2015 JUNE ESSAY QUESTION 1 (HAND WRITTEN) 65%

(1) STATE V. ARTHUR (A)

Conspiracy:
An agreement to commit an unlawful act, with intent to both agree and commit the act.
Here A and Cassie (C) came to an agreement to sell art without the authorization of the
gallery owners. While facts indicate "they intended to share the proceeds," the act they did
not obtain permission for their intended act would reasonably infer they knew the act was
outside the purview of their custody of the art. They agreed and intended to commit an act.
They can be charged with conspiracy.
Accomplice Liability:
Pinkerton's Rule:
All members of the conspiracy are liable for the criminal acts of co-conspirators that occur
during the natural course and scope of the conspiracy.
Here both A and C will be liable for each other's acts.
Solicitation:
To entice, induce, or encourage another to commit a crime.
When A "approached Woody and offered him "to take the package" for money, he had
committed solicitation to commit larceny, because the package would be subject to
asportation from the gallery.
Merger:
Lesser included offenses typically merge into the completed larceny.
Conspiracy:
Supra.
A's solicitation, and subsequent agreement by Woody may be sufficient for a second count
of conspiracy.
Embezzlement:
The conversion of personal property of another of which one has lawful possession.
Here facts seem to indicated that A and C were employees, rather than persons of
managerial status. As such, it is likely that only had custody, rather than possession of the
art inside. If they had possession, then they could be charged with embezzlement.

Homicide:
The killing of a human being by another human being.
Here Woody dies in the commission of a crime that A and C have paid him $500 to commit,
there has been a killing, and there may be criminal liability.
Actual Cause:
Test for cause in fact.
Here the prosecution will argue "but for" A and C's solicitation of Woody, he would not have
taken the route he took, and would not have died. A and C will argue that Woody was a
construction worker and was prone to fall of the roof. However, the prosecution will argue
Woody "fell through the gap" between the buildings, something he did only to further the
crime.
Therefore A and C are likely the actual cause.
Proximate Cause:
Tests for foreseeability of result and of any intervening forces.
Here it is foreseeable that Woody could have fallen during the course of the act A and C paid
him to do. They are the proximate cause.
Murder:
At common law a homicide (supra) with malice aforethought.
Malice:
One of (1) intent to kill; (2) intent to inflict great bodily injury; (3) wanton and reckless
conduct (depraved heart); (4) felony murder rule.
Felony Murder Rule:
A homicide occurring during the course of a dangerous felony is malice, and also applies in
modern first degree murders.
Here the prosecution will argue that A and C's scheme to have Woody jump between
buildings constitutes reckless and wanton conduct. However, it is unlikely this argument
succeeds since Woody is his own actor and undertook his act knowing and understanding
the risk. The prosecution will also argue that the crime took place during a felony (larceny).
However, larceny is generally not one of the dangerous felonies qualifying for felony murder.
If the prosecution can establish wanton and reckless, they can bring murder charges,
otherwise, it is likely the homicide will mitigate to Misdemeanor Manslaughter (infra).
Second Degree Murder:
Modernly, murders without premeditation or deliberation, and not felony murder rule.

As argued in common law murder supra, it is unlikely A and C will be charged. However, if
there were, in a modern jurisdiction, they could be charged with this.
Misdemeanor Manslaughter:
Also known as unlawful act manslaughter. Killings occurring during a misdemeanor or felony
not in the felony murder law list.
Here, if A and C are to be charged with criminal homicide, it is most likely going to mitigate to
this charge, although the Redline View may be operative.
Redline View:
A majority split holds that co-felons killed during course of felony not imputed.
Here Woody dies during his role in the felony of larceny. In such jurisdictions A and C might
not be charged.
Larceny:
The trespassory picking up and carrying away of he personal property of another with intend
to permanently deprive.
Here A took art by trespass since he was not authorized, and moved it, giving it to Woody.
He intended to permanently deprive, as facts state he wanted to sell it. Intent to share profits
does not eliminate liability.
A and C will be charged with larceny.
(2) STATE V. CASSIE (C)
Larceny:
Supra.
Cassie "took several more" paintings.
Conspiracy:
Supra.
Solicitation:
Supra.
Burglary:
Modernly burglary is an entry at any time into any structure with intent to permanently
deprive.
If C's going "back into the gallery" can be established as a constructive breaking, then she
may be charged with burglary under modern law. A would be liable as well.

