U.S.

Supreme Court
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889)
Dent v. West Virginia

and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, examined and shown to differ materially
from this case.
Page 129 U. S. 115

No. 119
Submitted December 11, 1888
Decided January 14, 1889
129 U.S. 114
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
Syllabus
The statute of West Virginia ( 9 and 15, chapter 93, 1882) which requires
every practitioner of medicine in the State to obtain a certificate from the
State Board of Health that he is a graduate of a reputable medical college in
the school of medicine to which he belongs, or that he has practiced
medicine in the State continuously for ten years prior to March 8, 1881, or
that he has been found upon examination to be qualified to practice medicine
in all its departments, and which subjects a person practicing without such
certificate to prosecution and punishment for a misdemeanor, does not, when
enforced against a person who had been a practicing physician in the State
for a period of five years before 1881, without a diploma of a reputable
medical college in the school of medicine to which he belonged, deprive him
of his estate or interest in the profession without due process of law.
The State, in the exercise of its power to provide for the general welfare of its
people, may exact from parties before they can practice medicine a degree
of skill and learning in that profession upon which the community employing
their services may confidently rely, and, to ascertain whether they have such
qualifications, require them to obtain a certificate or license from a board or
other authority competent to judge in that respect. If the qualifications
required are appropriate to the profession and attainable by reasonable study
or application, their validity is not subject to objection because of their
stringency or difficulty.
Legislation is not open to the charge of depriving one of his rights without
due process of law if it be general in its operation upon the subjects to which
it relates, and is enforceable in the usual modes established in the
administration of government with respect to kindred matters; that is, by
process or proceedings adapted to the nature of the case, and such is the
legislation of West Virginia in question. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277,

1 | Page

The Court stated the case as follows:

This case comes from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. It
involves the validity of the statute of that State which requires every
practitioner of medicine in it to obtain a certificate from the state board of
health that he is a graduate of a reputable medical college in the school of
medicine to which he belongs, or that he has practiced medicine in the State
continuously for the period of 10 years prior to the 8th day of March, 1881, or
that he has been found, upon examination by the board, to be qualified to
practice medicine in all its departments, and makes the practice of, or the
attempt by any person to practice, medicine, surgery, or obstetrics in the
State without such certificate, unless called from another State to treat a
particular case, a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both,
in the discretion of the court. The statute in question is found in 9 and 15
of an act of the State, c. 93, passed March 15, 1882, amending a chapter of
its Code concerning the public health. St. 1882, pp. 245, 246, 248. These
sections are as follows:
"SEC. 9. The following persons, and no others, shall hereafter be permitted
to practice medicine in this State, viz.:"
"First. All persons who are graduates of a reputable medical college in the
school of medicine to which the person desiring to practice belongs. Every
such person shall, if he has not already done so and obtained the certificate
hereinafter mentioned, present his diploma to the State Board of Health, or to
the two members thereof in his congressional district, and if the same is
found to be genuine, and was issued by such medical college, as is
hereinafter mentioned, and the person presenting the same be the graduate
named therein, the said Board, or said two members thereof, (as the case
may be) shall issue and deliver to him a certificate to that effect, and such
diploma and certificate shall entitle the person named in such diploma to
practice medicine in all its departments in this State."
"Second. All persons who have practiced medicine in this State continuously
for the period of ten years prior to the
Page 129 U. S. 116

8th day of March, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-one. Every such
person shall make and file with the two members of the State Board of
Health in the congressional district in which he resides, or if he resides out of
the State in the district nearest his residence, an affidavit of the number of
years he has continuously practiced in this State; and, if the number of years
therein stated be ten or more, the said Board, or said two members thereof,
shall, unless they ascertain such affidavit to be false, give him a certificate to
that fact, and authorizing him to practice medicine in all its departments in
this State."
"Third. A person who is not such graduate, and who has not so practiced in
this State for a period of ten years, desiring to practice medicine in this State,
shall, if he has not already done so, present himself for examination before
the State Board of Health, or before the said two members thereof in the
congressional district in which he resides, or, if he resides out of the State, to
the said two members of the State Board of Health in the congressional
district nearest his place of residence, who, together with a member of the
local board of health, who is a physician (if there be such member of the local
board) of the county in which the examination is held, shall examine him as
herein provided, and if, upon full examination, they find him qualified to
practice medicine in all its departments, they, or a majority of them, shall
grant him a certificate to that effect, and thereafter he shall have the right to
practice medicine in this State to the same extent as if he had the diploma
and certificate hereinbefore mentioned. The members of the State Board of
Health in each congressional district shall, by publication in some newspaper
printed in the county in which their meeting is to be held, or, if no such paper
is printed therein, in some newspaper of general circulation in such district,
give at least twenty-one days' notice of the time and place at which they will
meet for the examination of applicants for permission to practice medicine,
which notice shall be published at least once in each week for three
successive weeks before the day of such meeting; but this section shall not
apply to a physician or surgeon who is called
Page 129 U. S. 117
from another State to treat a particular case, or to perform a particular
surgical operation in this State and who does not otherwise practice in this
State."
"SEC. 15. If any person shall practice, or attempt to practice, medicine,
surgery, or obstetrics in this State without having complied with the
provisions of 9 of this chapter, except as therein provided, he shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor, and fined for every such offense not less than fifty nor
more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned in the county jail not less than

2 | Page

one month nor more than twelve months, or be punished by both such fine
and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court. And if any person shall file,
or attempt to file, as his own, the diploma or certificate of another, or shall
file, or attempt to file, a false or forged affidavit of his identity, or shall willfully
swear falsely to any question which may be propounded to him on his
examination, as herein provided for, or to any affidavit herein required to be
made or filed by him, he shall, upon conviction thereof, be confined in the
penitentiary not less than one nor more than three years, or imprisoned in the
county jail not less than six nor more than twelve months, and fined not less
than one hundred nor more than five hundred dollars, at the discretion of the
court."
Under this statute, the plaintiff in error was indicted in the State Circuit Court
of Preston County, West Virginia, for unlawfully engaging in the practice of
medicine in that State in June, 1882, without a diploma, certificate, or license
therefor, as there required, not being a physician or surgeon called from
another State to treat a particular case or to perform a particular surgical
operation. To this indictment the defendant pleaded not guilty, and, a jury
having been called, the State by its prosecuting attorney, and the defendant
by his attorney, agreed upon the following statement of facts, namely:
"That the defendant was engaged in the practice of medicine in the town of
Newburg, Preston county, West Virginia, at the time charged in the
indictment, and had been so engaged since the year 1876 continuously to
the present time, and has during all said time enjoyed a lucrative practice,
Page 129 U. S. 118
publicly professing to be a physician, prescribing for the sick, and appending
to his name the letters, 'M.D.;' that he was not then and there a physician and
surgeon called from another State to treat a particular case or to perform a
particular surgical operation, nor was he then and there a commissioned
officer of the United States army and navy and hospital service; that he has
no certificate, as required by 9, chapter 93, acts of the Legislature of West
Virginia, passed March 15, 1882, but has a diploma from the 'American
Medical Eclectic College of Cincinnati, Ohio;' that he presented said diploma
to the members of the Board of Health who reside in his congressional
district, and asked for the certificate as required by law, but they, after
retaining said diploma for some time, returned it to defendant with their
refusal to grant him a certificate asked, because, as they claimed, said
college did not come under the word 'reputable,' as defined by said Board of
Health; that, if the defendant had been or should be prevented from
practicing medicine, it would be a great injury to him, as it would deprive him
of his only means of supporting himself and family; that, at the time of the

passage of the act of 1882, he had not been practicing medicine ten years,
but had only been practicing six, as aforesaid, from the year 1876."
These were all the facts in the case. Upon them, the jury found the defendant
guilty, and thereupon he moved an arrest of judgment on the ground that the
act of the legislature was unconstitutional and void so far as it interfered with
his vested right in relation to the practice of medicine, which motion was
overruled, and to the ruling an exception was taken. The court thereupon
sentenced the defendant to pay a fine of $50 and the costs of the
proceedings. The case being taken on writ of error to the Supreme Court of
Appeals of the State, the judgment was affirmed, and to review this judgment
the case is brought here.
Page 129 U. S. 121
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion
of the court.
Whether the indictment upon which the plaintiff in error was tried and found
guilty is open to objection for want of sufficient certainty in its averments is a
question which does not appear to have been raised either on the trial or
before the Supreme Court of the State. The Presiding Justice of the latter
Court, in its opinion, states that the counsel for the defendant expressly
waived all objections to defects in form or substance of the indictment, and
based his claim for a review of the judgment on the ground that the statute of
West Virginia is unconstitutional and void. The unconstitutionality asserted
consists in its alleged conflict with the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
which declares that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; the denial to the defendant of the right
to practice his profession without the certificate required constituting the
deprivation of his vested right and estate in his profession, which he had
previously acquired.
It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any
lawful calling, business, or profession he may choose, subject only to such
restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition.
This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of
our republican institutions. Here, all vocations are open to everyone on like
conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years
of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or,
as it is sometimes termed, the "estate," acquired in them -- that is, the right to
continue their prosecution -- is often of great value to the possessors, and
cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more

3 | Page

Page 129 U. S. 122

than their real or personal property can be thus taken. But there is no
arbitrary deprivation of such right where its exercise is not permitted because
of a failure to comply with conditions imposed by the State for the protection
of society. The power of the State to provide for the general welfare of its
people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will
secure or tend to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and
incapacity, as well as of deception and fraud. As one means to this end, it
has been the practice of different States, from time immemorial, to exact in
many pursuits a certain degree of skill and learning upon which the
community may confidently rely; their possession being generally
ascertained upon an examination of parties by competent persons, or
inferred from a certificate to them in the form of a diploma or license from an
institution established for instruction on the subjects, scientific and otherwise,
with which such pursuits have to deal. The nature and extent of the
qualifications required must depend primarily upon the judgment of the State
as to their necessity. If they are appropriate to the calling or profession, and
attainable by reasonable study or application, no objection to their validity
can be raised because of their stringency or difficulty. It is only when they
have no relation to such calling or profession, or are unattainable by such
reasonable study and application, that they can operate to deprive one of his
right to pursue a lawful vocation.
Few professions require more careful preparation by one who seeks to enter
it than that of medicine. It has to deal with all those subtle and mysterious
influences upon which health and life depend, and requires not only a
knowledge of the properties of vegetable and mineral substances, but of the
human body, in all its complicated parts, and their relation to each other, as
well as their influence upon the mind. The physician must be able to detect
readily the presence of disease, and prescribe appropriate remedies for its
removal. Everyone may have occasion to consult him, but comparatively few
can judge of the qualifications of learning and skill which he possesses.
Reliance must be placed upon the assurance
Page 129 U. S. 123
given by his license, issued by an authority competent to judge in that
respect, that he possesses the requisite qualifications. Due consideration,
therefore, for the protection of society may well induce the State to exclude
from practice those who have not such a license, or who are found upon
examination not to be fully qualified. The same reasons which control in
imposing conditions, upon compliance with which the physician is allowed to
practice in the first instance, may call for further conditions as new modes of

treating disease are discovered, or a more thorough acquaintance is

obtained of the remedial properties of vegetable and mineral substances, or
a more accurate knowledge is acquired of the human system and of the
agencies by which it is affected. It would not be deemed a matter for serious
discussion that a knowledge of the new acquisitions of the profession, as it
from time to time advances in its attainments for the relief of the sick and
suffering, should be required for continuance in its practice, but for the
earnestness with which the plaintiff in error insists that, by being compelled to
obtain the certificate required, and prevented from continuing in his practice
without it, he is deprived of his right and estate in his profession without due
process of law. We perceive nothing in the statute which indicates an
intention of the legislature to deprive one of any of his rights. No one has a
right to practice medicine without having the necessary qualifications of
learning and skill, and the statute only requires that whoever assumes, by
offering to the community his services as a physician, that he possesses
such learning and skill shall present evidence of it by a certificate or license
from a body designated by the State as competent to judge of his
qualifications.
As we have said on more than one occasion, it may be difficult, if not
impossible, to give to the terms "due process of law" a definition which will
embrace every permissible exertion of power affecting private rights, and
exclude such as are forbidden. They come to us from the law of England,
from which country our jurisprudence is to a great extent derived, and their
requirement was there designed to secure the subject against the arbitrary
action of the Crown, and place him under the protection of the law. They
were deemed to be
Page 129 U. S. 124
equivalent to "the law of the land." In this country, the requirement is intended
to have a similar effect against legislative power -- that is, to secure the
citizen against any arbitrary deprivation of his rights, whether relating to his
life, his liberty, or his property. Legislation must necessarily vary with the
different objects upon which it is designed to operate. It is sufficient, for the
purposes of this case, to say that legislation is not open to the charge of
depriving one of his rights without due process of law if it be general in its
operation upon the subjects to which it relates and is enforceable in the usual
modes established in the administration of government with respect to
kindred matters -- that is, by process or proceedings adapted to the nature of
the case. The great purpose of the requirement is to exclude everything that
is arbitrary and capricious in legislation affecting the rights of the citizen. As
said by this court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, speaking by Mr. Justice Matthews:

4 | Page

"When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of

government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review
the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do
not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and
arbitrary power."
118 U. S. 118 U.S. 356, 118 U. S. 369. See also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.
714, 95 U. S. 733;Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 96 U. S. 104,
107; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516;Railroad Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S.
512, 115 U. S. 519.
There is nothing of an arbitrary character in the provisions of the statute in
question. It applies to all physicians, except those who may be called for a
special case from another State. It imposes no conditions which cannot be
readily met; and it is made enforceable in the mode usual in kindred matters
-- that is, by regular proceedings adapted to the case. It authorizes an
examination of the applicant by the Board of Health as to his qualifications
when he has no evidence of them in the diploma of a reputable medical
college in the school of medicine to which he belongs, or has not practiced in
the State a designated period before March, 1881. If, in the proceedings
under the statute, there should be any unfair
Page 129 U. S. 125
or unjust action on the part of the Board in refusing him a certificate, we
doubt not that a remedy would be found in the courts of the State. But no
such imputation can be made, for the plaintiff in error did not submit himself
to the examination of the Board after it had decided that the diploma he
presented was insufficient.
The cases of Cummings v. State of Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, and of Ex parte
Garland, 4 Wall. 333, upon which much reliance is placed, do not, in our
judgment, support the contention of the plaintiff in error. In the first of these
cases, it appeared that the Constitution of Missouri, adopted in 1865,
prescribed an oath to be taken by persons holding certain offices and trusts,
and following certain pursuits within its limits. They were required to deny
that they had done certain things, or had manifested by act or word certain
desires or sympathies. The oath which they were to take embraced 30
distinct affirmations respecting their past conduct, extending even to their
words, desires, and sympathies. Every person unable to take this oath was
declared incapable of holding in the State

"any office of honor, trust, or profit under its authority, or of being an officer,
councilman, director, or trustee, or other manager of any corporation, public
or private,"
then existing or thereafter established by its authority, or
"of acting as a professor or teacher in any educational institution, or in any
common or other school, or of holding any real estate or other property in
trust for the use of any church, religious society, or congregation."
And every person holding, at the time the constitution took effect, any of the
offices, trusts, or positions mentioned was required, within 60 days thereafter,
to take the oath, and, if he failed to comply with this requirement, it was
declared that his office, trust, or position should, ipso facto,become vacant.
No person, after the expiration of the 60 days, was allowed, without taking
the oath, "to practice as an attorney or counselor at law," nor after that period
could
"any person be competent as a bishop, priest, deacon, minister, elder, or
other clergyman of any religious persuasion, sect, or denomination to teach
or preach, or solemnize marriages."
Fine and imprisonment
Page 129 U. S. 126
were prescribed as a punishment for holding or exercising any of the "offices,
positions, trusts, professions, or functions" specified without taking the oath,
and false swearing or affirmation in taking it was declared to be perjury,
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary. A priest of the Roman
Catholic Church was indicted in a circuit court of Missouri and convicted of
the crime of teaching and preaching as a priest and minister of that religious
denomination without having first taken the oath, and was sentenced to pay a
fine of $500, and to be committed to jail until the same was paid. On appeal
to the Supreme Court of the State, the judgment was affirmed, and the case
was brought on error to this Court. As many of the acts from which the
parties were obliged to purge themselves by the oath had no relation to their
fitness for the pursuits and professions designated, the Court held that the
oath was not required as a means of ascertaining whether the parties were
qualified for those pursuits and professions, but was exacted because it was
thought that the acts deserved punishment, and that, for many of them, there
was no way of inflicting punishment except by depriving the parties of their
offices and trusts. A large portion of the people of Missouri were unable to
take the oath, and, as to them, the court held that the requirement of its

5 | Page

constitution amounted to a legislative deprivation of their rights. Many of the

acts which parties were bound to deny that they had ever done were
innocent at the time they were committed, and the deprivation of a right to
continue in their offices if the oath were not taken was held to be a penalty
for a past act, which was violative of the Constitution. The doctrine of this
case was affirmed in Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234.
In the second case mentioned -- that of Ex parte Garland -- it appeared that,
on the 2d of July, 1862, Congress had passed an act prescribing an oath to
be taken by every person elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit
under the United States, either in the civil, military, or naval departments of
the Government, except the President, before entering upon the duties of his
office, and before being entitled to his
Page 129 U. S. 127
salary or other emoluments. On the 24th of January, 1865, Congress, by a
supplemental act, extended its provisions so as to embrace attorneys and
counselors of the courts of the United States. This latter act, among other
things, provided that, after its passage, no person should be admitted as an
attorney and counselor to the bar of the Supreme Court, and, after the 4th of
March, 1865, to the bar of any Circuit or District Court of the United States, or
of the Court of Claims, or be allowed to appear and be heard by virtue of any
previous admission, until he had taken and subscribed the oath prescribed
by the act of July 2, 1862. The oath related to past acts, and its object was to
exclude from practice in the courts parties who were unable to affirm that
they had not done the acts specified; and, as it could not be taken by large
classes of persons, it was held to operate against them as a legislative
decree of perpetual exclusion.
Mr. Garland had been admitted to the bar of the Supreme Court of the United
States previous to the passage of the act. He was a citizen of Arkansas, and
when that State passed an ordinance of secession which purported to
withdraw her from the Union, and by another ordinance attached herself to
the so-called "Confederate States," he followed the State, and was one of
her representatives, first in the lower house, and afterwards in the senate of
the congress of the Confederacy, and was a member of that senate at the
time of the surrender of the Confederate forces to the armies of the United
States. Subsequently, in 1865, he received from the President of the United
States a full pardon for all offenses committed by his participation, direct or
implied, in the rebellion. He produced this pardon, and asked permission to
continue as an attorney and counselor of this Court without taking the oath
required by the act of January 24, 1865, and the rule of the Court which had
adopted the clause requiring its administration in conformity with the act of

Congress. The Court held that the law, in exacting the oath as to his past
conduct as a condition of his continuing in the practice of his profession,
imposed a penalty for a past act, and in that respect was subject to the same
objection as that made to the clauses of the Constitution of Missouri, and
was therefore invalid.

FELIX MARQUEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS and THE SECRETARYTREASURER OF THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent.

Page 129 U. S. 128

M.H. de Joya for petitioner.

Acting Attorney-General Reyes for respondents.

There is nothing in these decisions which supports the positions for which the
plaintiff in error contends. They only determine that one who is in the
enjoyment of a right to preach and teach the Christian religion as a priest of a
regular church, and one who has been admitted to practice the profession of
the law, cannot be deprived of the right to continue in the exercise of their
respective professions by the exaction from them of an oath as to their past
conduct respecting matters which have no connection with such professions.
Between this doctrine and that for which the plaintiff in error contends there is
no analogy or resemblance. The Constitution of Missouri and the act of
Congress in question in those cases were designed to deprive parties of their
right to continue in their professions for past acts, or past expressions of
desires and sympathies, many of which had no bearing upon their fitness to
continue in their professions. The law of West Virginia was intended to
secure such skill and learning in the profession of medicine that the
community might trust with confidence those receiving a license under
authority of the State.
Judgment affirmed.

G.R. No. L-24119

6 | Page

August 8, 1925

STREET, J.:
This is an original proceeding in this court by which the petitioner, Felix
Marquez, seeks to obtain a writ ofmandamus against the respondents, the
Board of Medical Examiners, requiring them to admit the petitioner to the
physicians' examinations conducted, or to be conducted by the respondents
in the City of Manila. To the original complaint the respondents answered,
and to the answer a demurrer was interposed in behalf of the petitioner.
It appears that petitioner is a graduate of the Chicago Medical College,
having received the degree of M.D. from said institution on June 8, of the
year 1922. No question appears to have been made by the respondents with
respect to the petitioner's qualifications of the physician's examinations in
other respects, but they have denied him admission to the examinations on
the grounds that the Chicago Medical College, where the petitioner was
graduated, has been classified as a Class C medical college by the National
Medical State Board of the United States. For this reason the respondents, in
accordance with the regulations of the board now in effect, have denied the
requisite standing to said institution and excluded petitioner.
It is not denied by the respondents that prior to the adoption of the present
regulations, and prior to the date when the Chicago Medical School was
classified as a Class C medical college, the Board of Medical Examiners for
the Philippine Islands had accepted diplomas of graduation from said
medical college as sufficient proof of proficiency in medical knowledge to
admit a graduate to the examinations held in these Islands; and as late as
October 29, 1923, said board accepted favorably upon the application of one
Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, who was graduated from said school in the year
1921. At the time said candidate was admitted, however, the regulations
denying the requisite status to the Chicago Medical College had not been

made effective, and they had been made effective by proper authority before
the present petitioner had submitted his application.
In the argument for the petitioner it is admitted that under Act No. 3111, and
the regulations now in force, the petitioner is disqualified to take the
examinations; but it is pointed out that at the time he began and even when
he conducted his course in the Chicago Medical School, said institution was
still recognized as a reputable medical institution; and the question submitted
is whether the petitioner's case should be governed by the law and
regulations in force at the time of his enrollment in and graduation from the
Chicago Medical School, or by those in force at the time he filed his
application for admission, on or about September 26, 1924. It is submitted for
the petitioner that his case should be governed by the law and regulations at
the time of his graduation. To hold otherwise, it is insisted, is to make the law
retroactive in effect and to do irreparable damage to the petitioner, who has
pursued his work in the institution referred to in good faith, believing that said
school had the status necessary to qualify him from examination.
The position taken by the petitioner is, we think, untenable. The question
whether a medical institution is "a reputable medical school," in the sense
intended by the law, is vested in the Board of Medical Examiners, and
although the action taken by them may conceivably, in isolated cases, result
in hardship, nevertheless the interests of the public require that the board
should be free to exercise its judgment and discretion without reference to
the effect of the determination of the question in particular instances. There
can in the nature of things be no vested right in an existing law, which would
preclude its change or repeal. No one who has commenced preparation in a
particular institution has any inchoate right on account of that fact. If the law
were otherwise upon this point, it would be impossible for the Board of
Medical Examiners to give effect to the knowledge which they from time to
time acquire as to the standing of medical schools; and an intending
physician, upon matriculating in a particular college, takes upon himself the
risk of changes that may be made in the standing of the institution by the
board.
The demurrer to the answer is not well taken. The answer is therefore
declared sufficient, and the petition dismissed, with costs, So ordered.

7 | Page

Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ.,

concur.

G.R. No. L-25135

September 21, 1968

PHILIPPINE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, vs. BOARD OF

MEDICAL EXAMINERS and JOSE MA. TORRES, Respondents.
Seva-Albert-Vergara and Julio V. Presbitero for petitioner.
Regino Hermosisima, Jr., for respondent Jose Ma. Torres.
Solicitor General for respondent Board of Medical Examiners.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Original action for certiorari and mandamus, against the Board of
Medical Examiners and Jose Ma. Torres, to annul a resolution of the former
and a certificate issued by the same authorizing the latter to practice
medicine in the Philippines without examination.
The facts are not disputed. Jose Ma. Torres - hereinafter referred to as
respondent - is a Spanish subject and a member of the Missionary Sons of
the Immaculate Heart of Mary, otherwise known as the Claretian
Missionaries. Having graduated from the University of Barcelona, Spain, with
the degree of Licentiate in Medicine and Surgery, he is entitled, under the
laws of Spain, to practice medicine and surgery throughout the territory
thereof.
On January 21, 1955, respondent was granted special authority to
practice medicine in Lamitan, Basilan City, where he resides, pursuant to
Section 771(e) of the Revised Administrative Code reading:
SEC. 771. Persons exempt from registration. - Registration shall not
be required of the following classes of persons: . . .

