International Politics of Recognition

The International
Politics of Recognition
Edited by
Thomas Lindemann and
Erik Ringmar
Paradigm Publishers
Boulder London
Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 1
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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be transmitted or reproduced

in any media or form, including electronic, mechanical, photocopy, recording, or
informational storage and retrieval systems, without the express written consent of
the publisher.
Copyright 2012 Paradigm Publishers
Published in the United States by Paradigm Publishers, 2845 Wilderness Place,
Suite200, Boulder, Colorado 80301 USA.
Paradigm Publishers is the trade name of Birkenkamp & Company, LLC,
Dean Birkenkamp, President and Publisher.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Printed and bound in the United States of America on acid-free paper that meets the
standards of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed
Library Materials.
Designed and Typeset by Straight Creek Bookmakers.
16 15 14 13 12
1 2 3 4 5
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Cute cats can create outrageous miracles.

In recognition of my catwoman Catherine Small.
Thomas Lindemann
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Contents
Illustrationsv
Part I Theoretical Preliminaries
Introduction The International Politics of Recognition
Erik Ringmar
Chapter 1 Recognition between States: On the Moral

Substrate of International Relations
Axel Honneth
25
Chapter 2 Prickly States? Recognition and Disrespect

between Persons and Peoples
Reinhard Wolf
39
Chapter 3 Symbolic and Physical Violence

Philippe Braud
Chapter 4 Is a Just Peace Possible Without Thin
and Thick Recognition?
Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller
57
71
Part II Empirical Applications

Chapter 5 Spirit, Recognition and Foreign Policy:
Germany and World War II
Richard Ned Lebow
Chapter 6 World War I from the Perspective of Power
Cycle Theory: Recognition, Adjustment Delusions,
and the Trauma of Expectations Foregone
Charles F. Doran
87
109
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vi Contents
Chapter 7 Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle
for Morocco: Rethinking Imperial Germanys
Security Dilemma
Michelle Murray
131
Chapter 8 Self-Identification, Recognition and Conflicts:

The Evolution of Taiwans Identity, 19492008
Yana Zuo
153
Chapter 9 Recognition, the Non-Proliferation

Regime and Proliferation Crises
Alexandre Hummel
171
Chapter 10 Recognizing the Enemy:

Terrorism as Symbolic Violence
Andreas Behnke
189
Part III Conclusions

Chapter 11 Concluding Remarks on the Empirical
Study of International Recognition
Thomas Lindemann
209
Index227
About the Contributors
000
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Illustrations
Figures
Figure 6.1 Systemic Bounds on Relative Growth
00
Figure 6.2 Conflicting Messages
00
Figure 6.3 Expectations Foregone:

Resolving WWI Puzzles of History
00
Figure 6.4 Power-Role Lag
00
Figure 6.5 Dynamics of Changing Systems Structure

15001993
00
Table
Table 8.1 Numbers of States Recognizing Taipei
and Beijing (19501990)
00
vii
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Part I
Theoretical Preliminaries
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Int roduct ion
The International Politics

of Recognition
Erik Ringmar
Identities matter to individuals and they matter to collective entities. In fact, few
things matter more than the identities we put together for ourselves since, without an
identity, we have no idea of who we are. Yet putting together an identity is often quite
a struggle. We need to come up with an account that describes us, but in addition, we
need to have this account accepted by people around us. We need to be recognized.1
As the chapters in this book make clear, the logic of identity creation is relevant also
to the entities that populate world politicsmost notably to the state. States too are
coming up with self-descriptions and struggling to have them recognized.2 In fact,
the struggle for recognition takes up much of a states time and resources, and it
makes states act and interact in specific ways. This is a logic of action and interaction,
which has been largely ignored by traditional scholars of international relation.3 As a
result, many international phenomena, including colonialism and armed conflicts,
have been misinterpreted and badly explained.
The reason why previous generations of scholars have ignored questions of identities is simply that they did not come up. The state was the indisputable subject
of a study of world politics and its existence was impossible to problematize. The
question was always what the state did and why, and never what, or perhaps who,
the state was. We are placed in a better position. In the twenty-first century, identity
crises and identity makeovers are everywhere, and the position of the state in world
politics is questioned like never before. Abandoning the old Realpolitik for a new
3
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4 Erik Ringmar
Identittsproblematik, we need new intellectual tools. This book unapologetically
assumes that world politics is a social system that can be analyzed with the help of
the tools of sociology.4 More specifically, we believe that sociological insights into
how identities are formed, maintained, and dissolved have much to teach a student
of international relations. This introduction provides a first outline.
The Subjectivity of the State

To begin, there is a sense that the state is a subject, which can be compared to a
person.5 Admittedly, this is a contested and an explicitly Eurocentric argument. It
is Eurocentric since it most obviously applies to the international system that came
into existence in Europe in the late Renaissance, and it does not necessarily apply
elsewhere. The argument is contested since states clearly are not persons.6 States
can be compared to persons to be sure but that does not make them into persons.
Most obviously, a state has no unified consciousness, no single memory, and no
subjective will. As a result, it is surely difficult to talk about the identity of a
state and to assume that this identity is fashioned in the same way as the identities
of individuals.
A person may not be what a state is, but this is nevertheless how states have been
talked about at least for the last four hundred years. The European origins of this way
of talking explain how subjectivity came to be attached to the state. In the Middle
Ages, political relations, like all human associations, were understood through the
metaphor of the corpus, the body.7 Guilds and fraternities were bodies but so were
cities and kingdoms, and all bodies were ultimately incorporated into the universal
body, which was the body of the Church. In early modern Europe, the sovereign state
found it useful to adopt this body language and to use it for its own purposes.8 It
was common to talk about the body politic, and to endow this body with arms,
legs, a stomach, and a heart. Naturally, it was the king, or the head of state,
who directed the states overall movements.
The states made up stories about themselves. States in early modern Europe
were compulsive self-mythologizers, attaching their often quite undistinguished
present to a past filled with classical or biblical references.9 The nationalists of the
nineteenth century rearranged these accounts to include more references to the
people, inventing traditions designed to bring legitimacy to their claims to national
self-determination.10 Propagated through the new systems of public education, these
stories were soon established as the official histories of the nation-state.11 Most of us
still believe in some versions of these semi-mythological accounts.
In early modern Europe, the world was often compared to a stage.12 Sometimes,
as in Shakespeare, the metaphor was used, slightly pathetically, to express the superficiality and vanity of human pretensions, but it soon became the standardized way
in which international politics was discussed. The body-metaphor and the stagemetaphor were combined; that is, the body of the state was turned into an actor.
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The International Politics of Recognition 5

After the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the state came increasingly regarded as a
sovereign, self-directing actor constrained only by the actions of other states.13 At the
royal courts but also on more popular occasions, such as at country fairs, plays were
performed that illustrated the political relations of the day.14 On the stage before them,
the audience would literally see their state acting and interacting with other states.
The stage was a world and the world was a stage. Together the various states formed
a theater company that regularly met for performances on the battlefields of Europe
or in the conference halls where the peace treaties were signed. It was an illustrious
troupe: the actors were civilized, they were Christian, they had an awesome military
and political capability. It was in their company that lesser political units one day
aspired to appear. And this is how we still think about international politics. Pick up
any newspaper article on world affairs, and it will be replete with states considering
options, acting aggressively, signing agreements, or threatening sanctionsall
before the critical or the approving eyes of world opinion.
This is how the subjectivity of the state originally came to be established. This
metaphorical cluster and its associated performative practices were eagerly adopted
by absolutist rulers for whom they seemed ideally suited. The l tat cest moi of Louis
XIV was not an egocentric indulgence as much as an expression of the official French
theory of sovereignty.15 But the subjectivity of the state was equally useful to republics
and later to the needs of democratic governments. Both citizens and leaders identify
themselves with their states; the state is the protector of our national culture and
our status in the world. We tie our hopes to our states and make careers in their
institutions; we celebrate their successes and lament their defeats. Funnily enough,
such tatisme is often strongest in places where state institutions are least appreciated.
L tat, even Americans agree, cest nous! 16
In international law, the subjectivity of the state is a well-established commonplace.
The state is the persona of international law in much the same way as individuals are the
persona of civil law and corporations the persona of commercial law.17 In international
law, a state is a subject endowed with rights and obligations, and it is an actor who
can think rationally and be held responsible for the consequences of its actions. In
fact, in legal treatises the state has usually attained nothing short of a transcendental
status.18 The state remains the same even as it changes its rulers, its citizens, and its
political system, or as territory is added to or subtracted from it. It is only if the state
is completely divided up by others that its subjectivity comes to an end.
We may perhaps object that this language is metaphorical through and through
and that the subjectivity of the state for that reason is a matter of language rather than
any real, observable facts. Perhaps it is nothing more than a hermeneutic devicea
way to illustrate and explain things; a way to show how international politics works.
And admittedly, beyond this metaphorical language, there can be no additional proof
of the states subjectivity. But much the same can be said about the subjectivity of
individuals.19 If we probe our brains for evidence of our identities we will necessarily
be disappointed. Brain states, after all, are not what we are. Identities are social facts
created through social interaction, and what is true for the identities of individuals
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6 Erik Ringmar
is true for the identities of states.20 We are not in the realm of reality; we are in the
realm of interpretation.
Recognition and Its Denial

If there is a sense in which states can be thought of as persons, it should be possible
to understand the formation of state identities with the help of the same intellectual
tools we use for understanding the identities of individuals. Relying heavily on Hegels
celebrated account in the Phenomenology of Spirit, we can understand this process first
as a question of the stories that individuals tell about themselves.21 We make up an
account, or we make up many, which describe ourselves to ourselves. The problem
with these self-descriptions is that they often are faulty. Unfettered in our fantasies,
we are wont to exaggerate our importance and our prospects or, alternatively, we are
only too ready to accept the accounts, handed down to us by society and by tradition,
of what a person like ourselves is supposed to be. In either case, we will be mistaken
about ourselves.
And even if we somehow manage to describe ourselves in a reasonably realistic
fashion, there are still many things about us that we simply do not know. Locating
ourselves inside our bodies, we believe we have privileged access to our mental states
indeed we may believe that we are our mental statesbut this privileged perspective
is also quite limiting. Above all, since we never can see ourselves except awkwardly
and in fleeting moments in a mirror, we have only limited knowledge of what we look
like while interacting with others.22 Other people, by contrast, are wont to describe
us far more realistically. They are unlikely to exaggerate our importance or our looks,
but equally, they may be able to see potentials in us that we have ignored. After all,
other people have a privileged perspective, too: seeing us from the outside, they know
far better what we are like as social beings. In the end, identities are created through
an interplay of these two alternative perspectives. We start by telling stories about
ourselves, which we go on to test on people around us. We let other people know who
we believe we are, and they let us know whether or not our account is reasonable. In
this way, our stories about ourselves are, or are not, recognized.
Stories are told about states in much the same fashion. A community of storytellers
could be referred to as a nation.23 A nation consists of people who mutually recognize each other as belonging to the same imagined community. The stories locate
the national self in space and time; they provide the nation with a past and a future,
a national character, certain traditions, ways of behaving, and long lists of things
that people like ourselves are likely to think, do, and eat. The stories are expressed
in our particular vernacular and disseminated through national printing presses and
electronic media. Reading, hearing, or watching these accounts, we know where we
belong. The state can be understood as the political guardian of this story-telling
community. For that reason, it is importantimportant to nationaliststhat each
nation should have a state, and each state only one nation.
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This story-telling capacity is acknowledged by international law. Each state has
the right to national self-determination, meaning not only a right to independence,
but a right to determine the character of its own collective self.24 This right has been
protected at least since the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, where the principle of cuius
regio, eius religio stipulated that the religion of a country should follow the religion
of its ruler. In 1970, the United Nations similarly affirmed that all peoples have the
right to freely determine, without external interference, their political status.y25
Many of the stories concern the role of the state in world politics. Some states see
themselves as superpowers, others as great powers, as revisionists, revolutionaries, or
as neutrals. These stories are not necessarily generally shared, and different stories
often contradict each other, yet through public discussions and obfuscations, some
dominant accounts usually emerge. This is not necessarily a democratic process.
Rather, debates about national roles and purposes are usually dominated by traditional
accounts, uncritically accepted, or by groups that yield disproportionate economic or
political powerand in some societies, public discussions are of course far from free.
Yet stories are still told about states, and most people still believe in them.
These stories, much as the stories we tell about our individual selves, must be
recognized before they can come to constitute a reasonable account of our national
selves. The stories we tell make four separate claims on their listeners.26 On the most
basic level, we demand attention from an audience. We want to be recognized in the
sense of being noticed. But our stories also ask for respect. That is, we insist that our
audiences treat us as equal to others and endowed with the same rights as everyone
else. In addition to being equal to others, however, we also want to be different from
others. We ask our listeners to recognize us as a clearly identifiable someone with a
life that is uniquely our own. Finally, our stories make statements about our affiliationsthey place us in an affective field made up of friends and enemies. From our
friends we ask support, and from our enemies we ask enmity.27 Stacked inside each
other, all stories about ourselves simultaneously make these four demands: (1) we
want our existence to be acknowledged, (2) we want respect, (3) we want individuality, and (4) we want an affiliation.
These demands turn identity-creation into a profoundly theatrical process.28
Compare the Latin word persona, derived from the masks carried by actors in the
Roman theater. The word Person is latine, as Thomas Hobbes pointed out, and it
signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage;
and sometimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a Mask
or a Visard.29 Like a Hobbesian actor, we carry our identities as masks before the
audiences we address. If the audiences recognize us, we have an identity which we,
increasingly self-confidently, can go on to use, and the persona will be attached evermore securely to our face. However, if the audience boos and hissesif we are denied
recognitionwe have a problem. To be denied recognition is a traumatic experience.
We feel slighted, insulted, and brought low; our pride is injured, we have lost our
status and our face. This is the case for individuals but also for states. To the extent
that people identify with their statesand they dothey will demand redress. Doing
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8 Erik Ringmar
nothing is not an option: we cannot be without being described, and unless we are
recognized, we have no social identity.
When faced with a denial of recognition, we basically have three options. The
most obvious alternative is to give up; to accept that others are right about us and
that we cannot be the person we thought we were. Our stories, clearly, do not apply
to someone such as ourselves. This is the situation a state faces in the wake of a loss
in a war or some similar calamity.30 As a result it is, for example, no longer possible
to lay claim to a status as a super, great, or a colonial power. Instead the state
in question has to come up with an alternative self-description and re-brand itself
as something else. Such a reconsideration of ones role is often a long and painful
exercise, and there is of course no guarantee that the new identity we come up with
will be recognized either.
A second option is to accept the verdict of the audience but to stick to our stories
and insist that we can live up to the self-descriptions they contain. This means embarking on a program of self-reformation.31 The offended state will have to do whatever
it takes to be accepted on its preferred termsdevelop itself economically, adopt the
required political institutions, improve its educational system, and so on. Once this
task is completed, the ugly duckling can go back to its detractors as a beautiful swan,
hoping to finally be recognized as the state it always presumed to be.
A third option is to stand by our stories without reform and instead to fight for the
self-descriptions they contain. The task here is to convince our detractors that they
are mistaken about us and to force them to change their minds. Violence may work
badly in interpersonal relations, since you cannot force someone to respect or love
you. In international relations, however, the use of force has greater use and similar
threats are often successful. A state that is not taken seriously can to go war to prove
its importance, and for a group fighting for its national independence, violence is
often the only available option.32 If our claims are rejected, we try to bomb our way
to respectability. Experts in international law have long recognized the right of such
groups to be considered as belligerents rather than as simple criminals, provided that
they espouse political goals and are organized into regular armies.33
An identity gives a measure of coherence to the ever-shifting events, memories,
and projects that appear in our public sphere; they are attached to a particular subject; they become ours. It is only as recognized that our identities will come to have
continuity over time and space.34 To the extent that we are able to achieve recognition
for our performance and to the extent that our audience remains loyal, we are able
to increasingly take our identities for granted. In the end, we will even forget that
we are play acting and that our identity originally was nothing but a make-believe.
Recognition in International Law and Diplomacy

Recognition, we said, is an important concern of international lawyers.35 Since the
state is taken as the subject of international law, jurists need to decide which entities
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belong to this class. It is the same in all membership clubs: we must establish some
criteria by which members can be selected, non-members excluded, and the relations
between members and non-members regulated.36 In addition, and far more fundamentally, recognition plays a role in establishing the conditions that make international law possible in the first place. A world of sovereign states, critics have insisted,
is not an environment in which law can have much force.37 To be sovereign, after
all, means that no other institution or power is in a position to restrain our actions,
but restrain our actions is exactly what the law does.38 If it is law, in other words, it
is not international, and if it is international, it is not law. This is the problem that
recognition addresses.
As legal scholars have pointed out, there are other sources of law than sovereign
command.39 When states act and interact with each other over time, a standard
gradually comes to be established regarding accepted and acceptable conduct. The
norms that develop in this way constitute a body of customary law, which is no less
powerful than laws promulgated through sovereign fiat. The codification of these
norms was the task of the new discipline of positive international law as it came to be
developed from the middle of the nineteenth century.40 Yet if international society is
the source of the law that governs the conduct of states, the question becomes who
belongs to this society. As the first generation of international jurists concluded, not
all political units can be included. In the end, only civilized states qualified; that
is, only European states.41 Only European statesand a couple of extra-European
settler colonieswere regarded as similar enough to form a proper society. That
is, only they could be counted on to recognize each otherto acknowledge each
others sovereignty and to behave reciprocally. Without such recognition, there can
be no international society, and without an international society, there can be no
international law.
All European states were regarded as subjects of international law and as equal
before it; there was no ranking between them and they enjoyed the same rights and
responsibilities. What these rights were was a matter of some dispute, but the list
commonly included items such as the right of existence, of self-preservation, of
equality, of independence, of territorial supremacy, of holding and acquiring territory,
of intercourse, and of good name and reputation.42 European states had complete
sovereignty; in other words, the right to territorial integrity, and they could act as they
saw fitenter into treaties, make alliances, and go to war. As for responsibilities, they
were above all supposed to honor their obligations and to respect the laws of civilized
warfare. New countries in Eastern Europe, like Romania, were somewhat problematic
cases, but when questions about their status arose, the Europeans usually discussed
the matter amongst themselves and decided on a shared course of action. In this way,
Turkey was formally admitted into international society in 1856.43
In addition, European states recognized each other diplomatically. They had
diplomats stationed at each others courts, and they had the right to participate in the
diplomatic conferences, which since the late Middle Ages, were regularly convened
to discuss common affairs, particularly at the conclusion of major wars.44 On these
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10 Erik Ringmar
occasions, seating arrangements and rules of precedence and address were designed
to assure that all participants were treated with respect and that they were treated
equally.45 Since the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the practice has been for states to seat
themselves in alphabetical order around a conference table; for the doyenthe most
senior diplomat in a capitalto enter an audience chamber ahead of his peers; and for
states to sign copies of treaties in alternative order, usually starting with themselves.46
In discussions of international law, a distinction is sometimes made between
a declarative and a constitutive conception of statehood.47 According to the
declarative view, a state is a state as long as it fulfills a few minimal requirements.
It must have a permanent population; a clearly defined territory; and a government
with the ability to govern itself, to defend itself, and to enter into relations with the
other states.48 As the constitutive view would have it, however, statehood depends
instead on recognition. A state that is not recognized may exist in itself but never for
itself; that is, it has no status as a subject of international law and diplomacy.49 Again
there is a close parallel here to individual human beings. A human being is surely a
human being even if unrecognized by others, yet it is only through recognition that
she becomes a person in Hobbess sense, that is, an actor with an identity.
As a practical matter, however, the distinction between declarative and constitutive
conceptions of statehood was always far less important than the distinction between
civilized and uncivilized states.50 And the declarative and the constitutive views were
one when it came to excluding non-Europeans from full membership in international
society. Non-Europeans simply lacked the required attributes. Their populations were
often nomadic, their territories were badly demarcated; sometimes they had no proper
government and no formal means of defending themselves. If entities such as these
were included, international society would no longer be a society, and international
law would no longer be law. For this reason, excluding outsiders and defining nonEuropeans as uncivilized became crucially important.51 In fact, the more important
you took international law to be, the more sharply, indeed aggressively, you were
likely to draw the line between the civilized and the uncivilized.
Yet non-Europeans were clearly not all the same. There was a considerable difference between, say, the unclothed inhabitants of the Australian bush and the cultivated
peoples of East Asia. To accommodate such differences, Europeans came up with
a distinction between savages and barbarians.52 Savages were itinerant peoples
without a fixed territory and without political institutions. Barbarians were countries
who had a territory, a fixed population and political institutions, and who for that
reason in many ways resembled European states. Yet their culture, their history, and
their alien ways immediately defined them as strange. Since there could be no such
thing as a non-European European, countries like Persia, Siam, Japan, and China
could at best be semi-barbarian or possibly semi-civilized.
The two groups were recognized in quite different ways. Savages had no international status and enjoyed no sovereign rights and could instead only count on the
benevolence that all human beings owe each other. Like the mentally retarded, savages
needed constant help and protection.53 Barbarian states, on the other hand, did have
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an international status but nothing like full membership in international society.54
They had to make do with partial recognition; that is, they were international subjects
only in certain respects. They were formally independent but not fully sovereign,
and they periodically saw their territories invaded and parts of their political systems
taken over by foreigners. Their actions were constrained by unequal treaties and by
military intimidation, but as the lawyers insisted, these arrangements were all for
their own good. The barbarians were like children who, if only properly educated
and disciplined, would one day perhaps be able to join the ranks of civilized states.
Japan was generally considered to be the most promising candidate.55
The Struggle for Recognition

The history of all hitherto existing international society is the history of the struggle
for recognition. Well, maybe not, but the struggle for recognition surely provides the
motivation for many of the things that states do. Everyone needs an identity after all;
everyone wants to gain recognition for the stories they tell about themselves. The poor
and powerless want to be recognized as rich and powerful; the great as greater still;
and everyone, even Switzerland, wants to be a member of the United Nations. Since
some of these claims are difficult to reconcile, we would expect a universal struggle
for recognition to result in universal strife. Yet as G. W. F. Hegel famously argued,
what human beings really are looking for is not preeminence but rather recognition
from their peers, provided that their peers are people they themselves can respect.
Once we all have attained this respectable status, the struggle for recognition will
draw to a close, and since this struggle, according to Hegel, is the main motivation
behind human action, history itself will end.56
Looking at international politics from a Hegelian perspective, we would today
seem to be closer to the end of history than ever before.57 The international system
of Europe now encompasses the entire globe, and with some minor exceptions,
everyone is recognizing the sovereignty of everyone else. There are no savages and
no barbarians, no imbeciles or infants; everyone is now a responsible grown-up and
not only civilized but also capitalist and next-to democratic. As such, every country
enjoys the full rights and responsibilities associated with membership in international
society. When everyone is recognizing everyone else, and we all have been turned
into civilized Europeans, the world will finally be at peace.58
There is a Whiggish smugness to this vision that is profoundly unattractive and,
like all Whiggish histories, based on a falsification of history. After all, Europeans did
not bring the blessings of their international system to the rest of the world. What they
brought was a colonial system that made inequality and lack of mutual recognition
into permanent, institutional, features of world politics. Whatever recognition was
granted was not granted on the basis of principles but instead purely as a matter of
expediency. Take the case of the treaties that the Europeans insisted on concluding
with whatever natives they came across.59 A typical British treaty with an African
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12 Erik Ringmar
king stipulated that he hand over his territory and sovereignty in perpetuity to
the British Crown.60 Yet this clearly implied that the ruler in question already had
a territory and a sovereignty to hand oversomething that savages, by definition,
were denied. Moreover, the very fact that a treaty was concluded surely bestowed an
international status on the local chief.61 Yet, paradoxically, the rights that the treaty
granted were the very same rights that the treaty itself revoked.62 But if the locals
already had or were given a standing in international law, with what right did the
Europeans invade them?
Or take the case of China. The international relations of East Asia had for centuries been organized in an alternative, and distinctly non-European, fashion. Here
China was the all-dominant power, and its relations with surrounding states were
conceptualized in hierarchical and explicitly inegalitarian terms.63 When the 1842
Nanjing Treaty, which concluded the First Opium War, made perfect equality between
Britain and China into a founding principle, this was a joke to the Chinese, but it
was a joke to the Europeans, too.64 China did not want to be a part of the European
international system, but this was unacceptable to the Europeans who demanded
access to Chinese markets. The Treaty of Nanjing stipulated the conditions on which
this access would take place: mutual recognition was henceforth to be granted on
Europes terms.65 The joke the Europeans kept to themselves was that China never
had a chance of being recognized as their equal, since it was a barbarian and not a
civilized country. The treaty recognized Chinas sovereignty, but while sovereignty
in Europe meant the right to dispose of ones own affairs as one saw fit, for China
it meant that the country had to transform itself according to Europes directions.
Which identity the country assumed in international affairs was not for the Chinese
to decide, since recognition only was offered on European terms. Sovereignty, for
China, meant that the country had to become more and more like Europe and less
and less like itself.
As these examples remind us, it was not the Europeans who spread the blessings
of their international system to the rest of the world. It was instead the way the
colonized countries liberated themselves from European control, which eventually
assured their sovereignty and equality. Educated in schools that had taught them
everything there was to know about the sovereignty of the British parliament
and the glory of the French nation, the first generation of nationalist leaders were
quick to apply the same notions to themselves.66 And where no identifiable national
self existedand this concerned a majority of the casessuch a self was speedily
invented. Yet the Europeans refused to recognize these new nations as independent
states, and recognition was therefore something for which they had to fight. The
slaves rose up in rebellion against their masters; they risked their lives, and only
through this struggle did they come to establish themselves as the kinds of subjects
which the masters were prepared to recognize as equal to themselves. That this logic
sounds perfectly Hegelian is not a coincidence. Hegel wrote the famous passage about
Master and Bondsman in the Phenomenology in 1805, just a year after the former
slaves on the French island of Saint-Domingue had risen up in rebellion and declared
4/18/11 12:36 PM

independence for the Republic of Haiti. There is good evidence that Hegel was
directly inspired by their example.67
From a Hegelian perspective, the Europeans were nothing as much as the unwitting instruments employed by historyor rather World Historyin its dialectical
movement across time. It was by occupying other continents that the Europeans
provided for their eventual liberation, their political development, and statehood.
Striking as this argument may be, it is worth asking whether liberation on these terms
really was worth it. The struggle for recognition was eventually won to be sure, but it
was won on the terms set by the former oppressors. As the former colonies came to be
universally recognized, they incorporated the logic of the European state system into
the very core of their identity. As a result, there were always limits to their freedom.68
Moreover, they remained fully exposed to the logic that in the nineteenth century
had transformed China: the only selves the Europeans were prepared to recognize
in the end were Europe-like selvesand Europe-like was what all former colonies
now desperately tried to become.
Yet few of them were ever Europe-like enough.69 The language of sovereignty and
equality was in many ways badly suited to non-European realities. In some cases,
too many ethnic groups were crammed into the same state; in other cases, the same
ethnic group was divided by state borders. Sorting out these incongruities resulted
in conflicts. In addition, the independent state, with its revenue base and power of
patronage, was a prize well worth fighting over, and fight the new nationalist leaders
did, often with arms or in strings of coup d tats. For the winner, the European doctrine of self-determination provided the perfect cover for assorted unsavory practices
including, in many cases, dictatorship, and in some cases, genocide. The former
colonies, the Europeans complained, had failed to live up to their expectations. They
had failed to develop economically, failed to establish democratic institutions; indeed
many were failed states tout court.70 And failed states can never be recognized on
the same terms as everyone else. Much as barbarian states in the nineteenth century,
they were formally sovereign but in practice subject to both economic expropriation
and military intimidation.71 Arguably, it was the terms on which their liberation was
achieved that set them up for these failures.
Europe has of late started modifying the rules under which recognition is given.
What matters is no longer a fixed territory, a permanent population, an uncontested
government, and the ability to defend oneself. In a world in which processes of globalization are quickly deterritorializing, sovereignty and equality are no longer first
principles.72 In Europe, sovereignty is now shared, functionally divided, or made
relative to the time and place in which it is asserted; territories are fully permeable,
and entities other than states have an international standing. Europe today combines
national decision-making with a considerable degree of Europe-wide centralization.
The same processes have yet to produce the same results elsewhere. Ironically, the
staunchest defenders of the rules of the traditional European international system are
the old colonies that won independence on their terms. There is usually no talking
to them about sovereignty-pooling, open borders, or reduced defense capabilities.
4/18/11 12:36 PM
14 Erik Ringmar
This makes them look distinctly old-fashioned and, arguably, badly prepared for
twenty-first-century realities. If the terms on which recognition is granted change,
they will once again be vulnerable.
Giants on Our Shoulders

