Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Respondents-spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos) own Lots
68 and 69 located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, Quezon City, which is managed
by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On the other hand,
respondents-spouses Frank and Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is ` to the
Tanjangcos lots.
Before the constructions of the house at lot 65, A relocation survey was conducted by
Democrito De Dios (Engr. De Dios), referred by the Corinthians to the Cuasos, operating
under the business name D.M. De Dios Realty and Surveying. Before, during and after
the construction of the said house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in
order to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules
and Regulations of Corinthian.6 Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed their house,
employing the services od the builder, C.B. Paraz, their perimeter fence encroached
on the Tanjangcos Lot 69 by 87 square meters.
No amicable settlement was reached between the parties.
the Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the latter
failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit against the
Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with Damages.
Eventually, the Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint8 against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and
Engr. De Dios. The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain
the proper specifications of their house, and to Engr. De Dios for his failure to undertake
an accurate relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to litigation. The Cuasos also
faulted Corinthian for approving their relocation survey and building plans without
verifying their accuracy and in making representations as to Engr. De Dios' integrity and
competence.
the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Tanjangcos. It, however, ruled that the
Cuasos were builders in good faith. The RTC likewise held that C.B. Paraz was grossly
negligent in not taking into account the correct boundaries of Cuasos lot when it
constructed the house. The third-party complaint against Corinthian and Engr. De Dios,
on the other hand, was dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Tanjangcos, the Cuasos, and C.B. Paraz all appealed
to the CA. CA reversed the ruling, holding that the Cuasos are builders in bad faith.
1. the CA allowed the Tanjangcos to exercise the rights granted under Articles 449, 450,
451 and 549 of the New Civil Code, which include the right to demand the demolition of
the offending perimeter wall after reimbursing the Cuasos the necessary expenses for the
preservation of the encroached area.
2. The Cuasos were ordered to pay monthly rentals of P10,000.00 for the use, enjoyment
and occupancy of the lot from 1989 up to the time they vacate the property, with interest.
3. hey were, likewise, ordered to pay the Tanjangcos moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees, with interest.
The Cuasos appeal against the Tanjangcos, on the other hand, was dismissed for lack of
merit.
On the third-party complaints, Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios were all found
negligent in performing their respective duties and the court ordered them to contribute to
the judgment sum.
1. Corinthian filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence,
Corinthian filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA
Decision and Resolution, and impleading the Cuasos as one of the respondents being
the third-party plaintiffs in the RTC. The Court gave due course and The Cuasos
filed their memorandum.
[2. In the meantime, the Tanjangcos moved for partial entry of judgment of the CA
Decision which was granted directing the issuance of an Entry of Judgment and a
Certification that its Decision has become final and executory with respect to the Cuasos,
C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios for their failure to file an appeal assailing the said Decision
before this Court.
The Tanjangcos then moved for the execution of the judgment against the Cuasos,
specifically the demolition of the perimeter fence,20 which was also granted by the RTC
in its Order. Because of this, the Cuasos prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction before this to enjoin the demolition
of the perimeter fence.
3. the Cuasos prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
preliminary injunction before this Court to enjoin the demolition of the perimeter fence.
They averred that the premature demolition of the alleged encroaching perimeter wall
and other improvements will cause grave and irreparable damage to them, because what
is sought to be demolished is part of their residence. To which Tanjangco opposed
contending that they cannot obtain affirmative relief from this Court by reason or on
account of the appeal taken by Corinthian. The appeal, they added, is personal to
Corinthian and would not benefit the Cuasos for they did not appeal the adverse decision
against them. Finally, they argued that the Cuasos are now estopped from questioning the
enforcement of the CA Decision since they issued a managers check to pay the money
judgment.
Cuasos' application for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction for lack of merit. In the
Cuasos case, their right to injunctive relief had not been clearly and unmistakably
demonstrated. They failed to show proof that there is material and substantial invasion of
their right to warrant the issuance of an injunctive writ.
It bears stressing that the Cuasos failed to appeal the ruling of the CA. This failure to
contest the CA decision before this Court was fatal to their cause. It had the effect of an
admission that they indeed acted in bad faith, as they accepted the CA ruling. The
decision of the CA, therefore, became binding and final as to them.
While it is true that this Court noted the Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum
filed by the Cuasos, such notation was made only insofar as Corinthian made them
respondents in this petition. This Court cannot grant to the Cuasos any affirmative relief
as they did not file a petition questioning the CA ruling. Consequently, the Decision of
the CA holding that the Cuasos acted in bad faith and that the perimeter fence may now
be demolished cannot be put in issue by the Cuasos. It is a fundamental principle that a
party who does not appeal, or file a petition for certiorari, is not entitled to any
affirmative relief.]
Issue: Corinthian, the sole petitioner in this case, raises the issue whether or not the Court
of Appeals has legal basis to be liable for the judgment sum and increase unilaterally
and without proof the amount prayed for in the Complaint, i.e., P2,000.00, as
reasonable compensation for the use and enjoyment of the portion of the lot
encroached upon, to P10,000.00.
Tanjangcos stand by the ruling of the CA and opine that Corinthian was negligent in
approving the building plan of the Cuasos.
1. They submit that Corinthian's claim that it merely conducts "table inspections" of
buildings further bolsters their argument that Corinthian was negligent in
conveniently and unilaterally restricting and limiting the coverage of its approval,
contrary to its own Manual of Rules and Regulations;
2. that the acceptance of a builder's bond does not automatically make Corinthian
liable but the same affirms the fact that a homeowner can hold it liable for the
consequences of the approval of a building plan;
3. and that Corinthian, by regularly demanding and accepting membership dues,
must be wary of its responsibility to protect the rights and interests of its
members.
Held:
a. negligent?
[we find Corinthian negligent. Corinthian cannot and should not be allowed to justify or
excuse its negligence by claiming that its approval of the Cuasos building plans was only
limited to a so-called "table inspection;" and not actual site measurement. To accept some
such postulate is to put a premium on negligence. its Manual of Rules and Regulations
stipulates in Section 3 thereof (under the heading Construction), thus:
No new construction can be started unless the building plans are approved by
the Association and the appropriate Builders cash bond and pre-construction fees
are paid.
It goes without saying that this Manual of Rules and Regulations applies to all - or it does
not apply at all. To borrow a popular expression, what is sauce for the gander is sauce for
the goose - or ought to be. To put it matter-of-factly and bluntly, thus, its so-called "table
inspection" approval of the Cuasos building plans is no less of an approval, as approvals
come and go. And since it is an approval tainted with negligence, the necessary and
inevitable consequences which law and justice attach to such negligence must, as a matter
of law and justice, also necessarily attach to Corinthian.]
b. judicial notice?
1. Courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed
property. However, petitioners herein erred in assuming that courts, in determining the
amount of rent, could simply rely on their own appreciation of land values without
considering any evidence. As we have said earlier, a court may fix the reasonable amount
of rent, but it must still base its action on the evidence adduced by the parties.
2. A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court may
take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the court must "allow the parties to be heard
thereon." Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in
question without supporting evidence. Truly, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because
evidence is required for a court to determine the proper rental value.
But contrary to Corinthian's arguments, both the RTC and the CA found that indeed rent
was due the Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession and use of their
property. This uniform factual finding of the RTC and the CA was based on the
evidence presented below. Moreover, in Spouses Catungal v. Hao,43 we considered the
increase in the award of rentals as reasonable given the particular circumstances of
each case. We noted therein that the respondent denied the petitioners the benefits,
including rightful possession, of their property for almost a decade.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos were deprived of possession and use of their
property for more than two decades through no fault of their own. Thus, we find no
cogent reason to disturb the monthly rental fixed by the CA.
All told, the CA committed no reversible error.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and
BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON,Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila,
Social Justice Society and other petitioners in an original petition for mandamus under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr.,
then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance was
enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila on November 20, 2001.
The ordinance provides that:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring
health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta.
Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded
by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the
south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pandacan in the west[,]
PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig
River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of
Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28
St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to
Commercial I.
xxx
xxx
xxx
On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU)[8] with the oil companies. They agreed that the
scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable
option. Which was ratified by the Sanggunian Panglungsod.
