding dual citizenship, and Wafd candidate Mounir Fakhri
Abdel Nour. 143 On the whole, the election was conducted with minimal sectarian language.
While the 2000 elections representedan important breakthrough, it is unclear if these efforts
will become permanent. For example, only one Coptic candidatewas successful in 2005 -
115
theMinister of Finance Youssef Boutros Ghali. Thus, it can still be argued that many parties
andvoters perceive a Coptic candidateas an electoral disadvantageand unlikely to succeed.
Furthermore,the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood in these elections also served to raise
fearsin the Coptic community.
The perception of discrimination is a longstanding Coptic view. Equality is enshrined in
the constitution but some members of the community believe that this is not fully
implemented. While discriminatory measuresare not widespread, many Copts perceive that
they do not enjoy equality regarding employment and opportunities. Until January 2006,
therewere no Coptic regional governors and few are found in high-ranking positions in the
144
for
list
However,
the twenty-six
the
appointments
of
new
military and security services.
Gen.
Ayoun
formerly
Lt.
MaJdi
Iskandar,
included
Coptic
an
officer
govemates
military
a
145
Qana.
his
Prior
to
Interior
the
Minister
to
the
governor
of
made
who was
assistant
of
from
last
Copt
hero
1973
decorated
to
Ghali,
the
Fouad
Aziz
the
war,
war
was
a
appointment,
hold the office of governor (Southern Sinai 1980-1983). Clearly, there are opportunities for
Coptic figures to be successful in this field. Furthermore, as a consequenceof the size of the
Coptic community, it would be expectedthat they would be a smaller proportion in such
in
discrimination
few
Copts
The
that
certain
areas
also
of
means
statistics.
perception among
decreasing
the already minimal
thus
these
services,
security
enter
career arease.g. police or
in
Copts
from.
Instead,
tend
to
the
to
either
work
educated
pool of candidates choose
businesssector (where they can be extremely successful)or else concentrate on specific
has
led
This
journalism
to
the
including
legal
medicine.
especially
and
affairs,
professions
Consequently,
in
these
be
Copts
one argument
areas.
that
over-representcd
may
possibility
in
in
high
difficulties
the
for
the
reaching
office
that
this
experienced
suggests
compensates
146 This is reminiscent of the historical status of non-Muslims as
fields.
political and military
116
dhimmi under the millet system where economic prosperity was possible but political power
andauthority over the Islamic armies was generally exclusive to Muslims.
There are two main examples of discrimination given by Copts. The first concerns
religious freedom. Copts are free to practice their own religion but this does not extend to
proselytism. Due to mass social pressureagainst converting to Christianity, few Muslims
convert and those who do, often emigrate to the West, contributing little to the indigenous
147
In contrast, the processfor conversion to Islam is substantially easier e.g. new
community.
ID cards are issued quickly.
requirement that the individual must meet with a priest before the official conversion takes
place. It is estimated that 10-15,000 Egyptian Christians convert to Islam each year often due
to economic and social reasons. Rumours regarding the kidnapping of Coptic girls and their
subsequentforced conversion do arise. However, little evidence has been provided to back
theseclaims, which frequently concern young women who wish to marry Muslim men. Yet
severaltimes, most notably over the Wafaa Constantine affair in December 2004 (the wife of
a Coptic priest purportedly converted but was then returned to the church hierarchy by the
authorities), the Coptic community has demonstratedfor the return of Coptic women who
they believe were forcibly converted.
The second example is the legislation concerning building places of worship. While there
are few restrictions on building mosques,under the Haymouni Decree, a government license
is neededto build a church. The 1934 Ministry of Interior regulations also set out further
from
100
being
include
the nearestmosque, the
These
the
away
metres
over
conditions.
site
148
Until
religious composition of the community and the proximity of other churches.
how
for
matter
no
minor. Another
repairs,
recently, presidential permission was needed
complaint was the lack of permits available. Between 1981-1990, only 10 permits for new
Coptic Orthodox churches and 26 for repairs were granted.149 Due to population growth and
117
urbanmigration,existingchurcheswereoftenovercrowdedandunauthorisedbuildings used
for services. As will be exploredshortly,this regularlyled to communalclashes.' 50 The
timetakento receiveany responseto an application- often over ten years- while mosques
wereconstantlybuilt, frequentlynearproposedsitesfor new churches,alsoservedto illustrate
thisinequality.
In responseto strongcriticism of this situation,a 1999presidentialdecreemaderepairsof
all placesof worship subjectto the 1976Civil ConstructionCode,putting churchesin the
151
for
first
Permissionfor new churchesneeds
time.
samecategoryasmosques the
in
increase
been
the amountof permitsapproved
but
has
there
presidentialapproval
a sharp
e.g. 23 in 2001 and9 in 2002. However,problemsstill exist. On average,applicationstake
decisions
have
been
four
be
there
to
cases
where
are
some
over
years
approvedand
is
Interior
The
Ministry
usuallyslow at submittingapplicationsto
of
continuallypostponed.
thePresidentand evenoncegranted,local authoritiesandthe securityservicesoften block
152
build
instances,
Christian
In
without a permit or try to
communities
construction.
some
know
Even
building.
that
this
they
in
Christian-owned
to
although
a
church
convert
property
is likely to escalatethe situationandpotentiallyleadto violencewith their Muslim
be
de
if
in
hope
they
the
that
the
can
completed,
will
get
they
work
neighbours,
persevere
factorecognitionasthe governmentwill want to avoidbeing accusedof closingdown
153
in
in
decree
been
have
These
a
presidential
proclaimed
acknowledged
churches.
problems
December2005which transferredauthorizationfor the constructionof churchesfrom the
decisions
be
that
level
must
to that of regionalgovernorsandstipulated
presidential
154
it
is
As
justified
yet,
an
application.
of
within onemonthof submission
publicisedand
building
legislation
in
breakthrough
be
if
or only
church
unknown this will prove to the major
leadto more disillusionmentamongthe Copticcommunity. Governmentofficials havealso
begunto participatein consecrationservicesin orderto highlight that Christiansarelegally
118
'
55
have
to
their
entitled
own placeof worship. Yet it is clearthat in Egypt, a public placeof
worshipappearsto takeon a "sacred"quality which in the caseof churches,can causetension
betweenthe communities. Individuals(on both sides)canstill createobstaclesregarding
building andrepairingchurches.
Anotherareaof Coptic concernis security. While the threatfrom militant groupshas
mostlybeeneliminated,sporadicclashesstill occur. Assaultson Christiansandattackson
churchesfrequentlyappearto be triggeredby Muslim angerat Christianattemptsto build or
expandchurches. In particular,unresthasbeencausedby Christianstrying to useother
buildingse.g. houses,librariesandofficesof Copticsocialorganizationsasunofficial
156
(illegal
Egyptian
legislation).
Incidentscanalso escalatein UpperEgypt
churches
under
dueto the tradition of blood vengeanceagainstperpetuatorsof any violence.157 One
prominentclashcentredon the village of al-Kushin UpperEgypt which hasa Christian
andMuslim customerin January2000
majority. A disputebetweena Christianshopkeeper
escalatedinto a confrontationthat left twenty ChristiansandoneMuslim dead,over forty
injured andChristianhomesandshopsattacked.158Relationsbetweenthe two communities
hadbeentensesincean incidentin 1998whentwo Christiansweremurderedandallegations
159
in
international
brutality
Coptic
the
of police
against
villagerswerepublicised
media.
Whenclasheseruptedin the samevillage in 2000,the local authorityresponsewas deemed
inadequate,failing to preventthe killings that occurredover a three-dayperiod andspreadto a
neighbouringvillage. Instead,the governmentreactedafter the event,funnelling substantial
fundsinto the village, which while aimingto avoid futureproblems,can actuallybe seenas
160
rewardingsuchactions.
Therefore,it is often claimedthat the governmentdoesnot provide enoughprotectionand
fails to bring the perpetuatorsto justice. The al-Kushincidentillustratesthis pattern. A
commonCoptic complaintis that the governmenttreatsthe victim andthe aggressorin the
119
samemanner, not recognising the clear differences between the two. Firstly, substantial
numbers on both sides were arrestedin order to avoid being seen as supporting one
161
Secondly, the initial trial of 58 Muslims and 38 Christians acquitted 92 out of
community.
the 96 defendants.162 A retrial was immediately ordered by the government, yet again, only
three were convicted - one for killing the sole Muslim and the other two for the destruction of
163
This failure to prosecutethe perpetrators is viewed by some Copts such as
property.
Youssef Sidhom, editor of the Christian owned newspaper Watani, as proving that Christian
blood is worth little and that the only justice Copts will obtain will be from God. ' 64 In
have
been
initial
the
violence
may
confessional
general, some of
unrest associatedwith
causedby the actions of a few Christians. However, most incidents follow the same pattern
of escalation which without intervention from the authorities leads to attacks on unspecified
Christians and their property and minimal damageto Muslim interests. Consequently,
in
Upper
Copts,
Egypt
for
fears
high
those
especially
residing
many
security
a
priority
remain
and rural areas.
Finally, economic concerns also feature highly. An ongoing economic crisis has led to a
165
by
The country
bome
the middle class.
mostly
rise in inflation and decline in real wages,
has a large public debt and budget deficit at around 6.5% GDP. 166 The Economist estimates
167
has
in
Mass
20%.
to
resulted
migration
a significant
rural urban
unemployment at around
expansion of the major cities especially Cairo. This has led to overcrowding, housing
inequality
the
in
breakdown
accentuated
of wealth
and
shortages,a
welfare services
distribution.
by
difficulties
Egyptians,
While
the
these
are
experienced
the
all
stretched resourcesof
state.
for
Coptic
incentive
further
discrimination
emigration,
a
as
acts
added perception of
has
importance
Coptic
the
traditionally
West.
The
stressed
to
the
of
community
especially
long
hours
from
to
for
is
It
and
abstain
work
couples
middle
class
education.
common
120
121
In general,
regions with a Muslim majority were made into large electoral districts (between 19 and 28
seats) while those with a Christian majority were adapted into small districts (between 3 and 8
170
seats).
Under the 1992 law, votes for each candidatewere counted at the level of the large
constituency (muhafaza) but unlike previous elections, the candidatescompeted to represent a
smaller unit (qada). As el-Khazen demonstrates,this meant that a candidate could be elected
to representa specific area without polling the majority of votes in that constituency. By way
of illustration, a Maronite candidate, Manuel Younes, received 5271 votes compared to 927
votes polled by his opponent Charles Ayoub in the count in the qada of Batroun. Yet
Younes only won by 232 votes after the votes from the rest of the muhafaza had been
included. Ayoub received 98% of his votes from electors in other constituencies within the
171
different
Due
to
these
a
who
represented
confession
candidates
conditions,
muhafaza.
from that of the majority of voters in the large electoral district relied heavily on the support
in
for
five
Christian
For
from
the
different
those
seats
example, candidates
of
confessions.
the South were dependenton Muslim votes as only around 20% of the electorate were
Christian. In Jbeil, Christian voters decisively influenced the election of the one Shiite
172
11,835
Muslim
Christian
to
51,944
voters.
candidate as there were
voters compared
Although this system distorted representationat the qada level for several confessional
groups, the Christian communities were affected to a greater degree as nine Christian deputies
deputies
Muslim
de
facto
by
three
Muslim
were dependenton
were
voters while
elected
Christian votes.173 This occurred to the extent that the Greek Orthodox vote did not
decisively influence the outcome of the fourteen deputies elected to represent them.174
Consequently, several of the Christian candidateselected were not considered as populist
in
Furthermore,
by
their
previous elections, the
representatives
communities.
122
123
There was deep discontent among Maronite circles when this electoral law was retained for
the 2005 parliamentary elections held after the Syrian withdrawal. The Maronite community
continued to be plagued by internal disunity. Somejoined the new anti-Syrian opposition led
by Saad al-Hariri and supported by Walid Jumblatt e.g. Qornet Shehwan members Nassib
Lahoud, Nayla Mouawad and Gabriel Murr. However, Aoun remained aloof from these
actors and allied with Christian figures who had been prominent in the former regime. His
bloc was successful in winning 21 seatsin the Mount Lebanon constituency. In the
immediate aftermath of the momentous events which occurred in Lebanon during 2005, there
appearedto be few changesto the feelings of political alienation previously expressedby the
Maronite masses. President Lahoud who is generally considered as a pro-Syrian appointment
especially after the extension of his mandate in September2004, withstood initial calls for his
resignation and remained in the office which is perceived as the highest position of authority
available to Maronites.
Security issues are also a Maronite priority in the post-civil war era. This focused on
Syrian influence in Lebanon in the post-civil war era. The Taif Accord legitimised the
presenceof the Syrian army but did state that the Syrians should redeploy to the Beqaa valley
'
80
This aspectwas not implemented and instead, Syrian policy was
two
within
years.
perceived by some as resulting in the de facto annexation of Lebanon. Several pacts were
signed, including the May 1991 Treaty of Brotherhood, Co-operation and Co-ordination, the
September 1991 Pact on Defence and Security and bilateral agreementson specific policy
18
1A
Maronite critic illustrates their understandingof Syrian-Lebaneserelations. "All
areas.
major decisions are to be arrived at "jointly" between the two unequal partners, which of
(Lebanon)
dictating
into
(Syria)
to
the
the
translates
weaker
on every
stronger
course
level". 182 There was also grave concern that the Lebanesesystem was becoming
"Syrianized". 183 Both the judiciary and security forces were used to crackdown on
124
184
Not
only do some Lebaneseregard this as double standardsbut they also fear the consequencesof
such activity on the future stability of the country. The army was regularly used to disperse
opposition demonstrations, resulting in injuries and the detention of the predominantly student
protestors. Members of the two main opposition groups - the Free Patriotic Movement led
by Aoun and the LebaneseForces loyal to the imprisoned Geagea- were targeted by the
75
150
In
August
2001,
and
over
received a prison
questioned
were
regime.
over
185
While conditions have easedsince the withdrawal of the Syrian army, new
sentences.
has
been
there
have
Since
the
al-Hariri,
a series of
of
assassination
security concerns
arisen.
bombing incidents in the Greater Beirut region. Several of these exploded in predominantly
186
have
been
figures
Naturally, this is
targeted.
Christian areasand influential Christian
likely to have an adverse effect on the Maronite community and dampen initial enthusiasm for
this new era in Lebanesehistory.
Finally, the grave economic situation is a major concern for all Lebanese,not just
Christians. Socioeconomic inequality, which favoured the Maronites, was recognised as a
Constitution,
to
the
In
the architects of the
factor
the
to
the
preamble
contributing
civil war.
Taif Accord statesthat, "The even development among regions on the educational, social, and
the
be
basic
the
levels
the
state
and
stability of the
of
unity
of
pillar
a
economic
shall
1
87
by
initially
fuelled
the
'.
Although
post-war reconstruction
was
growth
economic
systern'
boom, this faltered by the mid 1990sdue to overspending, the failure to collect taxes or clamp
down on corruption and lack of investment due to regional instability.
Consequently, the
by
debt
$32
become
has
national
a
vast
of
around
characterised
post-war economic situation
125
Summajy
126
remained steadfast. The tremendous changeswhich occurred in the region - the collapse of
the empire, the presenceof colonial rulers and independence- offered Christians a multitude
of opportunities. Nationalism representeda natural development from the situation attained
by the ground-breaking tanzimat reforms which introduced the notion of citizenship
regardlessof religious allegiance. Its emphasison ethnicity rather than Islam as the
fundamental determining identity of the nation allowed Christians to discard their dhimmi
status. It also provided the framework to participate in society as individual citizens rather
than depending on communal representation. The hope, time and energy invested in these
movements by Christians illustrates the belief that this approach was the only way to secure
recognition and participation. Yet by the latter twentieth century, it was apparent that not
only had all three variations failed to cure the problems facing the region or state respectively,
but also the quest for full participation and equality remained unfulfilled.
Various factors were responsible for the demise of nationalism as a populist indigenous
ideology. Firstly, actors proved unable to transform the rhetoric into comprehensive policies.
Regardlessof the development strategy followed, both countries failed to experience
widespread economic growth and fulfil the material needsof the entire population.
Secondly, complex identity issuesremained unresolved. In the caseof Arab and Egyptian
between
distinction
there
nationalism and Islam. Hence, there
nationalism,
was never a clear
was a clear correlation between the increasedprominence of Islam at the heart of these
movements and its popularity among the masses. In Lebanon, the variation of nationalism
followed by the Christian population (particularly the Maronites) failed to develop into an
ideology which surpassedcommunal identity and could be acceptedby all citizens of the
Lebanesestate. When confronted with severepolitical, socioeconomic and security
in
have
to
either of the states.
no
answer
challenges, nationalism appeared
127
According to the criteria established in the earlier chapter, the two countries studied in this
thesis can be describing as exhibiting conditions associatedwith a crisis of state environment.
Both stateshave struggled to provide physical and material security for all their citizens.
With the failure of the post-independencenationalist movements, a pattern has emerged
among the Muslim population. There has been a general revival of political Islam, witnessed
particularly in Egypt and amongst the Shiite community in Lebanon. The Christian
communities are concerned at this potential return to dhimmi status and the inequality
conveyed by this term. The failings of the nationalist movements are simultaneously the
failings of Middle East Christians to find a system that allows them to participate in political
life as equal citizens. For Christians, this leaves unansweredthe traditional questions
concerning their role in society. This perception of vulnerability is apparent when examining
contemporary concerns of the Christian communities. The Coptic community is still
struggling against its traditional position of dhimmi, failed to attain full equality with Egyptian
Muslims and frequently made the scapegoatwhen tensions erupt either between the
communities or between the authorities and Islamic militants. Recovering from the traumas
of the civil war, the Maronites came to the unhappy realization that their secular leadership
had collapsed and their pre-war political dominance was no longer assured. Instead, they
now have to wrestle with the same issuesfacing other Christian communities in the Middle
East, in particular political participation, equality and security. In this context, it is
unsurprising that both communities have turned to the one communal institution which is
has
Just
interests
the
the
their
as
occurred
church.
with
revival of
perceived as serving
is
is
but
instead
Muslim
this
Islam
the
a
radical
not
new
approach
population,
political
among
Christianity
in
historic
the Middle East traditional
aspect
of
and
an updated version of a
hierarchy.
the
through
church
political representation
128
I Robert Brenton Betts, Christians in the Arab East (London, SPCK, 1979) p. 20
2 Otto F Meinardus, Christian Eqvpt: Faith and Life (Cairo, The American University in Cairo Press
1970) p. 17
3 Bat Ye'or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam : from Jihad to Dhimmitude (London,
Associated University Press, 1996) p. 162
4 Bruce Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World : The Roots of Sectarianism
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001) p. 134
5 Kamal H Karpat, "Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the
post-Ottoman Era" in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds), Christians and Jews in the
Ottoman Empire: The Functioninq of a Plural Society Volume One The Central Lands (London,
Holmes & Meier Publisher Ltd, 1982) p. 163
6 Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World p. 134
Betts, Christians in the Arab East p. 22
Youssef Courbage and Phillipe Fargues, Christians and Jews under Islam (London, IB Tauris
Publishers, 1992) p. 79
Samir Khalaf, "Communal Conflict in Nineteenth Century Lebanon" in Benjamin Braude and
Bernard Lewis (eds), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural
Society Volume Two The Arabic Speakinq Lands (London, Holmes & Meier Publisher Ltd, 1982)
p. 129
10 Betts, Christians in the Arab East p. 23
John W Jandora, "Butrus al-Bustani, Arab consciousness, and Arabic Revival*,Muslim World 74(2)
1984 p. 76
: Ibid p. 73
13 Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism Between Islam and the Nation-State (London, MacMillan Press
:
129
Muslim and the Copt in Egypt 1906-1919" Muslim World 75(2) 1985 p. 106
36Carter, The Copts in Egyptian Politics p. 65
37Mustafa el-Feki, "A Coptic Leader in the Egyptian National Movement" International Studies 220)
1985 p. 56
38 Hasan, Christians Versus Muslims in Modern Eavot 35
p.
39Jean-Pierre Valognes, Vie et mort des Chrefiens d'Orient (Paris, Fayard, 1994)p. 533
40 Hasan, Christians Versus Muslims in Modern Egypt p. 36
41Carter, The Copts in Eqvptian Politics p. 16
42Ibid p. T6_3
43Christiaan van Nispen tot Sevenaer, "Changes in Relations between Copts and Muslims (19521994) in the light of the Historical Experience" in Nelly van Doom Harder and Karl Vogt (eds)
Between Desert and City: The Coptic Orthodox Church Today (Oslo, Institute for Comparative
Research in Human Culture, 1997) p. 25
44Carter, The Copts in E-qvptianPolitics p. 143
45Hasan, Christians Versus Muslims in Modern Egypt p. 38
46Carter, The Copts in Eqyptian Politics p. 143
47lbid p. 145
48JD Pennington, "The Copts in Modem Egypt" Middle Eastern Studies 18(2)_1982 161
p.
49Carter, The Copts in Egyptian Politics p. 145
50Nisan,
rities in the Middle East p. 123
51Asher Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia : The Search for an Identity in Lebanon (Brandeis University,
Unpublished Dissertation, 2000) p. 236
52Salibi, A House of Many Mansions p. 179
53Phares, Lebanese Christian Nationalism p. 39
54 Ibid p. 71
'55Najib E Saliba, "Syrian-Lebanese Relations" in Halim Barakat (ed), Toward a Viable Lebanon
(London, Croom Helm, 1988) p. 147
56Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon
Realities
Myths
Country:
Wars
In
Lebanon
Shattered
the
and
of
-A
(London, Holmes & Meier, 1996) p. 66
57Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon (London, The Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1993)
P* 70
Roger Owen, State. Power & Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (London, Routledge,
1992) p. 21
59R Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution : Fundamentalism In the Arab World (Syracruse, Syracruse
University Press, 1985) p. 109
60Bill and Springborg, Politics in the Middle East p. 39
61Laura Guazzone (ed), The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements In the
Contemporarv Arab World (Reading, Garnot Publishing Ltd, 1995) p. 8
62Owen, State. Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East p. 33
63Tibi. Arab Nationalism , Between Islam and the Nation-State p. 24
64Kirs'ten E Schulze, The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Harlow, Pearson Education Limited, 1999) p. 39
65Martin Kramer, Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival (London, Transaction Publishers, 1996) p. 3
6'3Laurent Chabry and Annie Chabry, Politique et minorites au Proche Orient: Les ralsons d'une
explosion (Paris, Maisonneuve & Larose, 1984) p. 302
Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East p. 33
68Valogn
ie et mort des Chretiens d'Orient p. 537
69Hasan, Christians Versus Muslims in Mo
103-4
.
70Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East P. 124
71Theodore Hall Partrick, Traditional Eastern Christianity :A History of the CoDtic Orthodox Church
(Greensboro, Fisher Park Press, 1996) p. 155
72Christian Cannuyer, Coptic Eqvr)t: The Christians of the Nile (London, Thames & Hudson Ltd,
2001) p. 103
73Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East P. 125
74Samir Khalaf, "Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon" Middle Eastern Studies 4(3 1968 p. 260
75Phares, Lebanese Christian Nationalism p. 88
76Farid el Khazen, The Communal Pact of National Identities (Oxford, Centre for Lebanese Studies,
1991) p. 35
77Andrew Rigby, "Lebanon Patterns Confessional Politics" Parliamentary Affairs 530) 2000
of
p. 170
130
78Ephraim A Frankel, "The Maronite Patriarch : An Historical view of a Religious Za'im in the 1958
Lebanese Crisis" The Muslim World 66(4) p. 245
9 Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon
Wars
in
Lebanon
Myths
Realities
the
Country:
Shattered
of
and
-A
(London, Holmes & Meier, 1996) p. 73
80Khalaf, "Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon" p. 236
81Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East P. 186
132
Picard, Lebanon -A Shattered Country p. 80
3 lbid p. 88
4 Raymond G Helmick, "Internal Lebanese Politics: The Lebanese Front and Forces" in Halim
Barakat (ed), Toward a Viable Lebanon (London, Croom Heim, 1988) p. 107
85Haddad, Simon, "Christian-Muslim Relations and Attitudes towards the Lebanese State" Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs 210) 2001 p. 132
John L Esposito (ed), Voices of Resurgent Islam (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983) p. 13
87 Ibid p. 13
88R Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution : Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Syracruse, Syracruse
University Press, 1985) p. 44
8gIbid p. 44
'oIbid p. 33
91Hassan Turabi, "The Islamic State" in John L Esposito (ed), Voices of Resurgent Islam (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1983) p. 250
92Yvonne Haddad, "Islamist Depictions of Christianity in the Twentieth Century: the pluralism debate
and the depiction of the other" Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 70 1996 p. 85
93Charles J Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State" in John L Esposito (ed), Voices of Resurqent
Islam (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983) p. 122
94Gudrun Kramer, "Dhimmi Citizen? Muslim-Christian Relations in Egypt" in Jorgen S Nielson (ed)
The Christian-Muslim Frontier: Chaos. Clash or Dialogue (London, IB Tauris, 1998) p. 41
Ibid p. 40
96 John J Donohue, Muslim-Christian Relations: Dialogue In Lebanon (Washington DC, Center for
Muslim-Christian Understanding : History and International Affairs, 1995) p. 15
97 Ahmad Yousif, "Islam, Minorities and Religious Freedom :A Challenge to Modern Theory of
Pluralism" Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 200) 2000 p. 36
198Haddad, "Islamist Depictions of Christianity in the Twentieth Century" p. 85
99 The perception of vulnerability was made clear in many interviews with Christians In both Egypt and
Lebanon. However, this was certainly more pronounced amongst ordinary members of the church
rather than members of the clergy or elite representatives.