The academic study of international politics has long been dominated by rationalistic approaches, by an emphasis on the state, and by the rules and practices that
governed the European international system. These concerns were related. The world
the professors described was the modern world where identities were given, and the
predominant problem of social life was how to assure order among self-governing
units. Only now, well into the twenty-first century, are we able to turn our back on
this paradigm. The world made up of rational, Europe-like states has had its time
and it is, all in all, good to see it go.
Since it first emerged as a sovereign entity in the late Renaissance, the state was
identified as a rational, interest-driven actor on which all other interest-driven actors
eventually came to be modeled.73 States, scholars insisted, maximize their power and
their security and they act and interact with other states that pursue the same goals.
All states are sovereign and all are equal. In the nineteenth century, this doctrine
came to be codified in the work of philosophers, historians, and lawyers, predominantly of a Germanic background, for whom the state represented the culmination
of world historyes ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt dass der Staat ist.74 As a result,
they were congenitally unable to imagine a world politics not constituted by states
and by state interests. The question of the identity of the state was disposed of with
a few off-the-rack definitions.
Compare how authors wrote about world politics in the Renaissance when the
state was still in the process of being established, and its apologists struggled to
delegitimize the claims of rivaling institutions. At the time, there was a multiplicity
of overlapping jurisdictions: the aristocracy made claims to independence and so
did peasantsmost notably in the great uprisings in Germany and France in the
sixteenth century. Meanwhile the pope and the emperor still nurtured pan-European
ambitions. Eventually the state emerged from this mle as the undisputed winner,
but at the time, this was not an obvious or inevitable outcome.75 During subsequent
centuries, the state established itself ever more firmly as the subject of international
relations, and scholars could no longer make sense of the concerns that had animated
people in the Renaissance.
But times have once again changed. The neat map of the world that assigns each
bit of territory to a specific sovereign is less and less relevant. We are once again in a
mle of competing jurisdictions. This is why we finally are able to come back to the
topic of identities after a hiatus of some four hundred years. We have regained our
intellectual flexibility, not because we are smarter than professors of previous ages but
because we have finally shrugged off those intellectual giants who were standing on
4/18/11 12:36 PM

our shoulders. The hegemony of rational choice theory will pass into history with the
passing of the hegemony of the state and the hegemony of the European international
system. This does not mean that questions of identities will go away but on the contrary that they will become evermore prevalent. Our collective subjectivities will look
for other vehicles to which they can attach themselves. There are many competing
candidates for such vehicles, and the process of identity realignment is likely to be
both protracted and messy. The struggle for recognition goes on.
Notes
I am grateful to Jeffrey Alexander, Andreas Behnke, Felix Berenskoetter, Axel Honneth, Jorg
Kustermans, Thomas Lindemann, Diane Pranzo, Reinhard Wolf, and Yana Zuo for comments on a previous version.
1. The Urtext is Hegel [1807] 1979. Hegels argument was famously analyzed by Kojve 1980. For an update, see Honneth 1996; critically discussed in Fraser and Honneth
2003. On identity-creation and rational-choice explanations, see Pizzorno 1986; Pizzorno
2008.
2. On the role of recognition in international relations, see inter alia Wendt 1999,
193245; Haacke 2005, 181194; Greenhill 2008, 343368; Ringmar 2008; Ringmar 2002;
Lindemann 2010.
3. Questions of identities have instead been a preoccupation of constructivist scholars.
For a seminal statement, see Wendt 1999. For a critical discussion, see Zehfuss 2001; Guzzini
and Leander 2001. Other key texts include Bloom 1990; Hall 1999; Bially Mattern 2001. A
useful survey is Berenskoetter 2010.
4. A sociological perspective on international relations is implicit in the English School;
see Bull 1995, 2349. For an introduction, see for example Linklater and Suganami 2006.
For a constructivist update, see Wendt 1999; Weber 2005. Compare the similarities between
constructivism in international relations and the strong program in cultural sociology.
Alexander and Smith 2001.
5. On the ontological status of the state in international relations, see for example the
contributions to a forum in Review of International Studies 30, no. 2, edited by Patrick Thaddeus
Jackson (2004). Note in particular Wendt 2004. See in addition Ringmar 1996; Bartelson
1998; Mitzen 2006. In philosophy, discussions on the question of the reality of groups is very
extensive; see for example Poole 1996; Baker 2002; Sheehy 2006.
6. For a discussion see, inter alia, Honneth 2011 and Wolf 2011 in this volume.
7. Kantorowicz 1997, 323; Gierke 1900. A famous overview is Maitland 1900.
8. Kantorowicz 1997, 2341; Skinner 1989, 90131; Melzer and Norberg 1998, 90131;
Ringmar 2008, 154155.
9. On France, Beaune 1991. On Sweden, Ringmar 2008, 156164; On Elizabethan
England, Helgerson 1995.
10. Hobsbawm 1992, 114.
11. On nineteenth-century France, see Weber 1976, especially 303338.
12. Ringmar 2008, 153154; On the theatrum mundi metaphor, see Berg 1985; Christian
1987. For the As You Like It, quote see Shakespeare 2003.
13. The European international system is often referred to as the Westphalian system.
4/18/11 12:36 PM
16 Erik Ringmar
As Osiander 2001 makes clear, however, the Westphalian treaty itself did not embody most
conceptual changes commonly associated with it. More generally on the Westphalian system,
see Lyons and Mastanduno 1995; Caporaso 2000; Teschke 2003.
14. On Italian city-states, see Orgel 1975, 1011. On seventeenth-century Sweden, see
Ringmar 2008, 160161. On Elizabethan England, see Hunt 2008, especially 146172.
15. Baker 1990, 5985.
16. In a poll from 1999, Lieven reports, 72 percent of adult Americans declared that
they were proud of their country. In the country with the next highest score, Britain, the
figure was 53 percent. Lieven 2005, 19.
17. On the state as an International Person in international law, see for example, Oppenheim 1912, 107, 116.
18. Ibid., 122125.
19. What we are, said Hume, is nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux
and movement. Hume 1986, 300. Compare to Ricoeur 1992 and Pizzorno 1986.
20. Like Hume, we might as well turn the question around and compare the identity of an
individual to a republic or a commonwealth. Hume 1986, 309. Compare to Jackson 2004.
21. On identity as narratively constructed, see Ricoeur 1992. On the recognition of narratives, see Taylor 1994; Ringmar 2008, 8791; cf. Pizzorno 1986.
22. Mead 1964.
23. Anderson 2006, 3746.
24. For a critique, see Kedourie 1993, 2443.
25. According to the so-called Friendly Relations Declaration, see Koskenniemi 1994,
245.
26. Cf. Honneth 1996, 92130. Honneth 2011, this volume, expresses doubts as to the
applicability of this schema to international politics since the motivations of a population are
difficult to ascertain. While this may be true as a matter of empirical investigations, this has
no bearing on the analytical distinction.
27. Barker 2007, 1834; Berenskoetter 2007, 647676.
28. Goffman 1959, 249255; cf. Butler 2007; Alexander 2006.
29. Of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated, in Hobbes 1982, 217.
30. Schivelbusch 2004 discusses the cases of France, Germany, and the American South.
On the French defeat in World War II, see Sartre 1949.
31. Kojve 1980, 2125.
32. Ringmar 2008, 8183.
33. See, for example, Bluntschli 1874, 289, 512.
34. Pizzorno 1986, 365372.
35. See, inter alia, Kelsen 1941; Lauterpacht 1944; Lauterpacht 1947. For a critical perspective, see Anghie 1999, 3844.
36. Ringmar 1995.
37. A point first developed in Austin 1874, vol. 1. For a discussion, see Anghie 2007,
4446, 6364; Koskenniemi 2004, 34, 4648.
38. On Carl Schmitt in this context, see Cumin 2005.
39. Koskenniemi 2004, 4751; Bull 1995, 5768; Anghie 1999, 1320.
40. Koskenniemi talks about these jurists as the men of 1873 in Koskenniemi 2004,
5154.
4/18/11 12:36 PM

41. Lorimer 1884a; Anghie 1999. See also Keal 2003, 5683.
42. Oppenheim 1912, 165.
43. Admitting Turkey was, according to Lorimer, not a good idea: In the case of the Turks
we have had bitter experience of the consequences of extending the rights of civilisation to
barbarians who have proved to be incapable of performing its duties, and who possibly do not
even belong to the progressive races of mankind. The subordinate position into which they
are rapidly sinking, seems to be that for which nature has designed them. Lorimer 1884b,
102. See also Krauel 1877, 388.
44. Mattingly 1937; Mattingly 1988; Satow 1917.
45. See, inter alia, Foster 1906; Satow 1917; Oppenheim 1912, 438.
46. Oppenheim 1912, 174.
47. Ibid., 108109. On this distinction, see also Honneth 2011, this volume.
48. Article 3: The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the
other states. Avalon Project 1933; Lauterpacht 1944, 385458.
49. Oppenheim 1912, 117; cf. Kelsen 1941, 605617.
50. Gong 1984.
51. Anghie 2007, 5265; Anghie 1999, 2030; Koskenniemi 2004, 7097; Keene 2002,
6096.
52. Lorimer 1884b, 101102; Lorimer 1884a. On this stage theory in the philosophy
of the Scottish Enlightenment, see Keal 2003, 7476.
53. The right of undeveloped races, like the right of undeveloped individuals, is a right
not to recognition as what they are not, but to guardianship that is, to guidance in becoming
that of which they are capable, in realising their special ideals. Lorimer 1884b, 157.
54. Ibid., 216.
55. Lorimer 1884a.
56. From this point of view, it is interesting to note that Kojve ended his life as an EU
official. See Lilla 2003.
57. On the teleological march of history in international relations, see Wendt 2003. Watson, for one, clearly believes that the spread of the European international system represents
an improvement. Watson 2009.
58. On peace and recognition, see Allan and Keller 2006; Allan and Keller 2011, this
volume. The standard work on democratic peace is Russett 1993. For some reservations
regarding such Kantianism, see Behnke 2008.
59. Anghie 2007, 6782. On the treaties concluded with Japan, see Auslin 2006; with
China, see Wang 2003. On treaty-making within the European international system, see
Lesaffer 2008.
60. Anghie 2007, 8284; Anghie 1999, 3238.
61. A treaty is the definition, by two or more separate States, of a specific jural relation
actually subsisting between or among them, which definition they engage to accept and enforce
as positive law. Lorimer 1884b, 260261.
62. Anghie 1999, 48.
63. Fairbank 1942.
64. Mayers 1901; cf. Krauel 1877, 391.
65. The treaties were instead a means by which they would disabuse the Emperor of his
preposterous claim to be the legitimate ruler of all the peoples of the world. Krauel 1877,
390.
4/18/11 12:36 PM
18 Erik Ringmar
66. On the role of the educational system in European colonies in South-East Asia, see
Anderson 2006, 116134.
67. Buck-Morss 2000, 842865; Buck-Morss 2009.
68. This resembles the logic of incorporation of the worldview of the oppressors discussed
by Fanon 2008 and Nandy 1989.
69. Keene 2002, 120144; Keal 2003, 185216.
70. For a definition and discussion of causes, see Rotberg 2003. On failed states in
international law, see Threr 1999. On failed states as an excuse for imperialism, see Mallaby 2002 and notoriously PNAC 2010. For a critical discussion, see Bialasiewicz et al. 2007,
409414.
71. For a defense of self-determination as a bulwark against imperialism, see Anghie 2007,
303309. An exploration of alternatives to the state is Brooks 2005. For a conservative critique
of self-determination, see Kedourie 1993.
72. Two early statements are Harvey 1991, esp. 201326 and Ruggie 1993, especially
142144, 168174. See also, inter alia, Brenner 1999; Hooghe and Marks 2003.
73. Hirschman 1976, 37; Force 2007, 135144.
74. Hegel [1820] 1991, 258.
75. Creveld 1999, 59125, has an extensive discussion.
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Russett, Bruce M. 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World.
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Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1949. La Mort Dans LAme. Paris: Gallimard.
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Green, & Co.
Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. 2004. The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and
Recovery. London: Picador.
Shakespeare, William. 2003. As You Like It. London: Chelsea House Publications.
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Sheehy, Paul. 2006. The Reality of Social Groups. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
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Chapter 1
Recognition between States

On the Moral Substrate
of International Relations
Axel Honneth
From an everyday, non-theoretical perspective, we seem to take for granted that state
actors are primarily guided by the aim of insisting that other states respect the communities they represent and of suing for recognition with corresponding measures.
In everyday discussion, we readily agree that the behavior of Palestines political leaders, for instance, cannot be understood without taking into account such strivings
for recognition; that Russias government has been going to great lengths to compel
Western countries to show more consideration for Russian interests; or that during the
Bush administration, Western European governments used diplomatic relationships
and maneuvers to obtain renewed respect from their American ally.1 At first sight,
these applications of the category of recognition to international relations certainly
do not seem surprising. After all, one of the more important motives behind the
recent revival of Hegels theory of recognition was the desire to return to a stronger
moral-theoretical language in analyzing the comportment of collective agents and
social groups, thereby extracting this behavior from the dominant paradigm of purely
purposive-rational, strategic action.2
But even in a work as old as the Philosophy of Right, Hegel objected to applying the
notion of a struggle for recognition to international relations, at least in the case of
25
4/18/11 12:36 PM
26 Axel Honneth
civilized nations. Instead, he sought to describe relations between states in terms
of the self-assertion of nation-states within the framework of universally accepted
international law. He reserved the idea of a striving for recognition and respect for
more underdeveloped and unrecognized nations, who were unsuccessful in their efforts at honor and glory, while the enlightened constitutional states of the West were
solely guided by the aims of maximizing welfare and preserving national security.3
That is the image that the dominant theory of international relations has adopted over
the last few decades. Without making any reference to Hegel, this theory maintains
that from the moment of their internationally recognized independence, national
governments essentially aim to assert themselves as nation-states and are thus mostly
uninterested in matters of international respect and recognition. A significant gap,
therefore, seems to lie between our everyday intuitions and the dominant theory, one
that appears difficult to overcome. While in our more theoretical explanations of state
comportment we accept that state activity is to be interpreted exclusively in terms
of purposive rationality, our more everyday intuitions also account for quasi-moral
motifs, such as a striving for recognition and violations of respect.
These intuitions, however, generally do not stand up to scientific models. The idea
that state actors and governments are exclusively interested in collective self-assertion
has so much suggestive power that we quickly abandon our everyday intuitions in
favor of the standard scheme of purely material motives. From this perspective, what
we once assumed to be acts fueled by a feeling of being disrespected, or by a desire
for recognition, now represents a merely symbolically concealed act motivated by
national interest. The question this raises is, in the first instance, purely empirical
and descriptive: Is the dominant paradigm of purposive-rational behavior an adequate
model for explaining political tensions, conflicts, and wars? From the perspective of
our everyday intuitions, we instead have to ask whether we would need to consider
more original [originr] motives, such as the desire for recognition and respect, in
order to explain foreign policy in general and international hostilities in particular.
The answer to these questions will also have opaque normative implications that cannot be left out of the picture, for the more our explanations of international relations
emphasize individual states striving for recognition, the more it appears we will have
to concede that states do not behave independently of the political reactions of their
counterparts and therefore have a latent awareness of the fact that their collective
identity must be internationally acceptable. Even if this shift in our perspective cannot
yield any immediate guidelines for action, it does strongly suggest that we prefer soft
power to military or hard power in international conflicts.4 The explanatory
framework we choose, therefore, has a strong bearing on our prescriptions for how
states should act in the case of international tensions, disagreements, or conflicts.
Depending on whether we emphasize the aspect of individual national self-assertion
or that of the foreign political striving for recognition, the normative horizon of our
prescriptions will change accordingly.
In what follows, I will make some tentative, exploratory efforts to answer these
questions. First, I explain why we should give more attention to the dimension of
4/18/11 12:36 PM
Recognition between States 27

recognition in explanations of international relations. Again, this concerns the purely
descriptive issue of the appropriate categorical means for describing international
conflict and tensions (I). Second, I will touch on some of the normative consequences
of this suggested paradigmatic shift on how we understand and explain international
relations. Because of my lacking familiarity with the issue, I will have to restrict myself to some tentative considerations, which should nevertheless make apparent that
by emphasizing the dimension of recognition in international relations, our moral
perspective on world politics will be changed significantly (II).
I.
The main difficulty we face in applying the category of recognition to international
relations is revealed by the obstacles we run into on our search for an appropriate
theoretical vocabulary. As soon as we try to give a name to the dimension of respect
involved in state conduct, we find that the only terms at our disposal are too psychologically or mentally laden. We speak, slightly helplessly and awkwardly, of a striving
for recognition or a need for respect, even though we know that such psychological concepts do not appropriately describe the matter at hand. As long as we only
transfer the concept of recognition from the interpersonal level to the behavior of
social groups or movements, we do not seem to have any terminological problems.
In this case, we view the collective identity of a given community as the higher-level
equivalent of personal identity or relation-to-self. We therefore have a relatively clear
picture about what is being fought over when individuals, but also groups, engage
in a struggle of recognition. Hence, there has never been any problem with speaking
of a politics of recognition when it comes to the struggles of minorities for legal
respect and social recognition for their collective identity. The starting point of these
struggles consists in shared experiences of exclusion, indignity, or disrespect, which
moves the members of such a group to band together and fight in solidarity for legal
or cultural recognition.5
But such a conceptual transfer is much more difficult, and the conceptual problems
become much broader once we switch from the level of group struggles to relationships between nation-states. Here we can no longer speak of collective identity, particularly because the obvious increase of ethnic and cultural subgroups has started
to make the illusion of a nationally homogeneous population disappear for good.
Even where, for historical reasons, the idea of the nation-state has been able to gain
a toehold, the state apparatus cannot be viewed as the executive organ of a collective
identity because the tasks it carries outproviding for security, preserving power,
and ensuring economic coordinationobey their own set of rules [eigengesetzlich].
Not only do the tasks of government change their form in accordance with various
overall forms of political organization, but the manner in which they are described
also changes according to the theory we employ. Depending on whether the function
of the liberal democratic state is regarded as consisting more in the biopolitical
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28 Axel Honneth
management of the population or in creating conditions of social justice compatible
with the requirements of national security, we will find great differences in the description of the tasks of government. But even beyond differences pertaining to the
form of government or the theoretical system of description, it remains true that the
foreign-political function of the state cannot merely be viewed as a compliant agency
charged with giving articulation to collective identity. Rather, the state is subject to
forces and imperatives that derive from the tasks of preserving the borders, economic
well-being, and political security. Therefore, we cannot simply transfer the concept
of recognition and claim that wherever collective identities exist, there must also be
a struggle for recognition. Between the supposed need of a people to have their own,
however fragmented, identity respected by foreign nation-states, there are always
the self-standing functional imperatives of political control [Steuerung] and the preservation of power. The psychological concepts we use when we speak of strivings,
needs, and feelings are thus inappropriate for describing international relations.
State actors do not have mental attitudes but are authorities charged with carrying
out politically determined tasks.
Now, on a theoretical level, there is a concept of recognition that is applied to
international relations as a matter of course. According to the statutes of international law, a politically organized community only comes into legal existence by
virtue of being recognized by other internationally recognized states. One of the
tasks of a governments foreign policy thus consists of examining whether a certain
community, which regards itself as a state, actually meets the generally defined prerequisites of a state.6 Hans Kelsen maintains that this act of legal recognition is a
necessarily reciprocal act because a newly recognized state can only be viewed as a
full-fledged member of the international community if it recognizes the states that
offer it recognition in turn. As long as a state fails to return the recognition extended
to it, the birth of a state within the international community will remain incomplete
because that state will not yet have proven its competence as a member of the legal
community of states.7
At the same time, however, Kelsen emphasizes that in acts of recognition between
states, a government only officially takes note of, or cognizes, an empirical reality,
rather than conveying its respect for that state. If a state recognizes another political community within the framework of international law, this only means that the
recognizing state regards the recognized state as having fulfilled the conditions of
statehood. This type of recognition, therefore, is not normative but instead expresses
that states cognition of a given state of affairs: The legal act of recognition is the
establishment of a fact; it is not the expression of a will. It is cognition rather than recognition.8 In order to speak of recognition between states in the true sense of the
term, Kelsen claims that there must be a certain amount of room for decision. This
would not involve examining a fait accompli in order to perhaps draw the conclusion that a state deserves recognition; rather, a decision would have to be made as to
whether more intense and benign relations should be taken up. According to Kelsen,
it is only at this second stage that we can justifiably speak of an act of recognition
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between states. This would not refer to the consequence of a states cognition of an
empirical fact but to a governments free decision to enter into a positive relationship
with another state. Kelsen terms these acts of recognition political in order to emphasize their specificity. With a political act of recognition, a government expresses its
intention to treat another state as an equal member of the international community.
Even if Kelsen primarily focuses on the establishment of diplomatic relations and
trade agreements, his conceptual proposal provides us with a key to pursuing the
previously mentioned institutions on a theoretical level. Obviously, what we mean
when we speak of recognition between states, of disrespect and indignity, lies on the
same level that Kelsen has in mind when he speaks of political acts of recognition.9
The first step we would have to take in order to get a better grasp of the issue
consists of emphasizing the sources of legitimacy that bind the conduct of state actors. The latter cannot carry out the task of foreign political self-assertion without
considering whether the manner in which they fulfill that task conforms to the
presumed expectations of the population. The manner in which a government
defends the nations security, political clout, and economic prosperity must be
made dependent upon the consent of the nations citizens, if only to demonstrate
the governments operational capacity. The necessity of legitimacy in foreign policy
even holds true for non-democratic political systems. Even in authoritarian states or
dictatorships, such as Iran or China, rulers and political elites usually understand
that their authority is wholly dependent on the degree of public consent to their
actions. We can assume that a states citizens, regardless of the cultural, ethnic, or
religious differences that might divide them, are very keen on seeing their country
accorded due respect and honor by other countries. The political representatives of
other communities are to recognize that upon which a community founds its selfimagethe challenges it has overcome in the past, its power to resist authoritarian
tendencies, its cultural achievements, and so on.10 We must not make the mistake
of immediately equating such desires with nationalism or feelings of supremacy over
other peoples. This is not only because the collective identity of a state-organized
community can no longer found itself on historical or ethnic commonalities and
not only because the processes of cultural globalization run counter to any such will
to supremacy.11 Rather, the desire for international recognition of everything that
makes up a nations self-respect is fundamentally directed toward the involvement,
and not the exclusion, of other states. Mundane examples for such desires can be
found in the often bemusing excitement that can envelop an entire population as
soon as its team brings home a victory in an international sports event or in the
naive pride with which a countrys citizens attempt to draw the attention of visitors
to cultural productions that honor the past of ones own community. That is neither
nationalism nor even constitutional patriotism [Verfassungspatriotismus] because it
neither demonizes other peoples nor necessarily expresses a positive opinion about
ones own democratic constitution. Instead, this represents a striving for a form of
collective recognition, without which a collective identity could not be maintained
in an unequivocal and unbroken fashion.
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30 Axel Honneth
It is this kind of collective expectation on the part of a countrys population to
which a states political agents must remain attached in their foreign-political activities. In order to legitimate their own actions, they understand that they will have to
appropriately display those features of their country that deserve recognition while
carrying out their functionally defined tasks. Therefore, the collective striving for
recognition is not just one particular function within the spectrum of a states tasks;
rather, it colors and underlies the way in which political agents fulfill the tasks assigned to them by the nations constitution.
In order to understand the alternatives open to state actors in this context, we
need to take the next step in our analysis. We need to get a clear picture of the
symbolic horizon of meaning that necessarily encompasses the entirety of state conduct. Political measures and actions have a whole series of meanings beyond their
expressly formulated content, and which are communicated through the manner of
their implementation. This involves the use of certain easily understood metaphors,
historically trained rituals, and even the conscious manipulation of facial expressions
and gestures at summits and other political events. These are all parts of the arsenal
of symbolic means with which state actors can intentionally communicate messages
that go beyond the official content of their communiqus.12 Presumably, much of
what Kelsen terms political recognition goes on in the symbolic staging of foreign
policy. Statements intended to raise awareness for the collective identity of ones own
country or to express respect for the achievements of another countrys population
are not normally an explicit part of a given political transaction but are contained
in the manner in which these transactions are concluded and presented. Of course,
there will always be cases in which government representatives believe they are acting
in accordance with the political mood of their home country when they explicitly
express a certain measure of recognition for the culture of another nations population.
A striking example is President Obamas astounding speech at Cairo University in
June 2009 before a large number of political and intellectual representatives of the
Islamic world. From greeting the audience in Arabic to his repeated mentions of the
cultural achievements of Islam, his entire speech sought to remove the impression
of disdain in many Arab countries during the Bush years. But much less common
are instances in which a political actor explicitly demands respect for the collective
identity of his or her own nations population. The desire to maintain the appearance
that ones own nation is unaffected by other nations opinions, the aim of avoiding
public embarrassment, and the etiquette of diplomatic encountersall that usually
prevents a peoples desire for recognition of its collective identity from being directly
and openly expressed by its political representatives. This recognitional dimension
of international relations is thus typically expressed indirectly and symbolically.
Behavior that serves to express a states interest in self-assertion is staged so as to
implicitly convey a finely calculated game in which respect and disrespect, desires
for recognition, and experiences of humiliation find expression.
Therefore, distinguishing a strategic dimension of self-assertion from a normative dimension of recognition is problematic. In their transactions with other states,
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olitical actors do not initially pursue purely purposive-rational aims, such as prep
serving power and maximizing welfare, in order to subsequently grant or revoke
recognition. Rather, states always define their interests within a horizon of normative
expectations that they presume their citizens to have in the form of diffuse desires for
the recognition of their own collective identity or that of another collective. Therefore,
it is wrong to initially assume a primary, isolated layer of purely strategic intentions
and calculations. State actors cannot formulate such interests without considering
the needs for recognition, which [added] they can presume on the part of the fragile
collective that is their own population, as well as the needs for moral reparations
harbored by an equally porous foreign population. Because political representatives
must preserve legitimacy by acting as interpreters of the experiences and desires
of their own respective citizenries, all encounters and relationships between states
stand under moral pressure generated by a conflict over recognition. Issues of this
kindthe need for an appropriate self-image in the eyes of the world, the defense
against the shame of collective humiliation, the desire to make reparations for unjust
deedsdetermine the execution of foreign policy to a degree that makes analytical
differentiation impossible.
All this, however, relates solely to the descriptive level of an analysis of international
relations. When it comes to explaining international relations, it is unwise to assume
a certain bundle of interests that refer exclusively to a states desire for self-assertion,
in order to then subsequently add a diffuse need for recognition. Rather, state actors define what they regard as necessary for the preservation of the countries they
represent in light of their interpretations of the desires for recognition held by the
citizenry. Naturally, rulers or state representatives have a certain amount of leeway
in interpreting the smoldering, diverse, and hardly organized sentiments of the
population in one direction or another, that is, in emphasizing either the conciliatory
or the hostile elements of the public mood. Only in democratic states, in which the
constitution itself is a principles-based interpretation of the nation-states identity,
are rulers compelled to obey certain guidelines in the fulfillment of such collective
strivings for recognition. But in no state can political actors simply ignore the populations demands concerning their collective identity because this would mean risking
the loyalty of the population. Therefore, when political agents interpret and execute
the functions accorded to them, they must always consider the expectations of their
citizens about the conduct of other states. Authors who, like Hegel, refuse to accept
such a connection between foreign policy and collective strivings for identity in the
case of civilized states do not have a clear grasp on [should be of ] the significance of
the need to secure legitimacy. They believe instead that in explaining international
relations, they can ignore moral demands emerging from collective identities because
they refuse to recognize that even modern, functionally differentiated states depend
on the consent of the citizens.
If we search out illustrative examples in the recent past, we will find a number
of both positive and negative cases. At the negative end of the spectrum, we would
find National Socialisms policy of territorial expansion, which cannot be explained
4/18/11 12:36 PM
32 Axel Honneth
without reference to widespread feelings of collective humiliation among the German
population due to the Treaty of Versailles. These feelings even found their way into
the definition of external enemies. In this case, it is almost impossible to examine
Nazi foreign policy without reference to the successful attempt to take diffuse feelings
among the population and concentrate them on a feeling of national humiliation due
to the Treaty of Versailles, thereby creating a justification for an aggressive policy
of reparations and revenge.13 At the other positive end of the spectrum, we could
cite an example from the very recent past: the new American presidents efforts at
reconciliation with the rest of the world. We cannot explain these efforts adequately
without seeing in them an attempt to overcome a widespread feeling of isolation and
shame among the American population. Certainly, both examples are extreme cases
of politically mediatized struggles for recognition. In the first case, political rulers
formed a narrative of justification on the basis of a diffuse mood among the citizens,
which allowed the rulers to engage in a campaign of conquest and revenge. In the
second case, a democratically elected president with impressive rhetorical skills has
interpreted the paralyzing unease of the majority in a way that allows him to justify
reconciliatory gestures toward currently hostile governments. Both examples, different as they are, clearly illustrate that we cannot divorce a nations foreign-political
aims from the respective demands of the nations collective identity. The manner in
which states react to each other, and the forms of relation they maintain with each
other, derive from a fusion of interests and values brought about by both sides. This
fusion consists in the disclosure of foreign-political goals from the perspective of the
hypothetical community that joins together a population, and which is interpreted
as a collective that is striving for recognition. Therefore, the psychological terminology I recommended avoiding above has a place after allnot as an element of our
theoretical language, but as one of the objects of that language in political reality.
And in that reality, state actors must interpret the populations moods, making use
of concepts related to strivings for recognition and historical humiliation.
At the same time, the moral spectrum illustrated by these two examples also
gives us a clear demonstration of just how many directions the political mobilization
of collective sentiments can take. The desire to have ones own collective identity
recognized by other peoples can be used to legitimate both an aggressive policy of
conquest and a deescalating policy of reconciliation. This raises questions that are
no longer merely descriptive, but that touch on the normative dimension of a theory
of international relations.
II.
In my opinion, we cannot further differentiate the type of recognition that plays a
constitutive role in the explanation of the dynamics of international relations. Unlike
social groups or movements, whose own statements can be used to draw conclusions
about the specific type of collectively desired recognition, national collectives are far
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too amorphous for us to be able to make comparable differentiations. Instead, we
must content ourselves with the relatively vague assumption that the members of a
nation-state generally have a diffuse interest in having their collective self-respect be
respected by other states and in receiving recognition for their common culture and
history. Differentiations between various modes of recognition, such as those made
in the realm of inter-subjective relations, seem inappropriate on the highly aggregated
level of entire populations.14 It is almost impossible to tell whether such populations
are striving for signs of goodwill, legal equality, or esteem in the eyes of the other side
because their individual members motives are too diffuse and their aims are insufficiently integrated.15 In any case, such differentiations play a very marginal role in the
explanation of international relations. What is decisive is not the type of recognition
for which a certain population actually strives but how political actors and rulers
interpret its respective moods. The we of the population, which will always have
an influence on the definition of foreign-political objectives, is not an empirical but
a hypothetical quantity. It arises when disordered and presumed expectations and
moods are formed into a collective narrative that makes a certain type of international
stance appear justified in light of past humiliations or desired recognition.16
Such narratives of justification give us a key to answering the normative questions
that arise when it comes to shaping international relations.17 After all, the shape of
international relations determines the chances for changing these relations so as to
reduce martial conflicts and improve prospects for peaceful cooperation. As soon as
we turn away from the descriptive problems of a theory of international relations and
turn toward the normative problems these relations entail, we must adopt a different
perspective on actual conflicts in the world. We then no longer ask how to properly
understand conflicts between states but which measures would have to be taken in
order to make such conflicts less likely and raise the chances for a more peaceful state
of international affairs. This second category of questions, however, cannot be wholly
separated from the first because only an appropriate understanding of the causes of
international conflict can enable us to envision solutions for overcoming the prevailing state of affairs. The realism of our normative considerations and utopias will
increase to the extent that we have correct hypotheses about the considerations that
underlie how state actors and governments plan and calculate their relations with
other states.18 The theoretical assumptions I developed in the first section of the
essay play a central role at the juncture between empirical facticity and normative
considerations. If it is true that states can only define their international relations by
including narratives of justification containing a credible and convincing interpretation of the populations interests in collective self-respect, then political relations of
recognition at the international level indirectly take on decisive importance as soon
as we seek to reduce conflicts between states.
This basic normative idea results from the close connection between collective
feelings on the one hand and political narratives of justification on the other. State
actors can only disclose and define foreign-political aims by viewing their citizens
elementary desires for security and prosperity in light of interpretations that constitute
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34 Axel Honneth
a narrative synthesis of the diffuse expectations of the population. At the same time,
very narrow limits are imposed on these interpretations because a summarizing construction of collective feelings must prove to be a halfway appropriate and convincing
interpretation of the citizenrys actual, if diffuse, expectations. Narratives intended
to justify a hostile and aggressive pursuit of foreign-political interests can remain
intact only as long as the population has perceptible grounds for feeling that their
collective self-respect has been violated or insulted by the conduct of other states. If
there is no evidence for such disrespect, feelings of humiliation and degradation will
not be able to spread among the fragmented publics in which citizens move, and the
narratives in play will fast lose credibility and thus become incapable of playing its
legitimating role. What is true in the case of aggressive foreign policy can also apply
to a policy of willing cooperation and reconciliation. A narrative interpretation that
supports such conduct can only be upheld as long as the feeling of having ones own
collective self-respect be disrespected by other states does not gain the upper hand.
In both cases, the collective feelings of a population that follows the signals of other
states with interest and suspicion will prove to be the decisive measure for the success
of foreign-political narratives of justification. The greater the distance between the
diffuse moods among the citizenry and the official justifications for political conduct,
the more difficulties state actors will have maintaining foreign-political objectives.
Therefore, perhaps we could say that states indirectly codetermine the foreign-political
conduct of other states because the symbolic means with which they convey respect
and recognition for other nations constitute an instrument for influencing the formation of public opinion and mood in other countries.
All these considerations have taken us a long way toward answering the normative questions at issue. We saw that the entirety of a states foreign-political conduct
stems from a specific interpretation of interests and values. This interpretation must
coordinate the functional requirements for maximizing security and prosperity
with the publics expectations about other states recognition of its own collective
identity. For that reason, state actors or governments must base their conduct on
narratives meant to justify, in light of historical events and episodes, pursuing their
states interests in an either cooperative or aggressive manner. At the same time,
however, we saw that states also exercise an indirect influence on how other states
legitimate their foreign policies because they can influence the formation of public
opinion and mood from abroad. The diverse tools used to signal recognition or
disrespect constitute a means for casting doubt on other states narratives of justification by demonstrating a divergent view of those states collective identity. These
measures drive a wedge between the self-justifications of state actors and the political
will-formation of the population; by means of credible expressions of respect and
recognition, they attempt to convince another citizenry to mistrust their governments narratives of justification. Although the history of international relations is
brimming with examples of such behavior, they play a very marginal role in the
theory. Because the latter interprets state activity largely according to the model of
purposive-rational behavior, it lacks the conceptual framework for according the
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affective dimension of international relations of recognition its proper place. On
the normative level, this ignorance comes back to haunt the theory in the form of
a procedural lack of fantasy regarding the chances for reducing hostile conflict and
expanding relations of peaceful cooperation. The theory instead restricts itself to
compromises and agreements under international law, even though the history of
international conflict teaches us that collective feelings of recognition or humiliation
by other states play a much more significant role.
The path for civilizing international relations primarily lies in sustained efforts
at conveying respect and esteem for the collective identities of other countries. Even
before legal agreements aimed at promoting peace can do their work, and even before
the cultivation of diplomatic relations and economic agreements can reduce international tensions, we need publicly visible signals that the history and culture of other
nations are worth being heard among the cacophony of the worlds peoples. Only by
means of such recognition, which goes over the heads of government representatives
and political agents, can we ensure that the citizens of another state no longer believe
the demonization practiced by political elites and that they can begin to trust that
the other side respects them. The history of international relations contains enough
examples proving that a violation of this normative principle only raises the danger
of international conflict, while demonstrable respect for this principle has reduced
the potential for such conflicts. Willi Brandts famous Warschauer Kniefall was
an internationally perceptible gesture that made it nearly impossible for the Polish
government to awake formerly prevalent prejudice and resentment about the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG).19 Europes (and especially Germanys) ignoring of the
harsh and determined struggle of the Serbs against the Nazis prepared the way for
a fatal policy of overly hasty international recognition of individual ex-Yugoslavian
states (Croatia, Kosovo), which drove Serbias government into increasing isolation
and thereby ultimately strengthened ultra-nationalistic narratives among the Serbian
public.20 The lacking sympathy, and perhaps even a total absence of solidarity, on the
part of internationally dominant states for the demeaning situation of the Palestinian
population continues to fuel a situation in which the local ruling elites fantasies of taking revenge on Israel finds collective support among the lower, impoverished classes.21
We could easily expand this list of examples. We might think of the constant
stream of new members joining Islamist terrorist organizations over the last several
years in order to get a sense of the effects of a policy that fails to extend recognition
to other peoples, an act of recognition that would go over the heads of state authorities. The first step toward reconciliation between states, toward developing peaceful
and cooperative relations, will always consist of using the soft power of respect and
esteem, which signals to a foreign citizenry that its cultural achievements are in no
way inferior and that it can count on others sympathy for its sufferings. The more
explicitly we demonstrate such recognition, the more visible these demonstrations
will be to other peoples and the more we can cast doubt on demonizations serving to
justify hostile reactions. The best means a state has at its disposal for counteracting
demonization and resentment on the part of other nation-states consists of globally
4/18/11 12:36 PM
36 Axel Honneth
visible and clear signals of willingness to include other citizenries in the international
moral community.
Certainly, such symbols of political recognition are not enough to create a solid
basis for transnational cooperation. We need to follow up on efforts to overcome rejectionist attitudes arising from experiences of collective humiliation and to undermine
historically grounded and yet long-exploited demonizations by taking steps toward
contractual agreements that secure peaceful relations and long-term arrangements on
how to coordinate efforts to meet common challenges. On the basis of that cooperation, more stable networks of transnational communities can arise, such as we might
find in the process of European integration.22 But before such a decentering of state
politics can take place, different citizenries must have the experience of recognizing
each others cultural productions and historical achievements, both of which make
up the conditions of their collective self-respect. A political theory that fails to gain
conceptual access to these affective roots of transnational confidence-building will
also be unable to appropriately conceive the normative conditions for civilizing world
politics. Therefore, it is time that we view international relations in a new lightone
that differs from the view of Hegel and the political realists following in his wake.
Notes
COMP: UNNUMBERED NOTE TO COME; LEAVE SPACE
1. I have taken these examples from Wolf 2008, 542.
2. See Honneth 1995, chapter 8.
3. Hegel 1967, 52.
4. These terms stem from Nye 2004.
5. See Taylor et al. 1994; Habermas 2004, 107ff; Honneth 2003, 110ff.
6. See Kelsen 1941, 605617.
7. Ibid., 609.
8. Ibid., 608.
9. On this perspective within the theory of international relations, see Wolf 2008; Haacke
2005, 181194.
10. See Rawls 2001.
11. See Habermas 1988, 313.
12. Edelman 1964. For a critique of this book, see Honneth and Paris 1979, 138142.
13. See Cohrs 2006. I owe this reference to Volker Heins.
14. Honneth 1995, chapter 5.
15. That is why I have doubts about the proposal made by Erik Ringmar in his essay in
the present volumean essay that is otherwise highly valuable. Ringmar 2011.
16. For the logic of such constructions, see Anderson 1983.
17. On the concept of narratives of justification, see Forst and Gnther 2009, 2327.
18. See Rawls 1999, 1.
19. For an analysis, see Schneider 2006; Wolffsohn and Brechenmacher 2005.
20. Despite all the idiosyncrasy and hyperbole of Peter Handkes political statements on
4/18/11 12:36 PM

