World Development Vol. 35, No. 4, pp.

607625, 2007
2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved
0305-750X/$ - see front matter
www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2006.06.006

Household Contributions to Community

Development in Indonesia
VICTORIA A. BEARD *
University of California at Irvine, CA, USA
Summary. Critical to the success of community development is the degree to which citizens contribute their resources. The paper develops regression models to examine the eects of household
and community characteristics on household contributions of time and money to three types of
participatory community development eorts: governance, social welfare, and environmental infrastructure. Households with indicators of lower socio-economic status generally contributed less
time and money to community development. Integration into social networks was also a strong
predictor of the amount of time a household contributed. Because most of the community development eorts analyzed rely on reciprocity, where participants contribute resources in order to receive benets, the ndings raise doubts about the extent to which these eorts help the poor and
socially excluded.
2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Key words participation, community development, collective action, social capital, Southeast
Asia, Indonesia

1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past 50 years, a new development
paradigm has gained momentum that increasingly favors locally planned and implemented
development strategies over centralized development (Chambers, 1997; Diamond, 2001; Hirschman, 1984; Manor, 1999; Ostrom, 1990;
Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004; Tendler, 1997;
Upho & Wijayaratna, 2000; Wunsch & Olowu,
1995). Its acceptance is evident in the wide application of decentralization policies, community
driven development strategies, and participatory approaches to project design and implementation. A dening characteristic of this
paradigm is the emphasis on citizens as essential
contributors of knowledge, time, and other resources to the development process. Advocates
claim a range of benets including, but not
limited to, reduced project costs, an enhanced
sense of local ownership, improved targeting
of beneciaries, community empowerment,
and democratization of local governance. 1 It
is often assumed by development practitioners
that localized approaches to development
herein referred to as community development efforts or activitiesare more likely to succeed in
rural areas as compared to their urban counter607

parts because social relationships there are

believed to be more stable, closed and cooperative, thus providing favorable conditions for collective action.
In Indonesia, questions about the viability of
community development are increasingly
important as the country decentralizes, a process set in motion by two pieces of legislation,
Law No. 22 and Law No. 25, implemented in
2001. Those laws have changed Indonesia from
a highly centralized state in which governance,
planning and scal management had been partially deconcentrated to provincial government oces, to a decentralized state in which
* The author is indebted to Elizabeth Frankenberg,
Duncan Thomas, James Stein, and Jim Leighland for
supporting the citizen participation module in the
Indonesian Family Life Survey. The author gratefully
acknowledges the critical commentary provided by
Victoria Basolo, Marlon Boarnet, Ian Coxhead, Jack
Huddleston, and three anonymous reviewers. Finally,
the author is indebted to Randi Cartmill for her help
with the data set and models and her substantive comments on drafts of the paper. The author accepts full
responsibility for the article and its shortcomings. Final
revision accepted: June 19, 2006.

608

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

power over such responsibilities has devolved to lower levels of government (Antlov,
2003; Beier & Ferrazzi, 1998; Booth, 2003;
Crane, 1995; Hadiz, 2004; Smoke & Lewis,
1996; Turner, Podger, Sumardjono, & Tirthayasa, 2003). In many areas of Indonesia, however, one result of the decentralization
legislation has been that local governments
have fewer resources made available to them
for development (Silver, 2003). In the absence
of state resources, a key determinant of the success or failure of decentralization is the likelihood that citizens will help in providing
goods and services through community development eorts. Yet planners and policy makers
have little empirical evidence about the types of
households that are likely to contribute resources to such eorts, or the types of communities in which those households reside. For
example, which households are willing or able
to contribute resources to community development? Are such eorts more likely to succeed in
rural or urban, large or small, homogenous or
heterogeneous communities? And to what extent, if any, does participatory community
development reinforce existing inequalities
among households?
This paper develops a series of regression
models that examine the eects of household
and community characteristics on household
contributions of time and money to participatory community development eorts in urban
and rural Indonesia. The paper begins by
describing a conceptual and theoretical framework central to understanding community
development in Indonesia. Based on this framework, the paper then outlines a series of
hypotheses regarding how household and community characteristics are likely to aect household contributions of time and money to
community development. Next, the data, variables and methods of analysis are presented. Finally, the ndings from the models and their
broader policy implications are discussed.
2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
Because most community development efforts expect households to contribute at least
nominal resources in order to receive goods
and services, a households participation is
mediated by its own socio-economic status.
Household participation is also aected by the
interaction among three elements: (1) the local

organizational context, (2) a communitys

capacity for collective action and (3) the presence of social capital. For the purposes of this
paper, the local organizational context refers
to community organizations that are initiated
by both state and non-state actors and that
can have either a secular or a religious focus.
Such organizations are the institutional spaces
or fora through which citizens come together,
organize and mobilize their resources. Collective action is dened as the process by which
people work together in those fora to accomplish goals of mutual interest and benet. Social capital refers to relationships of trust and
reciprocity between individuals that facilitate
collective action. The following sections examine each of the three elements.
(a) Local organizational context
As decentralization policies gain favor, many
scholars and practitioners are turning their
attention to the role of community organizations in development (Abers, 2000; Friedmann
& Douglass, 1998; Sandercock, 1998). In order
to understand such organizations in Indonesia,
one has to consider the pre-eminent role of the
state and its relationship with civil society in
the post-colonial period (Anderson, 1983; Eldridge, 1990; Emmerson, 1978; Malley, 1999;
Robison & Hadiz, 2004). Until the current period of political reform, Indonesia was characterized by a strong, centralized state with a
pronounced role for the military in social and
economic development (dwifungsi). During
Suhartos presidency (196698), the nature of
the state severely limited the social and political
spaces where citizens could organize. Indeed,
organizations that were not sponsored by the
state and those who participated in them were
often viewed with suspicion (Anderson, 2001).
Through a vertically integrated political-administrative structure, the state was able to monitor
and maintain a level of control over neighborhoods and households (Sullivan, 1992). The
structures vertical organization restricted the
horizontal spaces across communities, thus disallowing integration that could be used for a
broader social mobilization (Beard, 2002). That
politicaladministrative structure, however, was
not exclusively a state tool of social and political
control. For instance, in some communities residents managed to use it to increase their access
to resources and political power (Beard, 2003).
An outgrowth of this political legacy is two
tiers of civic participation in Indonesia. The