100G Warburg, "Islam and Politics in Egypt: 1952-1980" Middle Eastern Studies 18(2) 1982 p. 145
1()' Valognes, Vie et mort des Chretiens d'Orient p. 539
102John L Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999) p.
95
103Nadia Ramsis Farah, Religious Strife in Egypt: Crisis and Ideolociical Conflict in the Seventies
(London, Gordon and Breach Saerice Publishers, 1986) p. 36
104Ann M Lesch, "The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Reform or Revolution" in Matthew C Moen and
Lowell S Gustafson (eds), The Religious Challenge to the State (Philadelphia, Temple University
Press, 1992) p. 194
105John Eibner (ed) Christians in Egypt : Church Under Slege (London, Institute for Religious
Minorities in the Islamic World, 1993) p. 20
'06Christophe Ayad, Geopolitique de I'EqvDte (Bruxelles, Editions Complexe, 2002) p. 58
107Watson, Among the Copts p. 93
10'3
Denis J Sullivan and Sana Abed Kotob, Islam in Contemporarv Eqyi)t: Civil Society vs the State
(London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) p. 87
109Hamied Ansari, "Sectarian Conflict in Egypt and the Political Expediency of Religion" Middle East
Journal 38(3) 1984 p. 413
'u Eibner, Christians in Egypt: Church Under Sieqe.p. 24
John Watson, "The Desert Fathers Today: Contemporary Coptic Monasticism" In Anthony
O'Mahony (ed), Eastern Christianity: Studies in Modern History. Religion and Politics (London,
Melisende, 2004) p. 132
Cornelis Hulsman, "Christians in Egypt: the impact of Islamic resurgence" Reli-qiousNews
Service from the Arab World 27th December 2002 p. 89
... Elie Podeh, "Egypt's struggle against the Militant Islamic Groups* in Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and
131
Efrairn Inbar (eds), Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East (London, Frank Cass, 1997)
p. 50
113Sullivan, Islam in Contemporarv
Eqypt, Civil Society vs the State
128
p.
114Robert Springborg,
"Egypt:
Repression's
Toll" Current History 97j615) 1998 p. 32
115Mona Makram-Ebeid,
"Egypt's 2000 Parliamentary
Elections" Middle East Policy 8(2) 2001 p. 38
118 The Economist, "Not
8th December 2005
yet a democracy"
www, economist. com/displavstorv.
cfm? storv id=5280976
117Mona Makram-Ebeid,
"Political Opposition
in Egypt: Democratic
Myth or Reality" Middle Eastern
Journal 43(3) 1989 p. 432
The Europa Yearbook Volume 1142 nd edition (London, Europa Publications,
2001) p. 1421
119Ibid
p. 420
120John 0 Voll, "Fundamentalism
in the Sunni Arab World" in Martin E Marty and R Scott Appleby
(eds), Fundamentalism
Observed (London, University of Chicago Press, 1991) p. 387
121 Sullivan, Islam in Contemporarv
Eqvp p. 91
122 Fawaz A Gerges, "The Condition
of the Islamist Insurgency in Egypt? Costs and Prospects"
Middle East Journal 54(4 2000 p. 599
Interview with Catholic priest, Cairo, November 2003
124Hasan, Christians Versus Muslims in Modern Egypt
174
.
125Maurus Reinkowski,
"National Identfty in Lebanon since 1990" Orient 38(3) 1997 p. 501
12" Kirsten Schulze, The Arab-Israeli
Conflict p. 67
127Boutros Labaki, "The Christian Communities
and the Economic and Social Situation in Lebanon" in
Andrea Pacini (ed), Christian Communities
in the Arab Middle East: The Challenge of the Future
(Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1998)
128Phares, Lebanese Christian Nationalism
P. 146
129Labaki, "The Christian Communities
and the Economic and Social Situation in Lebanon" p. 245
130Meir Zamir, "From Hegemony to Marginalism
: The Maronites of Lebanon" in Ofra Bengio and
Gabriel Ben Dor (eds), Minorites and the State in the Arab World (London, Lynne Reinner
Publishers,
1999) p. 122
131 Hanf, Coexistence
in Wartime Lebanon p. 586
132Phares, Lebanese Christian Nationalism
p. 157
133Picard, Lebanon
139
Shattered
Country
p.
-A
134Andrea Z Stephanous,
in the Islamic
Religion and Politics in the Middle East: Political Christianity
Context (University of Manchester,
2002) p. 252
'jo Pennington,
"The Copts in Modern Egypt" p. 168
136Hasan, Christians Versus Muslims in Modern Egypt
112
.
137Al Ahram Weekl
"A Snag in the National Fabric" 22n' June 2000
,
htm
http: //weekiv. ahram. orq. eq/2000/487/eq8.
The belief that political parties are not pro-active in promoting Coptic candidates
was a commonin Cairo, October-November
held view amongst ordinary Copts interviewed
2003.
138The Economist. "Country Briefings
: Egypt" 1 9th December 2000
cfm? Storv ID=577598
www. economist. com/countries/EavDt/PrinterFriendly.
13gThe Economist, "Not
8m December 2005
yet a democracy"
14Ual-Akhbar, 21sDecember
2005
141Arabic News.
th February 2000
Copts"
4
"Ruling
Egyptian
com,
party nominates
html
http: //www. arabicnews. com/ansub/Dailv/Day/000204/200002045.
142Makram-Ebeid,
"Egypt's 2000 Parliamentary
Elections" p. 39
143Al Ahram Weekly, "A Snag in the National Fabrie 22nd June 2000
144-
html
http: //www. arabic. news. com. ansub/Dailv/Dav/060102/2006010218.
1413
Information obtained from interviews with Egyptians covering a wide range of religious and social
background.
147David Zeidan, "The Copts Equal, Protected
Persecuted? The Impact Islamization
148
149
150
151
or
of
on
Muslim-Christian Relations in Modern Egypt" Islam and Muslim-Christian Relations 10(l) 1999 p.
58
Eibner, Christians in Egypt : Church Under Siege p. 26
lbid p. 27
Zeidan, "The Copts - Equal, Protected or Persecuted? p. 57
International Reliqious Freedom Report 2003
132
152Watani International. "And again, Who can stand up to the security apparatus?. 26thOctober 2003
153Hulsman, "Christians in Egypt: the impact of Islamic resurgence" p. 81
154Middle East Online, "Mubarak eases restrictions on church building" 11thDecember 2005
www. copts.net/id-825
, 00 International Reliqious Freedom Report 2003
156BBC News, "Church bells lead to Egypt clashes" 1othFebruary 2002
htti):Hnews.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/World/middle east? 1812730.stm
157Ami Ayalon, "Egypt's Coptic Pandora's Box" in Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds), Minorities
and the State in the Arab World (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) p. 59
, 0* Middle East International 616. "Egypt: communal killings" 14thJanuary 2000 p. 17
159The Economist. "Egypt's vulnerable Copts" 6thJanuary 2000
www.economist.com/PrinterFriendiv.cfm?Storv ID=271592
Al-Ahram WeekIv, "The meanings of al-Kosheh" 3r(' February 2000
http://w ekIV.ahram.org.eq/2000/467/eq7.htm
161US Copts Association, "The Egyptian Regime Encourages Persecution of Coptic Christians" 7th
March 2002 http://www.coi)ts.net/print.asp?id=272
162Al Ahram WeekIV, "A[ Kosheh dossier reopened" 81nNovember 2001
http://w ekiv.ahran.org.eq/2001/559/eq6.htm
163International Religious Freedom Report 2003
104Watani International, "Shock acquittals at El Kosheh" 9thMarch 2003
165Eberhard Kienle, "More than a response to Islamism : The Political Deliberalization of Egypt In the
1990s" Middle East Journal 52(2) 1998 p. 230
' Weekly, "The Cabinet's new look" 2 5thJuly2004
166AI-Ahram
http://weekly. ahram.orq.eq/2004/699/eql. htm
167The Economist, "Egypt's Economy" 5"' January 2002 p. 44
Under the Taif Accord, parliamentary seats have been equally divided between Muslims and
Christians. Within each group, the allocation is as follows - 64 Muslim seats -(27 Sunni, 27 Shiite,
2 Alawi and 8 Druze) and 64 Christian seats (34 Maronite, 6 Armenian, 14 Greek Orthodox, 6
Greek Catholic, 4 Other Christians).
See Augustus Richard Norton and Jullian Schwedler, "Swiss Soldiers, Ta'if Clocks and early
elections: Toward a happy ending?" in Deirdre Collings (ed), Peace for Lebanon: From War to
Reconstruction (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994) p. 52
2001 p. 48
171Farid el Khazen, Prospects for Lebanon : Lebanon's First Postwar Parliamentary Election (Oxford,
Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1998) p. 24-5
172Ibid p. 25
173lbid p. 26
174 Khazen, "Lebanon
48
More"
No
Independent
p.
el
175 Norton and Schwedler, "Swiss Soldiers, Ta'if Clocks and early elections" p. 57
176Charles Winslow, Lebanon : War and Politics in a fragmented socie (London, Routledge, 1996) p.
282-3
177Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon : With Friends like these" Current History January 1997 p. 7
Norton and Schwedler, "Swiss Soldiers, Ta'if Clocks and early elections" p. 56
180Paul Salem, "Framing Post-War Lebanon : Perspectives on the Constitution and the Structure of
Power" Mediterranean Politics 30 1998 p. 17
181Norton, "Lebanon : With Friends like these" p. 9
182Habib C Malik, "The Future of Christian Arabs" Mediterranean Quarterly 17(2) 1996 p. 92
1133
Farid el Khazen, Prospects for Lebanon : Lebanon's First Postwar Parliamentary Election (Oxford,
Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1998) p. 73
184Magnus Ranstorp, "The Strategy and tactics of Hizballah's Current "Lebanonization" Process*
Mediterranean Politics 30) 1998 p. 125
"50BBC News, "Lebanese court releases Christians" 2othAugust 2001
"(1 Christian areas targeted include New Jdeide (March), Kaslik (March) and Achrafieh (September).
Victims of car bombings in 2005 include Samir Kassir aournalist), George Hawi (former leader of
the Lebanese Communist party), Elias Murr (outgoing Defence Minister at time of attack), May
Chidiac aournalist) and Gibran Tueni Gournalistand parliamentary deputy).
133
134
Introduction
135
patriarchal authority. As this revival commencedin the 1940s, its effects had obviously
already been witnessed in the church by the time Patriarch Shenoudabecame the head of the
church. However, it is crucial that it is examined here as it is a vital element of the authority
enjoyed today by the patriarch. As a member, monk and bishop of the Coptic Orthodox
Church, the future Patriarch Shenoudawas active at every level of the renewal movement.
Furthermore as patriarch, he has presided over a vibrant Coptic Orthodox Church and enjoyed
the fruits of the renewal process. The discussion will then look at the ways in which
Patriarch Shenoudahas used the themes of this renewal as tools to enhancethe authority of
the patriarch over the community. This study claims that after his return from the desert in
1985, the patriarch initially concentratedon consolidating power within the church and
community. This will be analysedin relation to the hierarchy, laity and ecumenical
been
Once
had
been
has
illustrating
this
this
that
successful.
achieved,
mostly
organisations,
the patriarch was able to addressother issuesin his role as Coptic civil representative.
The political views voiced by Patriarch Shenoudawill be examined, suggesting that
in
detailed
be
they
the
Coptic
to
earlier,
must
these
the
viewed
grievances
although
relate
look
discussion
The
the
will
at the responseto this political
context of
millet partnership.
laity),
Islamic
(both
Coptic
the
and
clergy
religious representatives
community
role amongst
involvement
leader
in
determine
the
the
to
of
a
religious
political
and
whether
government
issueshas an adverse effect on communal relations. Lastly, the successof these endcavours
by the patriarch will be critically assessedand possible scenarios for the continued role of the
be
Coptic
the
will
the
community
explored. This will
patriarch as
civil representativeof
in
influencing
individual
the
importance
a
patriarch
the
characteristics of
stressthe
of
discussion
Hence,
this
a
provide
on the political
to
will
chapter
response any political role.
dimension of the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch under Patriarch Shenoudawith reference to the
in
institution
temporal
leader
authority
the
a crisis of
that
exercise
can
of a religious
extent
136
state enviromnent in a country where relations between different groups are characterised,by a
system which cedes authority to the head of the church.
The development of the Coptic Orthodox Church in the late twentieth century has been
greatly influenced by its patriarch elected to office in 1971 - Pope Shenouda. Born Nazir
Gayed in 1923 to a middle class family in Assiut (Upper Egypt), he graduated in History from
'
Israel.
Thefuture
Cairo University and was an army officer in the 1948 war against
Shenoudabecame known as a theologian, journalist, orator and poet. Hewasactively
involved in the Sunday School movement, editor of the Sunday School magazine and in 1953,
2
he
Aged
Helwan.
in
thirty-one,
the
the
theology
enteredmonastic
seminary at
was
chair of
life, joining Deir al-Surian in 1954 where he spent sometime as a hermit. Aftereightyears
in the monastery, he became one of the first to take the new position created by Patriarch
Kyrillos VI - general bishop. In 1962, he was consecratedBishop of Higher Theological
Studies and was able to continue his interest in the Sunday School movement. As bishop,
Shenoudawas extremely popular particularly with the Coptic youth. His charisma and
"Shenouda
Heikal
that
the
traditional
states
was the
clergy.
energy contrasted with
determined
to change the
the
monks,
militant
of
new generation
outstanding representative of
Church from an isolated and backward institution into something more in tune with the
his
dars
important
One
meetings
weekly
a1jumaa
was
activity
contemporary world .3
(lesson on Friday). His willingness to answer questions from ordinary members of the
differences
illustrated
but
helped
these
humorous
also
only
remarks not
community often with
to ensurethat he became well-known within the community. Shenoudawas known to be
4
Coptic
rights.
outspoken regarding
137
After the death of Patriarch Kyrillos VI in 1971, Shenoudawas elected by altar lot having
5
Aged forty-seven
when he became patriarch, Shenoudahas been able to make an impression on the church in all
areas- spiritual, social and political.
As has been seen,under the millet system, the patriarch as the religious representative of the
Coptic community, also enjoyed a de facto political role. Several factors combined to ensure
that Patriarch Shenoudautilised this position in a more assertivemanner than his predecessor.
In fact, Sedra statesthat his election to the patriarchate ended the traditional millet
7
between
the state and the church. Representing the new generation of church
relationship
reformers, Patriarch Shenoudawas eagerto fill the leadership vacuum left by the decline of
the secular Coptic elite. Farah statesthat "The new church modernists saw themselves as
both the religious and political spokesmenfor the Copts". 8 Patriarch Shcnoudawas known
for his charismatic personality, strong political views and authoritarian Icadership.9 As
Bishop with responsibility for education, he held weekly meetings which had taken a political
10
his
Kyrillos
Pope
to
tone to the extent that Nasser pressurised
control
outspoken clcric.
According to Ansari, he representedthe movement within the church hierarchy that was no
longer willing to seekrecourse through the traditional method of private representation of
Coptic concerns to state officials. "
138
stand up for the collective rights of the community. Van Nispen statesthat "the patriarch
himself, Pope Shenouda,a very strong personality and one of the symbols of the Coptic
renaissance,came increasingly to play a political role and to be seennot only as the
12
but
leader
Christians".
representative,
as the real political
of the
This new confrontational approach was apparentbetween 1971 and 1981. Thefirstmajor
tension centred on a traditional Coptic grievance regarding restrictions on church buildings.
Due to the difficulties encounteredin gaining the required building permits, churches were
sometimesbuilt unofficially or Coptic owned buildings were used for services. Tension had
increasedin Khanka, a town to the north of Cairo over Coptic attempts to transform the
offices of a Christian society into a church. In November 1972, the premises were set on fire.
However, the patriarch refused to opt for problem solving behind the sceneswith government
officials as had been the tradition under other patriarchs. Instead, one hundred priests and
monks were sent to Khanka in protest at this incident and conducted prayers on the site.
Consequently, the situation escalatedwhen local Muslims attacked Christian property. 13 A
parliamentary commission investigated this incident and recommended several measures
including amending the laws pertaining to church building but these were not implemented.
14
In 1977, tensions were raised again when the government attempted to introduce sharia law
into the Egyptian legal system. The inclusion of the apostasypenalty was viewed by church
leaders as affecting Christians becausethose who converted to Islam for convenience e.g.
divorce or career ambitions, would be unable to return to Christianity. "
Consequently, a
Coptic Conference was held which addressednot only this specific issue but also other
bill,
to
the
The
the
apostasy
reject
annul the
government
general concerns.
conference urged
Ottoman law concerning the building of churches,ensureequal opportunities and take a
16
Shenouda
for
Patriarch
five
Furthermore,
Islamic
to
called
a
robust approach
extremism.
day collective fast to highlight the problems facing the community. This public use of a
139
O'Mahony
suggests that
these actions by the patriarch should be seen in the context of the community taking on the
17
The government
role of the monastery where all participate through collective action.
abandoned the bill but violence against the Copts increased as many Muslims resented what
22
In particular,
they organised annual pilgrimages at Easter. However, these had stopped once Israeli forces
between
Egypt and
With
Jerusalem.
the
the
of
relations
normalization
captured
entire city of
140
Israel as a consequenceof the Camp David Accords in 1978, Sadatwas under pressure from
the Israeli government to increasethe number of Egyptian visitors to Israel. These were
minimal in contrast to the many Israeli holidaymakers who came to Sinai. Acknowledging
that his policy towards Israel was highly unpopular, Sadat acceptedthat few Egyptian
Muslims were likely to be willing to visit Israel. However, he hoped that Copts could be
encouragedto resume their pilgrimages to Jerusalem. In contrast, Patriarch Shenoudadid not
believe that the hostile political relations between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world would
23
remain permanent. Thus, it was crucial to ensure that the Coptic community avoided any
possibility of being labelled traitors to the Arab cause. Patriarch Shenoudatold Sadat that he
would only go to Jerusalemif he was accompaniedby the leader of the Palestinians, Yasser
Arafat. 24 Although this reaction can be seenas indicative of the patriotism of the church
leaders, it is also true that the decision was motivated by his desire to protect the community.
The refusal of the patriarch to lift the official ban on the pilgrimage angered Sadat. This
apparent disobedience heightened the personal rivalry between the two men.
Furthermore, Sadatwas humiliated during his 1980 trip to the United Stateswhen Coptic
6migr6s launched newspaper campaignsand organised demonstrations protesting at the plight
25
in
Copts
Egypt.
On his return, he launched scathing public attacks on the church
of
hierarchy, declaring that the patriarch was aiming to be a political as well as religious leader.
He accusedhim of conspiring to establish a Coptic state in Upper Egypt, accepting CIA funds
to achieve this, stirring up sectarian strife and aiding the LebaneseMaronite militias. 26 Sadat
was able to use the clashes at Zawya al-Hamra, which was a rare casewhen Copts also used
27
integrity
Egyptian
illustrate
the
the
threat
to
that the patriarch posed a
of
state.
arms, to
Consequently, as part of the crackdown on all opposition, he used this opportunity to banish
Patriarch Shenoudato a monastery in Wadi Natroun and thus, appearedto retain his authority
as the political leader of all Egyptians, including the Copts. The assassinationof Sadat ended
141
this particular personality clash. However, it did not lead to the instant release of the
patriarch. It was not until Christmas 1985 that President Mubarak gave permission for his
return. This was partly due to the easing of communal relations and also the realization that
Patriarch Shenoudastill maintained strong support from many Copts who rccognised him as
the only legitimate leader of the Coptic Orthodox Church. Any attempt to deposethe
patriarch would encounter fierce resistancefrom the community.
To understand the political role of the patriarch, it is vital to examine the extent of
patriarchal authority in the church. Since his return from the desert, Patriarch Shenoudahas
clearly focused on consolidating his dual position as the head of the church and community.
In his efforts to establish the church as the only institution regarded as truly representative of
the community, he has been able to benefit from the Coptic renewal process that has
revitalised the church since the 1940s. One consequenceof the efforts of church reformers
such as Shenoudahas been the establishmentof the church as the focal point of the
community. This contrasts with the situation in the first half of the twentieth century when
the church was perceived by its members as stagnant,corrupt and plagued with rivalries.
Catholic and Protestant churcheswere gaining converts, partially due to the different style of
28
but
due
to their educational and social services. In response,urbanised
worship
also
educatedmiddle class youth began to work to revitalise the church. Hasan statesthat the
it
for
became
"main
to
their
the
and
proceeded
zeal
use
as a safe
reforming
church
outlet
haven, outside the reach of the Muslim state, from which to launch their project". 29 One of
the major initiatives of this renewal was the Sunday School movement. The credit for the
first
Girgis
is
the
Sunday
Schools
Habib
to
of
one
students on the newly
who was
early
given
142
143
Father Matta al-Meskeen) enteredthe monasteries. Although many of the traditional clergy
were hostile to the young reformers, the new patriarch Kyrillos VI who was elected in 1959,
was sympathetic to their plight and nominated them to positions within the church hierarchy.
SaadAziz and Nazir Gayed becamegeneral bishops of Public, Ecumenical and Social
Services and Church Education respectively, reflecting the specialisation of the Sunday
School that each had been involved in. 35 The Sunday School generation had achieved their
aim of gaining accessto the church hierarchy. Now they were in a position to further
influence the Coptic Revival.
Another feature of the reform movement was the monastic revival. Monasticism has
always been a key component of the Coptic Orthodox faith. However, this too had declined
by the twentieth century. By 1956, ten Sunday School leaders had joined monastic life
hoping to have a similar impact on monasticism.36 Their aims were aided by Pope Kyrillos
VI.
Working for a spiritual revival of the entire church, the patriarch ordered all monks to
in
instrumental
to
their
reviving old monasteries and building new
return
monasteries and was
first
his
lay
According
to
Doom-Harder,
the cornerstone
to
acts
as
patriarch
was
one
of
ones.
37
The patriarch also appointed one of the influential
Mina.
Abu
Deir
of the new monastery
new monks as Abbot of Deir Abu Maqar with instructions to rebuild the ruined monastery.
Father Matta al-Meskeen (the former Yusuf Iskander) was keen to revive the notion of the
hermit monk and lived as an ascetic for several years. However, he also founded a lay
38
life
to the church. He
religious movement where young well-educated men pledged their
led his followers to the desert, initially to live a solitary life in the style of the Desert
Fathers.39 Once given the task of rebuilding the monastery, he oversaw its expansion and
became
Consequently,
the
monasteries
centres of activity,
successful agricultural projects.
attracting more monks.
144
145
the twentieth century has served to energisethe wider church and acted as a focal point for the
community.
Elements of the renewal processhave also been used to relate to contemporary problems.
Hasan statesthat "Coptic religious memory is continuously being reconstructed to guide the
faithful through treacherouspaths and help them to cope with difficulties and take on new
47
challenges". The Coptic Orthodox Church is clearly linked with early martyrs. For
example, it is inspired by St. Mark who according to tradition was martyred in Alexandria.
The Coptic calendar commemoratesthe persecution suffered under the Emperor Diocletian.