the wars in the former Yugoslavia, his critique of Western Europes lack of respect for the
sufferings of the Serbian population is nevertheless compelling.
21. See Sarraj 2002, 7176. I owe this reference to Jos Brunner.
22. See Brunkhorst 2005, 330347; Bach 2000.
Bibliography
Bach, Maurizio. 2000. Die Europisierung nationaler Gesellschaften. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher
Verlag.
Brunkhorst, Horst. 2005. Demokratie in der globalen Rechtsgenossenschaft: Einige berlegungen zur posstaatlichen Verfassung der Weltgesellschaft. Zeitschrift fr Soziologie.
Sonderheft Weltgesellschaft..
Cohrs, Patrick. 2006. The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 19191932. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Edelman, Murray. 1964. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. University of Illinois Press.
Forst, Rainer, and Klaus Gnther. 2009. ber die Dynamik normativer Konflikte: Jrgen
Habermas Philosophie im Lichte eines aktuellen Forschungsprogramms. Forschung
Frankfurt 2.
of Recognition. Review of International Studies 31(1): 181194.
Habermas, Jrgen. 1988. Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity: Remarks
on the Federal Republics Orientation to the West. Acta Sociologica 31 (1): 313.
. 1994. Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State. In Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, edited by Charles Taylor. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Hegel, G. W. F. 1967. Philosophy of Right. Translated by T.M. Knox. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Honneth, Axel. 1995. The Struggle for Recognition: Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. London: Polity Press.
. 2003. Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser. In Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, edited by Nancy Fraser and Axel
Honneth. London: Verso Books.
Honneth, Axel, and Rainer Paris. 1979. Zur Interaktionsanalyse von Politik. Leviathan 7
(1): 138142.
Kelsen, Hans. 1941. Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations. The
American Journal of International Law 35 (4) October: 605617.
Nye, Joseph S. 2004. Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics. Washington: Public
Affairs.
Rawls, John. 2001. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ringmar, Erik. 2011. The International Politics of Recognition. In The International Politics
of Recognition, edited by Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar. Boulder: Paradigm.
Sarraj, Eyad El. 2002. Suicide Bombers: Dignity, Despair and the Need for Hope: An
Interview with Eyad El Sarraj. Journal of Palestine Studies 31 (4).
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38 Axel Honneth
Schneider, Christoph. 2006. Der Warschauer Kniefall. Ritual, Ereignis und Erzhlung. Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft.
Taylor, Charles. 1994. Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton:
Wolffsohn, Michael, and Thomas Brechenmacher. 2005. Denkmalsturz? Brandts Kniefall.
Munich: Olzog.
Wolf, Reinhard. 2008. Respekt: Ein unterschtzter Faktor in den Internationalen Beziehungen. Zeitschrift fr Internationale Beziehungen 15 (1): 542.
4/18/11 12:36 PM
Chapter 2
Prickly States?
Recognition and Disrespect between
Persons and Peoples
Reinhard Wolf
Probably the most characteristic error people make when describing human
behavior is to attribute the same kinds of properties to groups that ordinarily
apply to individuals.1
Do states, nations, and their leaders care for recognition in the same way individuals do when interacting in families or other small groups? Do they react as strongly
against disrespect as persons exposed to hurtful slights? Conceivably, respect and
recognition are vital for persons everyday well-being at their homes or at their
workplaces, yet play a rather marginal role for professional decision-makers steering
the policies of detached nation-states in a culturally heterogeneous international
system.
The chief concern of this contribution is not whether or not states or nations
really are persons but if they react to recognition and disrespect in ways so similar
to individual responses that it makes sense to apply psychological insights to international relations. In this context, I shall base my points on a thoroughly pluralistic
ontology. Even though most leaders and citizens tend to anthropomorphize the state
and think and talk of it as if it were a person, for the sake of my argument, I will
39
4/18/11 12:36 PM
40 Reinhard Wolf
assume that states and nations are not primary actors in their own right.2 Rather, I
will treat them as composite actors that can be reduced to their basic units, that is,
institutions, groups, and individuals.3 What I want to demonstrate is that, even in
a highly institutionalized environment, persons, domestic groups, and nations can
react to international (dis)respect in ways similar to individuals personally experiencing (dis)respect, and that these domestic actors often succeed in making the state
conform to their symbolic needs. Due to its conspicuous role in world politics, the
established nation-state will be taken as the paradigmatic example of an international
actor. Yet, with due circumspection, most of the observations can also be applied to
other institutional actors on the international scene.4
As I shall argue, there are indeed ample reasons for proceeding cautiously with
regard to extrapolations from psychology or philosophy.5 States, it will be claimed,
cannot be equated with individual actors. Even though states and nations are routinely subjected to linguistic, moral, and legal personification by both politicians and
political scientists, compared to interacting individuals, they are much more complex
actors (to say the least) encountering one another in more complex and diversified
social environments. Moreover, both their national decision-making and their mutual
dealings are regulated by norms and procedures that are supposed to institutionalize rationality and to minimize the impact of the personal factor. Hence, it seems
reasonable to assume that, overall, nation-states are actually less touchy or at least
behave in a more controlled and rational manner than individuals when they are
experiencing recognition or disrespect.
However, there are grounds for expecting more or less touchy states, depending
on national identities, political cultures, elite interests, decision-making structures,
and international circumstances. States may sometimes react even more strongly
to a given act of disrespect than an individual in an analogous situation. Even
when we disaggregate the nation-state into its constitutive components (persons,
groups, and institutions), a case can be made that states (or the actors who are
authorized to speak for them) demand social recognition from their peers. Thus,
while political scientists should not simply expect collective actors to consistently
behave according to patterns that other disciplines have established for individuals, they are well advised to make use of such findings when formulating their
own hypotheses.
This chapter starts with a brief overview of relevant psychological findings and
general grounds for caution concerning their application to international relations.6
This is followed by a discussion of various factors that tend to mitigate the impact of
recognition and disrespect among states, at least among those states which already
enjoy widespread legal recognition. The section thereafter will try to demonstrate that
all these factors could also enhance the demand for recognition and, correspondingly,
the upsetting effects of disrespect. The conclusion will therefore make the point that
states reactions to (dis)respect are likely to be more diverse, and thus clearly warrant
more thorough empirical studies.
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Recognition and Disrespect between Persons and Peoples 41
Psychological Findings on Respect and Disrespect

If states (or nations) were known to interact just like individual people, there would
be little doubt about the relevance of recognition and disrespect for international
relations. For persons interacting in small groups, psychological research has firmly
established that respect promotes cooperation while disrespect breeds conflict.7 When
people feel respected by fellow group members for their work and ideas, when they
think they are accepted as group members, they demonstrate greater compliance with
work norms, meet performance expectations to a greater extent, and show greater
willingness to engage in extra work on behalf of the group. Moreover, respected employees also identify more strongly with their work group, which further promotes
their pro-social activities.8 In those studies, the subjective feeling of respect was
strongly influenced by perceptions of fair and polite treatment, which people tend
to take as an indication of high personal status within their group. Institutionalized
voice opportunities, such as the right to get a hearing or to file a complaint, were
particularly important in this regard.9 As a result, individuals become significantly
more interested in the success of their groups.10 Not surprisingly then, researchers
also found evidence indicating that respect can promote cooperation in problematic
social situations.11
On the other hand, psychological research has clearly confirmed folk wisdoms
about the positive relation between disrespect, anger, and personal conflict behavior.
The experience of disrespect regularly stimulates an instantaneous urge to redress the
situation and educate the offender through direct retribution.12 Moreover, disrespect
almost automatically arouses anger, which is well known to constrain information
processing and to promote strong reactions against the disrespectful actor.13 Experiments have demonstrated that anger leads to negatively biased perceptions, reduces
the demand for information, shortens decision times, and consequently leads to more
risk-prone and more aggressive behavior.14
Still, as already pointed out, states (or nations) international behavior cannot
be predicted by making simple extrapolations from findings in social psychology or
social philosophy. Just like persons, states may routinely speak with a single voice
to their foreign peers and other actors; yet, if they are unitary actors at all, they are
at best collective actors consisting of an ensemble of political groups and officials.
To produce an authoritative foreign-policy output, a nations constituent actors
must coordinate their competing preferences through institutionalized debates and
negotiations. Perhaps even more important, states interacting on the international
scene tend to be far less interdependent than persons dealing with each other at the
workplace or within their families.
Hence, there may be two basic reasons why sovereign states and their representatives may care less for social recognition than individuals in their daily interactions:
(1) once they have gained international legal recognition, states are less dependent on
the respect of their peers, and (2) their institutionalized decision-making processes
4/18/11 12:36 PM
42 Reinhard Wolf
may privilege material cost-benefit calculations over purely symbolic status considerations and emotional needs. These processes can conceivably mitigate the hurtful
effects of disrespect. Compared to their individual citizens, states may therefore be
in a far better position to heed the challenging advice given by Stoic philosophers:
do not pay attention to disrespect you do not deserve.15
Reasons for Skepticism: The Case for the

Pervasiveness of Stoic States
There are quite a number of factors that should reduce a states urge to insist on social recognition. For one thing, states consist of an ensemble of different groups and
interact in a culturally diverse arena. This makes for far greater social heterogeneity
and also for greater social distance (1) between different nation-states, (2) between
nation-states and their citizens, and (3) between groups within nation-statesall of
which can significantly attenuate the demand for international recognition. Second,
states are institutions regulating the interaction of groups and individuals. As such,
they lack emotions and are equipped with norms and rules that tend to control the
impact of personal emotions.
Nations Do Not Equal Persons

Usually, the well-established link between respectful treatment and personal feelings
of self-worth is far weaker when we look at interaction between culturally diverse
groups or collective actors. After all, even as individuals, we rely to a greater extent
on the judgments of our peer group than on the opinions of complete strangers with
whom we may have little in common.16 Even disrespectful or humiliating treatment
on the part of outsiders tends to hurt less than abuse by group members because it
often can be explained away with the outsiders bad character or their lack of
better knowledge. Due to their greater similarities and their closer interaction among
themselves, group members can more easily question the validity of out-group views
and reassure each other of the worth of their own group. Compared to individuals,
interacting group members can more easily nurture or create feelings of superiority
vis--vis competing actors. Not surprisingly, very large groups, such as nations, are
especially good at this.17 Moreover, it is well known that group members tend to put
special emphasis on those positive characteristics where the in-group excels.18 Again,
such self-serving evaluations can be more easily stabilized when groups rarely interact
with foreign groups that excel in other dimensions and therefore tend to propagate
different criteria. Therefore, the intra-mural communication within a disrespected
group sometimes may go a long way in sheltering its members against its environments arrogance or other forms of symbolic ill-treatment. In sum, compared to ordinary individuals, nations should stand a far better chance of stabilizing self-serving
identity-narratives.19
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This greater social distance between nations is mirrored by individuals greater
distance from their nation. Obviously, when being addressed by others, persons interacting in small groups can hardly avoid identifying with their selves. Hence, the
disrespect they directly experience always concerns at least one ostensible component
of their personal identity. Even when the slight in question was primarily targeted at
a certain group that the victim apparently belonged to, it will hurt at least that part
of a persons social identity. When a Mexico-born American is being told a disparaging joke about Hispanics, he can scarcely avoid feeling offended. If, on the other
hand, the insult consists of an official statement directed against ones nation, it may
not hurt an individual at all. After all, persons need not identify with their state in
its international dealings. Moreover, while answering national slights can be left to
national leaders, personal slights call for personal reactions. They cannot be quietly
ducked without damaging a persons social standing. Consequently, the greater social
distance between citizens and their nation will often constrain citizens demand for
international recognition.
Finally, social distance and heterogeneity within nation-states can also mitigate
their response to foreign (dis)respect. Most nations are composed of different groups
with different ethnic or class identities. Sometimes these groups will not promote
similar variants of the same national narrative but incompatible and competing identity discourses, which tend to neutralize each other in the public domain. Where this
is the case, the national discourse lacks a common frame to interpret the meaning of
foreign acts and thus may fail to bring about an collective response. To be sure, such
internal heterogeneity could also undermine mutual affirmation as described above
and thus could render foreign disrespect more upsetting for individual citizens. On
the international level, however, this will hardly matter, since such an identity-torn
state may be burdened by fierce internal debates that gravely impair its external agency.
States Do Not Equal Nations: Institutionalization and (Material) Rationality

Yet even when national leaders and citizens feel severely slighted by foreign states
behavior, the institutional character of the state may attenuate calls for overt retribution.20 When converting various kinds of domestic demands into official foreign
policy, states arguably are biased in favor of rational decision-making focused on
material costs and benefits. Both bureaucratic processes and officials role conceptions
can diminish the effect of angry emotions, while better access for economic interest
groups tends to marginalize the foreign-policy influence of identity-oriented pressure
groups. Whereas the first two mechanisms impede dangerous short cuts, which tend
to bias individuals in favor of revenge and retribution, the latter often discriminates
against domestic actors insisting on enhanced international recognition.
Institutionalized decision-making is guided by norms, rules, and procedures that are
partly designed to prevent rash emotional responses. In modern states, even chief
executives will rarely decide on the spot without prior consultation with a range
of experts within their administration. Often, these experts will submit numerous
4/18/11 12:36 PM
44 Reinhard Wolf
analytical papers that thoroughly discuss the anticipated (material) costs and benefits
of various policy options. Most of these studies will be the joint product of several
officials and governmental agencies; that is, even before reaching the highest levels of
government, they will have been checked and discussed by experts with different areas
of expertise, interests, and perspectives. In the case of more important questions, chief
executives must even inform parliamentary leaders and ask the legislatures for their
political or financial support. Thus, bureaucratization and legislative control of foreign policy decision-making are likely to promote governmental rationality in several
ways, particularly, by upholding norms of individual and collective circumspection,
by stressing the need for transparent argumentation, by lengthening the search for
information and deliberation, and by ensuring the consideration of contrasting data
and assessments. While these effects hardly guarantee sound decisions, they will at
least contain the political impact of spontaneous emotions, such as anger. As pointed
out above, a persons angry mood is known to enhance the likelihood of hostile and
risky actions. Psychological research has shown that both increased self-awareness of
ongoing personal judgment processes and greater accountability make persons less
sensitive to such effects of anger.21 Moreover, the trivial fact that bureaucratization
delays decision-making may already be useful in as much as it increases the likelihood
that, by the time they actually make a decision, individual officials will no longer
experience strong personal emotions.
Political institutions also affect the personal approach of decision-makers to the
problem at hand. When dealing with foreign policy issues, state officials do not act
in their personal capacity but as representatives of their states or governmental agencies.22 In other words, they enact specified roles, knowing they will be held accountable if they fail to comply with pertinent norms. This may further circumscribe the
potential political effects of personal emotions, for offended officials may come to
view slights as directed against their nations or their governments rather than aimed
at themselves. As a result, they might take a more relaxed attitude. If, on the other
hand, they are more inclined to take such gestures personally, their role as national
representatives may help them in disregarding such experiences. As professionals
trained and paid for governmental service, they may find it easier to swallow their
personal pride for the good of their country.
Lastly, institutionalized access for interest groups might systematically privilege
the consideration of material consequences over demands for national recognition.
This especially applies to modern democratic welfare states whose elected leaders
are expected to meet the economic aspirations of their constituents. To do so, they
largely depend on the investments and exports of private business.23 Besides, companies and other private donors often play a crucial role in the financing of political
campaigns. Given this dual dependence, it is hardly surprising that parliaments and
state agencies have granted special access to powerful economic interest groups that
presumably pay more attention to the material implications of foreign policy than
to their recognition aspects.
4/18/11 12:36 PM

Summing up the preceding section, one is tempted to jump to the conclusion that
some nation-states will hardly care for social recognitionor if they do, such considerations will scarcely affect their foreign policy output. It seems that nation-states,
when dealing with their foreign peers, are both more rational and more materialistic
than persons engaged in close interactions. While this may be true in many circumstances, the following section will show that states sometimes act even less relaxed.
Reasons for Pessimism:

The Case for the Existence of Prickly States
Some of the factors discussed previously can also make states more sensitive to foreign
recognition. Greater social distance between nations may indeed render them less
vulnerable to foreign indifference or disrespectbut only for a certain while and
even then, only at the expense of mutual understanding. National divisions might
really compromise consensual self-images most citizens deem worthy of common
defense, yet they may also tempt endangered rulers to aggravate xenophobia and
cross-border conflicts. Finally, some governmental institutions conceivably mitigate
the impact of anger on foreign policy, but other state institutions may also propagate
national myths and norms that will stimulate national emotions that even pragmatic
leaders can not afford to ignore.
Nations, Leaders, and Citizens Can Be Touchy, Too

While often respect expressed by fellow members of ones peer group is more cherished
than respect between different groups, respect (or disrespect) expressed by out-groups
can still be vitalboth for the collective self-esteem of the in-group and for the
self-esteem of its individual members. For one thing, greater cognitive and social
distance cannot altogether invalidate the explicit or implicit judgments of outsiders.
Depending on social context and the salience of categories, current out-groups can
quickly become part of a larger (superordinate) in-group.24 Besides, due to higher
status, some out-groups judgments may always carry great weight. And sometimes,
even disrespect shown by lower-status groups can hurt. Cutting ties with groups
hardly provides a solution for such unpleasant experiences. In a globalizing world,
contact between alien groups can be avoided less and less. (And as the 2005 crisis
over the Muhammad cartoons in Danish newspapers demonstrated, even domestic
statements related via indirect communication can have grave consequences.) Hence,
confirmation among in-group members cannot indefinitely substitute for out-group
recognition.25 Eventually, temporary isolation could even increase the risk of especially hurtful encounters in the future. Without the correcting force of an ongoing
exchange of assessments, groups are inclined to exaggerate their own virtues or merits
in relation to those of out-groups. When social distance increases the leeway for
4/18/11 12:36 PM
46 Reinhard Wolf
social creativity, it also heightens the long-term risk of conflicts, as divergent status
markers promote status inconsistency, which in turn, breeds fights for dominance.26
Moreover, by isolating themselves, groups forgo opportunities for communicating
their own needs, ideas, or achievements. The longer this state persists, the greater the
risk that renewed encounters will result in particularly upsetting exchanges on relative
worth and status. Thus, temporary isolation is no substitute for genuine recognition,
especially not in the long run.
As concerns the individuals social distance to his or her nation, it should not be
overlooked that, at times, it can be extremely small. When their group is disrespected,
individual group members are motivated to defend their standing to the extent that
they identify with it.27 Depending on the circumstances, being a member of a given
group may figure prominently in an individuals social identity.28 Whoever disparages
my groups values, achievements, or features calls into question my own feeling of
self-worth to the extent that I share and take pride in those values, achievements, or
features.29 Resentment against attacks on the in-groups worth is therefore considered
a prime factor in the origins and escalation of ethnic conflicts.30 Fervent nationalists,
both within political elites and the public at large, will often react with outrage if
other nationals insult their nation.31 Even in the absence of national conscription,
millions of ordinary citizens have volunteered to put their lives at risk in combat.32
Citizens can also react strongly against personal disrespect that their leaders suffered
at the hands of foreign governments.33 On the other hand, sometimes people experience respect for their group as more pleasant or up-lifting than recognition of their
personal rights and achievements. Not a few nationalists have been willing to sacrifice
the personal rights that they enjoyed under colonial rule for the independence and
international recognition of their nation.34 Respect for their group, its representatives,
and its symbols can thus profoundly affect individuals self-esteem and consequently
also their behavior in various political contexts.35
Also, political leaders themselves may be even more strongly aroused by foreign
(dis)respect than ordinary citizens.36 First, they interact more closely and more frequently with foreigners than the rest of their compatriots. Especially within the group
of highly industrialized countries or within the Davos community, they form an
exclusive club whose members subscribe to special norms of dialogue. Thus, they may
care a lot if others behavior confirms their status within that club. Second, being the
leaders of their nations, they often identify even more strongly with their countries
than the average citizen. Third, leaders tend to be far more sensitive to status considerations than average citizens. Most of them have embarked on a political career
not so much for monetary reasons but because they sought an elevated status: they
wanted to lead. And those who make it to the top must be both especially qualified
for playing the status game and especially sensitive to its emotional rewards. Political success not only confirms their belief in their own leadership capabilities but
arguably also reinforces their habit of seeking personal satisfaction in this particular
way. Finally, leaders need to be concerned about the domestic effects of international
disrespect. Slights experienced at the hands of their foreign peers may not only hurt
4/18/11 12:36 PM

their personal pride but can also fatally compromise their standing vis--vis domestic
subordinates. Many lieutenants who have been willing to defer to a leader commanding international respect will no longer accept the orders of someone who failed to
respond to foreign insults.37
Moreover, it hardly needs mentioning that national leaders, even when they personally lack a nationalistic outlook, often will be inclined to promote their citizens
national sentiments, given the fact that such identification usually enhances citizens
loyalty to the regime currently acting on behalf of the nation.38 This temptation is
particularly strong at times when the governments legitimacy is heavily contested
by domestic opposition groups.39 Hence, deep domestic divisions are no guarantee
against an outburst of national sentiments. Rather, endangered political elites are
especially prone to diverting intra-mural conflicts to external targets.40 The easiest
way to do so is to downplay national differences by exaggerating international ones.
This can be achieved by making use of notorious group tendencies to subscribe to
the negative stereotyping of out-groups. To establish the evil nature of foreign nations and to stress the differences separating them from their own nation, regimes
sometimes make up events tarnishing the image of those nations. Usually, however,
it is much easier and safer to construe actual foreign moves as unprovoked slaps
in the face or as other kinds of arrogant or contemptuous behavior. In many cases
then, governments will use the leeway for the domestic interpretation of foreign acts
in ways that will aggravate rather than moderate their citizens sensitivity to alleged
instances of foreign disrespect.
Institutions Can Constrain Symbolic Flexibility