In the March 2007 decision, We ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty under the
Local Government Code (LGC) to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city,[13] including Ordinance No. 8027. We also held that we need not
resolve the issue of whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies
and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian could amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8027 since the resolutions which ratified the MOU and made it binding on
the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. We
concluded that there was nothing that legally hindered respondent from enforcing
Ordinance No. 8027.
After The Court promulgated its decision in this case on March 7, 2007, Chevron
Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (Shell) (collectively, the oil companies) and the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Department of Energy (DOE), filed their respective motions for leave
to intervene and for reconsideration of the decision.
Chevron[1] is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing of
petroleum products in the Philippines while Shell and Petron are engaged in the business
of manufacturing, refining and likewise importing, distributing and marketing of
petroleum products in the Philippines.[2] The DOE is a governmental agency created
under Republic Act (RA) No. 7638 [3] and tasked to prepare, integrate, coordinate,
supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the government
relative to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation.
On April 11, 2007, The conducted the oral arguments in Baguio City to hear petitioners
Prior to the motion made by the oil companies and Doe, Chevron, and Shell had filed a
complaint against respondent for the annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 with application
Second, the original parties failed to inform the Court about these injunctive writs.
Respondent (who was also impleaded as a party in the RTC cases) defends himself
by saying that he informed the court of the pendency of the civil cases and that a
TRO was issued by the RTC in the consolidated cases filed by Chevron and Shell
(IN RTC). It is true that had the oil companies only intervened much earlier, the Court
would not have been left in the dark about these facts. Nevertheless, respondent should
have updated the Court, by way of manifestation, on such a relevant matter.
In his memorandum, respondent mentioned the issuance of a TRO. Under Section 5 of
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a TRO issued by the RTC is effective only for a period of
20 days. This is why, in our March 7, 2007 decision, we presumed with certainty that this
had already lapsed.[61]
Respondent also mentioned the grant of injunctive writs in his rejoinder which the
Court, however, expunged for being a prohibited pleading. The parties and their
counsels were clearly remiss in their duties to this Court.
In resolving controversies, courts can only consider facts and issues pleaded by the
parties.[62] Courts, as well as magistrates presiding over them are not omniscient. They
can only act on the facts and issues presented before them in appropriate pleadings. They
may not even substitute their own personal knowledge for evidence. Nor may they
take notice of matters except those expressly provided as subjects of mandatory
judicial notice.
Issue 2: Notice on Ordinance 8119
The March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of Ordinance No.
8119 entitled An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and
Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and
Amendment thereto which was approved by respondent on June 16, 2006. The simple
reason was that the Court was never informed about this ordinance.
1. While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress, the
rule with respect to local ordinances is different. Ordinances are not included in the
enumeration of matters covered by mandatory judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129
of the Rules of Court.[73]
This cannot be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat in the City of Manila,
should have taken steps to procure a copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the party
of any duty to inform the Court about it.
Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of
municipal ordinances, a court is not required to take judicial notice of ordinances
that are not before it and to which it does not have access. The party asking the court
to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text of the rules the
party desires it to have notice of.[75] Counsel should take the initiative in requesting
that a trial court take judicial notice of an ordinance even where a statute requires
courts to take judicial notice of local ordinances. The intent of a statute requiring a
court to take judicial notice of a local ordinance is to remove any discretion a court
might have in determining whether or not to take notice of an ordinance. Such a
statute does not direct the court to act on its own in obtaining evidence for the
record and a party must make the ordinance available to the court for it to take
notice.
Issue 3: Respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027 was repealed by
Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379?
The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance
No. 8027 was repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379 (where
Petron assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027) when the parties in
their joint motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim stated that the issue
...has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the passage of [Ordinance No.
8119].[79] They contend that such admission worked as an estoppel against the
respondent.
Respondent countered that this stipulation simply meant that Petron was recognizing
the validity and legality of Ordinance No. 8027 and that it had conceded the issue of said
ordinances constitutionality, opting instead to question the validity of Ordinance No.
8119.[80]
The oil companies deny this and further argue that respondent, in his answer in civil
case no. 06-115334 (where Chevron and Shell are asking for the nullification of
Ordinance No. 8119), expressly stated that Ordinance No. 8119 replaced Ordinance
No. 8027:[81]
... Under Ordinance No. 8027, businesses whose uses are not in
accord with the reclassification were given six months to cease [their]
operation. Ordinance No. 8119, which in effect, replaced Ordinance
[No.] 8027, merely took note of the time frame provided for in Ordinance
No. 8119.... Ordinance No. 8119 thus provided for an even longer term,
that is[,] seven years;
While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a
position contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded,[83] the aforestated rule is not
applicable here. Respondent made the statements regarding the ordinances in civil
case nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which are not the same as this case before us.
[84]
To constitute a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case
in which it is offered.
Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did not
supersede Ordinance No. 8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be
considered estopped. They rely on the argument that Ordinance No. 8119 superseded
Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn its (8119s) validity. We frown on
the adoption of inconsistent positions and distrust any attempt at clever positioning under
one or the other on the basis of what appears advantageous at the moment. Parties cannot
take vacillating or contrary positions regarding the validity of a statute [85] or ordinance.
Nonetheless, we will look into the merits of the argument of implied repeal.
financial claims.[7] These financial claims were converted into three Promissory
Notes[8] issued by MMC in favor of GHI totaling P500M and secured by mortgages over
MMCs properties. Upon the signing of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and upon the
full satisfaction of the stipulated down payment, GHI immediately took physical
possession of the mine site and its facilities, and took full control of the management and
operation of MMC
Almost four years thereafter, or on August 23, 1996, a labor dispute arose
between MMC and NAMAWU, with the latter eventually filing with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board of Bacolod City a notice of strike. [11] Then Labor
Secretary, now Associate Justice of this Court, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, later assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute and ruled in favor of NAMAWU. the lay-off (of workers)
implemented was declared illegal and that MMC committed unfair labor practice. He
then ordered the reinstatement of the laid-off workers, with payment of full backwages
and benefits, and directed the execution of a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
incorporating the terms and conditions of the previous CBA providing for an annual
increase in the workers daily wage.[12] In two separate casest, we sustained the validity
of the Quisumbing Order, which became final and executory on January 26, 2000.[13]
partial writ of execution (Brion Writ) was thereafter issued which ordered the DOLE
sheriffs to proceed to the MMC premises for the execution of the same. Althoiugh
MMCs resident manager initially resisted its enforcement, the issuance of the July 18,
2002 Alias Writ of Execution and Break-Open Order (Sto. Tomas Writ) made the
enforecemant possible.
GHI filed with the Regional Trial Court Negros Occidental, Special Civil Action
(SCA) No. 1127 for Contempt with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Nullify the Sheriffs Levy on
Properties. GHI contended that the levied properties were the subject of a Deed of Real
Estate and Chattel Mortgage, executed by MMC in favor of GHI to secure the
aforesaid P550M promissory notes, and that the mortgaged properties were already
extrajudicially foreclosed in July 2001 and sold to GHI as the highest bidder.
The trial court issued ex parte a TRO effective for 72 hours, and set the hearing on the
application for a writ of injunction.[23] The trial court ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Injunction (issued on October 18, 2002)[24] enjoining the DOLE sheriffs from further
enforcing the Sto. Tomas Writ and from conducting any public sale of the levied-on
properties
NAMAWUs separate motions for the reconsideration of the injunction order and for the
dismissal of the case was thereafter denied.
Aggrieved, NAMAWU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing
the October 17, 18 and December 4, 2002 orders of the RTC.
after due proceedings, on October 14, 2003, the appellate court rendered a Decision
setting aside the RTC issuances and directing the immediate execution of the Sto. Tomas
Writ.
The CA ruled, among others, that the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
September 5, 1996 Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage yielded the conclusion
that the deed was sham, fictitious and fraudulent; (seci)
that it was executed two weeks after the labor dispute arose in 1996, but
surprisingly, it was registered only on February 24, 2000, immediately after the Court
affirmed with finality the Quisumbing Order.
The CA also found that the certificates of title to MMCs real properties did not
contain any annotation of a mortgage lien,
and, suspiciously, GHI did not intervene in the long drawn-out labor proceedings to
protect its right as a mortgagee of virtually all the properties of MMC.