(3) DEFENSES
A and C will argue that they did not have specific intent to permanently deprive owner, and
will try to use this to negate the intent in the conspiracy, solicitation, and larceny charges. As
argued in larceny supra, their "profit sharing" scheme still was intent to deprive, so this fails.
The defenses to homicide discussed supra under homicide.
There are no applicable defenses to the conspiracy charge.

2015 JUNE ESSAY QUESTION 2 (HAND WRITTEN) 65%

WALTER (W) V. BETSY (B)
Governing Law:
Uniform Commercial Code:
Statutes governing sale of goods.
Common Law:
Body of judicial decisions governing services, intangibles, and real property.
Here the purported contract is in regards to an employment contract. The Common Law
governs because employment contracts are for services.
Valid Contract:
An enforceable contract consists of an offer, acceptance, and valid consideration. The
validity of purported contract discussed infra.
Offer:
Outward manifestation of present contractual intent, communicated to the offeree in certain
and definite terms, inviting acceptance.
Here B manifested intent to contract when she communicated to W over the phone "get
down here as soon as possible and we can see where you would fit in." Where the offer is
problematic is in the terms:
Quantity: One job
Time of Performance: "As soon as possible"
Identity of Parties: B and W
Price: Undetermined
Subject Matter: Employment
Absent the price term, this offer is not certain and definite enough for a common law offer.
Contract formation would ordinarily fail at this point, but for the theory of Promissory
Estoppel, discussed infra.
There is not a valid offer at Common Law.
Acceptance:
Unequivocal assent to terms of the offer, at Common Law mirror image rule applies.
Facts state "W agreed". If there was a valid offer, this would have constituted valid
acceptance.
Consideration:
Bargained for exchange imposing sufficient legal detriment on offeror, or conferring benefit

of offeree.
Here, if there were a valid offer an acceptance, B's offer of employment (benefit) would have
cost her money (detriment). Likewise W working (detriment), would have been for money, a
(benefit). If there was a contract, there would have been valid consideration.
Valid Contract:
As discussed supra under offer, there terms were not sufficient, so there is not a valid
contract, see Promissory Estoppel infra.
Defenses to Formation:
Statute of Frauds:
To be valid, certain contracts must be in signed writing, including those for more than a year.
B will argue any agreement was oral, but employment contracts, unless a time is specified,
are generally not subject to SOF, this defense fails.
Promissory Estoppel:
This theory prevents a party from arguing the existence of a valid contract, wehre the
following elements are established: (1) defendant has made representations to induce
reliance; (2) there has been actual reliance by the plaintiff; (3) injustice would otherwise
result.
Here B told We she would provide him employment and that he should "get down there as
soon as possible". This induced reliance. W told here he would give notice, and she was
aware of this. We left his job, shipped his furniture, and flew to South City. This was actual
reliance. Lastly, his expenses, leaving his job, and the trouble of relocating would constitute
injustice -- meeting the last element.
Promissory Estoppel will substitute for consideration and will establish a quasi-contractual
relationship between the parties.
Performance:
W fulfilled his obligation to go to South City, a constructive condition precedent to B hiring
him. B instead notified W she would not hire him, an anticipatory repudiation of her duty. We
can now suspend performance because B is in:
Breach:
A failure to perform under contract.
Here B not hiring W is a material breach of their agreement.
(1) W has a claim of action against B.
Discharges:
Besty refuses to hire W because of cost cutting. This is a foreseeable situation effectively

negating any discharges for impossibility, impracticability, or frustration of purpose.

(1) See discussion supra.
(2) Damages:
Avoidable Consequences:
W made a good faith effort to obtain employment in South City before returning to Nashville,
he has avoided consequences.
Expectation Damages
Generally not available under Promissory Estoppel
Consequential and Incidental Damages
W will be entitled to damages resulting from his reliance on B's statements. Here he has
incurred substantial moving and relocating costs. B will be liable for those foreseeable
damages and any incidentals associated.