The institutionalized propagation of national narratives, the widespread bias in favor
of conflict norms, and the leaders sense of responsibility can sometimes make nations even less accommodating than individuals who have been subjected to alleged
disrespect.
State institutions play an important role in the construction, promotion, and stabilization of national narratives.41 Nation-states have founded university departments
to study the nations (alleged) roots and past achievements, national archives to store
its records, schools to disseminate official historical interpretations, and have set up
cultural agencies for keeping alive the nations artistic and folkloristic traditions. They
have erected monuments to celebrate national feats, established national symbols,
such as flags and anthems, for public worship, and have come up with all kinds of
public rituals, which help citizens enacting their identification with the nation.42 In
addition, they have set up peace-time military institutions for national protection,
which also promote national sentiments by routinely warning against dubious foreign
designs and by continuously training large numbers of men and women for the defense
of their country. Sometimes the influence of these national agencies and customs
are somewhat balanced by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) committed to
cosmopolitan causes. More often, however, national institutions face little domestic
4/18/11 12:36 PM
48 Reinhard Wolf
competition in their mission to promote citizens identification with a specific notion
of their countrys history and mission.
As a result, many state institutions emphasize the need to uphold the nations selfimage against perceived national challenges. First of all, the work of these institutions
underscores the difference between nationals and foreigners. Thereby, it increases the
well-known inclination for in-group self-enhancement at the expense of out-groups.43
Second, these activities homogenize the citizens positive image of their nation. Accordingly, even leaders who personally do not subscribe to the official narrative will
find it more difficult to ignore foreign acts challenging the nations established identity. Finally, such leaders willingness to search for international understanding will
be further compromised by the conflict norms that these institutions, the military
in particular, tend to propagate. Under these circumstances, an uncompromising
stance and ethnocentric rhetoric become the litmus test for national loyaltya test
that leaders must not fail if they want to stay in control.44
Even leaders role-playing is a double-edged sword. While it is true that internalized
role conceptions can guard officials against rash escalatory moves, such effects certainly
can be marginalized by personal emotions or status considerations. In these cases, leaders who personally feel disrespected may draw their nations into confrontations. Recent
examples include the personal rows that German Chancellor Schrder and French
President Chirac had with US President Bush.45 And political role conceptions can also
inhibit the search for pragmatic solutions. It has been demonstrated that representatives
acting on behalf of some principals are less accommodating than persons acting only
for themselves.46 Thus, when confronted with a strong challenger, individuals may
sometimes be prepared to give up personal status claims. True, doing so might diminish their personal prestige. Yet, whether they are willing to pay that price is a decision
they can take entirely on their own. Unlike individuals accepting a diminished personal status, national leaders would not only compromise their own international standing
but also the standing of their compatriots whom they have been entrusted to protect.
Therefore, role-conscious leaders may equate such a move with letting down their fellow citizens. So even if accommodation appears to be the reasonable move, leaders may
envision it as a personal failure that they are not entitled to tolerate.47
Conclusion
Even if states are neither persons nor peoples, recognition will often be an issue for
collective actors on the international scene. This is rather obvious for ethnic groups
seeking legal recognition for a new state, but it is also true for established nation-states
whose sovereignty is rarely questioned. As has been indicated previously, given their
lower level of social interaction, on balance, nations and institutionalized, international
actors seem to be less exposed and less vulnerable to disrespect than ordinary persons.
However, sooner or later, even ordinary citizens will be confronted with foreign views
and actions that either confirm or challenge their own sense of their countries place
4/18/11 12:36 PM

in history or contemporary international affairs. When this happens, (dis)respect
between nations and their states can become an important political issue, sometimes
as important as recognition between closely interacting individuals.
It has also become clear that the significance of international recognition problems
is not only less obvious but also more variable. Due to the great complexity of nationstates (and of their foreign policy apparatus), it is much more difficult to anticipate the
formers reactions to external stimuli. Social psychology may indeed have a good track
record in explaining and predicting the average humans response to certain types of
behavior. However, information processing and decision-making within the state are
far more complicated and thus open to numerous additional mechanisms that can
either enhance or mitigate the impact of (dis)respectful gestures. Thus, the range of
typical reactionstechnically speaking, the size of the standard deviationseems
to be much broader than in the case of individuals.
Apparently, in this context, a great number of factors need to be considered.
Particular attention should be given to the behavior of political leaders and prominent
intellectuals, for they can exert critical influence on how the broader community
comes to see both the status of its own nation and the symbolic implications of foreign
acts. In some cases, for example the Danish Muhammad cartoons, such foreign acts
would even go wholly unnoticed without domestic leaders setting them on national
agendas. In other cases, opinion leaders at least need to describe a particular foreign
move and to interpret its meaning for the nations identity as the latter is understood
in the dominant discourse: Is this act to be seen as a deliberate offense to an important status element of national identity, or is it just a routine action that says little
about foreign views of our nation? Thus, the crucial issue here is discursive framing,
which gives leaders and intellectuals a pivotal role in shaping the nations attitude to
possible acts of (dis)respect.
How leaders engage in such acts of creative framing depends on their outlook
and interests. For one thing, political leaders may actually share strong national
sentiments, or they might seek international status for themselves. In this case, they
will be motivated to bring the nation along by promoting a public discourse which
accords well with their own convictions or prestige ideas. However, they can also stir
up national sentiments for strictly instrumental reasons by using societys nationalist
inclinations to boost the regimes domestic legitimacy.
In doing so, however, leaders must consider prominent domestic cleavages. Playing
up alleged foreign slights may work wonders for authoritarian leaders embattled by
democratic oppositions or by social movements insisting on economic redistribution.
On the other hand, it may utterly fail when domestic society is divided between
groups holding on to rather different national narratives. In the latter case, stirring
up national sentiments could easily backfire because it might only deepen those
domestic divisions. Hence, the specific nature of domestic fault lines greatly affects
a states inclination to engage in the politics of international recognition.
Another major factor influencing the likelihood or intensity of recognition politics concerns the nature of norms shaping domestic political cultures. Apparently, a
4/18/11 12:36 PM
50 Reinhard Wolf
nationstate in which individualistic and materialist-hedonistic views predominate
will be less sensitive to foreign (dis)respect than a nation-state whose society stresses
collectivist norms and the honor of family clans or status groups. If protecting ones
honor is an essential purpose for individuals and domestic groups, it seems quite likely
that they will externalize such an outlook to international relations.48 In this case,
norms mandating the resolute defense of group standings within society may also be
applied to foreign policy. Strong collectivist norms make it easier for nationalists to
equate dissent with disloyalty and thus discourage both political leaders and intellectuals from advancing more nuanced arguments on the relative merits of insiders
and outsiders. Consequently, such norms create a political climate that promotes
negative stereotyping and self-righteous positions in international conflicts. Thereby
collectivist norms make it much easier to depict foreign behavior as an unjustified
violation of national status claims. In sum, domestic honor codes and strong collectivist norms render states pricklier when their demands for recognition are not met
by foreign actorsor even when they only appear to be ignored.
Essentially then, the differences between persons and peoples boils down to
three conclusions: First, there are no plausible arguments that would contradict this
volumes premise that not only individuals but also nation-states care for the social
recognition of their peers. Second, it seems likely that state demands for respect are
influenced by a far greater number of factors than is the demand for interpersonal
respect. Hence, state behavior in this field will be more variable and less predictable
than personal behavior. Third, we need far more empirical research on the conditions
shaping the demand for recognition among international actors. That is why research
on (dis)respect among states (or between states and other international actors) offers
a promising field for scholars inhabiting a small planet whose diverse communities
interact ever more closely.
Notes
1. Gould 2003, 147.
2. Ringmar 1996; Ringmar 2011 in this volume; Wendt 2004; Johnston 2008, 9599.
3. Wight 2004.
4. Although numerous types of institutional actors engage in cross-border activities,
by focusing on the modern nation-state, the following discussion deals only with the most
prominent type. However, most of my arguments can also readily be applied to separatist
movements as well as intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). On
NGOs see Heins 2008. In fact, such actors may be even more eager for international recognition than established states whose sovereign rights are beyond question (see Ringmar in this
volume). Moreover, many of these states share a long common history during which, by and
large, they have learned to accept their respective roles and identities. Normally, their place in
international society is less contested. Thus, the Western nation-state can be seen as a critical
case for the recognition perspective. If it can be argued that even rational bureaucratic states
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seek social recognition just like ordinary persons, the same analogy should also apply to other
types of international actors, such as NGOs. Therefore, studies of global governance might
also benefit from taking (dis)respect more seriously.
5. Kelman 1965; Tetlock 1998; Stein 2008.
6. For reasons of space, I focus on psychological findings based on empirical observation.
However, including philosophical works and more theoretical studies in psychology would
hardly affect my line of reasoning, since their pertinent arguments are largely borne out by
this empirical research. For a parallel discussion that takes philosophical debates as a point
of departure, see Axel Honneths contribution to this volume.
7. Most social psychologists doing empirical studies on these issues use the concept of
respect instead of recognition. This is one of the reasons why my own research is also
based on the respect/disrespect dichotomy rather than on recognition and disrespect. As I
understand the concept, to respect an actor is to recognize its status, that is, its social value
and importance. In my view, this strong linkage with status perceptions (rather than with an
actors overall identity) best explains why people react angrily when they feel disrespected.
For the purpose of my argument here, however, the semantic overlap of the two concepts is so
large that they will be used interchangeably in this chapter. See Wolf 2011 for an attempt to
delineate these concepts and for a more detailed overview of psychological findings concerning
the social effects of (dis)respect.
8. Tyler and Blader 2000, 2001; Doosje et al. 1999; Mercer 2008b; Mercer 2008a.
9. Tyler and Blader 2000, 136, 171, 178.
10. Ibid. 2000.
11. De Cremer 2002.
12. Miller 2001.
13. Ibid., 532536; Smith et al. 2003, 171; Tyler and Blader 2000, 112; Van Kleef et al.
2008.
14. Geva and Sirin 2008, 7; Geva and Skorick 2006, 214, 222; Huddy et al. 2007; Isbell
et al. 2006, 65; Van Kleef et al. 2008; Lerner and Keltner 2000; Lerner and Keltner 2001.
15. Epictetus 1961; Aurelius 1964. In fact, the Stoic view on recognition draws attention to
a paradox that thoroughly challenges cognitivist interpretations of the struggle for recognition:
if others see me in a less favorable light because they apply inappropriate standards or because
they lack correct data, their judgment must be wrong. Accordingly, it is useless information.
As such, it should be put right, were it to have negative material consequences. Otherwise,
it should not get more attention than the time shown by a malfunctioning watch. If, on the
other hand, their judgment is not mistaken, I obviously ought to correct my own views about
myself. Finally, if I am not sure which view is more accurate, I should at least reconsider my
own views and ask others to explain their different reasoning. Whichever is the case, there is
no reasonable justification for angry arguments. Yet, it hardly needs mentioning that humans
rarely follow this rational line. This seems to be a strong indication that the experience of
disrespect, especially if it seems wholly unwarranted, inevitably triggers an emotional gut
response related to human status needs. For evidence that status seeking and status defense
are hardwired in humans emotional apparatus, see Frank 1985, chapter 2; Frank 1999,
chapter 9; Wright 1994, chapters 12 through 13. For a contemporary international-relations
theory based on this assumption, see Lebow 2008.
16. Turner et al. 1987, chapter 4; Abrams et al. 1990; Haslam et al. 1996; Smith et al.
1998, 490.
4/18/11 12:36 PM
52 Reinhard Wolf
17. Mead (1932) 1964, chapter 26; Druckman 1994.
18. On social creativity, see Tajfel and Turner 1979; Platow et al. 2003, 270.
19. Not surprisingly, the preference for recognition from close associates also affects
individuals status considerations. Apparently, peoples status comparisons largely focus on
their rank within close communities rather than their rank within society at large. See Frank
1985, 4653, 7579; Frank 1999, chapter 9.
20. See also Honneth in this volume.
21. Lerner and Keltner 2000, 488ff.
22. Kelman 1965, 588; Allison 1971.
23. Lindblom 1977.
24. Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Stone and Crisp 2007.
25. Honneth and Ringmar in this volume.
26. Gould 2003, chapter 3; Lindemann in this volume.
27. Bloom 1990, chapter 4; Mackie et al. 2008; Rydell et al. 2008.
28. Druckman 1994, 49ff.
29. Mead (1932) 1964, chapters 26, 34; Worchel 2003, 482; Tyler and Blader 2000,
144148, 195; Kelman 1997, 175; Kelman 1977, 548.
30. Horowitz 1985, chapters 45.
31. Taylor 1994; Berlin 1991; Mackie et al. 2008; Rydell et al. 2008.
32. Stern 1995.
33. Horowitz 1985, 226.
34. Kelman 1997, 181. Interestingly though, many ethnic groups opposed political independence when decolonization would have put them in a state together with another more
advanced group that enjoyed higher status. Horowitz 1985, 190ff.
35. As a matter of fact, precisely because of its size and abstract nature, the nation often
may be ideally suited for enhancing personal self-esteem. To be sure, smaller groups permit
more personal and more intense interaction. Therefore, they are better suited for meeting
individuals pervasive need to belong. Baumeister and Leary 1995. On the other hand,
membership in smaller groups has its drawbacks. It invites direct comparisons between group
members, which easily leads to unpleasant status rivalries. See Frank 1985. However, internal
status competitions can be mitigated by engaging in collective out-group denigration, for the
latter activity assigns a higher overall status even to those in-group members who occupy a
lower rank within their own group. National chauvinism appears to be especially useful in this
regard because it gives out-groups fewer chances to challenge their negative image. Moreover,
nations, being imagined communities, leave more room for positive self-idealization than
domestic groups whose members may be too well acquainted with each others faults. See
Anderson 1983.
36. See Lindemann in this volume.
37. On such ripple effects of personal status contests, see Gould 2003, chapter 5.
38. See Axel Honneths contribution to this volume.
39. Snyder 2000, chapter 2; Van Evera 1994, 3033; Kelman 2008, 176.
40. Gelpi 1997.
41. Ringmar in this volume.
42. Gellner 1983; Assmann 2006; Giesen 1999, vol. 2.
43. Druckman 1994, 4855; Wright 1994, chapter 13.
44. Kelman 2007, 8589; Druckman 1994, 58, 63; Honneth in this volume.
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45. Pond 2003; Szabo 2004; Woodward 2004.
46. Druckman 1994, 54.
47. Deterrence theorists often argue that leaders may also hesitate to make concessions
because they suspect that accommodation undermines their states reputation as a resolute
actor. For various reasons, this rationalistic explanation for respect-seeking behavior cannot
convince. See Johnston 2008, 7; Mercer [1996] 2009; Tang 2005.
48. Lebow 2008, chapter 2.
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Chapter 3
Symbolic and Physical Violence

Philippe Braud
The manner in which political violence is defined will have a significant impact on
the answers to other important questions, such as what types of self-defense are appropriate; who initiated the aggressive interaction; and what factors sparked violence
or made it worse or, on the contrary, will help end it. In popular discourse, the word
violence has three different meanings, the first of which is not really relevant here:
the idea of a furious and incontrollable action (violent storm); the idea of destructive
aggression that causes personal or material injury (violent behavior); and finally
the idea of attacking things which deserve respect (doing violence to a belief).
If we accept Durkheims rule, according to which the scientific definition of a
concept should maintain reasonable links with the terms colloquial usage, these introductory observations are far from insignificant. This is in part because specifying
what constitutes an act of violence is itself a political issue. So we have to distance
ourselves from the terms used by the actors. Compare, for example, how the war
in Algeria, waged by the French from 1954 to 1962, was labeled as oprations de
pacification, and how the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was seen by the Soviet
Union as a manifestation of proletarian solidarity. We must find a way of avoiding
the trap of such politically and culturally biased definitions.
From the perspective of democratic ideals, violent behavior is normally condemned.
As a result, this encourages frequent strategies of semantic evasion in which one qualifies or otherwise hides potentially inappropriate actions with which one identifies.
However, scientific analysis has to keep its distance, or rather suspend value judgments that may divert it from an impartial perspective. The object of our analysis is
57
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58 Philippe Braud
to identify criteria that enable us to understand all forms of political violence without
political restrictions.
This chapter will begin by defining symbolic violence and explaining how it is
related to physical violence. The two are necessarily linked, Ill argue, since physical
violence without symbolic and emotional aspects is meaningless, and since physical
violence often is a response to symbolic violence. In conclusion, some implications
of this argument will be drawn for the practice and study of international politics.
Why Symbolic Violence Is Violence

In the scientific literature, political violence is commonly perceived as physical violence
whose targets or victims, modus operandi or effects, add political meaningeither
in terms of the resources to be employed or the threats to be prevented. Explicitly
or not, a majority of researchers have adopted the definition made famous by Nieburg: ... acts of disruption, destruction, injury whose purpose, choice of targets or
victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation and/or effects have political
significance, that is, tend to modify the behavior of others in a bargaining situation
that has consequences for the social system.1
As is evident from the first part of this quote, it is tempting to emphasize only the
material dimension of violencethe part that leaves visible marks. This approach
makes it easier to empirically identify violence and, since it is more easily delimited,
seemingly presents a more rigorous definition. As a result, this definition has been
used by a large majority of field researchers, including those who, like Charles Tilly,
attempt to quantitatively compare observable levels of visible violence across time
and space.2
Despite its obvious advantages, a definition that relies only, or even in large part,
on material criteria leads to serious intellectual problems. In the first place, it does not
properly consider the emotional dimension that accompanies all forms of violence.
When we say urban riots, we refer not only to burned cars and injured bystanders but also to the fear and anger of the victims. Furthermore, the victims include
not only those who are injured, but anyone who has suffered from the effects of the
violence. For example: urban riots also provide evidence, at least temporarily, of the
states failure to accomplish its goal of maintaining public order. In this sense, the
state is humiliated by public displays of disorder.
Similarly, an armed conflict involves not only the deployment of troops, the
use of weapons, and physical destruction, but it is intrinsically also a mode of selfaffirmation that entails much emotional suffering. Even if it is limited by relatively
restrictive conditions, war justifies the right to destroy and to kill, and this constitutes a significant breach with essential societal values. It sets up a specific body of
moral precepts. In addition, physical confrontations are usually accompanied by
denunciations and even a demonization of the adversaries in order to describe them
as inferior. Exceptions include chivalrous battles, or battles fought in sports, but in
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Symbolic and Physical Violence 59

these cases, the equal standing of the protagonists is a precondition for the existence
of their rivalry.
This emotional dimensionwhich accompanies every form of violence, from
assassination attempts to riots, from arbitrary arrests to armed conflictsis what
gives violence its political consequences and ramifications. As noted previously, the
impact of material violence depends on the symbolic value of the event, which in
turn relies on factors such as the status of the victim, the nature of the targets, and
the emotional effects spread by the event. The murder of an ambassador does not
resonate in the same way as an attack on the average national of a foreign country. A
burning flag during a public disturbance will have a greater impact than the burning
of a simple piece of fabric.
Even calculating the number of victims in a war or a terrorist act is not a purely
objective decision. The statistical operation may be used to mobilize outrage or to
dishearten an adversary. The timing of a body countwhether in war-time or in
peacewill affect its impact. Or consider the labeling of certain acts as genocide
or crimes against humanity. In contemporary society, such labels have both an
emotional charge and juridical consequences (for example, a no-limitation period
for prosecuting). So the label establishes the exceptional gravity of certain behaviors and also a special duty on the part of posterity to remember the violence. The
stigmatization of terrorism rests on the fact that terrorists ignore the rules of war
and harm innocent civiliansboth notions are of course highly psychologically
charged. Consider a historical example: the battle of Stalingrad had emotional effects in so far as Hitler, as well as Stalin, regarded the fall of the city as a striking
symbol of humiliation and not only as a purely strategic interest. Similarly, the
1940 defeat of France in less than three weeks immediately dissipated the myth
that the largest military force of the inter-war years also would be the strongest.3
Civilian victims add an affective aspect to every armed conflict, which technologies such as intelligent bombs seek to avoid. In practice, historians of war do
not necessarily neglect the importance of such emotional dimensions. In practice,
historians of war do not necessarily neglect the importance of such emotional
dimensions, yet, if they study them, they often do not include them in the actual
definition of violence.
A further disadvantage of this restricted point of view is that it disregards the
possibility of a kind of violence that is independent of physical or destructive action
but causes similar psychological injuries. Xenophobic or racist insults and abuse deliberately try to make the target feel fragile and humiliated. Nationalist arrogance,
or the claiming of religious, ideological, or ethical superiority, is a source of affront
to those who are not members of these groups.
Today, one can observe these effects on formerly colonized people.4 Legally
enforced apartheid was based on contempt for some social, ethnic, religious, or national group that established society regarded as inferior and from which it sought
to separate itself. During the era of European colonization, this occurred through
the creation of a stratified institutional framework, including laws that prohibited
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60 Philippe Braud
mixed marriage between individuals of different religions or races, the separation of
educational institutions and spaces for living and leisure, as well as discrimination
when it comes to political rights. More persistent today is social apartheid, or the
implicit banning of particular lifestyles. Transgressions of these norms are punished
by cultural stigmatization.
Even if this psychological form of violencethe emotional impact of which can
be equal or superior to that of physical violenceis often intentional, such intentionality disappears in other situations. Psychological violence is often the result of
structural constraints and will for that reason happen regardless of the intentions,
pure or otherwise, of the perpetrators, and it will occur even in cases where no perpetrators are identifiable.
As an illustration of the first case, consider attempts to assist the poor, either
within one country or internationally. Policies of poverty relief often confine the
recipients to a dependent and inferior status. Even in the most successful case, and
in spite of the material benefits, it may still lead a form of psychological suffering.
More broadly, social relations of inequality (from master to servant, from superior
to inferior, from employer to employee) conceal violent potential as long as this
inequality is not recognized by the dominated as entirely legitimate. The nature of
this relationship depends not only on the employers management style or his ability
to acknowledge those under his authority, but also on the ideological framework
through which hierarchy and dependence are deciphered. The probability that
employees and employers perceive each other as victims of violence increases in a
society dominated by the discourse of class struggle. On the contrary, this probability
is much weaker in a society where paternalistic relations are accepted by all parties,
since the legitimacy of the employers is not questioned.5 The same applies, mutatis
mutandis, to international relations, especially when military alliancesthe former
Warsaw pact, present-day NATOunite unequal states. Depending on the ways
in which the relationships are deciphered, superpower hegemony may be perceived
either as an unendurable dependence or as fraternal friendship. The presence of a
foreign military must be made sense of through subjective perceptions that are socially
constructed. Whether such a presence is perceived as political violence or not is never
only the mere reflection of a material fact.
The same conclusion applies to rapid changes in traditional ways of life. Discoveries of gold and oil, accelerated industrialization, as well as rapid urbanization
have always resulted in social upheavals. Depending on whether people have eagerly
adapted themselves to the new conditions or regarded the changes as doing irreparable damage to a cherished way of life, the clash between tradition and modernity
will be perceived either as an opportunity or as an intrinsically violent process. In
fact, both attitudes often co-exist in the same societysometimes in an individual
mindgiving rise to conflicts or to split personalities. However, the violence of these
processes becomes obvious when beliefs that underpin the cohesion of a social group
are discredited, or when a foreign occupying power denigrates a societys religious or
civil patrimony, its sacred space, or time-honored customs.
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The Westernization of the worldaccelerating throughout the past centurymass
migration, and even differences in birthrates between different groups in multicultural
societies have contributed to making people disoriented regarding their identities and
produced new sources of social and political instability. Following the arrival of the
Europeans, the clash of civilizations was particularly violent in the Americas, North
and South. Today it is especially conspicuous in the Muslim world, torn between
accepting or rejecting the alien values. People who seek to maintain their traditional
ways of life experience Western cultural and political supremacy as an unmistakable
form of violence.6
Symbolic violence is thus an inseparable component of any physical violence on
the one hand and on the other, an autonomous, underestimated form of violence.
But how can symbolic violence be defined? Pierre Bourdieu understands it as une
violence douce, invisible, mconnue comme telle, choisie autant que subie.7 He sees
symbolic violence in the way knowledge is defined and imposed in school; in the
criteria of aesthetic judgments determining good taste or appropriate language; in
codes of civility and manners of being or doing by which social elites recognize each
other. In all these situations, the dominated are obliged to bow to the pressure of
norms presented as socially neutral, though in reality these norms express the interests
and aspirations of the ruling class. Thus defined, symbolic violence has affinities with
Johan Galtungs conception of structural violence, since it too emphasizes situational effects rather than intentional actions.8 However, both definitions overlook
the victims point of view. It matters little for neither Bourdieu nor Galtung whether
the person accepts the situation, eagerly or indifferently, or whether he or she suffers.
According to them, only genuine sociologists know when violence is being exercised!
This definition nevertheless leads to an interesting conclusion. Pierre Bourdieu
asserts that the principal effect of symbolic violence is to reinforce a feeling of inferiority among the dominated. Forced to imperfectly assimilate to the norms of an
alien environment, the dominated either internalize their inferiority or they adopt
a rebellious, but inevitably very costly, posture. In this way, the author highlights a
crucial element of any analysis of symbolic actionthe damage done to ones selfesteem. This is a conclusion of great importance, albeit arrived at from a different
point of view.
The criterion of any violence, be it justified or not, is the suffering experienced
by a victim. We detect violence whenever an attack causes injury to a person or his
property, to the affinity networks made up of relatives or members of the same social
group, or to his way of life or his beliefs. This injury is never exclusively material.
Suffering physical brutalities or material damage is always, at the same time, an experience of confusion, humiliation, and the painful feeling of vulnerability, whether
this experience is short-lived or enduring, superficial or intense.
Accordingly, mere physical suffering does not constitute a sufficient definition;
besides, physical suffering is absent in the case of attacks on a persons property,
and it is absent too, say, in the case of the relatives and followers of a politician who
is suddenly murdered. They too suffer but in quite a different way. Neither can a
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62 Philippe Braud
definition of violence rest solely on the material nature of the act. Strictly speaking,
brute force exercised in accordance with the rules of a game, such as in sports, does
not create casualties. One cannot reduce violence to a single material, destructive
dimension since, crucially, the emotional impact will be missing. On the other hand,
menacing gestures, not accompanied by coercion, have a violent potential under some
circumstances. For the same reason, no definition should rely merely on an actors
aggressiveness. As we said, some forms of violence can hardly be attributed to identifiable actors, and others are unintentional results of individual action.
Instead any definition of violence, and in particular of political violence, has to
focus on the victim. While the perpetrator may be non-existent and the act ambiguous, the event as experienced by the victim is the common element of all forms of
violencebe it minor or major, material or purely symbolic. It is the very reality of
this experience that sets the dynamic of emotions in motion: outrage and desire for
revenge; the attempt to legitimize ones claims; feelings of compassionate solidarity;
the urgent need to reconstruct ones self. Yet, for the victim to be identified as such
in political life, the objective fact of a physical and/or psychological injury is unlikely
to be sufficient. First, the victim has to be socially recognized.
Sometimes such social recognition of victims is instantaneous: political assassinations or unprovoked aggressions against unarmed countries make it impossible to
deny that the targets indeed are victims. In other cases, however, victimhood must
be attributed to specific groups by influential organizations before it can result in
political action. Often the identification of victims is a drawn-out process and the
verdict is not always unanimous. For a long time, first peoples in Canada, Australia, and the United States struggled in vain to be recognized as victims of European
expansion. Moreover, when the victim is not perceived as innocent, the process may
get stuck or fail completely. For example: after the Second World War, Germans were
unlikely to be regarded as victims. In fact, they were unlikely to recall even their own
experiences of suffering under Allied bombardment.9
Why do we call it symbolic violence? It is certainly not because this violence is
secondary or minor compared with physical injury or material damage. The opposite
is more often true: the assassination of a celebrity, for instance, hurts many people
beyond the physical suffering of the victim. This violence is symbolic in the sense
that the damage operates at the level of self-representations, and it lowers self-esteem.
In this way, all symbolic violence entails humiliation, fragility, and powerlessness,
and it inflicts injuries on a persons identity.10
How victims react to symbolic violence depends on their position of power; whether
they have means of retaliating or whether they remain in a state of irreversible inferiority. In the former case, the symbolic violence suffered makes us want to wash away
the insult, to remove the feeling of vulnerability and weakness through exhibitions
of power. This accounts for the propensity to disproportional retaliation. Compare
the reaction of the United States to the September 11 attacks or Israel to raids by
Palestinian armed groups. In both cases, the aim is to restore an image tarnished by
impressions of weakness.
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In the second scenario, where the victims have no means of retaliating, they are
likely to suffer permanent injury to their identities. This is more likely the more
intense the symbolic charge. An arbitrary arrest lowers a person to the status of a
second-rate citizen, anguished and bruised, as state protection has abandoned him,
and equality before the law has turned out to be an illusion. Only a restoration of
justice, noticeably in courts, can lessen the damage to the self-image. During an
armed conflict, capitulation in front of a stronger adversary results in a profound
feeling of humiliation. Likewise, torture or deportation to camps with inhuman
living conditions wounds the victims dignity; the damage to ones self-esteem is so
severe it may become irreparable.11
Symbolic violence can be of low or high intensity. It can show itself openly or
remain buried, disguised behind the appearance of purely material violence. Occasionally it infiltrates silently and covertly into social and political relations, even if
these appear to be outwardly innocuous. Whether or not symbolic violence is related
to physical and material damage, it is judged by the same criterion: the reality of
psychological injuries lowering or, in the worst cases, even destroying the self-esteem
of an individual or a collective. In this way, we are able to incorporate Bourdieus
conclusion that feelings of inferiority are nothing more than the consequence of the
exercise of symbolic action. In my view, however, this feeling is not reduced to a
simple side effect but is instead the very essence of symbolic violence. It is a symptom
of symbolic violence and its most relevant criterion.
Symbolic violence is a form of political violence if, and only if, the collective
reactions they provoke have an influence on the course of political life. When subjected to symbolic violence, some people remain passive, but their resignation or
apathy, directly derived from a profound sense of inferiority, facilitates the rule of
the establishment. Others, more active, over-compensate by imitating the dominant
practices of the establishment. Neither are threatening the current political order but
contribute instead to reinforcing it. Among other people subjected to it, however,
symbolic violence may cause a rejection of dominant values and rules and the results
will be destabilizing. This occurs both inside states and the international community.
Symbolic Violence and International Violence