GHI elevated the case to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari,
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PERTINENT DECISION
OR ORDER IN THE SAID LABOR DISPUTE BETWEEN MMC AND NAMAWU
MAY BE ENFORCED AGAINST GHI, THERE IS ALREADY A FINAL
DEETERMINATION BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE RIGHTS OF THE
PARTIES IN SAID LABOR DISPUTE
Held:
a. Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its Decision in Maricalum Mining
Corporation v. Hon. Arturo D. Brion and NAMAWU,[34] in which we upheld the right
of herein private respondent, NAMAWU, to its labor claims.
Upon the same principle of judicial notice, we acknowledge our Decision
in Republic of the Philippines, through its trustee, the Asset Privatization Trust v. G
Holdings, Inc.,[35] in which GHI was recognized as the rightful purchaser of the
shares of stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of the company notes
accompanying the said purchase.
These company notes, consisting of three (3) Promissory Notes, were part of the
documents executed in 1992 in the privatization sale of MMC by the Asset Privatization
Trust (APT) to GHI. Each of these notes uniformly contains stipulations establishing
and constituting in favor of GHI mortgages over MMCs real and personal properties.
We find both decisions critically relevant to the instant dispute. In fact, they should
have guided the courts below in the disposition of the controversy at their respective
levels. To repeat, these decisions respectively confirm the right of NAMAWU to its
labor claims[37] and affirm the right of GHI to its financial and mortgage claims over
the real and personal properties of MMC, as will be explained below. The assailed
CA decision apparently failed to consider the impact of these two decisions on the case at
bar. Thus, we find it timely to reiterate that: courts have also taken judicial notice of
previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or
whether or not a previous ruling is applicable to the case under consideration.
2. However, the CA correctly assessed that the authority of the lower court to issue the
challenged writ of injunction depends on the validity of the third partys (GHIs) claim of
ownership over the property subject of the writ of execution issued by the labor
department. Accordingly, the main inquiry addressed by the CA decision was whether
GHI could be treated as a third party or a stranger to the labor dispute, whose properties
were beyond the reach of the Writ of Execution dated December 18, 2001.
In this light, all the more does it become imperative to take judicial notice of the
two cases aforesaid, as they provide the necessary perspective to determine whether GHI
is such a party with a valid ownership claim over the properties subject of the writ of
execution. In Juaban v. Espina,[40] we held that in some instances, courts have also
taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the
matter in controversy. These cases may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly
interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial notice. The two cases that we have
taken judicial notice of are of such character, and our review of the instant case cannot
stray from the findings and conclusions therein.
2,
Republic etc., v. G Holdings, Inc. acknowledged the existence of the Purchase
and Sale Agreement between the APT and the GHI, and recounts the facts attendant to
that transaction, as follows:
The series of negotiations between the petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, through the APT as its trustee, and G Holdings
culminated in the execution of a purchase and sale agreement on October
2, 1992. Under the agreement, the Republic undertook to sell and deliver
90% of the entire issued and outstanding shares of MMC, as well as
its company notes, to G Holdings in consideration of the purchase price
of P673,161,280. It also provided for a down payment of P98,704,000
with the balance divided into four tranches payable in installment over a
period of ten years.
It is difficult to conceive that these mortgages, already existing in 1992, almost four
(4) years before NAMAWU filed its notice of strike, were a fictitious arrangement
intended to defraud NAMAWU. After all, they were agreed upon long before the
seeds of the labor dispute germinated.
While it is true that the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage was executed
only on September 5, 1996, it is beyond cavil that this formal document of mortgage was
merely a derivative of the original mortgage stipulations contained in the Promissory
Notes of October 2, 1992. The execution of this Deed in 1996 does not detract from, but
instead reinforces, the manifest intention of the parties to establish and constitute the
mortgages on MMCs real and personal properties.
The Court notes that the case filed with the lower court involves a principal action for
injunction to prohibit execution over properties belonging to a third party not impleaded
in the legal dispute between NAMAWU and MMC. We have observed, however, that the
lower court and the CA failed to take judicial notice of, or to consider, our Decisions
in Republic, etc., v. G Holdings, Inc., and Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion
and NAMAWU, in which we respectively recognized the entitlement of GHI to the
shares and the company notes of MMC (under the Purchase and Sale Agreement),
and the rights of NAMAWU to its labor claims. At this stage, therefore, neither the
lower court nor the CA, nor even this Court, can depart from our findings in those
two cases because of the doctrine of stare decisis.
From our discussion above, we now rule that the trial court, in issuing the
questioned orders, did not commit grave abuse of discretion, because its issuance was
amply supported by factual and legal bases.
Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid
goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat.
Issue: Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles, considering, as
previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment of
Spouses Latip, took judicial notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the
Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.
Held:
!. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial
notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their
political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and
history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters
which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought
to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
a. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The
power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken
that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be
promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts
of general notoriety. (cww)
b. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying
that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be
otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that
it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere
personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is
not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those
matters which are "commonly" known.
3. Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters
coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of
life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are
capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. (og (tru))
a. From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the
matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite
of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice
to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the
RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of
"common knowledge" or notoriously known.
b. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA,
containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that
they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that
the reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need not be proved under
Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form
of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the
parties. However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of
attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalies
appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie.
On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting
to P2,570,000.00, we hold that the practice of payment of goodwill money in the
Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of judicial notice. Neither was Rosalie able to
provide sufficient evidence that, apart from the belatedly submitted Joint Affidavit of the
stallholders of Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for the payment of goodwill
money, and not payment for advance rentals by Spouses Latip.
Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from the leased
cubicles, what remains in evidence is the documentary evidence signed by both parties
the contract of lease and the receipts evidencing payment of P2,570,000.00.
The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts
for P2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented the contract of lease. However, it made a
quantum leap when it ruled that the amount was payment for rentals of the two (2)
cubicles for the entire six-year period.
There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment and receipt
of P2,570,000.00 referred to full payment of rentals for the whole period of the lease.
All three receipts state Rosalies receipt of cash in varying amounts. The first receipt
for P2,000,000.00 did state payment for two (2) cubicles, but this cannot mean full
payment of rentals for the entire lease period when there are no words to that effect.
Further, two receipts were subsequently executed pointing to the obvious fact that
the P2,000,000.00 is not for full payment of rentals. Thus, since the contract of lease
remained operative, we find that Rosalies receipt of the monies should be
considered as advanced rentals on the leased cubicles
Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip can be ejected
from the leased premises. They are liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals on the lease of
the two (2) cubicles in accordance with the stipulations on rentals in the Contract of
Lease. However, the amount of P2,570,000.00, covering advance rentals, must be
deducted from this liability of Spouses Latip to Rosalie.
kidnapping for ransom with homicide[1] and carnapping[2] in two separate informations.
Only Muit, Pancho Jr., Dequillo, Romeo, and Ferraer were arrested and stood trial.
However, Ferraer was discharged from the criminal cases by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) and was utilized as a state witness. [3] All appellants pleaded not guilty during
their arraignments.
(Julaton), a relative of Ferraer, arrived at the latters house
in Kaylaway, Nasugbu, Batangas with Sergio Pancho, Sr. (Pancho, Sr.),Pancho,
Jr., Dequillo and four other men on board a gray Mitsubishi car
Julaton introduced them to Ferraer and told the latter that Pancho, Sr. is also their
relative.Pancho, Sr. told Ferraer that they wanted to use his house as a safehouse for their
visitor.
Ferraer was hesitant at first as he thought it was risky for him and his
family. Hermano told Ferraer not to worry because they are not killers; their line of work
is kidnap for ransom.
Ferraer was assured that the money they will get would be shared equally among
them. Ferraer and Pancho, Sr. would guard their victim. Later, five other men came and
they were introduced to Ferraer as Muit, Morales, alias Tony, alias David and alias Puri.
They had dinner and chatted until midnight. That evening, Morales handed
to Ferraer for safekeeping a folded carton wrapped with masking tape contained in
a big paper bag, and a green backpack. Hermano told Ferraer that the package
contained guns.
