Review

Author(s): Henry J. Friendly

Review by: Henry J. Friendly
Source: The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Autumn, 1976), pp. 255-259
Published by: The University of Chicago Law Review
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1599266
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REVIEW
Police Discretion,KENNETH CULP DAVIS. West PublishingCo., St.
Paul, Minn.,1975.Pp. xii, 176.$4.45.
HenryJ. Friendlyt
This littlebookis a sequeltoProfessor
Davis's pioneering
essay,
Discretionary
Justice-A Preliminary
Inquiry(1969). It is a study
of"selectiveenforcement"'
ofthe criminallaw by theChicagopolice,mainlywithrespectto minorcrimes.Withhisusual refreshing
to dirtyhishandsbygrubbyworkon thefacts,Professor
willingness
Davis and fiveassistantsinterviewed
threehundredpoliceofficers,
fivedeputysuperintendents,
and the superintendent.
Whilethese
interviews
doubtlessrepresent
a reliablecrosssectionoftheChicago
police,it is unfortunate
that similarinvestigations
werenot conductedin a fewotherplaces to see howtypicaltheChicagoexperiforwhatProfessor
enceis. We mustbe grateful,
however,
Davis has
given us.

It is not too surprising

to learnthat,despiteIllinoislaws and
ofeverycriminal
Chicagoordinancesdemandingfullenforcement
law, "[s]ome law is always or almost always enforced,some is
neveroralmostneverenforced,
and someis sometimes
enforced
and
is unattainableas a practical
sometimesnot."2Full enforcement
has failedbya widemargin
matternotonlybecausethelegislature
to providethe necessaryfunds,3but because no one could really
wantit. IftheChicagopolicearrestedall unmarried
adultsofoppossex
who
were
or
all
ite
livingtogether,
boysridingbicycleson sidein publicparks,
beerwhilepicnicking
walks,orall familiesdrinking
offices
and thecriminal
theywouldnotonlywrecktheprosecutors'
courtsystembutwouldcreatea publicoutcry.Despitetheenthusiformultitudinous
asm oflegislators
penalstatutesand ordinances,
and lawssubjecting
policemento disciplineorevencriminalpunishmentforfailureto enforce
them,thepoliceare expectedto exercise
concernstheadministrative
somejudgment.The criticism
process,
or moreaccuratelythe lack of process,by whichthis exerciseof
judgmentis governed.
t SeniorJudge,UnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheSecondCircuit;Presiding
Judge,
SpecialCourtundertheRegionalRail Reorganization
Act.
K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 173(1975)[hereinafter
citedas POLICE DISCRETION].
2 Id. at 1.
3

Id. at 81.

255

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256

The University
of ChicagoLaw Review

[44:255

no policiesas
has promulgated
The ChicagoPoliceDepartment
The reasonit
to which,and to whatextent,lawsshallbe enforced.
headsindulgein "thepervahas notdoneso is thatthedepartment
are
thatall statutesandordinances
sivesystemoffalselypretending
This leavesthemakingofpolicyto thepatrolman
fullyenforced."4
in factmorethanmightbe
on thebeat. Somedegreeofuniformity,
among
expected,is achievedby the "bamboowireless"operating
and is oftenbasedon
is incomplete,
theofficers.
Buttheuniformity
andjudgeswilldo. A notable
erroneous
notionsofwhatprosecutors
instanceis the generalrefusalto arrest,evenfora seriouscrime
committedin the presenceof knownwitnesses,whenthe victim
declinesto signa complaint.5
withmanyofProfessor
Therecan be no rationaldisagreement
selective
Davis's proposedremedies.The principlesgoverning
at thetop,notat the botnonenforcement
shouldbe determined
tom.Onlythe superintendent
and his chiefassistantsknowwhat
thedepartment's
resourcesare in personneland equipment.Only
counterparts
theyhaveconstantdirectaccessto theirprosecutorial
and the judges and top administrative
personnelof the criminal
courts.Onlytheyare in a positionto commission
studiesbycriminologists to determine whether partial or only occasional
enforcement
is worththe priceand whetherthereare not better
orguidelines
alternatives.6
The resultwouldbe a setofinstructions
to prethan
least
qualified
who
are
best
rather
developedbythose
nota shortcoming,
thatin manycases
parethem.It is a necessity,
theseguidelines
willnotbe altogether
precise.'Forin mostinstances thevarietyofcircumstances
is toogreatfora fixedformula;
the
notto eliminateit.
policediscretion,
objectiveis to confine
Professor
Davis wouldhavesuchguidelines
developedbyruleprocedure
describedin
the notice-and-comment
makingfollowing
section4 oftheAdministrative
ProcedureAct.8Ifhe meansto proId. at 52.
disapofficers
whowereinterviewed
Id. at 7-12.In thisinstancemostofthesuperior
buttherewasno indication
to do anything
aboutit.
theyintended
provedthepractice,
6 E.g., with
Id. at 20-27.
ofprostitution.
respectto thecontrol
whichusessuchphrasesas "in
E.g., a proposed
rulewithrespectto socialgambling,
absenceofspecialcircumstances,"
high
arrest,"and "extraordinarily
"we do notordinarily
stakes."Id. at 142.
innaturefromthat
is quitedifferent
hereconsidered
8 5 U.S.C. ? 553. The rulemaking
and
discussedbyJudgeMcGowanin hisHolmesDeviseLectures.McGowan,Rule-Making
thePolice,70MICH. L. REV. 659(1972).TherulesadvocatedbyJudgeMcGowanaredesigned
withtheconstitutional
to helppolicemen
theirdutiesin a manner
consistent
rights
perform
advorules.The guidelines
forexclusionary
ofdefendants
and thereby
relievethepressure
whennotto enforce
Davis tellpolicemen
catedbyProfessor
penallawsand ordinances.

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Review

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257

vide forpublic hearingswhenhe advocatesthat "[t]hoseaffected

and to submit
[should]have a chanceto expresstheirpreferences
I have seriousdoubts.Take the questionshow
theirarguments,"9
and howfarthe policeshouldenforcethelaws against,say,selling
films.I agree
literatureand displayingpornographic
pornographic
in
entirelythat the police shouldconsultwiththeircounterparts
and judges,and shouldtry
othercities,as wellas withprosecutors
to ascertainwhat proceduresproducethe optimumcost-benefit
ratio.But I do notthinkit wouldbe seemly,or conduciveto good
relationswithlegislativebodies,forthe police to conductpublic
hearingsat whichcivil libertariansor pornopublishersor film
and the
thatthereshouldbe no enforcement
makerswouldtestify
Indeed,I
AnthonyComstockswouldclamorforfullenforcement.
believethat allowingsuch participantsto enterthefraywouldbe
sincewhateverthepolicedid theywouldbe accounterproductive
thatoughtto be appliedto legislative
to
cusedofyielding pressures
bodies.
I have withrespectto Professor
A moreimportantdifficulty
Davis's proposalsis what seems to me a certainfuzzinessabout
sanctions.In the firstplace, we are told that "[a] limitedjudicial
withrespectto otheradminisreviewofthekindthatis customary
trativeactionis clearlydesirable.Membersofthebar are likelyto
be almostunanimousin thatjudgment."'"The secondsentenceis
ofthebarareattractedtojudicialreview
correct;members
certainly
ofgoatsin rut.But reviewbywhatstanreminiscent
witha fervor
dards and at the suit of whom?In states withfullenforcement
statutes,the appropriatelegal standardwouldseemto be fullennobodywants.Even in stateswithoutsuch enforcement-which
actments,are the courtsto tell the police,save in cases wherethe
ontheirface,justhow
discriminatory
rulesareraciallyorreligiously
and
governing
admittedly
ornotenforce
farthepoliceshallenforce
who
valid criminal statutes? Quo warranto?Furthermore, has
standingto invokethisstrangeexerciseofjudicialpower?I knowof
on thebasis ofrace
no principle,absenta chargeofdiscrimination
to
forenforcement
selected
a
person
entitle
that
would
or religion,
relatedtopublicparticiA questionsomewhat
9 POLICE DISCRETION 106;see id. at 114-15.
theguidelines
shouldbe madepublicwhenadopted.
is whether
pationin openrulemaking
Police
is permitted.
This is in turnrelatedto the questionhowfarselectiveenforcement
POLICE DISCRETION 101-03,107,alseemto endorsepublication,
themselves
organizations
policechiefwithwhomI talked
thoughthe idea seemedanathemato a highlyintelligent
is thatmostofsuchruleswillleak
argument
on thesubject.Probablytheclinching
briefly
out anyway,perhapsin a garbledfashion;it is thusbetterto publishthem.
I

Id. at 118.

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258

The University
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[44:255

complainthatothersequallyguiltywerenot." Thesearenot"rules"
fromone
the conductof citizens;theyare instructions
governing
policemanto others.
To moveto a secondproblem,whatsanctionsshouldbe afIfa policemanfailstoarrest
oftheinstructions?
forviolations
forded
so,
he shouldbe subjectto
tell
him
to
do
whenthe instructions
weremade.But
wouldbe ifa complaint
disciplineand presumably
wherethepolicemanmakesan otherwhatoftheoppositesituation,
We surelydo not
prohibit?
wiselawfularrestwhichtheinstructions
want to createyet anotherdefense,unrelatedto guilt,forthose
chargedwithcrime.Indeed,we are told,withwhatseemsto me
can curexcessiveoptimism,
thatrulesforguidingpolicediscretion
rules.'2As for
tail ratherthanexpandjudicialuse ofexclusionary
measures,thereis some
disciplinary
moredirectsanctionsthrough
a
ofharassment,
circumstances
doubtwhether,
save in aggravated
for
would,orevenshould,disciplinea patrolman
policedepartment
to an instrucby statutebut contrary
makingan arrestpermitted
tion.Allthatremainsis a suitfordamagesbythevictimofan arrest
in contravention
oftheguidelines.Thereis surelyno federalright
to sucha remedy,
and I woulddoubtthatthestateswouldprovide
one. Perhapsthe best thatcan or shouldbe expectedis thatthe
hischances
willgointhepoliceman'srecordandwillaffect
incident
forpromotion.
requiresa
I mustalso expressdoubtsthat the Constitution
withrespectto selective
to issue instructions
police department
as somepassagesin Chapter6 mightbe deemedto
enforcement,
therecentdecisioninRizzo
imply.Apartfromotherconsiderations,
v. Goode'3givesscantcomfort
to thisview.
onlyminordisagreehowever,
The foregoing
remarks
represent,
mentswiththeauthor'smajorthesis.Nothingcouldbe worsethan
leavingtheindividualpatrolmanto makead hocdecisionsin each
and at worstreflect
case, decisionsthat at best are uninformed
and even
personalvalue judgmentsnotsharedby thecommunity
ofsomeselectivity
exercise
" Cf.Oylerv. Boles,368U.S. 448,456(1962)("theconscious
thequotedrein enforcement
violation").Although
is notin itselfa federalconstitutional
onthisscore.See also
therewasnodisagreement
opinion,
markwasmadeonlyina plurality
LindaR.S. v. RichardD., 410U.S. 614(1973).
12 POLICE DISCRETION 117.HereagainI woulddifferentiate
proposedby
theguidelines
Professor
Davis fromthe kindof rulesdiscussedby JudgeMcGowan.McGowan,RuleMakingand thePolice,70 MICH. L. REV. 659(1972).
'3 423U.S. 362(1976),revg506F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974),aff'g357F. Supp. 1289(E.D.
Pa. 1973).Professor
Davis and manyothersregarded
thedistrict
courtdecisionas "quite
inspiring." POLICE DISCRETION 130-31.

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Review

19761

259

maliceagainstindividualsor groups.Professor
Davis pointsus in
the rightdirectionas he so oftenhas done.
Sincethisissueis a tributeto Professor
Davis, theeditorshave
allowedme a finalparagraphto expressmypersonalindebtedness
to him.Mr. JusticeJacksonwas wiserthanhe knewwhenhe proclaimed that "[t]he rise of administrative
bodies probablyhas
beenthemostsignificant
legaltrendofthelastcentury
and perhaps
morevalues todayare affected
by theirdecisionsthanby thoseof
all thecourts,reviewofadministrative
decisionsapart.""4That was
said at a timewhentheterm"administrative
bodies"was generally
equatedwiththeindependent
federalregulatory
agenciesand their
state counterparts,
beforethe blossomingofthe welfarestate and
the systemofmass administrative
justice.It wouldhave been easy
forProfessor
Davis, whose1958Treatise"5
markedhimas a master
of traditionaladministrative
law, to reston his laurelsand ignore
thesenewdevelopments.
Insteadhenotonlyhasrecognized
thatthe
focusof interesthas changed,but has revealedthat in thesenew
areas the host of cases whichreach the level of reportedagency
determinations
areonlythetipoftheiceberg.The greatestproblem
lies in the discretionary
decisionsthat"numberin thebillionsanAs
nually."'6 illustrated
bythebookherereviewedand hisremarkable AdministrativeLaw of the Seventies,'7he is guidingus in
thesenew areas withthe same combinationof a passionforjustice and a recognition
ofthe practicalities
ofgovernment
thathas
all his writings.
characterized
He has been a valued mentorto all
membersof thejudiciarywhohave been willingto listen-and to
thisone also a friend.
FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343U.S. 470,487 (1952)(dissenting

I
'7

K.
K.
K.

TREATISE),

DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

opinion).

(1958).

(1969).
(1976 Supp. to ADMINISTRATIVE
reviewedin Leventhal, Book Review, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 260 (1976).

DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE-A

PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 9

DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES

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LAW