The reintegration of symbolic violence into the concept of political violence has
several consequences.
1. The first one is perfectly perceived by classical analyses of political violence:
there is but an approximate proportionality between the intensity of the violence
felt by a victim and the objective reality of the proven injury. On the political
stage, particularly in an international context, claims of attacks on ones dignity
and reputation are often exaggerated in order to advance ones standing, to
demand reparations, or to represent a belligerent move as an act of legitimate
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64 Philippe Braud
right to self-defense. In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
nationalist governments have often resorted to this ensemble of arguments
in their territorial or commercial conflicts with neighbors. During the era of
Romantic patriotism, injured self-esteemreal or imaginedoften pushed a
country to war. In 1870, the tone of the Ems Dispatch made up by Bismarck was
enough to trigger the desire of the French to go to war against the Germans.12
Similarly, the Fashoda episode drove the United Kingdom and France to the
verge of an open conflict.13
On the other hand, symbolic violence is minimized, or even denied, in
cases of groups who are deprived of political resources adequate for making
their complaints heard. For a long time, nomadic peoples forced to settle in
one place or traditional farmers removed from their land by agro-industries
or by urbanization drew little interest.14 In developing countries, insufficient
attention is paid to people displaced by the construction of gigantic dams or
oil and mining prospecting. If their fate arouses little more than indifference,
their isolated acts of resistance are easily labeled as common organized crime.
Or take the case of religious believers in advanced societies whose lives are
destabilized as a result of secularization. In nineteenth-century Europe, secularization led to anti-clericalism and political tension. Today Muslim despair
is widely misunderstood in Western countries, especially among the most
secular strata of the population. As these examples indicate, any assessment
of suffering on the part of victims of violence depends on the system of values
through which a situation is judged. In the sixteenth century, few moralists
were worried regarding a slave trade, which today is universally condemned.15
This way of ignoring the feelings of the victims can perhaps be understood
as an indirect consequence of the common conception that violence necessarily
is associated with evil. For example: if economic development is understood
as intrinsically good, and if the spread of Western values of democracy and
liberty throughout the world is an essentially positive process, those who are
suffering from the consequences of these processes can hardly be considered
real victims. The violence perpetrated on these backward people is ignored,
and their suffering is perceived as embarrassing, even illegitimate. This conclusion may perhaps be politically justified, but that is not good enough for a
researcher who aims to remain neutral and objective.
The point here is not to equate political violence with stigmatized behavior
the definition of which, in any case, would always be contested. The point is
rather to understand the specific reality that ensues given certain premises. The
military violence to which al-Qaedas combatants are subject, and the purely
symbolic violence suffered in todays world by fundamentalist believers of all
religious faiths can, from a certain point of view, be regarded as the product
of legitimate action. Yet this does not mean that no violence is exercised. By
acknowledging this fact, we are in a better position to understand how people
react to attacks on self-esteem.
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2. Another consequence of the reintegration of symbolic violence into the concept
of political violence is the need to rethink the true origin of military conflicts
and armed resistance, as well as the factors to be taken into account for a fair
and lasting solution to the problem of violence16. This raises significant political
stakes. When a conflict breaks out, the question of Who started it? requires
the identification of an aggressor, and it gives an internationally recognized
right of self-defense to the victim. And yet it is easy to misjudge the role played
by symbolic violence in the period preceding the call to arms. For an example,
consider the case of people whose firmly held religious beliefs are made fun
ofsay in the form of caricatures of the Prophet Mohamedor cases, such
as in the Niger Delta, where multinational companies exploiting the countrys
mineral wealth without any perceived benefits to the local population are made
targets of armed attacks. In order to understand the whole dynamic of the
conflicts throughout the Middle East, the Caucasus, or Sub-Saharan Africa,
as well as the apparently endless confrontations between certain neighboring
states, one should not forget to study the exercise of symbolic violence prior to
physical violence.
The failure to take into consideration what happened before physical violence
broke out constitutes an obstacle in the search for lasting peaceful solutions.
To neglect references to the events that preceded the open conflict constitutes
an additional example of violence inflicted on the victim. When a conflict is
ignited, mutual misunderstandings will perpetuate the conflict. Take the case
of violence aimed at new settlers. On the one hand, people dispossessed of their
land who have suffered injustices that are deeply engraved in their historical
memory, consider the presence of these newcomers as unacceptable. On the
other hand, the new residents who have become targets of attacksIsrael
or social apartheidRussians in the Baltic statesfind the violence of their
neighbors to be cruel and inhuman. Each group rejects the suffering of the
other as quickly as the abyss of fear and hatred grows. In addition, labels applied
to the adversaryterrorists or Zionists, fascists or occupierscreate
further antagonisms, adding new wounds to already fragile identities.
To take into account the suffering of the other, regardless of the political cost
of doing so, is an indispensable element in any lasting solution to an intractable
conflict.17 Real peace requires a real recognition of all the suffering perceived
by the adversary. However, such recognition does not imply an automatic acceptance of the aim of the adversary or a justification for the methods it uses
in its struggle. What is required is a rejection of the idea that the violence
perpetrated by the adversary necessarily is irrational. Apart from a few truly
pathological crimes, irrationality is rare, and explicative factors can be found
even in the case of the most odious attack.
Surely suicide bombings can only be explained by a sort of personal and
collective despair caused, in turn, by injuries to an identity that are ill-perceived
by the outside world. The fact that an increasing percentage of Palestinians
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66 Philippe Braud
understands or even supports such actions is not intelligible as a response to
the purely material violence displayed by Israel to assure its security. There is
clearly another level of analysis to be explored in order to interpret this manifest
discrepancy between actions and reactions. And we need intellectual tools that
are able to conceptualize it.
3. Symbolic violence does not only generate aggressive reactions in its victims, but
it also increases the probability of aggressive attacks from the dominant group.
Symbolic violence, we said, undermines identities, and undermined people are
more easily made into targets of physical violence. This is particularly the case
if a groups status is widely perceived as inferior. This means that the violence
committed against it draws fewer compassionate responses from the outside
world. As a result, the groups capacity for retaliation is reduced, and harsh measures can be put in place with less hesitation. This is why racism, anti-Semitism,
and all fears of otherness are potentially murderous. If such heterophobia comes
to constitute an accepted discourse in a society, it creates a favorable climate
for aggressive acts. Isolated individuals or extremist organizations, identifying
themselves with the dominant group, may feel authorized to commit brutalities
either against members of the stigmatized communityto put them back in
their placeor against the symbols of their identity. In Europe, even today,
migrants and Gypsies and synagogues and mosques constitute such targets.
Although the first perpetrators of such outrages no doubt have a propensity for
violence whose origin is far from political, the choice of their targets is given
by the socially accepted discourse of contempt. If such prejudices turn into
official ideologies, the state apparatus can be mobilized against the stigmatized
communities, enlarging the circle of potential perpetrators while increasing
the number of bystanders who feel they can legitimately avert their eyes from
the violence being committed.
During a civil war, each side tends to vilify the enemy as monstrous. If such
rhetoric becomes dominant, the temptation grows to ignore regular juridical and
humanitarian practices and the consideration appropriate for a human being.
As a result, there is an increase in police abuse, imprisonment without trial,
harsh interrogations, unexplained deaths, and disappearances. In the course
of military operations, methods will be used which increasingly resemble war
crimes: indiscriminate military attacks, aggressive treatment of prisoners of war,
violence against civilians, and systematic rape. Even if the perpetrators are not
officially encouraged in these actions, they are easily absolved of their crimes by
a public opinion that does not properly understand the harsh condemnations
of the outside world, nor the possible legal consequences.
When peace breaks out, however, the conduct widely allowed during the
conflict will be re-evaluated. Apologies and regrets, if not actual compensation, are a precondition for a true and lasting reconciliation. At the end of a
civil war, a country is often divided between those who want amnesia and/or
amnesty, and those who want the perpetrators to answer for the crimes. To
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the extent that legal processes are carried out, they do not only have the aim
of compensating the victims, but also of providing society as a whole with
cathartic experience.
4. Without the concept of symbolic violence, it is difficult to understand the
mechanisms behind perpetual violence. Emotional dynamics cause serious
distortions of rational judgment. This first happens prior to the decision to
resort to force and then again while the violence is in progress. Armed conflicts, in the main, do not originate in simple confrontations of interests. If
this were the case, cold rational calculations would lead actors to avoid many
wars because they often enough prove to be prohibitively costly, in human and
material terms, even for the winner. Moreover, is it really possible to clearly
distinguish interests and passions? As Montesquieu already argued, followed
by Adam Smith, even the quest for financial profit can be considered as a soft
passion.18 To fight in defense of economic interests also involves a certain idea
of identity. On the international stage, this means to claim a rank and a status.
For this reason, if a countrys preoccupation with protecting the security and
economic stability of its citizens plays a major role in causing armed conflicts,
these factors come to operate in an emotional context, perfectly understood
by the actors. There are four main emotions at play here, all closely related to
symbolic violence.
First there is fear.19 A normal reaction to danger for all vulnerable individuals and
groups, fear is a natural emotion, and it weighs heavily in the calculations of all
political actors: fear of humiliation, fear of a failure, fear not to respond adequately
to the expectations of public opinion, fear of being overwhelmed by challenges. Yet
fear is at the same time a particularly volatile emotion. It inspires uncontrollable
and disproportionate conduct: paralyzing astonishment as well as frenzied energy.
Fear itself is commonly feared, since it often results in dishonorable acts such as
withdrawal or escape, or a subservient acceptance of the will of the enemy. To admit
to fear when confronting an adversary is to reduce oneself to an inferior position, and
this, in turn, is to lose face. In order to cover up such an outcome, decision-makers
and opinion-makers may react by means of aggressive rhetoric. Such rhetoric can itself
put a country on the path of war, a step that may prove irreversible to the extent that
it provokes symmetric reactions in the adversary camp or makes domestic opinion
believe in the idea, or the illusion, of triumph.
A second emotion, closely related to symbolic violence, we could perhaps refer
to as predatory ardor. This emotion often arises both among the ruling circles and
the general population of a country if the balance of power is all too clearly in their
favor. Armed conflicts are encouraged by everything that stirs this temptation. If a
war seems to promise substantial advantages at a reduced cost, the only problem that
confronts power-hungry politicians is how to come up with the legitimate motivations.
For this reason, wars were often declared in the name of religion or national
pride, and today they are often declared in the name of national liberation or the
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68 Philippe Braud
f urthering of democracy or human rights. However, behind these honorable motivations, loudly proclaimed by the actors, the passion for triumph and the appetite
for material benefit soon show themselves. In the end, the self-confident victors,
in violation of their stated war aims, display a considerable reluctance to cede the
territories they have conquered or to restrain themselves when it comes to setting
the conditions of the peace. Those among them who better anticipate the uncertain
future and adopt a more conciliatory line will run into hawks who heavily criticize
them for their concessions.
Third, one cannot underestimate the role of resentment.20 Nietzsche correctly
regarded resentment as a hidden confession of weakness or sense of inferiority, which
in return entails an all-consuming desire for revenge. Caused by a previous experience of symbolic violence and/or memories of past cruelties, this feeling strongly
feeds the propensity for taking a hard line in conflict situations.21 Resentment may
be the main motivation for individuals to join organizations that favor violent words
or violent acts. As for decision-makers, regardless of their own thoughts, they have
to address the constraints imposed on them by the feelings of resentment among
ordinary people. Such feelings are common when a population has experienced
oppression or humiliation at the hands of representatives of alternative cultural or
political systems. In democracies, when public opinion is sufficiently agitated, it may
force the actions of a government that, everything else equal, would like to keep its
cool. Although the material benefits expected from a conquest or a war never accrue
equally to all members of a society, all can feel the sense of triumph that accompanies
the successful exercise of power over an enemy, not least since this gives relief from
a lingering sense of inferiority.
Last, the emotion of losing and saving face is a well-known explanation for the
conduct of individuals in their personal and social lives.22 The same mechanism
exists in interstate relations where considerations of prestige are greatly increased.
The complex codified language and etiquette of international diplomacy can largely
be explained by a concern for avoiding a terminology and behavior, which can be
perceived as symbolically violent by the adversary. Officials humiliated on the international stage are politically weakened inside their own country, and their future is
compromised. Military defeats almost always provoke at least forced resignations or,
in more extreme cases, coup dtats or regime change.
The loss of face and the quest to regain it makes citizens swing from feelings of
anger to depression and to desire for revenge. By contrast, military successes reinforce
the authority of the government, protecting them from criticism of their domestic
policy. Indeed, in binding individuals together in a sense of pride in their community,
this emotion explains the mystery of allegiance to a community or a nation.
The consideration of symbolic violence, be it intentional or unintentional, associated with physical violence or not, seems indispensable for a better understanding
of the historic, sequential chain of events at the root of internal troubles as well as
international conflicts. The notion of symbolic violence forces us to undertake a more
balanced re-examination of the actions and responsibilities pertaining to various
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a ctors. A better understanding of the global dimensions of violence and war presents
without doubt a move forward toward a durable peace.
Notes
Translated by Sador Usmanov, with Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar.
1. Nieburg 1969, 13.
2. Tilly 2003.
3. Shirer 1969.
4. Ashcroft and Alii 2000.
5. See the model of Nurturing Parent Family versus Strict Father Family as framing
political opinions in Lakoff 1996.
6. This is a strong component and even a deciding factor of the famous clash of civilizations. See Huntington 1996. His work implicitly refers to the concept of symbolic violence.
7. Bourdieu 1980, 219.
8. For Galtung, structural violence occurs when human beings are being influenced
so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations.
Galtung 1969, 168.
9. Sebald 1999.
10. Braud 2003, 3347.
11. See the deportees stories from writers like Jean Amery, Primo Levi, Imre Kertesz (Nazi
Camps) and Gustav Herling (Gulag). Adde: Sofsky 1996.
12. In June 1870, German Chancellor Bismarck deliberately hardened the words of a
dispatch announcing that the king of Prussia had rejected some claims of France so that the
French emperor felt strongly humiliated and went to war, which was what Bismarck secretly
wished. See Howard 1999.
13. Levering 1995.
14. Scott 1985.
15. Thomas 1997.
16. Allan and Keller 2006.
17. Again, Allan and Keller 2006. On Northern Ireland, see OLeary 2007.
18. The classical text here is Hirschmans The Passions and the Interests, 1977.
19. Robin 2004.
20. Ansart 2002.
21. Burg and Shoup 1999.
22. See Goffman 1967; Brown 1977.
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Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, eds. 2000. The Post Colonial Studies Reader
2nd ed. London: Routledge.
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Bourdieu, Pierre. 1980. Le Sens pratique. Paris: Les ditions de Minuit.
Braud, Philippe. 2003. Violence politique et mal-tre identitaire. Raisons politiques: Questions de violence. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 3347.
. 2004. Violences politiques. Paris: Seuil.
Brown, Bert. 1977. Face Saving and Face Restoration in Negotiations. In Negotiations.
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Burg, Steven, and Paul Shoup. 1999. The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and
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Galtung, Johan. 1969. Violence, Peace and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research 6.
Goffman, Erving. 1967. Interaction Ritual. New York: Anchor Books.
Howard, Michael. 1999. The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 18701871.
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Huntington, Samuel. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New
York: Simon and Schuster.
Lakoff, George. 1996. Moral Politics: What Conservatives Know that Liberals Dont. Chicago:
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Levering, David. 1995. The Race to Fashoda: London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Nieburg, H. L. 1969. Political Violence: The Behavioral Process. New York: St. Martins.
OLeary, Brendan. 1996. The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland. London,
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Robin, Corey. 2004. Fear: The History of a Political Idea. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scott, James. 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven:
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Chapter 4
Is a Just Peace Possible without

Thin and Thick Recognition?
Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller
Introduction: Peace, Justice, and Recognition

Can one have peace without recognition? Obviously, yes: peace may be obtained
through imposition. In international relations, when a strong party imposes its will
on a weaker one, the violent conflict ends and peace reigns. Although the fundamental disagreement may not have abated, the preceding struggle has ended with
the dominance of the powerful. Peace may also result through the utter destruction
of the Other. Such a peace can be exemplified by the Roman annihilation of its
enemy Carthage on the other shore of the Mediterranean. With the disappearance
of a party to a conflict, the conflict itself vanishes. A tautological thought, albeit not
an uncommon historical fact.
Thus, through imposition or destruction peace can come about in various ways.
But is such a peace real, one of a peace of minds? Clearly not. For this morally
preferable situation, peace needs to be desired by all parties to a conflict. Asserting
a wish for peace is vital but insufficient. It does not necessarily trigger negotiations
nor bring about a settlement. The real challenge is compromise, achieving peace
without either side claiming full victory. It is this second, more demanding kind of
peace that we discuss in this chapter by presenting a concept as well as a method of
reaching a peace that includes justice or elements of it.
71
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72 Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller

Can one have such a just peace without recognition? The simple answer is,
obviously, no. But what do we mean by recognition? What kind of recognition is
mandated? In our contribution, we argue that thin recognition, as we call it, while
necessary for a Just Peace, is not sufficient for three fundamental reasons. First of
all, such recognition does not include the fundamental defining features of identity,
nor does it address the crucial issue of the necessary political support within a party
that is essential for finding a peaceful solution. In other words, thick recognition
is needed from all politically relevant parties to a conflict.1 This means a process by
which each party needs to understand the Others fundamental features of its identity.
Mutual empathywhich does not necessarily entail sympathyis crucial here. An
inter-subjective consensus of what each side profoundly needs to remain self and
thus satisfied should be developed in a Just Peace process.
Second, a Just Peace requires two other conditions we posit as indispensable:
renouncement and rule. Renouncement refers to the requirement of a significant
concession made by each party, thus clearly signaling its quest for peace to the other
parties in a conflict. Rule is a generic term for all the rules and institutions developed in the public peace formula that fully and explicitly recognizes the other party.
Third, these four principles or conventionsthin recognition, thick recognition,
renouncement, and ruleare not only the necessary and sufficient conditions for
calling a given peace a just one. They are also part of a process of exploration wherein
the parties explore each others identities and, in this task, redefine them, including
their own. As a consequence, we argue that the search for a Just Peace modifies the
perceptions of the party that is being recognized; in addition, this task also modifies
some important features of the original party.
Unlike the doctrine of Just War where all conditions are necessary and, in case
all are fulfilled, a given war can be deemed a just one, our Just Peace approach
therefore defines a process of mutual recognition that goes beyond the initial selfdefinitions of the parties to it. For many years, scholars have primarily focused on
the idea of Just War. Countless books have examined the relationship between war
and justice from a legal, political, or moral perspective. Surprisingly, there has been
very little research on the concept of just peace and its history. We have shelves
full of excellent studies referring to negative peace, positive peace, armed
peace, perpetual peace, democratic peace, and universal peace, but very little
has been written in both political science and international law on what is a just
peace. Among theories of international relations today, an extensive literature has
been devoted to identifying what justice means in an international context, or the
more recent, but already sizeable, body of scholarship on the idea that a new kind
of world order is developing.2 Some theorists and practitioners have applied methods
of research on conflict resolution that focus on the negotiating process and the way
in which it is affected by the call for justice.3 They have looked at the extent to
which such calls influence the outcome of peace negotiations. They have compared
case studies to extrapolate the conditions required for a just peace. And they have
insisted on the importance of cultural differences, emphasizing how the individual
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Is a Just Peace Possible Without Thin and Thick Recognition? 73

or collective attitudes of conflict parties and psychological factors can shape relations between negotiators.4
International lawyers have also participated in the debate over the link between
peace and justice by studying the idea of unequal treaties. This notion has its
origins in the law of contracts and is an outgrowth of the natural-law concept of a
fair price. It was debated in the long drafting processes of the law of treaties and of
the state succession in respect of treaties.5 Recently, new attention has been paid to
the issue by critical legal scholarship providing us with fresh understandings of the
relationship between international law, European history, and colonialism.6 These
works insist on the discrepancy between formal equality and substantial political
and social inequality, paving the way for the theory and practice of compensatory
inequality. Nevertheless, like international relations theorists, they have paid far too
little attention to what precisely a just peace could mean. They have not investigated
enough the various conceptions of peace upon which many agreementsespecially
between Europeans and non-European peoples from 1600 to 1850were based.7
The purpose of this contribution is therefore to present our concept of Just Peace
while extending the discussion on questions of recognition.8 In that perspective, peace
agreements must be understood not only as legal documents but also as documents
that distinctively frustrate traditional disciplinary, methodological, and theoretical
conceptions of law and politics. In other words, peace agreements do not fit neatly
into categories like the political or the legal, the international or the domestic,
or even into public or private law. Adopting Christine Bells position, we define
peace agreements as documents produced after discussion with some or all of the
conflicts protagonists, that address militarily violent conflict with a view to ending
it.9 In that perspective, they are simultaneously process- and substance-related documents where process and substance cannot be separated but must be understood as
operating in complex unity.
Peace and Justice in History

In Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes, Quentin Skinner unequivocally
demonstrates how Hobbes pitched his political and legal theory to undermine the
humanist culture of the Renaissance.10 He rejected the notion of dialogue inherent
in humanists moral and political philosophy (audi alteram partem), which held that
criteria for such a dialogue were applied on a circumstantial or contextual basis rather
than being essential or universal. Hobbes sought to overcome the uncertainty
propagated through humanist philosophy, opting for a scientific and monological
footing by setting up a hypothetic-deductive method. In Skinners words, Hobbes
first initiated the shift from a dialogical to a monological style of moral and political
reasoning.11 The powerful appeal of Hobbess scientifically rigorous method gave
rise to a new wave of international legal theorizing that gradually subordinated and
overshadowed Grotius, along with the scholastic and classical traditions upon which
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he so heavily depended. Indeed, despite their rejection of the Hobbesian conception
of the state of nature, Pufendorf, Locke, Vattel, and Kant all forged their systems
of international relations on a uniformscientificvision of law, which ruled out
any dialogue with non-European people. Notwithstanding efforts on the part of
Pufendorf and Kant, not one of them defined the right of peace in terms of recognition or fairness. They used a language that marginalized the structure and political
systems of colonized peoples. They came up with a liberal theory of natural rights
that could be used to justify the imposition of European ideas of political society
and community on non-European cultures. By codifying the terms for membership
in this post-Westphalian society of states, they drew the boundaries between those
who belonged to this society and those who did not. Those who did formed a moral
community bound by mutually agreed rules of conduct. And fundamental to this
community was the idea that its members were not obliged to treat non-members
according to the norms that applied to relations between themselves.12
Thus, the history of the formative period of international law is important in
that it outlines the gradual emergence in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
of a discourse about law that either had pretentions to, or was regarded as having,
universal application.13 Other attitudes toward diversity and customs were discarded
in favor of one centralized legal conception of peace agreements. In the search for
universal peacewhich is very different from a Just Peaceno effort was made
to integrate non-European peoples and non-European visions of history and peace.
The debate was restricted to treaties as expressed in normative, European, and legal
terms, based on a homogeneous view of a state or a nation.
This view did not go unchallenged. In the eighteenth century, some theorists
such as Montesquieu and Rousseau pleaded for the necessity to adopt what James
Tully calls the principle of recognition. They did value difference, not only for its
own sake but also because to do otherwise would be to privilege one understanding
of what it is to be human over others.
In his early writings, especially in his Lettres Persanes (1721), Montesquieu clearly
shows that the idea of diversity was a central feature of his social and political thought.
He invoked a conception of diversity that recognized the important pedagogical and
moral value of the acceptance of various forms of life, as opposed to a relativist or
skeptical stance. Praise of the diversity of modes of association was connected with
the awareness that in the complexity of the world, the shapes of political goods and
evils are never pure or stable. Montesquieu was fascinated by the diversity of laws and
ethics across nations and intrigued by the wealth of beliefs and customs throughout
time and space; his views on the analysis of the sources of law and on customary
law illustrate that point very well. However, he did not recognize the importance of
diversity through the eyes of a skeptic or relativist. He did not merely defend each
persons right to be judged according to his or her own laws. The blanket rejection
of despotism that pervades his work could not have been built out of relativism. The
Spirit of the Laws (1748) is in fact a fundamental attempt to describe universalism
and relativism rather than a decision to adopt one or the other. Extreme relativism is
4/18/11 12:36 PM

a mere illusion, he argued, but it is impossible to go back to a universal philosophy
that ignores cultural plurality and the individuals quest for equality.
Rousseau also understood the importance of thick recognition for his social
theory. In the two Discourses (1750; 1755) and in lEmile (1762), Rousseau underlined the importanceand the waysof knowing other people. He pinpointed
the necessity to understand what is specific about each people and, by extension, the
ways in which they might differ from us. He called for an informed attitude, with no
ulterior motives, which requires jingoistic prejudice and ethnocentric preconceptions
to be cast aside. Rousseau made that point clear in chapter 8 of his Essay on the Origin
of Languages. Consequently, he did not just call for equality between men (implying
compassion toward indigenous peoples) but also between peoples. His international
thought is clearly a forceful plea for equality and fairness between nations.
Of course, Montesquieu or Rousseau should not be seen as modern-day advocates
of multiculturalism. Indeed, they did not write of culture in the plural (this was a
development that would occur in European writings of the nineteenth century, when
cultures would begin to signifyonly certainpeoples). Nevertheless, they were
perfectly aware of the categories under which human diversity was theorized (climate,
national character, race, moeurs, etc.). Before Diderot, Burke, Herder, and Kant,
whom they profoundly influenced, Montesquieu and Rousseau believed that human
beings are fundamental cultural creatures; that is, they possess and exercise, simply
by virtue of being human, a range of rational, emotive, and imaginative capacities
that create and transform diverse practices and institutions over time. The fact that
humans are cultural agents, according to them, underlies the diverse moeurs, practices, beliefs, and institutions of different people. It is therefore fair to say that they
did reject assimilation unless it was the free choice of the individual or people being
assimilated. They argued for a mutual agreement about the conditions for sharing
territory and land. It was clear for them that a lasting peace and a just reconciliation
between indigenous people and settler societies required thick recognition, mutual
consent, and negotiations in a respectful manner on a nation-to-nation basis.
In recent years, there have been genuine attempts from within the liberal tradition
to recognize other cultures and accommodate distinctive cultural or group rights.14
However, too often, liberals do so in keeping with what John Rawls termed reasonable pluralism, but solely on their own terms, according to their own world-view.15
Recognition is only acceptable within their own conceptual universe since it is, in
their view, a universal one.16 Why is it difficult for liberal political theory to understand the question of mutual recognition between different parties with identities,
histories, and cultures that are quite distinct from their own? Mainly because cultures
make demands that are identity-defining, and some of these usually defy the cultural
neutrality that is one of the foundations of the liberalism. Liberals see these demands
as a threat to the constitutional order. According to them, the liberal state should not
seek to recognize distinctive cultural or group rights but instead focus on providing
effective individual civil rights such as freedom of expression, association, religion,
movement, and the like.17
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These arguments have been subject to extensive criticism. Numerous authors have
underlined the tension between cultural difference and liberalism. Bhikhu Parekh,
for example, observes that the liberal state is a deeply homogenizing institution.18
It has evolved as a form of political organization that expects its citizens to subscribe
to an identical way of defining themselves and is consequently threatened by identities that can set up rival kinds of loyalty. Feminist authors have also underscored
how liberal theories have, in their quest for an imaginary unity, systematically put
aside other theories, which gave more place to differences. In particular, feminists
argue, liberalism has been identified with an abstract individualism that ignores its
own gendered content and have criticized the homogenizing ideals of equality that
require us to be or become the same.19
In sum, history shows that Westernand above all liberalpolitical theory has
a fundamental problem with the convention of thick recognition, which is central
to our perspective and which it cannot always accommodate. Each party has to be
able to understand the others fundamental identity features, in particular, the differences it needs to remain self. The recognition of these differences typically requires
reaching out of a universal scheme equally applicable to all parties. Fundamentally, we
are arguing in favor of a line of reasoning that is geared to the existence of multiple
institutions, legal traditions, and the presence of plural identities in the way parties
see themselves. This makes it impossible to resolve the problems of a Just Peace by
one allencompassing original position (as under universalism) or even by two sets
of overarching original positionsone within each nation and another among the
representatives of all nations. The existence of many identities is a central feature of
the world and cannot be ignored in exploring the demands for recognition. Only a
formal theory of just peace can give justice to this human diversity. This being said,
let us now probe deeper into the two fundamental kinds of recognition, starting with
the more limited one, thin recognition.
Thin Recognition
With thin recognition, parties, states, peoples, or other such collectives recognize each
other as agents, as autonomous entities that have a particular identity, a history, a
culture, and usually their own common language. In other words, they accept each
other as collectives of human beings. This thin recognition proceeds simply on the
acceptance of the Other, of its having the right to exist and continuing to exist as
an autonomous agent. At this level of a thin or minimalist recognition, the thickness of the other agent, while being accepted in principle, is not recognized as such
and remains in the background. Simply, the Other is only accepted as a full-fledged
negotiating partner while the negotiation may not succeed. The most crucial point
is that the parties recognize each other as key for resolving the conflict. It is this acceptance of the Other as such which is a necessarybut not sufficientcondition
of a Just Peace.
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In this sense, our perspective is analogous to Kants minimalist cosmopolitan
right, the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on
someone elses territory, a right of resort, allowing each human being to attempt
to enter into relations with others, such as trade.20 However, it does not imply the
knowledge of the other partys identity, simply the recognition that he has a separate
one and that one can enter into potentially fruitful interchange with him.
Interestingly, contemporary work in game theory has given extensive thought to
the mutual understanding of the Other. It is invaluable in probing very deeply into
the rationality of decision-making in interdependent social situations where each
decision has consequences depending on decisions by others. The modeling of the
rational choices of actors in such situations requires a theory of who these actors are.
However, in order to keep the analysis manageable, these others are highly stylized
and homogenized. Indeed, the Other is seen as homogeneous with oneself, albeit
with different preferences. Concepts such as common knowledge, that is, the joint
cognitive elements of a situation and its involved social actors, have become central.
What actors know about the situation, about the other players, and also what they
know about themselves has become a central feature of game theoretical modeling.21
The insights gained with these perspectives are invaluable. However, they come at a
price of a thin recognition, not a thick one.
Recognition needs to be thick in the sense of capturing the richness of the Other
this includes the Others contradictions and multifaceted richness, which is hard to
model analytically. We now turn to this concept.
Thick Recognition
Requiring thick recognition means that each party needs to understand the Other
in terms of the essential elements composing its identity. This condition is central
because it allows each party to identify essential and inevitable red lines that cannot
be crossed without challenging the very existence of the other party. To make our
claims clear: here, we are not asking for an overall consensus between parties. Nor
are we requiring the kind of societal consensus necessary in some societies whereby
differences are solved by long palavers, and where each individual has in some sense
the power of vetoing the collective decision. All we require for a Just Peace is a minimal understanding of the internal support a proposed just solution would have for
each significant or relevant group or sensitivity within each actor. According to the
identity of an actor, support may stem from the agreement of the legitimate leaders
in a representative democracy, or the consent of the major groups supporting an
authoritarian system or any other significant domestic political force or sensitivity
which may block a Just Peace formula.
The notion of identity is therefore crucial. Despite their undeniable rigidities,
identities are potentially changeable (and in fact negotiable) for two reasons. First,
unlike territory and resources, they are not inherently a zero-sum game; though they
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are perceived and debated as such in intense conflicts, it is in fact not the case that
ones identity can be expressed only if the others identity is totally denied. If the
twoor moreidentities are to become compatible, however, they have to be defined
anew or redefined. And here is the second reason they are changeable: they can be
redefined because they are to a large extent constructed out of real experiences, and
these experiences can be presented and ordered in different ways.22
The discovery that accommodation of the Others identity need not destroy the
core of the groups own identity makes these changes possible, and this kind of
learning is usually taking place during the negotiation process. Therefore, to find
a common ground between identities, it is essential to genially understand the core
identity of the Other. Thick recognition implies full acceptance of the humanity of
the Otherincluding the contradictory elements of human experience and their
societal dimensions.23
But it is not sufficient to comprehend the Other: it is just as important to understand oneself. Surprisingly, most social scientific approaches start from the premise
that actors are knowledgeable of themselves and concentrate on how the nature of
the Other is defined. Most often, the rationality of the Other is posited in order to be
able to rationally enter into social intercourse with her. However, we believe that those
representing a party need to fully grasp the core identity and potential for change of
their own party in order to be able to devise a solution that will be, sometimes only
with time, recognized and accepted by their own people.
Having discussed thin and thick recognition, we now discuss two further conditions pertaining to a Just Peace.
Toward a Just Peace