(e) In cases of epidemic or in municipalities where there is no legally

qualified practicing physician, or when the circumstances require it, in the
interest of the public health, the Director of Health may issue special
authorizations, to all medical students who have completed the first three
years of their studies, or to persons who have qualified in medicine, and to
graduate or registered nurses, who may request it.

respondent's certificate for the general practice of medicine in the Philippines

without the examination prescribed in said Act; that the Board had exceeded
its authority in passing said Resolution, because of which the same is null
and void; that the Board should, therefore, be ordered to cancel the
certificate issued in pursuance of said resolution; and that petitioner has no
other plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law.

This authority was revoked, on November 8, 1960, by the then

Secretary of Health, upon the ground that "the conditions under which it was
granted no longer obtained in Lamitan Basilan City, there being enough
practising physicians in that locality." Said officer restored the authority on
December 19, 1960, to be revoked again, on January 22, 1963. It was
renewed once more, on September 1, 1963, and, once again, it was revoked
on February 10, 1964, upon the recommendation of the Board of Medical
Examiners - hereinafter referred to as the Board. On motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent, the Board issued, on April 6, 1965, its
Resolution No. 25, series of 1965, which was approved by the President,
granting respondent a certificate to practice medicine in the Philippines
without the examination required in Republic Act No. 2882, otherwise known
as the Medical Act of 1959. The resolution relied therefor upon The Treaty on
the Validity of Academic Degrees and The Exercise of the Professions
between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, signed at
Manila on March 4, 1949, and ratified on May 19, 1949. 1

In their respective answers, respondents admit the basic facts, but not
the conclusions drawn therefrom by the petitioner and allege that the
resolution in question is sanctioned by the provisions of the Treaty above
referred to; that petitioner has no cause of action; and that the petition should
be dismissed for failure of the petitioner to exhaust the available
administrative remedies.

Petitioner herein, Philippine Medical Association, is a domestic

corporation. On June 14, 1965, it addressed the Chairman of the Board a
communication requesting reconsideration of said resolution No. 25, upon
the ground that, pursuant to said Medical Act of 1959, respondent has to take
and pass the examination therein prescribed, before he can be allowed to
practice medicine in the Philippines. This letter was followed by another,
dated October 6, 1965, to which said Chairman replied on October 8, 1965,
stating "that the final decision on the matter will have to come from the
President of the Philippines upon whose authority said resolution has been
finally approved and implemented."
Thereupon, or, on October 18, 1965, petitioner commenced the
present action, for the purpose stated at the beginning of this decision, upon
the theory that the Board had violated Republic Act No. 2882 in granting

8 | Page

Respondents cite the cases of Costas vs. Aldanese2 and Almario vs.
City Mayor 3in support of the theory that petitioner herein has no sufficient
interest or "personality" to maintain the present case. In the first case, it was
held that the President of the Association of Philippine (Marine)
Engineers4 had no particular "individual" interest, and, hence,no cause of
action for mandamus to compel the Collector of Customs to implement
section 1203(j) of the Administrative Code, providing that steamers making
round trips of more than 48 hours or travelling at night shall carry the
complement of marine engineers therein specified. In the second case, a
citizen of the Philippines, as such, who is not an Applicant for any stall or
booth, or the representative of any such applicant, stallholder or any
association of persons who are deprived of the right to occupy stalls in said
market, "is not the real party in interest who has the capacity, right or
personality" to bring an action for mandamus, to compel the office of Pasay
City to comply with the provisions of Republic Act No. 37, by ejecting, from
the public market of said City, stallholders who are not nationals of the
Philippines.
Said cases are not in point. To begin with, both are actions
for mandamus, whereas the case at bar is mainly one for certiorari. Although,
petitioner herein, likewise, seeks a writ of mandamus, directing the Board to
cancel the certificate of registration issued to the respondent, this would be a
necessary consequence of the writ of certiorari annulling the disputed
resolution. Moreover, said two (2) cases were commenced by individuals,

who, as such, had no special interest in the relief therein prayed for. Indeed,
in the Almario case it was intimated that the result might have been
otherwise had it been brought by an "association" whose members have an
interest in the subject matter of the action.
This was confirmed by PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez,5 in which we
sustained the right of the Philippine Constitution Association to assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836, insofar as it allowed retirement
gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to members of Congress
and to elective officials thereof. Further authority in favor of petitioner herein
is supplied by Nacionalista Party vs. F. Bautista Angelo 6 in which the
Nacionalista Party successfully impugned the validity of the designation of
the then Solicitor General as Acting Member of the Commission on Elections.
It is our considered opinion that the view adopted in the last three (3)
cases should be maintained and that, in line therewith, petitioner herein has
sufficient interest to prosecute the case at bar and a cause of action against
respondents herein.
As regards their objection based upon petitioner's failure to appeal to
the President, suffice it to say that the rule requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies is concededly subject to exceptions, among which
are cases involving only questions of law or when jurisdiction is in issue 7or
the action complained of bears the approval of a department secretary, as
the disputed resolution, which was approved by the Executive Secretary "by
authority of the President," or as an alter ego of the Executive. 8 The case at
bar falls under these exceptions to said rule.
The main issue herein hinges on the interpretation of Article I of the
Treaty aforementioned, reading as follows:
The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degrees or
diplomas to practice the liberal professions in either of the Contracting
States, issued by competent national authorities, shall be deemed competent
to exercise said professions in the territory of the Other, subject to the laws
and regulations of the latter. When the degree or diploma of Bachelor, issued
by competent national authorities allows its holder without requiring further
evidence of proficiency to pursue normally higher courses of study, he shall

9 | Page

also be deemed qualified to continue his studies in the territory of either Party
in conformity with the applicable laws and regulations of the State which
recognizes the validity of the title or diploma in question, and with the rules
and regulations of the particular educational institution in which he intends to
pursue his studies.
This Treaty provision was the subject matter of our resolution of August
15, 1961, in connection with the petition of Arturo Efren Garcia for admission
to the Philippine Bar without taking the Bar Examinations. After completing, in
Spain, the course prescribed therefor, Garcia had been graduated from the
College of Law of the Universidad Central de Madrid with the degree of
"Licenciado en Derecho", which entitled him to practice law in Spain. Having
invoked the provisions of said treaty in support of his claim of exemption from
the requisite bar examinations, this Court denied his petition upon the
ground, among others ". . . that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked
by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of
the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal
profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2, 9, and
16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can
practice the legal profession in the Philippines he must first successfully pass
the required bar examinations; . . ."chanrobles virtual law library
We find no plausible reason to depart from this view. On the contrary,
we reiterate the same, inasmuch as the theory of respondent herein cannot
be accepted without placing graduates from our own educational institutions
at a disadvantage vis-a-vis Spanish graduates from Spanish schools,
colleges or universities. Indeed, the latter could - under respondent's
pretense - engage in the practice of medicine in the Philippines without
taking the examination prescribed in Republic Act No. 2882, whereas the
former would have to take and pass said examination. Worse still, since - as
we ruled in the Garcia case - the benefits of the aforementioned Treaty
cannot be availed of in the Philippines except by Spanish subjects, the result
would be - should respondent's contention be sustained - that graduates from
Spanish schools of medicine would be entitled to practice medicine in the
Philippines without examination, if they were Spanish subjects, but not if they
are Filipinos.
Surely said treaty was not made to discriminate against
Philippine schools, colleges or universities, much less against nationals of
the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, we hold that said Treaty merely extended to diplomas

issued or degrees conferred by educational institutions of Spain the same
recognition and treatment that we accord to similar diplomas or degrees from
local institutions of learning; that holders of said Spanish diplomas or
degrees must take the examination prescribed by our laws for holders of
similar diplomas or degrees from educational institutions in the Philippines;
that resolution No. 25, series of 1965, of respondent Board is violative of
Republic Act No. 2882 and hence, null and void; and that, respondent Board
of Medical Examiners should be, as it is hereby ordered to cancel the
certificate of registration, for the practice of medicine in the Philippines,
issued in favor of respondent Jose Ma. Torres, without special
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.

of Branch XXXVII of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital

Judicial Region with seat at Manila, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY
LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the BOARD OF
MEDICAL EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL
MEASUREMENT (CEM), respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the
school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not
successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by
the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and
administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition
with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382,
as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985
and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for
securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with
accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT
as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition
for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20
April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously
scheduled.

G.R. No. 78164

July 31, 1987

TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B. ROVIRA,

EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in their behalf and in behalf of applicants for
admission into the Medical Colleges during the school year 1987-88
and future years who have not taken or successfully hurdled tile
National
Medical
Admission
Test
(NMAT).petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge

10 | P a g e

Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with this
Court to set aside the Order of the respondent judge denying the petition for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946,
known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the
following manner:

Section 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern

(a) the standardization and regulation of medical education (b) the
examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision,
control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines.
(Underscoring supplied)
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education which
is composed of (a) the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly
authorized representative, as Chairman; (b) the Secretary of Health or his
duly authorized representative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or his
duly authorized representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical Board or his
duly authorized representative; (e) a representative of the Philippine Medical
Association; (f) the Dean of the College of Medicine, University of the
Philippines; (g) a representative of the Council of Deans of Philippine Medical
Schools; and (h) a representative of the Association of Philippine Medical
Colleges, as members. The functions of the Board of Medical Education
specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:
(a) To determine and prescribe equirements for admission into a
recognized college of medicine;
(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical
facilities of colleges of medicine, to wit: buildings, including hospitals,
equipment and supplies, apparatus, instruments, appliances,
laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating and
delivery rooms, facilities for outpatient services, and others, used for
didactic and practical instruction in accordance with modern trends;
(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimum
qualifications of teaching personnel, including student-teachers ratio;
(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculum
leading to the degree of Doctor of Medicine;
(e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical
curriculum in a medical school that has exceptional faculty and
instrumental facilities. Such an experimental curriculum may
prescribe admission and graduation requirements other than those

11 | P a g e

prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only exceptional students shall

be enrolled in the experimental curriculum;
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical
school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to
collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each
which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical
Education;
(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments
of the hospitals for training which comply with the minimum specific
physical facilities as provided in subparagraph (b) hereof; and
(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules
and regulations for the proper implementation of the foregoing
functions. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical
schools:
Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any
student who has not been convicted by any court of competent
jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who
presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science
or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school
from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral
character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal
arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to
inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the
preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed
admissible.
xxx

xxx

x x x (Emphasis supplied)

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education,
Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform
admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an
additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission

into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 19861987. This Order goes on to state that:
2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument
toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the
medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical
education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful
applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined
every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with
the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of
each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as
presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for
the issuance of the prescribed certificate of elegibility for admission
into the medical colleges.
3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical
Education, each medical college may give other tests for applicants
who have been issued a corresponding certificate of eligibility for
admission that will yield information on other aspects of the
applicant's personality to complement the information derived from
the NMAT.
xxx

xxx

xxx

8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility

for Admission (CEA), or admitted for enrollment as first year student
in any medical college, beginning the school year, 1986-87, without
the required NMAT qualification as called for under this
Order. (Underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center
conducted NMATs for entrance to medical colleges during the school year
1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April 1987, respondent Center
conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges during the school
year 1987.1988.1avvphi1
Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction
may be issued to enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic

12 | P a g e

Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, pending
resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed statute and
administrative order. We regard this issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It
scarcely needs documentation that a court would issue a writ of preliminary
injunction only when the petitioner assailing a statute or administrative order
has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the
mind of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing a
clear legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is of course the
constitutionality of the statute or order assailed.
1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution
which are, in their assertion, violated by the continued implementation of
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, as amended, and MECS Order
No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked read as follows:
(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect of human rights. "
(b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation building and shall promote and protect their physical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It shall inculcate in
the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs."
(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education,
science and technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism
and nationalism, accelerate social progress and to promote total
human liberation and development. "
(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and promote the
right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and take
appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. "
(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements."

Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State
policies" which the government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The
petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to demonstrate to what extent
or in what manner the statute and the administrative order they assail collide
with the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in
other words, discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This
burden is heavy enough where the constitutional provision invoked is
relatively specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in behavioral or
operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier where
the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second portion of Article II
is cast, in language descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of basic
objectives of State policy and therefore highly generalized in tenor. The
petitioners have not made their case, even a prima facie case, and we are
not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulation
impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional
provisions pointed to by the petitioners.
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once
more petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation
they assail in fact clash with that provision. On the contrary we may note-in
anticipation of discussion infra that the statute and the regulation which
petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at the
level of professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section
5 (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the latter phrase of
Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really
enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education " accessible
to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional
school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who
qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements. "
2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and
(f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional
principle which forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by failing to
establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of
Medical Education. The general principle of non-delegation of legislative
power, which both flows from the reinforces the more fundamental rule of the
separation and allocation of powers among the three great departments of

13 | P a g e

government,1 must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes

which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex
and technical as medical education and the practice of medicine in our
present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago
in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission:2
One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle
of separation of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non
potest delegare or delegate potestas non potest delegare, adopted
this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E.
Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is
also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has
been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern government,
giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits of the principle of
"subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England
but in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and
Osmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering
the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward the
approval of the practice by the courts." 3
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making
authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are
necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice
Fernando in Edu v. Ericta4
The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the
non-delegation objection is easily met.The standard though does not
have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy
and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law,
clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads. 5
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section
1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical
education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute

itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the non-delegation principle.
3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No.
52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which
results in a denial of due process. Again, petitioners have failed to specify
just what factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and
"unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest that passing the
NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when added on top of the admission
requirements set out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other
admission requirements established by internal regulations of the various
medical schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus appear to
relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT requirement. But
constitutionality is essentially a question of power or authority: this Court has
neither commission or competence to pass upon questions of the desirability
or wisdom or utility of legislation or administrative regulation. Those
questions must be address to the political departments of the government not
to the courts.
There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the
legislative and administrative provisions impugned by them constitute, to the
mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The police
power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power
and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote an the important
interests and needs in a word, the public order of the general
community.6 An important component of that public order is the health and
physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one
can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. 7
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is
some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a
condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing
of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation
of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. 8 That the
power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is

14 | P a g e

also well recognized. thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring

those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board
examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power.9 Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a
recognized medical school for admission to the medical profession, has
also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the
state.10 What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the
regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as
noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of
medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student
body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the
process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting
admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for
medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain,
and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools
in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social
and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like
the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the
selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the
quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today
of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States
of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] 11 and quite probably
in other countries with far more developed educational resources than our
own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even
attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and
regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the
public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in
those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or
trauma.
4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in
conflict with the equal protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically,
petitioners assert that that portion of the MECS Order which provides that

the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores
on the NMAT, shall be determined every-year by the Board of
Medical 11 Education after consultation with the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges. (Emphasis supplied)
infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words,
that students seeking admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988,
when subjected to a different cutoff score than that established for an, e.g.,
earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this renders the MECS
Order "arbitrary and capricious." The force of this argument is more apparent
than real. Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by
differing conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff
score for a given year may be a function of such factors as the number of
students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year;
the number of places available in medical schools during the current year;
the average score attained during the current year; the level of difficulty of
the test given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent
and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from
year to year, may wen result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language
in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the
Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to meet
circumstances as they change.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum
scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the
Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the
respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Education, petitioners,
vs.
HON. DANIEL P. ALFONSO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 74, Fourth Judicial Region, Antipolo, Rizal, and the PHILIPPINE
MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN
COLLEGE
OF
MEDICINE
FOUNDATION,
INC., respondents.
Carpio, Villaraza & Cruz for private respondent.
Anatolio S. Tuazon, Jr. for intervenors.

NARVASA, J.:
Petitioners, the Board of Medical Education, the government agency which
supervises and regulates the country's medical colleges, and Secretary
Lourdes R. Quisumbing of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports,
as Chairperson of the Board, pray for a writ of certiorari to nullify and set
aside the order issued by respondent Judge Daniel P. Alfonso, Regional Trial
Court, Antipolo, Rizal, in Civil Case No. 1385 restraining the enforcement of
petitioner Quisumbing's order of closure of the respondent Philippine MuslimChristian College of Medicine Foundation, Inc. (hereafter simply the
College).lwph1.t
The, College, a private educational institution, was founded in 1981 for the
avowed purpose of producing physicians who will "emancipate Muslim
citizens from age-old attitudes on health." The, unstable peace and order
situation in Mindanao led to the establishment of the College in Antipolo,
Rizal, which granted it a temporary permit to operate in the municipality,
instead of in Zamboanga City where the school was first proposed to be
located. It has since adopted Antipolo as its permanent site and changed its
name to the Rizal College of Medicine.

G.R. No. 88259 August 10, 1989

THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION and the HON. LOURDES R.
QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and Chairman, Board of Medical

15 | P a g e

In 1985, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and the
Board of Medical Education (BME) authorized the Commission on Medical
Education to conduct a study of all medical schools in the Philippines. The,
report of the Commission showed that the College fell very much short of the

minimum standards set for medical schools. 1 The, team of inspectors,

composed of Doctors Florentino Herrera, Jr., Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Horacio
Estrada, Jose V. Silao, Jr. and Andres L. Reyes, recommended the closure of
the school 2 upon the following findings, to wit:
(a) the College was not fulfilling the purpose for which it had
been created because of its inappropriate location and the
absence in its curriculum of subjects relating to Muslim
culture and welfare;
(b) its lack of university affiliation hindered its students from
obtaining a "balanced humanistic and scientific" education;
(c) it did not have its philosophy base hospital for the training
of its students in the major clinical disciplines, as required by
the DECS;
(d) more than 60% of the college faculty did not teach in the
College full-time, resulting in shortened and irregular class
hours, subject overloading, and in general, poor quality
teaching.
The, school disputed these findings as biased and discriminatory. At its
request, the Board of Medical Education, in May, 1987, sent another team of
doctors 3 for a re-evaluation of the College. After inspection, the team
confirmed the previous findings and recommended the phase-out of the
school. 4
The, first two reports were verified on June 23, 1987 by a third team of
inspectors. 5 A year thereafter, the College failed another test what was in
effect the fourth evaluation of its fitness to continue as a medical school
conducted on March 4 and 5, 1988 by a team from the Board of Medical
Education determining the eligibility of medical schools for government
recognition. The, College was adjudged "inadequate" in all aspects of the
survey, to wit, college, curriculum, facilities, teaching hospital, and
studentry. 6 The, inspectors, Doctors Nilo Rosas, Macario Tan and Elena Ines
Cuyegkeng, accordingly recommended denial of government; recognition.

16 | P a g e

Accordingly, the Board of Medical Education recommended to the DECS the

closure of the College, effective the end of the school year 1988-1989. The,
College however succeeded in having the Board form yet another team to
review the previous findings. Doctors Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Alberto
Romualdez, Artemio Ordinaria Joven Cuanang and Nilo L. Rosas conducted
their inspection on June 18, 1988. Their findings: although there had been a
"major effort to improve the physical plant for classroom instructions and the
library, serious deficiencies remain(ed) in the areas of clinical facilities and
library operations;" "faculty continue(d) to be quite inadequate with no
prospects for satisfactory growth and development;" "student profile ... (was)
below par from the point of view of credentials (NMAT and transfer records)
as well as level knowledge and preparedness at various stages of medical
education," and "the most serious deficiency ... (was) the almost total lack of
serious development efforts in academic medicine i.e., seeming lack of
philosophy of teaching, no serious effort to study curricula, almost nonexistent innovative approaches." Again, the recommendation was to close
the College with provisions for the dispersal of its students to other medical
schools. 7
In her letter of June 23, 1988, Secretary Quisumbing informed the Chairman
of the College's Board of Trustees, Mr. Victor Sumulong, of the decision of
the Board of Medical Education to close the College. Mr. Sumulong instead
proposed a gradual phase-out starting the school year 1989-1990 in order
not to dislocate the students and staff and to minimize financial loss. 8 The,
Board subsequently allowed the College to continue its operations but only
until May, 1989, after which it was to be closed, this decision being "final and
unappealable." The, College was, however, assured of assistance in the
relocation of its students and in its rehabilitation as an institution for healthrelated and paramedical courses. 9
The, College appealed the decision to the Office of the President, imputing
grave abuse of discretion to the Secretary. 10 On February 16, 1989,
Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., finding "no reason to disturb" the
contested decision, affirmed it. 11
On March 2, 1989, the College went to court. It filed Civil Case No. 1385 in
the court of respondent Judge Daniel P. Alfonso against Secretary
Quisumbing in her capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports,

questioning the decision as illegal, oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory

and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain its implementation.
The, writ issued as prayed for by order of the respondent Judge dated May
10, 1989. 12 His Honor ruled that the inspection of June 18, 1988 was the
principal basis of the closure order, and on such basis sustained the claim of
the College that the inspection was done in an "arbitrary and haphazard
manner" by a team of inspectors who had already prejudged the school.
Judge Alfonso held that there was no evidence supporting the findings in the
report of June 18, 1988, and declared that his philosophy ocular inspection of
the College disclosed that the deficiencies mentioned in the report were nonexistent, and that on the contrary, the laboratory and library areas were "big
enough," and in the operations of the proposed base hospital were going on
smoothly at the time of the ocular inspection."
The, school thereupon promptly advertised in major newspaper dailies for
enrollees in all levels of the medical college and in its pre-board review
classes. 13
Hence the present petition, assailing the order of injunction dated May 10,
1989 as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, and praying for a
restraining order against its enforcement as well as for the dismissal of the
action instituted in the court a quo. The, Court on June 1, 1989 ordered the
respondent College to desist from advertising and admitting students, and
the respondent judge to refrain from enforcing his injunction order.
The, College in its Comment would justify its entitlement to the questioned
injunction on the ground that the closure order against which it was directed
was issued without factual basis and in violation of the right of the College to
due process of law, and that it violates MECS Order No. 5 (Series of 1986) to
the effect that the penalty of closure cannot be imposed earlier than three (3)
years from the last evaluation, which in this instance was made, on June 18,
1988.
Resort to the Courts to obtain a reversal of the determination by the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports that the College is unfit to
continue its operations is in this case clearly unavailing. There is, to begin
with, no law authorizing an appeal from decisions or orders of the Secretary

17 | P a g e

of Education, Culture and Sports to this Court or any other Court. It is not the
function of this Court or any other Court to review the decisions and orders of
the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an educational institution meets
the norms and standards required for permission to operate and to continue
operating as such. On this question, no Court has the power or prerogative to
substitute its opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is obviously not
expected that any Court would have the competence to do so.
The, only authority reposed in the Courts in the matter is the determination of
whether or not the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports has acted
within the scope of powers granted him by law and the Constitution. As long
as it appears that he has done so, any decision rendered by him should not
and will not be subject to review and reversal by any court.
Of course, if it should be made, to appear to the Court that those powers
were in a case exercised so whimsically, capriciously, oppressively,
despotically or arbitrarily as to call for peremptory correction or stated
otherwise, that the Secretary had acted with grave abuse of discretion, or
had unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty, or excluded another from the use or enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled it becomes the Court's duty to rectify
such action through the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition,
or mandamus, whichever may properly apply. Yet even in these extreme
instances, where a Court finds that there has been abuse of powers by the
Secretary and consequently nullifies and/or forbids such an abuse of power,
or compliance whatever is needful to keep its exercise within bounds, the
Court, absent any compelling reason to do otherwise, should still leave to the
Secretary the ultimate determination of the issue of the satisfy action or
fulfillment by an educational institution of the standards set down for its
legitimate operation, as to which it should not ordinarily substitute its over
judgment for that of said office.
In any case, the recorded facts quite clearly fail to support the College's claim
of grave abuse of discretion containing the order of closure, and on the
contrary convincingly show the challenged decision to be correct. From 1985,
no less than five (5) surveys were conducted of respondent institution to
determine its compliance with the minimum standards established for a
medical college. The, first survey, that undertaken by the Commission on