2015 JUNE ESSAY QUESTION 3 (HAND WRITTEN) 75%

PERRY (P) V. TOMMY (T)
Negligence:
When a defendant's conduct falls below a duty of cared owed to the plaintiff, which is the
actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
Duty:
A duty is owed to all foreseeable plaintiffs to conduct one's self in a manner that is
reasonable, ordinary, and prudent.
Here Tommy is a fourteen year old, generally children this age are held fo a rebuttable
presumption not to be liable for their tortious acts. This presumption can be rebutted on
facts. Here this is not necessary because the exception to infancy in tort liability is when
children engage in adult behavior. Facts state using the cart was an adult activity. As such
Tommy's standard of care will be the same as an adult. Who the duty is owed to is at issue
here given the distance issues in the facts. Cardozo's majority view in Palsgraf v. Long
Island Rail Road Company is that the duty is owed to those in the "zone of danger." The
Andrews view in the same case is that if a "duty is owed to one, it is owed to all."
Here since Perry "lives over ten miles" away, jurisdictions employing Cardozo may find no
duty owed. Andrews' view jurisdictions will hold Tommy owed a duty owed to Perry.
Tommy owed Perry a duty to be reasonable, ordinary, and prudent.
Breach:
Where a defendant's conduct falls below their duty, they are in breach.
Here, facts state "Tommy failed to watch where he was going and he ran into..." A
reasonable person is held to a standard of paying attention when operating a motor vehicle,
Tommy's lapse of attention is a breach of his duty owed to all on the golf course, Dana
included, and he has acted unreasonably.
There is a breach.
Actual Cause:
A test for the cause in fact of the plaintiff's harm.
Here, but for Tommy's breach, the chain of events leading to P's harm would not have
occurred. Alternatively, Tommy's breach was a substantial factor in P's harm.
Proximate Cause:
Tests of foreseeability of result, and of any intervening factors (I/F) coming into operation
after defendant's breach. Only both unforeseeable I/F and results can cut off liability.
Here Tommy will argue Dana is an independent intervening force, in that her golf shot was in

the chain. Hoever, Dana's act was a reactionary force, and thus dependent on T's act, Dana
does not cut off liability. T will argue that power plant's negligence in having "failed to attach
the required screen" is an intervening force. However, intervening forces must come into
active operation after defendant's act. Here this is not the case, Tommy's best argument is
that power plant's negligence created a "set stage" for which T's act sprung. This argument
may help establish the result as being unforeseeable, but still might not cut off liability since
the act occurred prior. Lastly T will argue P was an unforeseeable plaintiff, this was
discussed supra under duty. It is likely none of T's arguments will establish unforseeability of
both results and intervening forces, and hence he will be proximately liable.
Damages:
General (pain and suffering), and Special (out of pocket medical) available. Here P "suffered
brain damage". Tommy will be liable.
Defenses:
None of the ordinary negligence defenses: contributory negligence, comparative negligence,
or assumption of the risk will be available here, as P was in his house, connected to oxygen.
An action by Perry against Tommy will likely succeed, but he may be better served suing
power plant as well.
Joint and Several Liability
Where multiple defendants combine to harm plaintiff, there are jointly and severally liable.
If P brings actions against Tommy and Power Plant, they would be jointly and severely liable,
and they could seek contribution from each other.
Vicarious Liability:
Based on a relationship, where defendant is liable to plaintiff for the torts of tortfeasor.
Here there is evidence that golf course may be vicariously liable to Perry for Tommy's acts
under the theory of Negligent Entrustment, while the call doesn't ask for this, it is significant
nonetheless. Golf course owed a duty to rent carts to adults, and breached this duty renting
to Tommy, a fourteen year old. For liability to Perry see discussion supra under Perry v.
Tommy.

