Professional Documents
Culture Documents
45
INTRODUCTION:
3.37-40)1
At 2.65 Thucydides says of Pericles that he did not speak to please (rrpos 'sov6rv
Aeyetv): he had no need of such means for acquiring influence, since he already
enjoyed it because of his recognized merits. But his successors were on the same
plane as one another, each one striving to establish himself as the man first in
influence with the demos. And in this drive for ascendancy, they began to allow the
t)
d7,
people's pleasures to shape the advice they gave (E'rparovTo KaO' -q7ovadsT7)
Kat Tr TpadyFLaTaev6toovat).2
The next Athenian speaker we encounter is Cleon; and when we are told that the
demos regarded him as their most persuasive speaker,3 we expect from him that
gratification of the audience which has been described at 2.65. In one respect this is
exactly what we see. The savage proposal presented by Cleon at the first assembly gave
to the Athenians precisely the vengeance they desired. And in the second speech, the
' This
paperhas greatlybenefitedfromthe suggestionsof its anonymousreferee.I ampleased
to takethis opportunityto expressmygratitude.
2 On the
phraseirpos 8ov'rvAe'yevandrelatedideas,see J.de Romilly,'Lacondamnationdu
plaisirdans l'oeuvrede Thucydide',WS79 (1966),142-8;J.Ober,MassandElitein Democratic
Athens (Princeton, 1989), 43-4 (discussed below, n. 8); S. Flory, 'The meaning of rTO
f/) Lv90?&ES
and the Ancient Simplicity (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1998); N. R. E. Fisher, Hybris: A Study in
the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece (Warminster, 1992); M. Heath, 'Justice in
A Commentary
on
Thucydides'Athenianspeeches',Historia39 (1990),385-400;S. Hornblower,
vol. 1 (Oxford,1991);D. Kagan, 'The speechesin Thucydidesand the Mytilene
Thucydides,
debate', YCS 2 (1975), 71-94; J. Th. Kakridis, Der thukydideischeEpitaphios. Ein stilistischer
Kommentar (Munich, 1961); E. Levy, Athenes devant la defaite de 404. Histoire d' une crise
Inventionof Athens: The Funeral Orationin the Classical City (Cambridge, MA,1986); W Nippel,
Mischverfassungstheorieund Verfassungsrealitdtin Antike undfriiher Neuzeit (Stuttgart, 1980);
J. Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton, 1989); K. A. Raaflaub, Die Entdeckung
der Freiheit (Munich, 1985); J. de Romilly, Thucydidesand Athenian Imperialism(Oxford, 1963);
CRUX: Essays presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix ... (Exeter, 1985), 348-75; G. Vlastos,
'IZONOMIA IIOAITIKH', in J. Mau and E. G. Schmidt (edd.), Isonomia. Studien zur
Gleichheits- vorstellung im griechischen Denken (Berlin, 1964), 1-35; reprinted in G. Vlastos,
below.
46
J. A. ANDREWS
one Thucydides has seen fit to relate,Cleon persists in this appeal to opyr],using (as we
shall shortly see) some fine techniques for rekindling that spent anger.4
For some, Cleon's appeal to his audience's desire for revenge, coupled with the
elements of slander and exploitation of social tensions, is enough to confirm that
Cleon is Thucydides' prime illustration of the post-Periclean leadership, as characterized at 2.65.5 And yet it is Cleon himself who takes up Thucydides' complaint and
denounces both the demagogic flatterers (40.3 ot TreP7roVTV7ES
AoyU pTOpES) and the
Athenians themselves for succumbing to pleasure (38.7 aKojs 'Sovj 7yoaTrcovoI;
cf.
40.2 '8ov- Ayoywv).Moreover, he begins his speech by harshly upbraiding his audience
for the consequences of their democracy, which leads Gomme to comment that 'there
is no flattery of the demos by this persuasive demagogue, no letting himself be led by
the people'.6 How, then, can Thucydides say that Pericles' successors won the support
of the demos through fawning and flattery and then give to the first of these successors a speech as outspoken as this?7
Cleon's criticism of democratic practices is certainly loud and overt. What is less
obvious and more important, he also attacks certain aspects of democratic ideology.