Ferraer brought the package inside his room; he inspected the contents before placing
them under the bed.
in the afternoon of 24 November 1997, Ferraer saw Pancho, Jr., and Hermano with a
companion, seated under the tree in front of his house. Pancho, Jr. introduced their
companion as Romeo. They informed Ferraer that they would proceed with their plan.
At around two oclock in the afternoon of the same date, 2 December 1997,
Roger Seraspe (Seraspe), the personal driver of the victim, drove a blue Pajero
to visit the Flexopac project site at Barangay Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas. At the
site, Engr. Roldan and the victim alighted from the Pajero and, along with Engr.
Ed dela Cruz, toured the construction site.
After the site inspection, the three engineers walked towards the direction of
the Pajero. The driver was surprised to see that the three engineers who stood together
suddenly lay prostrate on the ground. The driver and warehouseman saw an unidentified
man standing near the three engineers. Three more armed men surrounded the Pajero. .
One of the armed men, Muit, poked a gun at driver and ordered him and warehouseman
to lay prostrate on the ground.[7] The assailants dragged the victim towards the Pajero
and after being on board and given the keys, They then started the Pajero and drove
away, passing through the Pag-asa Road gate.
that same afternoon, Lipa City Deputy Chief of Police, Supt. Arcadio Mission (Supt.
Mission) received a radio message from the Tanauan Police Station that a kidnapping was
ongoing and the kidnappers on board a Pajero heading towards lipa city. Supt. Mission
immediately ordered the police posted near the Lipa City bus stop to put up a barricade.
Right after Supt. Mission and the teams arrived at the barricade, the Pajero was spotted.
When policemen flagged down the Pajero, the driver stopped the vehicle. While two
policemen approached the Pajero, the driver and front passenger opened their car doors
and started firing at the policemen. At this point, all the policemen present at the scene
fired back. The cross-fire lasted for around four minutes. All the occupants of the Pajero,
except the driver and the front passenger who managed to escape, died. Muit, who was
the driver was apprended.
Pancho, Jr. waited along the highway in front of the construction site. He thought that he
had been left behind when he did not see the group, so he left. When Pancho, Jr. returned
to Ferraers house, he told Ferraer what happened to their operation. Worried that
something bad might have happened to the group, Pancho, Jr. went back and looked for
the rest of his group. Pancho, Jr. came back alone.
At around 5:30 in the morning of 3 December 1997, Ferraer saw Pancho, Sr. and Pancho,
Jr. watching the TV program Alas Singko y Medya. He joined them and saw on the
news thePajero riddled with bullets. Pancho, Sr. and Pancho, Jr. left Ferraers house
at around 9:00 in the morning and they also left behind the Mitsubishi car they
used.
That night, Ferraer saw on the news program TV Patrol a footage showing the cadavers
of Udon, Morales, Manuel, Bokbok and the victim, and the Pajero riddled with
bullets. Ferraer also saw Muit in handcuffs.
The prosecution presented Ignacio Ong, Sr., the father of the victim Engr. Ignacio Ong,
Jr.;
driver;
warehouseman;
the PNP Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy;
Supt. Mission, Ferraer, as the state witness; and Atty. Narzal Mallare[12] (Atty. Mallare),
the lawyer who assisted appellants Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo in executing their respective
sworn statements as witnesses.
Their accounts were corroborated by the prosecutions documentary evidence such as the
extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, Muit executed two extra
judicial confessions.
Dequillo, for his part, he was working as a mason,
Alleged that he was arrested at his house and that the police tortured him and forced him
to sign the written confession of his participation in the crimes. He denied having
participated in the commission of the offenses charged against him.
Muit claimed that on 2 December 1997 he was in Lipa City, near the place of the
shootout. He had just attended a gathering of the Rizalistas and was waiting for his
uncleBonifacio when the police arrested him. He denied having any knowledge of the
crime. He denied knowing the people whose name appeared in his two extra judicial
confessions. He claimed that the names were supplied by the police and that he was not
assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation.
The RTC held that mere denials and alibis of appellants cannot prevail over the
positive declarations of the prosecutions witnesses. he RTC did not give credence to the
claims of appellants that their extra judicial confessions were procured through torture as
these were belied by the testimony of Atty. Mallare and appellants medical certificates
which were issued during their incarceration and after the execution of their statements.
And the RTC noted that even without appellants extra judicial confessions, there was
still sufficient evidence on record to hold them guilty.
The Court of Appeals in a decision[19] dated 31 August 2007 affirmed the decision of the
RTC
Held:
The kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the carnapping were established by the
direct testimony of Ferraer, Seraspe and Chavez. Ferraer testified on how the group
approached and convinced him to let them use his house to keep the victim they planned
to kidnap.
the police were able to apprehend appellants Pancho, Jr., Romeo, and Dequillo who all
took part in the botched criminal conspiracy to kidnap the victim. During the
investigation, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit, with the assistance of their counsels and
family members, executed extra judical confessions divulging their respective roles in the
planning and execution of the crimes.
a. The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the
case against them. There is nothing on record to support appellants claim that
they were coerced and tortured into executing their extra judicial confessions.
One of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of appellants extra
judicial statements is that each contains many details and facts which the
investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied,
without the knowledge and information given by appellants. Moreover, the
appellants were assisted by their lawyers when they executed their
statements. Atty. Mallare testified that Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo executed their
statements voluntarily and affixed their signatures after he talked with them alone
and informed them of their constitutional rights.[28] Muit, on the other hand, was
assisted by counsels in each instance when he executed his two extra judicial
confessions; Muit cannot just conveniently disclaim any knowledge of the
contents of his extra judicial confession.
Nevertheless, in Muitscase, he was also positively identified by Seraspe and
Chavez as the one who pointed a gun at them during the kidnapping and ordered them
to lay prostrate on the ground.
b. The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit also strengthened
the prosecutions case against Romeo. The rule that an extra judicial confession
is evidence only against the person making it recognizes various exceptions.
One such exception is where several extra judicial statements had been made
by several persons charged with an offense and there could have been no
collusion with reference to said several confessions, the fact that the
statements are in all material respects identical is confirmatory of the
confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other persons implicated
therein.
Apellant claimed that he was asleep inside his house at the time of the incident.
He alleged that Rufino Abayata had a grudge against him because of an incident when he
tied Rufinos cow to prevent it from eating the corn in his farm. He denied having
confessed to the killing of Pantilgan.
He disclaimed ownership over the paltik .38 revolver and stated that he could not even
remember having surrendered a firearm to the barangay captain. The appellants father
and brothers corroborated the story as to the surrender.
After trial, the court a quo gave credence to the prosecutions evidence and rendered a
decision convicting appellant of Murder
Appellant interposed this appeal, contending that the trial court erred: (1) in giving
full faith and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses; (2) in proceeding with
the trial of the instant case amounting to lack of due process provided by law due to its
denial of accuseds motion for preliminary investigation or reinvestigation; and (3) in
rejecting the testimony of the defenses witnesses.
Issue: The confession is admissible.
1. The appeal has merit. In particular, appellant claims that his alleged confession or
admission, which was concocted by the Barangay Captain, is inadmissible in evidence
for being hearsay and for being obtained without a competent and independent
counsel of his choice. In effect, the quantum of evidence adduced by the prosecution
was not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The bare
allegation that he confessed or admitted killing Romero Pantilgan is not proof of guilt.
2. Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court defines an admission as an act, declaration
or omission of a party as to a relevant fact. (Ado)
A confession, on the other hand, under Section 33 of the same Rule is the declaration of
an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily
included therein.
Both may be given in evidence against the person admitting or confessing. On the whole,
a confession, as distinguished from an admission, is a declaration made at any time by
a person, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement, stating or
acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the commission of a crime.
d(vci) a(cpc)
Evidently, appellants alleged declaration owning up to the killing before the Barangay
Captain was a confession. Since the declaration was not put in writing and made out of
court, it is an oral extrajudicial confession.
3. The nexus that connects appellant to the killing was his alleged oral
extrajudicial confession given to Barangay Captain Cynthia Castaares and
two barangay kagawads. According to the trial court, their testimonies were positive
and convincing. Appellants retraction of his oral extrajudicial confession should not be
given much credence in the assessment of evidence. However, appellant disputes the
admissibility and sufficiency of the testimonial evidence offered to prove the alleged oral
extrajudicial confession.