This concept of martyrdom is not confined to history. Recent violence against Copts has led
to these victims also being proclaimed martyrs. Meinardus queries if distinctions are being
made between those who are killed due to their religious identity e.g. those who died in the
incidents at al-Zawya al-Hamra in 1981 and al-Kush in 2000 and those martyred due to their
in
1988 and the nine Copts killed during a prayer
in
Diwaina
witness e.g. a priest murdered
48
is
it
Certainly
in
Qurqus.
in
in
Abu
1997
clear that the notion of
meeting
a church
Coptic
Orthodox
faith.
is
Religious
literature
is
the
of
martyrdom still a strong component
overwhelmed by stories of the ancient saints and martyrs. Wakin argues that Coptic religious
leadershave been able to use the idea of persecution as an asset49 Indeed, many Copts stress
.
that the church has a history of hardship and that this is not only part of life as a Coptic
Christian but also strengthensthe community and explains the vibrancy of the church.'o The
identity.
intellectual
The study of the
has
to
this
emphasise
efforts
revival
also encouraged
Coptic
heritage.
been
has
to
Coptic
language
rediscover
as
a
means
encouraged
ancient
Wakin suggeststhat this fulfils an important psychological need as possessinga unique
language reinforces the idea of a separateidentity. 51
One consequenceof the Coptic Renewal is that the church is now central to the Coptic
community. Church attendancehas increasedmassively to the extent that churches are full
146
home
by
family
Frequent
job
the
training
visits
priest reinforces
schemes.
programmeand
the link betweenCoptsandtheir church. The communityis invited to sharein someaspects
bonds
the
fasting
thus
strengthening
within the
and
prayer,
of monasticismsuchas
booklets
liturgies,
Recorded
chants
as
well
as
religious
aresold at
and
sermons
community.
influence
In
the
these
of the churchextendsmuch
ways,
shopsat churchesandmonasteries.
furtherthanthe weekly attendanceof a service. Similar to the Islamic revival, this Coptic
have
frequently
homes
is
Christian
religious symbolse.g.
shops
and
renewal alsovisible.
in
bible,
from
depicting
the
wearjewellery
shaped
often
a cross.
andwomen
scenes
pictures
Furthermore,by stressingreligiousidentity, the reformmovementhasbeensuccessfulin
in
In
the
the
that
nineteenth
century.
the
church
particular,
alleviating classstruggles plagued
147
148
149
by reducing the territory of a large diocese and sub-dividing a diocese after the death of the
incumbent bishop. Smaller diocesesallow the bishops to cultivate personal relationships
with their congregations. Hence, the pastoral duties of the bishop have also greatly
increased. They are expected to deal with the concerns of their community whether spiritual,
economic, social or political.
Shenoudais also important. Many of the new bishops tend to be young and spend only a
short time in the monasteries in stark contrast to past tradition. While this has resulted in
several dynamic individuals being given important posts in the church, it also raises concern
by
be
the apparent quick rise to
the
attracted
regarding
motivation of some novices who may
success. The majority of the new bishops can be called the "spiritual sons" of Patriarch
Shenouda.63 Their loyalty to the patriarch means that the Holy Synod is dominated by his
its
Synod
fulfil
independent
in
to
diminishes
This
the
the
role
as
an
of
voice
ability
proteges.
church administration. Instead, the patriarch has the influence to ensure that his decisions are
implemented. According to Watson, "Shenouda has placed his imprint decisively on the
Coptic Orthodox Church by filling the Holy Synod with educatedexecutives who are more
like personal disciples than products of the establishedmonastic system".64
By placing his proteges at the head of important general bishoprics and church committees,
Patriarch Shenoudais able to ensurethat all sections of the church follow his vision of the
bishops
be
inner
the
An
the
as
patriarch's
who
act
close
advisers
can
circle
of
role of
church.
identified. Yet, simultaneously, this centralisation process of allocating the responsibility of
by
decentralization
been
has
tasks
to
the
within the high
accompanied
many
patriarchate
in
increase
duties
by
Due
the
hierarchy.
to
the
undertaken
the
vast
echelons of
church
patriarchate, the patriarch has actually had to delegate some of these. The amount of
demanding tasks given to certain bishops has challenged their ability to perform at the highest
level in every area. For example in the 1990s,Bishops Serapion and Musa were the direct
150
151
still arise between the al-majlis al-milli and the church hierarchy, especially over financial
matters, it is clear that the laity have little power to affect key policies.
Instead, there has been a general trend of incorporating the laity into the church hierarchical
system. Male volunteers are urged to become deaconsand a new position of mukarassat
(deaconesses)has been created for women.70 The traditional post of church servant
(khuddam) has also been affected by this centralisation process. The khuddam are regularly
is
dioceses.
This
the
that
rotated around
ensures
pastoral care standardisedthroughout the
country. However, by removing theseworkers from their home church or diocese, it also
ensuresthat allegiance is given to the central church and thus the patriarch. Services which
were traditionally performed by the laity have also come under the auspicesof the church
hierarchy.
Since the reign of Patriarch Kyrillos VI, general bishoprics have been established. These
bishops are given clear duties but no diocese, a system which can be seen as similar to the
Vatican Curia. 71 Several bishoprics have been created to cater for specialised tasks which
The Bishoprics of Church Education, Public, Ecumenical
and Social Services and Higher Studies, Coptic Culture and Scientific Research, were all
created by Kyrillos
VI.
Shenouda in order to incorporate the next generation of believers into the church.
Under the
dynamic Bishop Musa, it provides a space for the Coptic youth to discuss challenges facing
72
Although such activities could
belonging
to the community.
them and reinforces a sense of
be undertaken by priests, Bebawi suggests that the authority exercised by bishops allow these
73
initiatives to be more successful
The leadersof the Sunday School generation are now
members of the clergy but they have retained control of this essential aspect of ministry.
Patriarch Shenoudais the official head of this institution and children's activities are
74
Consequently, during the reign of the present patriarch, the laity
by
prioritised
all clergy.
152
have been integrated into the church system and while not completely subservient, no longer
pose the threat to patriarchal authority experiencedby previous patriarchs.
The authoritarian nature of church governanceunder Patriarch Shenoudaserves to
discourage criticism of the head of the church or his policies. For example, the members of
the 1981 Papal Committee (set up by Sadatto govern church affairs in the enforced absence
of the patriarch), experienced varying levels of punishment. Bishop Johannis was forced to
give up his position as Secretary of the Holy Synod, while Bishop Athanasius was confined to
his diocese and the work of Bishop Gregorius was limited to scientific researchonly. 75
Another prominent critic Father Matta al-Meskeen was subjected to similar treatment
including having his books banned from the patriarchal library and church shops.76 The
divisions between Father Matta and Patriarch Shenoudacan be seen as illustrating two
different visions of the role of the Coptic Renewal. As detailed earlier, Patriarch Shenouda
believed that the church should use its resourcesto improve the situation of the Coptic
community in all aspects. In contrast, Father Matta was concerned that this approach would
detract from the main essenceof the revival - the spiritual heritage of the Coptic Orthodox
Church. He was also wary that the social services provided by the church combined with its
efforts to be the sole representativeof the community would attract Copts to the church for
forced
After
the
removal of the patriarch to Wadi Natroun,
material not spiritual reasons.
Father Matta gave an interview to Time Magazine suggesting that there was now more chance
77
Consequently, Father Matta and the
between
the church and the state.
of peaceful relations
involvement
from
in the church.
been
have
Abu
Maqar
wider
ostracised
mostly
monastery of
This type of treatment of internal critics has become normal during the reign of Patriarch
Shenouda.
of a monk-priest
meant that he was not only ostracised by the patriarch and his immediate circle of bishops but
78
in
1992
While
bishops
Baramous
lost
his
Abbot
Monastery
the
of
of
also
position as
.
153
cannot be removed from office apart from in exceptional circumstances, several priests have
been excommunicated from the church by the patriarch. As a consequenceof a crackdown
on corruption amongst the clergy, there has been a substantial decreasein the loss of church
funds.79 However, some of those excommunicated appearto have been punished primarily
due to disagreementswith the patriarch. For example, the dismissal of Father Aghathon, a
priest at a historic church in Old Cairo was regardedby his parishioners as purely due to
differences over financing renovation work 80 There is some unrest concerning the conduct
.
of influential figures within the church such as Metropolitan Bishoi. In such instances,the
head
in
has
hesitation
to
to
the
traditional
the
respect
given
of the
patriarch
no
appealing
finances
The
dissent
the
the
to
community.
patriarchal
or
raise
church
church counter
within
further problems. Several members of the laity constantly demand that these accounts should
be made transparent. However, Patriarch Shenoudahas replied that this suggestsa lack of
trust in the patriarch. Consequently, this ensuresthat few Copts, especially within the
hierarchy, are likely to outwardly criticise the policies of the patriarch due to the potential
it
is
From
discussion,
this
to
their
this
and
status.
position
outcome of
action -a swift end
apparentthat Patriarch Shenoudahas establishedhimself as the undisputed leader of the
Coptic Orthodox Church. Furthermore, the successof the Coptic renewal process has
is
in
the
that
the
twenty-first
church
at the centre of the community.
ensured
century,
Consequently, it is clear that these strategieshave provided the foundations for Patriarch
Shenoudato develop the temporal dimension of the office.
PatriarchShenoudahasprovedwilling to addresspolitical
In contrastto his predecessors,
issues. Sincehis releasein 1985,it is clearthat the patriarchhasmodified his political
154
strategy to become less confrontational. Hasan suggeststhat while the tactics of the patriarch
may have changed, so too have the circumstances. While it is evident that a gradual
Islamization of Egyptian society has occurred under Mubarak, the president has not actively
pursued this. Unlike Sadat, Mubarak did not use the Copts as scapegoatsor declare
81
Coptic
communal clashesa result of
conspiracies. Thus, the patriarch adopts a particular
approach to correspond to the attitude of the governing authorities. The patriarch himself
highlighted the importance of the personality of the ruler. In an interview on the occasion of
his eightieth birthday, he said "Sadat easily got angry and annoyed and might make violent
decisions. However, President Mubarak thinks twice before becoming irritated and his anger
is not as dangerousas that of Sadat. Sadattended to destroy his opponents. But President
Mubarak tends to engagein dialogue with them and give them a chance".82 As both
Mubarak and Pope Shenoudaacknowledged that they sharedthe same enemy - Islamist
extremism, the patriarch no longer called for demonstrations after attacks on Christians but
instead acceptedthat diplomacy was the only meansto solve these problems.
The abandonmentof his earlier confrontational approach does not mean that Patriarch
Shenoudahas relinquished his political presence. In interviews, he frequently answers
questions regarding political issues. Until recently, the church hierarchy did not support
specific candidatesor parties instead solely advising that the community should participate in
national life. While this remained true in the 2005 parliamentary elections, the patriarch
controversially gave his full support to PresidentMubarak in the first presidential elections
held in 2005. In an edition of al-Keraza, (the official church magazine) an article described a
document signed by the Holy Synod before Mubarak had even annouhcedhis nomination.
This declaration expressedtheir contentment with the Mubarak years and listed his electoral
83
strengths- political wisdom, tolerance and experience. The patriarch has frequently
complimented the President, stating that he is attentive to Coptic concerns. "Relations
155
84
9
of extremism, bigotry and discrimination' . Thus, this strategy illustrates the political
astutenessof the patriarch as he is aware that while conditions may not be perfect, the
Mubarak regime has proved relatively tolerant to the Coptic community which could not be
guaranteedunder other candidates.
Concerning Coptic electoral participation, the patriarch has used his authority to encourage
the community to take part in elections.
crowds to hold up their voting registration cards and congratulated them for performing what
just
the
one segment.
not
whole
community
party should serve
156
that this party would challenge the authority of the church in the Coptic community, thus it is
unsurprising that the patriarch cautions against its formation.
On the issue of discrimination, the patriarch has made a few selectedcomments. He has
highlighted the difficulties facing ordinary Copts in gaining employment in sectors such as
thejudiciary and universities, contrasting this with the situation from the 1930s-1950s.
While there have been several disturbancesover disputed conversions to Islam, the patriarch
has mostly refrained from making public statementsand instead, relied on private liaisons
between senior clerics and government officials. This is often the preferred method of the
patriarch in dealing with many of the contentious issues e.g. conversions and church building.
One notable exception was the Wafaa Constantine affair in December 2004. In brief, the
wife of a Coptic Orthodox priest purportedly converted to Islam. Rumours immediately
forcibly
had
been
in
Coptic
that
and
the
abducted
converted.
she
community
spread
Protestors gathered outside the patriarchate in Cairo and clashed with security forces.
Eventually, the woman was returned to the church authorities where she eventually
before
However,
her
had
the
this
all.
that
after
was
not
religion
announced
she
not changed
in
had
been
distress
Natroun
had
Wadi
that
the
to
not
apparently
event
patriarch
retreated
89
resolved quickl Y. The significance of this symbolic act cannot be overemphasisedas this
was exactly the type of method employed by Patriarch Shenoudaduring the tense Sadat years
to draw attention to Coptic grievances. The next edition of al-Keraza (which is edited by the
issue
Coptic
fears
Firstly,
disturbances.
this
the
over
were claimed
patriarch) concentrated on
to be directly linked to communal tension in other regions including Sarnalut and Assiut.
Secondly in the account of the affair, the security services are clearly blamed for their
tardiness in resolving the problem i. e. finding and returning Wafaa Constantine to the church
Mubarak
President
is
in
to
the
This
to
who was out
given
praise
authorities.
sharp contrast
Thirdly,
his
instructed
but
to
the
a
quick
solution.
the
time
ensure
the
officials
of
country at
157
theme of police brutality is extremely strong. Several pictures are enclosed of bloodied and
bruised Copts including a priest.90 Clearly, this responsecan be regarded as a messagefrom
the patriarch to the authorities that conversion issues should be between the church authorities
and the individual concerned. Any indication that the security forces were not acting within
the legal framework which accords them the responsibility of recording any conversion, could
result in public protests which could only be dispelled by Patriarch Shenouda. On the other
controversial issue of church building, again the patriarch rarely comments. However, each
new permit for construction or repair work is mentioned in al-Keraza and accompanied by a
91
Mubarak.
messageof appreciation to President
On security issues,the patriarch does voice his concerns when deemed necessary. After the
escalation of events at al-Kush in 2000, an article in al-Keraza urged the government to
resolve issues rather than reverting to the traditional responseof covering up problems. The
church hierarchy justified these comments as necessaryto counter the inaccurate reporting
about this event. The patriarch expressedhis confidence in the central government in Cairo
final
The
illustrates
local
lay
the
that
the
authorities.
sentence
with
and stressed
problem
view of Patriarch Shenoudaon such incidents. "True reconciliation can take place only after
92
justice".
The patriarch also made known his
the blood of these victims receive
dissatisfaction after the subsequenttrial when 92 out of the 96 defendantswere acquitted.93
While this may have been a factor in the government decision to order a retrial, its failure to
convict the suspectshas left bitterness among the Coptic community at the apparent inability
to achievejustice in this case.
Patriarch Shenoudais also keen to highlight that Copts are an integral part of Egyptian
society. Various statementsare made stressingthis "national unity" e.g. "sons of a single
homeland". 94 He clearly rejects the idea that Copts are a minority, stressing that they are part
interference
Coptic
Egyptian
the
regarding
any
outside
wams
against
nation and
of
158
95
concerns. "We do not acceptany foreign interferencein our internalaffair, which we are
96 Therehasalsobeen
solving in peacewith the responsiblepersonsin our country9t.
increasedeffort to fostercloselinks with Islamicreligiousrepresentatives,
particularly the
GrandSheikhof al-Azhar. Thepatriarchperceivesthat theseactivitiesparticularly at festive
occasions,canhelp to strengthencommunalties. Regardingcommunaliftars, he said,
"Muslims andCoptssit sideby sidein thesedinnerswhich gives a goodimpressionand
pictureto the west aboutEgyptiansandthe goodrelationsthey have".97
The patriotic credentialsof PatriarchShenoudaarealsowidely recogniseddueto his firm
commitmentto the Palestiniancause. Thepatriarchhasbannedany pilgrimageto Jerusalem
until it is oncemore underArab control. Although someCoptsstill go, this is at the risk of
excommunicationfrom the church. While this strongappealagainstZionism doesenhance
the notion of the Coptic communityasloyal Egyptianssupportingoneof the major Arab
political issues,it must alsobe mentionedthat othermotivessuchasthe ongoingstruggle
over Deir as-Sultanmay influencethe stanceof the Coptic OrthodoxChurchtowardsthe
Israeli-Palestinianconflict. In conclusion,sincehis return from the desertmonasteryin 1985,
PatriarchShenoudahasadopteda pragmaticapproachtowardsthe governmentandreinforced
the ideaof Coptsasloyal Egyptians,an imagethat hadbecomeerodedduring the tensions
with Sadat. However,this hasnot beenat the expenseof voicing his concernsat timesof
crisis.
159
160
161
gain extensively from a decline in the political role of the church as they would attempt to fill
this vacuum, just as the clergy did in the 1970s.
Since the return of Patriarch Shenoudain 1985, cordial relations with President Mubarak
have allowed the millet partnership to re-emerge. Mubarak appearscomfortable working
107
historic
issues
Coptic
Yet as outlined
this
within
system on
relating to the
community.
earlier, Coptic concerns are not a high priority for the government. When Mubarak came to
power, the main aim was to combat the militants who advocatedthe overthrow of the state.
The quest for peace and stability has remained an integral policy of the Egyptian authorities.
According to Watson, the patriarch remained in his desertmonastery until 1985 partly due to
108
have
his
impact
threats to
any attack would
personal safety and the
on communal relations.
Political stability and economic growth are key aims of the regime. Hence, government
attitudes to Coptic concerns primarily dependon the likely effect these will have on the above
in
late
has
1990shas been attributed to
As
been
the
the
on
militants
goals.
seen,
crackdown
the adverse impact these attacks had on tourism -a crucial source of revenue. Although this
action was not taken as a direct responseto the threat posed to Copts by militants, the removal
in
Coptic
Upper Egypt where
benefited
these
the
community,
especially
of
groups obviously
the majority of these attacks occurred.
Consequently, Christian-Muslim tensions tend to be seenas part of a bigger picture.
Ayalon statesthat there was an assumption that once the Islamist militants had been
109
While this maybe partly true regarding
Coptic
contained, the
problem would also subside.
security matters, it is clear that Coptic concernscover a wide range of subjects including
insistence
building.
The
discrimination
of the
church
and
political representation,
government in dealing with all of these as security matters rather than as socio-political ones
has had a major implication on relations between the state and community. There is a clear
from
incidents.
Individuals
both sides are
to
to
the
pattern
government response violent
162
th
January.
7
Other
in
the
on
scheduled
actionsto
were
protested
pastwhen schoolexams
improvenationalunity includethe review of history textbooksin schoolsto includesections
163
12
Coptic
ignored!
The Minister of Awqaf formed ajoint
on the
erawhich werepreviously
committeebetweenthe Ministry andthe CopticOrthodoxChurchin orderto return someof
113
in
1950s.
The governmenthasalso
by
the churchpropertyconfiscated the regime the
promotedChristianpilgrimageon the Holy Family routein Egypt andis renovatingOld
114
Cairo,an areawith severalancientChristianchurches.
In recentyears,the governmenthassoughtto increasethe visibility of PatriarchShenouda
andhencethe Coptic community. For example,he wasnominatedfor the UNESCOMadanjeetSinghPrize for the Promotionof ToleranceandNon-Violencein 2000. Pope
15
Shenoudabecamethe first individual to receivethis award! At religiouscelebrations,
his
At
Muslim
is
to
the
to
the
shown
counterparts.
same
respect
effort made give
patriarch
the annualNationalUnity Iftar banquetheld by the Ministry of ReligiousEndowmentsduring
the Muslim holy month of Ramadan,PatriarchShenoudais placedat the top tablealongside
the PrimeMinister, Presidentof Parliament,Minster of ReligiousEndowmentsandthe
116
Sheikhof al-Azhar.
164
'
19
be
These
met many state representatives.
measurescan seen as a government attempt to
full
Egyptians
Copts
to
that
and
contributors to Egyptian
as
equal
prove all
are regarded
society. Yet at the same time, they can also be categorised as merely cosmetic measuresto
placate the community rather than wholeheartedly addressing the complex issues as the heart
of Muslim-Christian relations in Egypt. Furthermore, these improvements do not mean that
President Mubarak and Patriarch Shenoudameet regularly or necessarily enjoy close
by
between
discussions
Instead,
the
state
are
generally
conducted
and
church
relations.
advisers to the two men.
The Consequencesof the Political Role of the Patriarch and Future Prospects
Upon entering the patriarchate, Patriarch Shenoudaembarked on two missions. The first
just
Hissuccessin
the
the
church.
not
to
community
was assertpatriarchal authority over
this endeavour through the total renewal processof the Coptic Revival has been illustrated.
The second aim was to use this influence to become the sole civil representativeof the Copts
for
full
In
in
the
this area,
to
their
community.
rights
achieve
order
concerns
and articulate
the verdict is mixed. Hasan arguesthat Patriarch Shenoudahas certainly succeededin
120
into
The initial
a political countcrspace.
transforming the Coptic Orthodox religious space
first
he
have
highlighted
took
by
the
the
office,
may
when
pope
assertive approach undertaken
Church
but
failed
Orthodox
Coptic
head
functions
to produce any
the
the
of
of
political
it
fact,
In
that
for
improvements
the
some
argued
was
community.
significant
Muslim
Under
further
it
the
to
public
opinion.
antagonise
only
counterproductive as served
Mubarak presidency, the strategy adoptedby Patriarch Shenoudawould appearto reflect his
the
that
the
patriarch autonomy over the
the
allows
partnership
of
millet
rules
acceptanceof
Coptic community in exchangefor support of the regime.
165
166
faith or the reputation of Copts, the passive responseof the past is no longer adopted. While
the more militant tendenciesof the church leadership halted after 1981, aspectsof these can
be found in the communal responseto certain incidents, particularly in the twenty-first
century. Such reactions have the potential to adversely affect church-state relations. In the
al-Nabaa scandal, this Egyptian newspaperpublished allegations and photographs in 2001 of
a defrocked monk said to be sexually targeting women at the Monastery of Deir al-Muharraq,
123
holy
by
Copts.
In response,thousandsof Copts flocked to the patriarchate
regarded a
site
to hold demonstrations that lasted for four days to condemn the newspaper. One significant
aspectof this incident was that for the first time, Copts protested alone in the streetsof Cairo
beside the patriarchate, resulting in skirmishes with the police. 124 While obviously
condemning the journal, the church hierarchy struggled to pacify the crowd to the extent that
the weekly bible meeting held by Patriarch Shenoudawas cancelled and he remained in
Alexandria. The incident was resolved when the government closed down the paper and
suspendedits editor.
A further example is the reaction of some Copts to an Egyptian film releasedin the summer
of 2004, which featured a Coptic family in the 1960s. While some saw it as exploring social
issues,certain scenesof Baheb es-Sinema(I love the Cinema), especially those set in a
church, were regarded by others as marring the reputation of Copts. A small amount
(estimated around one hundred) demonstratedat the patriarchate for the removal of the film
125
film
had
The
the
themselves.
they
not actually viewed
even although some admitted
issue
involvement
hierarchy
this
tried
to
stating that although it did not wish
on
church
avoid
its
if
beliefs
have
to
the
the
opinion
voice
right
religious
a censorship role,
are
church should
believed to be violated. 126 Finally, the Wafaa Constantine affair discussedearlier illustrates
the potential for clasheswith state authorities over such incidents. These incidents have
attracted substantial press coverage in Egypt and raised the notion of Christian extremism. It
167
168
169
exercised, which is often regarded as a vital element of the renewal process. Furthermore,
the appearanceof credible lay representativeswould heighten tension between the church and
the community as illustrated by the al-majlis al-milli experience. While these developments
could challenge the authority of the patriarch, this is unlikely to occur in the immediate future
as the catalyst required - significant political reform - has yet to move beyond the rhetorical
stage.
It is also possible that the general problems affecting Egyptian society as well as those
related to Copts, will continue to grow. Increasedthreats to security and perceptions of
both
intolerant
affecting
atmosphere
sides, where
vulnerability can encouragea more
As
has
been
in
frequent
becomes
the
seen,
some
elements
occurrence.
communal violence
a
community already urge its leaders(i. e. the patriarch) to adopt a more vigorous policy and
demand that the government addressthese concerns. In this context, the church hierarchy
increasingly
feel
With
be
faced
dilemma.
they
activist
middle
class,
may
an
would
with a
that the church needs to accurately reflect the mood of the community. Yet, this is likely to
in
1971-1981.