This form of criticism takes outspokenness to a dangerous level,8 and makes sense
only if there is some deeper, hidden appeal. Such is the case in this speech: Cleon's
objective is to remove for his audience the ideological impediment to the realization of
4
It is not just Cleon but the Atheniansas a wholewho decrythe heinouscharacterof the
revolt(3.36.2).This,Salaithos'summaryexecution(3.36.1),andtheexplicitsurrender
of theproceedingsto opyr'(3.36.2)all maketheprevailingmoodof the assemblyperfectlyapparent.Fora
reconstructionof the argumentsat the firstassembly,see R. P Legon,'Megaraand Mytilene',
Phoenix22 (1968),208-9 (followedby Kagan[n. 2], 80-1).
5 Andrewes
(n. 2), 76-7 ('he violentlydiscreditshis opponentin advance... he appealsto
unregulated emotion....
KaO' rf8ova's r) 8rjpt
47
I. IMPERIALHONOURAND PRESTIGE(3.39-0.1)
'If you follow my advice', says Cleon at the conclusion of his speech (3.40.4),
'you will do whatis just towardthe Mytileneansas well as whatis in yourown interest' (rreLOoLEVOL {IEV E4io0 ra re tSKaLa Es MvlTA]qvaiovs
Kac r&a
6tvauopa
aFla
.).11
48
J. A. ANDREWS
as Cleonseesit, a polismayrevoltin
behinda voluntaryrevoltcan differsignificantly:
an attemptto augmentits ownpower.Not so the Mytileneans:'theyattemptedto ruin
us by sidingwith our worstenemies-a worseoffencethana warundertakenon their
own accountin the acquisitionof power.'The Mytileneansweremotivatednot by
self-interest,but malicepureand simple.
Having thus introducedthe questionof motives,Cleon devotesthe next several
sentencesto the psychologyof the Mytilenerevolt,and of revoltin general.15The
Mytileneansweredeterredneitherby the adverseoutcomeof earlierrevolts,nor by
the danger which lurks for those who enjoy extraordinary blessings (evSat/tovLa). On
TE al4a
17de Romilly(n. 2, 1963),part III, ch. iii, esp. 322-9. For recentreappraisalof i/pt,s, see
below, n. 23.
18 As elements of avTrovo1la, neither walls, ships, nor freedom from tribute is necessary or
sufficient. As M. Ostwald, Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History (Chico, CA, 1982), 27-8
observes, the Chians 'demolished their walls at the bidding of Athens in 425 B.C., and yet
Chios continued to be considered autonomous down to the time of her revolt in 412 B.C....
Participation with her ships (in joint naval campaigns with Athens) makes Methymna avTro'voos
in one passage but v7rrKooS in another.... (The Peace of Nicias) guarantees the atvrovoiLLa of
six Thracian cities, "provided that they continue to pay the tribute assessed at the time of
Aristeides".'
49
remove.19Instead, they left them intact, tokens of the esteem in which they held this
ally (3.39.2 Tr/J/xLEVOLES ra Trp&ra vTro'-uCv). Thus, the foundation of the islanders'
prosperity was the LttL accorded them by the Athenians. And it is precisely this which
made their prosperity adTpoaU8dK-ToS. It was shocking
and unexpected
that the
imperial masters, for whom LTt7 was so important,20should pay honour to those from
whom honour was due.21
Thucydides records another instance of a revolt which involved hubris: that of the
Corcyreans from their mother-city Corinth. All their other colonies, say the Corinthian representativesat Athens, pay due honour to their mother city (rLtcatLV). But the
rebel Corcyreans have grown terriblywealthy, and as a result are in the settled habit of
striking out against their mother city from an attitude of hubris (1.38.5 ;p/Et Se Kat
. . .). And yet, when the Cor?EovaLa 7rTAovrov TroAAaes a. ... . . 'ljapr7Kaut
inthians first began founding colonies, their expectation was that, far from becoming
the victims of their colonies' hubris, they would receive the honour and respect
which is properly owed a hegemonic state (38.2vp['eaOal ... OavpaLcieaOat).22In this
passage, hubris is aggressive behaviour involving the desire to bring dishonourto the
victim.23
19At thisdate
onlyMytileneandChiosretainedtheirnavies;eachwasrequired,on an ongoing
basis,to placea contingentat the disposalof the Atheniannavy(3.10.5).Thesetwo allieswere
likewisethe only Ionianstatesto haveretainedtheirwalls(3.39.2,4.51; 3.33.2).Doubtlessthe
to the Greekworldas a tokenof
presenceof wallsat Mytileneand Chioscouldbe represented
Athenianrespectfor the autonomyof these two states.This seemsto be Cleon'stactic here.
