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Corinthian Gardens vs Spouses Tanjangco

Respondents-spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos) own Lots
68 and 69 located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, Quezon City, which is managed
by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On the other hand,
respondents-spouses Frank and Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is ` to the
Tanjangcos lots.
Before the constructions of the house at lot 65, A relocation survey was conducted by
Democrito De Dios (Engr. De Dios), referred by the Corinthians to the Cuasos, operating
under the business name D.M. De Dios Realty and Surveying. Before, during and after
the construction of the said house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in
order to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules
and Regulations of Corinthian.6 Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed their house,
employing the services od the builder, C.B. Paraz, their perimeter fence encroached
on the Tanjangcos Lot 69 by 87 square meters.
No amicable settlement was reached between the parties.
the Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the latter
failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit against the
Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with Damages.
Eventually, the Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint8 against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and
Engr. De Dios. The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain
the proper specifications of their house, and to Engr. De Dios for his failure to undertake
an accurate relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to litigation. The Cuasos also
faulted Corinthian for approving their relocation survey and building plans without
verifying their accuracy and in making representations as to Engr. De Dios' integrity and
competence.
the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Tanjangcos. It, however, ruled that the
Cuasos were builders in good faith. The RTC likewise held that C.B. Paraz was grossly
negligent in not taking into account the correct boundaries of Cuasos lot when it
constructed the house. The third-party complaint against Corinthian and Engr. De Dios,
on the other hand, was dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Tanjangcos, the Cuasos, and C.B. Paraz all appealed
to the CA. CA reversed the ruling, holding that the Cuasos are builders in bad faith.
1. the CA allowed the Tanjangcos to exercise the rights granted under Articles 449, 450,
451 and 549 of the New Civil Code, which include the right to demand the demolition of
the offending perimeter wall after reimbursing the Cuasos the necessary expenses for the
preservation of the encroached area.

2. The Cuasos were ordered to pay monthly rentals of P10,000.00 for the use, enjoyment
and occupancy of the lot from 1989 up to the time they vacate the property, with interest.
3. hey were, likewise, ordered to pay the Tanjangcos moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees, with interest.
The Cuasos appeal against the Tanjangcos, on the other hand, was dismissed for lack of
merit.
On the third-party complaints, Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios were all found
negligent in performing their respective duties and the court ordered them to contribute to
the judgment sum.
1. Corinthian filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence,
Corinthian filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA
Decision and Resolution, and impleading the Cuasos as one of the respondents being
the third-party plaintiffs in the RTC. The Court gave due course and The Cuasos
filed their memorandum.
[2. In the meantime, the Tanjangcos moved for partial entry of judgment of the CA
Decision which was granted directing the issuance of an Entry of Judgment and a
Certification that its Decision has become final and executory with respect to the Cuasos,
C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios for their failure to file an appeal assailing the said Decision
before this Court.
The Tanjangcos then moved for the execution of the judgment against the Cuasos,
specifically the demolition of the perimeter fence,20 which was also granted by the RTC
in its Order. Because of this, the Cuasos prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction before this to enjoin the demolition
of the perimeter fence.
3. the Cuasos prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
preliminary injunction before this Court to enjoin the demolition of the perimeter fence.
They averred that the premature demolition of the alleged encroaching perimeter wall
and other improvements will cause grave and irreparable damage to them, because what
is sought to be demolished is part of their residence. To which Tanjangco opposed
contending that they cannot obtain affirmative relief from this Court by reason or on
account of the appeal taken by Corinthian. The appeal, they added, is personal to
Corinthian and would not benefit the Cuasos for they did not appeal the adverse decision
against them. Finally, they argued that the Cuasos are now estopped from questioning the
enforcement of the CA Decision since they issued a managers check to pay the money
judgment.

Cuasos' application for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction for lack of merit. In the
Cuasos case, their right to injunctive relief had not been clearly and unmistakably
demonstrated. They failed to show proof that there is material and substantial invasion of
their right to warrant the issuance of an injunctive writ.
It bears stressing that the Cuasos failed to appeal the ruling of the CA. This failure to
contest the CA decision before this Court was fatal to their cause. It had the effect of an
admission that they indeed acted in bad faith, as they accepted the CA ruling. The
decision of the CA, therefore, became binding and final as to them.
While it is true that this Court noted the Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum
filed by the Cuasos, such notation was made only insofar as Corinthian made them
respondents in this petition. This Court cannot grant to the Cuasos any affirmative relief
as they did not file a petition questioning the CA ruling. Consequently, the Decision of
the CA holding that the Cuasos acted in bad faith and that the perimeter fence may now
be demolished cannot be put in issue by the Cuasos. It is a fundamental principle that a
party who does not appeal, or file a petition for certiorari, is not entitled to any
affirmative relief.]
Issue: Corinthian, the sole petitioner in this case, raises the issue whether or not the Court
of Appeals has legal basis to be liable for the judgment sum and increase unilaterally
and without proof the amount prayed for in the Complaint, i.e., P2,000.00, as
reasonable compensation for the use and enjoyment of the portion of the lot
encroached upon, to P10,000.00.
Tanjangcos stand by the ruling of the CA and opine that Corinthian was negligent in
approving the building plan of the Cuasos.
1. They submit that Corinthian's claim that it merely conducts "table inspections" of
buildings further bolsters their argument that Corinthian was negligent in
conveniently and unilaterally restricting and limiting the coverage of its approval,
contrary to its own Manual of Rules and Regulations;
2. that the acceptance of a builder's bond does not automatically make Corinthian
liable but the same affirms the fact that a homeowner can hold it liable for the
consequences of the approval of a building plan;
3. and that Corinthian, by regularly demanding and accepting membership dues,
must be wary of its responsibility to protect the rights and interests of its
members.
Held:
a. negligent?
[we find Corinthian negligent. Corinthian cannot and should not be allowed to justify or
excuse its negligence by claiming that its approval of the Cuasos building plans was only
limited to a so-called "table inspection;" and not actual site measurement. To accept some

such postulate is to put a premium on negligence. its Manual of Rules and Regulations
stipulates in Section 3 thereof (under the heading Construction), thus:
No new construction can be started unless the building plans are approved by
the Association and the appropriate Builders cash bond and pre-construction fees
are paid.
It goes without saying that this Manual of Rules and Regulations applies to all - or it does
not apply at all. To borrow a popular expression, what is sauce for the gander is sauce for
the goose - or ought to be. To put it matter-of-factly and bluntly, thus, its so-called "table
inspection" approval of the Cuasos building plans is no less of an approval, as approvals
come and go. And since it is an approval tainted with negligence, the necessary and
inevitable consequences which law and justice attach to such negligence must, as a matter
of law and justice, also necessarily attach to Corinthian.]

b. judicial notice?
1. Courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed
property. However, petitioners herein erred in assuming that courts, in determining the
amount of rent, could simply rely on their own appreciation of land values without
considering any evidence. As we have said earlier, a court may fix the reasonable amount
of rent, but it must still base its action on the evidence adduced by the parties.
2. A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court may
take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the court must "allow the parties to be heard
thereon." Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in
question without supporting evidence. Truly, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because
evidence is required for a court to determine the proper rental value.
But contrary to Corinthian's arguments, both the RTC and the CA found that indeed rent
was due the Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession and use of their
property. This uniform factual finding of the RTC and the CA was based on the
evidence presented below. Moreover, in Spouses Catungal v. Hao,43 we considered the
increase in the award of rentals as reasonable given the particular circumstances of
each case. We noted therein that the respondent denied the petitioners the benefits,
including rightful possession, of their property for almost a decade.

Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos were deprived of possession and use of their
property for more than two decades through no fault of their own. Thus, we find no
cogent reason to disturb the monthly rental fixed by the CA.
All told, the CA committed no reversible error.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and
BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON,Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila,

Social Justice Society and other petitioners in an original petition for mandamus under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr.,
then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance was
enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila on November 20, 2001.
The ordinance provides that:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring
health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta.
Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded
by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the
south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pandacan in the west[,]
PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig
River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of
Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28
St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to
Commercial I.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the


operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are
hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this
Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of
businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial
and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification
to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of
effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the socalled Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies.

On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU)[8] with the oil companies. They agreed that the
scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable
option. Which was ratified by the Sanggunian Panglungsod.
In the March 2007 decision, We ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty under the
Local Government Code (LGC) to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city,[13] including Ordinance No. 8027. We also held that we need not
resolve the issue of whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies
and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian could amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8027 since the resolutions which ratified the MOU and made it binding on
the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. We
concluded that there was nothing that legally hindered respondent from enforcing
Ordinance No. 8027.

After The Court promulgated its decision in this case on March 7, 2007, Chevron
Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (Shell) (collectively, the oil companies) and the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Department of Energy (DOE), filed their respective motions for leave
to intervene and for reconsideration of the decision.
Chevron[1] is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing of
petroleum products in the Philippines while Shell and Petron are engaged in the business
of manufacturing, refining and likewise importing, distributing and marketing of
petroleum products in the Philippines.[2] The DOE is a governmental agency created
under Republic Act (RA) No. 7638 [3] and tasked to prepare, integrate, coordinate,
supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the government
relative to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation.
On April 11, 2007, The conducted the oral arguments in Baguio City to hear petitioners
Prior to the motion made by the oil companies and Doe, Chevron, and Shell had filed a
complaint against respondent for the annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 with application

for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction,


which was granted by the court.
Petron likewise filed its own petition in the RTC of Manila, Branch 42, also attacking the
validity of Ordinance No. 8027 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO). This was docketed as civil case no.
03-106379. In an order dated August 4, 2004, the RTC enjoined the parties to maintain
the status quo.
Thereafter, in 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119, also known
as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006.[18] This was
approved by respondent on June 16, 2006.[19] Aggrieved anew, Chevron, Petron and Shell
filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila, Branch 20, asking for the nullification of
Ordinance No. 8119. The court issued a TRO in favor of Petron, enjoining the City of
Manila and respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8119.
Meanwhile, in civil case no. 03-106379, the parties filed a joint motion to withdraw
complaint and counterclaim on February 20, 2007.[24] In an order dated April 23, 2007,
the joint motion was granted and all the claims and counterclaims of the parties were
withdrawn.

Issue: Notice on The Injunctive


writs
Held:
Contention of intervernors: Under Rule 65, Section 3[59] of the Rules of Court, a petition
for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station. According to the oil companies, respondent did
not unlawfully fail or neglect to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because he was lawfully
prevented from doing so by virtue of the injunctive writs and status quo order issued by
the RTC of Manila, Branches 39 and 42.
First, we note that while Chevron and Shell still have in their favor the writs of
preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction, the status quo order in
favor of Petron is no longer in effect since the court granted the joint motion of the parties
to withdraw the complaint and counterclaim.[60]

Second, the original parties failed to inform the Court about these injunctive writs.
Respondent (who was also impleaded as a party in the RTC cases) defends himself
by saying that he informed the court of the pendency of the civil cases and that a
TRO was issued by the RTC in the consolidated cases filed by Chevron and Shell
(IN RTC). It is true that had the oil companies only intervened much earlier, the Court
would not have been left in the dark about these facts. Nevertheless, respondent should
have updated the Court, by way of manifestation, on such a relevant matter.
In his memorandum, respondent mentioned the issuance of a TRO. Under Section 5 of
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a TRO issued by the RTC is effective only for a period of
20 days. This is why, in our March 7, 2007 decision, we presumed with certainty that this
had already lapsed.[61]
Respondent also mentioned the grant of injunctive writs in his rejoinder which the
Court, however, expunged for being a prohibited pleading. The parties and their
counsels were clearly remiss in their duties to this Court.

In resolving controversies, courts can only consider facts and issues pleaded by the
parties.[62] Courts, as well as magistrates presiding over them are not omniscient. They
can only act on the facts and issues presented before them in appropriate pleadings. They
may not even substitute their own personal knowledge for evidence. Nor may they
take notice of matters except those expressly provided as subjects of mandatory
judicial notice.
Issue 2: Notice on Ordinance 8119
The March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of Ordinance No.
8119 entitled An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and
Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and
Amendment thereto which was approved by respondent on June 16, 2006. The simple
reason was that the Court was never informed about this ordinance.
1. While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress, the
rule with respect to local ordinances is different. Ordinances are not included in the

enumeration of matters covered by mandatory judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129
of the Rules of Court.[73]

2. Although, Section 50 of RA 409[74] provides that:


SEC. 50 Judicial notice of ordinances. - All courts sitting in the
city shall take judicial notice of the ordinances passed by the
[Sangguniang Panglungsod].

