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Student: Alan Cummins 1165236 Lecturer: Dr. Rebecca Maguire Cognitive Psychology PSY281
INTRODUCTION
“We used to argue whether a machine could think. The answer is, ‘No’. What thinks is a total
ask whether a brain can think, and again the answer will be, ‘No’. What thinks is a
Gregory Bateson(1972)
The question of whether a mind is analogous to a computer is a difficult and emotive subject.
Philosophical debate can be given to whether a computer can be human. However, this essay
mind can be seen to think like a computer. Are there comparable features in the process of
cognition that act in a logical and mathematical way much as computers does. Definition will
be given to the mind and to a computer and discussion given to the cognitive analogy of
mental processes being equivalent to a computer. The two main approaches to computational
The mind can be considered to be an element, part, substance or process that reasons, thinks,
feels, wills, perceives and judges. It is the combination of both the conscious and unconscious
mental processes and activities. The mind has intellect and more importantly understanding
and comprehension of what it is doing. These processes acquire, share and use the
information in its environment to make sense of the world and take an appropriate action or
reaction dependent on the situation. Mental processes such as these are active, efficient and
accurate making use of top-down and bottom-up processing. The mind can be said to be
to achieve an end goal. The computer can be described as an electronic device designed to
accept data and perform prescribed mathematical and logical operations at high speed and
output the results. The mind similarly but not exclusively can work in such a manner to
logically store and use information provided by external or internal stimuli to produce an end
result. The processing units available in the mind are structured similarly to computers at a
high level with processing units that have independent but related functionality that taken as a
whole achieve something greater than the sum of its parts. Computers can be thought to be
structured in a similar manner with processing units that take care of various components of
IO, memory retrieval and storage and functional processing. At this level of high-end
architecture the mind does appear to work like a computer with central nodes (specific brain
regions) interconnected via wires (neurons) with even electrical impulses being carried
Taking ancient philosophy as a starting point we can consider two alternate view-points in
relation to how a mind comes to have the ability to process and comprehend at an early stage
of development. A computer has bios which gives it some initial concept of its components
and capabilities. This can be equated with Plato’s concept of rationalism where he considered
everyone to be born with innate concepts and knowledge. Aristotle, however, held sway with
concept of the formation of the psyche, that of the human mind being inextricably tied to
language, it could be argued that through software (language) and intelligent recursive
computer system. Cognitive science seeks to understand the architecture, representations and
processes that make up the mind. There is a key assumption that the mind can be described
representations and flexible rule-sets to mimic the mind. The mind has to build internal
representations of worldly objects in order to be able to retrieve and use them in later life or
with the concept of logic gates that individually carry-out minor instruction sets but as a
whole function co-operatively to process information. (McCulloch & Pitts (1943)) It should
be noted that mental processes are abstract in nature whereas computers work from solid
theoretical based mechanisms. The mind as a computer is an analogy and should not be
considered anymore than that. The analogy is based on equating the brain and the mind to
hardware and software respectively. There is an indication here that you cannot have
cognitive processes without a means of effecting the environment and those cognitive
processes work within the confines of their environment in a cyclic manner. A computer
system cannot solely exist, except in a thought experiment, as a floating set of rules or
algorithms without any bounding constraints. It must be defined, confined and allowed to
COGNITION
There are two main schools of thought in relation to computational cognitive theory, namely
symbolic and connectionist. Each lends both positive and negative impetus to the analogy of
the mind as a computer. Newell and Simon (1972) proposed a Physical Symbol System
Hypothesis which is the backbone to the symbolic approach. This suggests that all knowledge
can be expressed by symbols and that thinking involves manipulation of these symbols
(or machinery) that they reside on. So by association the mind could be considered to
function like a computer even if the underlying structure of mind and computers is different.
Broadbent (1958) suggests that cognition is purely a sequential series of processing steps.
Similarly Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) proposed a multi-store model of memory that captures
stimuli, perceptual processes and attends to them and stores resultant information in short or
long term memory. These hypotheses are undeniably linked to the concept of a logical
sequential computing device much like any modern-day computer. Stimuli are recorded by
input devices (camera, input device, HCI), interpreted and stored in short term memory cache
or written out to long term memory. The analogy relies on a functionalist separation of mind
and body, the same operation can be realised in multiple ways physically but the end result is
the same. Knowledge consists of declarative facts, combined into meaningful chunks of
memory that can be stored explicitly. Schematic knowledge such as this does exist and has
been studied by Brewer and Treyens (1981) in relation to perception and memory. Procedural
rules (skills, heuristics) can then be applied to manipulate the knowledge stored. Andersson’s
Skill Acquisition Theory(1983) suggests that the human mind works in such a manner noting
compositional stage where multiple rules are combined into single rules. This ties to how
modern programming is designed and produced with an object orientated approach with
objects of a specific class tied together in functional or procedural methods using recursive,
looping constructs in combination with simple Boolean logical tests in the form of IF-THEN-
ELSE statements. Newell and Simon (1972) suggest that any system that can manipulate
symbols in intelligent but John Searle (1980) suggests that human thought has meaning. The
analogy breaks down somewhat at this point because as humans we attribute meaning to
information while computers can be seen to be brute-force serial processors that do not
the Turing Test (Turing (1950)) and Searle’s Chinese Room show the failing of the symbolic
approach and in turn the failings of the mind-computer analogy. A new approach is required
to more closely mimic the functionality and cognitive processing of the mind. The human
mind is not serial, nor does it possess all knowledge as propositional symbols, namely where
do concepts such as emotion and feeling reside in the knowledge representation framework.