HOUSEHOLD CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA

rst tier encompasses community organizations

largely dependent on the participation of local
residents in a spatially bound community.
Some of those organizations are part of the
state structure (e.g., wards); others are indigenous and exist outside the purview of the state
(e.g., rotating credit schemes, indigenous governance organizations); while still others are
hybrids (e.g., mother and child health posts).
The second tier consists of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), operating usually at a
geographic and institutional level above or
unattached to the spatially bound community.
NGOs often have professional sta, and their
work either is based on a specic agenda, such
as agricultural assistance or environmental
sustainability, or focuses on a specic target
group. The two tiers represent fundamentally
dierent types of civic participation in Indonesia. Despite the growth of the NGO sector in
the last 15 years, community organizations still
have a much broader and more signicant national presence.
In 1997, Indonesia began to feel the eects of
an economic crisis that escalated and evolved
into a social and political crisis in 1998. During
the crisis the value of the rupiah declined, the
economy contracted, food prices increased, rioting occurred in Jakarta and other cities, demonstrators were killed and ultimately these events
culminated in the resignation of President Suharto. In 1998, the government of Indonesia
established a series of social safety net (SSN)
programs in response to the increase in poverty
created by the crisis. The SSN programs were
multifaceted and delivered benets in four
main areas: food security, employment creation,
access to education and health services, and
regional block grants for the purposes of public
works and subsidized credit. An evaluation of
the SSN programs, based on an analysis of the
100 Village Survey, found that the subsidized
rice program had the highest participation rates
among poor households, but it was also found
that the program delivered signicant benets
to non-poor households (Sumarto, Suryahadi,
& Widyanti, 2004). Elite capture of these
benets is partially explained by the fact that
distribution of the subsidized rice was the
responsibility of local community leaders, who
felt pressure to extend benets beyond eligible households (Sumarto, Suryahadi, & Pritchett, 2003). As Sumarto et al. (2004, p. 3) note,
prior to the initiation of the SSN programs
in 1998, Indonesia did not have an extensive
national social safety net; instead families

609

and communities provided the bulk of social

insurance. This paper evaluates the capacity
of these ubiquitous community development effortspresent before, during and, most likely,
long after the crisisto involve households.
(b) Collective action
In the context of Indonesias recent decentralization legislation and its economic crisis,
the state has increasingly depended on community organizations to deliver public goods and
services. Planners and policy makers therefore
need information about the capacity of those
organizations to engage residents in collective
action to achieve development objectives (e.g.,
delivery of preventive health care or building
and maintaining environmental infrastructure).
A number of social theorists have written about
the conditions under which groups of individuals will act opportunistically as well as cooperatively to achieve shared goals.
Olson (1965) asserted that groups of individuals with a shared interest will not act on behalf
of that interest. Rather, members of a large
group rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare, they will not act to advance their
common group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so . . . (Olson, 1965,
p. 2). According to Olson, the problem with
the assumption that groups will act on behalf
of a common interest is that there is no incentive for all to share the cost. Instead, each member of the group prefers that another member
will pay the entire cost, hence creating a free
rider problem. Olson acknowledged that small
groups are both quantitatively and qualitatively
dierent than large groups, and that with smaller groups the free rider problem is reduced.
Garrett Hardins (1968) argument is similar in
his theorization of the tragedy of the commons. Hardin explained that common use of
a scarce natural resource in the absence of a
coercive administrative system to control its
use inevitably leads to the degradation of that
resource.
Ostroms (1990) work presents serious theoretical and empirical challenges to Olsons and
Hardins understanding of the free rider problem and of the diculties associated with collective action. Whereas previous policy
analysts limited their proposed responses to
those problems to: (1) control by a strong central government or (2) regulation through a system of private property rights, Ostrom presents
a third option: individuals have agency to

610

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

create their own agreements, institutions, and

systems of management, which have the capacity to change over time and prevent tragic outcomes. Through a series of case studies of
management of small-scale common pool resources, Ostrom examined how in various contexts a group of principals who are in an
interdependent situation can organize and govern themselves to obtain continuing joint benets when all face temptations to free-ride, shirk,
or otherwise act opportunistically (Ostrom,
1990, p. 29). While the community development eorts analyzed here do not focus specifically on the management of scarce natural
resources, such organizations depend on the
agency of their members to manage household
resources (e.g., time and money) to create and
deliver public goods and services.
Yet an important question remains: Why are
some groups able to overcome the persistent
problems that plague collective action, such as
those related to co-ordination and social dilemmas, while other groups fail (Kollock, 1998)?
Recent work by a diverse group of scholars
has identied key factors that inuence the
prospects for collective action (Agrawal, 2001;
Baland & Platteau, 1996; Campbell et al.,
2001; Fung & Wright, 2003; Poteete & Ostrom,
2004; Quiggin, 1993; Vedeld, 2000). The factors include population heterogeneity (social,
economic, and ethnic), group size, dierential
power relationships and the mediating role
played by institutions. Summarizing three comprehensive studies of common property-based
natural resource management, Agrawal (2001)
developed a list of approximately 35 factors that
aect the sustainability of the commons. The
analyses in this paper examine some of the factors identied by Agrawal and others, but it is
important to note how this papers focus diers
from previous studies. Most signicantly, the
paper does not focus on managing a pre-existing, common pool natural resource. Rather, this
paper is interested in collective action for the
purposes of creating and distributing a public
good or service through a participatory community development process. The current study
also diers from existing studies in not focusing
on institutional arrangements per se, which in a
number of the organizations analyzed here
(governance organizations and social welfare
organizations, in particular) have been predetermined or xed by the state. Instead, the paper
is concerned with the relationship between
household and community characteristics and
contributions to community development.

(c) Social capital

Scholars analyzing collective action have
increasingly emphasized how the quality of the
social relationships among actors directly aects
the outcome of the system (Ostrom, 1995). As a
result, policy makers have become increasingly
interested in social networks and the level of
trust among actorsconcepts commonly captured under the umbrella of social capital (Carpenter, Daniere, & Takahashi, 2004; Daniere,
Takahashi, & Naranong, 2002; Dasgupta &
Serageldin, 2000; Grootaert, 1998; Grootaert
& van Bastelaer, 2002; Narayan & Pritchett,
1999; Woolcock, 1998; Woolcock & Narayan,
2000). The conceptualization and the ultimate
contribution of social capital to development,
however, remain unresolved issues both in the
social sciences (Coleman, 1988; Fine, 2001;
Loury, 1977; Portes, 1998) and in public policy
research (Harriss, 2001; Lin, 2001; Mansuri &
Rao, 2004; Paldman, 2000). In the literature,
social capital is generally conceptualized in
one of two ways. The rst focuses on the benets that individuals accrue from membership in
social networks or from contacts, whereas the
second conceptualization focuses on individual
relationships of trust that facilitate reciprocal
exchange.
Both Putnam (1993) and Coleman (1990)
have cited Cliord Geertzs account (1962) of
community rotating credit schemes (arisan) on
Java as an apposite example of social capital.
The credit schemes are noteworthy because
the risk involved dees the logic of collective
action; that is, individuals participate voluntarily in arisan and moreover continue to do so
after they have received the pot of money contributed by all members (Putnam, 1993).
According to Putnam, certain factors prevent
individuals from behaving in an opportunistic
manner. First, because the risk involved in participation is recognized by all members, new
participants are carefully screened; second,
the threat of ostracism from the socio-economic system is a powerful, credible sanction
in a community of dense networks of exchange
(Putnam, 1993, p. 168).
Coleman (1990) identied three conditions
associated with the presence of social capital:
closure, stability, and the presence of a communitarian ideology. According to Coleman, closure is when all the actors in a social system
have the power to place pressure (e.g., sanctions) on each other regarding events of mutual
interest (Coleman, 1990, p. 314). Closure is