Regardingthe absenceof walls in Ionia, see R. MeiggsThe AthenianEmpire(Oxford,1979),
149-51,who attributestheirremovalto Athenianimperialpolicy(Meiggsis anticipatedby P.A.
Brunt,'Atheniansettlementsabroadin the fifthcentury',in E. Badian[ed.],AncientSocietyand
Institutions.Studies... VictorEhrenberg
[NewYork,1967],84, 92, n. 54). The alternativeview,
first advancedby H. T. Wade-Gery,
Essaysin GreekHistory(Oxford,1958),219-20, is that the
walls had been removedby the Atheniansat the time of the Peaceof Callias.If this is true,
subsequentAthenianimperialpolicymayhaveconsistedin nothingmorethaninsistingon strict
observanceof the termsof the Peace.And if alliesin the timeof the Athenianapxq in Thrace
wereallowedto retaintheirwalls,thatis becauseno 'Peaceof Callias'willhaveexistedto protect
the allies from hostile neighbors(Andrewesin HCT, vol. V, 36). For furtherdiscussionand
see Hornblower(n. 2), 414-15.
bibliography,
20 The Athenianswho addressthe
Spartanassemblyat 1.75.3cite rtlt togetherwithfearand
Scholarshavedifficultytakingthefirstof these
profitas the fundamentalmotivesof theirapXr7.
as seriouslyas the others:see n. 22, andcf. Levy(n. 2), 111-19;de Romilly(n. 2, 1963),79.
21 In
Thucydidesthe prosperityor good fortunewhichleadsto hubrisis often said to have
arisenunexpectedly(de Romilly[n. 2, 1963],324).One of Cleon's'sharppractices'is his elision
betweendrrpoaSoKqrTos
as 'unexpected'
andas 'sudden'.
22
Crane(n. 2), 97-105 arguesthatwe musttake seriouslyThucydides'suggestionthat what
'irrational'
decisionto 'pushtheGreekworldinto ... war'(96)
chieflymotivatedtheCorinthians'
was the Corcyreans'refusalto performthose symbolicgesturesby whichthey mightpublicly
acknowledgeCorinth'sculturalsuperiority.The fundamentalissue is, as Thucydides1.38
supposes,the Corinthians'slightedhonour.Cf. de Romilly(n. 2, 1973),42: 'On dirait... que
l'honneurcommande... le conflitdes interets.'Similarlyp. 41: the roleplayedby rt,sj in this
episode'derouteles historiensmoderneset... leursembleminceau regarddel'evenement;mais
c'est
l'explication que donneThucydide'.
23
For Fisher(n. 2), 148, 'the core of the conceptis beyondany doubt the committingof
actionsof intentionalinsult,of acts whichdeliberatelyinflictshameand dishonouron others'.
Cairns(n. 2) acceptsthe emphasison honour,but arguesthatFisherhas incorrectlylimitedthe
'dispositional'aspectof hubristo the intentionto insultanddishonour.His emphasis'is on that
elementof hybriswhichrelatesto one'sown honour'.He arguesthat 'the stateof mindwhich
over-valuesone'sownhonouris decisiveforhybris... Termssuchas megaphroneinare ... ways
of referringto the subjective,dispositionalaspectof hybris,andthus,sincehybris-words
can be
used in purelydispositionalsenses,hybrisand "thinkingbig"can amountto the same thing'
(10-11).