A human mind is also slower with respect to the speed of neurons, as Sternberg (1999)
required to understand the structure as well as the functionality of the mind and its relation to
computational systems. The human brain is hugely parallel in nature using a distributed
network that fires electrical and chemical impulses across synaptic gaps based on a pattern of
excitatory activation via neurons. There is no one central executive ignoring the brain as a
whole but rather as a set of interconnected sub-systems. Computer systems increasingly act in
a similar manner making use of the power of distributed computing to break down and
achieve results. At a lower level computer systems apply the concept of elementary units
result dependent on a threshold level. Unlike the systematic approach no set pattern is
provided but only a means of tracing a path through the elementary elements. Some must be
given to Schacter (1989) and the concept of single events which seem to contradict this
multiple coordinated affect that governs connectionist systems. That is the brain can work in
both a symbolic and connectionist manner as required. Rules are seen not as explicit but as
shifting sets of weighted pathways. There is a biological similarity between the structure of
the mind and the structure of these Artificial Neural Networks (ANN). Just as the human
mind grows and increases in ability through experience so does the ANN. Chase and Ericsson
ability that it is rather practise and re-enforcement of skill-sets that allows experts to out-
perform those around them. ANNs can be seen to abide by this rule as they increase their
knowledge and efficiency of pathways through repeated tracing from problem to solution.
NETTalk by Sejinowski and Rosenberg (1987) is a good example of such a network in use as
a model of speech production. However Ratcliff (1990) has noted that the human mind can
that retains such patterns. Another positive against the mind-computer analogy is that the
mind can still function even if some memories are lost or incomplete. Sternberg (1999) points
out that equally ANN have this ability of content addressability and graceful degradation
when damage has occurred. Connectionist networks can be seen to work in a similar fashion
to that of of the mind and memory recency effects such as Calkins (1894) where the more
recent the memory the easier it is to recall it. Similarly in connectionist networks if a pathway
has only recently been travelled it will be take this efficient route again whereas after a period
the strength of the pathway will have diminished and therefore take longer to re-establish.
Having discussed the major tenants of the computer as a model of the human mind we shall
now compare and contrast them within the realms of our discussion. Evidential reports, as
noted above, suggests that knowledge used by the mind is implicit and explicit in nature
while in a symbolic computer system the knowledge is hard-wired and explicit in comparison
are localised and processed in a serial manner, much like the proposed memory models of the
human mind. However it is apparent that the mind can and does work on distributed inputs in
a parallel manner. Connectionist systems can and do mimic this action. Learning in the
human mind is flexible according to Ohlsson’s (1992) Representational Change theory where
cannot replicate this while the connectionist approach can do so. Both approaches have
strengths and weaknesses when held up against a mind-computer analogy. The mind has
cognitively penetrable processes, or those which are conscious, and cognitively impenetrable
processes, those that are unconscious. Symbolic systems excel at explaining conscious
processes.
NEW DIRECTIONS
Both approaches above go some way to describing the functionality of the mind as that of a
computational system. However both fail in terms of discussing how the structure and the
information around every organism are tied to behaviour, action, capabilities and perception.
The mind is embodied; it does not exist in a vacuumed world. Pecher and Zwaan (1987)
have made reference to this fact. Symbols cannot, as in the symbolic system, be considered as
discrete and random entities but rather as symbols making reference to objects around them.
Hannard (1990) has discussed this notion as that of symbolic grounding. Phenomenology and
Freudian theorists such as Lacan discuss the idea of signifiers and the signified, the notion of
concepts in of themselves but also importantly as part of a greater sense of being. Intelligence
given second (MIPS)or in a specific domain such as the robot Shakey, developed by Stanford
University in the late 60s, early 70s. Dreyfus (1992) discusses how formal representations are
not required for intelligence and that everything is based on interaction between the human
and the world. Computers are extremely limited in this respect. Brooks (1987) points out that
the many means of representing knowledge within a computer system does not come close to
truly representing what an object is. This is a problem known as Transduction. The human
mind works by using minimal representation and making use of sensation and perception to
used. The mind is far more robust than computer systems as they currently stand with an
ability to adapt and evolve under its environment. It is also able o react immediately to its
situation whereas computer systems are bound by a sense-plan-act loop. Computer systems
will continue to develop and must try to capture a sense of embodiment, situatedness and do
so via a bottom-up design, working on achieving simple tasks rather than try to complete a
total mind system. Evolution of such systems could then in analogous way to how the human
brain was formed begin to evolve and perhaps might one day make a switch from a
however, clear that computers are making a paradigm shift from pure logic engines to those
that closely mimic the cognitive capabilities of the human mind and so in future years it will
become difficult to know if the mind is like a computer or is it that the computer evolved into
a mind.
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