HOUSEHOLD CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA

more closely associated with rural areas, where

residents are presumed to be more sedentary
and thus to have more intimate knowledge of
each others extended families and personal histories. The second condition integral to social
capital is stability, whereas individual mobility
has the potential to weaken social structure
and imperil social capital (Coleman, 1990, p.
320). Stability too is considered a characteristic
endemic to rural areas, where social, economic,
and physical mobility are limited. The third
condition Coleman identied is the presence
of a communitarian ideology: An ideology
can create social capital by imposing on an
individual who holds it the demand that he
act in the interest of something or someone
other than himself (Coleman, 1990, p. 320).
Ideology is particularly relevant in the Indonesian rural context, where the state has promoted a communitarian ideology for the
purposes of development in numerous and diverse forms, such as gotong royong and swadaya
masyarakat (Bowen, 1986; Koentjaraningrat,
1961; Sullivan, 1992). 2
An important issue initially omitted from
much of the research on social capital is its potential negative impacts, or what Portes (1998,
p. 17) referred to as the downside of social
capital. New research in this area has highlighted the need to consider how social capital
reinforces asymmetries in power relationships,
inequalities, and social hierarchies. With specic reference to social networks and access to
credit in Indonesia, Okten and Osili (2004, p.
1243) found that women are more likely than
men to benet from participating in community
networks in gaining awareness of credit opportunities, as compared to their male counterparts. Their nding is contrary to a number
of other studies examining relationships among
social networks, social capital, and, gender
(Mayoux, 2001; Molyneaux, 2002; Rankin,
2002; Smith, 2000). For example, also with reference to Indonesia, Silvey and Elmhirst (2003,
p. 871) examined three ways in which social
networks can work against women by [supporting] unwelcome claims on womens labor
and remittances; [creating] normative constraints on womens mobility and behavior;
and . . .perpetuating womens exclusion from
more powerful networks. Any analysis of social capital should consider not only its potential to facilitate collective action for the
purpose of improving household and community welfare, but also the possibility that it will
reinforce existing inequalities.

611

3. HYPOTHESES
This paper analyzes household contributions
to three types of community development efforts in urban and rural Indonesia: community
governance, social welfare, and environmental
infrastructure. 3 Many organizations that manage community development eorts rely on
households to contribute money, time, or other
resources. Examples are organizations that provide community governance, water and waste
management services, nancial services, preventive health care services, and neighborhood
security. Given that these organizations depend
on a participatory and reciprocal model of
community development with a focus on providing services, it is hypothesized that a particular type of household will have a higher
likelihood of contributing to these organizations. This section of the paper presents a series
of hypotheses regarding household and community characteristics believed to be associated
with a households decision to contribute time
and money to participatory community development eorts.
Given the central role of reciprocity in community development, it is expected that development eorts are most likely to engage
households whose members both need a particular good or service and have the ability to contribute at least nominal resources. Hence a
household heads educational attainment and
per capita expenditures 4 are expected to aect
participation rates in similar ways. Households
with low levels of education and low per capita
expenditures are expected to need the service,
but they are not expected to have resources
available to contribute in return. Households
with intermediate levels of education and
expenditures are expected to have the highest
rates of participation, because they will have
both the need for the service and the ability
to contribute. Households with high levels of
education and expenditures are expected to
opt out of receiving services through participation (Agrawal & Gupta, 2005). They are expected to purchase the goods and services
they need. Other indicators of socio-economic
status are expected to have linear relationships
with participation. Whereas expenditures are a
measure of a households disposable income,
assets are a more xed measure of a households wealth. Households that own assets of
greater value are likely to contribute more resources because they have more resources,
and because assets, in particular, are a visual

612

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

indication (e.g., owning a motorcycle, household appliances or gold jewelry) of a households

economic status and can prompt increasedcommunity pressure on a household to contribute to
community development. Households in which
the head is employed will also experience more
intense social pressure to contribute resources
because of their elevated economic status as well
as their inclusion in social networks related to
their employment.
Households that are well integrated into social networks in their community are expected
to contribute more time and money to community development eorts (Ostrom, 1995; Putnam, 1993). Female-headed households are
expected to contribute less time and money to
community development eorts, for two reasons. First, female-headed households are expected to have their time consumed by
earning income. Second, because of how community institutions are structured in Indonesia,
they usually require that women who participate do so as partners with their husbands. Female-headed households thus face structural as
well as cultural obstacles to their participation.
It is expected that household heads who have
recently migrated to a new community would
have weaker social ties and thus be less likely
to participate. Households with more family
members (Okten & Osili, 2004) in the community, and those who belong to the majority ethnic group (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Collier,
2002) are expected to be better integrated into
social networks and thus contribute more.
Community characteristics are also hypothesized to aect household contributions to community development. While heterogeneity can
take many forms, it is expected that ethnic
and cultural dierences, in particular, make collective action more dicult because they leave
room for dierent interpretation of the rules of
the game being played, for dierent views about
who should enforce them and for dierent perceptions of social conventions and norms supporting co-operation (Baland & Platteau,
1996, p. 302). On the basis of the literature, collective action is expected to be more dicult in
communities with large, diverse populations
(Agrawal, 2001; Baland & Platteau, 1996; Collier, 2002; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Quiggin,
1993; Vedeld, 2000). As stated by Baland and
Platteau (1996, p. 298) One of the conditions
for successful collective action most tirelessly
and unanimously emphasized in the literature
is that user groups must have a small size.
Residing in a community with a larger popula-

tion or a community that spans a larger geographic area is expected to negatively aect a
households contributions to development efforts.
As an overarching hypothesis, rural households are expected to contribute more time
and money to community development than
urban ones. The argument supporting this
hypothesis is twofold. First, the population is
generally smaller and more stable in rural
areas, and as a result community groups are
smaller, social relationships are stronger and
households have more extensive knowledge of
one anothers personal histories. Second, the
ideology, norms, and customs that support collective behavior and generalized reciprocity
(e.g., gotong royong, swadaya masyrakat, soyo,
gugur gunung) are hypothesized to be stronger
and more strictly adhered to in rural areas. In
general, rural areas are expected to have more
of the characteristics that support the relationships based on trust and reciprocity, relationships that are foundational to social capital
and that ultimately facilitate community-level,
collective action.
4. DATA AND VARIABLES
The analyses were performed using the third
round of the Indonesian Family Life Survey
(IFLS-3) elded in 2000. The IFLS is a multipurpose, panel survey. In the rst round of
the survey (IFLS-1), the sample was stratied
by province and urban and rural areas, and a
random sample was selected from within those
strata (Frankenberg & Thomas, 2000). In
IFLS-1, 7,224 households were interviewed
(Frankenberg & Karoly, 1995). In IFLS-3,
10,541 households were interviewed, representing 94.7% of all targeted households: 6,768
IFLS-1 households and 3,773 split-o households (Strauss et al., 2004, p. 14). 5 The analyses presented here focus on the third round of
the survey because between the second and
third rounds the political system, media, and
civil society began a noteworthy process of
reform (reformasi) that aected the nature of
citizen participation. In addition, between the
second and third rounds, Indonesia experienced
a major economic crisis. 6
The survey includes a citizen participation
module that gathers detailed information on
individual household members participation
in community-level organizations and development eorts. The module was administered to

HOUSEHOLD CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA

household members aged 15 years or older in

IFLS-3. Men and women were asked questions
about a series of organizations that are open to
both sexes, and then each was asked about their
participation in male- or female-specic organizations. The module contains questions about
each household members knowledge of community organizations, whether they had participated in activities in the last 12 months, and
about individual contributions of time and
money in the last 12 months. The sample for
this module contains 25,470 individual respondents and 1,463 proxy respondents. 7
The dependent variables in the regression
models are measures of household contributions of time or money to three types of community development eorts in the 12 months
prior to the survey. The rst community development eort is community governance. This
measure includes neighborhood ward meetings
and Womens National Welfare Organization
(PKKPendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga)
meetings. The second type of eort is social
welfare, which includes cooperatives, community security activities, and the mother and
child health post (Posyandu). The third type
of community development eort is referred
to as environmental infrastructure. It includes
voluntary labor programs, projects that improve the communitys built environment, and
the provision of water and sanitation services.
The household heads educational attainment
is divided into ve dichotomous variables representing the highest level of education attended
by the household head: no education, elementary school, junior high school (omitted), senior
high school, and university. 8 Expenditures are
the rupiah value of a households routine per capita expenditures in the 12 months prior to the
survey. This variable is operationalized as three
dichotomous variables: low expenditures are the
1st through the 25th percentiles of the expenditures distribution, moderate are the 26th
through the 75th percentiles of the distribution
(omitted) and high expenditures are the 76th
through the 100th percentiles of the distribution. Assets are the natural logarithm of the
total value of all the households assets, including household members personal possessions,
home, savings, investments, business assets,
and land. 9 Employment is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the household heads
primary activity at the time of the survey was
working to help earn income.
A dichotomous variable is included for
whether the household head is female. The

613

models also include a dichotomous variable

indicating whether the household head had
migrated to a new community in the two-year
period prior to the survey. The size of the
households family network is the number of
relatives (specically, the parents, siblings, and
children of the household head, and the spouse
of the head) who live in a separate household in
the same community. Ethnic majority indicates
whether the household belongs to the majority
ethnic group in the community. A households
ethnicity is dened by the household as the ethnicity that is primarily inuential over their daily activities.
Three community characteristics were included in the models. Ethnic homogeneity is a
HerndahlHirschman index of the three major
ethnic groups in the village in 1997. The population size is the total number of community
residents in the year 2000. A communitys geographic size is the total number of hectares in
the year 2000.
The models also include a number of control
variables, such as the household heads age, the
religion of the household head and the number
of household members. Rural indicates whether
the community was located in an area designated as rural by the Indonesian government.
The models control for whether the household
was residing outside of one of the original IFLS
communities. In the rst round of the survey,
IFLS respondents were sampled from 323 communities. Detailed data were gathered on the
characteristics of these communities in each
subsequent round of the survey. As respondents
moved to new communities in later rounds, the
respondents were followed and limited data
were collected about these new communities.
The variable non-IFLS community was included in the models as a control for the replacement of missing data in these new IFLS
communities. 10 Finally, province dummy variables were entered into the model to help control for unobserved geographic heterogeneity.
5. METHODS OF ANALYSIS
The analyses in this paper consist of two
parts. The rst part, as seen in Table 1, describes ruralurban dierences in participation
levels and characteristics of the household and
community. In the second part, tobit regression
models are used to predict the levels of household participation. Table 2 contains tobit
regression models predicting the amount of

614

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

time that households contribute to community

governance, social welfare or environmental
infrastructure activities. Similarly, Table 3
shows tobit regression models predicting the
amount of money that households contribute

to those community development eorts. Interactions with the variable rural, indicating that a
household resides in a rural area, are included
in these models to test for ruralurban dierences in the eects of the independent variables.

Table 1. Rural and urban dierences in household contributions to community development and other characteristics
Variables

Urban (n = 4121)

Rural (n = 4597)

0.94
2510
0.64
2907
1.09
2303
0.10
3369
0.07
3604
0.18
3265

0.82
2739
0.56
3206
1.28
2371
0.10
3979
0.04
4228
0.09
3834

Household socio-economic status

No education, household head (%)
Primary education, household head (%)
Junior high education, household head (%)
Senior high education, household head (%)
University education, household head (%)
Low per capita expenditures (in 1st to 25th percentiles) (%)
Moderate per capita expenditures (in 26th to 75th percentiles) (%)
High per capita expenditures (in 76th to 100th percentiles) (%)
Household assets, in thousands of rupiah, logged
Employed household head (%)

7.13*
36.15*
15.63*
35.73*
5.35*
21.17*
50.37
28.45*
9.61*
82.80*

19.31*
57.13*
10.69*
11.82*
1.05*
28.51*
51.68
19.81*
9.41*
89.99*

Household social networks

Female household head (%)
Migrated in the last two years, household headc (%)
Size of family network in community
Household belongs to majority ethnic group (%)

19.03*
14.46*
2.29*
54.31*

15.83*
9.17*
3.87*
72.47*

Community characteristics
Ethnic homogeneity
Community population size (in thousands)
Community geographic size (in million hectares)

0.78*
12.89*
4.52

0.89*
4.44*
12.31

Control variables
Age of household head
Non-Muslim, household head (%)
Household size
Community not in original IFLS sample (%)

44.52*
10.38
5.33
28.52*

46.63*
6.69
5.20
17.49*

Participation levels
Hoursa to community governance activities
Contributed no time to community governance activities (n)
Hours to social welfare activities
Contributed no time to social welfare activities (n)
Hours to environmental infrastructure activities
Contributed no time to environmental infrastructure activities (n)
Moneyb to community governance activities
Contributed no money to community governance activities (n)
Money to social welfare activities
Contributed no money to social welfare activities (n)
Money to environmental infrastructure activities
Contributed no money to environmental infrastructure activities (n)

Note: unless otherwise indicated, the values in this table are means.
*
Rural-urban dierences are signicant at p < .05 level.
a
Hours are measured in hundreds.
b
Money is measured in hundreds of thousands of rupiah.
c
When data on the household head were unavailable, the oldest household member with available data was
substituted.