To
the
turbulent
period
of
as
occurred
relations
adversely affect church-state
its
demonstrate
broadly
hierarchy
that
to
this,
the
need
co-operative
would
avoid
church
approach to the government, is indeed beneficial to the community. Therefore, the extent of
the temporal authority of the patriarch dependsnot only on the measuresundertaken by the
in
Egyptian
developments
hierarchy
but
society.
wider
church
also
SUMMM
170
Coptic identity especially since the Coptic renewal, provided the legitimacy required for
Patriarch Shenoudato pursue his vision of the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch assuming
responsibility for the entire community. The patriarch personifies the successof the Sunday
School generation in enacting the Coptic Renewal
-a process which affected all strands of the
community and whose fruits are still being experienced. This renewal process has been
utilised to ensure that the church is perceived as the focal point for the community in both
spiritual and civil matters. The absenceof credible Coptic laity leadership has allowed
Patriarch Shenoudato use the resourcesof the church to fill this vacuum. His patriarchy has
been greatly affected by political developmentsin Egypt, particularly outbursts of communal
violence. The assertivepolices undertakenbetween 1971-1981 failed in terms of achieving
equality and security for Copts. Yet, Patriarch Shenoudawas able to maximise his role as
head of the community. This has been reinforced since 1985. The incorporation of
communal activities under the auspicesof the church and the centralization processwithin it
have ensuredthat the patriarch enjoys near total control over the community. Thus, he acts
as their civil representative and is a leading advocate of Coptic concerns to the state. While
some patriarchal statementsare consideredcontroversial especially those addressingparty
politics, on the whole, this political role is acceptedin the context of the millet system of
church-state relations.
In this casestudy, the participation of a religious leader in political affairs has not causeda
major upset to communal relations in post-SadatEgypt even although the patriarch is widely
regarded as articulating the specific views of the Coptic community rather than those of wider
Egyptian society. This is partly due to the general consensusin the country that the head of
the Coptic Orthodox Church is expectedto have a temporal dimension. Under the millet
system, the patriarch is recognised as the civil representativeof the Copts. This arrangement
has suited both parties. During the Mubarak years, this role has been recognised by the
171
government almost to the extent that the patriarch can be regarded as co-opted by the regime.
However, this also means that the patriarch is vulnerable to being made the scapegoatin times
of communal tension. Although Patriarch Shenoudamay have been successful in
consolidating power within the community, this has not been transformed into tangible
reforms from the government.
placate the patriarch and the community. The conciliatory approach has fared little better
than the assertive strategy in the Sadat era in meeting Coptic needs, especially regarding
discrimination and security.
The church hierarchy must perform an increasingly difficult balancing act to reassurethe
community that they are still the most effective institution to represent Coptic interests, while
simultaneously proving to the government that the community and the church in particular,
remain loyal Egyptians. As long as the statusquo continues especially concerning relations
with the state, the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch will be regarded as the main legitimate
representative of Copts on all aspects- spiritual and civil.
undermined by the increased activism among some Copts -a by-product of the very process
that allowed the Sunday School generation to gain this position. In order to retain his
predominance, the patriarch may resort to more assertive strategiesas in the past even
although he has witnessed the severerepercussionsthat this could have on both himself and
the wider Coptic community. In conclusion, Patriarch Shenoudahas revitalised the
traditional predominant role of the office adding a more political activist dimension, but by
failing to deliver all the promises of the Coptic Renewal, has left a potential opportunity to as
yet unknown actors, to challenge this temporal authority.
I Theodore Hall Partrick, Traditional Eastern Christianity :A History of the Coptic Orthodox Church
(Greensboro, Fisher Park Press, 1996) p. 169
2 Otto Meinardus, Coptic E-gypt: Ancient and Modern (Cairo, American University In Cairo Press,
1977) p. 13
3 Mohamed Heikal, Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat (London, Corgi Books, 1984) p. 171
4 PJ Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991) p. 421
172
5 In the last two papal elections, an electoral college consisting of lay representatives from elite
families selected three candidates from a list of figures nominated by the Holy Synod. The actual
decision is left to chance (or God) by writing the name of each candidate on a separate piece of
paper as well as a fourth choice. One name is drawn by lot by a young boy.
See SS Hasan, Christians Versus Muslims in Modern Egypt : The Century-Long Struggle for Coptic
Equali (New York, Oxford University Press, 2003) p. 245-6
6 Anthony O'Mahony, "The Politics of Religious Renewal : Coptic Christianity in Egypt" In Anthony
O'Mahony (ed), Eastern Christianity: Studies in Modern History. Religion and Politics (London,
Melisende, 2004) p. 148
7 Paul Sedra, "Class cleavages and Ethnic Conflict: Coptic Christian Communities in Modem
Egyptian Politics" Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 10(2) 1999 p. 225
8 Nadia Ramsis Farah, Reliqious Strife in Eqypt: Crisis and Ideological Conflict In the Seventies
(London, Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1986) p. 50
9 Andrea Z Stephanous, Religion and Politics in the Middle East: Political Christianity In the Islamic
Context (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Manchester, University of Manchester Press, 2002) p. 208
10Hasan, Christians Versus Muslims in Modern E-qypLp.87
11Hamied Ansari, "Sectarian Conflict in Egypt and the Political Expediency of Religion" Middle East
Journal 38(3) 1984 p. 398
Christiaan van Nispen tot Sevenaer, "Changes in Relations between Copts and Muslims (19521994) in the light of the Historical Experience" in Nelly van Doom Harder and Karl Vogts (eds),
Between Desert and City: The CoDtic Orthodox Church Toda (Oslo, Institute for Comparative
Research in Human Culture, 1997)"p. 30
13Ansarl, "Sectarian Conflict in Egypt" p. 400
14EJ Chitham, The Coptic Community in Egypt : Spatial and Social Change (Durham, Centre for
Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1986) p. 104
15John Eibner, Christians in Eqypt: Church Under Siege (London, Institute for Religious Minorities In
the Islamic World, 1993) p. 8
16Sohirin Muhammad Solihin, Copts and Muslims in Egypt: A Study In Harmony and Hqa!l&
(Leicester, The Islamic Foundation, 1991) p. 74
17O'Mahony, Interview, London May 2004
18Partrick, Traditional Eastern Christianity p. 172
19JD Pennington, "The Copts in Modern Egypt" Middle Eastern Studies 18(2) 1982 p. 174
20Ansari, "Sectarian Conflict in Egypt" p. 402
21Jean-Pierre Valognes, Vie et mort des Chretiens d'Orient (Paris, Fayard, 1994) p. 563
22There was an exception in 1961 when Patriarch Kyrillos V1imposed a ban on Coptic pilgrimages to
Jerusalem in protest at the decision of the Jordanian authorities to recognise the ownership claim of
the Ethiopian Orthodox Church concerning Dair as-Sultan. The bishops sought and obtained
Nasser's intervention. Once it became a political issue between Egypt and Jordan, the Coptic
Orthodox regained ownership of the keys to the holy site and recommenced pilgrimages. The role
of Nasser in resolving this issue was publicly recognised by the patriarch.
See Otto F Meinardus, Christian Egypt : Faith and Life (Cairo, The American University In Cairo
Press, 1970) p. 462-5
23 Heikal, Autumn of Fury p. 230
24 Hasan, Christians Versus Muslims in Modern Egypt p. 109
25 Ami Ayalon, "Egypt's Coptic Pandora's Box" In Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds), Minorities
Inc, 1999) p. 58
and the State in the Arab World (London, Lynne Reinner Publishers
Eibner, Christians in Eqvpt : Church Under Siege p. 18
27 Ansan, ; Sectarian Conflict in Egypt" p. 411
28 Hasan, Christians Versus Muslims in Modern EMt
p. 73
29 Ibid
p. 3
30 Wolfram Reiss, "Renewal in the Coptic Orthodox Church, notes of the Ph. D thesis of Revd Dr
Wolfram Reiss" translated by Cornelis Hulsman, Reliqious News Service
November 2002
31 O'Mahony,
"The Politics of Religious Renewal" p. 145
32 Reiss "Renewal in the Coptic Orthodox Church"
33 Hasan, Christians Versus Muslims in Modern Egypt p. 77
34 Ibid
p. 57
35 Reiss, "Renewal in the Coptic Orthodox Church"
36 Ibid
173
22 nd
37 Nelly van Doorn-Harder, "Kyrillos VI (1902-1971): Planner, Patriarch and Saint" in Nelly van DoomHarder and Karl Vogts (eds), Between Desert and City: The Coptic Orthodox Church Today (Oslo,
Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 1997) p. 236
38 Edward Wakin, A Lonely Minority: The Modern Story of Egypt's Copts (New York, William Morrow
& Company. 1963) p. 142
39 Father Matta el-Meskeen, Coi)tic Monasticism & The Monasterv of St. Macarius (Wadi Natroun,
Monastery of St. Macarius, 2001) p. 6
40 O'Mahony, "The Politics of Religious Renewal" p. 137
41 Partrick, Traditional Eastern Christianity p. 173
42 John Watson, "The Desert Fathers Today: Contemporary Coptic Monasticism" in Anthony
O'Mahony (ed), Eastern Christianity: Studies In Modern History. Religion and Politics (London,
Melisende, 2004) p. 114
43Otto FA Meinardus, Monks and Monasteries of the Egyptian Deserts (Cairo, American University in
Cairo Press, 1989) p. x
44Mark Francis Gruber, "Coping with God : Coptic Monasticism" in Nelly van Doorn-Harder and Karl
Vogts (eds), Between Desert and City: The Coptic Orthodox Church Today (Oslo, Institute for
Comparative Research in Human Culture, 1997) p. 62
4 Watson, "The Desert Fathers Today: Contemporary Coptic Monasticism" p. 114
45
a Nelly van Doorn-Harder, "Following the Holy Call : women in the Coptic Church" Parole de I'Orient
25 2000 p. 740
47Hasan. Christians Versus Muslims in Modern Egypt p. 103
413
Otto FA Meinardus, Coptic Saints and Pilgrimages (Cairo, American University in Cairo Press,
2002)p. 28
4gWakin, A Lonely Minoritv: The Modem Storyof Egypt's Copts 37
.
50Interviews with Coptic clergy and deacons, Egypt, October-November 2003
51Wakin, A Lonely Minority: The Modern Story of Egypt's Copts p. 153
52Hasan, Christians Versus Muslims in Modern Egypt p. 131
53Maurice Martin, "The Renewal in Context 1960-1990" in Nelly van Doorn-Harder and Karl Vogts
(eds) Between Desert and City: The Coptic Orthodox Church Today (Oslo, Institute for
Comparative Research in Human Culture, 1997) p. 17
54 Sedra, "Class cleavages and Ethnic Conflict" p. 226
55 David Zeidan, "The Copts Equal, Protected or Persecuted? The Impact of Islamization on MuslimChristian Relations in Modern Egypt" Islam and Muslim-Christian Relations 1100) 1999 p. 59
56 Hasan, Christians Versus Muslims in Modern Egypt 198
.
57 Reiss, "Renewal in the Coptic Orthodox Church"
58 Dina el Khawaga "The Political Dynamics of the Copts: Giving the Community an Active Role" In
Andrea Pacini (ed), Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East: The Challenge of the Future
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998) p. 183
59 Valognes, Vie et mort des Chretiens d'Orient p. 256
60 Otto F Meinardus, Two Thousand Years of Coptic Christianity (Cairo, American University in Cairo
Press, 1999) p. 11-12
61 Reiss, "Renewal in the Coptic Orthodox Church"
62 al Keraza 1 1thJune 2004
www.co ticpope.orq/ena-keraza/enqkeraza11-06-2004.i)d
63 Hasan, Christians Versus Muslims in Modern Eqvr)t p. 124
64 John H Watson, Among the Co]2-tS
(Brighton, Sussex Academic Press, 2000) p. 118
65 Hasan, Christians Versus Muslims in Modern Egypt p. 236
66 Ibid p. 236
67 Dina el-Khawaga, "The laity at the heart of the Coptic Clerical Reform" in Nelly van Doom-Harder
and Kari Vogts (eds), Between Desert and City: The Coptic Orthodox Church Today (Oslo, Institute
for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 1997) p. 151
68Sedra, "Class cleavages and Ethnic Conflict" p. 229
69Meinardus, Two Thousand Years of Coptic Christiani p. 74
70van Doorn-Harder, "Following the Holy Call: women in the Coptic Church" p. 743
71John H Watson, "The Transfigured Cross: A Study of Father Bishol Kamel" Coptic Church Review
230-2) 2002 p. 37
Hasan, Christians Versus Muslims in Modern Eavot p. 184
73GH Bebawi, "The Bishop in the Coptic Church Today" in Peter Moore (ed), Bishops But What Kind?
(London, SPCK, 1982) p. 74
174
175
176
Introduction
to sharemany of these concerns. While a significant proportion of this discussion will focus
on the period from 2000 until the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, his attitudes towards the
momentous developments in Lebanon since the assassinationof Hariri will also be explored.
This provides an opportunity to contrast the methods adopted by the church hierarchy in these
two periods to determine if changesin the political situation affect the role of the patriarch.
The involvement of a religious leader in national affairs has the potential to foster harmonious
communal relations and stability or alternatively could endangerthe fragile peace after the
civilwar.
In order to judge the effect that the political actions undertaken by Patriarch Sfeir
have had on Lebanon, the responseof the following groups will be examined: the Maronite
clergy and faithful, other Christian communities, politicians of all persuasions,government
final
The
different
Muslim
the
section will explore possible
communities.
officials and
in
future,
for
the
the
the
temporal
emphasising the significance of
patriarch
scenarios
role of
the personality of the patriarch in determining the outcome of such activities. Thus, this
institutions,
by
highlight
the spiritual
to
the
represented
religious
which
extent
chapter will
leader, can exercise political authority in a crisis of state environment in a region where the
in
been
have
the
experienced
a similar manner to the
not
process
effects of
secularization
West.
178
books
is
Sfeir
Patriarch
the
of
several
andtranslationson the
author
also
patriarchate).
Maronitefaith. His position asheadof the Catholiccommunitiesin Lebanonwas reinforced
in
Paul
1994
John
II
President
by
Pope
he
Cardinal
and
appointed
of the
a
when was made
SpecialAssemblyof the Synodof Bishopsfor Lebanononeyear later.
On his election, the patriarch was aware of the acute problems facing the Maronite
community. The setbacksexperiencedduring the civil war led to a crisis of identity - of
Both
long
been
had
the community and
faith
Maronite
core
element.
as
a
the
regarded
which
As
Patriarch
Sfeir
factions
divided
to
hierarchy
support.
was not the
over
what
church
were
immediately
he
Christian
dominant
this
time,
Forces,
Lebanese
the
group
at
the
candidate of
faced opposition to his policies. Once elected, he tried to continue reconciliation measures
indicated
he
his
letters,
his
his
Through
by
position on
pastoral
sponsored
predecessor.
179
Lebanon,
including
for
issues
the
opposition to
supporting
a
multicultural
unity,
several
need
Islamic theocratic rule and condemnation of both Israeli and Syrian intervention in Lebanon.4
He received religious representativesof other communities when possible including a meeting
5
in
he
Algeria
1987,
On
his
to
Sunni
the
met the
a visit
election.
with
mufti shortly after
leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) Yasser Arafat and later declared that
the Palestinian causewas "sacred'.P6 This diplomacy did not gain a favourable responsefrom
for
blamed
Palestinians
the outbreak
Maronite
the
the
community who still
many sections of
of violence in Lebanon.
After the mandate of President Amin Gemayel expired in 1988, the patriarch (with Vatican
invitation
from
Arab
League
be
held.
Receiving
to
for
the
to
an
elections
support), was eager
in
foster
heads
Lebanese
to
the
Kuwait
to
the
communities
order
to
of
other religious
go
meet
7
in
This
Christian
to
he
held
gain a
was
order
politicians.
with
a
summit
a peaceprocess,
by
betrayal
being
the
community
of
this
accused
of
to
mission and avoid
mandate undertake
participating in an Arab peaceinitiative.
8
Acknowledging
dialogue.
the grave situation
by
that Lebanon needed liberation
reason and
(the
National
Understanding
Taif
Document
1989
he
Christians,
the
of
the
supported
of
Accord) -a revision of the National Pact but one that sanctioned the presenceof the Syrian
it
in
legitimacy
Christian
to
doing
he
In
the
circles
allow
a
agreementenough
so, gave
army.
9
believed
that at this specific period,
Maronites,
Like
the
patriarch
some
chanceto succeed.
it was best to accept a pro-Syrian president and consequentSyrian influence in order to
his
However,
Lebanese
position contrastedwith many ordinary
the
state.
preserve
Maronites, especially the followers of General Aoun (the caretaker Prime Minister), whom
Patriarch Sfeir criticised for launching his War of Liberation in 1989. He believed that this
had
that
the
lead
the
patriarchate
always
to the partitioning of
country - an outcome
could
been against since the establishmentof the mandate. Incensed at the acquiescenceof their
180
181
support from the Vatican in their effort to ensureLebanon remained a refuge for Christians
and did not becomejust another Arab Muslim dominated state. Consequently, there was a
fundamental clash between the policies of the Vatican and the Maronite community.
According to Irani, many Maronites felt that "Lebanese Christians were being sacrificed on
13
Christian-Islamic
dialogue".
For example, President-Elect Bashir Gemayel
the altar of
stated that the Vatican must understandthat LebaneseChristians were not "guinea pigs" for
interfaith dialogue. 14 Vatican policy was perceived as out-of-touch with the actual situation
in Lebanon. This was highlighted by the meeting between the Pope and the Palestinian
leader Yasser Arafat only one day after the assassinationof Bashir Gemayel. Once the civil
instigated
it
to prove
that
Vatican
that
the
measures
were
was
vital
war was over,
recognised
to the disillusioned Maronite community that it could still representtheir interests.
Consequently, The Special Synod for Lebanon (1991-1995) was convened and stressedthe
join
It
in
Lebanon
together
for
to
to
Catholic
attain
spiritual
renewal.
all
communities
need
future
Christians
Muslims
Lebanese
Papal
the
the
one
where
work
and
vision of
outlined
together to rebuild their country. A quote from the Pope "Lebanon is more than a country:
Lebanon is a message"became the inspiration for many Lebanese- Christian and Muslim
15
"A
New
for
Exhortation
Hope
Lebanon"
Apostolic
followed
by
This
the
which
was
alike.
in
1997.
Apostolic
Lebanon
The
Exhortation
his
during
to
by
Pope
the
acts
visit
was signed
dialogue
its
Lebanon,
for
the
to
the
and
calling
mission
church,
situation of
as a guide
between the Christian churches, the Muslim communities and the need to work together for
national reconciliation.
16
The post-civil war era has also seenthe Maronite Church enact its own initiatives for church
had
for
Synod
Maronite
to
decades,
the
For
called
a
church
within
elements
renewal.
many
take account of the many changessince the last council in 1856. Writing in 1983, three years
before he was elected patriarch, the then Bishop Sfeir stated that in the past, councils had
182
183
184
185
Under Patriarch Sfeir, the church has rediscoveredits voice as the leader of the Maronite
community. However, it is unclear whether this has developed into temporal authority as in
the past. In the post-war era, the Maronite Church hasbeen consistentin its call for the full
implementation of the Taif Accord. The methodsused to achieve this aim have varied
depending on events in the country and the wider region. According to the rational choice
approach,these different strategiescan be seenas the most fruitful for each circumstance.
For most of the 1990s,the patriarch pursueda diplomatic approach;still speaking out against
injustice such as the electoral laws and supporting the 1992 opposition boycott, yet being
careful not to intentionally causeany controversy for the church or the community. The
views of the patriarch were given through the monthly communiqu6sof the Bishops'
meetings, sermonsand messagesat feast times. For example, several sermonsin 1992
concentratedon Christian concernsregarding the Taif Accord, in particular, the electoral
conditions explained in ChapterThree which were seento disenfranchiseopposition voters
(many of whom were Christian).26 This diplomatic approachcan be explained by the relative
weaknessof the Maronite community in the immediate post-war period and the eagernessof
ordinary Lebanesecitizens to avoid any return to the years of conflict that was still a fresh
memory.
However by 2000, the political commentsby the patriarch had becomemore pronounced.
This changecan be attributed partly due to the deteriorating economic situation and the failure
from
South
Israeli
The
Taif
implement
the
ten
to
withdrawal
after
provisions.
of
years
many
Lebanon in May 2000 acted as a catalyst for opposition activists to increasetheir campaign
againstSyrian influence in Lebanon. Hence, the church hierarchy was keen to avoid being
186
ruling).
being
instead
the
considered,the authoritiesactuallyreacted
that
concerns
of
which stated
had
initiatives.
It
dialogue
that
the
also
acknowledged
people
was
againstany consequent
29
hierarchy
demands.
From
the start
their
the
the
thus,
reiterated
church
supported appealand
have
become
the
communiqu6s,
these
especially
and
of
appeals,patriarchalmessages
However,
thesearenot addressed
than
at the
ones.
previous
substantiallymorepoliticised
expenseof exclusivechurchandspiritualmatters.
The patriarchandthe Maronitehierarchyhaveissuednumerousstatementson the political
influence
in
Syrian
Lebanon.
The
focused
in
In
these
Lebanon.
on
particular,
situation
in
Syrian
the
for
troops
always
placed
contextof
the
were
of
withdrawal
repeatedcalls
bishops
The
in
Taif
Accord.
the
rejectedthe notion that the
regainingsovereigntyasoutlined
Syrianpresencewas necessaryto ensurestability in Lebanon. "When peoplesay"it's either
187
the Syrian army or chaos", it is an argument that simply does not stand up". 30 This campaign
enjoyed limited successwith the gradual redeployment of troops from Greater Beirut, Mount
Lebanon and the North since June 2001. However, many Syrian troops remained in the
Beqaa region and it was not until the developmentsset in motion by the assassinationof
Hariri in 2005 that a complete withdrawal took place. Syrian political influence over
Lebanon was also identified by the bishops as eroding the distinct characteristics of Lebanon.
"Lebanon is vanishing little by little, losing its identity; its peculiarities, the constitutional
institutions and even its entity". 31 Patriarch Sfeir has remained adamant that historically
Lebanon was and should continue to be, an independent country. The hierarchy acceptsthat
the two countries should be close but not at the expenseof sovereignty. Therefore, they are
consistent in their calls for the full implementation of the Taif Accord in order to achieve
these aims. In one communiqu6, the bishops asked for the help of God, "we ask him to
hatred,
from
hearts
grudge
and
unite our ranks for our own good
restore our affairs, clean our
its
the
the
of
proper conditions, especially its dignity as a
recovery
and
glory of our country,
32
independence,
free
decision".
Syria
its
identity
having
sovereignty
and
enjoying
state
own
is indirectly blamed for the problems faced by Lebanon. Speaking in May 2004, Patriarch
Sfeir said that "The fact that this country cannot operate safely without foreign assistance
33
interference".
be
blamed
should
specifically on ....... outside
Regarding the scheduled 2004 Presidential elections which were postponed in favour of an
bishops
has
become
Lahoud,
for
"It
President
the
the
stated,
extension of
existing mandate
known that the Lebanesedo not have the last say in the presidential elections and a lot of
them have started to see it as a natural thing ...... which indicates a reduced senseof dignity
and an absenceof national Will99.34In a sermon, the patriarch stated that the amendment
"would destroy, once and for all, the little democracy that we pride ourselves on" 35 At the
.
time, he voiced his concerns about the impact of the extension. Due to international
188
189
Once a caretaker government was in place in April 2005, the patriarch turned his attention
to the electoral system. Political participation had long been a subject addressedby the
patriarch. Throughout the Taif era, he encouragedLebaneseto take part in elections as part
of their democratic duty. However, this did not deter criticism of government conduct during
elections. Concerning the 2000 parliamentary elections which were deemed to be relatively
fair on the actual election days, the bishops statedthat "The results of the elections were
known by the time election day arrived". 39 In the tense atmospherefrom September2004
onwards, the bishops demandedinternational monitoring for the 2005 elections in order to
prevent yet another rigged electoral law and reiterated their support for an electoral system
based on small districts (known as the qada system).40 In contrast to the existing system
where constituencies were drawn to favour particular groups or individuals, the qada system
(as explained in Chapter Three) was perceived to allow a greater number of votes to directly
affect the election result. The retention of the previous electoral system for the first elections
free of Syrian dominance was met with bitter disappointment, echoing the general sentiments
of the Maronite community. In an emergencymeeting, the bishops stated that this electoral
law contradicted the Taif Accord and would lead to a negative reaction from Christians who
would be justified in thinking that little had changed. As before, Christians would not be
41
to
able elect their preferred representatives. Although they refrained from advocating a
boycott, this issue has constantly been referred to in subsequentstatements.