This cannot be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat in the City of Manila,
should have taken steps to procure a copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the party
of any duty to inform the Court about it.
Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of
municipal ordinances, a court is not required to take judicial notice of ordinances
that are not before it and to which it does not have access. The party asking the court
to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text of the rules the
party desires it to have notice of.[75] Counsel should take the initiative in requesting
that a trial court take judicial notice of an ordinance even where a statute requires
courts to take judicial notice of local ordinances. The intent of a statute requiring a
court to take judicial notice of a local ordinance is to remove any discretion a court
might have in determining whether or not to take notice of an ordinance. Such a
statute does not direct the court to act on its own in obtaining evidence for the
record and a party must make the ordinance available to the court for it to take
notice.
Issue 3: Respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027 was repealed by
Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379?
The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance
No. 8027 was repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379 (where
Petron assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027) when the parties in
their joint motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim stated that the issue
...has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the passage of [Ordinance No.

8119].[79] They contend that such admission worked as an estoppel against the
respondent.
Respondent countered that this stipulation simply meant that Petron was recognizing
the validity and legality of Ordinance No. 8027 and that it had conceded the issue of said
ordinances constitutionality, opting instead to question the validity of Ordinance No.
8119.[80]

The oil companies deny this and further argue that respondent, in his answer in civil
case no. 06-115334 (where Chevron and Shell are asking for the nullification of
Ordinance No. 8119), expressly stated that Ordinance No. 8119 replaced Ordinance
No. 8027:[81]
... Under Ordinance No. 8027, businesses whose uses are not in
accord with the reclassification were given six months to cease [their]
operation. Ordinance No. 8119, which in effect, replaced Ordinance
[No.] 8027, merely took note of the time frame provided for in Ordinance
No. 8119.... Ordinance No. 8119 thus provided for an even longer term,
that is[,] seven years;

Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:


Section 4.
Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written,
made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does
not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made. (Emphasis supplied)

While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a
position contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded,[83] the aforestated rule is not
applicable here. Respondent made the statements regarding the ordinances in civil
case nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which are not the same as this case before us.

[84]

To constitute a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case

in which it is offered.
Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did not
supersede Ordinance No. 8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be
considered estopped. They rely on the argument that Ordinance No. 8119 superseded
Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn its (8119s) validity. We frown on
the adoption of inconsistent positions and distrust any attempt at clever positioning under
one or the other on the basis of what appears advantageous at the moment. Parties cannot
take vacillating or contrary positions regarding the validity of a statute [85] or ordinance.
Nonetheless, we will look into the merits of the argument of implied repeal.

G HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner, - versus - NATIONAL MINES


AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION Local 103
(NAMAWU)
The petitioner, G Holdings, Inc. (GHI), is a domestic corporation primarily engaged in
the business of owning and holding shares of stock of different companies. [2] . Private
respondent, National Mines and Allied Workers Union Local 103 (NAMAWU), was the
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of Maricalum Mining
Corporation (MMC),[3]an entity operating a copper mine and mill complex at Sipalay,
Negros Occidental.[4]
MMC was incorporated by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in 1984, on account of their foreclosure of
Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporations assets. MMC started its commercial
operations in August 1985. Later, DBP and PNB transferred it to the National
Government for disposition or privatization because it had become a non-performing
asset.
Pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement[6] executed between GHI and Asset
Privatization Trust (APT), the former bought ninety percent (90%) of MMCs shares and

financial claims.[7] These financial claims were converted into three Promissory
Notes[8] issued by MMC in favor of GHI totaling P500M and secured by mortgages over
MMCs properties. Upon the signing of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and upon the
full satisfaction of the stipulated down payment, GHI immediately took physical
possession of the mine site and its facilities, and took full control of the management and
operation of MMC
Almost four years thereafter, or on August 23, 1996, a labor dispute arose
between MMC and NAMAWU, with the latter eventually filing with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board of Bacolod City a notice of strike. [11] Then Labor
Secretary, now Associate Justice of this Court, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, later assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute and ruled in favor of NAMAWU. the lay-off (of workers)
implemented was declared illegal and that MMC committed unfair labor practice. He
then ordered the reinstatement of the laid-off workers, with payment of full backwages
and benefits, and directed the execution of a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
incorporating the terms and conditions of the previous CBA providing for an annual
increase in the workers daily wage.[12] In two separate casest, we sustained the validity
of the Quisumbing Order, which became final and executory on January 26, 2000.[13]

partial writ of execution (Brion Writ) was thereafter issued which ordered the DOLE
sheriffs to proceed to the MMC premises for the execution of the same. Althoiugh
MMCs resident manager initially resisted its enforcement, the issuance of the July 18,
2002 Alias Writ of Execution and Break-Open Order (Sto. Tomas Writ) made the
enforecemant possible.
GHI filed with the Regional Trial Court Negros Occidental, Special Civil Action
(SCA) No. 1127 for Contempt with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Nullify the Sheriffs Levy on
Properties. GHI contended that the levied properties were the subject of a Deed of Real
Estate and Chattel Mortgage, executed by MMC in favor of GHI to secure the
aforesaid P550M promissory notes, and that the mortgaged properties were already
extrajudicially foreclosed in July 2001 and sold to GHI as the highest bidder.
The trial court issued ex parte a TRO effective for 72 hours, and set the hearing on the
application for a writ of injunction.[23] The trial court ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Injunction (issued on October 18, 2002)[24] enjoining the DOLE sheriffs from further
enforcing the Sto. Tomas Writ and from conducting any public sale of the levied-on
properties
NAMAWUs separate motions for the reconsideration of the injunction order and for the
dismissal of the case was thereafter denied.

Aggrieved, NAMAWU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing
the October 17, 18 and December 4, 2002 orders of the RTC.
after due proceedings, on October 14, 2003, the appellate court rendered a Decision
setting aside the RTC issuances and directing the immediate execution of the Sto. Tomas
Writ.
The CA ruled, among others, that the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
September 5, 1996 Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage yielded the conclusion
that the deed was sham, fictitious and fraudulent; (seci)
that it was executed two weeks after the labor dispute arose in 1996, but
surprisingly, it was registered only on February 24, 2000, immediately after the Court
affirmed with finality the Quisumbing Order.
The CA also found that the certificates of title to MMCs real properties did not
contain any annotation of a mortgage lien,
and, suspiciously, GHI did not intervene in the long drawn-out labor proceedings to
protect its right as a mortgagee of virtually all the properties of MMC.
GHI elevated the case to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari,
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PERTINENT DECISION
OR ORDER IN THE SAID LABOR DISPUTE BETWEEN MMC AND NAMAWU
MAY BE ENFORCED AGAINST GHI, THERE IS ALREADY A FINAL
DEETERMINATION BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE RIGHTS OF THE
PARTIES IN SAID LABOR DISPUTE
Held:
a. Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its Decision in Maricalum Mining
Corporation v. Hon. Arturo D. Brion and NAMAWU,[34] in which we upheld the right
of herein private respondent, NAMAWU, to its labor claims.
Upon the same principle of judicial notice, we acknowledge our Decision
in Republic of the Philippines, through its trustee, the Asset Privatization Trust v. G
Holdings, Inc.,[35] in which GHI was recognized as the rightful purchaser of the
shares of stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of the company notes
accompanying the said purchase.
These company notes, consisting of three (3) Promissory Notes, were part of the
documents executed in 1992 in the privatization sale of MMC by the Asset Privatization

Trust (APT) to GHI. Each of these notes uniformly contains stipulations establishing
and constituting in favor of GHI mortgages over MMCs real and personal properties.
We find both decisions critically relevant to the instant dispute. In fact, they should
have guided the courts below in the disposition of the controversy at their respective
levels. To repeat, these decisions respectively confirm the right of NAMAWU to its
labor claims[37] and affirm the right of GHI to its financial and mortgage claims over
the real and personal properties of MMC, as will be explained below. The assailed
CA decision apparently failed to consider the impact of these two decisions on the case at
bar. Thus, we find it timely to reiterate that: courts have also taken judicial notice of
previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or
whether or not a previous ruling is applicable to the case under consideration.
2. However, the CA correctly assessed that the authority of the lower court to issue the
challenged writ of injunction depends on the validity of the third partys (GHIs) claim of
ownership over the property subject of the writ of execution issued by the labor
department. Accordingly, the main inquiry addressed by the CA decision was whether
GHI could be treated as a third party or a stranger to the labor dispute, whose properties
were beyond the reach of the Writ of Execution dated December 18, 2001.
In this light, all the more does it become imperative to take judicial notice of the
two cases aforesaid, as they provide the necessary perspective to determine whether GHI
is such a party with a valid ownership claim over the properties subject of the writ of
execution. In Juaban v. Espina,[40] we held that in some instances, courts have also
taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the
matter in controversy. These cases may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly
interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial notice. The two cases that we have
taken judicial notice of are of such character, and our review of the instant case cannot
stray from the findings and conclusions therein.

2,
Republic etc., v. G Holdings, Inc. acknowledged the existence of the Purchase
and Sale Agreement between the APT and the GHI, and recounts the facts attendant to
that transaction, as follows:
The series of negotiations between the petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, through the APT as its trustee, and G Holdings
culminated in the execution of a purchase and sale agreement on October
2, 1992. Under the agreement, the Republic undertook to sell and deliver
90% of the entire issued and outstanding shares of MMC, as well as
its company notes, to G Holdings in consideration of the purchase price
of P673,161,280. It also provided for a down payment of P98,704,000
with the balance divided into four tranches payable in installment over a
period of ten years.

It is difficult to conceive that these mortgages, already existing in 1992, almost four
(4) years before NAMAWU filed its notice of strike, were a fictitious arrangement
intended to defraud NAMAWU. After all, they were agreed upon long before the
seeds of the labor dispute germinated.
While it is true that the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage was executed
only on September 5, 1996, it is beyond cavil that this formal document of mortgage was
merely a derivative of the original mortgage stipulations contained in the Promissory
Notes of October 2, 1992. The execution of this Deed in 1996 does not detract from, but
instead reinforces, the manifest intention of the parties to establish and constitute the
mortgages on MMCs real and personal properties.

The Court notes that the case filed with the lower court involves a principal action for
injunction to prohibit execution over properties belonging to a third party not impleaded
in the legal dispute between NAMAWU and MMC. We have observed, however, that the
lower court and the CA failed to take judicial notice of, or to consider, our Decisions
in Republic, etc., v. G Holdings, Inc., and Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion
and NAMAWU, in which we respectively recognized the entitlement of GHI to the
shares and the company notes of MMC (under the Purchase and Sale Agreement),
and the rights of NAMAWU to its labor claims. At this stage, therefore, neither the
lower court nor the CA, nor even this Court, can depart from our findings in those
two cases because of the doctrine of stare decisis.
From our discussion above, we now rule that the trial court, in issuing the
questioned orders, did not commit grave abuse of discretion, because its issuance was
amply supported by factual and legal bases.

SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, Petitioners,


vs.
ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Respondent.

Respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial


building, located at Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City.
Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners,
Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a
contract of lease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor,
and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.1 a
Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease
rights over two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods
during the Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalies offer to purchase lease rights
in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under construction at the time. Thereafter, in
December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished, Spouses Latip occupied them
without waiting for the completion of five (5) other stalls.
Spouses Latip averred that the contract of lease they signed had been novated by their
purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to receive a
demand letter from Rosalies counsel and the subsequent filing of a complaint against
them.
The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, where the petitioners were ordered to vacate and
pay rental arrears. The RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip
ordering the respondent to pay moral and exemplary damages to the spouses. The
RTC did not give credence to the contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and, in
all other substantial aspects, incomplete.
The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was modified and
supplemented; and the entire lease rentals for the two (2) cubicles for six (6) years had
already been paid by Spouses Latip in the amount of P2,570,000.00.
ss to Rosalies claim that her receipt of P2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill payment
by prospective lessees to their lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease
rights, the RTC shot this down and pointed out that, apart from her bare
allegations, Rosalie did not adduce evidence to substantiate this claim
the CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of
the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract of lease, albeit lacking the signature of
Ferdinand and not notarized, remained a complete and valid contract.
And that finally, On the issue of whether the amount of P2,570,000.00 merely
constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this common
practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church.
According to the appellate court, this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint

Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid
goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat.
Issue: Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles, considering, as
previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment of
Spouses Latip, took judicial notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the
Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.
Held:
!. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial
notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their
political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and
history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters
which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought
to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
a. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The
power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken
that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be
promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts
of general notoriety. (cww)
b. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying
that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be
otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that
it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere
personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is
not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or

professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those
matters which are "commonly" known.
3. Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters
coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of
life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are
capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. (og (tru))
a. From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the
matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite
of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice
to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the
RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of
"common knowledge" or notoriously known.
b. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA,
containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that
they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that
the reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need not be proved under
Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form
of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the
parties. However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of
attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalies
appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie.
On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting
to P2,570,000.00, we hold that the practice of payment of goodwill money in the
Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of judicial notice. Neither was Rosalie able to
provide sufficient evidence that, apart from the belatedly submitted Joint Affidavit of the
stallholders of Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for the payment of goodwill
money, and not payment for advance rentals by Spouses Latip.

Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from the leased
cubicles, what remains in evidence is the documentary evidence signed by both parties
the contract of lease and the receipts evidencing payment of P2,570,000.00.
The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts
for P2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented the contract of lease. However, it made a
quantum leap when it ruled that the amount was payment for rentals of the two (2)
cubicles for the entire six-year period.
There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment and receipt
of P2,570,000.00 referred to full payment of rentals for the whole period of the lease.

All three receipts state Rosalies receipt of cash in varying amounts. The first receipt
for P2,000,000.00 did state payment for two (2) cubicles, but this cannot mean full
payment of rentals for the entire lease period when there are no words to that effect.
Further, two receipts were subsequently executed pointing to the obvious fact that
the P2,000,000.00 is not for full payment of rentals. Thus, since the contract of lease
remained operative, we find that Rosalies receipt of the monies should be
considered as advanced rentals on the leased cubicles
Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip can be ejected
from the leased premises. They are liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals on the lease of
the two (2) cubicles in accordance with the stipulations on rentals in the Contract of
Lease. However, the amount of P2,570,000.00, covering advance rentals, must be
deducted from this liability of Spouses Latip to Rosalie.

People Vs. Muit


Muit,
Panch
oJr,
Dequillo,
Romeo,
Hermano,
Ferraerwere charged withhomicide[1] and carnapping[2] in two separate informations.
Only Muit, Pancho Jr., Dequillo, Romeo, and Ferraer were arrested and stood trial.
However, Ferraer was discharged from the criminal cases by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) and was utilized as a state witness.

kidnapping for ransom with homicide[1] and carnapping[2] in two separate informations.
Only Muit, Pancho Jr., Dequillo, Romeo, and Ferraer were arrested and stood trial.
However, Ferraer was discharged from the criminal cases by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) and was utilized as a state witness. [3] All appellants pleaded not guilty during
their arraignments.
(Julaton), a relative of Ferraer, arrived at the latters house
in Kaylaway, Nasugbu, Batangas with Sergio Pancho, Sr. (Pancho, Sr.),Pancho,
Jr., Dequillo and four other men on board a gray Mitsubishi car
Julaton introduced them to Ferraer and told the latter that Pancho, Sr. is also their
relative.Pancho, Sr. told Ferraer that they wanted to use his house as a safehouse for their
visitor.
Ferraer was hesitant at first as he thought it was risky for him and his
family. Hermano told Ferraer not to worry because they are not killers; their line of work
is kidnap for ransom.
Ferraer was assured that the money they will get would be shared equally among
them. Ferraer and Pancho, Sr. would guard their victim. Later, five other men came and
they were introduced to Ferraer as Muit, Morales, alias Tony, alias David and alias Puri.
They had dinner and chatted until midnight. That evening, Morales handed
to Ferraer for safekeeping a folded carton wrapped with masking tape contained in
a big paper bag, and a green backpack. Hermano told Ferraer that the package
contained guns.
Ferraer brought the package inside his room; he inspected the contents before placing
them under the bed.
in the afternoon of 24 November 1997, Ferraer saw Pancho, Jr., and Hermano with a
companion, seated under the tree in front of his house. Pancho, Jr. introduced their
companion as Romeo. They informed Ferraer that they would proceed with their plan.
At around two oclock in the afternoon of the same date, 2 December 1997,
Roger Seraspe (Seraspe), the personal driver of the victim, drove a blue Pajero
to visit the Flexopac project site at Barangay Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas. At the
site, Engr. Roldan and the victim alighted from the Pajero and, along with Engr.
Ed dela Cruz, toured the construction site.
After the site inspection, the three engineers walked towards the direction of
the Pajero. The driver was surprised to see that the three engineers who stood together
suddenly lay prostrate on the ground. The driver and warehouseman saw an unidentified
man standing near the three engineers. Three more armed men surrounded the Pajero. .
One of the armed men, Muit, poked a gun at driver and ordered him and warehouseman

to lay prostrate on the ground.[7] The assailants dragged the victim towards the Pajero
and after being on board and given the keys, They then started the Pajero and drove
away, passing through the Pag-asa Road gate.
that same afternoon, Lipa City Deputy Chief of Police, Supt. Arcadio Mission (Supt.
Mission) received a radio message from the Tanauan Police Station that a kidnapping was
ongoing and the kidnappers on board a Pajero heading towards lipa city. Supt. Mission
immediately ordered the police posted near the Lipa City bus stop to put up a barricade.
Right after Supt. Mission and the teams arrived at the barricade, the Pajero was spotted.
When policemen flagged down the Pajero, the driver stopped the vehicle. While two
policemen approached the Pajero, the driver and front passenger opened their car doors
and started firing at the policemen. At this point, all the policemen present at the scene
fired back. The cross-fire lasted for around four minutes. All the occupants of the Pajero,
except the driver and the front passenger who managed to escape, died. Muit, who was
the driver was apprended.
Pancho, Jr. waited along the highway in front of the construction site. He thought that he
had been left behind when he did not see the group, so he left. When Pancho, Jr. returned
to Ferraers house, he told Ferraer what happened to their operation. Worried that
something bad might have happened to the group, Pancho, Jr. went back and looked for
the rest of his group. Pancho, Jr. came back alone.
At around 5:30 in the morning of 3 December 1997, Ferraer saw Pancho, Sr. and Pancho,
Jr. watching the TV program Alas Singko y Medya. He joined them and saw on the
news thePajero riddled with bullets. Pancho, Sr. and Pancho, Jr. left Ferraers house
at around 9:00 in the morning and they also left behind the Mitsubishi car they
used.
That night, Ferraer saw on the news program TV Patrol a footage showing the cadavers
of Udon, Morales, Manuel, Bokbok and the victim, and the Pajero riddled with
bullets. Ferraer also saw Muit in handcuffs.

The prosecution presented Ignacio Ong, Sr., the father of the victim Engr. Ignacio Ong,
Jr.;
driver;
warehouseman;
the PNP Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy;
Supt. Mission, Ferraer, as the state witness; and Atty. Narzal Mallare[12] (Atty. Mallare),
the lawyer who assisted appellants Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo in executing their respective
sworn statements as witnesses.

Their accounts were corroborated by the prosecutions documentary evidence such as the
extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, Muit executed two extra
judicial confessions.
Dequillo, for his part, he was working as a mason,
Alleged that he was arrested at his house and that the police tortured him and forced him
to sign the written confession of his participation in the crimes. He denied having
participated in the commission of the offenses charged against him.
Muit claimed that on 2 December 1997 he was in Lipa City, near the place of the
shootout. He had just attended a gathering of the Rizalistas and was waiting for his
uncleBonifacio when the police arrested him. He denied having any knowledge of the
crime. He denied knowing the people whose name appeared in his two extra judicial
confessions. He claimed that the names were supplied by the police and that he was not
assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation.

The RTC held that mere denials and alibis of appellants cannot prevail over the
positive declarations of the prosecutions witnesses. he RTC did not give credence to the
claims of appellants that their extra judicial confessions were procured through torture as
these were belied by the testimony of Atty. Mallare and appellants medical certificates
which were issued during their incarceration and after the execution of their statements.
And the RTC noted that even without appellants extra judicial confessions, there was
still sufficient evidence on record to hold them guilty.
The Court of Appeals in a decision[19] dated 31 August 2007 affirmed the decision of the
RTC
Held:
The kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the carnapping were established by the
direct testimony of Ferraer, Seraspe and Chavez. Ferraer testified on how the group
approached and convinced him to let them use his house to keep the victim they planned
to kidnap.
the police were able to apprehend appellants Pancho, Jr., Romeo, and Dequillo who all
took part in the botched criminal conspiracy to kidnap the victim. During the
investigation, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit, with the assistance of their counsels and
family members, executed extra judical confessions divulging their respective roles in the
planning and execution of the crimes.

a. The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the
case against them. There is nothing on record to support appellants claim that
they were coerced and tortured into executing their extra judicial confessions.
One of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of appellants extra
judicial statements is that each contains many details and facts which the
investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied,
without the knowledge and information given by appellants. Moreover, the
appellants were assisted by their lawyers when they executed their
statements. Atty. Mallare testified that Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo executed their
statements voluntarily and affixed their signatures after he talked with them alone
and informed them of their constitutional rights.[28] Muit, on the other hand, was
assisted by counsels in each instance when he executed his two extra judicial
confessions; Muit cannot just conveniently disclaim any knowledge of the
contents of his extra judicial confession.
Nevertheless, in Muitscase, he was also positively identified by Seraspe and
Chavez as the one who pointed a gun at them during the kidnapping and ordered them
to lay prostrate on the ground.

b. The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit also strengthened
the prosecutions case against Romeo. The rule that an extra judicial confession
is evidence only against the person making it recognizes various exceptions.
One such exception is where several extra judicial statements had been made
by several persons charged with an offense and there could have been no
collusion with reference to said several confessions, the fact that the
statements are in all material respects identical is confirmatory of the
confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other persons implicated
therein.

c. They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person


implicated therein to show the probability of the latters actual participation
in the commission of the crime and may likewise serve as corroborative
evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances that other
persons had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and
proved. These are known as interlocking confessions.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,


vs. HERMINIANO SATORRE
Appellant Herminiano Satorre alias Emiano Satorre was charged with Murder
Information 25th day of May, 1997 at 2:00 oclock dawn, more or less, in the Province of
Cebu, with intent to kill, with the use of .38 paltik revolver and by means of treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack
and shoot ROMERO PANTILGAN, hitting the latter at the head which caused his
instantaneous death.
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty
Gliceria Saraum, wife of the victim Romero Pantilgan, testified that at 2:00 a.m. of May
25, 1997, she and her two children were asleep inside the house of her parents at
Tagaytay, Calidngan, Carcar, Cebu. Her mother, Florida Saraum, was also in the
house. Her husband, Romero, went out to attend a fiesta. While she was asleep, she
was awakened by a gunshot. Gliceria got up and went out to the porch, where she
found her dead husband lying on the ground. Blood oozed out of a gunshot wound
on his head.
Rufino Abayata, a barangay kagawad, testified his fellow barangay kagawad, Pio
Alvarado, fetched him from his house and, together, they went to verify a report
regarding a dead person on the porch of the Saraum residence. Upon confirming the
incident, they reported the matter to the Carcar Police. Rufino further narrated that
appellants father, Abraham Satorre, informed them that it was appellant who shot
Pantilgan. They looked for appellant in the house of his brother, Felix Satorre, at
Dumlog, Talisay, Cebu, but were told that he already left. Nevertheless, appellants
brothers, went to Rufinos house and surrendered the gun which was allegedly used
in killing Pantilgan.
Flavio Gelle narrated that he accompanied appellant and his father, Abraham, to the
Barangay Captain of Can-asohan, Carcar, Cebu where appellant admitted killing
Pantilgan. Thereafter, appellant was detained.
The story was corroborated by the barangay captain. the accused confessed to her
that the he killed Pantilgan because the latter struck him with a piece of wood. That same
evening, she went to the Carcar Police Station with appellant where she executed an
affidavit. She further averred that appellant voluntarily narrated that he killed Pantilgan
with the use of a handgun which he wrestled from his possession.
Municipal Health Officer of Carcar, Cebu certified that the cause of Pantilgans death was
gunshot wound.

Apellant claimed that he was asleep inside his house at the time of the incident.
He alleged that Rufino Abayata had a grudge against him because of an incident when he
tied Rufinos cow to prevent it from eating the corn in his farm. He denied having
confessed to the killing of Pantilgan.
He disclaimed ownership over the paltik .38 revolver and stated that he could not even
remember having surrendered a firearm to the barangay captain. The appellants father
and brothers corroborated the story as to the surrender.
After trial, the court a quo gave credence to the prosecutions evidence and rendered a
decision convicting appellant of Murder
Appellant interposed this appeal, contending that the trial court erred: (1) in giving
full faith and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses; (2) in proceeding with
the trial of the instant case amounting to lack of due process provided by law due to its
denial of accuseds motion for preliminary investigation or reinvestigation; and (3) in
rejecting the testimony of the defenses witnesses.
Issue: The confession is admissible.
1. The appeal has merit. In particular, appellant claims that his alleged confession or
admission, which was concocted by the Barangay Captain, is inadmissible in evidence
for being hearsay and for being obtained without a competent and independent
counsel of his choice. In effect, the quantum of evidence adduced by the prosecution
was not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The bare
allegation that he confessed or admitted killing Romero Pantilgan is not proof of guilt.

2. Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court defines an admission as an act, declaration
or omission of a party as to a relevant fact. (Ado)
A confession, on the other hand, under Section 33 of the same Rule is the declaration of
an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily
included therein.
Both may be given in evidence against the person admitting or confessing. On the whole,
a confession, as distinguished from an admission, is a declaration made at any time by
a person, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement, stating or
acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the commission of a crime.
d(vci) a(cpc)

Evidently, appellants alleged declaration owning up to the killing before the Barangay
Captain was a confession. Since the declaration was not put in writing and made out of
court, it is an oral extrajudicial confession.
3. The nexus that connects appellant to the killing was his alleged oral
extrajudicial confession given to Barangay Captain Cynthia Castaares and
two barangay kagawads. According to the trial court, their testimonies were positive
and convincing. Appellants retraction of his oral extrajudicial confession should not be
given much credence in the assessment of evidence. However, appellant disputes the
admissibility and sufficiency of the testimonial evidence offered to prove the alleged oral
extrajudicial confession.
There is no question as to the admissibility of appellants alleged oral
extrajudicial confession. Indeed, as far as admissibility is concerned, Rule 130,
Section 33 of the Rules of Court makes no distinction whether the confession is
judicial or extrajudicial.
The rationale for the admissibility of a confession is that if it is made freely and
voluntarily, a confession constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the
strong presumption that no sane person or one of normal mind will deliberately and
knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and
conscience.

