Professional Documents
Culture Documents
BETWEEN:
HALIFAX EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATION
(the Employer)
-andTHE HALIFAX LONGSHOREMENS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 269 ILA
(the Union)
ARBITRATOR:
MICHEL G. PICHER
AWARD
This arbitration concerns a grievance filed by the Union which represents a
substantial challenge to the administration of the Employers Substance Abuse
Program, and in particular to the referral of employees to counselling by a counsellor
referred to herein as Counsellor J. The nature and scope of the grievance is best
reflected in the text of the grievance itself which reads as follows:
(2)
The
mandatory
requirement,
on
recommendation by [Counsellor J], that
employees attend counseling sessions with
[Counsellor J], which is inappropriate and gives
rise to a conflict of interest; and
(3)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
who
were
It is noted that the Union did not pursue in the arbitration the alleged violation of either
article 13.02 or any other additional provision of the collective agreement.
1.
BACKGROUND:
The MRP includes the SAP, which is applied when an employee tests positive for
drugs and alcohol, as well as the SRPP, a long term follow-up program to prevent
relapses.
The HEA policy on Employee Safety and Assistance (ESA) contains a number of
provisions respecting the EAP. Paragraphs 6.1 and 6.3 of the policy make specific
reference to the role to be played by the EAP Coordinator, as reflected in the following
provisions:
6.1
6.3
(b)
As part of his submission counsel for the Union draws to the attention of the
Arbitrator certain provisions of the delivery agreement made between the HEA and
Medavie Blue Cross, dated February 1, 2007, in respect of what is referred to as the
inConfidence Employee Family Assistance Program.
administered by Medavie Blue Cross, contains, in part, the following description under
section 2.0 General Services in which, it does not appear disputed, the HEA was a
Plan Sponsor:
With respect to the quality of HEAs program, its counsel notes that the HEA has
at all times contracted with a recognized provider of benefits, having assigned the
administrative delivery of the EAP to Medavie Blue Cross, which itself contracted with
Shepell-FGI, which administers a reputable EAP known as inConfidence. Further to the
execution of that standard, he notes that the contract between HEA and Medavie Blue
Cross expressly recognizes that Shepell-FGI is a duly qualified assistance plan
provider, fully certified under the Employee Assistance Society of North America and
accredited with the Council of Accreditation.
2.
qualifications, experience, expertise and competence to properly fill the role of EAP
Coordinator. The fundamental position of the Union is that by retaining and utilizing the
services of Counsellor J the HEA effectively violated the privacy and confidentiality
rights of the employees who were dealt with by Counsellor J at the behest of the HEA.
a.
It does not appear disputed that at one point in time Counsellor J was a member of
the Canadian Counselling and Psychotherapy Association. As related by the Union, his
credentials as a member of the Association were as follows:
x
x
x
counselling and was not certified as an alcohol and drug counsellor from the Canadian
Addiction Counsellors Certification Federation.
registered or licenced under the Nova Scotia Counselling Therapists Act or the Nova
Scotia Psychologists Act. The Unions position is that Counsellor J was not trained or
qualified to assess an employees dependence on drugs or alcohol, or to make
appropriate recommendations in respect of treatment programs.
b.
Counsellor J assessed employees who had been referred to him, found them to be
dependent on drugs or alcohol and then recommended that they attend counselling
sessions with him. The duality of those roles, that of assessment and treatment, in the
Unions view, constituted a conflict of interest contrary to ethical standards which govern
the practice of counsellors and psychotherapists. Counsel for the Union described the
7
c.
the sharing of personal and confidential information with the HEA through Counsellor Js
reports constitute a violation of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act (PIPEDA), S.C. 2000, c. 5. Counsel refers the Arbitrator to certain
principles found within the model code for the protection of personal information under
PIPEDA which, he submits, govern the HEA as reflected in paragraphs 4.2.4, 4.3.2 and
4.4.1 of the principles established under the model code for the protection of personal
information. Counsel summarizes those principles as follows:
x
The Union maintains that Counsellor J improperly shared intimate and personal
information about employees, including their personal histories, relationships and
personal health issues. By way of example for its allegation of questionable reporting
on the part of Counsellor J and the violation of his obligation of confidentiality, counsel
draws to the Arbitrators attention Counsellor Js report in respect of Employee M.