There is no question as to the admissibility of appellants alleged oral
extrajudicial confession. Indeed, as far as admissibility is concerned, Rule 130,
Section 33 of the Rules of Court makes no distinction whether the confession is
judicial or extrajudicial.
The rationale for the admissibility of a confession is that if it is made freely and
voluntarily, a confession constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the
strong presumption that no sane person or one of normal mind will deliberately and
knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and
conscience.
4. The term voluntary means that the accused speaks of his free will and accord,
without inducement of any kind, and with a full and complete knowledge of the nature
and consequences of the confession, and when the speaking is so free from influences
affecting the will of the accused, at the time the confession was made, that it renders it
admissible in evidence against him.[7] Plainly, the admissibility of a confession in
evidence hinges on its voluntariness.
The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if,
upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast
doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details which could only be supplied by
the accused reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be considered voluntary.
The problem with appraising voluntariness occurs when the confession is an oral
extrajudicial confession because the proof of voluntariness cannot be inferred from the
testimony of a witness who allegedly heard the confessant since there is no written
proof that such confession was voluntarily made. Neither can the confessant be
appraised by the court since, precisely, it was made outside the judicial proceeding. On
the question of whether a confession is made voluntarily, the age, character, and
circumstances prevailing at the time it was made must be considered. o be sure, a
confession is not required to be in any particular form. It may be oral or written, formal
5. In the case at bar, appellant was a 19-year old farmer who did not even finish first
grade. Granting that he made the confession in the presence of Barangay Captain
Castaares, he may not have realized the full import of his confession and its
consequences. This is not to say that he is not capable of making the confession out of a
desire to tell the truth if prompted by his conscience. What we are saying is that due to
the aforesaid personal circumstances of appellant, the voluntariness of his alleged oral
confession may not be definitively appraised and evaluated.
The trial court gave credence to appellants oral extrajudicial confession relying on
jurisprudence which we find are not applicable. In the cases cited by the trial court,[16] the
convictions were based on 1. circumstantial evidence in addition to the 2. appellants
confessions, or 3. the extrajudicial confessions were reduced to writing and were replete
with details which only appellants could have supplied. In the case at bar, however, there
was no circumstantial evidence to corroborate the extrajudicial confession of
appellant. More importantly, the said confession does not contain details which
could have only been known to appellant. 4. Furthermore, the events alleged in the
confession are inconsistent with the physical evidence. According to Barangay Captain
Castaares, appellant narrated to her that during the struggle between him and the
deceased, he fell to the ground after the latter hit him on the head with a piece of
wood. In the autopsy report, however, Dr. Plebia Villanueva found that the entrance
wound on the deceased was located at the top of the head or the crown, indicating that
the victim was probably lying down when he was shot. 6. the fatal gun and the slug
extracted from Pantilgans brain can not be considered as corroborative evidence. While
the slug embedded in Pantilgans brain came from the fatal gun, the prosecution was not
able to conclusively establish the ownership of the gun other than the bare testimony of
prosecution witnesses that appellants brothers surrendered the gun to them. This was
denied by appellant and his brothers and there was no other proof linking the gun to him.
6. an extrajudicial confession will not support a conviction where it is
uncorroborated. There must be such corroboration that, when considered in connection
with confession, will show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable
doubt. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient corroboration of a confession. It is not
necessary that the supplementary evidence be entirely free from variance with the
extrajudicial confession, or that it show the place of offense or the defendants identity or
criminal agency. All facts and circumstances attending the particular offense charged are
admissible to corroborate extrajudicial confession.
On the whole, it appears that the trial court simply based appellants conviction on the
testimonial evidence of prosecution witnesses that appellant orally owned up to the
killing. We cannot affirm appellants conviction on mere testimonial evidence,
considering that the voluntariness of said confession cannot be conclusively established
because of appellants personal circumstances and the failure of the police to reduce the
alleged oral confession into writing.
Tamargo vs Awingan
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot
and killed at around 5:15 p.m. of August 15, 2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta
Street, Binondo, Manila. T
The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo
Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit dated September 12, 2003. He stated that a
certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was
ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of
those who killed Atty. Tamargo. He added that he told the Tamargo family what he
knew and that the sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna.
on the strength of Gerons affidavit, the investigating prosecutor[5] issued a resolution
dated December 5, 2003 finding probable cause against Columna and three John Does.
the corresponding Informations for murder were filed a. against them in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Columna was arrested in Cagayan
march 8, 2008, Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed an affidavit
wherein he admitted his participation as look out during the shooting and implicated
respondent Romulo Awingan (alias Mumoy) as the gunman and one Richard
Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his
son, respondent Lloyd Antiporda.
Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed an affidavit wherein he admitted
his participation as look out during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo
Awingan (alias Mumoy), as the gunman and one Richard Mecate,. He also tagged as
masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr., exmayor and his son, respondent Lloyd
Antiporda mayor. On April 19, 2004, Columna affirmed his affidavit before the
investigating prosecutor[11] who subjected him to clarificatory questions.
c.Consequently, respondent Awingan filed a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition in the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. The Antipordas
separately filed another certiorari case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94188.
In a decision dated November 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610, the CA ruled that the
RTC judge gravely abused her discretion because she arbitrarily left out of her
assessment and evaluation the substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken
into account in concluding that there was no probable cause against all the accused. It
also held that Columnas extrajudicial confession was not admissible against the
respondents because, aside from the i. recanted confession, ii. there was no other
piece of evidence presented to establish the existence of the conspiracy.
Petitioner filed this petition assailing the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. Later on,
he filed an amended petition impleading respondents Antiporda and likewise assailing the
CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 94188.
Issue: The main issue for our resolution is whether or not the CA erred in finding that
Judge Daguna had committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the withdrawal of the
Informations for murder against respondents.
Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of Judge Daguna,
there was probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of Columna. She considered all
the pieces of evidence but did not give credit to Columnas recantation.
Respondents counter that Judge Daguna committed grave abuse of discretion by
limiting her evaluation and assessment only to evidence that supported probable cause
while completely disregarding contradicting evidence. They also contend that
Columnas extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against respondents because of
the rule on res inter alios acta.
Held:
1. It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information (on the
ground of lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial based on a resolution of the
DOJ Secretary), the trial court has the duty to make an independent assessment of
the merits of the motion.[25] It may either agree or disagree with the
recommendation of the Secretary. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary
would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine
a prima facie case.[26] The court must itself be convinced that there is indeed no
sufficient evidence against the accused.
2. There is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since
the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and
its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the
judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason. The judge or fiscal, therefore,
should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might
later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which
the courts are created to uphold.
We agree with the CA that Judge Daguna limited herself only to the following: (1)
Columnas affidavit dated March 8, 2004 wherein he implicated the respondents in the
murders; (2) his affirmation of this affidavit during the April 19, 2004 clarificatory
hearing; (3) his letter dated October 29, 2004 and (4) the May 30, 2005 DOJ resolution
upholding the prosecutors recommendation to file the murder charges. She completely
ignored other relevant pieces of evidence such as: (1) Columnas May 3, 2004 letter to
respondent Lloyd Antiporda narrating the torture he suffered to force him to admit his
participation in the crimes and to implicate the respondents; (2) his May 25, 2004
affidavit where he stated that neither he nor the respondents had any involvement in the
murders and (3) his testimony during the October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing wherein
he categorically affirmed his May 3, 2004 letter and May 25, 2004 affidavit.
Had Judge Daguna reviewed the entire records of the investigation, she would
have seen that, aside from the pieces of evidence she relied on, there were others which
cast doubt on them.
The selectivity of respondent RTC Judge for purposes of resolving
the motion to withdraw the informations effectively sidetracked the
guidelines for an independent assessment and evaluation of the merits of
the case. Respondent RTC Judge thus impaired the substantial rights of
the accused. Instead, she should have made a circumspect evaluation
by looking at everything made available to her at that point of the
cases
Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and
was inadmissible as evidence against them.