Medical Education, disclosed such various and significant deficiencies in the

school as to constrain the inspectors to recommend its closure. Four (4)
other surveys were thereafter made by as many different committees or
teams, at the school's instance or otherwise, all of which basically confirmed
the results of that first survey. Moreover, the findings of all five (5) surveys
were affirmed by the Office of the President. Indeed, the petitioner, through
the Chairman of its Board of Trustees, to all intents and purposes accepted
the validity of the findings of those five (5) survey groups when it proposed, in
1988, a gradual phase-out of the school starting in 1989. The, respondent
College knew that the recommendation for its closure was made, as early as
1986, that recommendation was reiterated and reaffirmed four (4) times
thereafter until it was finally approved and acted upon by the Secretary,
whose action was confirmed by the Office of the President. Said respondent
was given notice in June 1988, that in consequence of all these, the time for
its definite closure had been unalterably set at May, 1989, a notice which was
accompanied by assurances of assistance in the relocation of its students
before June, 1989 and in its rehabilitation as a school for other courses. After
having resorted to the whole range of administrative remedies available to it,
without success, it sought to obtain from the respondent Court the relief it
could not obtain from those sources, and what can only be described as a
deliberate attempt to frustrate and obstruct implementation of the decision for
its closure as of June, 1989 openly solicited, by newspaper advertisements
or otherwise, enrollment of new and old students.
Given these facts, and it being a matter of law that the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports exercises the power to enjoin compliance with
the requirements laid down for medical schools and to mete out sanctions
where he finds that violations thereof have been committed, it was a grave
abuse of discretion for the respondent judge to issue the questioned
injunction and thereby thwart official action, in the premises correctly taken,
allowing the College to operate without the requisite government permit. A
single ocular inspection, done after the College had been pre-warned
thereof, did not, in the circumstances, warrant only the findings of more
qualified inspectors about the true state of the College, its faculty, facilities,
operations, etc. The, members of the evaluating team came from the different
sectors in the fields of education and medicine, 14 and their judgment in this
particular area is certainly better than that of the respondent Judge whose
sole and only visit to the school could hardly have given him much more to

18 | P a g e

go on than a brief look at the physical plant and facilities and into the conduct
of the classes and other school activities. Respondent Judge gravely abused
his discretion in substituting his judgment for theirs. It is well-settled doctrine
that courts of justice should not generally interfere with purely administrative
and discretionary functions; that courts have no supervisory power over the
proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the
government; involving the exercise of judgment and findings of facts,
because by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters
falling under their jurisdiction, the latter are in a better position to pass
judgment on such matters andn their findings of facts in that regard are
generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts. 15 There are, to be
sure, exceptions to this general rule but none of them obtains in this case.
The, claim of denial of due process likewise holds no water, as the record
clearly shows that the College was given every opportunity to so improve
itself as to come up to requirements, but remained sadly sub-standard after
the inspections conducted by the evaluating teams. It had, in fact, admitted
its failure to have up to the desired standards when it proposed its gradual
phase-out in its letter dated June 27, 1988 to Secretary Quisumbing. It was
also precisely because of its complaints of bias and prejudice that the Board
of Medical Education dispatched new teams to survey and re-evaluate its
performance. It had even gone all the way up to the Office of the President to
seek a reversal of the order of closure. There is thus no reason for it to
complain of a lack of opportunity to be heard and to explain its side as well
as to seek reconsideration of the ruling complained of.
There is also no merit in respondent College's argument that the closure
violated NMCS ORDER No. 5, Series of 1986, because it was sought to be
effected before the lapse of the three-year period therein snowed, which in
this case is sought to be counted from June 18, 1988, or the date of the last
evaluation. The, provision referred to reads:
The following sanction shall be applied against any medical
school, for failure to comply with the specific requirements of
the essentials, viz.:
xxx

c. Withdrawal or cancellation of the school's government;

authority to operate, for failure to fully comply with the
prescribed requirements after three (3) years from the last
evaluation conducted on the school.
It must at once be obvious from a reading of the provision, paragraph c, that
the situation therein contemplated where a school is found to have failed
to "fully comply with the prescribed requirements," i.e., has not complied with
some requirements and has failed to do so within three (3) years from the
last evaluation is quite distinct from that obtaining in the case at bar where
respondent school was found to have deficiencies so serious as to warrant
its immediate closure. Said paragraph c should not be construed to prohibit
absolutely the withdrawal or cancellation of government; authority to operate
until after three (3) years from the last evaluation conducted on the school;
or, stated otherwise, it does not unexceptionally prescribe a three-year
waiting period before authority to operate may be withdrawn. Rather, it
should be read as giving the Secretary of Education the discretion,
depending on the seriousness of the discovered deficiencies, to afford an
educational institution which has failed to comply with some requirement or
other, time not exceeding three (3) years to correct the deficiencies before
applying the sanction of withdrawal or cancellation of the government;
authority to operate. The, circumstances in the case at bar are far from
nominal and, to repeat, are different from those obviously envisioned by the
paragraph in question. There had never been a recommendation that the
College be granted an opportunity to comply with certain requirements. From
the outset, the proposal had been that it be forthwith closed, its discovered
deficiencies as a medical college being of so serious a character as to be
irremediable. The, other four (4) surveys were conducted, not to determine if
in the course of time the petitioner school had already fully complied with all
the prescribed requisites, but rather, whether or not the original
recommendation for its closure was correct and should be sustained. And, as
already mentioned, the subsequent surveys, over a period of more than three
(3) years, served but to confirm the validity of that initial proposal for its
closure. Under these circumstances, therefore, even if it be assumed that the
provision, paragraph c, applied to petitioner school, it must be held that there
has been substantial compliance therewith.

19 | P a g e

Having thus disposed of the issues raised by the facts of the case, the Court
sees no useful purpose to be served by remanding the case to the Trial Court
for further proceedings. The, only acceptable reason for such a remand
would be so that the Trial Court may determine whether or not the petitioners'
first have acted within the scope of their powers or grossly abused them, a
matter that this Court has already passed upon here. Such a remand cannot
be justified on the theory that the Trial Court will make its philosophy
independent determination of whether or not respondent medical institution
has complied with the minimum standards laid down for its continued
operation, since, as here ruled, it has not that power.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted and the
temporary restraining order issued by the Court is made, permanent. The,
questioned writ of preliminary injunction dated May 10, 1989 is set aside and
respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 1385.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Cortes, Gri;o-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, and Sarmiento JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and
DIRECTOR
OF
CENTER
FOR
EDUCATIONAL
MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.

ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZONCAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, respondents.
Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.

After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989,

declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his
right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the
police power. 3
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.

CRUZ, J.:
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has
thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it
again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule thath) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take
the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall
not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
But first the facts.
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a
degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took
the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1 When he applied to
take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the
aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, to compel his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights
to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the
private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16,
1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. 2 In an amended petition filed
with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS
Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional
grounds raised were due process and equal protection.

20 | P a g e

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT

as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to
those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a
medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous
Court:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is
whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the
securing of the health and safety of the general community,
on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully
approached by recalling that the regulation of the pratice of
medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the
public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the
ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well
recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations
requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take
and pass medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.
Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a
recognized medical school-for admission to the medical
profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise
of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before
us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of
access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as
noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this

type: the improvement of the professional and technical

quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical
schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the
process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other
things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the
required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and
the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our
professional schools in general, and medical schools in
particular, in the current state of our social and economic
development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an
admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its
stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into
[our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of
medical education in the country." Given the widespread use
today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical
schools in the United States of America (the Medical College
Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in other countries
with far more developed educational resources than our
own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the
petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are
entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the
securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in
this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of
the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake
to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case
was not applicable. Her reason was that it upheld only the requirement for
the admission test and said nothing about the so-called "three-flunk rule."
We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the
case at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of
the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and,

21 | P a g e

indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be
regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical
profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to
repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably
necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. 5
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the
police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure
that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom
patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the
purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is
intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical
profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the
public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to
one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human
resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not
used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best
promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of
satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his
patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he
should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a
plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the
same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be

shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career

may be for others.

a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that
has not excited his interest.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not

absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to
choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements. 6

In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is

more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate
calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his
potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be
a brilliant future.

The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to
those better prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be
accommodated in our already crowded medical schools, there is all the more
reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found wanting.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is
not well-taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons
or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between
medical students and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and
the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of
the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more
vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an
equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate
responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the
tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In
other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality
education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is
entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent
has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say
the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is
stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute
incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is

22 | P a g e

We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who

should never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied
banking and teachers who could be better as merchants.
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our
system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is
best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may
be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because
we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent
court dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private
respondent. It is so ordered.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 144681. June 21, 2004]

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC), CHAIRMAN

HERMOGENES P. POBRE, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER

ARMANDO PASCUAL, BOARD OF MEDICINE, CHAIRMAN

RODOLFO P. DE GUZMAN, JOSE S. RAMIREZ, JUANITO B.
BILLOTE, RUBEN R. POLICARPIO, EDGARDO T. FERNANDO
and RICARDO D. FULGENCIO II, petitioners, vs. ARLENE V. DE
GUZMAN, VIOLETA V. MENESES, CELERINA S. NAVARRO,
JOSE RAMONCITO P. NAVARRO, ARNEL V. HERRERA and
GERALDINE ELIZABETH M. PAGILAGAN, ELNORA R.
RAQUENO, MARISSA A. REGODON, LAURA M. SANTOS,
KARANGALAN D. SERRANO, DANILO A. VILLAVER, MARIA
ROSARIO L. LEONOR, ALICIA S. LIZANO, MARITEL M.
ECHIVERRI, BERNADETTE T. MENDOZA, FERNANDO F.
MANDAPAT, ALELI A. GOLLAYAN, ELCIN C. ARRIOLA,
HERMINIGILDA E. CONEJOS, SALLY B. BUNAGAN, ROGELIO B.
ANCHETA, OSCAR H. PADUA, JR., EVELYN D. GRAJO, EVELYN
S. ACOSTA, MARGARITA BELINDA L. VICENCIO, VALENTINO P.
ARBOLEDA, EVELYN O. RAMOS, ACHILLES J. PERALTA,
CORAZON M. CRUZ, LEUVINA P. CHICO, JOSEPH A. JAO, MA.
LUISA S. GUTIERREZ, LYDIA C. CHAN, OPHELIA C. HIDALGO,
FERNANDO T. CRUZ, MELVIN M. USITA, RAFAEL I. TOLENTINO,
GRACE E. UY, CHERYL R. TRIGUERO, MICHAEL L. SERRANO,
FEDERICO L. CASTILLO, MELITA J. CAEDO, SAMUEL B.
BANGOY, BERNARDITA B. SY, GLORIA T. JULARBAL,
FREDERICK D. FRANCISCO, CARLOS M. BERNARDO, JR.,
HUBERT S. NAZARENO, CLARISSA B. BACLIG, DAYMINDA G.
BONTUYAN, BERNADETTE H. CABUHAT, NANCY J. CHAVEZ,
MARIO D. CUARESMA, ERNESTO L. CUE, EVELYN C.
CUNDANGAN, RHONEIL R. DEVERATURDA, DERILEEN D.
DORADO, SAIBZUR N. EDDING, VIOLETA C. FELIPE, HERMINIO
V. FERNANDEZ, JR., MARIA VICTORIA M. LACSAMANA,
NORMA G. LAFAVILLA, RUBY B. LANTIN, MA. ELOISA Q.
MALLARI, CLARISA SJ. NICOLAS, PERCIVAL H. PANGILINAN,
ARNULFO A. SALVADOR, ROBERT B. SANCHEZ, MERLY D.
STA. ANA and YOLANDA P. UNICA, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure seeks to nullify the Decision,[1] dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283. The appellate court affirmed the
judgment[2] dated December 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530. The trial court allowed the
respondents to take their physicians oath and to register as duly licensed

23 | P a g e

physicians. Equally challenged is the Resolution[3] promulgated on August

25, 2000 of the Court of Appeals, denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The facts of this case are as follows:
The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of
Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician
Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine
(Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released
their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination.
Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventynine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult
subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and
Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally
high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100%
in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored
99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those who passed
from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a
mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates
from other schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the
unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a
record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure
Examination.
On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the
registration as physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of
Medicine.[4] The PRC asked the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity marred the February 1993
Physician Licensure Examination.
Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr. Bienvenido F.
Nebres, S.J., an expert mathematician and authority in statistics, and later
president of the Ateneo de Manila University, to conduct a statistical analysis
of the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne of the said examination.
On June 10, 1993, Fr. Nebres submitted his report. He reported that a
comparison of the scores in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne, of
the FatimaCollege examinees with those of examinees from De La Salle
University and Perpetual Help College of Medicine showed that the scores
ofFatima College examinees were not only incredibly high but unusually
clustered close to each other. He concluded that there must be some
unusual reason creating the clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must
be a cause strong enough to eliminate the normal variations that one should

expect from the examinees [of Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort,
energy, etc.[5]
For its part, the NBI found that the questionable passing rate
of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the
conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test
questions.[6]
On July 5, 1993, respondents Arlene V. De Guzman, Violeta V.
Meneses, Celerina S. Navarro, Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, Arnel V. Herrera,
and Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan (Arlene V. De Guzman et al., for
brevity) filed a special civil action for mandamus, with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 93-66530 with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52. Their petition was adopted by the
other respondents as intervenors.
Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993,
charging respondents with immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit in
connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended
that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified. The case was
docketed as Adm. Case No. 1687 by the PRC.