4. The term voluntary means that the accused speaks of his free will and accord,
without inducement of any kind, and with a full and complete knowledge of the nature
and consequences of the confession, and when the speaking is so free from influences
affecting the will of the accused, at the time the confession was made, that it renders it
admissible in evidence against him.[7] Plainly, the admissibility of a confession in
evidence hinges on its voluntariness.
The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if,
upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast
doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details which could only be supplied by
the accused reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be considered voluntary.
The problem with appraising voluntariness occurs when the confession is an oral
extrajudicial confession because the proof of voluntariness cannot be inferred from the
testimony of a witness who allegedly heard the confessant since there is no written
proof that such confession was voluntarily made. Neither can the confessant be
appraised by the court since, precisely, it was made outside the judicial proceeding. On
the question of whether a confession is made voluntarily, the age, character, and
circumstances prevailing at the time it was made must be considered. o be sure, a
confession is not required to be in any particular form. It may be oral or written, formal

or informal in character. It may be recorded on video tape, sound motion pictures, or


tape.[14] However, while not required to be in writing to be admissible in evidence, it is
advisable, if not otherwise recorded by video tape or other means, to reduce the
confession to writing. This adds weight to the confession and helps convince the court
that it was freely and voluntarily made. If possible the confession, after being reduced to
writing, should be read to the defendant, have it read by defendant, have him sign it, and
have it attested by witnesses

5. In the case at bar, appellant was a 19-year old farmer who did not even finish first
grade. Granting that he made the confession in the presence of Barangay Captain
Castaares, he may not have realized the full import of his confession and its
consequences. This is not to say that he is not capable of making the confession out of a
desire to tell the truth if prompted by his conscience. What we are saying is that due to
the aforesaid personal circumstances of appellant, the voluntariness of his alleged oral
confession may not be definitively appraised and evaluated.
The trial court gave credence to appellants oral extrajudicial confession relying on
jurisprudence which we find are not applicable. In the cases cited by the trial court,[16] the
convictions were based on 1. circumstantial evidence in addition to the 2. appellants
confessions, or 3. the extrajudicial confessions were reduced to writing and were replete
with details which only appellants could have supplied. In the case at bar, however, there
was no circumstantial evidence to corroborate the extrajudicial confession of
appellant. More importantly, the said confession does not contain details which
could have only been known to appellant. 4. Furthermore, the events alleged in the
confession are inconsistent with the physical evidence. According to Barangay Captain
Castaares, appellant narrated to her that during the struggle between him and the
deceased, he fell to the ground after the latter hit him on the head with a piece of
wood. In the autopsy report, however, Dr. Plebia Villanueva found that the entrance
wound on the deceased was located at the top of the head or the crown, indicating that
the victim was probably lying down when he was shot. 6. the fatal gun and the slug
extracted from Pantilgans brain can not be considered as corroborative evidence. While
the slug embedded in Pantilgans brain came from the fatal gun, the prosecution was not
able to conclusively establish the ownership of the gun other than the bare testimony of
prosecution witnesses that appellants brothers surrendered the gun to them. This was
denied by appellant and his brothers and there was no other proof linking the gun to him.
6. an extrajudicial confession will not support a conviction where it is
uncorroborated. There must be such corroboration that, when considered in connection
with confession, will show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable
doubt. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient corroboration of a confession. It is not
necessary that the supplementary evidence be entirely free from variance with the

extrajudicial confession, or that it show the place of offense or the defendants identity or
criminal agency. All facts and circumstances attending the particular offense charged are
admissible to corroborate extrajudicial confession.
On the whole, it appears that the trial court simply based appellants conviction on the
testimonial evidence of prosecution witnesses that appellant orally owned up to the
killing. We cannot affirm appellants conviction on mere testimonial evidence,
considering that the voluntariness of said confession cannot be conclusively established
because of appellants personal circumstances and the failure of the police to reduce the
alleged oral confession into writing.

Tamargo vs Awingan
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot
and killed at around 5:15 p.m. of August 15, 2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta
Street, Binondo, Manila. T
The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo
Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit dated September 12, 2003. He stated that a
certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was
ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of
those who killed Atty. Tamargo. He added that he told the Tamargo family what he
knew and that the sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna.
on the strength of Gerons affidavit, the investigating prosecutor[5] issued a resolution
dated December 5, 2003 finding probable cause against Columna and three John Does.
the corresponding Informations for murder were filed a. against them in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Columna was arrested in Cagayan
march 8, 2008, Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed an affidavit
wherein he admitted his participation as look out during the shooting and implicated
respondent Romulo Awingan (alias Mumoy) as the gunman and one Richard
Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his
son, respondent Lloyd Antiporda.
Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed an affidavit wherein he admitted
his participation as look out during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo
Awingan (alias Mumoy), as the gunman and one Richard Mecate,. He also tagged as
masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr., exmayor and his son, respondent Lloyd
Antiporda mayor. On April 19, 2004, Columna affirmed his affidavit before the
investigating prosecutor[11] who subjected him to clarificatory questions.

b. Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty.


Tamargo) filed a complaint against those implicated by Columna in the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila.
Respondents denied any involvement in the killings. They alleged that Licerio was a
candidate for mayor in Buguey, Cagayan during the May 2004 elections and that the case
was instituted by his political opponents in order to derail his candidacy.
The Antipordas admitted that Atty. Tamargo was their political rival for the mayoralty
post of Buguey. Atty. Tamargo had been defeated twice by Lloyd and once by
Licerio. Before the killing, Atty. Tamargo filed an election case against Lloyd and a
kidnapping case in the Sandiganbayan against Licerio. However, they claimed that
both cases were dismissed as Lloyd emerged as the winner in the elections and Licerio
was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan.
During the preliminary investigation, 1. respondent Licerio presented Columnas
unsolicited handwritten letter dated May 3, 2004 to respondent Lloyd, sent from
Columnas jail cell in Manila. In the letter, Columna disowned the contents of his March
8, 2004 affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial
confession. He stated that those he implicated had no participation in the killings.[14] 2.
Respondent Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated May 25, 2004
wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten letter.
During the clarificatory hearing held on October 22, 2004, Columna categorically
admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the May
25, 2004 affidavit and denied that any violence had been employed to obtain or extract
the affidavit from him. The charges were dismissed. petitioner filed an appeal to the
Department of Justice (DOJ).[17] On May 30, 2005, the DOJ, through then Secretary Raul
M. Gonzalez, reversed the dismissal and ordered the filing of the Informations for
murder.[18] But after the MR, the secretary reversed.
Prosecutor Ramon Garcia dated October 29, 2004, Columna said that he was only
forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during the October 22,
2004 clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail. He
requested that he be transferred to another detention center.
As a result, on August 22, 2005, the trial prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the
Informations. The RTC, through Judge Cielito Mindaro-Grulla, granted the motion to
withdraw the Informations in an order dated October 26, 2005
After the mr was filed by the petitioner, the judge inhibited and cases were re-raffled to
Branch 19, presided by Judge Zenaida R. Daguna. Judge Daguna granted the MR of
petitioner in a resolution dated December 9, 2005. She ruled that, based on Columnas
March 8, 2004 affidavit which he affirmed before the investigating prosecutor, there
was probable cause to hold the accused for trial.

c.Consequently, respondent Awingan filed a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition in the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. The Antipordas
separately filed another certiorari case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94188.
In a decision dated November 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610, the CA ruled that the
RTC judge gravely abused her discretion because she arbitrarily left out of her
assessment and evaluation the substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken
into account in concluding that there was no probable cause against all the accused. It
also held that Columnas extrajudicial confession was not admissible against the
respondents because, aside from the i. recanted confession, ii. there was no other
piece of evidence presented to establish the existence of the conspiracy.

Petitioner filed this petition assailing the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. Later on,
he filed an amended petition impleading respondents Antiporda and likewise assailing the
CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 94188.
Issue: The main issue for our resolution is whether or not the CA erred in finding that
Judge Daguna had committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the withdrawal of the
Informations for murder against respondents.
Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of Judge Daguna,
there was probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of Columna. She considered all
the pieces of evidence but did not give credit to Columnas recantation.
Respondents counter that Judge Daguna committed grave abuse of discretion by
limiting her evaluation and assessment only to evidence that supported probable cause
while completely disregarding contradicting evidence. They also contend that
Columnas extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against respondents because of
the rule on res inter alios acta.

Held:
1. It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information (on the
ground of lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial based on a resolution of the
DOJ Secretary), the trial court has the duty to make an independent assessment of
the merits of the motion.[25] It may either agree or disagree with the
recommendation of the Secretary. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary
would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine
a prima facie case.[26] The court must itself be convinced that there is indeed no
sufficient evidence against the accused.

2. There is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since
the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and
its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the
judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason. The judge or fiscal, therefore,
should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might
later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which
the courts are created to uphold.
We agree with the CA that Judge Daguna limited herself only to the following: (1)
Columnas affidavit dated March 8, 2004 wherein he implicated the respondents in the
murders; (2) his affirmation of this affidavit during the April 19, 2004 clarificatory
hearing; (3) his letter dated October 29, 2004 and (4) the May 30, 2005 DOJ resolution
upholding the prosecutors recommendation to file the murder charges. She completely
ignored other relevant pieces of evidence such as: (1) Columnas May 3, 2004 letter to
respondent Lloyd Antiporda narrating the torture he suffered to force him to admit his
participation in the crimes and to implicate the respondents; (2) his May 25, 2004
affidavit where he stated that neither he nor the respondents had any involvement in the
murders and (3) his testimony during the October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing wherein
he categorically affirmed his May 3, 2004 letter and May 25, 2004 affidavit.
Had Judge Daguna reviewed the entire records of the investigation, she would
have seen that, aside from the pieces of evidence she relied on, there were others which
cast doubt on them.
The selectivity of respondent RTC Judge for purposes of resolving
the motion to withdraw the informations effectively sidetracked the
guidelines for an independent assessment and evaluation of the merits of

the case. Respondent RTC Judge thus impaired the substantial rights of
the accused. Instead, she should have made a circumspect evaluation
by looking at everything made available to her at that point of the
cases

3. Moreover, Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columnas extrajudicial


confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence against
respondents in view of the rule onres inter alios acta.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios
acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another.[32] Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused [33] and is considered as
hearsay against them.
Rationale: it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a
man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not
to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him.
4. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a
conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her coconspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than
the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been
made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece
of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. he recanted confession of

Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and
was inadmissible as evidence against them.
Indeed, at that stage of the proceedings, the duty of Judge Daguna was only to satisfy
herself whether there was probable cause or sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial
as co-conspirators. Given that she had no sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause
against respondents, her orders denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder
against them were issued with grave abuse of discretion.