50
J. A. ANDREWS
E'63pLaavwas not so much the revolt itself as the public humiliationof imperial
Athens.And it is this, and not any materialdamageresultingfrom the revoltitself,
which makes the Mytileneans /aAtc-ra8
t... 7SlK-qKorTasvtdi,
51
v
OVK E7TLKLVOSVVWS
OTrL v 17jAOyY 7rELUOEVTEsVf7Tr'aCLVTwrv
a,pTrTE
77 OLKTJ Ev8&TE,
7jyELUE
OV CKO7TOVregS OL TrvpaVVlSa
Kat OVK Es TrrV TrV eVLAldCXWVXa'PLV FLaaKL[EaOaL,
Ot OVK Ef (LSv
Kal rrpos ErtJSovAeVOVovaS aVTroVS Kal aKoVTas
EXETE TIrV adpX7v
da'pXotEvovs,
eS Vlads
av xaprIaaUOe
TXaarTroLevoLavrol
EKELVWVEVVOLa r7TplyoEV,aCe.
VIL5uV,dAA^
adKpoc)VTraL
E)E dv
v tzXA,ov
Tra
e)SXL
As allies, the Mytileneans are neither innocent nor weak, nor is there any prospect
that the Athenians can win the Mytileneans' gratitude and adherence (Xadpv,
xapt4]qaOE, aKpovraTi, eVvola) through pity (ot'KTc) and the neglect of their own
interests (da4apr7-re, EVSr>TE,FLaAaKIcLeaOal,
gAaTrTroLevot).This is because the
Athenians are in the position of the tyrant, and as such are dealing with people
who, far from allowing themselves to be placed under obligation, will seize this
unlooked-for opportunity to harm the Athenians.
By framing his discussion of the Athenians' change of heart in terms of pity,
self-sacrifice, and gratitude, Cleon invokes an ethical paradigm, familiar from funeral
orations and the tragic stage: throughout their history, the Athenians are the people
who, heedless of the consequences for themselves, pity the weak and innocent and
rescue them from the unjust oppression of the foreign foe.26The danger is glorious, not
only because it establishes the Athenians' claim of XapLs,27 but because it shows their
selfless devotion to the principle of justice among the Hellenes. As Heath remarks,'the
Athenians had constructed an ideal self-image, as the Greek city uniquely concerned
with upholding international law, labouring to defend innocent victims to the neglect
of her own interests'.28
Cleon's purpose is not to celebrate his audience's defence of justice among the
Hellenes, but to bring them face-to-face with the harsh reality which requires that they
disregard such foolish idealism: 'the empire you maintain is a tyranny'. The Athenians,
Cleon appears to suggest, have unconsciously fallen prey to their own invention: in
thinking that they can win gratitude through pity without fatal consequences to
themselves, they combine fantasies of invulnerabilitywith their self-idealization as the
city generous and just beyond all others.
Cleon takes this behaviour as proof that democracy is incapable of empire. Democracy is blamed in part because the notion of Athenian generosity toward other states
is a democratic conceit. But the real problem with democracy is that it fosters the
fantasy of security:
I for one haveoften perceivedthatdemocracyis incapableof rulingothers,but nevermore so
thanby yourpresentchangeof mindregardingMytilene.Forsincefearandcausefor suspicion
is absentfromyourdailyrelationswithone another,you feeljust the sametowardthe allies.
(3.37.1-2)
26
The primeexamplesarethe rescueof the Heraclidaeand the returnof the remainsof the
Sevento the Argivemothers.SaysLoraux(n. 2), 67:'forthe authorsof theepitaphioi,thesetwo
episodes are an opportunityof recallingthis generosity,this compassionfor the weak and
oppressed,which both tragedyand rhetoricagreeare one of the principalfeaturesof the
Atheniancharacter'.
27 In Thucydides, see Pericles at 2.40.4-5, where the statesman speaks of the Athenians
d pcvres KrWLpeOaTovs
outdoing their friends in kindness (ov yap TrdaxovTes Ev, adAAa
ktAovs). Some do read this passage as a comment on Athenian foreign relations (J. T. Hooker,
'Xapls and dpeTr7in Thucydides', Hermes 102 [1974], 164-9; Loraux (n. 2), 81). But Rusten (n. 2),
156 objects that this would be a 'grotesque distortion of the nature of empire, which he later
compares to a tyranny'. Pericles' words, says Rusten, 'are meant to apply to the character of
individualAthenians'.
28
52
J. A. ANDREWS
The words
ovot
Se ra
zvroLCLaav,
E7TTr7)0Ev&LdTWUv
r]i'1ovs
,Edv, Av7nrr)qpdas
oS rj OEiEL XO67 ovag 7rpoaulOEpEVot.