Indeed, at that stage of the proceedings, the duty of Judge Daguna was only to satisfy
herself whether there was probable cause or sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial
as co-conspirators. Given that she had no sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause
against respondents, her orders denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder
against them were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
that the continued use of the premises is on a monthly basis with the rental in the amount
previously agreed upon by the partie
6. Under Article 2213 of the Civil Code, "interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated
claims or damages, except when the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty." In the instant case, the claim of petitioner is unliquidated or cannot be
established with reasonable certainty upon his filing of the case in the RTC. This is
because of the contending claims of the parties
Toshiba vs CIR
Toshiba is a domestic corporation principally engaged in the business of manufacturing
and exporting of electric machinery, equipment systems, accessories, parts,
components, materials and goods of all kinds, including those relating to office
automation and information technology and all types of computer hardware and
software, such as but not limited to HDD-CD-ROM and personal computer printed
circuit board.
It is registered with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) as an Economic
Zone (ECOZONE) export enterprise and BIR.
Toshiba subsequently submitted to the BIR on July 23, 1997 its VAT returns for the first
and second quarters of 1997,[10] reporting the same input VAT payments of P
P3,875,139.65
and zero-rated sales totaling P7,494,677,000.00. It also applied for a tax refund. Toshiba
likewise filed with the CTA a Petition for Review[14] to toll the running of the two-year
prescriptive period under Section 230 of the Tax Code of 1977,[15] as amended. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) opposed the claim for tax refund/credit of
Toshiba, averring that iled miserably to show that the total amount of P3,875,139.65
claimed as VAT input taxes, were erroneously or illegally collected, or that the same are
properly documented;
Upon being advised by the CTA,[20] Toshiba and the CIR filed a
Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues, [21] wherein the opposing parties
agreed and admitted that the [Toshiba] is a duly registered value-added
tax entity in accordance with Section 107 of the Tax Code, as amended. (O
%v2)
2.
[Toshiba] is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax
on its export sales in accordance with then Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax
Code, as amended.
3.
[Toshiba] filed its quarterly VAT returns for the first two
quarters of 1997 within the legally prescribed period.
xxxx
7.
[Toshiba] is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax
on its export sales.
8.
[Toshiba] has duly filed the instant Petition for Review
within the two-year prescriptive period prescribed by then Section 230 of
the Tax Code.
In the same pleading, Toshiba and the CIR jointly submitted the following issues
for determination by the CTA
Whether or not [Toshiba] has incurred input taxes in the amount
of P3,875,139.65 for the period January 1 to June 30, 1997 which are
directly attributable to its export sales[.]
During the trial before the CTA, Toshiba presented documentary evidence in support of
its claim for tax credit/refund, while the CIR did not present any evidence at all.
CTA rendered the case in favor of Toshiba but reducing the amount of tax refund.
According to the CTA, the CIR himself admitted that the export sales of Toshiba were
subject to zero percent (0%) VAT based on Section 100(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Tax Code of
1977, as amended. Both parties filed mr. In its mr, cir argued in his Motion for
Reconsideration[26] that Toshiba was not entitled to the credit/refund of its input VAT
payments because as a PEZA-registered ECOZONE export enterprise, Toshiba was not
subject to VAT. The CIR contended that under Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7916, a
special law, all businesses and establishments within the ECOZONE were to remit to the
government five percent (5%) of their gross income earned within the zone, in lieu of all
taxes, including VAT. The mr were denied.
the CIR filed a Petition for Review which was granted. The appellate court ruled
that Toshiba was not entitled to the refund of its alleged unused input VAT payments
because it was a tax-exempt entity under Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7916. As a
PEZA-registered corporation, Toshiba was liable for remitting to the national government
the five percent (5%) preferential rate on its gross income earned within the ECOZONE,
in lieu of all other national and local taxes, including VAT and that the export sales of
Toshiba were VAT-exempt, not zero-rated, transactions.
The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it
must be treated as a judicial admission.[45] Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court, a judicial admission requires no proof. The admission may be contradicted only
by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made. The Court cannot lightly set aside a judicial admission especially when the
opposing party relied upon the same and accordingly dispensed with further proof of the
fact already admitted. An admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings
does not require proof.
4. The CIR cannot escape the binding
effect of his judicial admissions.
The Cir argued that the stipulation of
facts was made through palpable
mistake as it was false, wrong and
illegal, and no estoppel can be made
against the government through the
mistakes of its agents.
Yet, the Court observes that the CIR himself never alleged in his Motion for
Reconsideration of the CTA Decision dated October 16, 2000, nor in his Petition for
Review before the Court of Appeals, that Atty. Biazon committed a mistake in signing
the Joint Stipulation. Since the CIR did not make such an allegation, neither did he
present any proof in support thereof. The CIR began to aver the existence of a
palpable mistake only after the Court of Appeals made such a declaration in its
Decision dated August 29, 2002.
5. The judicial admissions of the CIR in the Joint Stipulation are not intrinsically
false, wrong, or illegal, and are consistent with the ruling on the VAT treatment of
PEZA-registered enterprises in the previous Toshiba case. There is no basis for
believing that to bind the CIR to his judicial admissions in the Joint Stipulation that
Toshiba was a VAT-registered entity and its export sales were zero-rated VAT transactions
would result in falsehood, unfairness and injustice. The judicial admissions of the
CIR are not intrinsically false, wrong, or illegal. On the contrary, they are consistent with
the ruling of this Court in a previous case involving the same parties, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.) Inc.[55] (Toshiba case),
explaining the VAT treatment of PEZA-registered enterprises.
6. It is now a settled rule that based on the Cross Border Doctrine, PEZA-registered
enterprises, such as Toshiba, are VAT-exempt and no VAT can be passed on to them. The
Court, nevertheless, noted in the Toshiba case that the rule which considers any sale
by a supplier from the Customs Territory to a PEZA-registered enterprise as export
sale, which should not be burdened by output VAT, was only clearly established
on October 15, 1999, upon the issuance by the BIR of RMC No. 74-99. Prior to
October 15, 1999, whether a PEZA-registered enterprise was exempt or subject to VAT
depended on the type of fiscal incentives availed of by the said enterprise. To recall,
Toshiba is herein claiming the refund of unutilized input VAT payments on its local
purchases of goods and services attributable to its export sales for the first and second
quarters of 1997. Such export sales took place before October 15, 1999, when the old
rule on the VAT treatment of PEZA-registered enterprises still applied.
People vs Villacorta
On June 21, 2002, an Information[3] was filed against Villacorta charging him with
the crime of murder, as follows:
That on or about 23rd day of January 2002, in Navotas, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with
intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said
weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ, thereby inflicting upon the
victim serious wounds which caused his immediate death.
When arraigned on September 9, 2002, Villacorta pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the
prosecution presented mendeja and belandres as witnesses.
Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was tending her sari-sari store located
at C-4 Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas. Both Cruz and Villacorta were regular customers at
Mendejas store. At around two oclock in the morning, while Cruz was ordering bread
at Mendejas store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed
Cruz on the left side of Cruzs body using a sharpened bamboo stick. Immediately, after
the stabbing incident, Villacorta left. Cruz was brought to the hospital.
Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro Hospital where
cruz died the morning afrer. When Cruz sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002,
he was taken to the Tondo Medical Center, where he was treated as an out-patient. Dr.
Belandres was able to determine, using Cruzs medical chart and diagnosis, that Cruz
died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.
Defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied stabbing Cruz. Villacorta recounted
that he was on his way home from work at around two oclock in the morning of .Upon
arriving home, Villacorta drank coffee then went outside to buy cigarettes at a nearby
store. When Villacorta was about to leave the store, Cruz put his arm around Villacortas
shoulder. This prompted Villacorta to box Cruz, after which, Villacorta went
home. Villacorta did not notice that Cruz got hurt. Villacorta only found out about
Cruzs death upon his arrest on July 31, 2002
Rtc convicted the accused of murder. Qualified by treachery. CA affirmed.
Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Joy Filart as the culprits. She also
tagged police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Alfaro had been
working as an asset to the NBI by leading the agency to criminals. Some of the said
criminals had been so high-profile, that Alfaro had become the darling of the NBI
because of her contribution to its success. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found
that Alfaros direct and spontaneous narration of events unshaken by gruesome crossexamination should be given a great weight in the decision of the case.
In Alfaros story, she stated that after she and the accused got high of shabu, she was
asked to see Carmela at their residence. After Webb was informed that Carmela had a
male companion with her, Webb became piqued and thereafter consumed more drugs and
plotted the gang rape on Carmela. Webb, on the other hand, denied all the accusations
against him with the alibi that during the whole time that the crime had taken place, he
was staying in the United States. He had apparently left for the US on 09 March 1991
and only returned on 27 October 1992. As documentary evidence, he presented
photocopies of his passport with four stamps recording his entry and exit from both the
Philippines and the US, Flights Passenger Manifest employment documents in the US
during his stay there and US-INS computer generated certification authenticated by the
Philippine DFA. Aside from these documentary alibis, he also gave a thorough recount
of his activities in the US
ISSUE:
Whether or not Webbs documented alibi of his U.S. travel should be given more
credence by the Court than the positive identification by Alfaro.
RULING:
For a positive identification to be acceptable, it must meet at least two criteria:
The positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness; and
The witness story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently
contrived.
The Supreme Court found that Alfaro and her testimony failed to meet the above criteria.
She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience.
She had been hanging around the agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for
mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. And although her testimony included
details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the case. She
took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly
incompatible acts of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames, for example,
just so she can accommodate the crime scene feature.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence
that:
He was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and
That it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
The Supreme Court gave very high credence to the compounded documentary alibi
presented by Webb. This alibi altogether impeaches Alfaros testimony not only with
respect to him, but also with respect to the other accused. For, if the Court accepts the
proposition that Webb was in the US when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will
not hold altogether. Webbs participation is the anchor of Alfaros story.
Gr. No. 158149
Boston bank (formerly Bank of Commerce) v. Perla Manalo and Carlos
Manalo.
Facts:
Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) sold to The Overseas Bank of Manila
(OBM) some residential lots in Xavierville subdivision. Nevertheless, XEI
continued selling the residential lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM. Carlos Manalo,
Jr. proposed to XEI, through its President Emerito Ramos, to purchase two lots in the
Xavierville subdivision and offered as part of the downpayment the
P34,887.66 Ramos owed him. XEI, t h r o u g h R a m o s , a g r e e d . I n a
letter dated August 22, 1972 to Perla Manalo, Ramos confirmed
t h e reservation of the lots. In the letter he also pegged the price of the
lots at P348,060 with a 20% down
payment of the purchase price amounting to P69,612.00 (less the P34,887.66 owing from
Ramos), payable as soon as XEI resumes its selling operations; the corresponding
Contract of Conditional Sale would then be signed on or before the same date. Perla
Manalo conformed to the letter agreement. Thereafter, the spouses constructed a house on
the property. The spouses were notified of XEIs resumption of selling operations.
However, they did not pay the balance of the downpayment because XEI failed to prepare
a contract of conditional sale and transmit the same to them. XEI also billed them for
unpaid interests which they also refused to pay.
XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM. Subsequently, Commercial
Bank of Manila (CBM) acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM requested
Perla Manalo to stop any on-going construction on the property since it (CBM) was the
owner of the lot and she had no permission for such construction.
Perla informed them that her husband had a contract with OBM, through
XEI, to purchase the property. She promised to send CBM the documents.
However, she failed to do so. Thus, CBM filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
the spouses. But later on, CBM moved to withdraw its complaint because of theissues
raised. In the meantime, CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of the Philippines.
Then, the spouses filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the
bank before the RTC. The spouses alleged that they had always been ready and willing to
pay the installments on the lots sold to them but no contract was forthcoming.
The spouses further alleged that upon their partial payment of the
downpayment, they were entitled to the execution and delivery of a Deed of Absolute
Sale covering the subject lots. During the trial, the spouses adduced in
evidence the separate Contracts of
Conditional Sale executed between XEI and 3 other buyers to prove that XEI continued
selling residential lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM after the latter had acquired the
said lots.
The trial court ordered the petitioner to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of the spouses upon the payment of the spouses of the balance of the
purchase price. It ruled that under the August 22,1972 letter agreement of XEI and the
spouses, the parties had a "complete contract to sell" over the lots, and that they had
already partially consummated the same.
The Court of Appeals sustained the ruling of the RTC, but declared that the balance of the
purchase price of the property was payable in fixed amounts on a monthly basis for
120 months, based on the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in
favor of other lot buyers. Boston Bank filed a Motion for the Reconsideration of the
decision alleging that there was no perfected contract to sell the two lots, as there was no
agreement between XEI and the respondents on the manner of payment as well as
the other terms and conditions of the sale. Boston Bank also asserts that
there is no factual basis for the CA ruling that the terms and conditions relating to the
payment of thebalance of the purchase price of the property (as agreed upon
by XEI and other lot buyers in the same subdivision) were also applicable to the
contract entered into between the petitioner and the respondents.
CAdenied the MR.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the factual issues raised by the petitioner are proper (Appeals
Evidence)
2.) Whether or not there was a perfected contract to sell the property
3.) Whether or not the CA correctly held that the terms of the deeds of conditional sale
executed by XEI in favor of the other lot buyers in the subdivision, which contained
uniform terms of 120 equal monthly installments, constitute evidence that XEI also
agreed to give the Manalo spouses the same mode and timeline of payment. ( Evidence,
Disputable Presumptions, Habits and Customs Rule 130, Section 34)
HELD:
1.)YES. The rule is that before this Court, only legal issues
m a y b e r a i s e d i n a p e t i t i o n f o r r e v i e w o n certiorari. The reason is
that this Court is not a trier of facts, and is not to review and calibrate the
evidence on record. Moreover, the findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed on
appeal by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court unless the case falls under
any of the following exceptions:
(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the r e s p o n d e n t s ; a n d ( 1 0 )
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premis ed
o n t h e supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
We have reviewed the records and we find that, indeed, the ruling of the appellate court
dismissing petitioners appeal is contrary to law and is not supported by
evidence. A careful examination of the
factual backdrop of the case, as well as the antecedental proceedings constrains us to hold
that petitioner is not barred from asserting that XEI or OBM, on one hand,
and the respondents, on the other, failed to forge a perfected contract to sell the
subject lots.
2.)NO. In a contract to sell property by installments, it is not enough that the parties agree
on the price as well as the amount of downpayment. The parties must, likewise, agree on
the manner of payment of the balance of the purchase price and on the other terms and
conditions relative to the sale. Even if the buyer makes a downpayment or portion
thereof, such payment cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the perfection of any
purchase and sale between the parties.
A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the
thing which is the object of the contract and the price. The agreement as to the manner of
payment goes into the price, such that a disagreement on the manner of payment is
tantamount to a failure to agree on the price.
We have meticulously reviewed the records, including Ramos February 8,
1972 and August 22, 1972 letters to respondents and find that said parties confined
themselves to agreeing on the price of the property (P348,060.00), the 20%
downpayment of the purchase price (P69,612.00), and credited respondents for the
P34,887.00 owing from Ramos as part of the 20% downpayment. Based on these two
letters, the determination of the terms of payment of the P278,448.00 had yet to be agreed
upon on or before December 31, 1972, or even afterwards, when the parties sign the
contract of conditional sale.
So long as an essential element entering into the proposed obligation of
either of the parties remains to be determined by an agreement which they
are to make, the contract is incomplete and unenforceable.
3.)NO. The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance
of the purchase price of lots purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly
installments does not constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to give the
respondents the same mode and timeline of payment.
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar
thing at another time, although such evidence may be received to prove habit,
usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties. Habit, custom, usage or pattern of
conduct must be proved like any other facts. The offering party must establish the
degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures more than a
mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather, conduct that is semiautomatic in nature. The offering party must allege and prove specific,
guilty of one count of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
The Information, dated April 10, 2000, in Criminal Case No. SCC 3282
reads as follows:
That on or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 5, 2000,
at the back of the Bical Norte Elementary School, municipality of
Bayambang, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a kitchen knife, by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with AAA3, a minor of 13 years old, against her will
and consent and to her damage and prejudice.4
When arraigned, appellant pleaded "not guilty".5 Thereafter trial ensued.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: private complainant
(AAA), her mother BBB and father CCC, and Dr. James Sison. The
defense presented five witnesses, namely: Joy Agbuya, Juanito
Macaraeg, Juanita Angeles, Albina Erguiza, and appellant.