The third necessary convention for our Just Peace concept is renouncement in the
sense of concessions and compromises being necessary to build a peace that will be
accepted as just. Some symbols, positions, and advantages need to be sacrificed. In
other words, it is not sufficient to find a win-win formula, but an essential ingredient
lies in sacrifices; that is, costs that each party needs to make with respect to the other.
Just Peace cannot be had on the cheap with mutual benefits only. Rather, it is a human
experience that requires a visible and obvious rapprochement on the human level and
that requires visible sacrifices from both parties. Aside from the division of territory,
sovereignty, and power, negotiations are often marked by one overriding factora
symbolic, initially non-negotiable issue around which the conflict is structured. That
issue may be the unity of the state, religious freedom, constitutional reform, or the
role of a language. In Northern Ireland, the defining factor is the union with Great
Britain. Canadas conflict is embodied in the issue of language. In Kosovo, religion
divides hearts and minds.
Rule constitutes our fourth and final condition. Just Peace cannot only be in the
minds of peoples, a subjective feeling amongst negotiators, a sentiment of justice
4/18/11 12:36 PM

or peace between them. For a Just Peace to be durable, it needs to be shown in the
open, in the public sphere. It requires explicit rules of settlement, legitimate rules of
acceptable behavior, and inter-subjective yardsticks allowing allboth parties and
outside observers or guarantorsto approve of the solution found. We define rule in
the generic sense of common principles, norms, and accepted behaviors. Typically,
the rule between parties to a Just Peace is grounded in law, which is seen as a way of
shaping the first three conventions. However, is it really impossible to settle on a legal
language shared and accepted by all? Therein lies the challenge posed by relativism
(impossibility to choose between legal traditions) and perspectivism (impossibility
to claim that one holds the truth inside a school of thought).
Tzvetan Todorov, Ashis Nandy, and Andrew Linklater provide us with useful
insights to solve this dilemma and think about a way to create channels between
rival traditions.24 They are concerned with the process of othering by means of
which a self understands the relationship between itself and some other and is an
understanding with practical implications. All three offer richly rewarding insights
into cross-cultural understanding, notably Todorovs idea of non-violent communication, Nandys notion of a dialogue of visions, and Linklaters application of Jrgen
Habermass discourse ethics to international relations. Through a conversational
process that does not assume Western superiority, they argue, it is possible to achieve a
dialogue between cultures and the degree of mutual understanding needed to sustain
international society. This dialogue permitsbut does not necessarily entailthe
development of rule, the arena where each partys cultural conventions on recognition and renouncement are reinvented, fleshed out, and modified. This is done by
the negotiators who develop narratives encompassing the essential features of each
partys mind-set and expectations.25 The populations themselves may be involved in
this process, although their political elites play the major role. By crafting and then
drafting a common acceptable convention using the terminology of both negotiating
traditions, it allows the features of the just solution to be objectified by a text. This
term is to be seen in the widest sense, including the essential symbolic features, such
as shaking hands, having a common meal, a reciprocal invitation to visit the leaders
private home, and so forth. It requires a common language to be set forth, respecting
the particular identities of each, making their concessions clear to all, and defining the
rights and duties of each in securing a Just Peace that is seen by both as a lasting one.
Differently put, after the highly subjective thick recognition and renouncement,
it is necessary that the agreement be fully communicated to the relevant publics. It
needs to be publicized, thus entering the public sphere not only of each party but also
of all outside observers and third parties, helping to cement the agreement.
So far, however, we have not explained in detail how we arrive at this common
language, that is, the process of reaching a Just Peace. We believe that Ludwig Wittgensteins approach to the concept of understanding provides us with the key element
of how parties reach the common language, which allows them in turn to reach a
Just Peace. In one of the most famous passages of his Philosophical Investigations,
Wittgenstein compares language to an ancient city: Our language may be seen as
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an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of
houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of
new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.26 This analogy is
used to make us understand that language, like a city, has grown up in a variety of
forms through practices overlapping in many ways the endless diversity of human
activities. Like a city, it does have a multiplicity of possible paths. Consequently, it is
impossible to articulate a comprehensive rule that stipulates the essential conditions
for the correct application of words in every instance, just as there is no such comprehensive view of a city. Wittgenstein explains that, a meaning of a word is a kind
of employment of it. For it is what we learn when the word is incorporated into our
language.27 He thus shows that understanding a general term is not the theoretical
activity of interpreting and applying a general theory in distinct cases. It is rather
the practical activity of being able to use it in various circumstances. In that sense,
Wittgensteins philosophy furnishes an alternative way of building an inter-cultural
dialogue by enabling the interlocutors to modify their languages and their pictures of
the world. This dialogical way of apprehending others thus provides us with a process
that does not entail comprehending what they say within one sides own language.28
In sum, his theory gives us a solid base to anchor our concept rule. It not only allows us to do things with words, following John Austins terminology, but it also
permits us to go beyond the usual opposition between liberalism and culturalism.29
Our four conditions thus both define a Just Peace and point toward the necessary features of a process leading to it. In fact, by neither specifying some general
rules of justice nor the content of the peace but focusing only on some very general
forms that the process of a Just Peace needs to proceed through, we have developed
a formal concept. A specific Just Peace formula will not necessarily be, as in a Kantian perspective, a perpetual one. Just Peace needs to be maintained, and therefore
adapted to changing societal circumstances, in order to survive. We argue that the
existence of many collective identities is a central feature of the world and cannot be
ignored in exploring the demands for recognition. Therefore, only a formal theory
of Just Peace can give justice to this human diversity: each peace is a particular one,
accommodating the specific identities involved. Differently put: only a content-free
concept is able to accommodate conflicting identities within a procedural approach
of mutual recognition, such as our Just Peace concept.
Conclusion
In Worcester vs. the State of Georgia (1832), United States Chief Justice John Marshall used thin and thick recognition as the cornerstone of his argument.30 Referring
in 1832 to the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763, in which the British Crown
set out its views on relations between North America and the Amerindian nations,
Marshall not only insisted on the fact that it unmistakably recognized indigenous
peoples as autonomous nations. He did not portray them using traditional Eurocentric
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Enlightenment discourse. Instead, he underlined the attitude of British negotiators
who adapted their approach to the Amerindian culture and refused to dismiss its
peoples as inferior on the evolutionary scale. He observed that the British Crown
had incorporated the idea of thick recognition into the treaties signed with Amerindians and concluded that the US government was bound to respect that undertaking.
History does provide us with some Just Peace agreements including thin and thick
recognitionalthough, as expected, these are relatively rare. The Edict of Nantes of
1598 negotiated by Henri IV and the commissioners to settle the Huguenot issue in
France and to integrate Protestants as full-fledged French citizens; the Great Peace
of Montreal of 1701 in which forty Amerindian nations met with representatives
of France to end persistent bloody conflicts; the Treaty of San Francisco (1951)
between Japan and the United States; and the constitutional negotiations in South
Africa between 1990 and 1994 could all be seen as examples of just agreements
in that they satisfy all four of our Just Peace conditions. In each of these cases, a
liberal thin recognition was insufficient for reaching a legitimate and durable peace.
This reminds us that recognition in a multilateral context is a thin concept not
necessarily permitting full or thick recognition paying due respect to each peace
partners identity.
Peace and justice are both critical imperatives in post-conflict (and often postauthoritarian) contexts. Too often, brokering (and maintaining) peace and advancing
justice are assumed to be in tension with each other, or it is thought that seeking one
will automatically be to the detriment of the other. Thin and thick recognition are
an important part of this accommodation process whereby negotiators seek to agree
to a fair and lasting peace. If we want to address the theoretical challenge posed by
multiculturalism to modern world politics, then continuing work on Just Peace is
essential.
Notes
We thank the two editors and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments.
1. We borrow Clifford Geertzs 1973 terminology to distinguish between what we call
a classical liberal or minimal thin recognition, and our definition of a thick one. Geertz
(1973, 6) himself adopted his thick description from Gilbert Ryle, a Wittgensteinian
philosopher. In doing so, we do not follow Michael Walzers moral conceptual distinction
between thin and thick morality. See Walzer 1994, xi.
2. On contemporary thinking about justice and international society, see various approaches in Mapel and Nardin 1999. See in particular Rawls 1999.
3. See, among others, Walter 2001; Stern and Druckman 2000.
4. See for instance Fisher and Brown 1988; Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey 1988; Cohen
1991.
5. See Lesaffer 2004.
6. See in particular Simpson 2004; Anghie 2007.
7. The same criticism could not be made, at least without serious qualifications, for cultural
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and legal historians. For an excellent analysis of the vision of peace defended by indigenous
peoples, see Williams 1999. See also White 1991; Jennings 1985; Pocock 2005, 226258.
8. We have tried to explore and further develop the concept of Just Peace in Allan and
Keller 2006. Parts of this chapter are based on this earlier work.
9. Bell 2008, 53.
10. Skinner 1996.
11. Ibid. 16.
12. Todorov 1984, Pagden 1995, Tuck 1999, and Tully 1995 have provided detailed historical accounts of this dynamics.
13. See Keal 2003, 8586.
14. Kymlicka 1989; 1995.
15. Rawls 1999, 45.
16. Tully 1995, 1011.
17. For a development of these claims, see Kukathas 1992.
18. Parekh 2000.
19. See Phillips 1991; Bock and James 1992. For a presentation of theses debates, see Tully
2004, 855862.
20. Kant 1991, 105106.
21. See Allan and Dupont 1999.
22. See Kelman 1997, 338. See also Behnkes contribution to this volume, which pleads
going beyond a Hegelian constitutive recognition.
23. As Ringmar argues in his introduction to this book, states tell stories about themselves
and demand approval of the individuality of their narrated self-conceptions.
24. Todorov 1984; Nandy 1992; Linklater 1998, chapter 3 especially.
25. In his contribution to this volume, Honneth contends that political actors and rulers
are key in the interpretation of their populations moods given the fact that nation-states
are themselves collectives far too complex to allow for simple recognition formulas.
26. Wittgenstein 2001, 7.
27. Wittgenstein 1972, 10.
28. Ibid. 15.
29. Austin 1962.
30. Marshall 1987, 435445 especially.
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Linklater, Andrew. 1998. The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of
the Post-Westphalian Community. Cambridge: Polity.
Mapel, David R., and Terry Nardin, eds. 1999. International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Marshall, John. 1987. Worcester vs. the State of Georgia, 6 Peter 515 (U.S.S.C. 1832). In
The Writings of John Marshall, Late Chief Justice of the United States, Upon the Federal
Constitution, 43545. Littleton: F.B. Rothman Press.
Nandy, Ashis. 1992. Traditions, Tyranny and Utopias: Essays in the Politics of Awareness. New
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Pagden, Anthony. 1995. Lords of All the World. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Parekh, Bikhu. 2000. Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory.
London: Macmillan.
Phillips, Anne. 1991. Engendering Democracy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania State
Press.
Pocock, John G. A. 2005. The Discovery of Islands: Essay in British History. Cambridge:
Rawls, John. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Simpson, Gerry. 2004. Great Powers and Outlaw States. Unequal Sovereigns in the International
Legal Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skinner, Quentin. 1996. Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stern, Paul C., and Daniel Druckman, eds. 2000. International Conflict Resolution after the
Cold War. Washington: National Academy Press.
Todorov, Tzvetan. 1984. The Conquest of America: The Question of Other. New York: Harper.
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Tuck, Richard. 1999. The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and International Order
from Grotius to Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tully, James. 1995. Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. Cambridge:
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. 2004. Approaches to Recognition, Power, and Dialogue. Political Theory 32:
855862.
Walter, Barbara F. 2001. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton:
Walzer, Michael. 1994. Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. Notre Dame:
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White, Richard. 1991. The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes
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Williams, Robert A. 1999. Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty Visions of Law and
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Blackwell.
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Part II
Empirical Applications
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4/18/11 12:36 PM
Chapter 5
Spirit, Recognition, and

Foreign Policy
Germany and World War II
Richard Ned Lebow
Plato and Aristotle posit three fundamental drivesappetite, spirit, and reasoneach
seeking its own ends. Three paradigms of international relationsrealism, liberalism,
and Marxismare rooted in appetite. Liberalism assumes that people and states seek
wealth and use reason instrumentally to design strategies and institutions conducive
to this goal. Realism differs from liberalism in arguing that concern for security must
come first in an anarchical world. Realists root their paradigm in Hobbess observationgenerally taken out of contextthat people are motivated to find ways out
of the state of nature, not only to preserve their lives but to protect their property
and create an environment in which they can satisfy other appetites.1 Marxism is
also anchored in appetite, although the young Marx was equally concerned with
the spirit. He wrote about mans alienation from his labor and how socialism would
restore workers self-esteem by reordering their relationship to what they produced.
Marx was a close reader of the Greeks and appreciated their richer understanding
of human motives and related understanding that human happiness required more
than the satisfaction of appetites.
The spirit has not been made the basis for any paradigm of politics or international
relations, although, as Machiavelli and Rousseau recognized, it has the potential to
87
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88 Richard Ned Lebow

serve as the foundation for one, and Hobbes described vanityhis term for the
spiritas a powerful, fundamental drive and principal cause of war. I attempt to
remedy this conceptual oversight in A Cultural Theory of International Relations.2
With Homers Iliad as my guide, I construct an ideal-type honor society and use it
as a template to understand the role of the spirit in real worlds, ancient and modern. In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of the characteristics and tensions of
spirit-based worlds and their implications for foreign policy. My understanding of
the spirit and the concept of recognition differ from that of other contributors to the
volume, whose definitions ultimately derive from Hegel and are commonly applied
by international relations (IR) scholars to understand the situation of subordinate
communities. I draw my understanding from Plato and Aristotle because they theorize
a universal human drive. Aristotles understanding of anger also encourages a focus
on powerful actors rather than oppressed groups, which allows me to analyze great
power politics in terms of the spirit.
I use my framework to analyze Germanys reaction to defeat in World War I and
how the resulting desire for regaining self-esteem was focused on the German state
and facilitated Hitlers rise to power. There was deep resentment toward the Allies and
the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Revealingly, its most-hated feature was not the
loss of territory, reparations, or restrictions on the German military that this Treaty
imposed but the articles that required Germany to accept responsibility for the war
and hand over the kaiser and other individuals for trial as war criminals. Compelled
to sign the treaty by the Allies, the Weimar Republic never achieved legitimacy.
Economic shocks further weakened the Republic. Right-wing opponents, Hitler
among them, gained popular support by promising to restore Germanys position in
Europe and with it, the self-esteem of the German people. Hitlers own motives for
going to war were pathological because they went far beyond restoration of status
quo ante bellum to the conquest of Europe, if not the world.3 Many of his foreign
policy and defense initiativeswithdrawal from the League of Nations, rearmament
of Germany, Anschluss with Austria, and dismemberment of Czechoslovakiawere
welcomed enthusiastically by most Germans and Austrians. His wars against Poland,
Western Europe, Yugoslavia, Greece, and the Soviet Union were decidedly less popular,
but what support they did have derived in large part from the same motives.4 The
importance of honor to the officer corps secured Hitler the quiescence, if not the
active support, of the German army, and its willingness to keep fighting long after
officers of every rank realized the hopelessness, if not the evil character, of their cause.
The Spirit
A spirit-based paradigm starts from the premise, common to Plato and Aristotle, that
people, individually and collectively, seek self-esteem. Simply put, self-esteem is a
sense of self-worth that makes people feel good about themselves, happier about life,
and more confident about their ability to confront its challenges. It is achieved by
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Spirit, Recognition and Foreign Policy 89

excelling in activities valued by ones peer group or society and gaining the respect
of actors whose opinions matter. By winning their approbation, we feel good about
ourselves. Self-esteem requires some sense of self, but also recognition that self requires
society because self-esteem is impossible in its absence. The spirit is fiercely protective
of ones autonomy and honor. According to Plato, any restraint on its self-assertion
arouses anger. It wants to avenge all affronts to its honor and seeks immediate satisfaction.5 Mature people are restrained by reason and recognize the wisdom of the
ancient maxim, as did Odysseus, that revenge is a dish best served cold.
Self-esteem is a universal drive, although it is manifested differently by different
societies. For the Greeks, identity was defined by the sum of the social roles people
performed, so esteem (how we are regarded by others) and self-esteem (how we regard
ourselves) were understood to be more or less synonymous because the latter depended
on the former. For modern Westerners, esteem and self-esteem are distinct words
and categories and are no longer synonymous. We distinguish external honor from
internal honor, a modern Western concept associated with behavior in accord with
our values. We can behave in ways that provoke the disapproval of others but still
feel good about ourselves if that behavior reflects our values and beliefs and confers
internal honor. We must nevertheless be careful about making hard and fast distinctions between Greeks and moderns because there is some evidence that internal honor
was not entirely foreign to Athenians.6
The spirit is mediated by society. People must be taught how to express and satisfy
the spirit through activities deemed appropriate by the society. They need appropriate
role models to emulate. For Aristotle, emulation, like many behaviors, is motivated
by pain and pleasure. We feel pain when we observe people, who are much like us,
and who have good qualities and positions that we do not have but might. To escape
this pain, we act in ways that make it possible for us to possess these goods and feel
good when we obtain them.7
Societies have strong incentives to nurture and channel the spirit. It engenders
self-control and sacrifice from which the community as a whole prospers. In warrior
societies, the spirit is channeled into bravery and selflessness from which the society
also profits. All societies must restrain, or deflect outward, the anger aroused when
the spirit is challenged or frustrated. The spirit is a purely human drive; organizations
and states do not have psyches and cannot be treated as persons. They can, nevertheless, respond to the needs of the spirit in the same way they do to the appetites of
their citizens. People support collective enterprises in the expectation of material and
emotional rewards. They build self-esteem by membership in high-status groups and
high status within those groups. Arguably the most important function of nationalism
in the modern world is to provide vicarious satisfaction for the spirit.
There are a bundle of concepts associated with the spirit that must be defined
with some care. The first of these is self-esteem, which I have described as a universal human need on a par with appetite. For Plato and Aristotle, and classical Greek
literature more generally, self-esteem or self-worth is an affect and, like all emotions
for the Greeks, is mediated by the intellect. We only feel good about ourselves when
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we recognize that we are esteemed for the right reasons by other actors whom we
respect and admire.
Esteem and self-esteem map on to different conceptions of identity. In the ancient
world, identity was social. People did not lack a concept of self, but that self was relationally defined and was the sum of socially assigned roles.8 Our word for person
derives from persona, the Latin word for mask, and describes the outer face that one
presents to the community.9 In the modern world, individual identity and self-esteem
have become increasingly important. From Rousseau on, Enlightenment and Romantic ideologies emphasized the uniqueness and autonomy of the inner self.10 Modernity
created a vocabulary that recognizes tensions between inner selves and social roles but
encourages us to cultivate and express our inner selves and original ways of being.11
Self-esteem is a subjective sense of ones honor and standing and can reflect or differ
from the esteem accorded by others. Tension and conflict can arise, internally and
socially, when actors self-esteem is considerably lower or higher than their external
esteem. Esteem and self-esteem can also be described as respect and self-respect. The
opposite of esteem is shame, an emotion that arises in response to the judgments, or
expected judgments, of others. Both forms of esteem are stipulatively social. Aristotle
describes shame as a pain or disturbance in regard to bad things, whether present,
past or future, which seem likely to involve us in discredit. Examples he provides
include throwing away ones shield in battle, withholding payment from someone
deserving of it, making a profit in a disgraceful way, and having sexual relations
with forbidden persons or at the wrong times or places.12 Aristotle is clear that we
shrink from knowledge of our behavior, not the acts themselves, as we are primarily
concerned with how we appear in the eyes of those who matter most to us.13 We must
exercise due caution with the binaries of social and individual identities and esteem
and self-esteem because Greek tragedy (for example, Sophocless Ajax and Euripidess
Medea) reveals that self-esteem existed to some degree in fifth-century Athens.
Self-esteem is closely connected to honor (tim), a status for the Greeks that describes the outward recognition we gain from others in response to our excellence.
Honor is a gift, and its bestowed upon actors by other actors. It carries with it a set of
responsibilities, which must be fulfilled properly if honor is to be retained. By the fifth
century, honor came to be associated with political rights and offices. It was a means
of selecting people for office and of restraining them in their exercise of power. To
summarize, the spirit is best conceived of as an innate human drive with self-esteem
its goal and honor and standing the means by which it is achieved.
Honor is inseparable from hierarchy. Hierarchy is a rank-ordering of status, and
in honor societies, honor determines the nature of the statuses and who fills them.
Each status has privileges but also an associated rule package. The higher the status,
the greater the honor and privileges and the more demanding the role and its rules.
Status can be ascribed, as in the case of kings, or achieved, and in traditional honor
societies, the two are expected to coincide. The king or chief is expected to be the
bravest warrior and lead his forces into battle. Other high-ranking individuals must
assume high-risk, if subordinate, roles. Service and sacrificethe means by which
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honor is won and maintainedhave the potential to legitimize hierarchy. In return
for honoring and serving those higher up the social ladder, those beneath them expect to be looked after in various ways. Protecting and providing for others is a key
responsibility of those with high status and office. The Song dynasty carried this
system to its logical extreme, integrating all males in the kingdom into a system of
social status signified by seventeen, and then twenty, ranks. Obligations, including
labor and military service, came with rank as did various economic incentives.14
Great powers have had similar responsibilities in the modern era, which have been
described by practitioners and theorists alike. The Security Council is an outgrowth
of this tradition. Its purpose, at least in the intent of those who drafted the United
Nations Charter, was to coordinate the collective efforts of the community to maintain the peace. Such hierarchies justify themselves with reference to the principle of
fairness; each actor contributes to the society and the maintenance of its order to the
best of its abilities and receives support depending on its needs.
Honor is a mechanism for restraining the powerful and preventing the kind of
crass, even brutal exploitation common to hierarchies in modern, interest-based
worlds. Honor can maintain hierarchy because challenges to an actors status, or
failure to respect the privileges it confers, arouse anger that can only be appeased by
punishing the offender and thereby putting him in his place. Honor worlds have
the potential to degenerate into hierarchies based on power and become vehicles for
exploitation when actors at the apex fail to carry out their responsibilities or exercise
self-restraint in pursuit of their own interests.
Standing and honor are related concepts. Standing refers to the position an actor
occupies in a hierarchy. In an ideal-type spirit world, an actors standing in a hierarchy
is equivalent to its degree of honor. Those toward the apex of the status hierarchy
earn honor by living up to the responsibilities associated with their rank or office,
while those who attain honor by virtue of their accomplishments come to occupy appropriate offices. Even in ideal spirit worlds, there is almost always some discrepancy
between honor and standing because those who gain honor do not necessarily win
the competitions that usually confer honor. In the Iliad, Priam and Hector gain great
honor because of their behavior on and off the battlefield but lose their lives and city.
Honor and standing can diverge for less admirable reasons. Honor worlds are
extremely competitive because standing, even more than wealth, is a relational
concept. Hobbes compares it to glory and observes that, if all men have it, no man
hath it.15 The value placed on honor in spirit-based worlds, and the intensity of the
competition for it, tempt actors to take short-cuts to attain it. Once actors violate
the rules and get away with it, others do the same to avoid being disadvantaged. If
the rules governing honor are consistently violated, honor becomes a meaningless
concept. Competition for honor is transformed into competition for standing, which
is more unconstrained and possibly more violent. As we shall see, there is a repetitive
pattern, especially in international relations.
The quest for honor generates a proliferation of statuses or ranks. These orderings
can keep conflict in check when they are known, respected, and effectively define the
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relative status of actors. They intensify conflict when they are ambiguous or incapable
of establishing precedence. This is most likely to happen when there are multiple
ways (ascribed and achieved) of gaining honor and office. Actors frequently disagree
about who deserves a particular status or office. This kind of dispute has particularly
threatening consequences in international relations because there are no authorities
capable of adjudicating among competing claims.
External honor must be conferred by others and can only be gained through
deeds regarded as honorable. Honor only exists when recognized. The Greek word
for fame (kleos) derives from the verb to hear (kluein). As Homer knew, fame not
only requires heroic deeds but bards to sing about those deeds and people willing to
listen and be impressed by them. For honor to be won and celebrated there must be
a consensus about what it is, how it is won and lost, and the distinctions and obligations it confers. This presupposes common values and traditions, even institutions.
When society is robust, the competition for honor and standing instantiates and
strengthens the values of the society. As society becomes thinner, as it generally is
at the regional and international levels, honor worlds become more difficult to create and sustain. In the absence of common values, there can be no consensus, no
rules, and no procedures for awarding and celebrating honor. Even in thin societies,
honor can often be won within robust sub-cultures. Hamas and other groups that
have sponsored suicide bombing have publicized the names of successful bombers,
paid stipends to their families, and encouraged young people to lionize them.16 Such
activity strengthens the sub-culture and may even give it wider appeal or support.
Honor societies tend to be highly stratified and can be likened to step pyramids.
Many, but by no means all, honor societies are divided into two groups: those who
are allowed to compete for honor and those who are not. In many traditional honor
societies, the principal distinction is between aristocrats, who are expected to seek
honor, and commoners, or the low-born, who cannot. This divide is often reinforced
by distinctions in wealth, which allow many of the high-born to buy the military
equipment, afford the leisure, sponsor the ceremonies, or obtain the education and
social kills necessary to compete. As in ancient Greece, birth and wealth are never
fully synonymous, creating another source of social tension. Wealth is generally
a necessary but insufficient condition for gaining honor. Among the egalitarian
Sioux, honor and status were achieved by holding various ceremonies, all of which
involved providing feasts and gifts to those who attended. Horses and robes, the
principal gifts, could only be attained through successful military expeditions
against enemy tribes, or as gifts from others because of the high regard in which
brave warriors were held.17
Recognition into the elite circle where one can compete for honor is the first,
and often most difficult, step in honor worlds. The exclusiveness of many honor
societies can become a major source of tension when individuals, classes, or political
units demand and are refused entry into the circle in which it becomes possible to
gain honor. What is honorable, the rules governing its attainment, and the indices
used to measure it are all subject to challenge. Historically, challenges of this kind
have been resisted, at least initially. Societies that have responded to them positively
4/18/11 12:36 PM