Sitte begriindete Freiheit zu beschranken'. I disagree, however, with Rusten's view (147) that
EAXevOpw ...7.roArELTEoLev bears only on what follows, d ...p.. ROS T KOLVOvarising merely
from Thucydides' habit of antithetical thought. I prefer the view that eAevOepws... r.roALTevotLev
is in part a recapitulation of 2.37.1, and that the words a ... rrpOs rT KOLVOV
are intended to
make that evident.So Gommein HCT, vol. II, 114-15;Kakridis(n. 2), 29-31; J. de Romilly,
Thucydide:La guerre du Peloponnese, LivreII (Paris, 1962), 96; Raaflaub (n. 2), 288.
30 On the suspiciousness of the tyrant, see Tuplin (n. 2), 354, 356, with nn. 25 and 33.
31 I read 2.37 as Pericles' attempt to distance Athenian democracy from the negative implications of the 'name orltLoKpaTra'. In this I differ with Gomme in HCT, vol. II, 110 and follow
instead Kakridis (n. 2), 24-8 (esp. 25); J. R. Grant, 'Thucydides 2.37.1', Phoenix 25 (1971), 104-7;
R. Sealey, 'The origins of Demokratia', CSCA 6 (1973), 281 (who cites R. Hirzel, Themis,Dike
und Verwandtes[Leipzig, 1907], 263 with n. 8); Nippel (n. 2), 50-1; Raaflaub (n. 2), 287. For
further discussion of this reading of 2.37, see 'Freedom and equality in Periclean Athens'
(forthcoming).
53
gratitude instead of resentment and danger. That is bad. But a far worse consequence
of Athenian 'AevOepiais that it does foster disrespect for the laws:
Worstof all will be if nothingin the matterof our decreeswill standfirmlyestablished,and if
we fail to realizethat bad lawswhichare neversubvertedare betterfor a city than good ones
thathaveno authority...
(3.37.3)
7rTT'VrWV
yvwao/LeOa
aKVpOLS
dK6pot~.
be
7TCpl, q7USe
El [3EaLOv
77jLWV.L778ev KaOeaT77ELt wvaLv
8eLVoTaToV
0?7
oTL XElpoaL
VO/LoLS aKIV^?ToLS XPWfilEVv] 7rOALS KpE(aauwV
erT7tv j KaAc)S EXovalv
. .32
and its repealseenas the subversionof v6zot, apparentlyon the assumptionthathis audienceis
at this point more attunedto his criticismof theirdemocracythan to the Mytilenequestion.
RegardingCleon'sapparentequationof decreesandlaws,see furtherbelow.
34Saar(n. 2), 28-31.
35
54
J. A. ANDREWS
7ToAAadKLyap
E8SLdaKOpLEV
EVEKa TWV
EKaaTOTE
7roAAov 7rpo7rapeKKevacFt.Evovs
J. Wallach, and J. Ober (edd.), Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstructionof American
-T
EVKOacpOVas
BookI (London,1905;repr.Bristol,1982),223.
Marchant,Thucydides,
J
38 On the centralrole of
in Archidamus'
argument,see J. W. Allison,Power and
wrapaaKev
Preparednessin Thucydides(Baltimore, 1989), 45-60.
55
rowv)
bavAoTErpoL Trjv avOp, a'7roUOvTs
7E
7j
vveaeL
avTrv dLVaOeaTepoL
/iev
rTC)V
Ordinary people, because they frankly accept their intellectual limitations, defer to
the wisdom of the laws. Just as important, they do not venture to compete with those
who, by finding fault with other speakers, eagerly display their own brilliance.
Avoiding such individualistic competition, they serve instead as KptTat aroT rov
'aov, equal partners in the joint task of reaching a sound judgement.39 And in this
they are generally successful: ordinary people, if simply left to come to their own
conclusions, can be depended on to reach a wise collective decision.
This is of course a distinctly democratic sentiment, one which, according to Ober,
should be read as a fundamental tenet of Athenian democratic ideology. Stated in full,
it is the belief that 'the collective wisdom of a large group was inherently greater than
the wisdom of any of its parts'.40Ober takes as his prime fifth-century illustration
Athenagoras' remark in Book Six that 'none can hear and decide so well as the
many'.41 But Ober cites Cleon too, noting that he expresses the idea in 'an extreme
form'.42
What makes Cleon's allusion to the wisdom of mass decisions extreme is the conclusion he draws from it:
(s
ov
Kat
/d&s 7roLoVvTas
p.r
vjLETE'pO TrrA OELTrapalvelv.
Xpr)
80oav rT
8ElVvT7rTL Kalt
uvvEaeW
dyyvL
e7TTrapofLevovs 7rapa
(3.37.5)
'We speakers', says Cleon, 'should do likewise and not allow ourselves to be so carried
away by eloquence and intellectual rivalry that we give advice which runs counter to
what has seemed best to you, the people.' Cleon seems to be speaking of the mass
decision, that is, the decree of the popular assembly: irapa
<7r>
8o'av,
as it has
sometimes been emended.43 Such is its wisdom that the speakers themselves, in
performing their advisory function, should put aside their selfish intellectual
pretensions and emulate its greater wisdom. Were Cleon speaking specifically of the
Mytilene decree, this might make sense: rather than subjecting the Mytilene question
to renewed analysis, they should defer to the wisdom of this mass decision. But Cleon
39
KpLraL
56
J. A. ANDREWS
and thereforeseemsto be
obviouslyis not limitingdiscussionto the presentdecree,44
sayingthat all decreesarewise decisions.
In orderto appreciatethe natureof this wisdom,we must considerthe implications of the 6vvE'aEw dyyVL. Wishing to demonstrate their powers of persuasion
(8ELvo'Trs),politicians eagerly engage in an intelligencecontest, in the course of which
they put forth views contraryto the ordinary-or, as Cleon puts it, 'urgeyou the
peopleto acceptwhatrunscounterto 86oav'. Weareforcedto wonderwhetherCleon
is speakingof repealof a decree,ro6Soav, or novelideasat odds with the ordinary
view,r-7)v86av.45 That his awkwardomissionof the definitearticleis intendedto
createsuch a confusionbetweendecreesand ordinaryopinionis confirmedwhen,in
the very next sentence(38.1), Cleon chargesthat his opponentis planningto base
his attack on the Mytilenedecree on certainparadoxicalideas about justice and
self-interest.What Cleon gains from the ambiguity,as I have arguedon an earlier
occasion,46is a suggestion that advising the people, in a matter of justice and
self-interest,contraryto an existingdecreenecessarilyinvolvesthe employmentof
argumentswhichareparadoxicaland absurd.47
Archidamusspoke only of the Spartans'refusalto go againsttheir own better
Butin Cleon'sAthenswhatmakesthejudgementof the
judgement(7rapdr SoKoOVV).
assemblya betterandwiserdecisionis thatit is a massdecision.And whenthe people,
invitetheirspeakersto give advice rrapao86avand to arguefor policies
ro rrTXjAo,
basedon paradoxicalviewsof justiceand self-interest,theybecomeguiltyof granting
too muchfreedomto the intellectualelite.Theycreateand condonea permissiveand
lawlesspoliticalsociety,and so becomethe victimsof theirownideologyof tolerance.
This is indeed rravrwv SELVodraov, far the worst consequence of the Athenians'
democratic AE'AvOep'a.48
v LaovoyLEiaOat)?
Tera rTroAAX
da
44 Note the generalizing expressions: ~Erd r rhov
Trcv aleL Aeyolevwv,
dtAetvov
otKovoa,
rroAAad
TaLdrAEcl).
acdAAovat, opOoVVTat
45 As Gomme in HCT vol. II, 302
observes, the normal sense of 7rapad 86av in Thucydides is
'contrary to expectation'.
46 Andrews (n. 2), 36-7.
47 Cleon indicates what he regards to be his audience's endoxic truths regardingjustice and
self-interest in the next sentence (3.38.1). For discussion, see Andrews (n. 2), esp. 32-3.
48 Cleon in 3.38 will take his audience to task for their permissiveness,
explaining it in terms of
their fondness of intellectual display. For discussion, see Andrews (n. 2), 38.
57
...
all.51
49
On taos in the sense'fair,'see Vlastos(n. 2), 184-5,n. 78. On the relationof Athenagoras'
debateto thequestion
of arithmetic
andgeometric
seeE D. Harvey,
'Two
hypothetical
equality,
antikenSozialgeschichte.
E Vittinghoff
Festschrift
(CologneandVienna,1980),7-57 (cf.Raaflaub
[n. 2], 277-83). According to Raaflaub, anxiety in the 430s over the possibility that social class
wouldre-emergeas a criterionforpoliticalinvolvement
led to currencyof a newterm, rrapprqata:
the freedom of each citizen, regardless of social class, to speak as he wished ({la^yopia, which
58
J. A. ANDREWS
The masses must abandon their habit of EhAvOEepa,tolerance and openmindedness, and adopt instead an attitude of ada0aa, a refusal to listen when they
encounter advisers who consider the political acumen of their audience as grossly
unequal to their own. This amounts to a silencing of dissenting opinion, which carries
a clear implication of 'mass tyranny'. This becomes clear if we once more return to
Athenagoras' speech.
According to Athenagoras, the share of political power accorded the wealthy few is
fair and, if anything, more than equal to that accorded the other divisions of the
demos.52 If they accept this share, L'aov KaOtrTAEov, they will 'advance the interests of
the city, the common interest of us all' (6.40.1 Tr6 rs 7roAEws tv'rTnaat KOLVOV
But if they prefer to seize this greater share rather than accept it in the form
av/ETE).
given them, they will clearly be aspiring to oligarchy, which 'does not merely seek
more than its share of the advantages, but takes and keeps to itself all there is' (6.39.2
ov 7TAEOVeKTEifLOVov, d,AAa Kal 6vLT7TraVT'
adehAoL'evrEc'Xel).It is
cIbEAL')Ycov
of
the
this
and
their
desire
for
rAEeovet'a
few,
wealthy
precisely
apx', 'sole rule over
the city' (6.38.2 aVTroVs TjS rro'Aews adpXEL),which in the past has led to stasis in
T(WV 8'
Studien,18,49, n. 60),eventhatwhichcontradictsconventionalviewsonjusticeandself-interest.
59
who, like Cleon, clearly demonstrates that, when it comes to matters of justice and
self-interest, his is the voice of the masses themselves57
Cleon supposes that the Athenian 7r,AOoSis susceptible to the same pleonexia,
desire for 'sole rule', as are Athenagoras' oligarchs, and that, if given the chance, they
will seek a share of power which is more than equal. And, just as at Syracuse, such
pleonexia bodes tyranny-in this case, a metaphorical tyranny of the masses. But as
Cleon's pronouncement at 3.37.2 shows, tyranny can be used metaphorically also of
imperial states which disregard claims of To u'aov,equality and fairness, and instead
pursue sole and absolute rule over others.58Two notable implausibilities in this speech
show that Cleon also appeals to imperialpleonexia, the desire of the masses to rule the
allies in the fashion of the tyrant, without regard for the principle of fairness and
equality. The first implausibility concerns justice, the second, law.59
57
On thisspeechas evidencefora democratic'establishment
mentality',seeM. Ostwald,From
PopularSovereigntyto the Sovereigntyof Law (Berkeleyand Los Angeles, 1986), 253-4.
RegardingCleon'spose as the championof o86a and endoxicreasoning,see Andrews(n. 2). It
shouldnow be apparentthat this endoxicethos is intendedto exploitthe audience'sassumpis its tacit appealto these
tions abouto'ea and mass wisdom.Partof its hiddenattractiveness
ideological
presuppositions.