The patriarch has also become attentive to the controversy over the presidency. As stated
earlier, there was a clear condemnation of the constitutional amendment which extended the
term of President Lahoud. However, once this law was passed,his position was accepted albeit grudgingly - as a fait accompli. The policy of the patriarch has been to stressthe
importance of the institution of the presidency. During the time of the street protests in
March 2005, the patriarch made it known to the opposition that he was not in favour of
190
that they should work within the constitution as the removal from power of all tile previous
42
Again when
clamours for the ousting of Lahoud grew as the release of the Melifis report drew near,
Patriarch Sfeir made his position clear. In the Annual Maronite Bishops Declaration released
in September 2005, the bishops demanded that Lebanese citizens stopped attacking tile
43
institution
by
halo
be
"surrounded
The
presidency - an
a
of respect".
which should
but
October
2005
Mehlis
the
stated that some elements
released
patriarch welcomed
report
in
needed to be clarified.
like other pro-Syrian officials, was in some way, party to the developments which led to tile
assassination of Hariri.
The patriarch's protection of the presidency must be examined in the context ofthe
confessional system. Ever since the institution was established in tile mandate era, it has
been recognised as a Maronite post. Thus, Patriarch Sfeir has endeavoured to ensure that this
accessto power will remain. He has been careful to clarify that the issue of the presidency
affects all Lebanese not just the Christians and has discouraged any n1ovcs that could be
interpreted as one sect (the Maronites) determining tile identify of the next president (head of'
the entire Lebanese state). To this end, he refused to sponsor any meetings ofChristian
politicians at Bkerke to discuss these issues and publicly at least, will not nominate one
44
This illustrates the desire of the patriarch to remain above party politics.
candidate.
Instead, he has kept close relations with leading figures and potential rivals e.g. Michel AOU11
and Samir Geagea. Consequently, he would appear to wish that the fate of President Lahoud
be deten-nined by the political situation of the country rather than pre-eniptcd by others Nvho
may be acting in their own interests rather than those of the country as a whole.
191
This issueof self-interesthasbecomea key concernto the patriarch. With the departureof
Syriantroopsandthe electionof a new government,manyhad hopedthat this would leadto a
new era in Lebanon. Yet the immediateperiod sincethe electionsin Junedoesnot appearto
havefulfilled this hope. Political actorsfrom all confessionalgroupsareaccusedof
furtheringtheir own interestsat the expenseof nationalunity andreconciliation. Although
the vast majority of Lebaneseagreedthat a new governmentneededto be formedinstantly
after the elections,disputesover the allocationof certainpostsmeantthat the countrywas
without a cabinetfor over onemonth. The hierarchyvoicedconcernat this "rush" to secure
positionsaccordingto confessionalstatus. "Bickering betweenpolitical partiesandblocs
insideParliamentincreasestensionswhile a true refon-nneedsthe achievementof national
45
accordandreconciliation". In the AnnualDeclarationand subsequentstatements,the
bishopshavedespairedof the inability andperhapsunwillingnessof the politiciansto
implementpromisedreforms. Thepatriarchhasconstantlystatedthat any true relationship
betweenthe govcrnmentandthe peoplemustbe basedon truth andintegrity. Yet, to his
dismay,the primary aim of political actorsstill seemsto be the protectionof their own
interests.
The patriarchhasbeenparticularlyscathingof Christiandisunity. He ascribedthe weak
inherent
in
Lebanon
factionalism
to
the
Maronite
the
post-war
community
position of
Christian
leaders
(Michel
Aoun
With
during
the
the
of
populist
return
civil
war.
experienced
from exile and SamirGeageafrom prison),therewas initial hopethat Christianswould be
first
the
full
to
to
republic. Yet, the Christian
under
able return
participationenjoyed
including
Several
Geagea's
2005
divided
the
groups
elections.
at
communitywas sorely
LebaneseForcesallied with the recognisedoppositionled by SaadHariri andWalid Jumblatt.
However,oppositionnegotiationswith Aoun's FreePatrioticMovementcould not reachan
Aoun
districts,
Michel
Zahle
Murr, a
in
Lebanon
Mount
Thus,
the
allied
with
and
agreement.
192
key figure in the previous pro-Syrian regime and defeated several Christian opposition
46
In responseto this lack of unity, Patriarch Sfeir lambastedthe "chaos prevailing
politicians.
47
issue,
his
Christian
As
the
concerning
presidency
approach
within
cautious
ranks".
with
this can be seen as a warning to the Christian leaders that disunity could lead to a loss of their
political status and power.
The Maronite bishops have also addressedsecurity issues. Under the pro-Syrian regime,
the erosion of freedom and lack of respect for human rights in Lebanon was a key concern.
Stressing the history and identity of Lebanon, they argued "What worth is Lebanon without
freedom?' 9.48 The patriarch continually called for the release of political prisoners -f rom all
49
has
been
Geagea.
Patriarch
Sfeir
Samir
just
individuals
also
as
such
communities not
outspoken about the use of repression againstprotestors and opposition activists. During the
Murr affair in 2002 when Gabriel Murr an opposition politician, was removed from his seat
bishops
"measures
being
that
his
taken to
the
television
stated
are
and
station was closed,
50
free
speech". The patriarch has
silence every free voice, although the constitution secures
if
it
double
he
been
highlight
standards
could potentially
to
even
as
perceives
what
not
afraid
aggravatethe religious divide e.g. the unequal treatment of protestors. With the changes that
have occurred in 2005, new concernshave been added to their list, most notably insecurity
due to a series of bomb attacks. On the whole, these have targeted Christians, whether aimed
Unsurprisingly,
developments
individuals
these
areas.
at specific
or residential/shopping
have led to general uneaseand feelings of vulnerability, affecting not just Christians but all
Lebanese. The responseof the patriarch has been to focus on the inability of the government
to prevent these attacks and discover the identity of the perpetuators. He has restated his
belief that the priority of the political elite must be to restore confidence in the government,
which must involve tackling security concerns.
193
1
willingnessto conductcelebrationsasa nationalnot confessionalvictory. Similarly, the
bishopswelcomedthe successfulnegotiationsbetweenHizb'allah andIsrael in 2004which
resultedin the releaseof someLebaneseprisoners. However,they alsousesuchoccasionsto
stressthat theseactionsaffect all Lebanesenotjust oneconfession. Thus,the hierarchytook
the opportunityof the aboveprisonerreleaseto reiteratea demandthat the Lebaneseand
Syriangovernmentsinvestigatecasesof peoplemissingsincethe civil war era.52 This
Syrian
This
has
troops.
has
the
of
period
alsowitnessed
withdrawal
message continuedsince
demonstrations
During
Hizb'allah.
the
tense
towards
period
of
street
morecritical statements
in
fully
Sfeir
Hizb'allah
Patriarch
to
the
Hariri,
the
urged
participate
after
assassination
of
Lebanesepolitical systemandhelp solveproblemsaffectingall Lebaneseratherthan dwelling
demonstrations
by
in
issue.
Syrian
This
the
the
of
counter
organised
context
on
was
53
for
Hizb'allah which rallied support the pro-Syrianstatusquo at that time. The Annual
BishopsDeclarationof September2005indirectly calledfor the disarmamentof Hizb'allah as
is
international
is
the
It
that
the
aware
of
climate
patriarch
clear
a constitutionalrequirement.
United
Nations
Western
from
the
that the remit of
the
states
and
constant
calls
powerful
and
the LebaneseArmy shouldextendto the entirestateandconsequently,result in the
disarmamentof any remainingmilitias. Again, this illustratesthat the political strategy
pursuedby the patriarchis highly dependenton the political situationencounteredat a
specifictime.
194
195
Maronites during the civil war, just as occurred in other communities but urges all groups to
look to the future together. "It is time for us to be conscious of and learn from our mistakes,
57
it
disintegrates".
many
before
for
to unite in order to seek the right solutions
our country
Lebanon
Church
Maronite
have
been
the
that
as a
perceives
made
stressing
public statements
living example of Christian-Muslim dialogue and coexistence. "Lebanon is the nation of
58
Christian
Islamic
it
is
freedoms and of religious diversity
the country of
coexistence".
and
...
Similarly, "Even if there have been ups and downs in the history of relations between
Christians and Muslims, Lebanon can and must be an example of how well Muslims and
Christians can live together". 59 The patriarch clearly believes that conviviality has always
intervention
in
Lebanon
receded.
outside
once
and would continue
existed
The new government formed in July 2005 was welcomed by the patriarch as a first step
towards national reconciliation. Its multiparty formation was perceived as positive as
first
including
for
in
the
the
different
cabinet,
groups participated
representativesof many
time, a ministerial portfolio for Hizb'allah.
196
different governing systems. Desperateto retain their active participation in the Lebanese
state, they are against any changeswhich would hinder their position.
To gain Christian support for deconfessionalism,the Lebaneseauthorities would have to
implement a widespread secularization processin an attempt to confine religious identity to
the private sphere only. Considering the history of the Lebanesestate and the general failure
of the secularization process in the Middle East to replicate its successin the West in
relegating religion to the private sphere,this would appearto be an unlikely development.
Without this process, Christians would regard the abolition of the confessional system as
influence
decisions
to
them
the
that
significantly
on Lebanese
removing
allow
safeguards
national affairs. Instead, the Muslim majority population would be able to exercise political
power without any institutionaliscd measuresto ensure consultation with other groups.
Patriarch Sfeir is also clearly aware of the xegional environment that is the reality for the
Maronite community. He has repeatedly condemned frequent violence in the Holy Land and
Iraq. The patriarch reiterated the anti-war stanceof the Pope regarding Iraq. This reflects
the attentivenessof the patriarch to Christian fears that Middle East Christians could become
in
Land
Iraq.
Holy
due
the
Muslim
the
to
cycle
of
violence
and
continual
at
anger
scapegoats
Instead, the patriarch has stressedthat the unity between the different communities illustrates
that a clash of cultures or religions does not exist in Lebanon but instead all can live together
61
peacefully.
The political activities of the patriarch are not solely restricted to issuing public statements.
He has also used his position to tackle a long-running problem amongst the Christian
in
Taif
lack
the
Asa
the
to
political
representation
genuine
of
response
community- unity.
Qomet
Shehwan
Gathering).
(The
helped
called
the
create a political grouping
era,
patriarch
This group is named after the monastery where it held its first meeting in April 2001. The
impetus for its formation came from the 2000 communiqu6 calling for the withdrawal of
197
Syrian troops. As the September2001 statementnoted, "The knots in the tongues were
62
Deploring
began
to voice their convictions, albeit with caution" .
untied, and people
Maronite disunity that had harmed the community so greatly especially during the last years
of the civil war, the patriarch was eager to encouragethe opposition to unite not just within
Maronite and Christian circles but also to expand to include other communities. As the
leader of the entire Maronite community, Patriarch Sfeir could not be associatedexclusively
with one faction. Instead, a bishop was initially chosento chair the group and acted as the
representativeof the patriarch.
While the patriarch played an instrumental role in creating the conditions for the
"patriarch's
the
Qornet
Shehwan,
the
was
not
perceived
as
political
group
establishment of
involved
in
is
being
Instead,
in
the
the
the
actively
politics.
opposite
party"
patriarch
senseof
true. Qornet Shchwan was formed to take the ideas of the hierarchy into the political arena
in
be
directly
involved
its
believes
the
because
cannot
the
representatives
precisely
church
lost
hierarchy
ideas
Once
the
the
their
political
process,
entered
actual political system.
into
fit
by
the
the
to
because
politicians
political
them
they
adapted
often
were
control of
Christian
leaders
that
they
the
Furthermore,
the
are
against
community
state
church
reality.
forming one monolithic political bloC.63 Firstly, this would encouragefurther division in
Lebanon along confessional lines and hinder attempts to develop cross-communal alliances.
Secondly, they also believe that the Christian community, like all groups, has diverse views
is
be
heard.
They
be
that
this
to
the
that
these
stress
one of the
opportunity
and
should
given
Qornet
Shehwan
is
The
to
democratic
features
of
role
enable
system.
political
main
a
of
different political movements and individuals to work together to express common principles.
Qornet Shehwan can be categorised as an umbrella group of various politicians rather than a
in
former
from
Its
participants
pro-Syrian
vary
members
cohesive organised political party.
governments, those who adopted a policy of soft criticism and others who were more
198
aggressivein their criticism of Syrian influence in Lebanon. It appearsthat the only issue
which united them was what they stood against - the Syrian presence. Even their means to
oppose this differed greatly. Consequently, Qomet Shehwan cannot be viewed as an
alternative government but instead a loose coalition of individuals. While the group includes
non-Maronites, there has been little successin reaching out to Muslim politicians.
The record of Qomet Shehwan can be regarded as mixed. It has been successful in gaining
publicity and making its views known - probably benefiting from its association with the
patriarchate. However, it has also been beset with internal divisions. Their poor results in
the 2004 municipal elections exposeddisunity as they failed to organise effective alliances
Furthermore,
to
their
thus
as
a
appeal
national
opposition.
ability
with other groups,
affecting
has
been
Qomet
Shehwan
between
tested. Qomet
the
also
and
co-ordination
patriarch
Shehwan regarded the 2002 Metn by-election as an opportunity to confront the regime.
Hence, they chose to support one of their members Gabriel Murr. The situation became
extremely tense as he was running against the daughter of one of the most pro-Syrian
be
his
happened
brother.
Hence,
Patriarch
to
Minister,
former
Interior
the
who
politicians,
Sfeir regarded the contest as a family feud and acceptedthe compromise candidate for the
disputed Greek Orthodox seat- the nephew of the deceasedincumbent.64 The successof
Gabriel Murr, although short-lived, illustrated not only the strength of support Qomet
Shehwan could attract when united, but also highlighted that the patriarch could not exercise
temporal authority in the same manner as enjoyed by his predecessors. His wish to field only
Qomet
Shehwan.
By
2004,
by
there
of
members
most
one candidate was not respected
Qomet
The
Shehwan.
between
Bkerke
have
been
and
to
a rapprochement
appeared
Lahoud
Emile
the
to
allowed
group
unite with
the
of
mandate
extension of
presidential
Bkerke in their opposition to this development. Qomet Shehwan statementsand meetings
199
200
In publicising their views on national matters, the Maronite hierarchy is aware that they are
open to criticism. As has been seen,the use of the Council of Bishops to relay these opinions
to the public indicates collective responsibility among the clergy. However, they accept that
naturally, "The Patriarch is the reference point of the Church, its father and its head".65 Thus,
the patriarch statesthat his role as head and father of the community means that he must
defend his people. Like all spiritual chiefs, he is obliged to take positions on issues such as
freedom, justice and human rights.
66
of the rights of human beings and their dignity; a defense of freedoms and a warning against
67
independence
free
for
homeland".
the
selfish passions; a call
and
choice of the
sovereignty,
Patriarch Sfeir also defends his right to speak out on issuesconcerning Lebanon as his
patriotic duty and denied any external interference in these positions. In answer to
accusationsthat he is acting on behalf of foreign interests, he statesthat, 'Tcoplc say one day
it is Rome, the next that it's the United States,or even Israel behind our statement,but we
don't need anyone's permission not even the president's - to expressour opinion on the
future of the country" 68
.
In general, the responseof the Maronite community and some other Christians, has been
favourable towards this proactive church role. The majority accept that due to the absenceof
genuine representative Christian civil leaders,the patriarch is attempting to fill this vacuum.
The fact that Patriarch Sfeir evidently has few personal political ambitions also attributes to
their willingness to accept his involvement. The patriarch insists on providing general
principles only rather than intricate detailed programmes. One Qornet Shehwan member
201
described this as giving the "headlines" of the problems facing Lebanon and how they should
be resolved 69 He is also perceived as one of the few Lebanese figures whose political
.
discourse has been consistent in the post-war era, always calling for the full implementation
of the Taif Accord. Furthermore, the history of the Maronite Church ensuresthat in times of
crisis, the community expects the patriarch to defend their rights. Consequently, people treat
him as an influential figure by telling him their grievances in expectation of finding a
solution, handing over petitions to him and holding rallies at Bkerke. The extent of support
that the patriarch attracts is illustrated by the large turnout of followers (numbering into
thousands) during patriarchal visits or on his return from trips abroad. Few other Christian
leaders could muster such support. A press releaseby the International Maronite Foundation
provides a concise summary of the general consensusamong the Maronite community
regarding the role of the patriarch.
"He has the moral duty to set forth his thoughts as well as the collective
thoughts of the bishops of his church on the circumstances and
inalienable
further
has
He
his
the
impact
that
right
people.
conditions
to speak out to redressconditions of wrong that he seesin his
jurisdiction.
While it is true that few Maronites consider this political role of their church to be an ideal
leadership
is
in
Maronite
that
the
secular
a position to represent
situation, many accept
until
the community, a politically active church is the best option available. Christian opposition
by
Lebanese
that
the
stress
when
political
self-interest,
motivated
politicians, perhapspartly
hierarchy
functioning
fully
becomes
the
should return to concentrating on
more,
once
system
Aoun's
Free
Patriotic
Movement
One
duties.
the
groups
opposition
of
main
pastoral
Syrian
influence
during
but urged
influential
the
the
the
years
of
patriarch
role of
recognised
202
him to use his position wisely and to constantly denounce the situation in Lebanon."
Yet
others feel that Patriarch Sfeir should be less politically active becausethey are against the
involvement of any religious officials - whether Christian or Muslim - in the political system.
This argument is particularly used by some politicians who are distrustful of the participation
of Hizb'allah (an Islamist party which has several members of the ulema as party activists and
leaders) in the electoral system. They fear that the political role of the Maronite patriarch is
72
involvement
in
direct
justify
their
political parties.
used by groups such as Hizb'allah to
The reaction of other communities has mostly been favourable. As has been seen,the
Maronite patriarchate has generally been well-respected - some even go so far as to call the
head of the Maronite church the Patriarch of Lebanon. Thus, Patriarch Sfeir hears the
73
As
but
just
Maronites
of
other
communities.
many of the
members
also
grievances of not
benefiting
Lebanese,
by
all
as
especially concerning
the
taken
stances
patriarch are regarded
his
The
defuse
helps
to
conflict
over
role.
absenceof
this
confessional
economic matters,
his
in
disregarded
by
factor
is
that
language
views
ensuring
are
not
another
emotive sectarian
desires
independent
he
is
that
to
It
a
sovereign
and
all
clear
other confessional groups.
Lebanon. Unlike many Christian political leaders,he is able to articulate these views without
necessarily being perceived as anti-Syrian or anti-Arab.
However, the communiqu6s calling for the withdrawal of the Syrian presencedid result in a
predictable inflammatory responseand the polarization of public opinion along confessional
lines. Several influential ulema (Muslim clerics) warned of the danger in blaming Syria for
74
Lebanon.
Ajoint
Lebanon's problems stressingthat Syria guaranteedthe security of
Qabalan
Council
Sheikh
Abdel-Amir
Shiite
Higher
President
by
Vice
the
and
of
statement the
Sunni Grand Mufti Sheikh Mohammed Rashid Qabbani, expressedtheir surprise at the
declaration and emphasisedthe sacrifices that Syria had made to ensure the survival of
Lebanon.75 At the time, Sheikh HassanNasrallah, Secretary-Generalof Hizb'allah, stressed
203
204
increased at the expenseof efforts towards national reconciliation, thus damaging attempts at
co-operation between the main religious leaders.
In general, the government response(up to February 2005) to the political activities of
Patriarch Sfeir was a combination of countermoves, exploiting divisions and working towards
improving relations with Bkerke. Reacting to the communiqu6s regarding the Syrian
withdrawal, President Lahoud accusedthe bishops of provoking "confessional, sectarian
instincts which do not serve the nation's highest interests".80 The Maronites were also
reminded by pro-Syrian figures that Syria had actually entered Lebanon in 1976 to save the
Christians.81 Reconciliation initiatives between the Lebanesecommunities were obstructed
immediately
Christian
150
than
the
opposition
activists,
mostly
such as
arrest of more
following the visit of the patriarch to the Chouf 82 The government tried to exploit divisions
within the opposition by advocating good relations with Bkerke while targeting activists from
Patriotic
Movement.
Free
Thus,
Forces
the
Lebanese
the
some prisoners
and
groups such as
were releasedfrom Syrian jails in December 2000 as the result of mediation by the Speaker of
83
hierarchy.
Parliament Nabih Berri, in an effort to appeasethe
The recognised influence and importance of the patriarchate ensuredthat government
figures endeavouredto get close to the hierarchy in order to gain credibility and popularity.
Thus, the patriarch was "consulted" by the authorities, in the sensethat he was often one of
the first figures to be informed of major decisions. In particular, meetings between the
increased
during
times of crisis.
ministers
patriarch and government
Easter 2004, Patriarch Sfeir received separatevisits from President Lahoud and Prime
Minister Hariri
84
This can be seenin the context of the debate regarding the presidential
According
Star,
2004.
771e
Daily
"Both
November
for
to
elections which were scheduled
figure
ties
that
such
an
close
with
eminent
national
and a
maintaining
men seemedconvinced
prominent Christian authority - who furthermore enjoys the support and respect of Damascus
205
be
beneficial
images
legitimacy
for
to
their
could
only
their
own
and
would
provide
more
85
political stands". This rapprochement,especially between Bkerke and Damascus, can be
understood in the context of increasingly tense United States-Syrian relations at this time.
Analysts suggestedthat the Syrian government was keen to maintain favourable relations with
Bkerke becausethe patriarch was perceived as one of the few leaders who could dampen antiSyrian rhetoric among some LebaneseChristians. For example, The Daily Star suggested
that by February 2004, such meetings were used by Damascus to illustrate that "this particular
sword of theirs had been temporarily changedinto a ploughshare in appreciation for the
patriarch's understanding in recent months while Syria faced the discomfort of US forces on
its border". 86
Certainly, in early 2004, there were fewer calls for Lebanesesovereignty in some
detail
in
in
Chapter
Six,
kept
be
As
the
greater
patriarch
also
explored
communiqu6s.
will
his distance from opposition groups which successfully lobbied the United States Congress to
Sovereignty
Restoration Act. One part of this
Lebanese
Syrian
Accountability
the
and
pass
law related to the Syrian presencein Lebanon calling for an immediate withdrawal to allow
the Lebaneseto recover their sovereignty and independence. While this aim was supported
by many Lebanese(not just Christians), few residing in Lebanon were willing to openly voice
their support as they were aware of the hostility towards US policies in the region. Support
for measureswhich involve foreign intervention could have been interpreted by some
Lebaneseas an indication of the lack of Christian loyalty to the country. Due to the
fragmented Lebanesesociety, there is always danger that any deterioration in communal
illustrates
that the overriding concern of the
Again,
lead
this
to
relations could
unrest.
his
for
dealing
his
is
that
strategies
the
with the state are
and
community
of
security
patriarch
dependenton the political climate. However, the hierarchy were quick to assertthat they had
206
207
civil war. Finally, the question of abolishing political sectarianism was raised again. As
Christians perceive that this would lead to the loss of their remaining political power, this
threat has been routinely used to halt overt Christian opposition to the political situation in
Lebanon.
The extension of the presidential mandate clearly dampened the apparent rapprochement
between Bkerke and Damascus and once more led to a change of political strategies by both
the patriarch and the government.
of Syrian troops
in April, there were periodic verbal attacks on the patriarch from groups which were regarded
as pro-Syrian.
of Beirut as well as Jbeil and Kesrouan praising the role of al-Assad, Lahoud and Hizb'allah
Shehwan
Qomet
to
the
candidates.
reject
and warning
people
"Conspiracies are being cooked in the kitchen of the Qomet Shchwan Gathering by their
leader Patriarch Sfeif" while the leaflet later accused anyone associated with Qomct Shchwan
89
in
first
direct
Similarly,
being
the
American/Israeli
the patriarch, a
attack
on
agent
of
an
.
in
before
February,
in
Lebanon
from
the assassinationof
Ba'th
Party
shortly
the
statement
Hariri, claimed that Patriarch Sfeir took "direct orders from the French and American
90
embassies". These accusationswere used in a desperateattempt to prevent the notoriously
divided anti-Syrian opposition overcoming their mutual suspicions. By questioning the
loyalty of the patriarch, this was calculated to reopen traditional Muslim fears that Lebanese
Christians would seek foreign intervention to securetheir predominance at the expenseof
Muslim political participation as has occurred several times in the past.
Consequently, these measuresdemonstratethe extent of recognition given by both
influence
in
Maronite
to
the
as
a
significant
patriarch
position of
supporters and critics
Lebanesenational affairs. This has continued under the new Lebanesegovernment.