HOUSEHOLD CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA

615

Table 2. Tobit regression models predicting the amount of time contributed to community development, in hundreds of
hours (n = 8718)
Community
governance

Social welfare

Environmental
infrastructure

SE

SE

SE

Household SES
No education, head
Primary education, head
Senior high education, head
University education, head
Low per capita expenditures
High per capita expenditures
Household assets, logged
Employed head

1.577*
0.530*
0.368*
0.025
0.028
0.358*
0.368*
0.577*

0.232
0.161
0.177
0.300
0.128
0.133
0.037
0.174

0.804*
0.080
0.020
0.301
0.064
0.466*
0.051
0.122

0.408
0.235
0.234
0.418
0.129
0.144
0.034
0.186

0.711*
0.062
0.413*
0.891*
0.122
0.452*
0.126*
0.732*

0.256
0.183
0.200
0.358
0.142
0.148
0.038
0.212

Social networks
Female head
Migrated in last two years, head
Size of family network
Belongs to ethnic majority

1.108*
0.940*
0.103*
0.678*

0.170
0.191
0.025
0.166

1.124*
0.738*
0.041*
0.464*

0.176
0.191
0.016
0.176

1.652*
0.915*
0.060*
1.189*

0.192
0.204
0.019
0.174

Community characteristics
Ethnic homogeneity
Community population size
Community geographic size

0.203
0.031*
0.002

0.356
0.008
0.001

0.535
0.006
0.001*

0.463
0.008
0.001

0.842*
0.022*
0.002

0.396
0.008
0.001

Control variables
Age of household head
Non-muslim, head
Household size
Rural
Non-IFLS community

0.026*
0.530*
0.182*
2.469*
0.865*

0.006
0.241
0.028
0.432
0.157

0.035*
0.415*
0.240*
2.179*
0.676*

0.004
0.212
0.023
0.632
0.158

0.000
0.211
0.179*
0.307*
1.205*

0.005
0.258
0.026
0.139
0.163

0.547
0.650*
0.009
1.368*

0.471
0.309
0.356
0.652

2.141*

0.669
0.005*

0.001

6.882

0.630

Interaction terms
Rural* no education
Rural* primary education
Rural* senior high education
Rural* university education
Rural* family networks
Rural* ethnic homogeneity
Rural* community population
Rural* community geog. size
Rural* age of head
Rural* non-Muslim
Rural* household size
Constant
Log pseudo-likelihood
Uncensored n

0.096*

0.031

0.097*
0.004*
0.029*
0.769*
0.080*
9.904

0.027
0.001
0.007
0.303
0.038
0.648

11668.147
3469

3.665
9685.877
2605

0.593

13864.214
4044

Note: these models also include province (provinsi) xed eects to control for unobserved geographic heterogeneity.
*
Signicant at p < .05.

Tobit modeling was used here because the

dependent variables had a high percentage of
zeros, which causes a left censoring problem.
Specically, the structural equation for the
tobit model is

y i xi b ei ;
where xi is a vector of independent variables, b
is a vector of parameter estimates, ei is the error
term and y i is a latent variable that is observed

616

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

Table 3. Tobit regression models predicting the amount of money contributed to community development, in hundreds of
thousands of rupiah (n = 8718)
Community
governance

Social welfare

Environmental
infrastructure

SE

SE

SE

Household SES
No education, head
Primary education, head
Senior high education, head
University education, head
Low per capita expenditures
High per capita expenditures
Household assets, logged
Employed head

1.308*
1.124
0.490
0.467
0.330
1.076*
0.710*
0.994

0.518
0.603
0.430
0.687
0.286
0.523
0.338
0.631

0.222
0.237
0.627*
0.462
0.250
0.056
0.153*
0.225

0.394
0.232
0.275
0.367
0.162
0.156
0.058
0.207

0.791
0.392
0.190
2.957
0.040
0.731*
0.290*
1.036

0.587
0.321
0.262
2.013
0.239
0.373
0.129
0.599

Social networks
Female head
Migrated in last two years, head
Size of family network
Belongs to ethnic majority

1.539
1.501
0.082
0.686

0.957
0.852
0.044
0.579

0.947*
0.677*
0.042*
0.042

0.282
0.277
0.019
0.203

0.773*
0.519
0.064
0.223

0.379
0.362
0.043
0.296

Community characteristics
Ethnic homogeneity
Community population size
Community geographic size

0.895
0.032
0.211*

0.867
0.021
0.103

0.081
0.010
0.001*

0.384
0.008
0.001

1.403
0.001
0.001

0.726
0.012
0.002

Control variables
Age of household head
Non-Muslim, head
Household size
Rural
Non-IFLS community

0.004
0.046
0.249
1.647*
0.026

0.011
0.455
0.161
0.688
0.502

0.008
0.193
0.097*
0.280
0.620*

0.005
0.239
0.031
0.294
0.247

0.010
0.543
0.181
0.573
1.352*

0.010
0.444
0.094
0.355
0.681

1.092*
1.063*
0.785
1.624

0.537
0.382
0.417
1.878

0.858*
5.851

0.380
1.407

14.690

6.649

Interaction terms
Rural* no education
Rural* primary education
Rural* senior high education
Rural* university education
Rural* community geog. size
Rural* non-IFLS community
Constant
Log pseudo-likelihood
Uncensored n

0.212*

0.103

20.611

9.975

6102.934
1370

3780.800
886

6889.463
1619

Note: these models also include province (provinsi) xed eects to control for unobserved geographic heterogeneity.
*
Signicant at p < .05.

for values greater than 0 and censored for values less than or equal to 0.
The observed y is dened by the measurement equation
y i y i if y i > 0 and

y i 0 if y i < 0:

In all the tobit regression models, the independent variables include characteristics of the
household head, the household unit and the community. 11 Population weights provided with the

IFLS data were used in the analyses to correct for

attrition and the over-sampling of urban areas
and smaller provinces. Table 4 in the Appendix
contains descriptive statistics for all the dependent and independent variables included in the
regression models.
Two statistical issues are important for these
regression models: the potential endogeneity of
the independent variables and unobserved geographic heterogeneity. Endogeneity could be a

HOUSEHOLD CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA

problem if one or more of the independent variables aect participation as well as are aected
by participation. For example, if participation
in community development activities had a
benecial eect on the economic status of participants, a simultaneity problem would be
created. This scenario is unlikely; 12 thus, simultaneity is not expected to bias the estimates in
the models. Although the possibility of endogeneity was carefully considered prior to the selection of all the independent variables in the
models, it can never be completely ruled out in
models using cross-sectional survey data.
Unobserved heterogeneity could also be a
problem if one or more unmeasured shared
characteristics are aecting participation in a
geographic region. This possibility has been controlled for by including community-level variables and province xed eects, the smallest
level of aggregation possible due to small sample
sizes in some communities. Like endogeneity,
unobserved heterogeneity cannot be completely
ruled out in analyses of this type.
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The discussion of the ndings is organized into
three parts: the eects of: (1) socio-economic
status, (2) social networks and (3) community
characteristics on household contributions of
time and money to community development
eorts. In each of these sections, the descriptive
statistics are discussed rst, followed by the
results of the regression models.
(a) Household socio-economic status
As can be seen in Table 1, households in urban
areas generally had higher socio-economic status. For instance, urban areas had a signicantly
lower percentage of households with low levels
of educational attainment (no education and
primary education) and a signicantly higher
percentage of households with high levels of
educational attainment (junior high, senior high,
and university) as compared to their rural counterparts. Urban areas had a smaller percentage
of households in the low expenditures per capita
category and a larger percentage of households
in the highest per capita expenditures category.
Urban households also had household assets
of signicantly higher value. The one area where
urban households fared poorly relative to their
rural counterparts was that urban household
heads were less likely to be employed.

617

In Table 2, while not all of the hypotheses

regarding the relationship between socio-economic status and contributions of time to community development eorts were supported by
the ndings, most of the signicant ndings
were in the expected direction. Note that the results found are net of province xed eects,
lessening the likelihood that they are capturing
unobserved geographic heterogeneity. In the
models predicting the amount of time a household contributes to community governance
organizations, urban and rural households in
which the head had no education or primary
educational attainment contributed less time
on average and households in which the head
had a senior high school education contributed
more time on average, compared to households
in which the household head had educational
attainment at the junior high school level. As
expected, urban and rural households with the
highest expenditures per capita, the 76th
through the 100th percentiles, contributed less
time to participatory community governance,
compared to the households with moderate
expenditures per capita, the 26th through the
75th percentiles. 13
Having household assets of a higher value
and having an employed household head was
positively associated with the amount of time
that both urban and rural households contributed to community governance. The nding
concerning assets was expected for a number
of reasons. First, this measure includes the value of the households home and land and
therefore is indirectly a measure of the households ties to the community. As mentioned in
the hypotheses section, owning assets of higher
value is a visual indication of a households social status and economic well being, so it is expected that communities will exert pressure on
those households to contribute more. While
the nding related to employment status may
seem counterintuitive because an employed
head will have less free time to volunteer,
employment also bestows social status and
indicates access to social networks that may
make the household head more likely to become involved in community governance.
Looking at the second model in Table 2, as
expected, both urban and rural households in
which the head had no education and rural
households in which the head had primary-level
education contributed less time to community
social welfare eorts, as compared to households whose heads had a junior high school
education. The eects of the head having no

618

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

education are sensitive to the choice of cutos

used to create the three expenditure variables,
however. 14 Thus, conclusions about the eect
of this variable should be considered tentative.
Unexpectedly, households in rural areas where
the head had university-level education contributed more time on average to eorts to improve
social welfare. This nding may reect the social pressure in rural areas on individuals with
university education, particularly women, to
use their advanced educational attainment to
help organize social welfare activities, many of
which focus on education, health, and family
planning issues. As expected, urban and rural
households with the highest expenditures per
capita, the 76th through the 100th percentiles,
contributed less time to participatory social
welfare activities on average compared to
households with moderate per capita expenditures. One possible interpretation of this nding is that households in the highest
expenditure category can aord to take advantage of alternatives to participatory, social welfare services (e.g., private health care and
commercial banks) and thus become disengaged from community eorts to provide these
services.
Turning to environmental infrastructure
activities, as expected, in both urban and rural
areas households in which the head had no education and households in which the head had a
senior high school education or a university
education contributed less time on average,
compared to households in which the head
had educational attainment at the junior high
school level. As expected, urban and rural
households with the highest expenditures per
capita, the 76th to 100th percentiles, contributed less time on average to participatory environmental infrastructure projects. Urban and
rural households with assets of a higher value
contributed more time on average to environmental infrastructure. Finally, urban and rural
households with an employed head contributed
more time on average to environmental infrastructure, possibly because such households
have higher social status and access to larger
social networks.
Turning to Table 3, most of the results for
the money models were as expected. Unsurprisingly, urban and rural households with uneducated heads contributed less money to
community governance as compared to their
counterparts with junior high education. Urban
and rural households with high per capita
expenditures contributed less money on aver-

age to community governance, compared to

households with moderate per capita expenditures. Households in both urban and rural
areas with assets of a higher value contributed
signicantly more money on average to community governance. In the social welfare model, as the interaction eects show, rural
households whose heads have no education or
primary education contributed less money on
average while urban and rural household heads
with senior high school education contributed
more money, relative to households whose
heads had junior high school education. The
same pattern for expenditures and assets was
found in the environmental infrastructure model as was found in the community governance
model: urban and rural households with high
per capita expenditures contributed less money
on average while urban and rural households
with assets of a higher value contributed more
money on average to infrastructure activities.
Again, this nding could be attributed to the visual nature of household assets and the resulting community pressure or sense of obligation
a household feels to contribute more money.
(b) Social networks
In Table 1, the dierences between urban and
rural households access to social networks is
consistent with the hypothesis that rural areas
have characteristics associated with stronger
social networks. The table shows that urban
households have a higher percentage of female-headed households. Urban households
are also more likely to have heads that have migrated in the last two years, and they have
smaller family networks in their community
on average. Additionally, a smaller percentage
of urban households belong to the majority ethnic group, compared to their rural counterparts.
Most of the ndings in Table 2 support the
hypotheses regarding the relationship between
access to social networks and contributions of
time to participatory community development.
The models included two measures that represent exclusion from social networks: having a
female household head and migrating in the
two-year period before the survey. In the community governance model, both of those variables were negatively associated with urban
and rural household contributions of time.
The models also included two variables that
indicate inclusion in social networks: having a
larger family network in the community and

HOUSEHOLD CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA

belonging to the majority ethnic group. In the

case of community governance, having larger
family networks positively predicted the contributions of time by urban households. One possible explanation is that urban communities are
less stable and closed, and as a result, contributions of time are more sensitive to integration
into social networks. Urban and rural households that belonged to the majority ethnic
group also contributed more time on average
to community governance eorts. Similar patterns were found in the social welfare and the
environmental infrastructure models. Both urban and rural households with female heads
and heads who had recently migrated contributed less time on average. Urban and rural
households with larger family networks and
those that belonged to the majority ethnic
group in their community were more likely to
contribute time, although the eect of family
networks on contributions of time to social welfare activities was sensitive to the choice of
expenditures cutos. 15 This casts some doubt
on the robustness of the nding.
Turning to Table 3, overall, the social network variables did not have equally strong or
consistent eects in the models predicting
household contributions of money as these
variables had in the models predicting household contributions of time. In the second model, households with a female head or a head
who had migrated in the last two years gave less
money on average to social welfare activities. In
the same model, households with larger family
networks contribute more money on average
to social welfare activities. In the third model,
households with a female head gave less money
to environmental infrastructure activities. It is
not surprising that the social network variables
were more often signicant in the models measuring time. Contributing time requires establishing social relationships and working
together with other residents on collective efforts, whereas contributing money symbolizes
condence in a collective action eort, but requires no intense social interaction. If contributing money reects social integration, it does
so to a lesser extent than contributions of time
do.
(c) Community characteristics
Table 1 compares urban and rural community characteristics. Urban communities were
less ethnically homogenous and had larger populations than their rural counterparts. These

619

ndings were expected given the population

density and diversity that characterizes urban
Indonesia.
In Table 2, the eects of community characteristics on household contributions of time
are mixed. In the rst model measuring time
given to community governance, the interaction
eect shows that urban households give more
time and rural households give less time on
average to community governance as population size increases. Another interaction eect
indicates that rural households contributed
more time on average in communities characterized by larger geographic size. It was hypothesized that collective action would be more
dicult in communities where population size
and geographic size were larger. While the ndings for population size in rural areas support
the original hypothesis, an alternative interpretation of these ndings is that when a communitys population and geographic size expands
past a particular threshold this creates more
complex and time consuming governance issues.
The eects of community characteristics on
household contributions of time to social welfare activities were surprising. Rural households residing in more ethnically homogenous
communities contribute less time to social welfare on average. This nding contradicts the
collective action literature. Urban and rural
households contributed more time on average
in geographically larger communities. Again,
this may be related to the increased complexity
of delivering services in this larger geographic
environment.
In the model predicting time given to environmental infrastructure activities, contrary to
expectation, urban and rural households in ethnically homogenous communities contributed
less time on average. Again, this contradicts
the collective action literature. Both urban
and rural households in communities with larger populations contributed more time to environmental infrastructure activities on average.
This nding may reect the fact that a larger
population increases the severity of environmental problems, such as those associated with
poor sanitation, and the need for careful management of scarce environmental resources like
water. The interaction eect shows that rural
households in geographically larger communities contributed more time to these activities.
Once again, this may reect the increased complexity of organizing activities in a larger area,
particularly activities related to physical infrastructure.

620

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

In Table 3, the interaction eect shows that

urban households in geographically larger communities contributed signicantly less money to
governance activities. These physically larger
communities may be less socially cohesive and
consequently households are less likely to contribute money to governance. In the second
model, both urban and rural households in geographically larger communities contributed
more money to social welfare activities. Such
activities in geographically larger communities
may be more expensive because of increased
transportation cost. It is worth noting that
none of the community characteristics had an
impact on the amount of money contributed
to environmental infrastructure activities.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper examines household contributions
to community development in three areas: governance, social welfare, and environmental
infrastructure. In Indonesia, household contributions to those eorts are signicant because
the state has implemented decentralization policies that transfer power from the central government to local governments, and in many
areas the new policies have resulted in resource
shortfalls at the local level. In the wake of the
economic crisis and higher poverty levels, there
is a pressing need to understand the types of
households and communities that will contribute to the delivery of public goods and services.
The paper begins by asking: What types of
households are likely to contribute to community development eorts? What types of community characteristics facilitate or impede
community development eorts? Will household contributions reinforce existing inequalities? Finding clear-cut answers to these
questions through statistical modeling is not always easy. The models in this paper may be affected by omitted variable bias, in the form of
unmeasured geographic dierences, or by endogeneity of the independent variables. Steps have
been taken to avoid both of these problems.
The inclusion of province xed eects in the
models is intended to help control for unobserved geographic heterogeneity and prevent
the appearance of spurious ndings. Also, the
independent variables were carefully selected
to avoid the possibility of endogeneity. Nevertheless, these issues may still aect the ndings.
This paper should therefore be considered an
imperfect rst attempt to describe the house-

hold-level determinants of participation, but

one that shines some light on the issues and
thereby contributes to important policy debates.
Discussion of the ndings is organized
around three areas that the literature identies
as likely to aect household contributions: a
households socio-economic status, access to
social networks and community characteristics.
Beginning with socio-economic status, household heads with lower educational attainment
contributed signicantly less time to community governance. This nding casts doubt on
the assumption that moving the locus of decision-making from the central government to
the community automatically facilitates the
incorporation of previously excluded households into planning and governance. It also
calls into question the assumption that the
needs and priorities of such households are represented in the community governance process.
Households with lower expenditures and less
valuable assets, indicating lower economic status, also contributed less time and money to
community development. Given the reciprocal
model used in most community development
eorts, this nding should cause concern
among policy makers who assume that such
programs have the capacity to involve and assist the poor. Some may argue that households
with lower economic status will continue to
reap the benets of community development
eorts regardless of their contributions.
Although that may be so, I argue that it is true
only to a limited degree: for example, households that do not contribute to a neighborhood
security eort may still reside in a safer community if their neighbors contribute to the eort.
However, based on my extensive direct observation of the community development programs examined in these models, the benets
received by those unable to contribute are limited and uneven. Moreover, although not consistent across all the models, the reverse
pattern was also found; that is, households with
higher expenditures also contributed less to
community development eorts, indicating that
those households are transferring a relatively
small amount of their resources to less auent
households through these eorts.
The ndings regarding social networks were
some of the most robust and consistent across
all the models. In particular, female-headed
households and recent migrants were less likely
to participate in most of the community development activities analyzed here. In addition,

HOUSEHOLD CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA

having a larger family network in a households

own community and to a lesser extent belonging to the dominant ethnic group are positively
associated with household contributions to
community development eorts. The ndings
regarding social networks were found in both
urban and rural areas, and they underscore
the potential weakness of relying on participatory community development to involve, and
by extension deliver, benets to socially excluded segments of the population. If a household is, for example, outside familial and
dominant social networks, its members may
have diculty in establishing membership in
community organizations and gaining access
to the goods and services they deliver.
The ndings also demonstrate the importance of community characteristics. One unexpected nding is that ethnic homogeneity is
not a strong or consistently positive predictor
of household contributions to community
development. Two other unexpected ndings
are that households in communities with larger
populations and in communities that span larger geographic areas often contributed more
on average to community development. As stated earlier, these ndings suggest that large

621

populations and geographic size magnify the

need for and increase the logistical complexity
of community development. One possible
explanation regarding the dierences between
the ndings in this paper and those in the
collective action literature is that much of the
literature referenced earlier focuses on the management of natural resources, whereas the models here focus on community governance and
the creation and distribution of public goods
and services.
In conclusion, the ndings tentatively call
into the question the assumption that community development benets the most vulnerable
segments of the population, who have the fewest resources to contribute. Further, the ndings indicate that community development has
a limited ability to redistribute resources. Policy
makers and planners should be sensitive to the
tendency of community development to reinforce existing patterns of social exclusion and
to maintain existing inequalities. The ndings
demonstrate the need for further research on
who benets from the paradigm shift towards
localized approaches to development including
decentralization policies, community driven
development and participatory processes.

NOTES
1. A growing body of literature highlights the weaknesses of decentralized and community-based approaches to development (see Abraham & Platteau,
2000; Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Conning & Kevane,
2002; Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Ebrahim, 2003; Hadiz,
2004; Harriss, 2001; Galasso & Ravallion, 2000; Mansuri
& Rao, 2004; Platteau, 2004; Ribot, 1999; Shatkin, 2004).

5. For detailed explanation of the interhousehold

sampling scheme used in IFLS-1 and the tracking
protocols used in later rounds of the survey, see Strauss
et al. (2004).

2. These cultural traditions and norms are controversial in the academic literature because it is maintained
that the Indonesian state has co-opted them for selfserving political purposes such as the cultivation of
nationalist sentiment (see Bowen, 1986).

6. T-tests comparing variables across the two rounds

with participation data, IFLS-2 and IFLS-3, show that
many characteristics of urban and rural residents
changed during the economic crisis. For example,
average rates of participation, average employment rates
of household heads, the average value of household
assets and the average number of members per household were signicantly dierent in 2000.

3. The term community here refers to a territorially

based village (desa) or urban neighborhood (kelurahan)
whose boundaries are dened by the Indonesian politicaladministrative structure.

7. If an individual respondent could not be interviewed, a proxy respondent (usually another member of
the household) was asked whether that individual
participated in various activities.

4. It is well documented in the literature on measuring

well-being and living standards in developing countries
that routine expenditures or consumption is the preferred indicator of income (see Deaton & Grosh, 2000;
Ravallion, 1994).

8. The members of the household identied the household head.

9. A logarithmic transformation was performed on this
variable to reduce the positive skew in its distribution.

622

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

10. Over 75% of households were living in an original

IFLS community in 2000.

11. A correlation matrix was used to check for

potential collinearity among the independent variables
in each of the regression models. No variables were
highly correlated, but two pairs of variables were
moderately correlated (community population and rural
residence, and belonging to the ethnic majority and
community ethnic homogeneity). To further check for
multicollinearity, one variable in each pair was temporarily removed from the models, and the standard error
of the other variable in the pair was examined for signs
of having been inated. No signs of inated standard
errors were found.
12. To the authors knowledge there are no studies
demonstrating that household participation in community governance, social welfare, and environmental
infrastructure activities signicantly aects a households expenditures or assets.

13. This eect and the expenditure eects in the other

models estimating household contributions of time are
sensitive to the cutos used to create the variables for
low, moderate, and high per capita expenditures.
14. The household head having no education had no
signicant eect on the average amount of time urban
and rural households gave to community governance
when the low, moderate, and high expenditures variables
were dened as follows: 1st to 33rd percentiles, 34th
to 66th percentiles and 67th to 100th percentiles or 1st to
10th percentiles, 11th to 90th percentiles and 91st to
100th percentiles.
15. The size of a households family network had no
signicant eect on the average amount of time rural
households gave to social welfare activities when the low,
moderate, and high expenditures variables were dened
as either the 1st to 40th percentiles, 41st to 60th
percentiles and 61st to 100th percentiles or the 1st to
33rd percentiles, 34th to 66th percentiles and 67th to
100th percentiles.

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625

APPENDIX
(See Table 4).
Table 4. Descriptive statistics on variables in regression models (n = 8718)
Variables

a
b
c

Mean (SD)

Dependent variables
Hoursa to community governance activities
Hours to social welfare activities
Hours to environmental infrastructure activities
Moneyb to community governance activities
Money to social welfare activities
Money to environmental infrastructure activities

0.917
0.608
1.259
0.102
0.060
0.127

(1.977)
(1.559)
(2.564)
(2.285)
(0.936)
(1.710)

Household socio-economic status

No education, household head
Primary education, household head
Junior high education, household headc
Senior high education, household head
University education, household head
Low per capita expenditures (in 1st to 25th percentiles)
Moderate per capita expenditures (in 26th to 75th percentiles)c
High per capita expenditures (in 76th to 100th percentiles)
Household assets, logged
Employed household head

0.133
0.459
0.136
0.240
0.032
0.253
0.507
0.240
9.525
0.868

(0.339)
(0.498)
(0.343)
(0.427)
(0.176)
(0.435)
(0.500)
(0.427)
(1.786)
(0.338)

Household social networks

Female household head
Migrated in the last two years, household head
Size of family network in community
Household belongs to majority ethnic group

0.171
0.115
3.150
0.799

(0.376)
(0.319)
(3.359)
(0.353)

Community characteristics
Ethnic homogeneity
Community population size (in thousands)
Community geographic size (in million hectares)

0.828 (0.183)
8.970 (10.014)
9.756 (86.587)

Control variable
Age of household head
Non-Muslim, household head
Household size
Rural
Community not in original IFLS sample

45.579
0.123
5.315
0.527
0.222

Hours are measured in hundreds.

Money is measured in hundreds of thousands of rupiah.
This category is omitted in the models.

(15.214)
(0.328)
(2.682)
(0.499)
(0.416)