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SHAPING
THE
FUTURE
ABSTRACT
In efforts to combine theory and practice, action research confronts a challenge that pertains to all kinds of research. It is,
consequently, a challenge that is subject to much discussion,
not least in fields like epistemology. These discussions provide
valuable points and insights but they cannot be converted
directly into research positions, which also demand consideration of practical issues. When research sets out to learn from
practices a new challenge emerges: how is this learning to take
place? Can the single researcher understand the world or is there
a need for social relationships between (many) actors to develop
this learning? This contribution discusses the theory-practice
challenge and the need for new forms of social relationships
within the research community itself.
KEY WORDS
action research
critical theory
networking
phenomenology
pragmatism
social capital
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Introduction
In 1997, the political authorities in Sweden introduced development as a third
task for the universities and other institutions of higher learning, in addition
to research and education (Brulin, 2001). The third task has given rise to several
discussions, to some extent of a controversial nature: first, concerning the legitimacy of the task itself; second, if the task is found legitimate, how to live up to it.
In this context action research has made its appearance, or rather, reappearance,
since from the 1960s there have been several projects and programmes that
correspond to the idea of action research. Action research, as it emerges as a part
of the history of social research, is not, however, automatically embraced by all
as the most adequate response. Partly it is seen by many conventional academics
as an esoteric kind of research, which generally has difficulty gaining academic
acceptance. Even those who may look more favourably upon action research,
often find it difficult to relate to. Actual, ongoing projects, be they in Sweden or
elsewhere, seem strongly linked to their local contexts and, consequently, to show
a lot of variation. What, then, does action research really mean? What should the
person who would like to join the ranks of action researchers actually do?
The purpose of this contribution is not to try to answer the basic questions.
The purpose is more modest: to look at the way in which the questions are
approached. When we want to develop an answer to a question, how do we set
about doing it? Do we, for instance, try to find one single project that is thought
to represent all good things about action research or do we look at a number of
projects simultaneously, to compare, to add, or to learn from differences?
Throughout most of its history action research has been project-bound.
Single cases have tended to form the focal points for most of the discussions. Each
researcher has had the expectation that the project that I am doing just now is the
project that will answer, if not all questions, at least the most burning ones. Each
project has tended to be its own island of understanding, meaning and action.
Against this there have been some broader programmes where projects have been
grouped, or clustered, in such a way that interaction between projects has been
possible (Gustavsen, 1992, 2001). Even these, however, have been linked to
contexts that are not particularly broad when seen in a global perspective.
The emergence of the Handbook of Action Research (Reason and Bradbury, 2001) has changed this picture in the sense that for the first time there is a
broad overview available. This overview prepares the ground for a discourse
where the relationships between action research projects are placed in focus.
This is, in itself, a many-sided issue. Some of the issues have been dealt with
by this contributor in other contexts; in particular the use of a programatic
approach (Gustavsen, 1992, 2001, 2003). This topic will be bypassed here in
favour of two others. First I will touch, however, briefly upon the theorypractice problem in general as it has appeared in theory of science, partly to
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remind ourselves that this is a general problem that has to be confronted by all
kinds of research, partly to point out that we cannot deal with operational
research challenges purely by developing theoretical arguments. Second, I will
discuss a theme that is seldom commented on in research: the broader social relationships among researchers. If we want to develop arguments based on linking
experience from a broad range of projects, there is a need for certain kinds of
social relationships between the researchers who work in the different projects.
specific research strategies. In its simplest form, the question raised by Kierkegaard is: do we understand the world better through the eyes of theory? Having
read Hegel, Kierkegaard found reason to voice skepticism. Theory or other
forms of conceptual schemes that are thought in some way or other to exist and
be adopted prior to a confrontation with reality can act as filters and screening
mechanisms that steer us in a wrong direction as much as in a right. The point is
to understand the world as it is by confronting it directly; by trying to grasp the
phenomena as they really are.
A somewhat different approach to the theory-practice problem was developed by the pragmatists. The ultimate purpose of any theory is to enable us to do
something better in the real world (Peirce, 19311958; see also Reason, 2003, on
the modern pragmatist Richard Rorty). The point is not to what extent the theory
resembles the world but to what extent it helps us perform rational action. A
theory can be anything, from a large text to a short formula; the point is that it
identifies action to be performed and levers to be pulled if we want to do something about reality.
What eventually came to be called critical theory has its roots in the 19th
century as well, in particular with Marx. Of the various efforts to convert Marx
into specific research positions it is perhaps those that were mediated by the
Frankfurt school that came to exert most influence in the period after the second
World War (Horkheimer, 1982). In brief, the core point here is that the world
can be understood only if it is understood that it could have been different. No
portrait of the world as it is will tell us much since it makes the world appear as
a metaphysical destiny and consequently hides the reasons why it is as it is.
Instead, whatever is must be seen against a background of what might have been.
The role of theory, then, is not only to help us make a picture of the world as it
is, but also and of greater importance actually to make us see how the world
could have been. Understanding is consequently something that plays itself out
between three reference points: theory, practices as they are and practices as they
could have been.
Research responses
The research positions to emerge out of these schools of thought are many and
varied, in particular since the relationship between theory on a philosophical level
and actual research practices is not a simple one. With this reservation, one may
point at some lines between the phenomenology of Kierkegaard and positions
such as anthropological field studies, participant observer methodologies, the
Chicago school (Whyte, 1955), the idea of thick descriptions (Geertz, 1983) and
the kind of action research called ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967). Of interest to note is that these forms of research, when they emerged, played important
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roles, developed new insights and rightfully attracted a lot of attention. It is also
clear that they are, if not gone, no longer core thrusts in contemporary research
activities. They provide inspiration, questions and concerns, but it is obvious that
another detailed study of the mores of a Pacific tribe will hardly exert the influence that the studies of Mead, Malinowski and other students of the natives as
they really are once had.
In some ways, the research positions inspired by pragmatism may be more
strongly present in the contemporary landscape. There are links between pragmatism and the idea of the experiment in the laboratory and in the field as
well as between pragmatism and practice-oriented pedagogics, action learning
and similar. However, there has been no simple solution to how to give ideas of
this kind expression in research terms. If we see at least some of the main streams
of Western action research as related to pragmatism, we also need to face the
point made by Greenwood (2002), that even though action research may have
enjoyed advances and even some elements of prestige in some contexts, the overall story of action research is far from one of linear success.
Critical theory has always had an ambivalent relationship to actual
research positions. There is a certain degree of skepticism running through most
of critical theory towards the kind of commitment to and contacts with society
necessary to perform research. The most famous effort of this school to enter the
field of empirical research, the authoritarian personality studies (Adorno,
Brunswick, Levinson & Sanford 1950), gave rise to a major debate carried on in
the form of the so-called positivist dispute in German sociology (Adorno, Albert,
Dahrendorf, Habermas, Pilot & Popper, 1976). In the relationship between critical theory and actual research much remained unsolved. Instead, critical
theory in the early Frankfurt school version reached its peak in the year 1968,
when students all over the world tried to put into practice the idea that we need
to understand how the world should be, before it is possible to understand how
it actually is.
However briefly and unjustly they have been presented here, certain points
emerge from these schools of thought and their various fates.
First, there is no simple answer to the theory-practice problem. None of the
perspectives on the relationship between theory and practice inherent in these
schools are particularly easy to convert into research positions. Action research,
with its claim to be able to transcend this division, consequently faces some major
challenges. But those who criticize action research on the basis of the Cartesian
argument have hardly considered the critique against this argument. The proponents of purely descriptive-analytic research maintain their position simply by
overlooking this critique rather than responding to it.
However, the point that all the research positions to which these schools of
thought have given rise seem to have followed a rise-and-fall curve, indicates that
positions on a philosophical level cannot provide full answers to the challenges of
operative research. Topics like ontology and epistemology can identify some of
the challenges that have to be met and provide some ideas on how to meet them,
but they are not the same as specific research positions. Nor can we meet the challenges of today simply by recirculating, say, the thick descriptions of Geertz or the
action research of Lewin and associates (Lewin, 1943). There is no Golden Age
that can be recaptured. Research positions must be formed to meet the specific
conditions under which research is to operate.
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also face the problem that the research responses to the theory-practice challenge
are still with us. Today there are more situations and contexts that bring this
challenge to the surface. What to do; where to turn?
Since there is little hope of inventing a new basic position in epistemological terms, nor of deducing new ways of expressing the old ones as an exercise
purely of the mind, there is only one direction in which to turn: towards those
relationships to practice and practical actors that constitute the challenge in the
first place. This can be done in two different ways.
One is to look at the research practices to which the new contexts give
rise, in this case modern action research: in what contexts does it operate, what
challenges does it try to meet, what does it actually do. This is largely done in
Reason and Bradbury (2001) and the picture to emerge is that action research is,
on the one hand, a fairly widespread activity and on the other hand also highly
context-bound. If we want to learn from research practices as they actually are,
we need to be able to compare, and in other ways work with, a broad range of
different projects and activities. Then, however, a new challenge emerges: how is
this to be done? Here it can be of interest to explore the practices of other actors:
those that research, work with, and write about it.
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ally performing its tasks it is in the same kind of situation. In fact, given all the
complex relationships that research has to enter into under present forms of production of knowledge, the demand for objectivity has probably never been higher and more critical than at present. The challenge is to find practical ways of
handling practical challenges and such a task can best be approached by looking
at what research actually does when it makes an effort to be objective, under
what conditions research comes under criticism for not being objective, and so
on, but also at what other actors do when they make an effort to be objective.
A third example, introduced by Johannisson (2003), is entrepreneurship.
Even here we have a concept that attracts much attention from research, but as
something pertaining to somebody else. Johannisson makes the point, however,
that we may also see research as an entrepreneur. Why not learn from those
actors who seem able to create something although it may be in entirely different
fields? This perspective will, in many ways, lead towards the social capital perspective. Whereas it used to be common, to see the entrepreneur as a deviant, it
has become more common to see the entrepreneur as someone who may have
especially strong networks and relationships.
One may ask if such an incorporation of practices into research implies that
out of the three main efforts to overcome the theory-practice separation indicated
above, pragmatism is actually chosen above the other ones. To some extent this
is true, but it is also defensible on the grounds that pragmatism is setting out to
create an interplay between theory and practice (Reason, 2003) and not only, as
phenomenology, to find new ways of understanding the world. Compared with
critical theory, pragmatism has a stronger constructivist orientation and will not
as easily fall victim to the argument that it offers only critique, no alternative.
The reasons for improving on the possibilities for learning from practices
across project boundaries can be sought in the overall situation of action research. They can, however, also be anchored in more specific needs emanating
out of specific contexts: This contributor generally works within the field of
work, organization and participation, to a large extent within a Nordic perspective. If we count, say, all the projects that are unfolding or have been taking place
recently on the level of single organizations in this field, the Finnish National
Work Organisation Program (Alasoini & Kyllnen, 1998) recently concluded a
phase with 500 enterprise projects. There are between 100 and 200 projects of
this kind going on under the framework of the Norwegian Value Creation 2010
programme at the moment. Sweden has no comparable programmes but there is
no lack of projects here either, since most universities and university colleges
plus a number of research foundations and other research organizations have
responded individually to the demands of the third task. In Denmark several
topically oriented initiatives are unfolding in the same field. The sum total of
organization development projects that can claim attention is approaching a fourdigit figure. In actual practice the number of cases really worth consideration is of
course far less, but the gross figure nevertheless gives some indication of the scale
of the challenge. There is, of course, some communication, but the overall picture
remains characterized to a large extent by each project being a closed universe
where communication is difficult because others do not understand.
The Nordic countries do not constitute the ultimate framework for communication. Beyond the Nordic countries there is a global audience. Even this
audience can, however, be reached only if there is some kind of shared frame of
reference, something that does, in turn, demand some social relationships that
can provide understanding and trust (Ennals & Gustavsen, 1998).
Concluding remarks
In its effort to link reflection and action, theory and practice, action research confronts one of the most basic of all challenges facing research. The challenge is not
unique to action research, but is something that has several consequences. One
cannot, for instance, bypass the theory-practice challenge simply by rejecting
action research. The challenge remains, nonetheless. It also means, however, that
action research is not the only branch of research where this problem is attacked.
Any discourse on the relationship between theory and practice does not enter virgin terrain but a terrain that is quite well-filled with actors, discourses and views.
A number of these discourses take place in fields like ontology and epistemology. They can help clarify the challenges and provide points and arguments,
but they do not contain full specifications for research positions. In developing
research positions other concerns need to enter the picture as well, not least concerns emanating from the more specific tasks research sets out to deal with and
the context in which it is done.
By influencing tasks and contexts, practice makes its impact on research.
How do we set about understanding these tasks and contexts? Do we, for
instance, set about it in the same way as when working with theoretical issues? In
the last case it is generally assumed that the researcher is a rational point from
which everything can be seen and understood, if not in detail at least in a broad
outline. If we imagine that practice cannot be fully understood in theoretical
ways, the idea of the rational, all-encompassing subject evaporates. Practices may
need forms of understanding that are, in themselves, practical. What other actors
do when they want to understand practical issues is to form relationships with
each other. Where innovation is to be promoted, these relationships encompass
not only mutual understanding in a way sufficient to read each other but go far
deeper in terms of mutual trust, ability to rely on tacit knowledge etc. To learn
from practices, research needs to develop social relationships; internally within
the research community as well as in relation to other actors. The new production of knowledge as identified by Gibbons and colleagues (Gibbons et al., 1994)
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is above all a network activity, and research cannot stay outside this process and
remain as isolated individuals looking at the world from up above.
Notes
1
This contribution is a revised and translated version of a keynote speech originally held during the conference University and society in co-operation, Ronneby,
Sweden, 1416 May 2003.
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