Meanwhile, on November 22, 1993, during the pendency of the instant

petition, the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 93-66530 was held. Then,
the parties, agreed to reduce the testimonies of their respective witnesses to
sworn questions-and-answers. This was without prejudice to crossexamination by the opposing counsel.
On December 13, 1993, petitioners counsel failed to appear at the trial
in the mistaken belief that the trial was set for December 15. The trial court
then ruled that petitioners waived their right to cross-examine the witnesses.
On January 27, 1994, counsel for petitioners filed a Manifestation and
Motion stating the reasons for her non-appearance and praying that the
cross-examination of the witnesses for the opposing parties be reset. The
trial court denied the motion for lack of notice to adverse counsel. It also
denied the Motion for Reconsideration that followed on the ground that
adverse counsel was notified less than three (3) days prior to the hearing.
Meanwhile, to prevent the PRC and the Board from proceeding with
Adm. Case No. 1687, the respondents herein moved for the issuance of a
restraining order, which the lower court granted in its Order dated April 4,
1994.

On July 28, 1993, the RTC issued an Order in Civil Case No. 93-66530
granting the preliminary mandatory injunction sought by the respondents. It
ordered the petitioners to administer the physicians oath to Arlene V. De
Guzman et al., and enter their names in the rolls of the PRC.

The petitioners then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari docketed
as G.R. No. 115704, to annul the Orders of the trial court datedNovember 13,
1993, February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994. We referred the petition to the
Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506.

The petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals to set aside the mandatory injunctive writ, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 31701.

On August 31, 1994, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 34506
as follows:

On October 21, 1993, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No.

31701, with the dispositive portion of the Decision ordaining as follows:

WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary
restraining order/preliminary injunction is GRANTED and the Orders of
December 13, 1993, February 7, 1994, February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994
of the RTC-Manila, Branch 52, and all further proceedings taken by it in
Special Civil Action No. 93-66530 are hereby DECLARED NULL and VOID.
The said RTC-Manila is ordered to allow petitioners counsel to crossexamine the respondents witnesses, to allow petitioners to present their
evidence in due course of trial, and thereafter to decide the case on the
merits on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Costs against respondents.

WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary

mandatory injunction issued by the lower court against petitioners is hereby
nullified and set aside.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Arlene V. de Guzman, et al., then elevated the foregoing Decision to this
Court in G.R. No. 112315. In our Resolution dated May 23, 1994, we denied
the petition for failure to show reversible error on the part of the appellate
court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[8]
The trial was then set and notices were sent to the parties.
A day before the first hearing, on September 22, 1994, the petitioners
filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion praying for the partial

24 | P a g e

reconsideration of the appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506,

and for the outright dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. The petitioners
asked for the suspension of the proceedings.
In its Order dated September 23, 1994, the trial court granted the
aforesaid motion, cancelled the scheduled hearing dates, and reset the
proceedings to October 21 and 28, 1994.
Meanwhile, on October 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the partial
motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. Thus, petitioners filed
with the Supreme Court a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 117817,
entitled Professional Regulation Commission, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
On November 11, 1994, counsel for the petitioners failed to appear at
the trial of Civil Case No. 93-66530. Upon motion of the respondents herein,
the trial court ruled that herein petitioners waived their right to cross-examine
the herein respondents. Trial was reset to November 28, 1994.
On November 25, 1994, petitioners counsel moved for the inhibition of
the trial court judge for alleged partiality. On November 28, 1994, the day
the Motion to Inhibit was to be heard, petitioners failed to appear. Thus, the
trial court denied the Motion to Inhibit and declared Civil Case No. 93-66530
deemed submitted for decision.
On December 19, 1994, the trial court handed down its judgment in Civil
Case No. 93-66530, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the respondents to allow the
petitioners and intervenors (except those with asterisks and footnotes in
pages 1 & 2 of this decision) [sic], [9] to take the physicians oath and to
register them as physicians.
It should be made clear that this decision is without prejudice to any
administrative disciplinary action which may be taken against any of the
petitioners for such causes and in the manner provided by law and consistent
with the requirements of the Constitution as any other professionals.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[10]
As a result of these developments, petitioners filed with this Court a
petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 118437,
entitledProfessional Regulation Commission v. Hon. David G. Nitafan,
praying inter alia, that (1) G.R. No. 118437 be consolidated with G.R. No.

25 | P a g e

117817; (2) the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1994 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 be nullified for its failure to decree the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 93-66530, and in the alternative, to set aside the decision of
the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530, order the trial court judge to inhibit
himself, and Civil Case No. 93-66530 be re-raffled to another branch.
On December 26, 1994, the petitioners herein filed their Notice of
Appeal[11] in Civil Case No. 93-66530, thereby elevating the case to the Court
of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37283.
In our Resolution of June 7, 1995, G.R. No. 118437 was consolidated
with G.R. No. 117817.
On July 9, 1998, we disposed of G.R. Nos. 117817 and 118437 in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 117817 is DISMISSED for being
moot. The petition in G.R. No. 118437 is likewise DISMISSED on the ground
that there is a pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. Assistant Solicitor
General Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang is advised to be more circumspect in her
dealings with the courts as a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with accordingly.
SO ORDERED.[12]
While CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 was awaiting disposition by the appellate
court, Arnel V. Herrera, one of the original petitioners in Civil Case No. 9366530, joined by twenty-seven intervenors, to wit: Fernando F. Mandapat,
Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T. Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando T.
Cruz, Marissa A. Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R.
Triguero, Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-Cabanes,
Laura M. Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa, Carlosito C.
Domingo, Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R. Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur N. Edding,
Derileen D. Dorado-Edding, Robert B. Sanchez, Maria Rosario L. LeonorLacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita Belinda L.
Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio, Elcin C.
Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, manifested that they were
no longer interested in proceeding with the case and moved for its dismissal.
A similar manifestation and motion was later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I.
Yeban-Merlan, Michael L. Serrano, Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador,
Belinda C. Rabara, Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B.
Baclig, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan,
Evelyn C. Cundangan, Frederick D. Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J.
Caedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano,
Danilo A. Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M. Usita. The

Court of Appeals ruled that its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 would not
apply to them.
On May 16, 2000, the Court of Appeals decided CA-G.R. SP No. 37283,
with the following fallo, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, We
hereby AFFIRM the same and DISMISS the instant appeal.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[13]
In sustaining the trial courts decision, the appellate court ratiocinated
that the respondents complied with all the statutory requirements for
admission into the licensure examination for physicians in February 1993.
They all passed the said examination. Having fulfilled the requirements of
Republic Act No. 2382,[14] they should be allowed to take their oaths as
physicians and be registered in the rolls of the PRC.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS HAVE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR MANDAMUS AGAINST PETITIONERS IN THE LIGHT OF THE
RESOLUTION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN G.R. NO. 112315
AFFIRMING THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DECLARING THAT IF
EVER THERE IS SOME DOUBT AS TO THE MORAL FITNESS OF
EXAMINEES, THE ISSUANCE OF LICENSE TO PRACTICE MEDICINE IS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY GRANTED TO THE SUCCESSFUL EXAMINEES.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS COULD PROCEED
DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1687, WHICH
WAS PRECISELY LODGED TO DETERMINE THE MORAL FITNESS OF
RESPONDENTS TO BECOME DOCTORS.[15]
To our mind, the only issue is: Did the Court of Appeals commit a
reversible error of law in sustaining the judgment of the trial court that
respondents are entitled to a writ of mandamus?

26 | P a g e

The petitioners submit that a writ of mandamus will not lie in this case.
They point out that for a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have
a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and it is
the duty of the respondent to perform the act required. Thus, mandamus may
be availed of only when the duty sought to be performed is a ministerial and
not a discretionary one. The petitioners argue that the appellate courts
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 upholding the decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 93-66530 overlooked its own pronouncement in CA-G.R. SP
No. 31701. The Court of Appeals held in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701 that the
issuance of a license to engage in the practice of medicine becomes
discretionary on the PRC if there exists some doubt that the successful
examinee has not fully met the requirements of the law. The petitioners
stress that this Courts Resolution dated May 24, 1994 in G.R. No. 112315
held that there was no showing that the Court of Appeals had committed any
reversible error in rendering the questioned judgment in CA-G.R. SP No.
31701. The petitioners point out that our Resolution in G.R. No. 112315 has
long become final and executory.
Respondents counter that having passed the 1993 licensure
examinations for physicians, the petitioners have the obligation to administer
to them the oath as physicians and to issue their certificates of registration as
physicians pursuant to Section 20[16] of Rep. Act No. 2382. The Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, found that respondents complied with all
the requirements of Rep. Act No. 2382. Furthermore, respondents were
admitted by the Medical Board to the licensure examinations and had passed
the same. Hence, pursuant to Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, the
petitioners had the obligation to administer their oaths as physicians and
register them.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction,
in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court,
tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the
official station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of
law.[17] Section 3 of Rule 65[18] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure outlines
two situations when a writ of mandamus may issue, when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully (1) neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station; or (2) excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which the other is entitled.
We shall discuss the issues successively.
1. On The Existence of a Duty of the Board of Medicine To Issue
Certificates of Registration as Physicians under Rep. Act No. 2382.

For mandamus to prosper, there must be a showing that the officer,

board, or official concerned, has a clear legal duty, not involving discretion.
[19]
Moreover, there must be statutory authority for the performance of the act,
[20]
and the performance of the duty has been refused. [21]Thus, it must be
pertinently asked now: Did petitioners have the duty to administer the
Hippocratic Oath and register respondents as physicians under the Medical
Act of 1959?
As found by the Court of Appeals, on which we agree on the basis of the
records:
It bears emphasizing herein that petitioner-appellees and intervenorappellees have fully complied with all the statutory requirements for
admission into the licensure examinations for physicians conducted and
administered by the respondent-appellants on February 12, 14, 20 and 21,
1993. Stress, too, must be made of the fact that all of them successfully
passed the same examinations.[22]
The crucial query now is whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding
that petitioners should allow the respondents to take their oaths as
physicians and register them, steps which would enable respondents to
practice the medical profession[23] pursuant to Section 20 of the Medical Act
of 1959?
The appellate court relied on a single provision, Section 20 of Rep. Act
No. 2382, in concluding that the petitioners had the ministerial obligation to
administer the Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them as
physicians. But it is a basic rule in statutory construction that each part of a
statute should be construed in connection with every other part to produce a
harmonious whole, not confining construction to only one section. [24] The
intent or meaning of the statute should be ascertained from the statute taken
as a whole, not from an isolated part of the provision. Accordingly, Section 20
of Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended should be read in conjunction with the
other provisions of the Act. Thus, to determine whether the petitioners had
the ministerial obligation to administer the Hippocratic Oath to respondents
and register them as physicians, recourse must be had to the entirety of the
Medical Act of 1959.
A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that
the law uses the word shall with respect to the issuance of certificates of
registration. Thus, the petitioners shall sign and issue certificates of
registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements
of the Board. In statutory construction the term shall is a word of command. It
is given imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies the
requirements for the grant of his physicians license, the Board is obliged to