On November 27, 2000, the RTC found appellant guilty of the crime of
rape, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
In view whereof, the Court finds the accused LARRY C. ERGUIZA
guilty of RAPE under Article 266-a paragraph 1(a) in relation to
Article 266-b of R.A. 8353 and R.A. 7659 and sentences (sic) to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the offended
party, AAA P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral
damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, to give support to
AAA's offspring and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA aptly summarized the respective versions of the
parties, based on the evidence presented before the trial court, thus:
PROSECUTION'S VERSION:
On January 5, 2000, at around 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, AAA, a thirteen-year old first year high school
Uncle, Rudy Domingo, AAA finally revealed that she was raped by
accused-appellant.14
On April 8, 2000, AAA, accompanied by her mother and uncle,
went to the police headquarters in YYY, Pangasinan to report the
incident.15 Then the police brought her to YYY District
Hospital16 where Dr. James Sison, Medical Officer III of said
hospital conducted the examination on Michelle. Dr. Sison made
the following findings:
"Q. x x x No extragenital injuries noted. Complete healed hymenal
laceration 11:00 o'clock. x x x. In layman's term, Dr. Sison found
no physical injury from the breast, the body except the genital
area wherein he found a significant laceration complete (sic)
healed over 11:00 o'clock."17 Dr. Sison also testified that a single
sexual intercourse could make a woman pregnant.
BBB testified that her daughter AAA stopped going to school after
she was raped and that no amount of money could bring back the
lost reputation of her daughter.
CCC (AAA's father), testified that on May 2, 2000, the family of
accused-appellant went to their house and initially offered
P50,000 and later P150,000; that in January 5, 2000, while they
were repairing his house for the wedding reception18, Larry left at
around 4:00 o'clock p.m.
DEFENSE'S VERSION
On January 5, 2000, Larry Erguiza helped in the repair of
CCC's19 house from 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 5:00 o'clock
in the afternoon. When he reached home at around 5:00 pm, his
mother Albina Erguiza instructed him to fetch a "hilot" as his wife
Josie was already experiencing labor pains. He proceeded to
fetch the "hilot" Juanita Angeles and stayed in their house until his
wife delivered a baby at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of
January 6, 2000.20
Juanita Angeles corroborated Larry's testimony that he indeed
fetched her at around 5:10 pm on January 5, 2000 to attend to his
wife who was experiencing labor pains and who delivered a baby
at about 3:00 a.m. of January 6, 2000; and that Larry never left his
wife's side until the latter gave birth.
Albina, mother of the accused-appellant, testified that AAA is the
daughter of her "balae"Spouses CCC and BBB; that her son
Larry, her husband and two others left CCC and BBB's residence
at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on January 5, 2000; that she
went to Spouses CCC and BBB to talk about the charge of rape
against her son; that Spouses CCC and BBB were asking
for P1,000,000.00 which was later reduced to P250,000.00 and
that she made a counter-offer of P5,000.00.21
Joy Agbuya testified that she and AAA were at the mango
orchard of Juanito Macaraeg on January 5, 2000; that she
never left AAA when her short pants got hooked; that they
went together to the store of Auntie Beth where they parted.22
Juanito Macaraeg, the mango orchard caretaker, testified that the
house of Larry was a walking distance of about three minutes
from the mango orchard; that if one runs fast, it would only take a
minute to reach his house; and that he could not recall having
seen Larry in the orchard.23(Emphasis supplied)
In its Decision dated November 18, 2005, the CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC, but modified the amount of the award of exemplary
damages and costs as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing circumstances, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos (Pangasinan),
Branch 57 dated November 27, 2000 in Criminal Case No. SCC3282 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant
Larry Erguiza is heldGUILTY of Rape and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the victim
AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral
damages, andP25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to give
support to AAA's offspring.
SO ORDERED.24
Hence, herein appeal.
In his appeal Brief,25 appellant raises the following errors:
examining complainant, the hilot told BBB that her daughter was
pregnant. AAA later revealed that she was raped by appellant.36 BBB
further testified that she accompanied AAA to the police headquarters in
YYY, Pangasinan to report the incident.37 Afterwards, the police brought
complainant to YYY District Hospital38 where Dr. James Sison, Medical
Officer III of said hospital, conducted the examination on complainant.
On cross-examination, BBB testified that the family of appellant offered
her money to settle the case.39
CCC, the father of AAA, was the lone rebuttal witness of the
prosecution. In order to rebut the allegation made by appellant's family
that the present case was filed because appellant's family did a poor job
in preparing for the wedding of CCC's daughter DDD and apellant's
brother Carlito, CCC testified that on the contrary, the wedding went
smoothly.40 CCC further claimed that the family of appellant knelt before
him crying and offered money to settle the case.41 Moreover, CCC
testified that appellant left his house at 4:00 p.m. on January 5, 2000.
On the other hand, the defense presented four witnesses, namely:
Juanito Macaraeg (Macaraeg), Albina Erguiza (Albina), Juanita and Joy.
Macaraeg, the caretaker of the mango orchard, testified that he did not
see appellant on any occasion in the orchard.42 More specifically,
Macaraeg emphasized that he did not see appellant on January 5,
2000.43 However, on cross-examination, he testified that the house of
appellant is only a three-minute walk from the mango orchard and
probably a minute if one walks fast.44
Albina, the mother of appellant, testified that on January 5, 2000, she
was with appellant at the house of CCC and BBB preparing for the
wedding of CCC's daughter DDD and appellant's brother Carlito. She
said that they left the house of CCC at around 5:00 p.m.45 Albina
narrated that when they arrived home, at around 5:02 or 5:03 p.m., she
sent appellant to fetch a hilot, as the wife of appellant was having some
labor pains.46 She said that appellant and the hilot arrived at around
5:30 p.m.47According to Albina appellant never left their house.48
On the day of the wedding, Albina testified that she had an altercation
with BBB regarding the bills and that they never resolved their
quarrel.49 She spoke to BBB and CCC because she learned that they
were falsely accusing appellant of raping AAA.50 After talking to BBB
and CCC, she and her husband confronted appellant and asked if he
A. Our reason in talking to them was that when Larry said that he
did not commit the alleged rape and so we went there to talk to
them so that we could preserve our relationship as in-laws even if
it is for the sake of peace we could try our best to cope up
even P5,000.00 just for the sake of peace because our intention
in going to their house was to extract the truth, sir.57
On cross-examination, appellant gave the following statements:
Q. Before the filing of this case with this Honorable Court, your
parents and you were pleading to the parents of AAA not to
continue anymore the case, is it not?
A. Yes, sir, so that the case will not be filed and our relationship
will not be destroyed, sir.
Q. In fact you asked your parents to do so, is it not?
A. No, sir. They were the ones who went to the house of AAA,
sir.
Q. But the family of AAA did not agree to the pleadings of your
parents that the case be not filed anymore, is it not?
A. They will agree if we will pay then 1 million, but we do not have
1 million, sir.
Q. Did you offer them 1 million?
A. No, sir. They were the ones who told that to us.58 (Emphasis
Supplied)
The alleged offer of the parents of appellant to settle the case cannot be
used against appellant as evidence of his guilt. Appellant testified that
he did not ask his parents to settle the case. Moreover, appellant was
not present when the offer to settle was allegedly made.
An offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to
an admission of the party himself.59 Although the Court has held in some
cases that an attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case is
an implied admission of guilt,60 we believe that the better rule is that for
a compromise to amount to an implied admission of guilt, the accused
xxxx
Q. Is AAA your bestfriend?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Since you said that AAA is your bestfriend was there an
occasion wherein she told you that she was raped?
A. None, sir.69 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On cross-examination, Prosecutor Ely Reintar elicited the following
statements from Joy:
Q. In the year 2000, when was the last time that you talked to
AAA?
A. April, sir.
Q. After April, you did not talk to AAA anymore?
A. No more, sir.
Q. Your friendship was severed?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you please tell the Honorable Court why your friendship
became severed?
A. Because she quarreled with me, sir.
Q. And because you quarreled, that is the reason why you are
now testifying against her?
A. Yes, sir.70
On re-direct examination, Joy clarified, thus:
Q. Madam Witness, you said that you have a quarrel with the
private complainant, AAA, will you please tell this Honorable
Court what is the reason or cause of your quarrel with AAA?