Throughout the crucial developmentsof 2005, the patriarch has been visited by many political
208
actorsandkept informedof events. For example,on his return from abroad,SaadHariri met
with the patriarch. Politiciansof all persuasionsstill flock to be seenat Bkerke. While the
patriarchis naturally associatedwith the anti-Syrianopposition,to a certainextent,he has
tried to project the imageof beinga nationalleaderandthe voice of the peopleratherthan
representinga particulargroup. Thus,the patriarchateis opento all representatives
of the
Lebanesepeople. Similarly, the patriarchrefutesaccusationsthat dueto his political views,
he disenfranchises
a sectionof the Maronitecommunitywhich identifiesitself with a proSyrianposition. It is clearfrom this discussionthat regardlessof the sometimeshostile
reactionto his involvementin nationalaffairs,the patriarchbelievesthat it is his duty to
provide guidancenotjust for Maronitesbut all Lebanese. However,the strategiespursuedby
the patriarchto achievethis do appearto differ accordingto the changesin the Lebanese
political scene.
The Consequencesof the Political Role of the Patriarch and Future Prospects
209
Lebanesewho wished to seesubstantial changes. Aware that there were relatively few
immediate threats to the security of the Christian community at this time, the demands in the
communiqu6s became more blunt towards the Syrian presence. These were tempered during
2004 when deteriorating relations between the United Statesand Syria led the church leaders
to believe that more would be gained by demonstrating their independencefrom unpopular
Western policies. However, recognising that the Western powers were intent on forcing
Syria to reconsider its involvement in Lebaneseaffairs, the political strategy of the Maronite
church once more focused on securing independence.
Yet regardless of the different approachesfollowed by the church, the announcementshave
had little impact on the realities of the Lebanesepolitical situation. The redeployment of
some Syrian troops from 2001 onwards can be viewed as a concession to the demandsof the
patriarch. Further measureswere rare and can be considered rewards for good behaviour. It
took renewed international interest in the Syrian presencein Lebanon and the momentous
force
Hariri
by
to
the withdrawal of Syrian troops and offer
the
events started
assassinationof
the Lebanese another opportunity to regain sovereignty. While Patriarch Sfeir can certainly
take credit for remaining an often lonely voice in the wilderness calling for the recovery of
independence,it is clear that his role was restricted to rhetoric rather than action. Yet, this
his
his
Sfeir
Reliant
highlights
Patriarch
to
that
the
ascribes
offlice.
on
moral
actually
role
issue
draw
to
Sfeir
Patriarch
a
specific
attention
and reiterate his
authority alone,
can only
demands. Lacking the ability and willingness to force the government and others to fulfil his
demands,the patriarch will continue to be a spokespersonfor the Lebaneserather than a
his
interprets
leader
Sfeir
is
Patriarch
It
that
role
as
of the community
political activist.
clear
leaders
fill
he
the
that
until
credible
civil
vacuum
emerge.
political
present
as meaning
must
Thus, the patriarchate is unlikely to revert to the type of temporal authority enjoyed in the past
by his predecessors.
210
211
The political role of the patriarchis likely to be affectedby the changesthat haveoccurred
in Lebanonafter February2005. The withdrawalof Syrian forcesanddeclineof its influence
seemedunlikely evenafter the UN Resolution1559waspassed. However,the processsetin
motion by Hariri's deathled to a rapid upheavalof the statusquo. This thesishasproposed
that PatriarchSfeir becamean outspokenfigure in Lebanesepolitics in order to fill the
leadershipvacuumleft vacantby the deepsplits amongstthe Maroniteelite. The 2005
parliamentaryelectionswerethe first in the Taif erawhich werenot held underSyrian
tutelage. This declinein Syrianinfluencewould be expectedto leadto the emergenceof
included
figures.
Christian
The
representatives
of different
otherpolitical
politicians
elected
factionssuchasthe LebaneseForces,FreePatrioticMovementandQornetShehwan. With
the return of Michel Aoun andthe releaseof SamirGeagea,the Christiancommunitynow has
two credibleleaderswho enjoypopularsupport,especiallyamongstMaronites. The success
of Aoun in the Mount Lebanondistrict at the expenseof the mainstreamChristianopposition
demonstratedthat he is regardedasthe voice of the Christianstreet. His insistencethat his
his
by
is
support
appealingto membersof
also
enlarge
party a non-sectariangroupingcould
is
It
based
on
communal
affiliation.
clearthat Aoun
solely
otherconfessionsweary of parties
Lahoud. After being
would be willing to presenthimself asa candidateto replace/succeed
has
from
Geagea
from
in
2005,
July
publicly
aloof
political events.
remained
released
prison
However,it is apparentthat he still enjoysa substantialfollowing andwould be expectedto
be a naturalrival to Aoun. The strengthof his supportwas illustratedin June2005when his
wife was electedto parliamentunopposed.
It would be expectedthat the reintroductionof thesepolitical actorswould impact
Maronites.
The
the
the
the
the
of
community
as
representative
patriarch
negativelyon
role of
leaving
leadership,
the churchto reflect on spiritual
"secular"
be
to
to
would able return
hostility
by
be
it
the patriarchas
If
with
greeted
this
affairs.
occurred, would not necessarily
212
213
conditions still exist and consequently in this enviromnent, the political role of the patriarch is
likely to remain constant.
summ4a
214
215
CV of H.B. Cardinal Sfeir Maronite Patriarch of Antioch and All The East
www. bkerke.or-q.lb/Sfeirl e.html
Raymond G Helmick, "Internal Lebanese Politics : The Lebanese Front and Forces" In Halim
Barakat (ed), Toward a Viable Lebanon (London, Croom Helm, 1988) p. 313
3 Jean-Pierre Valognes, Vie et Mort des Chretiens d'Orient (Paris, Fayard, 1994) p. 388
4 Ibid p. 397
Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon (London, The Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1993)
p. 310
6 Valognes, Vie et Mort des Chretiens d'Orient p. 394
7 Ibid p. 398-9
8 Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon p. 577
9 Farid el Khazen, Prospects for Lebanon : Lebanon's First Postwar Parliamentarv Election 1992
An Imposed Choice (Oxford, Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1998) p. 13
10 Valognes, Vie et Mort des Chretiens d'Orient p. 399
11 Charles Winslow, Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society (London. Routledge, 1996)
p. 278
13 Ibid p. 118
14 Annie Laurent, "Le Dialogue Islamo-Chretien
au Liban a la Lumiere du Synode Special des
Eveques" in Marie-Therese Urvoy (ed), En Hommage au Pere Jacques Jomie (Paris, Editions du
Cerf, 2002) p. 311
Is Antoine Najm, "Envisioning a Formula for Living Together In Lebanon: In Light of the Apostolic
Exhortation" Journal of Maronite Studies 2(2) 1998
www. mari.orq/JMS/april98/Envisioninq a Formula.htm
16 Exhortation Apostolique Post-Synodale "Une Esperance Nouvelle pour le Liban" (Vatican, Librerla
Editrice Vaticana, 1997) p. 10
17 Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir Lent Message 2003
htm
maronitesvnod.
orq/Enalish/intro/l)at-letter.
www.
18 Interview with member of 2003 Maronite Synod, Beirut, April 2004
19 Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir Lent Message 2003
20 Final Communiqu6 of the First Session of the Patriarchal Synod 21 "t June 2003
htm
www. maronitesvnod. orq/Enqlish/sessionl/final-communique.
21 Ibid
22
Ibid
23The Daily Star "Lebanese monk among 6 granted sainthood" 17thMay 2004
24Ea-baki,"The Christian Communities and the Economic and Social Situation In Lebanon" p. 253
25Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir Lent Message 2003,
26Khazen, Prospects for Lebanon : Lebanon's First Postwar Parliamentary Election 1992 0.13
27Communiqu6 September 2000
httr)://www.geocities.com/Cal)itolHill/Parliament/2587/declaration.html
28Middle East International " Paths to Dialogue" 13'nOctober 2000 p. 15-16
Communiqu6 September 2001
enq.html
www. bkerke.or.q.lb/commsei)t2OO1
6uMiddle East Times "Maronite-Shilte divide over Syrian presence In Lebanon 13thOctober 2000
31 Communiqu6 September 2001
32Communiqu6 October 2002
www. bkerke.orq.lb/commoct2002enq.htmI
.
The Daily Star, "Sfeir blames Syria for problems" 6thMay 2004
34 Middle East Times "Maronite Patriarch calls on Syria to respect Lebanese sovereignty" 23d June
2000
1hAugust2004
35The Daily Star, "Harid holds talks
Sfeir
in
Diman"25
with
36 : Fh-e
Daily Star, "Sfeir concerned about international consequences of Lahoud's extension"
-Ur-September 2004
37The Dailv Sta "Chirac tells Sfeir France committed to 1559" 29th January 2005
,
.. The DailV Star, "Lahoud praises Hariri as Lebanese call for Syria to leave" 17'hFebruary 2005
39Communiqu6 September 2000
216
www. bkerke.orq.lb/commmay2003.enq.htmI
4'The Daily Star"After 10 years in jail, Geagea's supporters demand a full pardon" 22ndApril 2004
50
uniqu6 October 2002
51Communiqu6 June 2000
www. bkerke.orq.lb/commiuneenq.htmI
Communiqu6 February 2004
www. bkerke.orq.lb/commfeb2004enq.htmI
"'The DailV Star "Sfeir: Hizb'allah should stop rallies and Join political life" 14thMarch 2005
54The Daily Star "Bishop's Council: Elections not in Lebanese hands" e August 2004
Communiqu6 September 2002
www. bkerke.orq.fb/api)eal3.html
00Final Communiclu6 of the First Session of the Patriarchal Svnod 21't June 2003
57
uniqu6 September 2000
N The Daily Star "Crowds greet Lahoud on route to Diman" 2ndAugust2004
59
East Times "Maronite-Shiite divide over Syrian presence In Lebanon* 13thOctober 2000
60Kfid-dieEast Times "Lebanon patriarch urges national reconciliation" 10thAugust2001
61Communiqu6 March 2003
www. bkerke.orq.lb/commmarenq.htmI
Communiqud September 2001
63Interviews with members of the Maronite hierarchy, Lebanon, April 2004
64Middle East International "Byzantine Politics" 31't May 2002
65Final Communiclu6 of the First Session of the Patriarchal Synod 21't June 2003
"t' Interview, Patriarch Sfeir, Beirut April 2004
67Final Communiqu6 of the First Session of the Patriarchal Synod 21't June 2003
th
68 Middle East Times "Maronite-Shiite divide over Syrian presence in Lebanon" 13 October 2000
Interview with member of Qornet Shehwan, Beirut, April 2004
70International Maronite Foundation Press Release 25t October 2001
th
January 2004
htm
4
011025.
www. maronet.orq/news/release
71The Daily Sta "Aoun condemns Harirl, says media is spreading false rumors" 17'hApril 2004
,
Interviews with Christian politicians, Beirut, Lebanon, March-April 2004
73Labaki, "The Christian Communities and the Economic and Social Situation In Lebanon" p. 232
74Middle East Times "Maronite-Shiite divide over Srlan presence In Lebanon" 13,h October 2000
75Middle East International, "Paths to Dialogue" 13' October 2000
'5 Sami Moubayed, "Lebanon dodges bullets of another civil war" Washington Report on Middle Eas
Affairs 20(4) 2001 p. 21
lbid p. 21
7'3The Daily Star, "Bishops indicate support for disarmament- 9thSeptember 2005
79The Daily Star, "Leaders weigh in after Sfeir opposes new mandate" 24thAugust2004
"u BBC News, "Syria hits back at Lebanese bishops" 22ndSeptember 2000
th
81
In
Lebanon*
October 2000
Syrian
13
divide
East Times "Maronite-Shiite
presence
over
82-6-BCNews, Lebanon rounds up Christian opposition.8 thAugust 2001
83Middle East International, "The disappeared" 22d December 2000
a4The Daily Star, "Sfeir is a popular man to visit at Easter time* 15thApril 2004
50[bid
86The Dailv Star, "End of reign" in Beirut?" 14th February 2004
87Th--eDa-ilyStar, "Murr announces revocation of citizenship of up to 4000" 2 I't April 2004
88The Daily Star, "Syria's mention of Lebanese civil war draws criticism* II thOctober 2004
"" The DailV Star, "Anti Maronite Patriarch leaflets distributed" 7thJanuary 2005
217
Introduction
A study of the contemporary Middle Eastern Christian communities has to take into account
the issue of migration and the impact this has had on the respective churches. Although the
church hierarchies have tried to prevent this trend as it negatively affects the community left
in the Middle East, they have also sought to reinforce their authority among the faithful in
their new places of residence. Due to this expansion, the churches in the Middle East can
now be perceived as global "universal" churches. This chapter commences with a general
homeland
host.
in
diaspora
the
the
to
and
model of
relation
activity
The discussion turns to the validity of religious diasporas arguing that the theories
into
insight
Firstly,
the
the
in
Chapter
One
role
of
church
abroad.
encountered
can provide
the fruits of the globalization process,namely communications technology and transport
advanceshave allowed the church hierarchy in the Middle East to retain close links with the
is
distance
in
diaspora,
that
the
no longer an impediment to church
communities
proving
authority. Secondly, as the migrants are leaving a society where religion retains social and
political influence, it is likely that they will try to replicate these relations. Thirdly, aspects
leaders
bridge
between the
that
the
can
act
thesis
as
a
church
of
suggest
secularization
traditional culture of migrants and their new society. Religious institutions are usually one of
the first communal groups to be establishedand help the newcomers to settle into a different
influence
is
has
likely to decline. Finally,
integration
this
However,
occurred,
country.
once
in
if
the new countries remains the
that
the
church
a rational choice approach would presume
actor best placed to provide the services required by migrants, it will survive challenges to its
218
The term diaspora comes from the Greek diaspeiro meaning to sow or scatter from one end
1
toanother. Historically, it related to three distinct groups -the Jews, Greeks and
Armenians. Recently, there has been substantial interest in the notion of diaspora. Esman
has
from
to
"generalized
to
has
been
any
population
migrated
which
that
term
refer
the
states
its country of origin and settled in a foreign land, but maintains its continuity as a
distinguishing
diaspora
from other groups such
92
This
a
when
community'.
causesconfusion
it
diaspora,
be
In
to
a
would
expected that the
as
qualify
order
as expatriate communities.
influence
host
large
the
to
be
society. There has
potentially
enough
group must
significantly
been difficulty in reaching consensusconcerning the criteria neededto be rightfully
basic
be
three
Van
Hear
diaspora.
requirements
must
met; the
suggests
categorised as a
is
lands,
there
homeland
from
to
is
dispersed
a continual presenceabroad
the
other
population
3
Safran
dispersed
is
between
the
adds that the group
there
populations.
and
an exchange
desire
belief
A
homeland
that
the
an
eventual
return.
and
must retain a collective memory of
4
feelings
of alienation. While a
they are not fully acceptedby the host society also adds to
219
senseof exile is likely to increase solidarity among the diaspora, diasporas can be formed as a
result of both forced and voluntary migration.
Two main causescan be identified for the increase in the number of diasporas since the late
twentieth century. Firstly, in the post-Cold War era, there has clearly been a resurgenceof
5
"rights
by
Hear
This
terms
the
ethnic nationalism, accompanied what van
revolution".
means that many ethnic groups are now placing their demandswithin the diaspora context as
they believe that this presentsa stronger claim to recognition as a distinct group (and often
6
including
being
than
political settlements
merely
self-govemancc, autonomy),
a minority.
Secondly, as explored earlier, the globalization process tends to accentuatedifferent identities.
While migration is certainly not a new trend, advancesin transport and communication
technology have aided individuals to retain links with their homeland.
220
The above discussion, as does the majority of the literature on diasporas, concentrateson
two
this
Concerning
topic
the
diasporas.
study
of
religiouscommunities
ethnicnationalist
identifies
through
their
be
to
solely
religious
these
which
a
group
applied
criteria
can
identity? Therewould appearto be a dilemmafor both casestudies. Are they part of the
diasporaor canthey be moreaccuratelydescribedasthe Coptic/Maronite
Egyptian/Lebanese
diaspora? Canmembershipof the secondgroupbe complementedby alsojoining the
221
national diaspora? Just as these questionshave not been fully addressedin the respective
homelands, it is unsurprising that such issueshave not been resolved in host countries.
Diasporas identified by religious affiliation are not unusual. After all, religious communities
can be regarded as one of the oldest types of transnational communities. However, in the
existing literature, discussion on religious diasporastends to be limited to either global faiths
e.g. Islam or Catholicism or else to those which overlap with a distinctive ethnic identity e.g.
the Armenians.
Both the Coptic and Maronite communities abroad would appear to satisfy the basic criteria
to be categorised as a diaspora. A distinct homeland exists and collective identity has been
kept especially though not exclusively through the church. Communal organisations have
been formed and frequent contact maintained both with the homeland and between the
migrant communities in different host countries. The activities of the diaspora also have an
impact on both the community and wider society in the homeland. Clearly, religion can play
life.
As
faith
important
in
helping
to
their
adjust
new
a
often provides core
migrants
an
role
identity.
Members
it
of the religious community
reinforce
can
values of a specific culture,
tend to worship collectively which accentuatescommunal tics. Spiritual leaders can
accompany the migrants or arc sent to minister to their needs, thus maintaining links with the
homeland. In fact, Vertovec statesthat religious adherencecan become stronger in the
diaspora than at home becauseit ensuresthat collective memories remain relevant to the
in
has
Similarly,
the host country, religion can have
the
settled
community
community.
once
10
less influence especially among the younger generations.
222
223
culture, welfare programmes and social networks. As long as the religious institution is
perceived as being the best actor to perform these services, they will enjoy religious vitality.
Consequently, it is now necessaryto examine these propositions concerning the contemporary
Coptic and Maronite diasporasto ascertainfirstly what role religious institutions can play
among a diaspora.which is identified primarily through religious affiliation and secondly,
what impact these activities will have on the homeland.
224
Due to
the oil boom in the Gulf and then the civil war, migration continued throughout the remainder
of the twentieth century. Although Lebaneseof all confessions left during this turbulent
period, it is estimated that over half were Christian and significantly, unlike other groups, few
return, especially among the Maronites.
As explored earlier, both the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite hierarchies are concerned at the
decline in the size of their community in comparison to other sections of the population. As
in any situation, the larger a group is, the more likely its demandswill be heard. Thus, an
ever decreasing community would appearto negatively affect the political role of the
patriarch. The fact that many of the migrants are young professionals accentuatesthis
involvement
but
deprived
is
their
homeland
in
also a
of
the
not only
problem as the church
have
Consequently,
leaders
tried to
the
church
new generation.
substantial proportion of
in
to
the
their
to
convince
remain
measures
members
offer encouragementas well as practical
Orthodox
its
Church
Coptic
Youth,
the
to
Bishopric
Through
the
use
attempts
of
region.
traditions and history to addressthe concernsof the youth regarding their future. For
humblest
for
his
God
the
Bishop
Musa
that
poorest
and
work, and
chooses
stresses
example,
13
because
have
blessing.
God's
in
fact
they
rich
while they may be poorly paid, they are
Similarly, Patriarch Sfeir urges the Maronite youth to resist the pull of emigration, "the
14
is
first
dutics".
The
in
trial,
homeland,
times
of
your
one
to
the
of
especially
attachment
hierarchies have also recognised that practical aid is required. Through the Coptic Orthodox
Bishopric of Public, Ecumenical and Social Services, social services and job training
225
The initial responseof both churchesto the global expansionof their adherentscan be
in
the
Yet
haphazard.
the
especially
early
years,
no-one,
characterisedas slow, reactiveand
Although
long-lasting
be
the
be
aware
of
this
that
presence.
a
would
migrants,could certain
implement
hierarchies
to
cohesive
the
struggled
to
needto minister thesecommunities, church
Kyrillos
Pope
trend,
Coptic
it
became
Once
that
emigrationwas a permanent
clear
policies.
VI addedthe responsibilityof establishingchurchesin the diasporato the already
first
16
Marcos
the
Marcos
Father
1964,
In
as
was appointed
overburdenedBishop Samuel.
17
in
liturgy
Initially
America.
the
in
North
Copts
celebrated
was
priest to minister to the
homesbut throughthe efforts of the laity andthe smallbut growing numberof priests,church
buildings were acquired.
Although the Maronitediasporawas establishedmanydecadesbeforeCoptic emigration
becamewidespread,they still facedsimilar problems. While substantialMaronitc emigration
behind
lagged
these
the
hadtakenplacesincethe mid-nineteenthcentury, churchresponse
is
Patriarch
Maronite
Patriarch,
the
not the
Orthodox
Coptic
developments.Unlike the
during
this
territory,
the
in
cra,
head
patriarchal
of
the
outside
matters
and
church
supreme
of
in
Maronite
1889,
Thus,
decisions.
the
had
to
See
the authority make
the Holy
alone
Patriarchrequestedpermissionfrom the Vaticanto provideservicesfor the immigrants. This
226
Through
in
laid
the diaspora
foundations
to
developments,
vibrant
a
church
ensure
these
the
were
homeland.
in
Maronites
the
to
which could act asencouragement
Turning to the role of the two patriarchsstudiedin this work, it is clearthat both havebeen
influential in the expansionof the churchabroad. UnderPopeShenouda,the Coptic
OrthodoxChurchin the landsof immigrationhasincreaseddramatically. Increasingthe
227
228
from the 6migr6 communities e.g. Bishop Suriel of Melbourne. The clergy are encouraged to
learn the language of the country where they are ministering to help their pastoral work with
the youth who are not always fluent in Arabic. Clergy are sent from Egypt to conduct
services at Christmas and Easter in each 6migr6 community. Bishops are often requestedto
attend meetings with the patriarch in Egypt in addition to the annual Synod of Bishops.
Under Patriarch Sfeir, the Maronite Church in the diaspora has also undergone significant
expansion. It is estimated that around 4-5 million Maronitcs reside outside of the Middle
East. As explored earlier, initial diocesesabroad were established during the reign of
Patriarch Meouchi. However, several more have been added including Canada, Europe,
Argentina, Mexico, and a secondone in the United Statesbased in Los Angeles. With over
in
United
States.
There
be
diaspora
the
to
the
arc also
most
active
appear
seventy churches,
fourteen
in
in
Canada
Australia,
and
churches
over eleven churches and one monastery
24
is
Maronitc
less
Control
Europe.
in
the
Latin
American
over
churches
abroad
several
and
it
is
because
Eastern
Church
Catholic
Orthodox
in
Coptic
the
than
an
rite which
clear cut
diaspora
The
head
the
the
Pope
growth
of
the
church.
of
as
supreme
regards the
- outside of
the existing patriarchal territory - has forced the church to addressthe issue of patriarchal
it
Canons
Churches,
1990
Code
Eastern
drafting
the
During
the
the
was
of
of
of
authority.
historical
However,
the
territory.
of
that
outside
extend
could
suggested
patriarchal authority
the finished Code confirmed that patriarchal territory would be defined in a geographic
25
is
historical
Maronite
The
territory
considered to cover Lebanon, Syria,
patriarchal
sense.
the Holy Land, Egypt and the rest of the Middle East. While decisions regarding the
historical
the
bishops
Maronite
the
eparchics
outside
of
creation
and
appointment of
Canons,
Synod
Code
Bishops
See,
the
the
Holy
of
of
the
territory
under
rest with
patriarchal
26
in
be
Unlike
the
when
could
appointments
past
the
made
proposes
shortlist of candidates.
hierarchy
Maronite
has
in
involvement,
the
the
cases,
now
of
majority
without any patriarchal
229
230
by stating that although the patriarch is supposedto be regarded as the father of the entire
Maronite Church, those outside the patriarchal territory feel more like stepchildren.28 Aware
of these concerns, Patriarch Sfeir has frequently addressedthese issues. At the 2003
Maronite Synod and the two subsequentsessions(2004 and 2005), the role of the church in
the countries of expansion and Maronite identity were major themes. Patriarch Sfcirasscrted
that all who follow the Maronite rite and tradition are Maronites - no matter where they were
bom or reside.29 Like the Copts, the term diaspora tends also to be replaced, usually by
referring to "the countries of expansion".
It is evident that under the present patriarchs, interest in the diaspora has been maintained
and in fact strengthened. The work of the diocesesabroad is crucial in ensuring that migrants
is
homeland.
One
be
done
in
this
to preserve
the
to
the
way
can
retain attachment
church
their unique identity and heritage. The majority of dioceses in both traditions publish their
both
in
life
in
information
diaspora
to
the
relevant
and
own newsletters and magazineswith
the homeland 30 The churches also support projects including schools, language classes,
.
heritage.
learn
to
their
to
the
community
about
spiritual retreats and convention centres allow
Many activities focus on the youth due to the importance of the younger generation for the
School,
in
involvement
Sunday
including
the
youth
associations,
services
survival of
church,
is
Maronites,
there
homeland.