have matured, and in some cases, gradually moved away from, all or in part, their
warrior base.
Throughout A Cultural Theory of International Relations, I use the term recognition to mean acceptance into the circle where it is possible to compete for honor.
Recognition carries with it the possibility of fulfillment of the spirit and differs from
the use the term has come to assume in moral philosophy. Hegel made the struggle
for recognition (Kampf um Anerkennung) a central concept of his Philosophy of Right,
which is now understood to offer an affirmative account of a just social order that can
transcend the inequalities of master-slave relationships.18 In a seminal essay published
in 1992, Charles Taylor applied Hegels concept to the demands for recognition of
minorities and other marginalized groups. He argues that human recognition is a
distinctive but largely neglected human good, and that we are profoundly affected
by how we are recognized and mis-recognized by others.19 The political psychology
of recognition has since been extended to international relations, where subordinate
states are assumed to have low self-images and low self-esteem. Axel Honneth stresses
the importance of avoiding master-slave relationships among states and, more recently,
the relationship between recognition and morality at individual and social levels of
interaction.20 Fernando Cornil argues that subaltern states enjoy the trappings of sovereignty but often internalize the negative images of them held by the major powers.21
I acknowledge the relationship between status and esteem but make a different
argument. In terms of at least foreign policy, it is powerful states, not weak ones,
who feel the most humiliation. Here, I draw on Aristotles understanding of anger
as a response to an oligria: a slight, lessening, or belittlement. This can issue from
an equal but provokes even more anger when it comes from an actor who lacks the
standing to challenge or insult us. Anger is a luxury that can only be felt by those in
a position to seek revenge. Slaves and subordinates cannot allow themselves to feel
anger. It is also senseless to feel anger toward those who cannot become aware of our
anger.22 In the realm of international relations, leadersand often peoplesof powerful states are likely to feel anger of the Aristotelian kind when they are denied entry
into the system or recognition as a great power or are treated in a manner demeaning
to their understanding of their status. They will look for some way of asserting their
claims and seeking revenge. Subordinate states lack this power and their leaders and
populations learn to live with their lower status and more limited autonomy. Great
powers will feel enraged if challenged by such states.23 I believe we can profit from
reintroducing the Greek dichotomy between those who were included in and excluded
from the circle in which it was possible to achieve honor and Aristotles definition
of anger. Both conceptualizations help to illuminate important social and political
phenomena that would otherwise not be noticed or flagged as important.
Germany
My account of Nazi Germany builds on my earlier analysis of German imperialism and
the origins of World War I. In chapter 6 of A Cultural Theory of International Relations,
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I emphasized the survival of pre-modern values among a powerful aristocracy, the
partial feudalization of the German middle class, and the deflection outward of its
strivings for self-esteem.24 The commitment of the Junker aristocracy to preserve its
power and way of life and the vicarious association of the middle class with the state
provided reinforcing incentives for an aggressive foreign policy, as well as political
backing for it. The German Empire came to an abrupt end in 1918 and was replaced
by a republic that drew support from socialists, Catholics, and some members of the
middle class. It was opposed by nationalists on the right and communists on the left,
and ultimately lost support to both, paving the way for extra-parliamentary government and Hitlers dictatorship. Historians have offered many reasons for the Weimar
Republics failure. They include the success of the right in hanging the hated Treaty of
Versailles around its neck; the growth of independent, anti-Republican paramilitary
forces, the economic crises of the early 1920s and 1930s and their consequences for
the middle and working classes; middle class fears of socialism; alienation of the intellectuals; a flawed constitution and bad leadership.25 Historians also point to deeper
causes, among them the schism between German and Western political thought,
and the sense of a special German mission to which it gave rise in opposition to the
more commercial and democratic values of France and Britain.26 German idealism
encouraged deep respect, if not reverence, for the state and the subordination of the
individual to it. The German middle class and intellectuals were predisposed to look
to the state for unity, purpose, and guidance, a role that a querulous, controversial,
weak, and threatened republic could not possibly fulfill.27
I do not pretend to offer a comprehensive explanation for Hitlers rise to power
and Germanys role in bringing about World War II. Rather, I offer an account that
highlights the role of the spirit in understanding these events and to advance the
claim that concern for self-esteem was not only an underlying cause of this conflagration but a necessary condition. Self-esteem was a key, if frustrated, ambition for
the semi-feudalized German bourgeoisie. This need became more acute after the
humiliation of defeat in World War I and the imposition of what Germans widely
regarded as the punitive Treaty of Versailles. British and American revisionists would
support this German charge, while later revisionists would argue against the punitive nature of the treaty. What is relevant for my argument is that the majority of
Germans perceived the Versailles settlement as punitive and humiliating and that
this belief made it correspondingly more difficult for the Weimar Republic to build
legitimacy, and comparatively easier for its right-wing opponents to win support in
the name of nationalism. Hitler was particularly adept at playing on the desires of
the middle class for self-esteem. The Nazi emphasis on the Volksgemeinschaft held out
the promise of a higher purpose to be achieved through unity, sacrifice, and struggle
in a showdown with the nations internal and external enemies.28 Hitlers defiance of
the Western powers and the Treaty of Versailles was widely popular with the middle
classes, who were his largest supporters at the polls.
In November 1918, Allied advances on the Western front and German war-weariness led to mutinies and worker uprisings. On November 9, socialist leader Philip
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Scheidemann proclaimed a republic on the steps of the Reichstag, and Kaiser Wilhelm
fled to Holland the next day. Prince Max of Baden, the last imperial chancellor, had
opened negotiations with the Allies in October for an armistice, which came into
effect on November 11. The victorious Allied leaders, meeting in Paris, summoned a
German delegation to Versailles in May 1919 to receive a draft treaty. The Allies gave
the Germans fifteen days to submit objections and questions in French or English,
a deadline that was later extended by a week.29
The treaty required Germany to return Alsace-Lorraine to France, hand over
Eupen and Malmdy to Belgium, northern Schleswig to Denmark, Hultschin to
Czechoslovakia and parts of West Prussia, and Posen and Upper Silesia to Poland.
East Prussia was separated from West Prussia by a corridor of territory given to Poland
to guarantee it access to the Baltic Sea. The Saar, Danzig, and Memel were put under
the control of the League of Nations, and Germany was required to give up all of its
colonies and the land it had taken from Russia under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The
German army was reduced to 100,000 men, and severe restrictions were placed on its
navy and air force. The Rhineland was to be demilitarized permanently. Germany
was forbidden from incorporating Austria, despite strong sentiments for unification
in both countries. It had to accept responsibility for starting the war and assume the
burden of reparations in an amount to be determined, the bulk of which was to go
to Belgium and France to compensate them for damages caused by the war and four
years of German occupation.30
The German reaction to the draft treaty is revealing in two respects. The first
is the state of shock and denial that it provoked. By all accounts, Germans of all
classes were stunned by the peace terms, having convinced themselves that Woodrow Wilson would compel a reluctant Britain and France to offer a generous peace
based on the American presidents Fourteen Points. The draft treaty was in fact mild
in comparison to either the September Program of 1914, prepared by the German
government in the expectation of victory over Belgium and France, or the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk, imposed on Bolshevik Russia by Germany in March 1918. The latter
forced Russia to cede or give independence to all of its western territories (Finland,
the Baltic provinces, Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine). It offers evidence of the kind
of harsh terms Germany would have imposed on the Western powers if its 1918 offensive had succeeded in breaking Allied resistance. Germans on the whole failed
to make this comparison and saw themselves as undeserving victims. The German
military deluded itself into believing that it would receive Allied backing for a drang
nach Osten (march to the east) to St. Petersburg to overthrow the Bolshevik regime.31
It is equally revealing that Germans gave evidence of being more upset by those
articles of the treaty they considered offensive to their honor than by those inimical
to their security or well-being.32 Article 228 allowed Allies to indict and try people
for acts against the laws and customs of war. Almost across the political spectrum,
Germans opposed this demand as a matter of national pride, without any concern
for the possible substance of the allegations. It was a largely symbolic issue as the
kaiser had taken refuge in Holland. Article 231, the so-called war guilt clause,
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demanded reparations for allied and associated governments as a consequence of
the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies. The German
delegation summoned four experts with international reputations to draft a response.
The document they submitted insisted that the question of war guilt could only be
determined by a careful comparative analysis of the archives of all the warring powers. The Allied reply played to Allied public opinion and excoriated the Germans for
their wartime actions. In the judgment of Wolfgang Mommsen, it paved the way
for the passionate, often demagogic, discussion of the war-guilt lie which helped
kindle German nationalism once again.33
With respect to territory, public opinion accommodated itself readily to the loss
of Alsace-Lorraine but was least reconciled to ceding territory to Poland. Harald von
Riekhoff reasons that Germans respected France as an equal or superior power and
thus more readily acquiesced in that loss than in the loss of territory. They looked
down on the Poles as their inferiors and had no respect for anything associated with
them, which made it more difficult to relinquish territory to them.34 This phenomenon offers more evidence for Aristotles understanding of anger as an emotion
primarily aroused by slights from those we consider beneath us.35 With respect to
both reparations and territory, the spirit, not appetite or fear, appears to have dictated
the German response.
Prime Minister Scheidemann told the Reichstag that the treaty was unacceptable.
Even moderates rejected its terms and spoke about revenge.36 Hans Delbrck wrote
in the Preuische Jahrbcher that The day and hour will come when we will demand
everything back.37 Only one deputy, an Independent Social Democrat, was willing
to affirm the treaty on the sensible grounds that Germany had no choice but to make
peace. Marshal Ferdinand Foch drew up very public plans for an invasion of Germany, while British prime minister David Lloyd George pleaded with the French to
accept some revision of the treaty in the hope of reaching an accommodation. French
prime minister Georges Clemenceau agreed to some changes, the most important
of which was a plebiscite to decide the political future of Upper Silesia. The draft
treaty had awarded the territory outright to Poland. The German government sent
representatives back to hold out the prospect of signing the treaty without its two
most objectionable provisions concerning war guilt and war criminals. The same
day, word reached Paris that the German navy had scuttled its battle fleet in Scapa
Flow. The French, Americans, and British were furious and refused to consider any
further revisions. The German government had no choice but to accept the treaty,
making the Republic vulnerable to charges by the right-wing nationalists that its
socialist leaders were responsible for Germanys humiliation.38
The treaty became a central issue of Weimar politics, and all parties save the independent socialists (USPD) condemned it. The Burgfriedenthe truce among parties
at the outset of the First World Warhad made criticism of pre-war diplomacy all but
impossible during the war. The treaty controversy effectively foreclosed exposure and
criticism of the ills of the former monarchical political system under the Republic.39
It deprived pro-Republican forces of what in other circumstances would have been
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a powerful political tool, while shackling them with treaty terms arising from a war
for which they were not responsible.
The army and right-wing forces successfully propagated the fiction that the German army had not been defeated but stabbed in the back by socialists on the home
front.40 Frei Korps, composed of former veterans, coalesced into extra-legal armies
and fought to suppress socialism in Berlin and further east and intimidate voters in
plebiscites, especially in Silesia from 1920 to 1921. Frei Korps also participated in the
Kapp Putsch of March 1920, an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Republic.41
The foreign ministry conspired with conservatives to propagate the fiction that
Germany bore no responsibility for the war. In a cover up that would continue into
the 1960s, an entire department within the Wilhelmstrae cleansed, edited, forged,
hid, and destroyed incriminating memoranda, letters, and cables and paid scholars
and journalists at home and abroad to refute what it called the war-guilt lie.42 With
a few exceptions, the German historical profession was a willing participant in this
patriotic self-censorship and self-delusion. In 1930, Hermann Hesse lamented to
Thomas Mann that of 1,000 Germans, even today, 999 still know nothing of [our]
war guilt.43
Pro-Republican partiesSocial Democrats (SPD), Democrats, and the Zentrum
won over 70 percent of the vote in the first post-war national election in January
1919.44 The inauspicious beginning of the Weimar Republic did not bode well for its
survival, and some scholars see its demise as inevitable.45 Other historians emphasize
the contingency of Nazi Germany. In an early and still highly regarded history of
the Weimar Republic, Erich Eyck makes a credible case that the synergism between
the economic downturn and bad leadership brought Hitler to power.46 Wolfgang
Mommsen maintains that the collapse of Weimar was inevitable but the rise of
Hitler to power was not.47 Henry Turner uses counterfactuals to make the case that
Hitlers survival during the First World War and a later automobile accident were
both remarkable and that without Hitler, Weimars failure would likely have led to a
conservative, authoritarian regime with revanchist goals in the east but no stomach
for another continental war. It would have been anti-Semitic, but unlikely to have
carried out draconian measures against Jews.48
The determinists sensitize us to all the serious impediments that stood in the way
of the success of the Republic, and those who emphasize contingency alert us to the
need to separate the fate of the Republic from the question of what kind of regime
might have succeeded it. The forces arrayed against the Republic were on both ends
of the political continuum. The communists on the left opposed a constitutional
bourgeois order. Led by intellectuals, their base consisted of workers whose support
waxed and waned as a function of the economic situation.49 By 1928, there was very
little inclination on the part of the conservatives to cooperate with the socialists, and
the pro-Republican parties did not have enough seats to cobble together a left-center
coalition. The grand coalition that attempted to govern lasted less than six months,
the victim of Gustav Stresemanns death and the stock market crash.50 The nationalistconservative opposition was divided among several parties, and in the last years of
4/18/11 12:36 PM

the Republic, the National Socialists (Nazis) became by far the strongest of these
parties. In July 1932, the Nazis won 38.2 percent of the overall national vote, making
anti-Republican forces a majority in the Reichstag. Government had to be conducted
by emergency decree, which shifted power to President Paul von Hindenburg and
paved the way for the appointment of Hitler after the failure of the short-lived von
Papen and Schleicher regimes.51 Hindenburg could have used his emergency power
to support a pro-Republican government but preferred to rule through a conservative
fronde that excluded the socialists from power. He set in motion a chain of events that
had an outcome very different from what he imagined.52 So did the Communists.
On instructions from Moscow, they made a fatal error in refusing to support the
grand coalition, composed of the socialists, Zentrum, and moderate parties on the
right. They welcomed the Nazi regime in the expectation that it would quickly fail
and pave the way for a workers revolution.53
According to Karl Dietrich Bracher, the nationalist, anti-Republican front was
composed of people and groups representing four orientations: imperialistic nationalism, conservative authoritarianism, a nationalist and romantic variant of socialism,
and supporters of a vlkisch, race-based ideology.54 Imperialistic nationalism focused
on territorial revisionism, and Weimars foreign policy, which vacillated between
East and West, resistance and compliance, cooperation and revision, was incapable of
putting a break on this dynamic.55 Revisionist demands were intense between 1918
and 1923 and again after the depression began in 1929.56 Conservative authoritarianism was well established in Prussia under the Hohenzollers, and in Germany more
generally since the creation of the Reich in 1871. It continued under the Republic
and sustained a predisposition, formerly directed toward the person of the Kaiser, to
support a strong leader.57 Nationalism had been actively encouraged under the empire,
but its combination with a romantic variant of socialism was relatively novel. Vlkisch
sentiment was also strong within the middle class and initially found expression as
straightforward xenophobia but increasingly morphed into racial anti-Semitism under
the influence of the Nazi Party.
Hitler cleverly sold himself as the personification of all four orientations. He rallied
the middle class on the basis of his nationalism, opposition to socialists and Jews,
and promises of full employment. Analyses of party rolls and election data indicate
that Hitler appealed not only to the lower middle class (Kleinbrgertum) but other
middle class groups, as well. He won over conservative business and political elites
by conveying the impression that he would serve as their pliant tool once in power.58
Success of National Socialism, at home and abroad, was very much the history of
the fatal underestimation of Hitler by the army, industrialists, bankers, conservative
politicians, and President Hindenburg. Hitler pandered to their shared illusion that
they could box him in and exploit him for their own ends. He did the same in his
foreign policy, where he communicated willingness to negotiate while making threats,
preparing for war, and engaging in faits accomplis. Above all else, he displayed great
flexibility; he made extreme demands, but was willing to pull back when opposed
and to push ahead when his opponents appeared weak or vacillated.59
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Once in power, Hitler and Goebbels propagated the Fhrer myth, which encouraged his idolization among the middle classes.60 It stressed Hitlers ability to
transcend class divisions, revitalize the economy, restore growth and stability, and
restore German rights, territory, and dignity. He was portrayed as personally unattached, selfless, incorruptible, and above party politics. The Hitler cult made some
inroads among workers, although the groups least receptive to his propaganda were
the organized sections of the working class, Catholics, and the educated elite.61 In
1928, the Nazis garnered a mere 2.6 percent of the vote. Once the depression set in,
this figure rose to 18.1. In the March 1933 elections held two months after Hitler
took office, the Nazis still received considerably less than half of the vote but more
votes than any party had in the Weimar era.62 The Nazis received enough working
class support to shock and baffle the Marxists associated with the Institute for Social Research (the Frankfurt School), some of whichHorkheimer, Marcuse, and
Frommturned to Freud to look for non-rational, non-economic explanations for
this baffling behavior.63
Hitlers foreign policy successes greatly increased his support. Fully 95.1 percent
of Germans supported his withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations.64 His
popularity soared because he liberated the Saar and Rhineland, brought Austria into
the Reich and Memel and the Sudetenland as well, and established protectorates over
Bohemia and Moravia, and all without war.65 The twin humiliations of defeat and
Versailles had been largely overcome. As Hitler put it in a well-publicized speech of
April 28, 1939: I have further attempted to tear up page for page that Treaty, which
contained in its 448 articles the most base violations ever accorded to nations and
human beings. I have given back to the Reich the provinces stolen from us in 1919.66
Hitlers appeal extended well beyond those who thought of themselves as Nazis and
included people who were critical of his domestic policies and ideology.67 Despite support for Hitler, there was very little support for war. Most Germans desperately wanted
to believe that peace could be maintained. When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, there was none of the enthusiasm for war that had been so visible in 1914.68
Hitlers rhetorical strategy and the basis of his support indicate the extent to which
the spirit was central to his rise to power and subsequent popularity. Ian Kershaw,
author of the most comprehensive study of Hitlers speeches, concludes that he always enjoyed a particular talent, approaching demagogic genius, for appealing to the
populist national emotions, hopes, and aggression of increasing numbers of ordinary
Germans, in particular by exploiting the deep-rooted resentments which the name
Versailles conjured up. He wisely refrained from talking about his wider imperialist
aims, as they could not be achieved without a second world war.69 Hitlers racism,
which vaunted the superiority of the Aryans over other races, was also intended to
enhance his listeners self-image and self-esteem. Economic improvements and stability, valued in their own right, were also portrayed as a means of restoring German
dignity and self-esteem.
The spirit is easily angered by real or imagined slights and readily responds to
opposition with hostility. This process drives the action in Sophocless Ajax, where
4/18/11 12:36 PM

the armor of the dead Achilles is awarded to Odysseus. Convinced that he deserves
it but that it was denied him by virtue of the hostility of others, Ajax seeks revenge
against Odysseus, the Atridae clan, and the Greek army. Paranoia of this kind is
often associated with heroic actors and is particularly prevalent in societies with low
self-esteem. Such paranoia was evident in the German Empire, where Fritz Stern
notes that visions of politics were blurred by clouds of evil fantasy. 70 Publicists and
anti-Semites charged England and France with plotting Germanys encirclement and
Jews and socialists of boring away from within. These conspiracies also flourished
in the Weimar period, augmented by the new charge of a dolchstoss (stab in the
back) made by Hindenburg to a parliamentary committee in 1919.71 The socialists
and JewsNovember criminalswere made responsible for defeat and the hated
Treaty of Versailles.72 The widespread success of conspiratorial theories under the
empire and in Weimar is further evidence of the degree to which German politics
were driven by the spirit.
Recognition and International Relations

A key feature of the modern world is civil society. For a long time, the concept of
societas civilis referred to the condition of living within a legal order that possessed
sufficient force to guarantee its subjects security and good government.73 Montesquieu was the first to make the connection between the spirit of liberty and personal
independence on the one hand and the emergence of civil society (l tat civile) on
the other. Rather than undermining order, he thought it had the potential to create
a new form of public mores (murs) that could endow social relations with more
consistency.74 Adam Ferguson stressed the importance of civil society as a means of
opposing illegitimate state authority.75 Hegel redefined civil society (die brgerliche
Gesellschaft) to refer to an equality-based system of social relations among associations
of people that was independent of the state and the family, which he thought to have
first emerged in Europe in the seventeenth century. His civil society is characterized
by free labor, a commodity market, and a system of contract law enforcement.76 In our
time, the concept of civil society has been expanded to include a general strengthening of the rule of law and the development of voluntary associations not connected
with commercial relations.77
Civil society encourages citizens to find satisfaction in the commercial and private
sphere and to indulge their appetites as they see fit. It heralds a turning away from
the state, the decline of man as a zoon politikon, and an upgrading of the appetite in
response to the perceived social benefits of individual greed. For all these reasons,
civil society was anathema to many conservative supporters of the ancien rgime and
regarded by radicals as at best a necessary evil. Marx considered civil society another
means by which the bourgeoisie could tighten its hold over society.78 Montesquieu and
Tocqueville sought to adapt the spirit to modern society in the hope that it could act
as an effective check on central authority and inspire politicians and civil servants to
4/18/11 12:36 PM

put aside their private interests in pursuit of projects that benefited the community
as a whole.79 Civil society not only legitimized the appetite as a drive, it facilitated its
partial blending with the spirit to the extent that wealth became not only a marker
of standing but also a means of attaining it.
Civil society provided new domains and opportunities for achieving honor and
standing. Some of these routes led to national, even international fame (that is, sports,
science, the creative and performing arts), while others led to renown in specialized
or geographically restricted communities (for example, law, mathematics, spelunking, community service). This diversity gave rise to multiple hierarchies in which
individuals of varying talents and interests could compete for honor and standing,
making it at least theoretically possible for everyone to achieve self-esteem. A critical development in this regard has been the increasing openness of many of these
arenas to people of all class, religious, and racial backgrounds. In Europe prior to
the French Revolution, only aristocrats were allowed to compete for standing and
honor. Recognition, in the form of admission into this elite, was a significant barrier
to those with talent but the wrong religious affiliations or genealogical antecedents.
Such prejudice has not altogether disappeared in Western societies, but even the
most traditional elite hierarchies (that is, military, diplomatic service, and formerly
aristocratic sports like tennis and golf ) began to open up, offering opportunities for
members of groups that have historically been at the bottom of the social ladder to
rise to the top of these intensely competitive hierarchies. Henry Kissinger, Madeleine
Albright, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and Tiger Woods are cases in point.
Viewed in this light, the international system is something of an atavism that
still reflects the values of warrior societies. In contrast to societies in the developed
world, there is still a single hierarchy of standing, and it is based on military power.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, revolutionary powers (that is, the United States,
France, the Soviet Union, China, and Iran) have challenged the legitimacy of this
hierarchy and claimed standing on ideological grounds. These challenges failed, and
most of the powers in question subsequently sought and achieved standing on traditional military grounds. A more serious challenge is now underway, spearheaded by
a diverse group of countries, many of which, like Canada, Japan, and the members
of the European Union, claim standing on the basis of the multilateral nature of
the foreign policies and how their wealth is used to benefit their citizens and those
of less-developed countries. Their claims for status are based on honor and rest on
the hope that international society has become more like domestic societies in that
multiple hierarchies are possible and thick enough to allow honor to replace standing
as the basis of influence.
The transformation of the international system is by no means preordained, but
it is a distinct possibility. Key to any transformation is discourses that define what
actors consider to be legitimate and illegitimate. Changes in the criteria for standing
encourage shifts in foreign policy behavior, which in turn affect how states define their
interests and ultimately their identities. As conflictual and violent the current world is,
and as remote an ideal a peaceful world appears, there is nevertheless a more realistic
4/18/11 12:36 PM

possibility than ever before of transforming the character of international relations
to make it more closely resemble the more ordered and complex world of domestic
societies. Troyor Iraqmay ultimately become the tomb of heroes and heroism
as understood by Homer and deeply embedded in Western culture ever since. It is
important not to lose sight of this possibility and for international relations theory
to show us how such a world could come about.
Notes
1. Hobbes 1996, 126.
2. Lebow 2008.
3. Weinberg 1970, 358; Rich 1973, 310; Fest 1974, 213218.
4. Kershaw 1987, 15168, reports that Hitlers high point in support came after the fall
of France and before his failure to conquer Britain or force it to sue for peace.
5. Plato 1991, 440c441c.
6. Plato 1989.
7. Aristotle 2004, 1388a29b30.
8. Durkheim 1984, preface, 21922; Finley 1978, 134.
9. Hobbes 1996, 112.
10. Hegel 1979, Bb, Cc, described the authentic romantic as a beautiful soul, pure
in its inwardness and uncorrupted by modernitys divisiveness. Durkheim 2001; Durkheim
1984.
11. For the development of the concept of the relational self, see Shotter 1989, 13351;
Eakin 1999.
12. Aristotle 2004, 1383b151884a21.
13. Ibid., 1384a2228.
14. Yates 2006, 205240.
15. Hobbes 1991, 1.1.
16. Levitt 2006, 5960, report monthly stipends of $5,000 to $5,500 to prisoners of Israel
and $2,000 to $3,000 to widows or families of those who have given their lives.
17. Hassrick 1964, 296309.
18. Hegel 1979, 178196.
19. Taylor 1994, 2574.
20. Honneth 1996; Fraser and Honneth 2003; Honneth 1997, 1634.
21. Cornil 2000, 3755.
22. Aristotle 2004, 387a3133, 1378b1011, 13802429. Konstan 2006, 4176.
23. Aristotle 2004, 1379b1012, on the anger provoked by slights from our inferiors.
24. Lebow 2008, chapter 7, on the German middle class.
25. Mommsen 1996; Bracher, 1970, 168178, 191198; Aycoberry 1981.
26. Plessner 1959; Mosse 1964; Stern 1974.
27. Krieger 1957; Ringer 1969.
28. Kershaw 1983, 12; Dahrendorf 1967, 404.
29. MacMillan 2001, 460463.
30. See The Versailles Treaty.
4/18/11 12:36 PM

31. Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, see 1918 Documents.
32. Mommsen 1996, 89128; Krger 1994; Walzel 2007; Heinemann 1983.
33. Mommsen 1996, 89128; MacMillan 2001, 463474.
34. Riekhoff 1971, 383.
35. Aristotle 2004, 1379b1012, 1387a3133.
36. Mommsen 2006, 53546; Schwabe 2006, 3768.
37. Mommsen 1996, 91.
38. Schwabe 2006; Lentin 2006, 221243; Stevenson 2006, 87110.
39. Broszat 1987, 47.
40. Mommsen 1996, 105106.
41. Eyck 1967, I, 150154.
42. Rohl 1973, 2136; Geiss 1966, 7591, on the foreign office in the 1960s; Herwig
1987, 544.
43. Quoted in Herwig 1987, 000.
44. Broszat 1987, 45.
45. Krieger 1957; Hamerow 1966, viii; Puhle 1972.
46. Eyck 1967.
47. Mommsen 1996.
48. Turner 1989.
49. Mommsen 1996, 456, 494495, 535537.
50. Eyck 1967, I, 20352; Broszat 1987, 94115.
51. Eyck 1967, I, 350488; Dorpalen 1964, 301446; Broszat 1987, 115149; Mommsen
1996, 357432.
52. Dorpalen 1964, 302303, 316317, 472; Mommsen 1996, 357432; Broszat 1987,
8081.
53. Mommsen 1996, 456, 494495, 535537.
54. Bracher 1970, 10.
55. Ibid. 21.
56. Broszat 1987, 1117, on the political consequences of the Great Depression.
57. Mosse 1975, chapters 14; Nipperdey 1968, 529585; Kershaw 1987, 14.
58. Schoenbaum 1966, 119158; Kershaw 1983, 113114; Childers 1983, 151.
59. Bracher 1970, 48, 287303; Eyck 1967, 449487; Mommsen 1996, 433489; Bracher
1970, 169214; Bullock 1962, 369370; Weinberg 1970, I, 358, 363.
60. Kershaw 1987; Schoenbaum 1966; Mommsen 1996, 47.
61. Kershaw 1987, 34, 53; Kershaw, 1983, 71110; Allen 1984, 6990; Broszat 1987,
1516; Mommsen 1996, 318356; Childers 1983, 151.
62. Stver 1996, 2; Mommsen 1996, 314317.
63. Jay 1973, chapters 3 and 4.
64. Kershaw 1987, 120139.
65. Weinberg 1970, I, 159179, 239263, on Hitlers successes.
66. Quoted in Kershaw 1987, 256.
67. Kershaw 1987, 5; Schoenbaum 1966, 77118, on Hitler and labor.
68. Kershaw 1987, 139147; Frei Peoples Community and War.
69. Kershaw 1987, 122.
70. Stern 1992, xxxviii.
71. Dorpalen 1964, 5152.
4/18/11 12:36 PM

72. Krumeich 2003, 585599; Seiler 1966, 120.
73. It is used in this sense by Vattel 2001 and Immanuel Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, and Perpetual Peace, both in Kant, 1991, 000-000,
000-000.
74. Montesquieu 1777, I.3.6, 19.27.
75. Ferguson 1773, 729.
76. Hegel 1991, 157, 188.
77. Seligman 1995.
78. Marx and Engels 1972, 146174.
79. Tocqueville 2002, I.2.10, 383; II.4.7.
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Walzel, Frank. 2007. Die Anfnge deutscher Auenpolitik in der Weimarer RepublikUlrich
Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau und der Streit um die deutsche Kriegsschuld in Versailles.
Berne: Lang.
Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. 1977. Deutsche Geschichte: Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 18711918.: Bd 9.
Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Weinberg, Gerhard L. 1970. The Foreign Policy of Hitlers Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in
Europe 19331936. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Welch, David. 1983. Propaganda and the German Cinema 19331945. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Winkler, Heinrich August. 2000. Der lange Weg nach Westen, Volume 2. Munich: C. H. Beck.
. 2002. The Long Shadow of the Reich: Weighing Up German History: the 2001 Annual
Lecture. London: German Historical Institute.
Yates, Robin. 2006. Song Empire: The Worlds First Superpower? In Unmaking the West:
Counterfactual and Contingency, edited by Philip Tetlock, Richard Ned Lebow, and Noel
Geoffrey Parker, 205240. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
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Chapter 6
World War I from the Perspective

of Power Cycle Theory
Recognition, Adjustment Delusions,
and the Trauma of Expectations Foregone
Charles F. Doran
There is a time at which the tides of history change. There is a time at which
the nation-state suddenly becomes cognizant that a discontinuity with the
past has occurred, that its long anticipated place among countries has been
irrevocably altered, that its prior assumptions about role, status, and security
have been proven wrong. This is the existential interval in which a government is vulnerable to entanglement in the most major wars. This existential
interval is the critical point on the state power cycle.1
History records those existential moments when governments suddenly discover that
their long-standing expectations about future role, status, and security are no longer
valid. With the familiar foreign policy anchors in question, massive uncertainty
and an increasing sense of threat challenge policy-making. In tracing the historical
trajectory of a states relative power in the system of leading states, the power cycle
captures those critical moments when the structural tides of history suddenly pull the
state on to a new, uncertain course. The power cycle maps, for each moment in time,
the states clearly defined past and the likely trajectory of its yet-to-be-determined
109
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110 Charles F. Doran

futurerevealing at each step how contemporaneous decision-makers perceive its
likely future security and foreign policy standing. The projected trend embedded
at each point in the cycle is the states expectation regarding its future power, role,
and security. Imagine the sudden shock when the long prior trend of relative power
change suddenly undergoes a complete shift, abruptly proving those long-reinforced
projections wrong. Everything hinges on those projections, as the quoted paragraph
from my book Systems in Crisis reveals regarding the dilemma faced by Germany in
the years prior to World War I.2
Germanys crisis was a systemic crisis, for the relative power and role so highly
prized and contested are necessarily systemic. The system provides the norm, which
determines whether a state rises or declines, and decides whether a state will be attributed role and status. In arguing the details of power cycle theory, the book explains how conflicting messages and disturbing surprises of relative versus absolute
power growth made Germanys sudden turn into decline all the more traumatic and
threatening. It demonstrates the paradigm shift in understanding obtained in moving
beyond a balance of power perspective to a dynamic structural perspective. Four
chapters delve into the historical record to show what statesmen saw and how they
reacted to the trauma of critical change between 1905 and 1914; the devastating
illusions that accompanied changes in European power cycles after 1885; and the
incongruities that followed European efforts to balance a state so powerful and
yet so restless. The German experience provides unambiguous evidence that, amidst
massive structural change, the balance of power operates against the need to adjust
diplomatic role through political recognition.
From the power cycle perspective, role is coequal with power in matters of statecraft; it is the coordinate concept that amends realism.3 An encompassing notion,
foreign policy role indexes the states foreign policy behavior over time, and it is
deeply normative. More than status or place, role involves informally legitimized
responsibilities and perquisites associated with the states diplomatic place in the
system. It involves the practical reality of international political discourse, which
governments barter, jealously guard, and sometimes contest. It reflects whether a
state is a comparative leader or a follower, an aid-giver or a recipient; whether it
joins coalitions or remains comparatively isolated; whether it is a provider or a net
beneficiary of security; whether it is sought after for counsel or is disregarded. While
role is sensitive to incremental changes in power, it is distinct from power and in fact
acts as a guide to the exercise of state power. A role is legitimized when other actors
recognize the role and declare it politically acceptable. Recognition acknowledges
that these role differences exist and that they count in world politics.
In explaining the origins of World War I, quite in contrast to both traditional and
recent literature (focusing in turn on war guilt and German strategy),4 power cycle
theory incorporates the concept of recognition as essential to the establishment and
maintenance of foreign policy role. This chapter first exposes the adjustment delusions that prevented recognition of Germany and helped precipitate WWI. It then
explores some puzzles associated with interpretation of the war and how recognition
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World War I from the Perspective of Power Cycle Theory 111

assists in unraveling them. Finally, it explains the idea of dynamic international political equilibrium developed within power cycle theory, showing how recognition
helps overcome some of the shortcomings of balance-of-power logic that led directly
to the war outcome. Concluding with a conjecture, the chapter speculates about a
counterfactual, namely, that the war was not inevitable. The war might have been
averted if other actions had been taken and, in particular, if political recognition had
been more aptly employed in the long prior interval of German rise.
This chapter thus speaks directly to the links between role, status, identity, and
symbolism in international relations.5 Most states are not as convulsed in an identity
crisis as was Germany for the century after 1850. But for states that experience an
ongoing identity crisis, this preoccupation can drive foreign policy, overwhelming
more rational foundations of foreign policy conduct and state interests and thus seriously qualifying the realist foreign policy paradigm and its application. Fed by a diet
of social Darwinism,6 Machtpolitik captured the European imagination at the turn
of the century and encouraged expression of identity through power and conquest.
What was lacking in the German sense of its identity was an ability to coordinate
diplomacy. Germanys institutional development was hollow, and its late bow to
democracy incomplete and ineffective. Its identity became increasingly composed of
blut und eisen with no sensitivity to the prudent management of power relationships.
The kaisers exaggerated rhetoric undoubtedly further fueled the flames of rivalry.
According to power cycle theory, the dynamic of foreign policy role captures the
tragic interplay of realism and constructivism in the German sense of political identity.
As a created state, mostly by Prussian power, Germany struggled to find its identity
in the context of increased role participation, but the failure of recognition channeled
its identity in a pernicious direction. Failing to be accorded a legitimate foreign policy
role corresponding to its enhanced capabilities, Germany would substitute fantasy
for international political reality, a mythic past and a Darwinian power impetus for
a more moderate and lasting foreign policy role.
Recognition was what Germany sought on the part of other governments and what
these governments failed to give. As a result of long being denied appropriate recognition, Germanys weak sense of identity did not permit a reciprocal recognition of the
legitimate concerns and claims of others. The two faces of recognitionthe need to
find acceptance of ones own claims in the policy of others and willingness to abide
the diplomatic claims of others in ones own foreign policythus never matured or
became fixed in the German sense of statecraft. This incongruity in its identity was
a tragic legacy of the historical dynamic leading to World War I.
I. Recognition in Power Cycle Theory: Concept and Application