27 | P a g e

administer to him his oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to

Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 22[25] of the Medical Act of 1959.
However, the surrounding circumstances in this case call for serious
inquiry concerning the satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements
by the respondents. The unusually high scores in the two most difficult
subjects was phenomenal, according to Fr. Nebres, the consultant of PRC on
the matter, and raised grave doubts about the integrity, if not validity, of the
tests. These doubts have to be appropriately resolved.
Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested with the
power to conduct administrative investigations and disapprove applications
for examination or registration, pursuant to the objectives of Rep. Act No.
2382 as outlined in Section 1[26] thereof. In this case, after the investigation,
the Board filed before the PRC, Adm. Case No. 1687 against the
respondents to ascertain their moral and mental fitness to practice medicine,
as required by Section 9[27] of Rep. Act No. 2382. In its Decision dated July 1,
1997, the Board ruled:
WHEREFORE, the BOARD hereby CANCELS the respondents[]
examination papers in the Physician Licensure Examinations given in
February 1993 and further DEBARS them from taking any licensure
examination for a period of ONE (1) YEAR from the date of the promulgation
of this DECISION. They may, if they so desire, apply for the scheduled
examinations for physicians after the lapse of the period imposed by the
BOARD.
SO ORDERED.[28]
Until the moral and mental fitness of the respondents could be
ascertained, according to petitioners, the Board has discretion to hold in
abeyance the administration of the Hippocratic Oath and the issuance of the
certificates to them. The writ of mandamus does not lie to compel
performance of an act which is not duly authorized.
The respondents nevertheless argue that under Section 20, the Board
shall not issue a certificate of registration only in the following instances: (1)
to any candidate who has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction
of any criminal offense involving moral turpitude; (2) or has been found guilty
of immoral or dishonorable conduct after the investigation by the Board; or
(3) has been declared to be of unsound mind.They aver that none of these
circumstances are present in their case.
Petitioners reject respondents argument. We are informed that in Board
Resolution No. 26,[29] dated July 21, 1993, the Board resolved to file charges

against the examinees from Fatima College of Medicine for immorality,

dishonesty, fraud, and deceit in the Obstetrics-Gynecology and Biochemistry
examinations. It likewise sought to cancel the examination results obtained
by the examinees from the Fatima College.
Section 8[30] of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that a
person who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines, must have
satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination. Section 22, in
turn, provides that the oath may only be administered to physicians who
qualified in the examinations. The operative word here is satisfactorily,
defined as sufficient to meet a condition or obligation or capable of dispelling
doubt or ignorance.[31] Gleaned from Board Resolution No. 26, the licensing
authority apparently did not find that the respondents satisfactorily passed
the licensure examinations. The Board instead sought to nullify the
examination results obtained by the respondents.
2. On the Right Of The Respondents To Be Registered As Physicians
The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one
that has been established by law. If no legal right has been violated, there
can be no application of a legal remedy, and the writ of mandamus is a legal
remedy for a legal right.[32] There must be a well-defined, clear and certain
legal right to the thing demanded. [33] It is long established rule that a license
to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government. [34]
It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right [35] of every
citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable,
and equitable admission and academic requirements. [36] But like all rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated
pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. [37] Thus, persons
who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or
technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a
prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes
particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who
would practice medicine. In a previous case, it may be recalled, this Court
has ordered the Board of Medical Examiners to annul both its resolution and
certificate authorizing a Spanish subject, with the degree of Licentiate in
Medicine and Surgery from the University of Barcelona, Spain, to practice
medicine in the Philippines, without first passing the examination required by
the Philippine Medical Act.[38] In another case worth noting, we upheld the
power of the State to upgrade the selection of applicants into medical
schools through admission tests.[39]

28 | P a g e

It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the

exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by
the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A
political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the
authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain
conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving up ones
constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license. [40] Under the view
that the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse
a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down
license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a
license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity
without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said
officials in the exercise of their power.[41]
In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines are provided for in
Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended, which prescribes the requirements for
admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of candidates for the
board examinations, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds
for denying the issuance of a physicians license, or revoking a license that
has been issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the
applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with
all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing
authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than
satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is
distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if denied.
Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and
conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of
mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.
3. On the Ripeness of the Petition for Mandamus
Lastly, the petitioners herein contend that the Court of Appeals should
have dismissed the petition for mandamus below for being premature.They
argue that the administrative remedies had not been exhausted. The records
show that this is not the first time that petitioners have sought the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 93-66530. This issue was raised in G.R. No. 115704, which
petition we referred to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 34506. On motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506,
the appellate court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the
prayers for the nullification of the order of the trial court and the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 93-66530 were inconsistent reliefs. In G.R. No. 118437, the
petitioners sought to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 34506 insofar as it did not order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-

66530. In our consolidated decision, dated July 9, 1998, in G.R. Nos. 117817
& 118437, this Court speaking through Justice Bellosillo opined that:
Indeed, the issue as to whether the Court of Appeals erred in not ordering the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530 sought to be resolved in the instant
petition has been rendered meaningless by an event taking place prior to the
filing of this petition and denial thereof should follow as a logical
consequence.[42] There is no longer any justiciable controversy so that any
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. [43] It should be
recalled that in its decision of 19 December 1994 the trial court granted the
writ of mandamus prayed for by private respondents, which decision was
received by petitioners on 20 December 1994. Three (3) days after, or on 23
December 1994, petitioners filed the instant petition. By then, the remedy
available to them was to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals, which
they in fact did, by filing a notice of appeal on 26 December 1994.[44]
The petitioners have shown no cogent reason for us to reverse the
aforecited ruling. Nor will their reliance upon the doctrine of the exhaustion of
administrative remedies in the instant case advance their cause any.
Section 26[45] of the Medical Act of 1959 provides for the administrative
and judicial remedies that respondents herein can avail to question
Resolution No. 26 of the Board of Medicine, namely: (a) appeal the
unfavorable judgment to the PRC; (b) should the PRC ruling still be
unfavorable, to elevate the matter on appeal to the Office of the President;
and (c) should they still be unsatisfied, to ask for a review of the case or to
bring the case to court via a special civil action of certiorari. Thus, as a rule,
mandamus will not lie when administrative remedies are still available.
[46]
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply where, as in this case, a pure question of law is raised. [47] On this issue,
no reversible error may, thus, be laid at the door of the appellate court in CAG.R. SP No. 37283, when it refused to dismiss Civil Case No. 93-66530.
As we earlier pointed out, herein respondents Arnel V. Herrera,
Fernando F. Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T. Mendoza, Ruby B.
Lantin-Tan, Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A. Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. MallariLargoza, Cheryl R. Triguero, Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn
S. Acosta-Cabanes, Laura M. Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C.
Escusa, Carlosito C. Domingo, Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R. Raqueno-Rabaino,
Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-Edding, Robert B. Sanchez, Maria
Rosario Leonor-Lacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-Palma,
Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina P.
Chico-Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro
manifested to the Court of Appeals during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No.

29 | P a g e

37283, that they were no longer interested in proceeding with the case and
moved for its dismissal insofar as they were concerned. A similar
manifestation and motion were later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I. YebanMerlan, Michael L. Serrano, Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Belinda
C. Rabarra, Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig,
Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan, Evelyn C.
Cundangan, Frederick D. Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J. Caedo,
Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A.
Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M. Usita. Following these
manifestations and motions, the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283
decreed that its ruling would not apply to them. Thus, inasmuch as the
instant case is a petition for review of the appellate courts ruling in CA-G.R.
SP No. 37283, a decision which is inapplicable to the aforementioned
respondents will similarly not apply to them.
As to Achilles J. Peralta, Evelyn O. Ramos, Sally B. Bunagan, Rogelio
B. Ancheta, Oscar H. Padua, Jr., Evelyn D. Grajo, Valentino P. Arboleda,
Carlos M. Bernardo, Jr., Mario D. Cuaresma, Violeta C. Felipe, Percival H.
Pangilinan, Corazon M. Cruz and Samuel B. Bangoy, herein decision shall
not apply pursuant to the Orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530,
dropping their names from the suit.
Consequently, this Decision is binding only on the remaining
respondents, namely: Arlene V. de Guzman, Celerina S. Navarro, Rafael I.
Tolentino, Bernardita B. Sy, Gloria T. Jularbal, Hubert S. Nazareno, Nancy J.
Chavez, Ernesto L. Cue, Herminio V. Fernandez, Jr., Maria Victoria M.
Lacsamana and Merly D. Sta. Ana, as well as the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, (1) the
assailed decision dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 37283, which affirmed the judgment dated December 19, 1994, of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530,
ordering petitioners to administer the physicians oath to herein respondents
as well as the resolution dated August 25, 2000, of the appellate court,
denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; and (2) the writ of mandamus, issued in Civil Case No. 93-66530,
and affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 is NULLIFIED
AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., no part.
Austria-Martinez, J., no part - on leave.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
84945[2] dated November 16, 2004 which affirmed the Decision[3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Manila, datedOctober 19, 2003.[4]
The facts are as follows:
Yasuyuki Ota (respondent) is a Japanese national, married to a Filipina, who
has continuously resided in the Philippines for more than 10 years. He
graduated from Bicol Christian College of Medicine on April 21, 1991 with a
degree of Doctor of Medicine.[5] After successfully completing a one-year post
graduate internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, he
filed an application to take the medical board examinations in order to obtain
a medical license. He was required by the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) to submit an affidavit of undertaking, stating among
others that should he successfully pass the same, he would not practice
medicine until he submits proof that reciprocity exists between Japan and the
Philippines in admitting foreigners into the practice of medicine. [6]

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
BOARD OF MEDICINE,
DR. RAUL FLORES
(now DR. JOSE S. RAMIREZ),
in his capacity as Chairman of the
Board, PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION COMMISSION,
through its Chairman,
HERMOGENES POBRE
(now DR. ALCESTIS M. GUIANG),
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 166097

Present:
QUISUMBING,* J.,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

-versusPromulgated:
YASUYUKI OTA,
July 14, 2008
Respondent.
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
DECISION

30 | P a g e

Respondent submitted a duly notarized English translation of the Medical

Practitioners Law of Japan duly authenticated by the Consul General of the
Philippine Embassy to Japan, Jesus I. Yabes;[7] thus, he was allowed to take
the Medical Board Examinations in August 1992, which he subsequently
passed.[8]
In spite of all these, the Board of Medicine (Board) of the PRC, in a letter
dated March 8, 1993, denied respondent's request for a license to
practice medicine in the Philippines on the ground that the Board believes
that no genuine reciprocity can be found in the law of Japan as there is no
Filipino or foreigner who can possibly practice there. [9]
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus against the
Board before the RTC of Manila on June 24, 1993, which petition was
amended on February 14, 1994 to implead the PRC through its Chairman.[10]
In his petition before the RTC, respondent alleged that the Board and the
PRC, in refusing to issue in his favor a Certificate of Registration and/or
license to practice medicine, had acted arbitrarily, in clear contravention of
the provision of Section 20 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2382 (The Medical Act
of 1959), depriving him of his legitimate right to practice his profession in the
Philippines to his great damage and prejudice.[11]

On October 19, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision finding that respondent
had adequately proved that the medical laws of Japan allow foreigners like
Filipinos to be granted license and be admitted into the practice of medicine
under the principle of reciprocity; and that the Board had a ministerial duty of
issuing the Certificate of Registration and license to respondent, as it was
shown that he had substantially complied with the requirements under the
law.[12] The RTC then ordered the Board to issue in favor of respondent the
corresponding Certificate of Registration and/or license to practice medicine
in the Philippines.[13]
The Board and the PRC (petitioners) appealed the case to the CA, stating
that while respondent submitted documents showing that foreigners are
allowed to practice medicine in Japan, it was not shown that the conditions
for the practice of medicine there are practical and attainable by a foreign
applicant, hence, reciprocity was not established; also, the power of the PRC
and the Board to regulate and control the practice of medicine is
discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not compellable by a writ
of mandamus.[14]
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the RTC. [15]
Hence, herein petition raising the following issue:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT
HAD ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF RECIPROCITY
IN
THE
PRACTICE
OF
MEDICINE
BETWEEN
THE PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN.[16]
Petitioners claim that: respondent has not established by competent and
conclusive evidence that reciprocity in the practice of medicine exists
between the Philippines and Japan. While documents state that foreigners
are allowed to practice medicine in Japan, they do not similarly show that the
conditions for the practice of medicine in said country are practical and
attainable by a foreign applicant. There is no reciprocity in this case, as the
requirements to practice medicine in Japan are practically impossible for a
Filipino to comply with. There are also ambiguities in the Medical
Practitioners Law of Japan, which were not clarified by respondent, i.e., what
are the provisions of the School Educations Laws, what are the criteria of the
Minister of Health and Welfare of Japan in determining whether the academic
and technical capability of foreign medical graduates are the same or better
than graduates of medical schools in Japan, and who can actually qualify to
take the preparatory test for the National Medical Examination. Consul
General Yabes also stated that there had not been a single Filipino who was
issued a license to practice medicine by the Japanese Government. The
publication showing that there were foreigners practicing medicine in Japan,