JESUS CUENCO, petitioner,


vs.
TALISAY TOURIST SPORTS COMPLEX,
INCORPORATED AND MATIAS B. AZNAR III,
Petitioner leased from respondents for a period of two (2) years, from May 8, 1992 to
May 8, 1994, the Talisay Tourist Sports Complex, to be operated as a cockpit. The lease
was extended for another four (4) year
Under the Contract of Lease,1 it was stipulated that petitioner shall, like a good father
of the family, maintain in good condition the furniture, chattels and all other
equipment and shall, at all times, keep the leased premises clean and sanitary. For
this purpose, petitioner would allow the respondents building supervisor or his
authorized representative to make a regular spot inspection of the leased premises to see
to it that these stipulations are strictly implemented.2 Any damage caused to the
furniture, chattels, equipment and parts of the leased premises shall be the
responsibility of petitioner to repair and compensate.3 Furthermore, petitioner would
give a deposit equivalent to six (6) months rental to answer for whatever damages may be
caused to the premises during the period of the lease.4
Upon expiration of the contract, respondent company conducted a public bidding for the
lease of the property. Where in the petitioner participated in the bidding.
The petitioner thereafter made 4 demand letters, that he be released from the contract,
demanding the return of the deposit of p500,000, the second letter reiterating the first, the
third questioning the accuracy of and why the inventory was not given,
As all of his demand letters remained unheeded, on October 21, 1998, petitioner
filed a Complaint11 for sum of money, damages and attorneys fees.
respondents countered that petitioner caused physical damage to some portions of the
leased premises and the cost of repair and replacement of materials amounted to more
than P500,000.00.
A pretrial conference was held where it was admitted that there

is no inventory of damages up to this time;


2. [Petitioner] deposited the amount of P500,000.00;
3. [Petitioner] sends (sic) several letters of demand to [respondents] but said letters were
not answered.
4. There was a renovation of the Talisay Tourist Sports Complex with a qualification that
the renovation is only 10% of the whole amount. (idd10%)
During the trial, the lease contract, demand letters, inventory and ocular inspection report,
the last 2 were offered by the respondents were submitted as evidence.
RTC ratiocinated that respondents failure to reply to the letters of petitioner raises
a presumption that petitioner has complied with his end of the contract. The lower
court gave credence to the testimony of respondents witness, Ateniso Coronado
(Coronado), the property custodian of the respondents, that the sports complex was
repaired and renovated by the new lessee. The court also considered the admission of
respondents counsel during the pre-trial that no inventory of the property was
conducted on the leased premises. The RTC debunked the inventory presented by
the respondents during trial as a mere afterthought to bolster their claim against
petitioner.
CA ruled in favor of respondents on the basis of: Coronados testimony that petitioner
continued to hold cockfights two months after the expiration of the lease contract which
was not refuted by petitioner and the new lessor incurred expenses amounting to overP3
million when he shouldered the rest of the repair and renovation of the subject property
(there was still damage to the property).
issue: (1) whether a judicial admission is conclusive and binding upon a party making the
admission; and (2) whether such judicial admission was properly rejected by the CA
Held:
1. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and as a rule, does not weigh anew the
evidence presented by the parties. However, the instant case is one of the
exceptions to the rule because of the conflicting decisions of the RTC and the
CA based on contradictory factual findings. Thus, we have reviewed the
records in order to arrive at a judicious resolution of the case at bench.
2. Petitioner questions the CAs finding that there was damage caused the premises
while the lease was still in force. Such finding could only have been based on
alleged inventory of the property conducted by the respondents. Petitioner takes
exception to this evidence because of the earlier judicial admission made by
respondents counsel that no inventory was conducted and, accordingly, any

evidence adduced by the respondents contrary to or inconsistent with the


judicial admission should be rejected.
Yet during the trial, Coronado testified that during the ocular inspection There were
missing and destroyed fixtures and physical damage sustained by the complex.
Obviously, it was on Coronados testimony, as well as on the documentary evidence29 of
an alleged property inventory conducted on June 4, 1998, that the CA based its
conclusion that the amount of damage sustained by the leased premises while in the
possession of petitioner exceeded the amount of petitioners deposit.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the pleadings, (2) during the trial, by verbal
or written manifestations or stipulations, or (3) in other stages of the judicial
proceeding.30 The stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial
admissions. The veracity of judicial admissions require no further proof and may be
controverted only upon a clear showing that the admissions were made through palpable
mistake or that no admissions were made. Thus, the admissions of parties during the
pre-trial, as embodied in the pre-trial order, are binding and conclusive upon them.
Respondents did not deny the admission made by their counsel, neither did they claim
that the same was made through palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is
incontrovertible and may be relied upon by the courts.
Thus, respondents are bound by the admissions made by their counsel at the pre-trial.
Accordingly, the CA committed an error when it gave ample evidentiary weight to
respondents evidence contradictory to the judicial admission.
3. respondents are not entitled the full amount of the deposit because the repair and
renovation of the sports complex after the expiration of petitioners lease were
undertaken not by respondents but by the new lessee, as testified by Coronado.
4. Finally, the Court observes that the inventories presented by respondents were not
countersigned by petitioner or were they presented to the latter prior to the filing of the
case in the RTC. Thus, we are more inclined to agree with the trial court that the
"inventory was made as an afterthought,"37 in a vain attempt of the respondents to
establish their case.
5. This two (2) months over-stay of petitioner in the leased premises should be charged
against the deposit. Because there was no renewal of the lease contract, it is understood

that the continued use of the premises is on a monthly basis with the rental in the amount
previously agreed upon by the partie
6. Under Article 2213 of the Civil Code, "interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated
claims or damages, except when the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty." In the instant case, the claim of petitioner is unliquidated or cannot be
established with reasonable certainty upon his filing of the case in the RTC. This is
because of the contending claims of the parties

Toshiba vs CIR
Toshiba is a domestic corporation principally engaged in the business of manufacturing
and exporting of electric machinery, equipment systems, accessories, parts,
components, materials and goods of all kinds, including those relating to office
automation and information technology and all types of computer hardware and
software, such as but not limited to HDD-CD-ROM and personal computer printed
circuit board.
It is registered with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) as an Economic
Zone (ECOZONE) export enterprise and BIR.
Toshiba subsequently submitted to the BIR on July 23, 1997 its VAT returns for the first
and second quarters of 1997,[10] reporting the same input VAT payments of P
P3,875,139.65
and zero-rated sales totaling P7,494,677,000.00. It also applied for a tax refund. Toshiba
likewise filed with the CTA a Petition for Review[14] to toll the running of the two-year
prescriptive period under Section 230 of the Tax Code of 1977,[15] as amended. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) opposed the claim for tax refund/credit of
Toshiba, averring that iled miserably to show that the total amount of P3,875,139.65
claimed as VAT input taxes, were erroneously or illegally collected, or that the same are
properly documented;

Upon being advised by the CTA,[20] Toshiba and the CIR filed a
Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues, [21] wherein the opposing parties
agreed and admitted that the [Toshiba] is a duly registered value-added
tax entity in accordance with Section 107 of the Tax Code, as amended. (O
%v2)
2.
[Toshiba] is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax
on its export sales in accordance with then Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax
Code, as amended.
3.
[Toshiba] filed its quarterly VAT returns for the first two
quarters of 1997 within the legally prescribed period.

xxxx
7.
[Toshiba] is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax
on its export sales.
8.
[Toshiba] has duly filed the instant Petition for Review
within the two-year prescriptive period prescribed by then Section 230 of
the Tax Code.

In the same pleading, Toshiba and the CIR jointly submitted the following issues
for determination by the CTA
Whether or not [Toshiba] has incurred input taxes in the amount
of P3,875,139.65 for the period January 1 to June 30, 1997 which are
directly attributable to its export sales[.]
During the trial before the CTA, Toshiba presented documentary evidence in support of
its claim for tax credit/refund, while the CIR did not present any evidence at all.
CTA rendered the case in favor of Toshiba but reducing the amount of tax refund.
According to the CTA, the CIR himself admitted that the export sales of Toshiba were
subject to zero percent (0%) VAT based on Section 100(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Tax Code of
1977, as amended. Both parties filed mr. In its mr, cir argued in his Motion for
Reconsideration[26] that Toshiba was not entitled to the credit/refund of its input VAT
payments because as a PEZA-registered ECOZONE export enterprise, Toshiba was not
subject to VAT. The CIR contended that under Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7916, a
special law, all businesses and establishments within the ECOZONE were to remit to the
government five percent (5%) of their gross income earned within the zone, in lieu of all
taxes, including VAT. The mr were denied.
the CIR filed a Petition for Review which was granted. The appellate court ruled
that Toshiba was not entitled to the refund of its alleged unused input VAT payments
because it was a tax-exempt entity under Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7916. As a
PEZA-registered corporation, Toshiba was liable for remitting to the national government
the five percent (5%) preferential rate on its gross income earned within the ECOZONE,
in lieu of all other national and local taxes, including VAT and that the export sales of
Toshiba were VAT-exempt, not zero-rated, transactions.

Toshiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration[31] of the aforementioned Decision, anchored


on the following arguments: (a) the CIR never raised as an issue before the CTA that
Toshiba was tax-exempt under Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7916. The Mr was denied.
Issue: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
[TOSHIBA], BEING A PEZA-REGISTERED ENTERPRISE, IS EXEMPT FROM VAT
UNDER SECTION 24 OF R.A. 7916, AND FURTHER HOLDING THAT
[TOSHIBAS] EXPORT SALES ARE EXEMPT TRANSACTIONS UNDER SECTION
109 OF THE TAX CODE.
Held:
1. The CIR did not timely raise before the CTA the issues on the VAT-exemptions of
Toshiba and its export sales. Rule 9 SECTION 1. Of ROC states. Defenses and
objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
The CIR did not argue straight away in his Answer in CTA Case No. 5762 that Toshiba
had no right to the credit/refund of its input VAT payments because the latter was VATexempt and its export sales were VAT-exempt transactions. The Pre-Trial Brief[36] of the
CIR was equally bereft of such allegations or arguments. The CIR passed up the
opportunity to prove the supposed VAT-exemptions of Toshiba and its export sales when
the CIR chose not to present any evidence at all during the trial before the CTA.
2. It is axiomatic in pleadings and practice that no new issue in a case can be raised in a
pleading which by due diligence could have been raised in previous pleadings.[39] The
Court cannot simply grant the plea of the CIR that the procedural rules be relaxed
based on the general averment of the interest of substantive justice. It should not be
forgotten that the first and fundamental concern of the rules of procedure is to
secure a just determination of every action. liberal interpretation and application of
rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and
circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally
true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure
to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
2. The CIR judicially admitted that Toshiba was VAT-registered and its export sales
were subject to VAT at zero percent (0%) rate.
The purpose of pre-trial under rule 18 is for
simplification of the issues and The possibility of obtaining
stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof;

The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it
must be treated as a judicial admission.[45] Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court, a judicial admission requires no proof. The admission may be contradicted only
by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made. The Court cannot lightly set aside a judicial admission especially when the
opposing party relied upon the same and accordingly dispensed with further proof of the
fact already admitted. An admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings
does not require proof.
4. The CIR cannot escape the binding
effect of his judicial admissions.
The Cir argued that the stipulation of
facts was made through palpable
mistake as it was false, wrong and
illegal, and no estoppel can be made
against the government through the
mistakes of its agents.
Yet, the Court observes that the CIR himself never alleged in his Motion for
Reconsideration of the CTA Decision dated October 16, 2000, nor in his Petition for
Review before the Court of Appeals, that Atty. Biazon committed a mistake in signing
the Joint Stipulation. Since the CIR did not make such an allegation, neither did he
present any proof in support thereof. The CIR began to aver the existence of a
palpable mistake only after the Court of Appeals made such a declaration in its
Decision dated August 29, 2002.
5. The judicial admissions of the CIR in the Joint Stipulation are not intrinsically
false, wrong, or illegal, and are consistent with the ruling on the VAT treatment of
PEZA-registered enterprises in the previous Toshiba case. There is no basis for
believing that to bind the CIR to his judicial admissions in the Joint Stipulation that
Toshiba was a VAT-registered entity and its export sales were zero-rated VAT transactions
would result in falsehood, unfairness and injustice. The judicial admissions of the
CIR are not intrinsically false, wrong, or illegal. On the contrary, they are consistent with
the ruling of this Court in a previous case involving the same parties, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.) Inc.[55] (Toshiba case),
explaining the VAT treatment of PEZA-registered enterprises.

6. It is now a settled rule that based on the Cross Border Doctrine, PEZA-registered
enterprises, such as Toshiba, are VAT-exempt and no VAT can be passed on to them. The
Court, nevertheless, noted in the Toshiba case that the rule which considers any sale
by a supplier from the Customs Territory to a PEZA-registered enterprise as export
sale, which should not be burdened by output VAT, was only clearly established
on October 15, 1999, upon the issuance by the BIR of RMC No. 74-99. Prior to

October 15, 1999, whether a PEZA-registered enterprise was exempt or subject to VAT
depended on the type of fiscal incentives availed of by the said enterprise. To recall,
Toshiba is herein claiming the refund of unutilized input VAT payments on its local
purchases of goods and services attributable to its export sales for the first and second
quarters of 1997. Such export sales took place before October 15, 1999, when the old
rule on the VAT treatment of PEZA-registered enterprises still applied.

People vs Villacorta
On June 21, 2002, an Information[3] was filed against Villacorta charging him with
the crime of murder, as follows:
That on or about 23rd day of January 2002, in Navotas, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with
intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said
weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ, thereby inflicting upon the
victim serious wounds which caused his immediate death.
When arraigned on September 9, 2002, Villacorta pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the
prosecution presented mendeja and belandres as witnesses.
Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was tending her sari-sari store located
at C-4 Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas. Both Cruz and Villacorta were regular customers at
Mendejas store. At around two oclock in the morning, while Cruz was ordering bread
at Mendejas store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed
Cruz on the left side of Cruzs body using a sharpened bamboo stick. Immediately, after
the stabbing incident, Villacorta left. Cruz was brought to the hospital.
Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro Hospital where
cruz died the morning afrer. When Cruz sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002,
he was taken to the Tondo Medical Center, where he was treated as an out-patient. Dr.
Belandres was able to determine, using Cruzs medical chart and diagnosis, that Cruz
died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.
Defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied stabbing Cruz. Villacorta recounted
that he was on his way home from work at around two oclock in the morning of .Upon
arriving home, Villacorta drank coffee then went outside to buy cigarettes at a nearby
store. When Villacorta was about to leave the store, Cruz put his arm around Villacortas
shoulder. This prompted Villacorta to box Cruz, after which, Villacorta went
home. Villacorta did not notice that Cruz got hurt. Villacorta only found out about
Cruzs death upon his arrest on July 31, 2002
Rtc convicted the accused of murder. Qualified by treachery. CA affirmed.

Issue: The testimoniy of the eye witness should be disregarded.


Villacorta interposed his appeal contending that the testimony of the eye witness was
inconsistent on material points such as when there were other witnesses to the stabbing,
mendeja was the only one who ran after him, and that it impossible for her to positively
identify the accused because as the witness alleged, the attack was swift, and that
Mendeja alleged that the bamboo was left at her store. although she had also stated that
the said bamboo stick was left embedded in Cruzs body.
Held:
1. To begin with, it is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of the
credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full
weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect. Such
determination made by the trial court proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling
examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique position to assess the
witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor.
2. Villacorta was unable to present any reason or motivation for Mendeja to fabricate
such a lie and falsely accuse Villacorta of stabbing Cruz on January 23, 2002. We have
ruled time and again that where the prosecution eyewitness was familiar with both
the victim and accused, and where the locus criminis afforded good visibility, and
where no improper motive can be attributed to the witness for testifying against the
accused, then her version of the story deserves much weight
3. In the face of Mendejas positive identification of Villacorta as Cruzs stabber,
Villacorta could only muster an uncorroborated denial. Denial, like alibi, as an
exonerating justification, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated, regresses
to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative
evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
FACTS:
On 30 June 1991, Estellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and Jennifer were
brutally slain at their home in Paranaque City. Four years later in 1995, the NBI
announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica Alfaro, one
of its informers, who claimed that she had witnessed the crime. She pointed to
Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano, Artemio Ventura, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio

Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Joy Filart as the culprits. She also
tagged police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Alfaro had been
working as an asset to the NBI by leading the agency to criminals. Some of the said
criminals had been so high-profile, that Alfaro had become the darling of the NBI
because of her contribution to its success. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found
that Alfaros direct and spontaneous narration of events unshaken by gruesome crossexamination should be given a great weight in the decision of the case.
In Alfaros story, she stated that after she and the accused got high of shabu, she was
asked to see Carmela at their residence. After Webb was informed that Carmela had a
male companion with her, Webb became piqued and thereafter consumed more drugs and
plotted the gang rape on Carmela. Webb, on the other hand, denied all the accusations
against him with the alibi that during the whole time that the crime had taken place, he
was staying in the United States. He had apparently left for the US on 09 March 1991
and only returned on 27 October 1992. As documentary evidence, he presented
photocopies of his passport with four stamps recording his entry and exit from both the
Philippines and the US, Flights Passenger Manifest employment documents in the US
during his stay there and US-INS computer generated certification authenticated by the
Philippine DFA. Aside from these documentary alibis, he also gave a thorough recount
of his activities in the US
ISSUE:
Whether or not Webbs documented alibi of his U.S. travel should be given more
credence by the Court than the positive identification by Alfaro.
RULING:
For a positive identification to be acceptable, it must meet at least two criteria:
The positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness; and
The witness story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently
contrived.
The Supreme Court found that Alfaro and her testimony failed to meet the above criteria.
She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience.
She had been hanging around the agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for
mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. And although her testimony included
details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the case. She
took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly
incompatible acts of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames, for example,
just so she can accommodate the crime scene feature.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence
that:
He was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and
That it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

The Supreme Court gave very high credence to the compounded documentary alibi
presented by Webb. This alibi altogether impeaches Alfaros testimony not only with
respect to him, but also with respect to the other accused. For, if the Court accepts the
proposition that Webb was in the US when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will
not hold altogether. Webbs participation is the anchor of Alfaros story.
Gr. No. 158149
Boston bank (formerly Bank of Commerce) v. Perla Manalo and Carlos
Manalo.
Facts:
Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) sold to The Overseas Bank of Manila
(OBM) some residential lots in Xavierville subdivision. Nevertheless, XEI
continued selling the residential lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM. Carlos Manalo,
Jr. proposed to XEI, through its President Emerito Ramos, to purchase two lots in the
Xavierville subdivision and offered as part of the downpayment the
P34,887.66 Ramos owed him. XEI, t h r o u g h R a m o s , a g r e e d . I n a
letter dated August 22, 1972 to Perla Manalo, Ramos confirmed
t h e reservation of the lots. In the letter he also pegged the price of the
lots at P348,060 with a 20% down
payment of the purchase price amounting to P69,612.00 (less the P34,887.66 owing from
Ramos), payable as soon as XEI resumes its selling operations; the corresponding
Contract of Conditional Sale would then be signed on or before the same date. Perla
Manalo conformed to the letter agreement. Thereafter, the spouses constructed a house on
the property. The spouses were notified of XEIs resumption of selling operations.
However, they did not pay the balance of the downpayment because XEI failed to prepare
a contract of conditional sale and transmit the same to them. XEI also billed them for
unpaid interests which they also refused to pay.
XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM. Subsequently, Commercial
Bank of Manila (CBM) acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM requested
Perla Manalo to stop any on-going construction on the property since it (CBM) was the
owner of the lot and she had no permission for such construction.
Perla informed them that her husband had a contract with OBM, through
XEI, to purchase the property. She promised to send CBM the documents.
However, she failed to do so. Thus, CBM filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
the spouses. But later on, CBM moved to withdraw its complaint because of theissues
raised. In the meantime, CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of the Philippines.
Then, the spouses filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the
bank before the RTC. The spouses alleged that they had always been ready and willing to
pay the installments on the lots sold to them but no contract was forthcoming.
The spouses further alleged that upon their partial payment of the
downpayment, they were entitled to the execution and delivery of a Deed of Absolute
Sale covering the subject lots. During the trial, the spouses adduced in
evidence the separate Contracts of

Conditional Sale executed between XEI and 3 other buyers to prove that XEI continued
selling residential lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM after the latter had acquired the
said lots.
The trial court ordered the petitioner to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of the spouses upon the payment of the spouses of the balance of the
purchase price. It ruled that under the August 22,1972 letter agreement of XEI and the
spouses, the parties had a "complete contract to sell" over the lots, and that they had
already partially consummated the same.
The Court of Appeals sustained the ruling of the RTC, but declared that the balance of the
purchase price of the property was payable in fixed amounts on a monthly basis for
120 months, based on the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in
favor of other lot buyers. Boston Bank filed a Motion for the Reconsideration of the
decision alleging that there was no perfected contract to sell the two lots, as there was no
agreement between XEI and the respondents on the manner of payment as well as
the other terms and conditions of the sale. Boston Bank also asserts that
there is no factual basis for the CA ruling that the terms and conditions relating to the
payment of thebalance of the purchase price of the property (as agreed upon
by XEI and other lot buyers in the same subdivision) were also applicable to the
contract entered into between the petitioner and the respondents.
CAdenied the MR.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the factual issues raised by the petitioner are proper (Appeals
Evidence)
2.) Whether or not there was a perfected contract to sell the property
3.) Whether or not the CA correctly held that the terms of the deeds of conditional sale
executed by XEI in favor of the other lot buyers in the subdivision, which contained
uniform terms of 120 equal monthly installments, constitute evidence that XEI also
agreed to give the Manalo spouses the same mode and timeline of payment. ( Evidence,
Disputable Presumptions, Habits and Customs Rule 130, Section 34)
HELD:
1.)YES. The rule is that before this Court, only legal issues
m a y b e r a i s e d i n a p e t i t i o n f o r r e v i e w o n certiorari. The reason is
that this Court is not a trier of facts, and is not to review and calibrate the
evidence on record. Moreover, the findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed on
appeal by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court unless the case falls under
any of the following exceptions:
(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence

on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the r e s p o n d e n t s ; a n d ( 1 0 )
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premis ed
o n t h e supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
We have reviewed the records and we find that, indeed, the ruling of the appellate court
dismissing petitioners appeal is contrary to law and is not supported by
evidence. A careful examination of the
factual backdrop of the case, as well as the antecedental proceedings constrains us to hold
that petitioner is not barred from asserting that XEI or OBM, on one hand,
and the respondents, on the other, failed to forge a perfected contract to sell the
subject lots.
2.)NO. In a contract to sell property by installments, it is not enough that the parties agree
on the price as well as the amount of downpayment. The parties must, likewise, agree on
the manner of payment of the balance of the purchase price and on the other terms and
conditions relative to the sale. Even if the buyer makes a downpayment or portion
thereof, such payment cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the perfection of any
purchase and sale between the parties.
A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the
thing which is the object of the contract and the price. The agreement as to the manner of
payment goes into the price, such that a disagreement on the manner of payment is
tantamount to a failure to agree on the price.
We have meticulously reviewed the records, including Ramos February 8,
1972 and August 22, 1972 letters to respondents and find that said parties confined
themselves to agreeing on the price of the property (P348,060.00), the 20%
downpayment of the purchase price (P69,612.00), and credited respondents for the
P34,887.00 owing from Ramos as part of the 20% downpayment. Based on these two
letters, the determination of the terms of payment of the P278,448.00 had yet to be agreed
upon on or before December 31, 1972, or even afterwards, when the parties sign the
contract of conditional sale.
So long as an essential element entering into the proposed obligation of
either of the parties remains to be determined by an agreement which they
are to make, the contract is incomplete and unenforceable.
3.)NO. The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance
of the purchase price of lots purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly
installments does not constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to give the
respondents the same mode and timeline of payment.
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar
thing at another time, although such evidence may be received to prove habit,
usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties. Habit, custom, usage or pattern of
conduct must be proved like any other facts. The offering party must establish the
degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures more than a
mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather, conduct that is semiautomatic in nature. The offering party must allege and prove specific,

repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of habit. The examples


offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must be
numerous enough to base on inference of systematic conduct. Mere similarity of
contracts does not present the k i n d o f s u f f i c i e n t l y s i m i l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s
t o o u t w e i g h t h e d a n g e r o f p r e j u d i c e a n d c o n f u s i o n . I n determining
whether the examples are numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the key criteria
are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. It is only when examples offered
to establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an inference of
systematic conduct that examples are admissible.
Respondents failed to allege and prove that, as a matter of business usage,
habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the balance of
the purchase price in installments of 120 months of fixed amounts with precomputed interests, and that XEI and the respondents had intended to
adopt such terms of payment relative to the sale of the two lots in
question. Indeed, respondents adduced in evidence the three contracts of
conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers merely to prove that XEI
continued to sell lots in the subdivision as sales agent of OBM after it acquired said
lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct on the part of XEI to require all
lot buyers in the subdivision to pay the balance of the purchase price of said lots in
120 months.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee


vs.
LARRY ERGUIZA
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
LARRY ERGUIZA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The Court is confronted with another case of rape. The victim, a 13year-old girl. And although the Court may be moved by compassion and
sympathy, the Court, as a court of law, is duty-bound to apply the law.
Basic is the rule that for conviction of a crime, the evidence required is
proof beyond reasonable doubt -- conviction with moral certainty.
For review before this Court is the November 18, 2005 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H. C. No. 00763 which affirmed
with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 57, finding Larry Erguiza (appellant)

guilty of one count of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
The Information, dated April 10, 2000, in Criminal Case No. SCC 3282
reads as follows:
That on or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 5, 2000,
at the back of the Bical Norte Elementary School, municipality of
Bayambang, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a kitchen knife, by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with AAA3, a minor of 13 years old, against her will
and consent and to her damage and prejudice.4
When arraigned, appellant pleaded "not guilty".5 Thereafter trial ensued.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: private complainant
(AAA), her mother BBB and father CCC, and Dr. James Sison. The
defense presented five witnesses, namely: Joy Agbuya, Juanito
Macaraeg, Juanita Angeles, Albina Erguiza, and appellant.
On November 27, 2000, the RTC found appellant guilty of the crime of
rape, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
In view whereof, the Court finds the accused LARRY C. ERGUIZA
guilty of RAPE under Article 266-a paragraph 1(a) in relation to
Article 266-b of R.A. 8353 and R.A. 7659 and sentences (sic) to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the offended
party, AAA P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral
damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, to give support to
AAA's offspring and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA aptly summarized the respective versions of the
parties, based on the evidence presented before the trial court, thus:
PROSECUTION'S VERSION:
On January 5, 2000, at around 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, AAA, a thirteen-year old first year high school

student, together with her friends, siblings Joy and Ricky


Agbuya, went to the mango orchard located at the back of ZZZ
Elementary School to gather fallen mangoes.7When they were
bound for home at around 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, AAA's short pants got hooked on the fence. AAA
asked Joy and Ricky to wait for her but they ran away and left
her.8
While AAA was trying to unhook her short pants, Larry suddenly
grabbed and pulled her. Poking a knife at her neck, Larry
threatened to hurt her if she would make a noise.9
Accused-appellant dragged AAA towards a place where a
tamarind tree and other thorny plants grow. Then Larry removed
his maong pants and forced AAA to lie down on the grassy
ground. Thereafter, he removed her short pants and panty,
mounted himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her
private parts and made push and pull movements. He likewise
raised AAA's "sando" and mashed her breast. AAA felt pain when
accused-appellant entered her and she felt something sticky in
her private part after Larry made the push and pull movements.10
Larry told AAA not to tell anybody about the incident otherwise he
would kill her and all the members of her family and then he ran
away.11
AAA lingered for a while at the place and kept crying. Having
spent her tears, she wore her panty and short pants and
proceeded to the adjacent store of her Aunt Beth who was asleep.
After staying for some time at the store, AAA decided to come
(sic) home. Upon reaching home, she directly went to bed.
Fearing Larry's threat, AAA kept mum on the incident.12
On April 7, 2000, BBB brought her daughter AAA to her
grandmother (BBB's mother), a hilotresiding in XXX, Tarlac, to
consult her on the unusual palpitation on the mid-portion of AAA's
throat and the absence of her monthly period.13 After examining
AAA, her grandmother told BBB that her daughter was pregnant.
BBB asked AAA who was the father of her unborn child but AAA
refused to talk. After much prodding, and in the presence of her

Uncle, Rudy Domingo, AAA finally revealed that she was raped by
accused-appellant.14
On April 8, 2000, AAA, accompanied by her mother and uncle,
went to the police headquarters in YYY, Pangasinan to report the
incident.15 Then the police brought her to YYY District
Hospital16 where Dr. James Sison, Medical Officer III of said
hospital conducted the examination on Michelle. Dr. Sison made
the following findings:
"Q. x x x No extragenital injuries noted. Complete healed hymenal
laceration 11:00 o'clock. x x x. In layman's term, Dr. Sison found
no physical injury from the breast, the body except the genital
area wherein he found a significant laceration complete (sic)
healed over 11:00 o'clock."17 Dr. Sison also testified that a single
sexual intercourse could make a woman pregnant.
BBB testified that her daughter AAA stopped going to school after
she was raped and that no amount of money could bring back the
lost reputation of her daughter.
CCC (AAA's father), testified that on May 2, 2000, the family of
accused-appellant went to their house and initially offered
P50,000 and later P150,000; that in January 5, 2000, while they
were repairing his house for the wedding reception18, Larry left at
around 4:00 o'clock p.m.
DEFENSE'S VERSION
On January 5, 2000, Larry Erguiza helped in the repair of
CCC's19 house from 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 5:00 o'clock
in the afternoon. When he reached home at around 5:00 pm, his
mother Albina Erguiza instructed him to fetch a "hilot" as his wife
Josie was already experiencing labor pains. He proceeded to
fetch the "hilot" Juanita Angeles and stayed in their house until his
wife delivered a baby at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of
January 6, 2000.20
Juanita Angeles corroborated Larry's testimony that he indeed
fetched her at around 5:10 pm on January 5, 2000 to attend to his
wife who was experiencing labor pains and who delivered a baby

at about 3:00 a.m. of January 6, 2000; and that Larry never left his
wife's side until the latter gave birth.
Albina, mother of the accused-appellant, testified that AAA is the
daughter of her "balae"Spouses CCC and BBB; that her son
Larry, her husband and two others left CCC and BBB's residence
at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on January 5, 2000; that she
went to Spouses CCC and BBB to talk about the charge of rape
against her son; that Spouses CCC and BBB were asking
for P1,000,000.00 which was later reduced to P250,000.00 and
that she made a counter-offer of P5,000.00.21
Joy Agbuya testified that she and AAA were at the mango
orchard of Juanito Macaraeg on January 5, 2000; that she
never left AAA when her short pants got hooked; that they
went together to the store of Auntie Beth where they parted.22
Juanito Macaraeg, the mango orchard caretaker, testified that the
house of Larry was a walking distance of about three minutes
from the mango orchard; that if one runs fast, it would only take a
minute to reach his house; and that he could not recall having
seen Larry in the orchard.23(Emphasis supplied)
In its Decision dated November 18, 2005, the CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC, but modified the amount of the award of exemplary
damages and costs as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing circumstances, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos (Pangasinan),
Branch 57 dated November 27, 2000 in Criminal Case No. SCC3282 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant
Larry Erguiza is heldGUILTY of Rape and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the victim
AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral
damages, andP25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to give
support to AAA's offspring.
SO ORDERED.24
Hence, herein appeal.
In his appeal Brief,25 appellant raises the following errors:

1. THE COURT A QUO GRAVLEY ERRED IN GIVING


CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE, THUS UNBELIEVABLE
TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AAA.
2. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE PROSECTUION EVIDENCE FAILED TO
ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
3. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
APPRECIATING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF ALIBI
CORROBORATED BY THE WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE
DEFENSE.26
The appeal is meritorious. The prosecution's evidence does not pass
the test of moral certainty.
This Court has ruled that in the review of rape cases, the Court is
guided by the following precepts: (a) an accusation of rape can be made
with facility, but it is more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to
disprove it; (b) the complainant's testimony must be scrutinized with
extreme caution since, by the very nature of the crime, only two persons
are normally involved; and (c) if the complainant's testimony is
convincingly credible, the accused may be convicted of the crime.27
In the case at bar, the CA upheld the conclusion of the RTC in finding
the complainant credible, to wit:
The testimonies of victims who are young and of tender age, like
AAA, deserve full credence and should not be dismissed as mere
fabrication especially where they have absolutely no motive to
testify against the accused-appellant as in this case. Larry even
admitted that AAA had no ill motive for charging him with rape.
The Supreme Court in several cases, ruled that full credence is
accorded the testimony of a rape victim who has shown no ill
motive to testify against the accused. This being so, the trial court
did not err in giving full credence to AAA's testimony.28
This Court does not agree with the CA.
The Court is not unmindful of the general rule that findings of the trial
court regarding credibility of witnesses are accorded great respect and

even finality on appeal.29 However, this principle does not preclude a


reevaluation of the evidence to determine whether material facts or
circumstances have been overlooked or misinterpreted by the trial
court.30 In the past, this Court has not hesitated to reverse a judgment of
conviction, where there were strong indications pointing to the possibility
that the rape charge was false.31
Generally, when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
was committed. And so long as her testimony meets the test of
credibility and unless the same is controverted by competent physical
and testimonial evidence, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof.32
After a judicious examination of the records of the case, the Court finds
that there is testimonial evidence that contradicts the findings of the
RTC and CA on the basis of which no conviction beyond reasonable
doubt could arise. It is the unrebutted testimony of a credible defense
witness. The testimony of Joy Agbuya (Joy) casts doubt as to the
possibility of rape having taken place as narrated by complainant. In
addition, the testimony of a disinterested defense witness, Juanita
Angeles (Juanita) corroborated the alibi of appellant.
Before dwelling on the testimonies of Juanita and Joy, the Court shall
first scrutinize the testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution
and the defense.
Aside from the testimony of complainant, the prosecution presented the
following witnesses: Dr. James Sison, BBB, and CCC. The pertinent
portions of their testimonies may be summarized as follows:
Dr. James Sison testified that he conducted the medical examination of
complainant. His diagnosis was that there was a significant laceration
completely healed at the 11:00 o'clock position.33However, Dr. Sison
testified that his findings were not conclusive, but were rather
suggestive that complainant was raped. Furthermore, as to the question
of paternity of the child of complainant, Dr. Sison suggested doing a
DNA match.34
BBB testified the she brought AAA to her grandmother, a hilot residing in
XXX, Tarlac, to consult her on the unusual palpitation on the mid-portion
of complainant's throat and the absence of her monthly period.35 After

examining complainant, the hilot told BBB that her daughter was
pregnant. AAA later revealed that she was raped by appellant.36 BBB
further testified that she accompanied AAA to the police headquarters in
YYY, Pangasinan to report the incident.37 Afterwards, the police brought
complainant to YYY District Hospital38 where Dr. James Sison, Medical
Officer III of said hospital, conducted the examination on complainant.
On cross-examination, BBB testified that the family of appellant offered
her money to settle the case.39
CCC, the father of AAA, was the lone rebuttal witness of the
prosecution. In order to rebut the allegation made by appellant's family
that the present case was filed because appellant's family did a poor job
in preparing for the wedding of CCC's daughter DDD and apellant's
brother Carlito, CCC testified that on the contrary, the wedding went
smoothly.40 CCC further claimed that the family of appellant knelt before
him crying and offered money to settle the case.41 Moreover, CCC
testified that appellant left his house at 4:00 p.m. on January 5, 2000.
On the other hand, the defense presented four witnesses, namely:
Juanito Macaraeg (Macaraeg), Albina Erguiza (Albina), Juanita and Joy.
Macaraeg, the caretaker of the mango orchard, testified that he did not
see appellant on any occasion in the orchard.42 More specifically,
Macaraeg emphasized that he did not see appellant on January 5,
2000.43 However, on cross-examination, he testified that the house of
appellant is only a three-minute walk from the mango orchard and
probably a minute if one walks fast.44
Albina, the mother of appellant, testified that on January 5, 2000, she
was with appellant at the house of CCC and BBB preparing for the
wedding of CCC's daughter DDD and appellant's brother Carlito. She
said that they left the house of CCC at around 5:00 p.m.45 Albina
narrated that when they arrived home, at around 5:02 or 5:03 p.m., she
sent appellant to fetch a hilot, as the wife of appellant was having some
labor pains.46 She said that appellant and the hilot arrived at around
5:30 p.m.47According to Albina appellant never left their house.48
On the day of the wedding, Albina testified that she had an altercation
with BBB regarding the bills and that they never resolved their
quarrel.49 She spoke to BBB and CCC because she learned that they
were falsely accusing appellant of raping AAA.50 After talking to BBB
and CCC, she and her husband confronted appellant and asked if he

had raped complainant, which appellant denied.51Albina claimed that


CCC and BBB were demanding P1,000,000.00 and that they later
reduced it toP250,000.00.52 Albina said that she offered P5,000.00 to
BBB and CCC only to preserve their relationship as in-laws and for
peace.53
In sum, with the exception of the claim of AAA that she was raped by
appellant, other evidence presented by the prosecution did not identify
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
Moreover, the testimonies of the witnesses for both the prosecution and
the defense conflict on certain points, more notably the claim by BBB
and CCC that the family of appellant offered to settle the case. This,
however, was denied by Albina, who claimed that it was BBB and CCC
who demanded P1,000,000.00.
The offer of compromise allegedly made by Albina is critical to the case
at bar in light of law and jurisprudence that an offer of compromise in a
criminal case may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt.54 In the case at bar, the offer of compromise was first testified to by
BBB on cross-examination, to wit:
Q. Is it not a fact that there was an offer by you to the mother of
the accused that they pay you 1 million and you have reduced it
to P250,000.00?
A. No, sir, it was they who were the ones offering for settlement,
but we never offer them any settlement, sir.55
On rebuttal, CCC corroborated the testimony of BBB that the family of
appellant offered to settle the case, to wit:
Q. And according to Larry Erguiza as well as his witnesses they
told the Honorable Court that you and your wife are demanding
from Larry Erguiza and his parents the amount of one million
pesos so that you will not file this case against the accused, what
can you say about that?
A. There is no truth about that, sir.
Q. And what is the truth about it?

A. It was they who went to my house, they even knelt before me


crying and they were offering money, sir.56
However, Albina, the mother of appellant, denied the foregoing
allegations, to wit:
Q. What happened when you went to the house of BBB and CCC
talking with them about their problem of the alleged rape on AAA,
their daughter?
A. They were asking for a settlement price for one million pesos
but we have no money, sir.
Q. What did you do when they were asking one million pesos from
you?
A. We told them that we do not have that money until they
reduced the price to P250,000.00 but we have no money because
we are poor, sir.
Q. Were you around when BBB testified to the witness stand?
A. I was here, sir.
Q. Did you hear what BBB said that you were the one offering
money?
A. Yes, sir, I was here and I heard that.
Q. What can you say to that allegation of BBB?
A. That is not true, sir. She was saying that we were the ones
offering money for one million to them but she was telling a lie, it
was they who were asking for one million pesos, sir.
Q. What is your proof that is was they who are demanding the
amount of one million and reduced that to two hundred fifty
thousand (P250,000.00)?
A. We already left because we cannot afford to give that much, sir.
Q. Aside from the fact that you do not have money, was there any
reason or what was your other reason in going there?

A. Our reason in talking to them was that when Larry said that he
did not commit the alleged rape and so we went there to talk to
them so that we could preserve our relationship as in-laws even if
it is for the sake of peace we could try our best to cope up
even P5,000.00 just for the sake of peace because our intention
in going to their house was to extract the truth, sir.57
On cross-examination, appellant gave the following statements:
Q. Before the filing of this case with this Honorable Court, your
parents and you were pleading to the parents of AAA not to
continue anymore the case, is it not?
A. Yes, sir, so that the case will not be filed and our relationship
will not be destroyed, sir.
Q. In fact you asked your parents to do so, is it not?
A. No, sir. They were the ones who went to the house of AAA,
sir.
Q. But the family of AAA did not agree to the pleadings of your
parents that the case be not filed anymore, is it not?
A. They will agree if we will pay then 1 million, but we do not have
1 million, sir.
Q. Did you offer them 1 million?
A. No, sir. They were the ones who told that to us.58 (Emphasis
Supplied)
The alleged offer of the parents of appellant to settle the case cannot be
used against appellant as evidence of his guilt. Appellant testified that
he did not ask his parents to settle the case. Moreover, appellant was
not present when the offer to settle was allegedly made.
An offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to
an admission of the party himself.59 Although the Court has held in some
cases that an attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case is
an implied admission of guilt,60 we believe that the better rule is that for
a compromise to amount to an implied admission of guilt, the accused

should have been present or at least authorized the proposed


compromise.61 Moreover, it has been held that where the accused was
not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made,
such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution.62
In addition, the Court, in weighing the evidence presented, may give
less weight to the testimonies of Albina, on the one hand, and BBB and
CCC, on the other, as they are related to the appellant and the victim,
respectively63 Their testimonies relating to the offer of settlement simply
contradict each other. As a matter of fact, even the lower courts did not
consider the alleged offer of settlement in resolving the case.
Thus, the Court now considers the testimonies of Juanita and Joy.
Testimony of Juanita Angeles
Juanita, a hilot, testified that appellant fetched her at around 5:10 in the
afternoon of January 5, 2000.64 She asserted that they arrived at the
house of appellant at 5:30 p.m. She said that appellant's wife gave birth
at dawn at 3:00 a.m. of January 6, 2000.65 Juanita said that appellant
was with her the entire time and never left the house.66
Testimony of Joy Agbuya
For a better perspective on the testimony of Joy, it is necessary to
repeat the testimony of AAA. AAA testified that on January 5, 2000, she
was accompanied by 12-year-old Joy and the latter's brother Ricky
Agbuya (Ricky) to the mango orchard at the back of the elementary
school to pick fallen mangoes. Further, complainant claims that she was
left behind by Joy and Ricky when her shorts got hooked to the fence
and that while she was unhooking her pants from the fence, appellant
grabbed her and raped her.67
This was however contradicted by Joy, to wit:
Q. How many times did you go to the mango orchard of Juanito
Macaraeg?
A. Three (3) times, sir.
Q. When you usually go to the mango orchard of Juanito
Macaraeg, where did you met [sic] with AAA?

A. In their house, I dropped by her house, sir.


Q. Was there an occasion wherein you brought your brother
Ricky when you went with AAA to the mango orchard of
Juanito Macaraeg?
A. No, sir.
Q. Are we made to understand that Ricky, your brother did
not go even once to the mango orchard of Maning Macaraeg?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. According to AAA in her sworn statement she stated that
in [sic] January 5, 2000 you were with your brother Ricky and
AAA in going to the mango orchard, what can you say about
that?
A. What she is saying is not true. I was not with my brother,
sir. I did not tug him along with me.
Q. It is also said by AAA that you left her behind in the mango
orchard when her pants was hooked, what can you say about
that?
A. No, sir I waited for her.
Q. Are we made to understand Madam Witness, that there
was no instance or never that happened that you left her in
the mango orchard alone?
A. No, sir, I waited for her and both of us went home together,
sir.
Q. Going back to the occasion wherein you were with AAA,
who were with you in going back home?
A. Just the two (2) of us, sir.
Q. In your way home, where did you part or separate with
each other?
A. In front of the store of auntie Beth, sir.68

xxxx
Q. Is AAA your bestfriend?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Since you said that AAA is your bestfriend was there an
occasion wherein she told you that she was raped?
A. None, sir.69 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On cross-examination, Prosecutor Ely Reintar elicited the following
statements from Joy:
Q. In the year 2000, when was the last time that you talked to
AAA?
A. April, sir.
Q. After April, you did not talk to AAA anymore?
A. No more, sir.
Q. Your friendship was severed?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you please tell the Honorable Court why your friendship
became severed?
A. Because she quarreled with me, sir.
Q. And because you quarreled, that is the reason why you are
now testifying against her?
A. Yes, sir.70
On re-direct examination, Joy clarified, thus:
Q. Madam Witness, you said that you have a quarrel with the
private complainant, AAA, will you please tell this Honorable
Court what is the reason or cause of your quarrel with AAA?

A. Because they wanted me to say another statement that I


left AAA behind, sir.71(Emphasis supplied)
On re-cross examination, Joy gave the following answers to the
questions of Prosecutor Reintar:
Q. You said that the reason for your quarrel is that they wanted
you to change your statement, that you left behind AAA, who are
those they, that you are referring to?
INTERPRETER
No answer.
Witness
I, sir.
PROS. REINTAR
Q. Who told you to change your statement that you left AAA
behind?
A. Because they are saying that I will change my statement
that I left AAA but I did not sir.
Q. Who are these who are telling that?
A. They, sir.
Q. Will you please mention them?
A. BBB, only her, sir.72
The testimony of 12-year-old Joy makes it impossible for the appellant
to have raped AAA the way complainant narrated it, to wit:
Q. You try to understand clearly the question, Madam Witness,
and may I repeat that, at the time of the rape when according to
you, you were the one raped, where were Joy and Ricky Agbuya?
A. They left ahead of me because my short pants was hooked at
the fence so I was left behind, sir.

Q. Were you able to remove the pants of yours at the fence?


A. I was removing it sir, when he suddenly grabbed me.
Q. And who is this person you are referring to as the one who
grabbed you?
A. Larry Erguiza, sir.73
Put simply, complainant could not have been raped because Joy waited
for complainant when the latter's shorts got hooked to the fence and
thereafter both went home together. The Court finds no cogent reason
for Joy to lie and say that she had waited for complainant and that they
both went home together. She had nothing to gain for lying under oath.
Moreover, the records are bereft of any showing or claim that Joy was
related to or was a close friend of appellant or his family. On the
contrary, Joy considers herself the "best-friend" and playmate of
complainant.74
When Prosecutor Reintar questioned her as to her understanding of the
oath she took, Joy answered, "That I will swear to God, sir. x x x The
truth, sir."75 Furthermore, Joy did not succumb to pressure even as she
was being conscientiously examined by Prosecutor Reintar. Joy boldly
testified that BBB, the mother of complainant, was forcing her to change
her statement.
The testimony of Joy clearly lays down the following facts which are
damaging to the case of the prosecution: first, that Joy did not leave
behind AAA when the latter's shorts got hooked to the fence; and
secondly, that Joy and AAA left the orchard, went home together and
separated at their Aunt Beth's house, indicating that no untoward
incident, much less rape, was committed by appellant at the time and
place that complainant had testified on.
Necessarily, either Joy or AAA lied under oath. It was thus critical for the
prosecution to show that Joy gave false statements.
Unfortunately for AAA, the prosecution miserably failed to rebut Joy's
testimony. Neither complainant nor Ricky, BBB or any other witness was
called to the witness stand to refute Joy's testimony. True, it is up to the
prosecution to determine who to present as witnesses.76 However,
considering that the testimony of Joy critically damaged the case of the

prosecution, it behooved the prosecution to present evidence to rebut


the defense evidence. Witnesses such as Ricky, AAA and BBB should
have been presented by the prosecution to demolish Joy's testimony.
The testimony of Ricky is particularly significant, especially since AAA
claimed that he was with her and his sister Joy at the mango orchard on
the day of the alleged rape incident. The failure on the part of the
prosecution to present Ricky or AAA bolsters the defense evidence, that
no rape happened on the date and time claimed by AAA.
The prosecution presented CCC, the father of complainant, as it's lone
rebuttal witness.77 However, the testimony of CCC covered facts and
issues not related to the testimony of Joy. The testimony of CCC merely
rebutted the allegation made by appellant's family that the present case
was filed because appellant's family did a poor job of preparing for the
wedding of CCC's daughter DDD and apellant's brother Carlito. To this,
CCC testified that on the contrary, the wedding went
smoothly.78Furthermore, CCC claimed that the family of appellant knelt
before him crying and offered money to settle the case.79 In addition,
CCC testified that appellant left his house at 4:00 p.m. on January 5,
2000. Thus, the testimony of CCC did not in any way rebut the
testimony of Joy.
Further, Joy testified that during the three times she went with AAA to
the mango orchard, the time was 1:00 p.m.80 However, AAA testified that
she went to the mango orchard with Joy at 4:00 p.m.81The variance in
the testimonies of Joy and AAA as to the time they went to the mango
orchard on the day of the alleged rape incident may be disregarded as
they are de minimis in nature and do not relate to the commission of the
crime. There is a common point uniting the testimonies of both Joy and
AAA; that is, that both referred to the day when AAA's short got hooked
to the fence.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that the variance between the
testimonies of AAA and Joy as to the time they were together at the
mango orchard is an indicia that AAA may have been raped by appellant
on a different day, not on January 5, 2000, to still impute to appellant the
crime of rape is not plausible.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the exact date of the
commission of the crime of rape is extraneous to and is not an element
of the offense, such that any inconsistency or discrepancy as to the
same is irrelevant and is not to be taken as a ground for

acquittal.82 Such, however, finds no application to the case at bar. AAA


and Joy may differ in their testimonies as to the time they were at the
mango orchard, but there could be no mistake as to the actual day
when AAA was supposed to have been raped; it was the day when
AAA's shorts got hooked to the fence at the mango orchard.
The RTC and CA unwittingly brushed aside the testimonies of Juanita
and Joy and gave full credence to the testimony of AAA. As a matter of
fact, their probative weight were not considered or evaluated in the text
of the lower courts' decision.
As mentioned earlier, the prosecution could have rebutted the testimony
of Joy, but for some reason or oversight, it chose not to do so.
Consequently, in view of the unrebutted testimony of Joy, appellant's
defense of alibi and denial assumes considerable weight. It is at this
point that the issue as to the time that the rape was committed plays a
significant factor in determining the guilt or innocence of appellant. This
Court must therefore address this issue for a thorough evaluation of the
case.
The Court takes note that Macaraeg, the caretaker of the orchard,
testified that appellant's house was only a minute away from the orchard
if one would run.
As earlier mentioned, CCC testified that appellant left CCC's house at
4:00 p.m. on January 5, 2000, contrary to the testimony of Albina that
she and appellant left at 5:00 p.m. AAA declared that the alleged rape
took place after 5:00 p.m.
Q. So at 4:00 o'clock you were at the house and you left and
proceeded at the back of the school to pick mangoes?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That was already around 5:00 o'clock?
A. Yes, sir. I asked my companion Joy.
Q. What did you ask of her?

A. She was wearing a wristwatch and I asked Joy what time is


it and when I looked at her wristwatch, it was already 5:00
o'clock, sir.83 (Emphasis Supplied)
Moreover, on cross-examination, AAA gave the following statements, to
wit:
Q. So it is almost 5:00 p.m. When you went to the mango orchard
with Joy Agbuya and Ricky Agbuya?
A. What I only know was that, it was already about 5:00 o'clock
then, sir.
Q. How many minutes did you consume in getting mangoes?
A. When we went there, we were not able to get some mango
and when I asked sir what was the time then and when I
looked at the wristwatch, it was already 5:00 o'clock,
sir.84(Emphasis Supplied)
The testimony of Joy makes it impossible for AAA to have been raped at
4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m. or any time thereafter since it was not rebutted
that Joy never left complainant at the mango orchard even when AAA's
shorts got hooked to the fence, and both went home together without
any other untoward incident.
This Court is not unmindful of the doctrine that for alibi to succeed as a
defense, appellant must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a)
his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the
offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of
the crime.85
In the case at bar, although the orchard is just a minute away from the
house of appellant, in view of the testimony of the hilot Juanita that
appellant was with her from 5:10 p.m. and never left his house from that
time until his wife gave birth at 3:00 a.m.; and the testimony of Joy that
she never left AAA in the orchard and that they both went home
together, the defense of alibi assumes significance or strength when it is
amply corroborated by a credible witness.86 Thus, the Court finds that
appellant's alibi is substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.

What needs to be stressed is that a conviction in a criminal case must


be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt -- moral certainty that
the accused is guilty.87 The conflicting testimonies of Joy and
complainant, and the testimony of Juanita that corroborated appellant's
alibi preclude the Court from convicting appellant of rape with moral
certainty.
Faced with two conflicting versions, the Court is guided by the equipoise
rule.88 Thus, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable
of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then
the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction.89 The equipoise rule provides that
where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the
constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the
accused.90
It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity
and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and
inevitable conclusion.91 What is required of it is to justify the conviction
of the accused with moral certainty.92 Upon the prosecution's failure to
meet this test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the Court,
lest its mind be tortured with the thought that it has imprisoned an
innocent man for the rest of his life.93
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 18, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H. C. No. 00763
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Larry Erguiza is ACQUITTED and
ordered immediatelyRELEASED from custody, unless he is being held
for some other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement
this Decision forthwith and toINFORM this Court, within five (5) days
from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from
confinement.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

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