2015 JUNE ESSAY QUESTION 4 (HAND WRITTEN) 75%

ABE V. BOB
Defamation:
Publication by the defendant of a defamatory statement, that is understood by a third party
to be defamatory, and does hard to the defendant's reputation.
Act:
Publication by defendant.
Here Bob accused Abe of stealing money "while standing in a crowd of students and
parents." This act of making a statement where others could hear establishes this element.
Defamatory Statement:
"Bob knew the accusations was untrue" and demonstrated intent in that he was "seeking to
have Abe fired" The nature of the state was both defamatory and was intended as such to
harm his reputation.
Understood by a third party to be defamatory
Here "a crowd of students and parents" hear Bob accuse Abe of "stealing money from the
team fund." It is reasonable to infer that the crowd understood the statement as defamatory.
Actual Cause:
Cause in fact test.
Here, but for Bob's statement, Abe would not have been defamed.
Proximate Cause:
Foreseeability tests.
Here it was foreseeable that making defamatory statements in a crowd would defame Abe in
the eyes of the community.
Damages:
Slander Per Se:
Ordinary slander is a non-permanent publication of defamatory content, and general
damages are not presumed. However, the Slander Pe Se categories, including: imputing
moral turpitude; loathsome disease; unchastity; and such do provide a presumption of
general damages.
Here Bob imputes criminal behavior on Abe, saying he stole. This constitutes Slander Pe Se
and Abe will be entitled to General Damages. Moreover, Punitive Damages are available
when it can be proved defendant's states were made with Actual Malice. Here Bob
knowingly made an untrue statement with the intent to get Abe fired. It is likely malice will

apply.
Abe will be able to collect for general and punitive damages, as he lost his job and cannot
find employment as a result of Bob's Slander Per Se.
Defenses:
None applicable.
Vicarious Liability:
Where defendant is liable to plaintiff for the torts of tortfeasor based on the relationship
between defendant and tortfeasor.
ABE V. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
Respondeat Superior
A form of vicarious liability (supra) where an employer is held vicariously liable for torts
committed during the course and scope of employment.
Here Abe will argue elementary school should be liable for Bob's defamation discussed
supra. Elementary school will argue that Bob intentionally defaming Abe was outside the
scope of his employment. Hoever since it occurred at a school function, school is likely liable
for Bob's Slander Per Se. Bob had no defenses, school will not either.
BOB V. ABE
Assault:
The intentional act by defendant that causes reasonable apprehension of an imminent
harmful and offensive touching.
Act:
Volitional movement by defendant.
Here Abe threw a basketball, this act was volitional.
Intent:
Did defendant desire, or act with substantial certainty their act would result as it did.
Here it is reasonable to infer Abe desired to throw the ball since facts state he dis so "in
retaliation". Intent is satisfied.
Apprehension:
Was plaintiff expectant of an imminent contact.
Here Bob "ducked to avoid being hit". This act of avoidance indicates he was in
apprehension. This satisfies this element.

Damages:
Facts don't indicate any personal or property damages, so nominal damages are available. If
Bob can convince the finder of fact that Abe acted with malice, punitives would be available.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)
Extreme and outrageous conduct by defendant that is calculated to cause, and does cause,
emotional distress.
Act:
Defined supra
Here Abe told Bob "you better watch your back" following his assault.
Intent:
Defined supra
It is likely Abe's behavior will be considered a manifestation of desire to inflict IIED.
Extreme and Outrageous:
Abe's statement followed his assault of Bob. It is likely this conduct will suffice.
Causation:
Supra
Abe's conduct is a substantial factor in Bob's harm.
Damages:
Bob subsequently had "nightmares." If he requires medical or psychiatric treatment, Abe will
be liable.
Defenses:
None
CARL V. ABE
Assault:
Supra
Here if Carl saw the ball coming, Abe will be liable under the theory of Transferred Intent.
Battery:
A harmful or offensive touching of the plaintiff cause by defendant's intentional act.

Act:
Supra
Here Abe threw the ball.
Intent:
Supra
Under the theory of Transferred Intent, Abe's act towards Bob transfers to Carl.
Harmfull Offensive Touching:
Abe's thrown basketball "struck Carl... in the face." This constitutes harmful and offensive
touching.
Causation:
Supra
Here Abe's act was a substantial factor in Carl's harm.
Damages:
Supra
Facts don't speak to personal injury or property damage. Carl will collect nominal damages.
Defenses:
Supra
Abe has no affirmative defenses.