58
Tuplin(n. 2) is criticalof what he judges to be extravagantscholarlyclaimsabout the
origins and significanceof the imperialtyrannymetaphor.'The truth is that directcharacterizationsof tyranny,whendealingwithgeneralfeaturesat all, mostlydwellon the illegitimacy,
lawlessness,unrestrainedpower,dependenceon forceand arroganceof the tyrant,that other
andthatthereis no good
metaphoricalusesof tyrannyevidentlyderivefromsuchcharacteristics,
is 'the
reasonto requiremoreof its applicationto empire'(366).Oneof thosecharacterizations
obviouspoint that the autocrat,once installed,necessarilydeniesequalityto thosearoundhim'
textsin
(365;my italics).And indeedTuplinsuppliesa wholeseriesof fifth-and fourth-century
which'theoppositionbetweentyrannyandequalityis ... explicit'(364-5;myitalics).ThatCleon
encourageshis audienceto aspireto whatis unfairand unequaland to exercisethe resulting
the expertadvisers'exercise
powerwithoutregardforrT6 i'ov is, I believe,evident.Representing
of freeandequalspeechas a displayof contemptforthe ordinaryviewsof themasses,he tempts
the7rnXos to arrogateto themselvesthe rightto decidewhois fit to speak.Thisis dvlaov,as are
casefrombeingheardandthe use of lawto intimidate
too the attemptto keepthe Mytileneans'
the allies(seebelow).Finally,CleonurgestheAtheniansto punishthe Mytileneans,if necessary,
'contrary to what is fair' (3.40.4 rrapaTr ElKOS). Cleon is appealing to the pleonexia of the
masses, their appetite for a share greater than equal. Thus, to the extent that ro avLaov is
60
J. A. ANDREWS
The commentators object to Cleon's disregard for moral and logical consistency.61
But if Cleon's audience are willing to adopt the attitude of the tyrant, as indeed
according to Cleon they must, then they will find nothing offensive in the assumption that justice does not affect the issue unless it can be shown to serve the tyrant's
own personal interests. The empire is a tyranny, and a tyrant, being always in mortal
danger,62must define justice in terms of self-preservation. And it is no concern
whether this involves the tyrant in some illogic: as Euphemus will say, for imperial
cities as for individual tyrants, 'nothing is illogical provided it is expedient' (6.85.1
7rtoAcEdpX})v EXovar ove;v a,oyov ontv14E'pov ..).
avPptL o Tvpavvw
To this extent, then, Cleon's argument not only asserts that the Athenian empire is a
tyranny,but also assumes that the Athenians will adopt the attitudes of the tyrant. The
8e
yvwodeOa
8ELvo6TaToV
OTl XELpoa
p,
El
gefaLov l7j/V tL77S8EVKa0eaT7e ooftXivVreavpV77(S
v 7 KaA
e
vOiLOLS adKLVCTOLSXPWJZLE`v'r 7TOAL KpELXUWVS
XoVaLV
aKpots ...
(3.37.3)
It is usually said that Cleon here is equivocating. Gomme, for example, remarks that
60R. P.Winnington-Ingram,
'TA AEONTAEIHEIN:Cleonand Diodotus',BICS 12 (1965),
VO/LOs
o EXpn7TO(6.54.6).
77 rTOALAt
TotES TptV KELULEVOLS
61
as 7rept TOVTrWV,a av $o~r, even though (as Saar himself recognizes), the attraction of the
to intervene on behalf of the Corcyraeans lest they establish the precedent (v4/ov KaoLOarcvaL)
wherebyeithertheyor thePeloponnesians
maybringaidto stateswhodefectfromtherivalcamp.
Further, Diodotus evidently has the rapadSelyxa of 3.40.7 in mind when he says (3.45.3): OVK
EaTL V exoS OaTS
precedent in Athenian law itself (S. C. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law [Oxford, 1993], 49-63,
esp. 60-1), this use of volios to express the idea of a precedent is perhaps surprising.
66 Compare Zeus in Aesch. P V, who preserves his rule through laws of his own making (403
and for whom justice is no more than his freedom to satisfy his own
LStots voFLOLsKpaTvveL),
interests (186-7 7rap' Eavurc ro 8IKatov
EXeL).
J. A. ANDREWS
62
but when it maintains advisers who speak so as to gratify its desires.67If Cleon attacks
and undermines the freedom that guarantees the right of elite advisers to counsel the
Athenians against their inclinations, he also gratifies his audience's pleonectic desire
for sole rule, and with it a form of freedom more ochlocratic than democratic: the
freedom of the tyrant 7rrA0os,both at home and abroad.68
Ohio University
67
JAMES A. ANDREWS
andrewsj@ohiou.edu
'
Cf. Soph. Ant. 506-7 aAA'7 rvpavvts TrohAAd aAA'evatlVLoveE KaO(Eeatv avr-j 8pdv