For
the
trips
to
still concern at the rate of assimilation
the
and
into the Latin Catholic church partly due to the lack of Maronite schools. Regarding the
United States,Labaki asserts,"absorption into the Latin Church is a very real danger in
America". 31 Consequently, at the secondsessionof the patriarchal synod, it was decided to
32
diaspora
There
dedicated
to
in
with
parishes.
relations
the
establish an office
patriarchate
has also been a concerted effort to conduct a censusof all Maronites living abroad.
Both churches have developed the capacity to provide material aid for migrants and offer
for
Combined
(homes
the
the
(childcare)
for
the
with
elderly).
the
old
and
services
young
231
-Role
of the Pat-narch
Although the main church responseto the challenge of emigration has been to transform it
into a positive outcome through global expansion,this development has had other
different
formation
the
communal groups which threaten the
of
repercussions,notably
As
the
noted earlier, once migrants
the
community.
spokesmanof
position of the patriarch as
have settled into their new homelands, they tend to establish communal organisations.
Members of the different Christian denominations representedin the Middle East have been
Armenians
historic
the
With
in
the
of
and
exceptions
these
obvious
activities.
proactive
Assyrians, few have arrived in the diaspora as a result of involuntary migration. Ilowcvcr,
232
233
Act, met with Congress committees and placed newspaperadverts during the hearing of the
bill, alleging systematic oppression of the Copts.35 At present, these activities have had little
impact on US administrations but as they have developed close relations with individual
senatorsand congressmen,the activists are in a position to take advantageof any changes in
US policy which may benefit their aims. tmigr6 groups have benefited from
communications technology, using the Internet as a means to instantly publicise information.
However, some of these organisations view any incident within a persecution framework and
36
fail
details.
language
inflammatory
to
and often
verify
are prone to exaggeration, use
In comparison, the majority of Maronite 6migr6 groups tend to be more politiciscd than
their Coptic counterparts. Some groups are closely connected to Lebanesepolitical parties
37
Others
to
their
advocate alliances with
on
policies.
agree
ability
which adversely affects
Israel.38 With memories of the civil war still vivid, the problems of Maronite internal
disunity so prevalent in the homeland appearto have been replicated in the diaspora.
Particularly since the end of the conflict, the main priority for Maronite groups was to end
Coptic
Using
Lebanon.
the
Syrian
as
similar
methods
they
of
occupation
what
regarded as
United
the
6migr6
to
the
tried
described
of
engage
support
activists
groups
above, some
States. In the post-September I Ith era, they were quick to perceive that American political
independence
Lebanese
to
favourable
likely
be
towards
secure
efforts
to
actors were
more
from Syrian influence than in the past. For example, groups such as the Council of Lebanese
American Organizations (CLAO) lobbied in favour of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act (SALSRA) passedby Congressin 2003. GcneralAoun, oneof
39
Allthesc
Congress
to
during
figures
testified
committee.
leading
6migr6
a
this
the
period
to
the
them
from
technology
benefited
have
allowing
monitor
communications
groups
also
both
their
in
own supporters and with
Lebanon
with
campaigns
situation
and co-ordinate
other groups in the diaspora.
234
235
236
establish hegemony over the state even although they are no longer the largest scct. The fact
that the Christian, especially Maronite, lobby is rccognised as being the most developed can
be seen as a contributory factor to the decision to continue to exclude expatriate voters from
the 2005 elections as this would greatly swell the Maronite vote.
The existence of the type of 6migr6 groups described above requires a responsefrom the
patriarch not only to safeguardcommunal harmony but also to defend the position of
predominant spokespersonfor the community. In the Coptic Orthodox example, Patriarch
Shenoudahas frequently stressedthat such activists are a small minority of the Coptic
diaspora and not representativeof the views of the church and the wider Coptic community.
In fact, he adds that such associationshave sometimesdenouncedthe patriarch and the Coptic
Orthodox Church.42 He has constantly rejected foreign intervention and statesthat any
This
be
Egyptian
be
internally
the
authorities.
can
seenthrough
with
problems will
solved
his lukewarm responseto the US International Religious Freedom Commission delegations.
The patriarch has also addressedhis responseto the Coptic diaspora. As explored above,
there has been a concerted effort to ensurethat the church remains the focus point among
be
it
is
in
The
Egypt.
can
seen as cmphasising the
process
centralization
migrants as
lay
from
independently
the
the
the
of
movements
operating
expense
authority of
patriarch at
involved
in
6migr6s
become
for
Coptic
to
has
The
widely
called
publicly
church.
patriarch
43
interest.
Responding to
Egyptian
national
pressuregroups which seek to promote the
heed
by
Coptic
he
has
to
take
the
of
all
opinions
voiced
migrants
asked
claims of persecution,
Copts living in Egypt and if possible, to visit Egypt in order to have personal experience of
44
in
has
his
The
Egypt.
in
Coptic
adherents
also
urged
patriarch
the
situation contemporary
it
is
For
Egyptian
be
West
made clear that the church
example,
the
to
roots.
proud of their
hierarchy disapproves of demonstrationsduring the annual visit of President Mubarak to the
United States. During pastoral visits to Coptic communities abroad, Patriarch Shcnouda
237
238
45
One
international
highest
by
demand
difference
the
that
this
authority on world affairs
major
was
if
by
legitimate
that state was
than
passed
one
country,
even
any acts
was perceived as more
the global superpower. Thus, Patriarch Sfeir felt able to reject accusationsof welcoming
foreign intervention.
Patriarch Sfeir has also tried to consolidate his authority over the diaspora. Whilc this was
is
likely
be
Syrian
the
to
by
the
since
withdrawal
changedenvironment
resisted many groups,
his
has
directly
The
to
favourable
community
appealed
to
these
patriarch
attempts.
more
in
Lebanon
to
them
which seek to re-establish the country as an
efforts
support
abroad, urging
independent and democratic state. The personal status of the patriarch has been enhancedby
high-level visits abroad including audienceswith the French President Chirac and US
President George W Bush.47 Furthermore, local politicians and notable figures also meet
his
head
he
in
knowledge
that
the
the
authority
as
use
of the church to
can
patriarch
with
attempt to influence Maronite public opinion.
There is also awarenessamongst the hierarchy that the church is associatedwith any group
involvement.
Aware of the
in
has
Maronite
title
actual
the
that
the word
regardlessof any
harm which can be done to the church and its attempts to foster national reconciliation, efforts
by
the
to
being
patriarch.
that
proposed
to
guidelines
agree
groups
such
are
made ensure
239
240
241
affairs.
Summ
in
Eastcrn
diaspora
two
the
the
illustrated
has
discussion
that
shape
The
of
a religious
Christiandenominationsexaminedabove,clearly existsandis likely to remaina significant
dimensionof the Coptic OrthodoxandMaronitecommunities. While this doesnot nccd to
be at the expenseof their membershipof the nationaldiaspora(in someways,their religious
242
243
by
Both
their governmentsas leaderswith considerable
patriarchs
are
perceived
patriarch.
influence
be
their
to
the
can
over
community,
which
used
combat
of other actors.
authority
The statusof the patriarch at home and abroadis also enhancedas the leaderof a universal
ratherthan national church with adherentsin many countries. The challengeof the diaspora
hasillustrated that the church hierarchy and institutions, just as in the past, can adaptto
changesin circumstances. Under the presentpatriarchs,both churcheshave witnessed
widespreadexpansionin the lands of immigration and resolvedpotentially damagingissues,
identity
belong
the
to
to the religious community.
and
criteria
concerning
required
especially
In conclusion, it is evident that the church leadershiphas transformeda potent challenge- the
decline of the community in the homelanddue to migration - into a substantialstrength- the
formation of a global community and a universal church.
A Centurv of Emigration
Studies, IB Tauris & Co Ltd, 1992) p. 5-6
and Social
Situation
in Lebanon"
p. 253
16 Meinardus,
244
Press, 1993) p. 74
19Alixa Naff, "Lebanese Immigrationinto the United States: 1880 to the Present7in Albert Hourani
and Nadim Shehadi (eds), The Lebanesein the World: A Century of Emigration (London, The
Centre for LebaneseStudies, IB Tauris & Co Ltd, 1992) p. 141-165
20 Faris, Eastern Catholic Churches : Constitutionand Governancep. 52
21 Labaki, The Maronites in the United States p. 104
22 Coptic Orthodox Church Mission
www.cocm.or-q.au
23 O'Mahony, The Politics of ReligiousRenewal p. 72
24 Opus Libani, "Maronite Dioceses"
www.opuslibani.orq.lb/newdioceses
Faris, Eastern Catholic Churches : Constitutionand Governancep. 350
26Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches Latin-EnglishEdition (Washington,Canon Law Society of
America, 1990) p. 69
27 For the Coptic Orthodox Patriarchatesee www.copticpoi)e.orq
For the Maronite Patriarchatesee www.bkerke.orq.lb
28 Marini, "The Role of the PatriarchOutside the Middle East"
29 Opening Address of His Beatitude& Em. NasrallahBoutros Sfeir"The Maronite Church in its
Worldwide Expansion"4thMarch 2004
www.maronitesvnod.orq
30 As an example of the work of the dioceses abroad, see the following websites
Coptic Orthodox Diocese of Los Anqeles. Southern.California and Hawaii www.lacopts.orn
Coptic Orthodox Diocese of Melbourneand Affiliated Regions www.melbcopts.orq.au
Coptic Orthodox Diocese of Sydney and Affiliated Reqionswww.coptic.orq.au
Maronite Diocese of St. Maroun. Svdnevwww.maronite.orq.au
Maronite Diocese of Brazil www.iqrenamaronita.
orq.b
Maronite Eparchy of Our Ladv of Lebanon,Los Anqeles, www.usamaronite.orq
Maronite Eparchv of St. Maron, Brooklvnwww.stmaron.orq
Labaki, The Maronites in the United States p. 238
32
October 2004
Synod"
20'n
The
Daily
Star
"The
Maronite
33 Farah, Religious Strife in Egypt p. 11
34 Shawky F Karas, "Egypt's BeleagueredChristians"Worldview 26(3) 1983 p. 14
35 The Economist."The danger of foreign meddling"2
1998
36 See US Copts Association,www.uscopts-com
37 As an example of political groups acting as lobby groups or those connected to political parties in
Lebanon, see the following websites
Lebanese Forces www.lebanese-forces.orq
Lebanese American Council for Democracywww.la-cd.orq
Free Patriotic Movementwww.tavyar.orq
See Lebanese Foundationfor Peace,www.free-lebanon.com
39 Free Patriotic Movement"Testimonyof General Aoun" 18"' September 2003
www.tayyar.orn/files/q-mal/030917aounconqressHearina.htm
40 The Daily Sta "Lebaneseexpatriates : voices in the wilderness" 21't June 2005
,
www.dailVstar.com.lb/r)rintable.asp?art ID=16088&cat ID=1
41 Arabic News.com. "On the Coptic issue in Egypt76th November 1998
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Dailv/Dav/981106/1998110620.
html
42 al-Musawwar."Interviewwith Pope Shenouda" I O'nOctober 2003
44 Arabic News.com. Pope Shenouda highlights Egypt's religious tolerance, improvementsneeded"
ay 2002
http://www. arabicnews. com/ansub/Daily/Dav/020531/2002053135. html
44 lbid
245
48Final Statement of the Second Session of the MaroniteSynod, Fetka, 27thOctober 2004
www.maronitesvnod.or_q
4VMeinardus, Two Thousand Years of Coptic Christianity p. 135
50Coptic Orthodox Church Mission
246
i)d
pd
Summ
247
is
in
it
is
law,
Maronite
See
Holy
that
the
takes
the
patriarch
precedence canon
clear
although
leader
head
but
the
the
the
of the community.
of
church
also
spiritual
not
only
as
regarded,
Clearly, tradition combinedwith the authority associatedwith the office of patriarch has
be
legitimate
heads
to
the
the
representativesof their
regarded
as
churches
of
allowed
is
Coptic
Orthodox
Maronite
As
to
the
the
or
above
criteria
not
exclusive
communities.
traditions, it would be expectedthat this would be relevant to all headsof the patriarchal
it
is
imperative
in
found
East.
However,
Middle
to note that the two churches
the
churches
in
be
described
in
the region.
the
this
communities
amongst
most
powerful
can
as
study
used
It is clear that patriarchal authority alone is not necessarilyindicative of an active political
is
head
Even
the
church
generally recognisedas the spiritual
any
patriarchal
of
although
role.
leaderof a community, it would be difficult for the patriarch of a church with relatively few
adherentsand membersscatteredthroughout the region, to act effectively as the representative
of the community.
248
identity and led to a more exclusive approach. In turn, this has allowed the churchesto
led
institution,
has
leading
to the patriarchs
the
their
which
communal
position as
maximise
exercising the temporal dimensionof the office. However, this method of church civil
left
identity
led
the groups
has
to
the
and
of
communal
politicisation
representation also
When
disloyalty
to
the
to
religious and communal
state.
of
nation
accusations
vulnerable
identity overlap to the extent describedin the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite traditions, it
its
institution
fulfil
be
that
the
potential as a political actor.
could
religious
expected
would
249
likely
identities.
The
due
different
to
to
the
are
of
adherents
vary
needs
national
group
within
hindering
to
the
the
adopt one set of policies applicable
of
patriarch
ability
state,
each
within
to all.
4) Yhewillingness of church leaders to utilise their own institutions to cater to the needsof
their community
The casestudiesof PatriarchsShenoudaand Sfeir have illustrated that this has been an
influential trend during their reigns. The needsof the community can be divided into three
have
Both
communities
experienceda period of
and
political.
areas- spiritual, social
decades
before
the
Coptic
The
commenced
several
process
renewal
spiritual renewal.
in
leading
he
Yet
Shenouda.
the
Patriarch
activist
as
a
can take
movement,
patriarchy of
its
The
Maronite
has
for
(with
spiritual
renewal
occurred
success.
credit
other reformers)
under Patriarch Sfeir as a responseto the catastropheof the civil war. There have been
efforts to ensurethat the clergy are responsiveto their parishioners. Church activities have
also beenprioritised such asprayer groups and pilgrimages. One prominent feature of the
Coptic Orthodox renewal processis the SundaySchool Movement which illustrates the
significance attachedto youth ministry. For the Maronites, the Maronite Synod has proved
to be the main venue for church reform. Both renewalshave focusedon the key elements
and traditions of eachfaith. This emphasisesthe distinct heritage of the community and
fulfils the need for belonging which many in both communities feel cannotbe obtained within
the national framework. Church teachingsare also usedto addressthe situation faced by the
250
groups and help provide both meaning and comfort to adherents. A consequenceof the
is
increased
life
hierarchies
the
two
the
the
spiritual
of
churches
attention
on
of
revitalisation
especially the patriarchs.
The secondcategorycoversthe social needsof the community. As discussed,the two
inherent
in
socioeconomicproblems. Although this has always
groupsreside a region with
been an elementof Christian ministry, the recent decline in the standardof living has made
this imperative during the reigns of the presenttwo patriarchs. This has been more prominent
and successfulunder Patriarch Shenouda. As patriarch, he was able to build on the work
undertakenby the generalbishopric of Public, Ecumenicaland Social Serviceswhich had
been establishedby his predecessor. The provision of social servicesis clearly a priority in
the contemporaryCoptic Orthodox Church. As well as the programmessponsoredby the
bishopric, eachindividual bishop devotessignificant resourcesto this work in his diocese.
Through his centralizationpolicies, PatriarchShenoudahas been able to retain control over
this aspectof church ministry. This contrastswith the situation of Patriarch Sfeir. The
monastic ordershave long beenresponsiblefor providing social care in the Maronite church.
While theseactivities have increasedin the post-war period, somemembersof the community
criticise this response,believing that the church should use more of its wealth (particularly
through land ownership) to alleviate the living conditions of its members. Unlike the Coptic
Orthodox, the Maronite church doesnot have a centralizedbody to co-ordinate theseactivities
and although Patriarch Sfeir may desireto increasehis authority on this issue,the independent
nature of the Lebanesemonastic orders limits his influence. By providing theseservices,
both churcheshave taken on many of the social responsibilities normally associatedwith the
state. Consequently,support for the churchesand their respectivepatriarchshas grown in
accordancewith the fulfilment of thesematerial needs.
251
252
The presentpolitical environmentin the country where the patriarch residesalso influences
the approachtaken by a group regardingpolitical representation. Few Egyptians or Lebanese
(regardlessof religious affiliation) considerthat their opinions are taken into accountby the
ruling elite. For the Coptic Orthodox, the disillusionment with the nationalist stateis
magnified becausethey had hoped that nationalism would allow them to obtain full
citizenship which had not beenpossible under previous regimes. Instead,the perception of
discrimination has remained,especiallyregarding conversions,church building and the
governmentresponseto communalunrest. Concerningthe Maronites, in contrastto their
unique position where they were able to enjoy substantialpower, in the post-war period, some
of their privileges have been eroded,particularly in terms of political representation. The rise
of political Islam as the main alternativeto the nationalist regimeshas also increased
Christian unease. Thus while in general,Copts and Maronites still identify themselvesas
Egyptians or Lebaneserespectively,many believe that at present,they are unlikely to be
grantedtheir full entitlement of rights as citizens.
This insecurity has beenheightenedby other factors. Firstly, both countries suffer from
severesocioeconomicproblems. Uneven modernization has contributed to the
inequality of wealth, high unemploymentand deteriorating living conditions for much of the
population that are common in Egypt and Lebanon. Secondly,security issuesremain
important. In Egypt, sporadicviolent outburstsoften claim Coptic victims whilst in
Lebanon, Christian areasand political figures have beenthe target of bomb attacks. Finally,
the demographiccontext is also important. In numerical terms, both groups are minorities
and in proportion to the size of the Muslim population, their percentageof the population is in
decline. This addsto the perception of vulnerability. The groupshave found refuge in their
exclusive communal identity which by emphasisingtheir religious affiliation (the main
253
for
from
has
distinguished
the
the
an
opportunity
group
others),
provided
characteristicwhich
religious leaderto undertakea proactive political role.
The absenceof a challengefrom the lay leadershipof eachcommunity can also be
influence
loss
developments.
In
Egypt,
the
to
of the
of political
connected national political
traditional Coptic elite can be traced to the nationalization policies pursued from the 1952
Syrian
Lebanon,
In
the
the
civil
war,
especially
consequences
of
revolution onwards.
influence in the Taif era, severelycurtailed the ability of popular Maronite leadersto
be
in
In
to
there
this
the
appear
crisis
of
state
environment,
would
post-war state.
participate
little choice but to turn inward to the traditional systemof political representationthrough the
is
In
head
the
the
the
the
contrast,
community.
political
role
of
patriarch
of
spiritual
office of
likely to decreaseif the crisis of stateconditions ease. In an environment of relative stability,
be
inclined
believe
Christians
to
that they
would
more
economic growth and political reforms,
lay
leadership
framework.
Thus,
fully
the
of the community
existing
could
participate within
become
However,
be
to
the
expected
predominant.
would
actors,
expenseof religious
at
is
likely
it
that
the
to remain
these
evident
appear
patriarch
would
criteria
are
satisfied,
until
the political spokesmanof the community.
254
than those issuedby Patriarch Sfeir. Thus, the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch is perceived to
representsolely Coptic interestswhilst the Maronite Patriarchhas been termed the patriarch
of Lebanon as many of his views reflect concernsof ordinary Lebanesefrom all confessions.
This perhapsreflects the different situation in the two countries. In Egypt, there is a clear
majority and small Coptic minority. As the only Christian leaderwhose remarks are
guaranteedto be publicised, Patriarch Shenoudatendsto use his position to concentrateon
issuesaffecting the Coptic community. This could lead to the perception that his comments
are only relevant to this small sectorof the Egyptian population. During tenseperiods, this
aspectcan raise doubt on the ability of the patriarch and the Coptic community to be loyal
because
Copts
The
they are the only significant group that
out
precisely
citizens.
are singled
differs from the large majority. In contrast,Lebanonconsistsof various communities of
which the Maronites are only one of the major confessionalgroups. Unlike the Copts, the
Maronites are not facing an overwhelming majority with distinctly different policies. Several
groups sharesomeof the Maronite concernswhich allows some inter-communal co-operation
and lessensthe impressionthat the Maronite patriarch caterssolely for the needsof his
community. This also leadsto a more positive responsefrom other political actors than is
usually experiencedby the Coptic patriarch.
The views of both patriarchsmostly correspondto the concernscited by their communities.
Although the details vary, the topics coveredare similar
- political participation,
255
256
patriarch as occurredunder the leadershipof Maronite PatriarchKhreish during the civil war
years.
The views articulatedby the patriarch are also important. In order to retain support, he
must be seento reflect the concernsof the entire community. As the casestudieshave
illustrated, religious leadersare also prone to modifying their political strategiesin accordance
with developmentsboth in the country and the wider region. The presentstrategiesadopted
by PatriarchsShenoudaand Sfeir highlight the difficulties encounteredby Christian spiritual
leadersin their questto balancethe conflicting demandsof the different actors,most
importantly the community and the government. Yet, they also demonstratethat this task is
not impossible.
257
security instability but are the group most likely to gain from the easingof the crisis of state
conditions.
In contrast, Coptic secularleadershipremainsweak, and is mostly treatedwith contempt by
the community. The main challengeto the political authority of Patriarch Shenoudais likely
to come from the so-called"Coptic street". The main supportbaseof the patriarch comes
from poor and middle classCopts. Just as they helped the patriarch becometheir legitimate
his
downfall.
In
they
recent years, elementsof
also
engineer
could
political representative,
the community have becomeradicalisedand are increasingly willing to defend their church
has
insults
At
faith
from
the
threats.
present,
patriarch
accommodatedthese activities.
or
and
It is unclear the extent of control that Patriarch Shenoudahas over thesegroups, particularly if
he withdrew his support from them. However, any return to the assertivepolicies of the
Sadatera could have severerepercussionsfor both the patriarch and the community.
Therefore, other memberswould be fearful of the consequencesof such activities. While this
increased
future,
for
be
the
activism could split the
must regardedas a potential challenge
community and damagethe claim of the patriarch to representthe entire community. At
be
Maronite
does
to
the
to
this
type
community.
relevant
present,
not appear
of challenge
Thus, with few credible challengersto their position as communal leader,both patriarchs are
likely to continue this role.
The stateauthorities also have the resourcesto curb the political role of the patriarch. In
Egypt, the governmenthas lent legitimacy to the position of Patriarch Shenoudaas the official
spokesmanfor the Copts by choosingto addresscommunal issuesthrough the millet system.
It would be expectedthat this will continue only as long as it is serving stateinterests. In
Lebanon,governmentscan encouragecampaignsagainstthe patriarch. This will lead to two
outcomes- either the strengtheningor shatteringof communal solidarity. Both patriarchs do
co-operateto a certain extent with the ruling regimes. This can curb excessesfrom the
258
community but possibly at the expenseof voicing legitimate grievances. The responseof
Muslim communitiesto the involvement of the patriarch in political affairs can also challenge
patriarchal authority. On the whole, there is acquiescenceto the idea of a religious leader
undertaking civil representationbut on the understandingthat the patriarch doesnot actually
participate in the decisionmaking process. However, in somecases,the political activities of
the patriarch can be perceivedas acting abovehis dhimmi status,leading to tenseMuslimChristian relations. This is more likely in Egypt than in Lebanondue to the demographic
situation. Consequently,the patriarchsclearly occupy an influential position but their ability
to continue to do so dependson eventsoutsidetheir control. In this sense,they are
vulnerable to challengesboth from within the community and also from wider society.
The extent of challengesto patriarchal authority have an important impact on the political
role of the patriarch. The two examplesusedin this study can be describedas weak
communities with a leadershipvacuum which hasbeenfilled by the religious hierarchy. The
patriarch of a community which enjoyedvarious communalinstitutions and an active and
respectedelite, is unlikely to exercisesignificant political influence. Regardlessof the
internal dynamicsof the community, the policies followed by both the government and wider
society are also important. In order to articulate the concernsof the community, the patriarch
must operatein an environmentwhich allows relative freedom, otherwise his activities and
hence,political significance will be greatly curtailed. Yet, an open environment could
also
have an adverseeffect on the political influence of the patriarch as it is likely to encourage
rival actorswithin the community to participate in national affairs. In contrast, if the view of
the majority society is primarily basedon the dhimmi system,this could lead to restrictions.
In order for the patriarch to successfullyperform this function, he must not only enjoy the
support of the majority of the community but also convince the authorities that it is worth
accommodatinghis demands.