31 | P a g e

which respondent presented before the Court, also did not specifically show
that Filipinos were among those listed as practicing said profession.
[17]
Furthermore, under Professional Regulation Commission v. De Guzman,
[18]
the power of the PRC and the Board to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine, which power is discretionary and not
ministerial, hence, not compellable by a writ of mandamus.[19]
Petitioners pray that the CA Decision dated November 16, 2004 be reversed
and set aside, that a new one be rendered reinstating the Board Order
dated March 8, 1993 which disallows respondent to practice medicine in
the Philippines, and that respondent's petition before the trial court be
dismissed for lack of merit.[20]
In his Comment, respondent argues that: Articles 2 and 11 of the Medical
Practitioners Law of Japan and Section 9 of the Philippine Medical Act of
1959
show
that
reciprocity
exists
between
the Philippines and Japan concerning the practice of medicine. Said laws
clearly state that both countries allow foreigners to practice medicine in their
respective jurisdictions as long as the applicant meets the educational
requirements, training or residency in hospitals and pass the licensure
examination given by either country. Consul General Yabes in his letter
dated January 28, 1992 stated that the Japanese Government allows a
foreigner to practice medicine inJapan after complying with the local
requirements. The fact that there is no reported Filipino who has successfully
penetrated the medical practice in Japan does not mean that there is no
reciprocity between the two countries, since it does not follow that no Filipino
will ever be granted a medical license by the Japanese Government. It is not
the essence of reciprocity that before a citizen of one of the contracting
countries can demand its application, it is necessary that the interested
citizens country has previously granted the same privilege to the citizens of
the other contracting country.[21] Respondent further argues that Section 20 of
the Medical Act of 1959[22] indicates the mandatory character of the statute
and an imperative obligation on the part of the Board inconsistent with the
idea of discretion. Thus, a foreigner, just like a Filipino citizen, who
successfully passes the examination and has all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications, is entitled as a matter of right to the issuance of a
certificate of registration or a physicians license, which right is enforceable
by mandamus.[23]
Petitioners filed a Reply[24] and both
memoranda[25] reiterating their arguments.

parties

The Court denies the petition for lack of merit.

filed

their

respective

There is no question that a license to practice medicine is a privilege

or franchise granted by the government.[26] It is a right that is earned through
years of education and training, and which requires that one must first secure
a license from the state through professional board examinations. [27]
Indeed,
[T]he regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches
has long been recognized as a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power
to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized
to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus,
legislation and administrative regulations requiring those
who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical
board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises
of
governmental
power. Similarly,
the
establishment of minimum medical educational requirements
i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized
medical school for admission to the medical profession, has
also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the
regulatory authority of the state.[28]
It must be stressed however that the power to regulate the exercise
of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State
or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body
which regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both
forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. As the
legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a
license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license
legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license
to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without
prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in
the exercise of their power.[29]
R.A. No. 2382 otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959 states in Section
9 thereof that:
Section 9. Candidates for Board Examinations.- Candidates
for Board examinations shall have the following
qualifications:
1. He shall be a citizen of the Philippines or a citizen of any
foreign country who has submitted competent and

32 | P a g e

conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the

Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his countrys
existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice
medicine under the same rules and regulations governing
citizens thereof;
xxxx
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 223[30] also provides in Section (j)
thereof that:
j) The [Professional Regulation] Commission may,
upon the recommendation of the Board concerned, approve
the registration of and authorize the issuance of a certificate
of registration with or without examination to a foreigner who
is registered under the laws of his country: Provided, That
the requirement for the registration or licensing in said
foreign state or country are substantially the same as those
required and contemplated by the laws of the Philippines
and that the laws of such foreign state or country allow the
citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession on the
same basis and grant the same privileges as the subject or
citizens of such foreign state or country: Provided, finally,
That the applicant shall submit competent and conclusive
documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of
Foreign Affairs, showing that his country's existing laws
permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession
under the rules and regulations governing citizens thereof.
The Commission is also hereby authorized to prescribe
additional requirements or grant certain privileges to
foreigners seeking registration in the Philippines if the same
privileges are granted to or some additional requirements
are required of citizens of the Philippines in acquiring the
same certificates in his country;
xxxx
As required by the said laws, respondent submitted a copy of the
Medical Practitioners Law of Japan, duly authenticated by the Consul
General of the Embassy of the Philippines in Japan, which provides in
Articles 2 and 11, thus:

Article 2. Anyone who wants to be medical

practitioner must pass the national examination for medical
practitioner and get license from the Minister of Health and
Welfare.
xxxx
Article 11. No one can take the National Medical
Examination except persons who conform to one of the
following items:
1.

Persons who finished regular medical courses

at a university based on the School Education
Laws (December 26, 1947) and graduated from
said university.

2.

Persons who passed the preparatory test for

the National Medical Examination and practiced
clinics and public sanitation more than one year
after passing the said test.

3.

Persons who graduated from a foreign medical

school or acquired medical practitioner license in
a foreign country, and also are recognized to
have the same or more academic ability and
techniques as persons stated in item 1 and item
2 of this article.[31]

Petitioners argue that while the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan

allows foreigners to practice medicine therein, said document does not show
that conditions for the practice of medicine in said country
are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant; and since the
requirements are practically impossible for a Filipino to comply with, there is
no reciprocity between the two countries, hence, respondent may not be
granted license to practice medicine in the Philippines.
The Court does not agree.
R.A. No. 2382, which provides who may be candidates for the
medical board examinations, merely requires a foreign citizen to submit
competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), showing that his countrys existing laws

33 | P a g e

permit citizens of the Philippines to practice medicine under the same rules
and regulations governing citizens thereof.
Section (j) of P.D. No. 223 also defines the extent of PRC's power to
grant licenses, i.e., it may, upon recommendation of the board, approve the
registration and authorize the issuance of a certificate of registration with or
without examination to a foreigner who is registered under the laws of his
country, provided the following conditions are met: (1) that the requirement
for the registration or licensing in said foreign state or country are
substantially the same as those required and contemplated by the laws of
the Philippines; (2) that the laws of such foreign state or country allow the
citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession on the same basis and
grant the same privileges as the subject or citizens of such foreign state or
country; and (3) that the applicant shall submit competent and conclusive
documentary evidence, confirmed by the DFA, showing that his country's
existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession
under the rules and regulations governing citizens thereof.
The said provision further states that the PRC is authorized to
prescribe additional requirements or grant certain privileges to foreigners
seeking registration in the Philippines if the same privileges are granted to or
some additional requirements are required of citizens of the Philippines in
acquiring the same certificates in his country.
Nowhere in said statutes is it stated that the foreign applicant must
show that the conditions for the practice of medicine in said country
are practical and attainable by Filipinos. Neither is it stated that it must first
be proven that a Filipino has been granted license and allowed to practice
his profession in said country before a foreign applicant may be given license
to practice in thePhilippines. Indeed, the phrase used in both R.A. No. 2382
and P.D. No. 223 is that:
[T]he applicant shall submit] competent and conclusive
documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of
Foreign Affairs, showing that his country's existing
laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the
profession [of medicine] under the [same] rules and
regulations governing citizens thereof. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
It is enough that the laws in the foreign country permit a Filipino to
get license and practice therein. Requiring respondent to prove first that a
Filipino has already been granted license and is actually practicing therein

unduly expands the requirements provided for under R.A. No. 2382 and P.D.
No. 223.
While it is true that respondent failed to give details as to the
conditions stated in the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan -- i.e.,the
provisions of the School Educations Laws, the criteria of the Minister of
Health and Welfare of Japan in determining whether the academic and
technical capability of foreign medical graduates are the same as or better
than that of graduates of medical schools in Japan, and who can actually
qualify to take the preparatory test for the National Medical Examination
respondent, however, presented proof that foreigners are actually practicing
in Japan and that Filipinos are not precluded from getting a license to
practice there.
Respondent presented before the trial court a Japanese Government
publication, Physician-Dentist-Pharmaceutist Survey, showing that there are
a number of foreign physicians practicing medicine in Japan.[32] He also
presented a letter dated January 28, 1992 from Consul General Yabes,
[33]
which states:
Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 12 January 1993,
concerning your request for a Certificate of Confirmation for
the purpose of establishing a reciprocity with Japan in the
practice of medical profession relative to the case of
Mr. Yasuyuki Ota, a Japanese national, the Embassy wishes
to inform you that inquiries from the Japanese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health and Welfare as well as
Bureau of Immigration yielded the following information:
1.

They are not aware of a Filipino physician who was

granted a license by the Japanese Government to
practice medicine in Japan;
2.
However, the Japanese Government allows a
foreigner to practice medicine in Japan after
complying with the local requirements such as
holding a valid visa for the purpose of taking the
medical board exam, checking the applicant's
qualifications to take the examination, taking the
national board examination in Japanese and
filing an application for the issuance of the
medical license.

34 | P a g e

Accordingly, the Embassy is not aware of a single

Filipino physician who was issued by the Japanese
Government a license to practice medicine, because it is
extremely difficult to pass the medical board
examination in the Japanese language. Filipino doctors
here are only allowed to work in Japanese hospitals as
trainees under the supervision of a Japanese doctor. On
certain occasions, they are allowed to show their medical
skills during seminars for demonstration purposes only.
(Emphasis supplied)
Very truly yours,
Jesus I. Yabes
Minister Counsellor &
Consul General
From said letter, one can see that the Japanese Government allows
foreigners to practice medicine therein provided that the local requirements
are complied with, and that it is not the impossibility or the prohibition against
Filipinos that would account for the absence of Filipino physicians holding
licenses and practicing medicine in Japan, but the difficulty of passing the
board examination in the Japanese language. Granting that there is still no
Filipino who has been given license to practice medicine in Japan, it does not
mean that no Filipino will ever be able to be given one.
Petitioners next argue that as held in De Guzman, its power to issue
licenses is discretionary, hence, not compellable bymandamus.
The Court finds that the factual circumstances of De Guzman are
different from those of the case at bar; hence, the principle applied therein
should be viewed differently in this case. In De Guzman, there were doubts
about the integrity and validity of the test results of the examinees from a
particular school which garnered unusually high scores in the two most
difficult subjects. Said doubts called for serious inquiry concerning the
applicants satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements. [34] And as
there was no definite showing that the requirements and conditions to be
granted license to practice medicine had been satisfactorily met, the Court
held that the writ of mandamus may not be granted to secure said privilege
without thwarting the legislative will.[35]

Indeed, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant

must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. It must also appear that he has fully complied with all the
conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority.
[36]

In De Guzman itself, the Court explained that:

A careful reading of Section 20[37] of the Medical Act
of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word shall with
respect to the issuance of certificates of registration. Thus,
the petitioners [PRC] shall sign and issue certificates of
registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with
the requirements of the Board. In statutory construction the
term shall is a word of command. It is given imperative
meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies the
requirements for the grant of his physician's license, the
Board is obliged to administer to him his oath and register
him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par.
(1) of Section 22 of the Medical Act of 1959.[38]
In this case, there is no doubt as to the competence and
qualifications
of
respondent. He
finished
his
medical
degree
fromBicol Christian College of Medicine. He completed a one-year post
graduate internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial MedicalCenter, a
government hospital. Then he passed the Medical Board Examinations
which was given on August 8, 1992 with a general average of 81.83, with
scores higher than 80 in 9 of the 12 subjects.

35 | P a g e

In fine, the only matter being questioned by petitioners is the alleged

failure of respondent to prove that there is reciprocity between the laws
of Japan and the Philippines in admitting foreigners into the practice of
medicine. Respondent has satisfactorily complied with the said requirement
and the CA has not committed any reversible error in rendering its Decision
dated November 16, 2004 and Resolution dated October 19, 2003.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice