2.

UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE DEBEMUS When the
law does not distinguish, neither should we distinguish.
Dabalos v RTC Br. 59, Angeles City, Pampangga, G.R. No. 190960, January
7, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Karlo Angelo Dabalos was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of R.A.
9262 Violence Against Women and Children before the RTC Branch 59, Angeles
Pampangga, for the act of violence on the complainant by pulling the latters hair,
punching the complainants back, shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and
degrading the complainants worth and dignity as a human being. The RTC ordered
for the arrest of the said petitioner.
Dabalos filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the order of the RTC
and insists that his act is not covered by R.A. 9262 due to the reason that he was
no longer in a dating relationship with the private respondent, thus the proximate
reason for the petitioners act is not their relationship. Instead, petitioner claims
that the act constituted was only Slight Physical Injuries under the Revised Penal
Code which falls under the Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the act constituted by the accused is covered by R.A. 9262.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the petition filed herein has no merit.
Sec. 3(a) of R.A. 9262 reads:
Section 3. Definition of Terms.
(a) Violence against women and their children refers to any act or series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or likely to result
in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.
The law is broad but it specifies two limiting qualifications for act or series of acts to
be considered a violation of R.A. 9262:
(a) It is committed against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had sexual or dating relationship, or with

whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or

illegitimate, within or without the family abode;
(b) It result in or likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
In Ang v Court of Appeals, The Court enumerated the elements constituting violence
against women
and their children through harassment, to wit:
1. The offender has or had sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of
harassment against the woman;
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to her.
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman, for R.A. 9262 to be applicable, it is not
indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship.
Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on
statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the
courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women
with whom the offender has or had sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled
by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship has ceased for as long as there
is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship.
The petition is DISMISSED. The Orders of the RTC Branch 59, Angeles, Pampangga
are AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the court is LIFTED an
the RTC is directed to continue with the Criminal proceedings.

SPOUSES ROMEO LL. PLOPENIO vs DAR and LBP

GR No. 161090
and
Eduardo Plopenio vs DAR and LBP
GR No. 161092
FACTS: Petitioner-spouses and Edwardo owns 11.8643 and 22.8349 hectares of
coconut land in Caramoan, Camarines Sur respectively. In 2000, the land of their
brother Gavino Plopenio was valued by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) at 51,125.60 per hectare in DARAB Case No. V-LV-040CS-00. On this basis, petitioners offered their entire landholdings to the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for acquisition and distribution pursuant to Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 6657.
On 26 October 2001, public respondent Land Bank sent a Notice of Valuation and
Adjudication valuing the land of petitioner-spouses at 23,485.00 per hectare and
that of petitioner Eduardo at 22,856.62 per hectare. Dissatisfied with Land Banks
offer, petitioners rejected the Notice of Valuation and Acquisition and referred the
matter to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Sur for
summary administrative proceedings.
The PARAD affirmed the valuation made by Land Bank in a Decision dated 5
September 2002, a copy of which petitioners received on 27 September 2002.
On 11, October 2002, or 14 days thereafter, petitioners filed their Motion for
Reconsideration. The PARAD denied their Motion in an Order dated 20 November
2002, which petitioners received on 21 December 2002.
Petitioners then filed separate Petitions before the SAC-RTC on 6 January 2003, or 16
days after their receipt of the PARADs Order. They explained that they were allowed
to file their appeal 15 days from the receipt of the Order of denial of their Motion for
Reconsideration. Since the 15th day fell on a Sunday, they reasoned that they
should be allowed to file their appeal until 6 January 2003.
In its answer, Land Bank alleged that the Decision of the PARAD had already
attained finality after the lapse of the 15-day period, counted from petitioners
receipt of the PARADs Decision. Thus, it argued that the SAC-RTC (Special Agrarian
Court-RTC) should no longer entertain the Petitions. In its assailed Decisions, the
SAC-RTC ruled that the Decision of the PARAD had already attained finality because
petitioners failed to file their Petitions on time.

From the Decisions and Orders of the SAC-RTC, petitioners then filed the instant
Petitions for Review directly before this Court. On 24 July 2006, we resolved to
consolidate the cases at bar, considering that the factual milieu and legal issues
involved in both cases are similar in nature.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners erred in applying Rule 45 of Rules of Court on
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court and not Rule 60 of Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law.

Held: The Supreme Court denied the consolidated petition for review on the
grounds that the petitioners resorted to a wrongful mode of appeal by applying Rule
45 of Rules of Court, filing the petition directly with the Supreme Court. The
Petitioners should have filed the petition to the Court of Appeals as provided in Rule
60 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law:
Section 60. Appeals. - An appeal may be taken from the Special Agrarian
Courts
(SAC-RTC) by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals within
fifteen days (15) days from receipt of notice of the decision; otherwise, the
decision shall become final.
The special jurisdiction of the SAC-RTC is conferred and regulated by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and appeals there from are governed by
Section 60 thereof.
Furthermore, even if the Court were to allow the appeals to prosper, The Court finds
that the Petitions before the SAC-RTC were filed out of time.
In this case, petitioners received a copy of the PARAD Decision on September 27
2002.They filed their Motion for Reconsideration thereof on 11 October 2002, or 14
days from their receipt of a copy of the Decision. On 21 December 2002, they
received the Order denying their motion. Hence, petitioners only had one more day
within which to file their Petitions with the SAC-RTC for the determination of just
compensation for their respective properties. Since December 22, 2002 fell on a
Sunday, they had until December 23, 2002 to file their Petition However, they only
filed their Petitions on January 6 2003, or 16 days after they received the order
denying their Motion for Reconsideration. Clearly, the Petitions before the SAC-RTC
were filed out of time.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated Petitions for Review are
hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decisions and Orders of the Special Agrarian
Court-Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Naga City in Civil Case Nos. 2003-007 and
2003-004 are hereby affirmed.

3. GENERALIA VERBA SUNT GENERALITER INTELIGENCIA - What is generally

spoken shall be generally understood.
GUTIERREZ vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
G.R. No. 193459 (February 15, 2011)

FACTS:

On 22 July 2010, Baraquel, et al. filed an impeachment complaint (First

Complaint) against Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez (petitioner)
based on betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution.

On 3 August 2010, a Second Complaint was filed by Reyes, et al. against the
same respondent also based on betrayal of public trust and culpable violation
of the Constitution.

On 11 August 2010, the two complaints were referred by the House Plenary
to the Committee on Justice at the same time.

On 1 September 2010, the Committee on Justice found the First and Second
Complaints sufficient in form. On 7 September 2010, the Committee on
Justice, found the First and Second Complaints were sufficient in form.

On 13 September 2010, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and

prohibition before the Supreme Court seeking to enjoin the Committee on
Justice from proceeding with the impeachment proceedings. The petition
prayed for a temporary restraining order.
Petitioner: She invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction to
"determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
Public Respondent: The petition is premature and not yet ripe for
adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public
respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the
present petition on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the
determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the two
complaints. Hence, certiorari is unavailing.

The following day, during the en banc morning session of 14 September

2010, the majority of the Court voted to issue a status quo ante order
suspending the impeachment proceedings against petitioner. (Note: In urgent
cases, it is a matter of practice for the Court that all the Justices should have
been given time, at least an hour or two, to read the petition before voting on
the issuance of the status quo ante order. Unfortunately, this was not done.)

Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no

impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year."

ISSUE #1: Does the Supreme Court have the power to determine whether public
respondent committed a violation of the Constitution in the exercise of its discretion
relating to impeachment proceeding?

HELD: Yes, under the doctrine of expanded judicial review. The Constitution did not
intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.
Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr, judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise
of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.

There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial
review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated
system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this
instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository
of the sovereign will.

ISSUE #2: Is the petition premature and not yet ripe for adjudication?
HELD: No. In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on the validity of
the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a
mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the
House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for
immediate interpretation.
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment
complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot
thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the
constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated
against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.

ISSUE #3: When is an impeachment complaint deemed initiated?

HELD: There are two components of the act of initiating the complaint: the filing of
the impeachment complaint AND the referral by the House Plenary to the
Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated
(meaning, filed and initiated), another impeachment complaint may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period.

ISSUE #4: Do the Impeachment Rules provide for comprehensible standards in

determining the sufficiency of form and substance?

HELD: Yes. Contrary to petitioner contention, the Impeachment Rules are clear in
echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a "verified
complaint or resolution," and that the substance requirement is met if there is "a
recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction
of the committee.

In fact, it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of

form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This
requirement is not explicitly found in the Constitution which merely requires a
"hearing." ( Section 3[2], Article XI). In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the
House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an
impeachment complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment process,
hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.

ISSUE #5: May the Supreme Court look into the narration of facts constitutive of
the offenses vis--vis petitioners submissions disclaiming the allegations in the
complaints?
HELD: No. This issue would "require the Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature
(Francisco vs. House of Representatives.)

ISSUE #6: Was petitioner denied of due process, because of the delay in the
publication of the Impeachment Rules?
HELD: No. The Supreme Court discussed the difference between publication and
promulgation.

To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3,
2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th
Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules,
admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers
of general circulation.

Citing Taada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process
since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after
public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise
tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that
"Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section."

Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to "the

publication of rules in any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official
Gazette or newspaper of general circulation."
While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there is a statutory
difference in their usage. The Constitution notably uses the word "promulgate" 12
times. A number of those instances involves the promulgation of various rules,
reports and issuances emanating from Congress, the Supreme Court, the Office of
the Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices.

To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms "promulgate" and
"publish," the case of the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the Supreme Court has invariably required the publication of
these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned,
however, PROMULGATION means "the delivery of the decision to the clerk of
court for filing and publication.

Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood

that is, to make known. Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict
"promulgation" to "publication," the former should be understood to have been used
in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to
promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is
permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision
to the clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to tell a
co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has
not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to
dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.

Inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is

the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly
publish a set of rules of procedure. (Neri vs. Senate)

Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the
proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully
comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in
cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the
mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would already run
or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior
to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already
violate the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints
pending the completion of the publication requirement. (Just like what
happened in this case, where the complaint was filed even before the 15 th Congress
open its first session)

Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on
impeachment is aimed at "effectively carry[ing] out the purpose" of impeachment
proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed
it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to
meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in keeping with the "effective"
implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the
provisional adoption of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is within the
power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the avowed purpose.

Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the

Constitution, merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment.
Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of
a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws." In the present case, petitioner fails to
allege any impairment of vested rights.

It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the
rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the
people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.

ISSUE #6: When do we reckon the start of the one-year ban?

Petitioner contends that it is reckoned from the filing of the first impeachment
complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26,
2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no
second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public
respondent.

HELD: Francisco doctrine states that the term "initiate" means to file the
complaint and referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may
not be filed against the same official within a one year period. Therefore, the oneyear period ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date
it is referred to the House Committee on Justice.

Petitioner submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because
"something prior to that had already been done. This is wrong. Following
petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement
by a member of the House steps done prior to the filing would already initiate
the impeachment proceedings.

ISSUE #7: Does an impeachment complaint need to allege only one impeachable
offense?
Petitioner argues that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it
disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, which provides that "the Rules
of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to
impeachment proceedings before the House." Petitioner invokes the application of

Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on one offense per
complaint rule. To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in
form and substance since each charges her with both culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust.

HELD: The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses,
with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set
known as the "Articles of Impeachment." It, therefore, follows that an impeachment
complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v SANDIGANBAYAN and VICTORIA AMANTE

G.R. NO. 167304 AUGUST 25, 2009

FACTS:
Victoria Amante, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province
of Cebu, was charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of P.D. 1455, otherwise
known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Accused filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation due to lack of Jurisdiction stating that Section 4 of R.A. 8249
provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where
the accused holds a position otherwise classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher,
based on the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. 7658). The
Sandiganbayan considered the said motion by Amante and dimissed the case.
Petitioner disputed the contention of Amante and the appreciation of the
Sandiganbayan of its decision in Inding v Sandiganbayan, which in this particular
case, Inding did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of
the enumeration provided for in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. 1606, as amended,
exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either violation of R.A. 3019, R.A.

1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the RPC. Petitioner adds that the
enumeration in the said statutes were equally applicable to offenses committed in
relation to public office.
Amante commented that the general rule for the Sandiganbayan to acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter as laid down in the Section 4 of P.D. 1806 which
states that the offender must be of SG 27 and the exceptions were laid down in the
following sub paragraphs and if the indictment involves offenses other than that of
the three offenses mentioned, such general rule shall be applicable. Respondent
stated therefore that the Ruling of the Sandiganbayan is correct in its decision.
OSP, in its reply, reiterated that the enumeration of Public officials in Section 4(a)(1)
to (g) or P.D. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
should include their commission of other offenses in relation to the office under
Section 4(b) of the same P.D. 1606. It cited the case of Esteban v Sandiganbayan
wherein the ruling of the Court is that an offense is said to have been intimately
connected with the office of the offender or perpetrated in the performance of his
or her official functions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26
who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the offense therein charged is intimately
connected with the accuseds office and was and was perpetrated while they were
in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed,
the accused had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have
committed it had they not held their offices.
It is beyond the clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any
qualification as to the public officals involved. It simply stated, public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same code. Therefore, it refers to
those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically
enumerated.
It is a well settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of statute will be
interpreted in their natural , plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless

it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to

those words.

Petition is granted. The case is Remanded to the Sandiganbayan for further

proceedings.

AMADORA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-47745 (April 15, 1988)
FACTS: Pablito Daffon mortally hit Alfredo Amadora with a gun while in the
auditorium of the school. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless
imprudence. The victims parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for
damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal,
dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students.
Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the
defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebus decision for the following reasons:
1. Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts

and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the
semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun,
and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through
enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe
other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school
to submit his physics report, a requirement for graduation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Collegio San Jose-Recoletos, which is not an arts and trade
establishment, is liable under Article 2180
HELD: Pertinent portion in Article 2180 provides:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain
in their custody.
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to
all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather
than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the
student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part
of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception
to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of
their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the
head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula
singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of
establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."
The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the
school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It
was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement.
What was important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other
hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable
because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each
was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable
considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and
later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to
the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was
shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision
because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made
responsible for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts

disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with
Alfredo resulting to his death.

PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION, vs. THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET

G.R. No. 183137

FACTS: On December 8, 2005, the Provincial Board of the Province of Benguet

approved Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 05-107, otherwise known as the Benguet
Revenue Code of 2005 (Tax Ordinance). Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance
levied a ten percent (10%) amusement tax on gross receipts from admissions to
resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots. It was
Pelizloy Realty Corporation's position that the Tax Ordinance's imposition of a 10%
amusement tax on gross receipts from admission fees for resorts, swimming pools,
bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots is an ultra vires act on the part of the
Province of Benguet. Pelizloy filed the present petition on June 10, 2008 on pure
questions of law assailing the legality of Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance
as being a (supposedly) prohibited percentage tax per Section 133 (i) of the Local
Government Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not provinces are authorized to impose amusement taxes on
admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist
spots for being amusement places under Section 140 of LGC.
HELD: Section 140 of the LGC provides:
SECTION 140. Amusement Tax - (a) The province may levy an amusement
tax to be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of
amusement at a rate of not more than thirty percent (30%) of the gross
receipts from admission fees.
Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of amusement taxes
on the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls,
circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement.
However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are
not among those places expressly mentioned by Section 140 of the LGC as being
subject to amusement taxes.
Thus, the determination of whether amusement taxes may be levied on admissions
to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots hinges on
whether the phrase other places of amusement encompasses resorts, swimming
pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter
follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be
restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or
class as those specifically mentioned.
Section 131 (c) of the LGC already provides a clear definition of amusement
places:

Section 131. Definition of Terms. - When used in this Title, the term: x x x (c)
"Amusement Places" include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and
other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself
by seeing or viewing the show or performance
Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs
and tourist spots cannot be considered venues primarily where one seeks
admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances.
While it is true that they may be venues where people are visually engaged, they
are not primarily venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display, stage
or present shows and/or performances. Thus, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses,
hot springs and tourist spots do not belong to the same category or class as
theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia. It follows that they
cannot be considered as among the other places of amusement contemplated by
Section 140 of the LGC and which may properly be subject to amusement taxes.

AUTO BUS v BAUTISTA

G.R. No. 156367 (May 16, 2005)
FACTS: Antonio Bautista was employed by Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. in May
1995. He was assigned to the Isabela-Manila route and he was paid by commission
(7% of gross income per travel for twice a month). On January 2000, while he was
driving his bus he bumped another bus owned by Auto Bus. He claimed that he
accidentally bumped the bus as he was so tired and that he has not slept for more
than 24 hours because Auto Bus required him to return to Isabela immediately after
arriving at Manila. Damages were computed and 30% or P75,551.50 of it was being
charged to Bautista. Bautista refused payment.
Auto Bus terminated Bautista after due hearing as part of Auto Bus management
prerogative. Bautista sued Auto Bus for Illegal Dismissal. Labor Arbiter (LA) Monroe
Tabingan dismissed Bautistas petition but ruled that Bautista is entitled to
P78,117.87 13th month pay payments and P13,788.05 for his unpaid service
incentive leave pay.
The case was appealed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
NLRC modified the LAs ruling. It deleted the award for 13 th Month pay. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
Auto Bus averred that Bautista is a commissioned employee and if that is not
reason enough that Bautista is also a field personnel. hence he is not entitled to a
service incentive leave. They invoke:
Art. 95. RIGHT TO SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE
(a) Every employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall
be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay.
Book III, Rule V: SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE
SECTION 1. Coverage. This rule shall apply to all employees except:
(d) Field personnel and other employees whose performance is
unsupervised by the employer including those who are engaged on task or
contract basis, purely commission basis, or those who are paid in a fixed
amount for performing work irrespective of the time consumed in the
performance thereof.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Bautista is entitled to Service Incentive Leave. And if he is;

2. Whether or not the three-year prescriptive period provided under Article 291
of the Labor Code, as amended, is applicable to respondents claim of service
incentive leave pay.

HELD: Yes, Bautista is entitled to Service Incentive Leave. The Supreme Court
emphasized that it does not mean that just because an employee is paid on
commission basis he is already barred to receive service incentive leave pay. The
question actually boils down to whether or not Bautista is a field employee.
According to Article 82 of the Labor Code, field personnel shall refer to nonagricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal
place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work
in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
As a general rule, field personnel are those whose performance of their job/service
is not supervised by the employer or his representative, the workplace being away
from the principal office and whose hours and days of work cannot be determined
with reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid specific amount for rendering
specific service or performing specific work. If required to be at specific places at
specific times, employees including drivers cannot be said to be field personnel
despite the fact that they are performing work away from the principal office of the
employee.
Certainly, Bautista is not a field employee. He has a specific route to traverse as a
bus driver and that is a specific place that he needs to be at work. There are
inspectors hired by Auto Bus to constantly check him. There are inspectors in bus
stops who inspects the passengers, the punched tickets, and the driver. Therefore,
he is definitely supervised though he is away from the Auto Bus main office.
On the other hand, the three-year prescriptive period ran but Bautista was able to
file his suit in time before the prescriptive period expired. It was only upon his filing
of a complaint for illegal dismissal, one month from the time of his dismissal that
Bautista demanded from his former employer commutation of his accumulated
leave credits. His cause of action to claim the payment of his accumulated service
incentive leave thus accrued from the time when his employer dismissed him and
failed to pay his accumulated leave credits.
Therefore, the prescriptive period with respect to his claim for service incentive
leave pay only commenced from the time the employer failed to compensate his
accumulated service incentive leave pay at the time of his dismissal. Since Bautista
had filed his money claim after only one month from the time of his dismissal,

necessarily, his money claim was filed within the prescriptive period provided for by
Article 291 of the Labor Code.

NOTA BENE:
Definition of Service Incentive Leave
Service incentive leave is a right which accrues to every employee who has served
within 12 months, whether continuous or broken reckoned from the date the
employee started working, including authorized absences and paid regular holidays
unless the working days in the establishment as a matter of practice or policy, or
that provided in the employment contracts, is less than 12 months, in which case
said period shall be considered as one year. It is also commutable to its money
equivalent if not used or exhausted at the end of the year. In other words, an
employee who has served for one year is entitled to it. He may use it as leave days
or he may collect its monetary value.
ALBON v FERNANDO
G.R. No. 148357 (June 30, 2006)
FACTS: In May 1999, the City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen,
clear, and repair the existing sidewalks to Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. It was
undertaken by the city government pursuant to Ordinance No. 59. Subsequently,
petitioner Albon filed a taxpayer suit for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with
damages against respondents City Engineer Alfonso Espirito, Assistant City
Engineer Anaki Maderal, and City Treasurer Natividad Cabalquinto.
According to the petitioner it was unconstitutional and unlawful for respondents to
use government equipment and property, and to disburse public funds of the City of
Marikina for the grading, widening, clearing, and maintenance of the existing
sidewalks of the said subdivision. He alleged that the sidewalks were private
property because Marikina Greenheights Subdivision was owned by V.V. Soliven, Inc.
Hence, the city government could not use public resources on them. In undertaking
the project, therefore, respondents allegedly violated the constitutional prescription
against the use of public funds for private purposes as well as Section 335 and 336
of Republic Act 7160 and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents. Ordinance No. 59 is a valid
enactment. The court recognized the inherent police power of the municipality and
with this, it is allowed to carry out the contested works. The Court of Appeals
sustained the decision of the trial court stating that sidewalks of Marikina
Greenheights Subdivision were public in nature and ownership thereof belonged to

the City of Marikina or the Republic of the Philippines following the 1991 White
Plains Association decision. Thus, the improvement and widening of the sidewalks
pursuant to Ordinance No. 59 of 1993 was well within the LGU powers.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of Ordinance
No. 59
HELD: No, like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact ordinances for
the purposes set forth in the Local Government Code (RA 7160). It is expressly
vested with the police powers delegated to LGUs under the General Welfare Clause
of RA 7160. With this power, LGUs may prescribe reasonable regulations to protect
the lives, health, and property of their constituents, and maintain peace and order
within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Also, in the exercise of their inherent
police power, the cities and municipalities have the power to exercise such powers
and discharge such functions and responsibilities as may be necessary, appropriate
and incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic service and facilities,
including infrastructure to efficient intended primary to service and facilities,
including infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of their
residents and which are financed by their own funds. These infrastructure facilities
include municipal or city roads and bridges and similar facilities. Regarding the
nature of ownership of the sidewalks in question, there is also no hindrance in
declaring that the sidewalks are of public dominion. PD 957, as amended by
PD1216, mandates subdivision owners to set aside open spaces which shall be
devoted exclusively for the use of the general public.