Counsel stresses that Counsellor Js report to the HEA contains clearly confidential
information with respect to the employees personal and family relations including,
among other things, express reference to his recent diagnosis and lung surgery dealing
with cancer. The Union emphasizes that Employee M did not wish to have revealed to
the HEA either his cancer diagnosis or his surgery. Counsel vehemently submits that
conveying that information to the Employer violates the standard of confidentiality and
ethical dealing which should have governed the actions and reports of Counsellor J. In
the Unions submission the information related to the HEA by Counsellor J far exceeded
the scope of information consented to by employees on the standard consent form for
the release of information to the HEA.
In his
f.
Js
Alleged
The Union has filed with the Arbitrator a number of employees statements which
contain examples of the alleged indiscretions by Counsellor J. By way of one example,
among others, Employee M relates that upon learning that he had no lock on his door at
home Counsellor J proceeded to comment:
[masturbating], your roommate could come in and catch you anytime. It is noted that in
his own Will Say Statement Counsellor J categorically denies having made that
statement.
g.
Counsel for the Union rejects the suggestion of the HEA that the doctrine of
estoppel should apply to the grievance by reason of what the Employer views as the
Unions consistent acceptance of Counsellor J over the years. Counsel submits that
acquiescence or estoppel cannot be grounded where, as in the instant case, there was
no actual knowledge on the part of the Union with respect to the actions and misconduct
which are the basis of the instant grievance. There was not, he submits, any knowing
acquiescence to Counsellor J, to his actions or to the disclosure, collection and use of
11
personal information. In that circumstance, counsel submits that estoppel simply does
not apply as a bar to the instant grievance. Additionally, he maintains that individual
acquiescence by Union members cannot ground an estoppel against the Unions own
grievance. In that regard he cites Re Skeena Sawmills and International Woodworkers,
Local I-71, (1988), 5 L.A.C. (4th) 214 (Bird). Additionally, counsel asserts that estoppel
cannot be raised as a bar to statutory rights, citing Re British Columbia Institute of
Technology and British Columbia Government & Service Employees Union, (1997), 62
L.A.C. (4th) 168 (Kelleher).
Counsellor Js services being included under a last chance agreement for Employee
C, the Union reflects that it made no objection to the selection because that
arrangement was acceptable to the employee in question.
Further authorities on the issue cited to the Arbitrator by the Union include the
following: Re Taggart Services Ltd. and United Food & Commercial Workers Union,
Local P818, (1989), 6 L.A.C. (4th) 279 (M.G. Picher); Canadian National Railway and
Teamsters Canada Rail Conference (Love), (2013), 240 L.A.C. (4th) 100; Alberta v.
Alberta Union of Provincial Employees (Privacy Rights Grievance), [2012[ A.G.A.A. No.
23; Re Molson Breweries and Canadian Union of Brewery and General Workers,
(2005), 142 L.A.C. (4th) 84; Nammo v. TransUnion of Canada Inc., [2012] 3 F.C.R. 600
and Chitrakar v. Bell TV, [2013] F.C.J. No. 1195.
h.
12
The Union disputes the assertion of the HEA that any remedy must be limited to
the seven day period prior to the date of the grievance. It stresses that the breaches of
the collective agreement and PIPEDA which are the subject of this dispute are in fact
ongoing, with certain personal information in dispute having been seen by Employer
representatives and remaining in employee files. Nor, the Union argues, is it possible to
cut off any remedy in respect of emotional or psychological distress which accumulated
over time, as it affected the employees, to a period of harm limited to seven days before
the date the grievance was filed. Counsel stresses that the Employer was aware as
much as four years ago of one employees alleged inappropriate encounters with
Counsellor J.
opportunities should run from the time the Union first raised concerns about Counsellor
13
J with the Employer, referring to a conversation in the spring of 2014 between Union
Local President Kevin Piper and Ms. Nadine Wentzell, a consultant to the HEA.
3.
The HEA asserts that certain of the allegations made by the Union are
inarbitrable. In that regard it identifies paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 30 of
the Unions Statement of Issues submission as being improperly advanced. Paragraph
19 deals with the fact that Counsellor J conducted counselling sessions in the living
room of his private home, which allegedly made employees uncomfortable. Paragraph
20 is the allegation that Counsellor J asked employees questions in relation to their sex
lives which were allegedly irrelevant. Paragraph 21 implicitly suggests a conflict of
interest in that employees were required by the HEA to see Counsellor J in furtherance
of the counsellors own recommendations.
14
having completed an outpatient detox program, refused to deal with Counsellor J any
longer by reason of his alleged unprofessional conduct, which included the counsellor
talking openly to another client on the phone while Employee E was present. Employee
E was eventually referred to another counsellor.
b.
The HEA categorically asserts that Counsellor J is qualified for the counselling
tasks which were assigned to him and was recognized as such by Shepell-FGI. In
support of that assertion the HEA cites the following qualifications held by Counsellor J:
x
x
x
x
x
x
The HEA stresses that the Union has cited no legislative, regulatory or medical
basis for its position that a person in Counsellor Js position must be a specialist in
addiction counselling to be qualified for the work that he does and contends that nothing
in the Nova Scotia Counselling Therapists Act or the Nova Scotia Psychologists Act
15
would prohibit Counsellor J from providing the counselling services which he does. Nor,
counsel emphasizes, did Counsellor J ever hold himself out as a psychologist or purport
to practice psychology, contrary to the Psychologists Act.
As well, with respect to the Unions assertion that Counsellor J was not properly
trained to assess whether an individual is dependent on drugs and/or alcohol, the HEA
notes that no individual was in fact identified by the Union who was allegedly improperly
assessed as dependent by Counsellor J. In that regard counsel points to documented
confirmation of the substance abuse and dependence status of a number of employees
dealt with in the material placed before the Arbitrator including Employee C, Employee
M, Employee E and Employee N.
Accordingly, the HEA stresses that Counsellor J was at all material times a
qualified counsellor in accordance with the standards of the Canadian Professional
Counsellors Association and the Canadian College of Professional Counsellors and
Psychotherapists and strongly disputes the Unions suggestion that there was any
impropriety in the HEA utilizing Counsellor J or in providing his services to employees.
c.
The Employer rejects the suggestion of any conflict of interest on the part of
Counsellor J on the basis that he himself counselled employees following his own
assessment and recommendations.
16
recommended himself as necessarily being the person to provide counselling and that
in all cases it was Shepell-FGI which independently made the determination as to
whether an employee should be counselled by Counsellor J, following Counsellor Js
assessment of that individual.
Based on the precedent of PIPEDA case summary number 287, the HEA argues
that the collection of what might otherwise be viewed as sensitive personal information
may be justified in the context of ensuring safety where the employee in question
17
occupies a safety sensitive position. In that regard, the HEA suggests that the cancer
diagnosis of Employee M could fairly be viewed as an impediment to the resolution of
his substance dependency, having regard to his history.
In the foregoing context counsel stresses that the HEA is responsible for the
safety of employees in a substantially safety sensitive workplace. That, he submits,
raises critical sensitivities with respect to the circumstances of substance dependent
employees who may be at risk of relapsing. Counsel stresses that the potential for
relapse was in fact part of a substantial argument made by the Union in a submission
made to the Arbitrator in respect of another employee who grieved his dismissal,
Employee AC.
18
e.
of the grievance to assert that the Union should not be permitted to now take a wholly
different position from the position it has consistently taken over years with respect to
Counsellor Js qualifications and the HEAs utilization of his counselling services. The
HEA asserts that for many years, without any apparent objection until the grievance was
filed on April 17, 2014, the Union acquiesced in all elements of the HEAs utilization of
Counsellor J as its EAP Coordinator, which included his making assessments of Union
members and then subsequently providing the recommended treatment and
counselling. The HEA further emphasizes that the acceptance of Counsellor J was
19
With respect to the HEAs assertion of an obligation on the part of the Union to
clearly and promptly express its concerns or objections to the manner in which an
employer has proceeded reference is made to the decision of Arbitrator Weiler in Re
Corporation of the City of Penticton and Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local
20
608, (1978), 18 L.A.C. (2d) 307 (Weiler). Reference is further made to the decision of
Arbitrator MacDowell in Re Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging Ltd. and International
Woodworkers of America, Local 2-242, (1982), 6 L.A.C. (3d) 30 (MacDowell).
Counsel points out that it was only with the filing of the grievance on April 17,
2014 that the HEA was first advised that the Union believed that Counsellor J was
unqualified, was in a conflict of interest position and improperly disclosed personal
information to the HEA. Its counsel stresses that the HEA was therefore deprived of the
ability to address alleged problems with Counsellor J prior to the filing of the grievance
on April 17, 2014.
Counsel for the HEA submits that the Unions failure to object to Counsellor J
until April of 2014 and its specific agreement to him as the designated counsellor for an
employee in a settlement agreement made on or about April 3, 2014, amounts to a
representation by the Union that in its view Counsellor J was acceptable. Counsel
maintains that the HEA has effectively relied, to its detriment, on what for all purposes
was conduct and representations by the Union to the effect that Counsellor J was in fact
generally acceptable to the Union. (On the question of detrimental reliance further
reference is made to the affirming decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Nor-Man
Regional Health Authority Inc. v. Manitoba Assn. of Health Care Professionals, 2011,
S.C.C. 59; Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc. v. Manitoba Assn. of Health Care
Professionals [2011] 3 S.C.R.) 616.) The HEAs counsel submits that the fact that no
meaningful protest was made to the HEA with respect to Counsellor J prior to the filing
21
of the grievance effectively prevented the HEA from considering and dealing with the
issue. It was only when the HEA became aware of certain Union objections to
Counsellor J that it was able to immediately take steps, without prejudice, to assign a
different counsellor.
Finally, counsel for the HEA maintains that in all the circumstances, given the
Unions consistent acceptance of Counsellor J over the years, it should be concluded
that the Unions motivation for filing the grievance was solely an attempt to have
negative employee reports filed by Counsellor J thrown out so they would all get their
jobs back.
h.
the Unions request that the HEA not refer any further bargaining unit members to
Counsellor J is now academic, given that the HEA has, without prejudice, ceased to
refer employees to Counsellor J. With respect to the request for an order that reports
and communications from Counsellor J concerning all employees be removed from the
employee files and destroyed, counsel submits that such an extraordinary order could
only be justified if the Union has shown that the reports in question are inaccurate or
otherwise tainted by reason of Counsellor Js alleged deficiencies, something that
counsel submits has not been established in this matter.
22
As regards the Unions request for damages for mental distress for employees
counselled by Counsellor J, the HEA draws to the Arbitrators attention judicial
precedents which indicate the need for medical evidence and/or documentation to
establish the alleged distress. In that regard reference is made to the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Keays v. Honda Canada Inc., [2008], S.C.C. 39, as well as
Macdonald-Ross v. Connect North America Corp., (2010), CarswellNB 373.
Counsel for the Employer further submits that there is no basis to award lost
wages for employees diagnosed as dependent absent clear evidence that they were in
fact not dependent. Implicit in that argument is the suggestion that there is no evidence
to that effect, and no real controversy as to the substance dependence of the
employees who may have, by reason of that condition, suffered some loss in wages.
Counsel for the HEA submits that any damages in the instant case and any
related remedy must be limited to a period calculated within seven days of the filing of
the grievance. In that regard the HEA refers the Arbitrator to the provisions of articles
11.02 and 11.05 of the collective agreement, as follows:
5.
a.
Commission vested with the authority to investigate all aspects of alleged irregularities
in the administration of the Substance Abuse Program which operates under the HEAs
Policy on Employee Safety and Assistance. The Arbitrator agrees with the HEA that the
text of the grievance itself is critical in determining the scope of matters to be dealt with.
24
Drawing on the text of the grievance, reproduced above, the Arbitrator is satisfied
that there are four basic grounds upon which the HEA is said to have acted arbitrarily,
unreasonably and beyond the scope of its management rights as articulated in article
2.03. The first is whether Counsellor J, retained by the HEA, is properly qualified to
diagnose or treat issues of drug and/or alcohol dependency. The second is whether,
following Counsellor Js assessment of an employee, his recommendations that
employees attend counselling sessions with him were inappropriate and caused a
conflict of interest. The third issue raised in the grievance concerns the question of
whether alleged breaches of confidentiality through alleged improper disclosures to the
HEA of personal information about employees went beyond the degree of consent given
by employees, i.e. whether there was improper and excessive disclosure of personal
information in violation of PIPEDA and the fourth is whether Counsellor J breached the
employees entitlement to privacy respecting their counselling and/or otherwise acted in
an unprofessional manner in his provision of counselling services.
b.
inarbitrability of these issues. The HEA objected to the arbitrability of matters set out in
paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 30 of the Unions Statement of Issues, which
have been detailed in secton 3 of this Award regarding the position of the HEA. In the
Arbitrators view these parts of the evidence tendered by the Union and objected to by
the HEA go to the core of the Unions effort to support or demonstrate the allegations
which are central to its grievance, that being that Counsellor J is not properly trained or
25
qualified to assess or treat the drug and/or alcohol dependence of employees and that
his actions in counselling employees have been both unprofessional and in breach of
the collective agreement and PIPEDA. To put it differently, the disputed allegations go
to the substance of the grievance. For these reasons, the Arbitrator is compelled to
reject the submission of the HEA that the allegations raised in paragraphs 19, 20, 21,
25, 26, 27, 28 and 30 of the Unions brief are inarbitrable.
c.
allegation that Counsellor J was not properly trained or qualified to either assess
whether an employee is dependent on drugs and/or alcohol or recommend an
appropriate treatment program as alleged by the Union. The Arbitrator has difficulty
with that submission of the Union. As reflected in the materials before the Arbitrator,
Counsellor J has a Master of Education degree, with qualification as a Registered
Professional Counsellor (RPC). He held that status while he was a member in good
standing of the Canadian Counselling and Psychotherapy Association, as well as the
status of Master Practitioner of Counselling Psychology (MPCP) and a member in the
Canadian College of Professional Counsellors and Psychotherapists (CCPCP). It is
further undisputed that Counsellor J was a member in good standing of the Canadian
Professional Counsellors Association. As confirmed in the unchallenged submission
contained in the HEAs materials, the Nova Scotia Counselling Therapists Act and
Psychologists Act contain no provisions which would prohibit Counsellor J from
providing the services he did with the qualifications he possessed. The Arbitrator is
26
satisfied in the correctness of the HEAs assertion that Counsellor J did not hold himself
out as a psychologist or practice psychology contrary to the Psychologists Act.
Moreover, the Arbitrator considers it significant, as stressed by the HEA, that Counsellor
J has over 25 years of experience in counselling, including a one year internship with
the Nova Scotia Drug Dependency Commission, in addition to his 30 years of
experience with Correctional Services of Canada.
In the Arbitrators view the standing and background of Counsellor J, and the
qualifications reviewed at greater length above, confirm that Counsellor J did have the
formal training and qualifications to perform the duties which were assigned to him by
Shepell-FGI Consultants as a substance abuse counsellor for the HEA. The Arbitrator is
unable to sustain the Unions allegation that by retaining Shepell-FGI together with
Counsellor J and having employees referred to him for assessment and treatment
following positive tests for drugs and/or alcohol, the Employer has acted in a manner
that is unreasonable, arbitrary or constitutes an excessive exercise of managements
rights, as contained in the collective agreement.
27
d.
allegation that Counsellor J was in a conflict of interest in his relations with employees
referred to him.
necessary dynamics of the referral process. Obviously, the first step in dealing with an
employee with an alleged addiction problem is proper assessment. The evidence is
clear that because the HEA utilized the services of Shepell-FGI, Counsellor J, who
worked for Shepell-FGI, was repeatedly utilized to assess whether an employee of the
HEA was drug or alcohol dependent and whether treatment should be recommended.
Of particular significance, the unchallenged material before the Arbitrator confirms that it
was not Counsellor J himself, but rather the appropriate officer of the service provider,
Shepell-FGI, who made the specific referral of any given employee to Counsellor J for
both the assessment and subsequent counselling treatment. Accordingly, if there was a
conflict of interest arising from Counsellor J performing the assessment and providing
the follow-up treatment, (which I specifically do not find) it was not a conflict of interest
created by Counsellor J.
28
The Union alleges that in any event when Counsellor J both conducted
assessments of an employees dependence and also recommended treatment by
himself he acted contrary to the ethics and standards of practice for counsellors and
psychotherapists.
Code of Ethics
1. I will make every effort which appropriate (e.g.
except when the client is in crisis) to complete a
comprehensive standard Clinical Assessment at
the beginning of the counselling relationship;
2. If I do not have the skill level to provide the help
needed, I will refer a client to other qualified
professionals;
3. I will preserve the clients right to confidentiality
and will not release any identifying information
verbally or in writing without the clients signed
permission (excepting the threat of suicide, homicide
or suspected child abuse or when requested by a
Court of law);
4. I will not engage in any relationship with the
client
other
than
the
counsellor-client
relationship;
29
safe,
private
setting
for
[emphasis added]
The terms of the Code of Ethics anticipate that a counsellor will engage in both
assessments and counselling. The Code does not draw a wall between the two
services. In all the circumstances, the Arbitrator cannot accept the Unions allegation
that Counsellor J acted through a conflict of interest in his assessment of employees
when it was recommended that those he found to be substance dependent should
attend counselling sessions with himself. Moreover, even if it was Counsellor J who
recommended that he should carry out the counselling for an employee he had
assessed, the Arbitrator has been made aware of no professional or ethical standard in
the field which would prevent a professional counsellor from both assessing a subject
and recommending that that same subject pursue a program of counselling with him or
her, absent fraud or bad faith, which are not alleged here. Accordingly, the Unions
allegation of a conflict of interest must be dismissed.
30
e.
manner and in a fashion which compromised the personal privacy rights of the
employees referred to him, because Counsellor J received employees for counselling
sessions within his own home. It is noted that there is no suggestion in the evidence
that anyone else was present in Counsellor Js home during the course of any
counselling session with any employee.
While it is clear from the documentation reviewed above that the counsellors
obligation of confidentiality is paramount, there is nothing on its face which would
suggest that meeting privately and alone with a client within his or her home would
constitute a violation of confidentiality or privacy on the part of a counsellor. Home
offices are not uncommon in many professions and the use of a home to provide
professional services is far from unheard of.
Even apart from the fact that no employee seems to have specifically objected to
attending at counselling sessions in Counsellor Js home, the Arbitrator can find nothing
objectionable, in and of itself, in the fact that Counsellor J had his counselling office in
his home. The Union has directed the Arbitrator to no law, regulation or guideline which
would prohibit a professional counsellor from utilizing his or her home to meet with or
deal with clients, particularly when there is no other person present during his or her
provision of counselling services and where no indiscretion or violation of the obligation
of confidentiality has been demonstrated.
31
On the basis of the foregoing, the Arbitrator, therefore, cannot sustain the
Unions suggestion that meeting and counselling employees in his home was of itself
unprofessional or improper on the part of Counsellor J. Accordingly, this aspect of the
Unions grievance is dismissed.
f.
32
loss of a parent or the serious illness of a child, can have a bearing on the mental state
and potential stability of any person. However, to tie the disclosure of Employee Ms
diagnosis of cancer and surgery to concerns for the potential for relapse, standing on its
own, is simply too facile to justify the disclosure and, in the Arbitrators view, violates the
counsellors obligation of confidentiality toward the employee entrusted to him.
With
The
Arbitrator considers that this aspect of the evidence discloses a serious breach of the
confidentiality and privacy rights of Employee M that, on its face, would appear to be a
violation of Employee Ms right to confidentiality as reflected in paragraph 3 of the
Code of Ethics of the Canadian Professional Counsellors Association, set out above.
Employee M had every reason to believe that sharing confidential information with
Counsellor J could be done in the knowledge that it would not go any further. The
Arbitrator is satisfied that Counsellor Js failure to respect that expectation of
confidentiality could foreseeably undermine the trust that is essential to the viability of
the counselling process itself.
33
Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, the Arbitrator must agree with the
Union that Counsellor J blatantly exceeded the limits of confidentiality when, in his
written report in relation to Employee M dated April 1, 2014, he expressly disclosed that
Employee M had recently been diagnosed with lung cancer.
g.
Counsellor J arise with respect to the variety of public locations he chose for carrying
out some of his counselling services. The unchallenged evidence confirms that a
number of counselling sessions conducted with Employee M occurred outside
Counsellor Js home, including various Tim Hortons locations in Halifax, as well as in
the course of walking openly on the Halifax waterfront.
The Arbitrator appreciates that there may be limits to what an employer can do to
respect rights of confidentiality. For example, when an employee is required in the
workplace to provide a cheek swab or a urine sample as part of an appropriate drug
testing program, it may not always be possible for that process to unfold without some
degree of observation or knowledge by others, no matter what precautions may be
taken. When, however, individuals are referred to professionals for assessment and
34
The Arbitrator is satisfied, on the whole, that Counsellor J genuinely cared about
his clients and acted in good faith. However, the inescapable conclusion which the
Arbitrator is compelled to draw is that on a number of occasions Counsellor J did fail in
the duty of confidentiality and privacy which he owed to all of the employees in his care
by placing himself and employees he was counselling in a variety of public places
where the employees were exposed to being seen by the public in the company of
Counsellor J.
In the Arbitrators view, the above described failing on the part of Counsellor J
must be viewed as serious and expressly contrary to the confidentiality requirements of
the Code of Ethics of the Canadian Professional Counsellors Association, reproduced
above, and arguably contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of PIPEDA. In the Arbitrators
opinion nothing in the collective agreement, or in the law generally, would expressly or
impliedly authorize the Employer to compel its employees to engage with a professional
offering services in the obviously sensitive area of substance abuse counselling in
35
circumstances where those services are rendered in public places, in a manner that
fails to respect the privacy and dignity of employees by not maintaining rigorous
standards of strict confidentiality.
While the Arbitrator has reviewed the explanation for his actions provided in the
Will Say Statement of Counsellor J, the Arbitrator cannot accept that he had any
legitimate purpose in violating the confidentiality of employees under his care, by
effectively communicating to the world at large that they were being counselled by him,
as occurred for example in the case of Employee M who was compelled to undergo
counselling sessions at Tim Hortons restaurants, a Home Depot location and during the
course of Counsellor Js grocery shopping. There is nothing before the Arbitrator that
would mitigate the following assertion contained in the submission of the Union This
experience was extremely stressful and uncomfortable for [Employee M], who did not
want to be seen in public with his counsellor and was always fearful of running into
someone he knew. That is clearly confirmed in the Will Say Statement of Employee M
himself, as follows:
36
8 of the Code of Ethics which mandates a safe and private setting for counselling, along
with the expectation of privacy found in PIPEDA, which I am also satisfied is implicit in
any employment relationship and in the collective agreement.
37
conversation. That was plainly unprofessional on the part of the counselor. In my view
it also deeply offended the rights of Employee E who would have every reason to doubt
his ability to communicate at any time thereafter in confidence with Counsellor J.
important to stress that Counsellor J, who is the focal subject of much of the grievance,
is a properly qualified and experienced professional in the field of counselling. The
Arbitrator is satisfied that as a general matter he proceeded in good faith in the delivery
of his services.
While the Arbitrator does not find that there was anything inappropriate in
Counsellor J interviewing employees in his own home or occasionally giving them a ride
in his car, the Arbitrator has determined that Counsellor Js inclusion of such highly
personal and private medical information as a cancer diagnosis in his report to the HEA
and speaking openly on the telephone with one employee while in the presence of
another constituted a serious breach of the confidentiality requirements of the Code of
Ethics and a breach of the protections of PIPEDA.
Moreover, the Arbitrator must agree with the Union that in certain other specifics,
and on some occasions, Counsellor Js actions and statements did violate the right of
privacy and confidentiality to which the employees under his care were entitled,
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including as set out under the Code of Ethics. As noted above, the Arbitrator finds that
that is specifically established in his having counselled employees in public places such
as Tim Hortons restaurants, where they were clearly uncomfortable by reason of the
risk of being seen by others.
In fairness to the HEA, it would appear that for some time at least the HEA was
unaware of certain of the serious allegations now being made in respect of Counsellor
J. The Arbitrator accepts as truthful the Will Say Statement of HEA President Richard
Moore that it was only at a grievance meeting on or about April 17, 2014 that he
became aware of the allegation of Counsellor J asking employees inappropriate
questions about their sex lives. Further to that question, he relates, and the Arbitrator
accepts, that the allegations relating to Employee Ms counselling by Counsellor J were
never brought to his attention until after the grievance was filed and Employee Ms Will
Say Statement was produced. Be that as it may, however, in the Arbitrators view it
cannot be seriously argued that the HEA can disclaim all responsibility for the actions of
Counsellor J on the basis that it did not specifically know of them or endorse them.
The HEA assigned the administrative delivery of the EAP to Medavie Blue Cross,
which itself contracted with Shepell-FGI which administers a reputable EAP service
known as inConfidence and employed Counselor J as the EAP Coordinator.
Accordingly, the fact is that Counsellor J was effectively chosen as a counsellor by the
HEA and that consequently employees found to be drug or alcohol dependent had little
alternative but to deal with Counsellor J, the counsellor retained by their employer. The
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employer cannot disavow or escape responsibility for the actions of its chosen agent
and must bear liability for any violation, in the course of his duties, of the rights of the
employees in the bargaining unit for which he was responsible.
While the Arbitrator has been compelled to make some difficult determinations,
this Award should not be understood as a wholesale condemnation of Counsellor J and
the services which he provided. There is uncontroverted evidence before the Arbitrator
that Counsellor J did provide valuable counselling as acknowledged by a number of the
employees themselves. This Award must be understood as dealing strictly with those
proven instances where the privacy and confidentiality rights of employees were,
whether by oversight or otherwise, denied to employees in their dealings with
Counsellor J and his communications with their employer.
The conclusive fact, which the Arbitrator cannot ignore, is that certain
transgressions of privacy and confidentiality did occur in a manner which can be
assumed to have caused distress to any reasonable employee. As noted above, the
Arbitrator is also compelled to conclude that the actions of Counsellor J did depart from
the professional guidelines in respect of confidentiality which governed him, as well as
the overall protections of PIPEDA and the specific protection of personal information
reflected in section 5(3) of that statute which provides:
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For the reasons related, in a number of instances, the actions of Counsellor J violated
the above-noted standards.
In approaching this aspect of the grievance, the Arbitrator is satisfied that there is
a degree of merit to the assertion of the HEA with respect to the weight to be given to
the Unions own acceptance of Counsellor J over a period of years. As reflected in the
material reviewed above, for several years and in a number of instances, the Union
handled the cases of a number of employees who were assessed by Counsellor J in the
knowledge that he would both assess them and would provide the counselling
recommended in his own report.
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In the result, for the reasons set out, the Arbitrator declines to accept the HEAs
claim of estoppel. Accordingly, the Arbitrators findings of breaches of the various
employees rights to confidentiality and privacy, as set out, must stand .
j.
being that Cousellor J acted in breach of his obligations regarding confidentiality and
privacy in respect of some of the employees he counselled by (1) including in his
reports to the HEA unduly personal and private information inclusive of medical
diagnoses; (2) by carrying out counselling sessions with various employees in public
places, and (3) by engaging in some professionally indiscreet communications with
various employees, inclusive of openly discussing over the telephone the circumstances
of another employee in front of one of the grievors.
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There are four additional remedies that have been sought by the Union: First, the
Union seeks damages for mental distress and harm to dignity and privacy for the
affected employees. Second, the Union requests that the Arbitrator make an order for
the removal of all reports and communications made by Counsellor J to Shepell-FGI
and/or the HEA in respect of the employees affected, as well as the destruction of those
documents. Third, the Union requests compensation for lost wages in respect of lost
work opportunities which resulted from being required, on the recommendations of
Counsellor J, to attend counselling sessions, treatment or other programs. Fourth, the
Union asks for an order directing that no bargaining unit employees ever again be
referred to Counsellor J for assessment and/or treatment.
Regarding damages, Union counsel submits that the remedy in the instant case
should recognize the violation of the privacy and confidentiality rights of the employees,
including the violations of the provisions of PIPEDA.
compelled to spend with Counsellor J, counsel submits that Employee M should receive
damages in the amount of $10,000.00, while the others, Employee C, Employee N and
Employee E, should be compensated at the level of $5,000.00 each.
At
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The Arbitrator does, however, have some doubt with respect to the amounts of
compensation sought by the Union in respect of the employees involved. In the
Arbitrators view the measure of damages must be kept in reasonable perspective.
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There is no medical evidence or other documentary material filed by the Union before
the Arbitrator to suggest or confirm that the employees affected suffered substantial
medical impacts, such as clinical depression, by reason of their dealings with
Counsellor J. What the case before the Arbitrator reveals is repeated instances of
errors in judgment and insensitivity on the part of Counsellor J which did, as the
Arbitrator has found, fail to respect the rights of privacy and confidentiality of these
employees. Bearing in mind that an arbitrators jurisdiction is to award damages which
are compensatory, and not punitive, the Arbitrator is of the view that the amounts
suggested by counsel for the Union are beyond what is necessary for that purpose.
In the result, the Arbitrator deems it appropriate to direct, and does direct, that
Employee M be compensated in the amount $5,000.00 and that Employee C be
compensated by the payment of an amount of $2,500.00,
relation to the violation of their rights of privacy and confidentiality as a result of the
actions and reports of Counsellor J.
I am satisfied that
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Regarding the removal and destruction of reports, the Union urges the Arbitrator
to order the redaction and destruction of the reports of Counsellor J through ShepellFGI in respect of all four grievors, being Employee M, Employee C, Employee N and
Employee E. The Arbitrator has substantial concern with the breadth of the Unions
request and considers that it would be going too far. The Union has not challenged, for
example, the determinations made by Counsellor J in the case of a number of
employees to the effect that they were in fact substance dependent. On what basis
should those determinations, which are effectively unchallenged, be removed from the
Employers records and destroyed? The Arbitrator can see no responsible basis for
such a direction.
In contrast, however, the Arbitrator does find that there is reason for legitimate
concern with respect to the nature and extent of the personal and private information
which may be contained in reports which Counsellor J made to the HEA. One obvious
example of such a problem was the communication to the HEA by Counsellor J of
confidential information concerning an employee having been diagnosed with lung
cancer.
The
Arbitrator therefore directs that the parties work together to review the reports of
Counsellor J provided to Shepell-FGI or the HEA in respect of each employee with
whom he dealt.
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Turning to the Unions request for compensation for lost wages, the Arbitrator
finds no basis for awarding compensation for lost wages in respect of alleged lost work
opportunities resulting from the actions of Counsellor J or for the loss of work time
during his counselling. No facts have been placed before the Arbitrator to justify such a
remedy. Finally, as the unchallenged representations before the Arbitrator would
indicate that the counsellor in question is no longer retained by the HEA, no order in
respect of his continued retainer appears to be necessary. For the purposes of clarity,
however, had it been necessary to do so the Arbitrator would have made such a
direction.
On the basis of the foregoing and for the reasons set out, the grievance is
allowed in part and denied in part. The Arbitrator retains jurisdiction in respect of the
grievances considered herein in the event of any dispute between the parties
concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Award or the fashioning of the
remedies ordered.
Michel G. Picher
Michel G. Picher
Arbitrator
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