259
260
Following the importanceof the diasporato the two communities discussedin this study, it
is clear that this can now be addedas a factor in determining the extent of the political role of
the patriarch. If a Middle EasternChristian community doesnot have an organiseddiaspora,
it risks losing valuable resourcesfrom the region without gaining any benefits abroadas
homeland
links
lose
the
and the church.
with
churches
and
migrants will scatter,attendother
In order to createthis diaspora,it is vital to have a strong church in the homeland which is
include
for
In
its
this
to
to
must
particular,
sending
migrants.
cater
use resources
willing
dynamic priests and maintaining direct links with the patriarchate. If 6migr6 groups are wellhave
from
they
the potential not only to supersedethe
policies,
radical
and
refrain
organised
leadershiprole of the church in the new countriesbut also to influence policies in the
homeland. However, the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite caseswould suggestthat such
from
the community, thus
be
divided
to
support
widespread
groupswill
and struggle attract
by
focusing
its
the
to
on the position of the patriarch as the
allowing
church retain authority
father of the entire community.
261
four
help
determine
is
It
the type of political role exercised
that
these
variables
clear
group.
by the patriarch. If they are not satisfied, it certainly hinders the ability of the patriarch to
if
fulfilled
in
However,
these
temporal
conditions
were
a manner
even
authority.
exercise
that would suggestan active political role, this would not necessarilybe the caseunlessthe
other conditions were also met.
Firstly, it has been demonstratedthat eachindividual patriarch determinesto a large extent
the political role that he will play. He decidesif the church institutions will be usedto fulfil
the needsof the community. It is his opinion of the duties expectedof the head of the church
it
is
his
into
Furthermore,
taken
political views and understandingof the
are
account.
which
be
if
live,
Thus,
in
the
the
which
will
made
public.
even
community
environment which
community have a distinct identity and homeland,without the willingness of the patriarch to
if
Similarly,
is
to
the views of the patriarch are
this
occur.
unlikely
undertakea political role,
not sharedby his community, this also preventshim from exercising temporal authority over
the group.
Secondly,this study has shown that the political situation of the country where the patriarch
have
is
in
determining
a
patriarch
will
an active or passivepolitical
resides, crucial
whether
in
fact,
involvement
In
the
the
patriarch political matters often tends to be a reaction
role.
of
to developmentsin the particular country. Relationsbetweenthe different communities and
influence
both the view and responseof the patriarch.
the
towards
governmentpolicies
group,
If the group is content with its treatmentby both the governmentand society, the need for the
patriarch to intervene in political affairs is less likely. Yet, in other circumstanceswhere the
community perceivesitself to be threatened,this may also ensurethat the patriarch does not
adopt an active political role becausethe risk to the patriarch as an individual and the
community as a whole is consideredto be too great. This would be true regardlessof how
262
lead
be
to
to
the
a strong
would
expected
satisfied
which
were
conditions
of
other
many
political role.
In addition, the challengesto patriarchal authority also affect the type of political role
linked
be
illustrated,
been
to the
has
tend
to
As
these
by
the
closely
patriarch.
enjoyed
internal situation of the country. The position of the secularelite of the community in both
including
has
been
to
ongoing problems
events,
connected
national
clearly
casestudies
Christian
Similarly,
towards
the
policies
government
concerningpolitical participation.
issues
by
and
economic
as well as awarenessof
communities are often shaped wider political
the attitudes of the Muslim majority in the country regarding communal relations. Therefore,
the other variableshighlight the circumstancesthat are more likely to result in an active
is
it
However,
that
leader.
the
by
situation
present
political
a religious
political role
determinesthe environmentthat the patriarch operatesin and limits the options available to
him. Consequently,the importanceof the political and cultural context must be highlighted
in relation to the theoretical approachesconcerningthe relationship between religion and
politics.
263
if
264
Although
be
less
the
the
the
to
of
community.
civil
representative
act
as
able
would
patriarch
issue
hierarchies
to
statementson national affairs, thesewould
would continue
church
discussed
if
Even
the
the
above were
of
criteria
several
samesignificance.
possibly not enjoy
in
highly
have
to
the
a
political
role,
an active
patriarch
satisfied and one would expect
In
be
to
temporal
authority.
these
retain
enough
not
necessarily
would
secularizedsociety,
Christian
influence
declining
the
affairs
of
the
on
political
short,
situation could resemble
framework,
developments
the
in
Thus,
theoretical
West.
leaders
this
the
using
spiritual
determining
factors
be
the
to
main
would
authority
within society and challenges patriarchal
dual
However,
the
the
the
the
strong
acceptance
of
of
patriarch.
role
political
regarding
if
in
that
these
two
the
suggests
casestudies
even
patriarch
spiritual and civil role of
lead
in
to
the
the
to
secularizationof
and
region
occur
were
widespreadmodernization
In
have
to
the
this
retain
position.
resources
the
society,
patriarchswould still potentially
in
Christianity
this
the
to
region at present,the
of
role
political
order explain accurately
into
both
historical
the
be
to
take
to
account
thesis
revised
secularization
would need
backgroundand the contemporarypolitical context.
According to the crisis ofstate approach, in this contextofa 'failed environment", it would
be expectedthat Christian institutions wouldfill the vacuumleft by the state by addressing
spiritual andpractical concernsthrough theirpositions asprotectors of Christian identity
and providers ofservices. Yheeasing of the multiple political, socioeconomicand security
lay
be
likely
to
where
secular
the
create an environment
crises affecting
region would
leadership could re-emergeat the expenseof thepatriarch.
265
This study has proposedthat the crisis of stateenvironment,which can be found throughout
the Middle East region, offers a useful insight into the presentpolitical role of the patriarch.
This approachcan be describedas a revised secularizationtheory. Norris and Inglehart stress
that statesin the developing world have struggledto provide human security (absenceof
immediate risk to personalsafety). While some aspectsof modernization have occurred in
the region, the inability of the regimesto provide for the material needsof the population, has
allowed religion to retain its social significance. As has beendemonstrated,both Egypt and
Lebanon fulfil crisis of stateconditions. The failure to deliver developmentand democracy
has affected all the citizens of thesecountries. However, this has addedresonancefor the
Christian communitieswho had relied on the nationalist movementsto guaranteetheir full
is
discrimination
in
Instead,
minimal
and
political participation
participation society.
is
heightened
by
Their
also
sporadic attacks,especially
of
vulnerability
common.
perception
in Egypt. Desperatelyrequiring strong leadership,both communities have beenplagued with
legitimacy
lack
divided
laity
within the community.
often
weak and
representativeswho
Consequently,the church hierarchy has soughtto fill this vacuum. They have used their
from
daily
institution
to
the
leading
the
offer
a
refuge
uncertainty
of
position as
communal
life. In doing so, they have preservedthe group identity, provided for the material needsof
the community and articulated their political concerns. When the level of statecrisis is high,
the political situation of the country where the patriarch resides,becomesthe most important
variable. The other factors, especiallycommunal identity and the personality and views of
the patriarch help determinewhat type of political role the patriarch will undertakewithin this
context. Where theseare strong,the patriarch is likely to enjoy an active role as communal
in
In
the
this
and
security
sharp contrast to
stability
representative.
church offers
situation,
the state. Thus, membersof the group are willing to delegatepolitical representationto the
church leaderswho have attemptedto provide their spiritual and material needs.
266
If the level of statecrisis were to decline, it would be expectedthat the diminished threats
in
less
likely
have
institutions
lead
to
to
a
were
major
role
a situation where religious
would
immediate
lack
danger
Inglehart,
According
Norris
the
to
would mean that
of
and
society.
individuals would be more inclined to rely on their own resourcesin dealing with particular
it
is
institutions.
However,
depending
than
possible that church
on religious
situations rather
leaderswould try to resist thesechangesin order to preservetheir power over the community.
The Coptic Orthodox Church is more likely to be successfulat this. The millet system
appearsto be acceptedby many Egyptians (both Muslim and Christian) as the natural method
to managecommunal relations. Importantly, this is especiallytrue of the ruling regime.
Furthermore,there are few seriouschallengersto patriarchal authority. In contrast,the
Maronite Church has had more experienceof operatingin an environment characterisedby
its
leaders
leadership.
Church
that
the
aware
community
are
perceives
present
strong secular
faced
by
due
Lebanon
the
to
temporary
challenges
since the civil
political role as a
situation
institution
itself
loss
its
from
is
less
likely
be
the
to
the
Thus,
to
there
of
role
resistance
war.
be
This
Maronites.
the
the
can
also
attributed to the recognition
as
political representativeof
Maronite
leaders
by
be
the
the
populist
political
who have reof
supportwhich could obtained
enteredthe Lebanesepolitical systemas a consequenceof the changeswhich occurred in
2005.
However, even if thesecrisis conditions eased,both churchesare likely to continue their
efforts to representthe community. The difference would be that no longer would they enjoy
the extent of influence as exercisedat present. While patriarchal authority, communal
identity and the use of institutions to assistthe community, would help them remain an
important voice in the community, thesefactors alone would not guaranteethat the religious
leaderwould enjoy an active political role. The crisis of statethesis provides a useful
explanationof the political activities of the patriarch in the Middle East. It shows that while
267
Using the aboveapproach, it would be expectedthat the backlash to the globalization process
would allow the church to lead the responseof the communityas it is thefocalpoint of
communal identity. The tools of the communicationsrevolution would also serve to revitalise
the church, allowing thepatriarch to retain control of the entire community regardless of
geographical location. Accordingly, the identification of the church with the indigenous
culture of the communitywould enable thepatriarch to sustain a durable temporal dimension
to his position.
268
It is true that the tools of the technology revolution have helped revitalise both churches. In
the homeland, they have helped link remote areasto the patriarchateand servedto encourage
the adherenceof the younger generations. The internet and global travel have proved vital in
have
been
Close
ties
the
maintained with the
combating
challengeof emigration.
congregationsabroadthrough sendingclergy to the new churches,patriarchal visits to these
immigrants.
have
by
Thus,
Egypt
the
tackled the
to
trips
churches
churchesand return
challenge of emigration and ensuredthat this global expansionhas become a positive
developmentfor eachgroup. This aspectof globalization has allowed the churchesto
accentuatetheir significance to the community, thus acting as a foundation for any future
(as
has
Clearly,
the
the
the
of
expansion
of
church
management
political role.
careful
occurred in both the casestudies)can help to raise the profile of the patriarch as the head of
all adherentsof the community and consequently,lend credibility to his political activities.
The globalization approachto religion and politics suggeststhat the church will become
active in the political arenaas the defenderof the particularist culture becauseit is identified
with the indigenousculture of the community. Clearly, an impact of globalization has been
to increasethe importanceof communal identity, the identification of a homeland and the
different
led
has
diaspora.
Yet,
to
this
a
reaction from Christians than that of
existenceof a
Muslims in the region. It is evident that both churchescan be categorisedas the main
defenderof their specific identity. However, this is not the indigenous culture of the society
in which they reside. This has severalimportant repercussions. Firstly, they do not seethe
"West" as an alien culture to the sameextent as Islamic institutions. While the Islamic
civilization has shapedtheir historical experiences,throughout the ages,their religious
identity tends to have allowed Middle East Christians to act as a bridge betweenthe two
worlds. Secondly,they do not perceivethemselvesas under attack from Western culture.
Although the Oriental and Orthodox churchesare certainly wary of Westerninfluence, this
269
Firstly, religious institutions offer rewards and compensatorswhich in this context, could
strengthenthe identity and cohesivenessofthe community. This could lead to their
willingness to delegatepolitical representationto thepatriarch.
Secondly,the existenceofa monopolywould suggestthat the religious institution benefited
from a privileged relation with the state. While it would be expectedthat this situation would
lead to a decline in members,it would be counterbalancedby thepotentialfor the patriarch
to use this relationship to securehis position as civil head of the community.
Yhirdly, it would be expectedthat the attitudes of the ruling authorities and society influence
thepolitical strategypursued by the religious leader, resulting in a more assertiveapproach
when the communityis perceived as endangered,
The first proposition suggeststhat strong religious adherenceand the willingness to delegate
political authority to church leaderscan be explainedby the existenceof rewards and
270
hardships
function
the
the
The
the
ofjustifying
afterlife
perform
of
compensators.
rewards
in
dominated
by
faith
being
another
an
environment
community
a
associatedwith
membersof
belonging
(which
has
been
identified
be
Several
of
sense
not
can
religion.
compensators
leisure
identity,
distinct
framework),
the
and
material
services
obtained within
national
identity
in
lead
the
By
the
taking
the
church reinforces comniunal
community,
role
networks.
(potentially at the expenseof national identity). By successfullyusing church resourcesto
leader
in
its
himself
the
the
religious
can
place
members,
provide
spiritual and social needsof
In
dimension
develop
the
the
to
support
of
community.
order to
with
a position
a political
realise this potential, the personality and views of the patriarch are crucial in determining the
type of political role that will be undertaken. While religious vitality may have been
intensified by other "non-religious" factors in the two casestudies,one cannot ascribethe
important.
Culture
In
in
the
these.
to
the
remains
extremely
strong adherence
solely
region
Middle East, religion still retains strong social significance. Thus, deeply-held spiritual
beliefs are still important in understandingthe role that religious institutions have in society.
The secondhypothesisproposedby rational choice theorists suggeststhat when a religious
institution operatesas a monopoly, it enjoys privileged relations with the statebut at the
expenseof a declining membership. Both the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite churchescan
be defined as monopolies within their communities. However, the cultural environment is
important asboth are located in a Muslim dominant areawhere cultural factors are extremely
significant in choosingreligious affiliation. The Coptic Orthodox Church is by far the largest
Christian denominationin Egypt. The church hierarchy is recogniscdby the government as
the leading Coptic institution and in particular, the patriarch is acknowledgedas the head of
the community. In Lebanon,the Maronite church is acceptedas the main denomination for
the community. In the confessionalsystem,the Maronite patriarch is recogniscdas the
spiritual headof the community in the samemanneras the other leadersof the different
271
between
historical
Maronites
However,
the
the
connections
of
and
groups.
as a consequence
the Lebanesestateas well asthe size of the community, the patriarch certainly enjoys a
privileged position in Lebanon.
In both cases,the rational choice approachwould suggestthat thesechurcheshave
have
Yet,
in
decline
they
enjoyed significant and ongoing
experienceda
membership.
illustrate
These
that connectionsto the ruling regime are
cases
periods of religious renewal.
likely to be detrimental to a religious institution only if there is a sharedhistory between the
two. Even in Lebanon,the church leadershave never experiencedtemporal authority to the
extent that was witnessedin Europe. Thus, recognition from the respectivegovernmentshas
if
important
in
Furthermore,
harmed
the
the
religion
remains
not
popularity of either church.
life of a community, the leader of a religious institution which enjoys a monopoly can in fact
find itself in a position where it is possibleto undertakean active political role, especially if
there are few challengesto this authority.
In examining the third strand,it is clear that the strategiespursuedby the patriarchs do alter
dependingon the particular national/regionalsituation. For example,the patriarchs examined
in the casestudieshad different reasonsfor adopting a more assertivestance. Patriarch
Shenoudahas undertakenthis changewhen there is a perception of increasedthreatsto the
wellbeing of the community. However, Patriarch Sfeir adoptedsimilar strategiesin 2000
primarily becauseit was less likely that the community would be targeted(physically at least)
due to its political views. Certainly, both patriarchshave taken into account the situation in
the country when determining their responseto specific issues. They are aware of the
attitudesof the ruling authorities. The regimesnot only have the power to affect the daily
conditions of the community but their policies can also impact on the position of the
individual patriarch. Similarly, the stateof communal relations is also closely watched as the
patriarchsare awarethat the Christian communities are an easytarget for a discontented
272
majority. Thus, once more, the political situation of the country and the views of the
in
by
determining
factors
the
type
the
undertaken
of
political
activities
crucial
patriarch are
patriarch.
The rational choice model offers a different approachto the study of the relationship
betweenreligion and politics. In one sense,it can help explain the reasonswhy people turn
to religious institutions and in the Middle East context,why this may lead to the religious
leadersbecoming involved in political affairs. However, it is evident that the importance of
culture cannot be overstated. In this study, the historical backgroundand political situation
of the relevant country, the personality and views of the patriarch and the challengesto
in
identified
determining
have
been
the political role of the
as
crucial
patriarchal authority
in
discussed
Yet,
the rational choice model, especially
the
these
patriarch.
are not
on
whole,
concerningthe first two strands. Furthermore,certain parts of the model i. e. the link between
a competitive pluralist market and religious vitality are not relevant to the Christian churches
examined. Consequently,the rational choice approachusedon its own, doesnot accurately
explain the continual political role of the patriarch.
This study has examinedthe political role of the presentpatriarchsof the Coptic Orthodox
and Maronite churches. Both gained control of relatively weak churches(in political terms)
and through a combination of policies which focusedon spiritual, social and political
dimensions,have presidedover revitalised institutions and have consolidatedtheir position as
the spokesmanfor their community. It is important to note that this is not a new policy
which they developedonce in office. Their careersasbishops give a clear indication of these
strategies. Traditionally, the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch is not regardedas a political actor.
273
Yet, there is a generalconsensusthat one of the duties of the patriarch is to act as the civil
representativeof the community. The continueduse of the millet systemhas meant that
Egyptians generally regard such activities as acceptable. Due to the centralization measures
adoptedby Patriarch Shenouda,the Coptic Orthodox Patriarchnow enjoys almost complete
control of the community. At present,there are few influential rivals to his role as leader of
the Coptic community. In contrast,the office of the Maronite patriarch has historically had a
temporal dimension and is generally acceptedby the community. Yet at the sametime, there
has always been fierce competition with the secularelite over the leadershipof the
community. The collapseof this leadershipas a consequenceof the civil war allowed
Patriarch Sfeir alone to exercisehis political authority. Yet, due to the history of the office,
the Maronite patriarch is unlikely to enjoy full control of the community to the extent attained
by Patriarch Shenouda. Consequently,while on paper,the Maronite patriarch appearsto
enjoy a more political dimension, in practice, this has actually been fulfilled by the Coptic
Orthodox Patriarch Shenoudawho has successfullytranslatedhis spiritual control over the
church into recognition of his role as the undisputedpolitical leaderof the community.
This thesis has arguedthat the crisis of stateconditions found in Egypt and Lebanon allow
the two patriarchsto utilise their institution to provide all the needsof their community spiritual, social and political. The findings of this study must now be applied to patriarchs of
other Christian communities in the Middle East. Using the crisis of stateapproachand the
intervening variables as a guideline, it would be expectedthat the presentspiritual headsof
churcheswhose leadershave historically enjoyed a temporal dimension, would be more
inclined to act as a civil representativeof the community. An interesting casestudy would be
an examinationof the ChaldeanPatriarch,especiallyin the context of the turbulent
environmentof post-SaddamHusseinIraq. Another patriarch who is usually describedas
politically active is the Latin Patriarchof Jerusalem. Previously, holders of this office did not
274
including
factors
due
the
to
small number of adherents
various
exercise a strong political role
in
With
leaders
Jerusalem.
the patriarchy
Christian
the
religious
and
concentrationof several
has
Patriarchate
Latin
the
first
Sabbah,
Palestinian
take
this
Michel
to
the
position,
of
Again,
Christian
the
Palestinian
the
communities.
assumeda more powerful role amongst
for
the passiveresponseof patriarchs of other
indicate
help
the
reasons
variables should
Another
Orthodox
Greek
tradition.
the
those
avenueto explore
of
communities, particularly
both
the political activities of the
Islamic
be
the
the
environment on
would
significance of
by
be
This
this
to
examining the role of the
achieved
the
could
role.
patriarchs and
response
in
former
Soviet
Union
the
Christian
Eastern
states.
communities
patriarchs of
In examining the relationship betweenreligion and politics, this study aimed to add a new
in
Western
Christianity
that
the
debate.
The
and
of
world
to
this
of
role
subtopic
political
Islam in the Muslim world has beenwidely researched. Yet few scholarshave explored the
has
This
by
dominated
in
one.
another
study
political role of one religion a region
demonstratedthat the political involvement of Christian communities in the Middle East is
in
Jerusalem.
Places
The
in
Holy
interest
the
traditional
than
the
patriarch - the
much wider
in
his
The
become
has
leader
own
right.
actor
case
political
a
the
spiritual
of
community in
developing
leaders
in
the
have
demonstrated
that
world,
religious
situations
studies
certain
have been able to retain a temporal dimensionto their office. The crisis of stateconditions
common to many poorer countrieshave left a leadershipvacuum for people seeking
fulfilment of both material and emotional needs,in particular, a senseof belonging. In the
examplesstudied in this thesis,theseopportunitieshave been graspedby the church
leadership,an indication that this could happenelsewhere. Each church found itself in a
strong position becauseof the extent of patriarchal authority traditionally ascribedto the
religious headof the community. Similar to the lay elite of the past, the patriarchs have
struggledto achievetangible results in their efforts to improve the conditions faced by the
275
community. Yet, by interpreting their role asbeing the communal spokesmanrather than
political activist, they have beenable to retain communal support for their position. At
in
in
flux.
Certainly
Lebanon, major
in
the
the
present,
region remains
political situation
in
it
is
have
Yet,
changes
clear, as Egypt, that the political role of the patriarch
occurred.
remains relevant both to the respectivecommunities and also to wider society.
This study has also demonstratedthat religious identity has retained social significance in
the Middle East. For Christians,this has presenteda dilemma. By accentuatingtheir
communal identity, the church hasprovided a refuge from a difficult environment where the
majority of the population belong to anotherreligion. Yet at the sametime, this strategy
emphasisesthe differencesbetweenthe groups and leavesthe Christian communities more
vulnerable to accusationsand attacks. Both churcheshave attemptedto perform a balancing
act to prove that Christians can be proud of their faith without being disloyal to the state. The
casestudieshave demonstratedthat they do not desireto be treated as a minority with special
rights but insteadas citizens who can freely participate in national affairs.
It is also vital to study the Christian communitiesin the Middle East in order to gain
awarenessof the root causesof the communalunrest which sporadically occurs in the region.
The extent of harmoniousrelations betweenthe communities greatly affects the stability and
security of both Egypt and Lebanon. Furthermore,international interest in the region means
that theseeventscan have wider repercussions. The situation continuesto be unstable,with
eachnew incident (especially in Egypt) challenging the ability of political actors to contain
communal unrest. At present,the Christian communities have chosento delegatecivil
authority to the patriarch. Consequently,his views and responseto Christian-Muslim
relations are extremely significant in determining church-staterelations. The patriarch and
his community are also affectedby wider developmentsin the Middle East. For example, the
rise of political Islam and anti-Westernsentimentcould have an adverseimpact on the
276
277
Bibliography
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Ph.D Theses
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htm
lb/presidenc/s=bols/constitution.
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Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt
htm
http://www. sis.jzov.eg/eginffieML/politics/Darlim/html/res03O3.
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Coptic Orthodox Church Network
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Coptic Orthodox Dioceseof Los Angeles, Southem,Califomia and Hawaii
www. laco]2ts.
org
Coptic Orthodox Dioceseof Melboume and Affiliated Regions
www. melbcopts.org.au
Coptic Orthodox Dioceseof SouthemUnited States
www. suscot)ts.or2
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Coptic Orthodox Patriarchate
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315
316
Interviews
Clergy and membersof the Coptic Orthodox Church in the United Kingdom, July 2003
October 2005
Monks and priests of the Coptic Orthodox Church, Egypt, October-November2003
Bishop Mouneer Anis, Bishop in Egypt, Episcopal Church, Cairo, October 2003
Bishop Yohanna Qolta, Coptic Catholic Church, Cairo, November 2003
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His Beatitude,PatriarchNasrallah Boutros Sfeir, Patriarch of Antioch and All The East of the
Maronites, Bkerke, April 2004
Bishop Youssef Bchare,Head of the Maronite Qomet ShehwanMonastery, Beirut, April
2004
Priestsand nuns of the Maronite Church, Lebanon,March-April 2004
Bishop GeorgeKhodr, Orthodox Bishop of Mount Lebanon,Lebanon,April 2004
JesuitPriest, Beirut, March 2004
Dory Chamoun,Leader,National Liberal Party, Beirut, April 2004
GeorgeHawi, former Leader, Communist Party, Beirut, April 2004
Representativeof the Maronite League,Beirut, April 2004
Academicsfrom severalLebaneseinstitutions including The American University in Beirut,
Notre Dame University, University of St. Joseph,Near East School of Theology, Hagazian
University, Lebanon,March-April 2004
318
319
Maronite Patriarch
320
Challengesto patriarchal
authority
Existenceand Activities of a
Diaspora
321