How does recognition become an issue in the factors accounting for the origin of
WWI? The word recognition, from the Latin recognitio, enjoys a long tradition
of usage both in domestic and international law as legal permission to be heard. In
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domestic politics, it was the formal acknowledgement of a claim, for example, of
the sovereign to be received by the people at a coronation. In the context of general
international relations, recognition contains more the meaning of acceptance or acknowledgment of having something worth hearingof being entitled to consideration
or to attention.7 In the context of the late nineteenth century, recognition conveys
the urgent desire of Germany to be taken seriously by the international community,
to be acknowledged by the other leading states as a juridical equal, and in particular,
to gain acceptance of the notion that the German foreign policy role should enjoy
incremental increase parallel to its rising power.
Wilhelmian Germany, Role Deprivation, and the Shock

of Structural Trend Shifts
Germany in the nineteenth century rose faster and further on its cycle of relative power
than any other state because of its ever strengthening technological and industrial base.
Discovery of the Bessemer process and open-hearth steel furnaces enabled Germany
to exploit its huge deposits of high-phosphoric ore, transforming the leading industry
and ultimately the entire economic, and hence geopolitical, map of Europe. Germanys
superb science and engineering bolstered its industrial development more broadly. In
relative terms, its meteoric rise meant an equivalent decline distributed among other
European states. That a corresponding increase in the German foreign policy role would
lag behind its surging economic and military power was not unusual for a rising state.
For the German foreign policy role to increase, other states had to move over to accommodate a role for the newcomer. Traditionally, governments do this with reluctance.
But the lag of German role was unusual because particular structural changes
affecting its competitors (whose own absolute growth rates increased in the 1880s)
reinforced their belief, supported by balance-of-power thinking, that such role adjustments to German rise were unnecessary. Thus ever-widening power-role gaps opened
up for Germany and its competitors not just because of Germanys own surging growth
but because of critical changes on the relative power trajectories of older members of
the system with which Germany competed for role recognition.
To be sure, the power of France, Britain, and Austria-Hungary relative to the
central system (including Russia, Japan, and eventually the United States) was in
decline. But, as I will explain, their own improvement in rate of absolute growth
led each to experience the hopes and illusions that their decline was abating. This
unusual structural situation exacerbated the lag in Germanys role attainment and
fed Germanys hunger for political recognition, for acknowledgment of its economic
and cultural achievements, for a diplomatic place in the sun to recognize its status
as a member of the inner circle of major powers.8 In reaction to this intransigent
role-deprivation, as German chancellor Bethmann Hollweg wrote in his Memoiren:
A nation as large and capable as the German one cannot be restricted from free and
peaceful development.9
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Thus not only did Germany have to contemplate the normal reluctance of states
to make room for a newcomer. The three states in severe relative decline, historically among Germanys greatest rivals, refused to adjust any of their foreign policy
role or diplomatic perquisites.10 What most embittered Germanys leaders was that
Germany was expected to take a second-seat not only in the colonies (where Britain,
France, Belgium, and other countries had attained the benefits as first-comers) but
also diplomatically regarding governance of the central system.11
For those who hold the hegemonic (unipolar) view that a single dominant state
establishes rules of the system and maintains order through military preponderance,
this situation of power-role disparity is particularly problematic, not only because
those hegemonic theories have no intrinsic conception of foreign policy role, but
also because they do not contemplate the possibility of status competition and
status dissonance within such a hegemonic setting.12 The power cycle interpretation differs profoundly: power-role gaps that include status dissonance surface at
each of the critical points and implicate all of the states in the system. No amount
of top-heavy distribution of capabilities can alter the tension caused by these gaps,
or by the associated status dissonance, because every power cycle is impacted. The
German power-role gap was an externally imposed, made-in-Europe gap in a highly
nationalistic era. Only from the power cycle perspective of critical structural change
(the shifting tides of history) and power-role equilibrium can one fully understand
how important recognition is to statecraftand how its denial created a severely
disequilibrated system in crisis that ended in world war.13
Figure 1: Systemic Bounds on Relative Growth
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Figure 2: Conflicting Messages
Figure 3: Expectations Foregone: Resolving WWI Puzzles of History
Figure 4: Power-Role Lag
114
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Figure 5: Dynamics of Changing Systems Structure 15001993
Legend: Each curve represents the states evolving Percent Share of Power in the Central System,
15001993. (This representation stresses the historical trends in changing relative power and is not
to be taken as a precise metric of the actual levels attained. The decline of the Venetian Empire in the
16th century is no depicted.)
Source: Conceptualized by Doran (1965; updated 1981, 1989, 1993), based on estimations for the
period 1500 to 1815, and data for the years 18151993.
The Trauma of Shifting Tides, the High Stakes of Role Deprivation

Power cycle theory transforms understanding of the structural changes that fractured
statecraft prior to World War I, undermining the thesis that Germany would have
been master of Europe if it had not gone to war. The accompanying figures represent schematically the dynamics that precipitated tragedy. In the hour of its greatest
achievement in terms of absolute power growth, Germany was driven on to unexpected
paths by the bounds of the system (limited systemic shares, depicted in Figure 1).
Power cycle theory exposes the conflicting messages (Figure 2) and disturbing surprises
(Figure 3) in the evolution of the European power cycles between 1885 and 1914,
which made adjustment to structural change so difficultfirst during the period of
Germanys uninterrupted rise in power and expectations for future role recognition
and subsequently during the critical interval of 1914 when, suddenly pulled on to
the path of relative decline, Germany and all of Europe experienced the trauma of
expectations foregone of a powerful state that remained severely role-deprived and
recognition-denied (Figure 4).
Power cycle theory explains the dynamic of state rise and decline (changing systems
structure) and how that dynamic affects government decisions about foreign policy
conduct. The individual power cycles evolve as part of a single dynamic of state
and system, and of power and role, which maps the structural trends of history as
schematically represented in Figure 5. The principles of the power cycle (Figure 1)
explain how differential absolute growth sets the cycles in motion, creating a particular
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nonlinear pattern of change (critical points where the prior trend is inverted) on each
states relative power trajectory.
This single dynamic encodes the perspective and concerns of statecraft in the
trends, and shifting trends, of the component state cycles. When decision-makers
contemplate future change on a state power cycle, they form expectations regarding
the states future security and foreign policy role. But competition for power share
creates powerful undercurrents that contour structural change via critical shifts in
the trend on state power cycles. Each critical point on a power cycle creates a crisis
of foreign policy expectations:
1.
birth throes of a major power (the states rise on its cycle begins)
2.
trauma of constrained ascendancy (first inflection point, marking the shift from
ever-increasing to ever-decreasing rise)
3.
trauma of expectations foregone (upper turning point, where the rising state is
pulled into decline)
4.
hopes and illusions of the second wind (second inflection point, where accelerating
decline begins to decelerate)
5.
throes of demise as a major power (low-point or exit from the system)
Each critical point corresponds in the states experience to a time when the tides
of history have shifted the trend of structural change in the international system.14
Governments push and shove in these intervals of enormous uncertainty, where
the rules of the game are in flux and the stakes so high, making wars of large magnitude, high intensity, and great duration much more likely than in normal periods of
statecraft. Systems transformation results when several leading states experience such
high-stakes change on their power cycles in a rather short interval (as in 1885 to 1914).
Failure to adjust to structural change leads to ever-widening power-role gaps (role
surplus for some, role deficit for others), increasing the sense of threat. As critical
changes cumulate, one final critical point (such as Germanys sudden turn into relative decline) makes the ever-growing strains between power and role internal to each
state (such as Germanys huge role deficit and Austria-Hungarys overextension in the
Balkans) ricochet throughout the system as states are forced to confront the power-role
gaps amidst the trauma and uncertainty of the latest structural shift. During the five
systems transformations since Westphalia, each of the major players saw its foreign
policy and security outlook severely altered and at risk, resulting in massive warfare.15
This dilemma of peaceful change is exacerbated by the natural inertia of role
change. As a states relative power increases, other governments refuse to adjust, or
the state postpones role gratification believing it can enhance its role more easily and
on better terms with even higher power. As relative power declines, allies demand
security and elites want to retain role and prestige, causing overextension for states
that refuse to adapt. Such failure of role to adjust to power change creates a structural
disequilibrium that goes to the heart of the capacity to act in foreign policy. Adjustment
must ultimately occur. Yet this inertia in adjustment can be perversely encouraged
by the conflicting messages, shocks, and surprises of critical changes on the state
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power cycles. This invidious relationship between critical trend shifts and powerrole disequilibrium both encourages the use of balance-of-power logic and makes
inevitable its tragic failure. It thus provides the foundation within power cycle theory
for a dynamic equilibrium that must precede and complement the balancing process.
In contrast to other structural interpretations (hegemonic stability,16 long cycle,17
and power transition18 theories), power cycle theory argues that war is not necessary
for transformation from one international system to another. Causation goes from
structural transformation, to failure of systemic adjustment, to the war that ensued;
the shifting tides that restructured the system created the new power relations that will
prevail in the new system. The implication is clear: massive warfare can be avoided
by a judicious adjustment of foreign policy roles and diplomatic recognition during
the period of consistent rise (and decline) on the state power cyclesminimizing
power-role disequilibriumbefore the onset of critical change alters prior expectations and creates a crisis of failed adjustment.
Adjustment Delusions Prior to WWI

Why did the critical structural change on each declining states power cycle lead them
to believe they need not accommodate German rise with enhanced role, that they
need only apply the balance of power to offset Germanys growing power? And why
was that strategy flawed and doomed to failure? Power cycle theory argues that the
organic rise and decline of states so twists and distorts the chessboard of balanceof-power logic that, in an interval of extreme structural change, the game can no
longer be played. Indeed, its use attempts to offset declining power and to halt rising
powerresisting rather than adapting to the long-term structural changes. Its use
leads to a severely disequilibriated system that ultimately erupts to eliminate the
ever-growing structural strains between power and role.
The balance of power is inadequate as a solution to this dilemma of peaceful
change because it considers only power, ignoring completely the high-stakes issues
of role and recognition. For a system to endure, it must establish a distribution of
roles and responsibilities (hence, recognition and status) that matches the capacity of
states to carry out these functions. To ensure stability amidst structural change, power
cycle theory proposes a dynamic equilibrium that matches strategies of opposition
and balance or alternatively, of adaptation and role recognition, to the trajectories
of power change of potentially expansionist states (see part III of this chapter). The
theory conjectures that World War I could have been prevented.
For recognition to be helpful in international relations, it must be based on a conception of statecraft that sees reality for what it is, especially in abnormal intervals of
history where structural change is abrupt and massive. But in the decades preceding
WWI, the notion of recognition was distorted by the tragic application of the balance
of power to offset the long-term rise of German power in lieu of role adjustment.
France, Austria-Hungary, and Britain held foreign policy roles far in excess of their
declining relative power; but each also passed through a second inflection point on
its power cycles marking a suddenly improved (lessened) rate of decline in relative
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power. The second inflection point signifies the hopes and illusions of the second
wind analogous to a long-distance runner far behind in a race who suddenly experiences a surge and the illusion of possible victory.
For a state with a role surplus, the hopes and illusions of the second wind creates
a particularly egregious problem for statecraft, for it pulls the state into opposing
directions. While its continuing relative decline indicates its weakened capability
to carry out its existing foreign policy roles (and its vulnerability to challenge by
stronger rivals), its sudden experience of improved circumstances (lessened rate of
decline) makes it confident that it need not make concessions to other states in the
system and, indeed, can be even more assertive in foreign policy matters. It discards
any motivation to mitigate its role surplusto allow any transfer of status, perquisites of diplomacy, or offers of engagement to its competitor for role attainment and
recognition. The illusion from its improved circumstances is that it can restore its
weakened capability by a new assertiveness, by digging in its heels more resolutely.
The state thus acts ever more toughly in communication and negotiation in hopes
that its relative decline will reverse.
Illusions of the second wind caused France and Britain to believe they did not
need to engage Germany but could continue to try to isolate and encircle it; Russia
was an enthusiastic accomplice. The second-wind gave Austria-Hungary the illusion
of being able to manage its internal empire and cope with the tumult of the Balkans
alone, when in fact Austria-Hungary was on the edge of collapse. This hubris was
especially trying with respect to Serbia. Germany bought into the Austro-Hungarian
illusion wholeheartedly, while Russia sought to puncture it.
For recognition to be helpful in world affairs, it must be founded on realism and a
correct understanding of the dynamic of structural change. But the structural change
that France, Austria-Hungary, and Britain recognized after the demise of Bismarck
was founded on the illusion of the second-wind. When these illusions combined with
those Germany harboredthat it would continue to rise and that it could correct
its role and status gap by the use of forcethe prelude to WWI is not surprising.
Lacking was sound reasoning about how statecraft ought to respond to structural
change. Each of the principal actors contributed to this fantasy.
II. Recognition, Power Cycle Theory, and Puzzles of WWI

The problem of recognition, viewed from the power cycle perspective, helps resolve
several puzzles regarding World War I.
The Timing of World War

If Germanys power-role gap and its hunger for political recognition help explain
why WWI occurred, the dynamics of the power cycle incorporating the anxiety for
political recognition explains the timing of WWI, or why the war occurred when it
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did. Germany had grown into an extraordinarily prosperous and powerful nation in
a few decades, but by 1914, its leaders realized that something had gone wrong with
the German effort to excel, to achieve ever-greater place in the system.
The problem was not its absolute power, which increased in larger and larger increments. So large were these increments that some historians believed Germany was
capable of dominating the entire European system politically. Yet, as contemporaneous
German government officials were shocked to discover, German relative power was
no longer increasing. The more they tried to increase their place in the system, the
more they felt the constraints on relative growth. Chief of Staff von Moltke recognized
this military and political dilemma. Germany was pressing against the bounds of
the system and could not increase its relative power further.
Sometime between 1905 and 1912, German power peaked, reaching a plateau it
could not transcend despite its surging absolute growth. Awareness of this reality set
off alarm bells in Berlin. Caught between ever-rising absolute power and stagnating
relative power, the German foreign policy elite was traumatized. From the moment
Germany confronted passage through the upper turning point on its power cycle,
it became distraught about its foreign policy future. It contemplated the trauma of
expectations forgone. Then, quite abruptly in 1914, Germany found itself being pulled
onto a declining trajectory. The tides of history had shifted against it, completely
destroying Germanys expectations regarding future security and a larger foreign
policy role. The timing of WWI was triggered by Germanys passage through the
upper turning point on its power cycle.
Did Germany Know Its Power Had Peaked?

How much did contemporaneous Germans recognize about their situation and
their fate? Enough historical evidence has now accumulated, at a sufficient level of
seniority in government, that German leaders had little doubt about its imminent
relative decline even though its absolute power continued to skyrocket. According
to Riezler, an advisor to Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, the Chancellor said on July
20, 1914: The Russian power is rapidly growing ... The future belongs to Russia
which grows continually and imposes an ever worse nightmare upon us.19 These and
other quotations from foreign office and the general staff reinforce the same message
of German fear in security terms of its recently discovered declining relative power
base. In 1912, the German chancellor reports from his Russian journey to a friend:
My journey from Russia, albeit too brief, was full of beautiful and great impressions.
This journey has also rectified many of my misconceptions about Russia reported by
our superficial journalism. The richness of natural resources and brute human strength
are factors which we do not fear but which should not be overlooked.20
Germany confronted the reality that Russias latent power base was much greater
than Germanys. In the critical interval at the German peak, the massive political
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uncertainty was equaled only by fears about future realities. German government
officials could not think clearly about their future. Uncertain about their status
among nations, they doubted that other governments would treat them fairly. Denied
recognition of their place in the past, they had every reason to believe they would
face malice and aggression when in decline. Lack of recognition on the upside of the
power curve convinced the Germans that the downside would be even less welcoming, indeed more forbidding.
Geltung, Anerkennung, Gleichberechtigungand Gefahr

Looking at the German objectives in 1914, American historian Jonathan Steinberg was
puzzled as to what the Germans wanted. They wanted Geltung, Anerkennung, and
Gleichberechtigung, but Europe was not about to recognize any of these emotionally
charged characterizations. But Germans also feared a surprise British naval attack, a
fear Steinberg dubbed the Copenhagen Complex.21 Unable to explain the European
reaction to its rising power, Germany thought that it was encircled militarily and
that the British fleet would attack at its most vulnerable point in the Baltic Sea. The
British navy did have exactly such a plan, but only as a defensive contingency plan.
In their obsession with security, the Germans could not distinguish a contingency
plan from an offensive military doctrine.
Loosely translated from the German, the greatly desired objectivesGeltung,
Anerkennung, Gleichberechtigungare prestige, recognition, equality of rights.
The word Gefahr means dangerthe danger Germans felt regarding their security
in the face of both encirclement and Russias rise, and the danger they felt regarding
these objectivesthe growing fear that their prestige, recognition, and equality as a
major power would never be attained.
Germany sought objectives in international politics that had been unleashed
inside the German Principalities by the French Revolution, but that took on a larger
and more earnest connotation when applied to the international system by an ever
more powerful Germany. Germany felt that it was being denied these objectives even
though they had been earned by its growth in relative power, and even though the
over-extended declining powers were no longer capable of maintaining the roles of
the past. Other governments did not necessarily perceive this power-role gap, much
less acknowledge that it was problematic.
The notion of Gefahr has also puzzled historians. As Rudolf Stadelmann argued
in 1948, What a strange and incomprehensible self-delusion lay in this word Gefahr!22 Of what or of whom was Germany fearful? Why did it believe its security
and foreign policy role were endangered if it was the most powerful state in Europe?
What would it take to erase this sense of danger that so permeated the German
consciousness? When one contemplates the conflicting messages of Germanys huge
level of absolute power and undiminished economic dynamism on the one hand, and
its counterintuitive peak in relative power growth on the other, the German Gefahr
is seen to be neither incomprehensible nor self-delusional.
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Was WWI a Preventive War?

Machtpolitik is a brutal application of force to politics that all the major powers
practiced at the end of the nineteenth century. Each state threatened to use force
against the others to forestall aggression against itself. Given the historical context of
Machpolitik, might Germany have instigated WWI as a preventive war to forestall
its decline and Russias rise?
Some contemporary scholars find this explanation appealing.23 But how plausible
is the argument? From one perspective, each government, once convinced that war
was inevitable, naturally sought to prevent its opponents from winning and becoming dominant. From that perspective, each government proceeded as though it was
waging a preventive war, a war to prevent its own decline as well as preserve its
security. There is also abundant evidence that Germany feared Russia in just these
terms and worried that eventually Russia would come to dominate Germany politically, economically, and militarily. Thus, when Germany finally decided that war
was inevitable, it certainly sought to defeat Russia and prevent its own capitulation.
But there are many problems with the preventive war notion applied to any of
the belligerents in 1914. From the days of the elder von Moltke, Germany worried that
the next war could not be ended easily, would not be as short as in mid-nineteenth
century, would involve the cult of the offensive, and thus would require Germany
to strike first to prevail against superior numbers. Such a cult of the offensive
appears more a best means of defense against aggression than aggressive intent to
dominate. If the war were prompted by cold calculation intending to defeat Russia
before Russia could dominate Germany, how could Germany expect France not to
honor its alliance with Russia, especially if Germany came close to defeating Russia? If France entered the war, Germanys worst fears would be realizedfighting a
two-front war. How could it carry out a preventive war against Russia if it had to
protect its flank against France? And if France were in danger of defeat, how likely
was Germany to avoid a naval blockade by Britain or even active military engagement
on land? Once Germany decided that war was inevitable, it fudged the diplomatic
transmission to Russia regarding Serbia to try to place the blame for starting the
war on Russia. But it did not do so for the preventive war motivation conceived
in recent scholarship.
Where is evidence that Germany thought it could so defeat Russia as to end
permanently the prospect of political domination by Russia? The most its military
leaders could promise in their wildest optimism was a decade or so to regroup. Given
the kind of war the German military leadership thought it faced, its costs and duration, would a rational actor believe that a preventive war against such an adversary as
Russia was an acceptable bargain? Only the non-rational response of a government
caught in a crisis interval, already certain of its own inevitable relative decline and
desperate to escape what it thought was encirclement and the supposedly aggressive
intent of its opponents, would have led it to take such risks by embarking on a war
with so little true prospects.
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A problem with the preventive war hypothesis is that in big wars against big opponents, the costs so far outweigh the possible benefits that the risks are unacceptable
to a decision-maker with enough information to act rationally in an environment
adequately subject to control. Only miscalculation, aborted strategies, confused signals
from opponents, and desperationall made within the context of huge uncertainty
and conflicting messages created by the abrupt shift in future expectations engendered
by Germanys turn into relative declinecan explain how each of the belligerents
slipped toward war in the weeks prior to the Russian mobilization. The inflexible
military contingency plans of the belligerents did not predestine war, but once war
occurred, they surely made war more intense.
Did Germany Plan a War in 1914 to Dominate All of Europe?

Most of the war aims were formulated after the war had begun to justify to the German public the sacrifices being made on the battlefield. So a problem of causation
exists when war aims are used to explain how the war began.24 Another problem is
that those in the government who had doubts were silenced. Bethmann Hollweg
resisted announcing war aims publicly, and after the war, militarists claimed that the
military was stabbed in the back during the war by subversives who had doubts
about the war and did not have Germanys interests at heart. Moreover, each of the
allies had war aims that, in terms of territorial transfer, looked remarkably similar in
form and content to the German war aims. That these allied war aims were agreed
to by secret treaty before the war only reinforced the German suspicions that France,
Russia, Britain, and Italy were colluding at its expense.25
A particular danger of historiography regarding WWI and WWII is transposing Hitlers motives and strategy on to Wilhelmian Germany, oversimplifying and
distorting history. That Hitler wanted to dominate all of Europe militarily (albeit
step-by-step) does not mean that Bethman Hollweg, the kaiser, and von Moltke
had these objectives in mind as they engaged Russia. Even if, in their musings, they
occasionally pondered implications of such an outcome, they were far more realistic
than their Nazi successors about the negative prospects. In an age when the notion
of hegemony is loosely appropriated by scholars and practitioners, such an interpretation is perhaps unsurprising. But as the German historian Ludwig Dehio observed,
reflecting on his informed experience of WWI, we ourselves had no desire, no plan,
to try to dominate Europe militarily.26
The best antidote to transferring Nazi ideology into Wilhelmian minds is to consider the strategic context of WWI. If German leaders planned to try to dominate
all of Europe, why were they so filled with angst over the prospect that the Russians
would overwhelm them by 1917? Who was to be dominating whom? It is a very long
step from arguing that Russia was capable of subjecting Germany to domination to
the contrary view that Germany would have the capacity and purpose to dominate
not just Russia militarily but all of Europe. If Germanys plan was to become the
master of Europe in 1914, surely the weakest member of the central system, Russia,
4/18/11 12:36 PM

should not have been much of a challenge militarily, since mastery would also
involve defeating the more powerful France and Britain.
The reality is that the German government found itself in a critical interval of
history, a crisis in which it did not know what to believe, changed its strategic mind
repeatedly, and allowed its contingency plans to do much of its thinking (such as the
ill-fated Schlieffen Plan to avoid a two-front war by quickly defeating France before
Russia could mobilize).27 It helplessly allowed history to unfold in its alliance with
Austria, without adequate forethought or control. Its failure to decide whether it
would face a two-front war was a brazen example of strategic contradiction. Another
was Germanys alternating strategic conception of how it would deploy its armies,
either against Russia, or France, or both. Its failure to decide whether Britain would
enter the war, and if so, where and when, amounted to more than tactical indecision,
given the stakes for Germany. It did not decide because it could not.
In this abnormal interval of critical structural change in which Germany was
torn between the conflicting perceptions of surging absolute growth but declining
relative power, its thirst for recognition went un-slaked, political uncertainty was
gargantuan, and nothing seemed to make any sense. In such a critical interval, the
conditions that had long guided rational foreign policy strategy were no longer valid;
and with the criteria for rational choice no longer present, strategy is likely to be
flaweda condition I call non-rationality.28 Charles Maier explains how decisionmakers prior to the wars outbreak believed that each step was a rational choice as
the sequence of events unfolded:
From one point of view the war was irrational, risking national unity, dynasties, and
even bourgeois society. Many of the European statesmen ... claimed to understand
that such long-term stakes were involved ... they did not think they were in a position
to act upon these long-term forebodings. Rather, they say themselves confronted with
decisions about the next step.29
Joseph Nye concludes: Although each step may be rational in a procedural sense
of relating means to ends, the substantive outcome may be so distorted that one
should refer to it as irrational.30 In other words, the struggle to act rationally
was overwhelmed by the sudden and ineluctable inversion of prior expectations
regarding high stakes in the midst of enormous uncertainty. In 1914, any clearly
thought-out plan for military domination of Europe was very far from the German
strategic mind.
III. Recognition, Dynamic Equilibrium, and Stability

To show how recognition fits into the framework for stability, I first explain how its
absence from the practice of the balance of power in the context of a rapidly changing
system led to a monumental failure of the balance mechanism. I then develop the
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concept of dynamic international political equilibrium and demonstrate what part
recognition must play in the operation of that equilibrium.
Balance of Power Confronts State Rise and Decline

Maintenance of world order in the nineteenth century depended on proper use of
the balance of power by all of the states. Assertions that Britain alone practiced
the balance or had superior intuition in effectively implementing it are mistaken.
Castlereagh, the British foreign secretary at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, was no
greater practitioner of the art of balance than was Metternich, the German-born
architect of Austrian foreign policy, a decade later. Because of its island status, navy,
colonies, and abhorrence of a land war on the Continent, Britain practiced a slightly
different tactical version of the balance of power than did the Continentals, but the
overall strategic vision was exactly the same.
Britain threw its weight against any dominant coalition that formed on the
Continent, thus bolstering the weaker coalition so as to maintain the balance and
prevent aggression by any member of the dominant coalition.31 Over time this tactical approach to the balance of power came to be known as off-shore balancing,
and Britain became known as the holder of the balance.32 The only difference in
tactical implementation of the balance of power for the Continentals was that they
were usually already a member of either a dominant or an inferior coalition. They
tended to leave one coalition or to join another as they saw their interests impacted.
They too were concerned that the balance should remain in balance, thus preserving
first their own security and secondarily the peace, but sometimes their foreign policy
interests got in the way of the larger balance-of-power vision. Moreover, Continental
states were often contiguous, complicating the task of shifting the balance without
upsetting a security-conscious neighbor.
But after the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, Bismarck maintained the balance
for twenty years by applying a peculiarly complex balance-of-power arrangement.
Bismarck recognized that he could successfully maintain the balance if he could tie
up any two of the five members of the system in an alliance. This tactical version of
maintaining balance stood the notion on its head: instead of balancing the dominant
coalition, Germany under Bismarck was part of the dominant coalition. And yet
the balance balanced because Bismarck had a vision of stability for Europe that
would allow Germany to mature and prosper. In Bismarcks view, Germanys days of
territorial expansion were over; the natural limits had been reached. By its allying
with any two actors in the central system, no other actor or pair of actors was likely
to challenge the status quo militarily. The logic was coherent. But neither traditional
nor Bismarckian balance could deal with the structural changes straining the system.
Indeed, balancing to maintain the status quo enabled the actors to postpone giving
attention to the growing imbalance between power and role throughout the system.
While the balance of power is crucial to the understanding of world politics and
probably has helped preserve the territorial security of many states since the origin
of the modern state system, it was designed for normal intervals of statecraft when
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structural change is minimal. But for Europe after 1885, structural change was
rampant. Several states passed through critical points on their power cycles where
everything changed in structural terms for state and system. Uncertainty is at a
maximum when the tides of history suddenly shift. The flat chessboard of statecraft
is twisted and torn. Conventional diplomatic strategy fails. In these transformed
intervals of statecraft, the balance of power sends off the wrong signals, becoming
part of the problem rather than the solution.
Recognition, the Balance of Power, and WWI

WWI might have been averted, but only if the shortcomings of the balance of power
during a period of systems transformation could be avoided. To do so required understanding the dynamics of the power cycle and the fundamentals of recognition.
Germany was a rising state throughout the latter two-thirds of the nineteenth
century. Britain began its relative descent by midcentury, notwithstanding its colonial expansion by the 1870s. France had been in relative decline since the middle of
the prior century. Austria-Hungarys relative decline was so far advanced, because
of the disintegration of its internal empire and its laggard industrialization, that by
the eve of WWI, it had virtually dropped out of the central system. Germany relied
too heavily on Austria for order-maintenance responsibilities in the Balkans that
were entirely beyond its capacities. All of these states insisted on their perquisites
and place in terms of statecraft, elbowing Germany out of the colonial regions and
excluding it from equal status in the central European system. In short, Europe
denied Germany recognition of its achievements and a constructive foreign policy
role and did so repeatedly and in a fashion that led Germany to identify force as the
means to attainment.
Britain, France, and Russia observed the balance of power meticulously. Instead
of allowing a rising state to attain diplomatic status and recognition, they sought to
encircle and restrain it. Instead of engaging Germany early, before its belligerence
became too difficult to manage, they in effect created a noose into which, as the
Kaiser recognized by late summer of 1914, Germany too readily inserted its own
neck. By waiting until 1912 or so to offer Germany some palliatives (such as the
Haldane visit to Berlin to alleviate concerns about British naval intentions), they had
waited too long. The thunderheads of war were already on the horizon. Recognition
of German economic and military achievement did not mean giving up territory to
Germany, laying down their own arms, or adopting pacifist postures. Recognition
meant treating Germany as a cultural and political equal.
International Political Equilibrium:

How WWI Could Have Been Averted
According to power cycle theory, rising power cannot be constrained and declining
power cannot be artificially bolstered.33 These are the dual impulses of the balance
of power that, in a dynamic interval of systems transformation, are bound not only
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to fail but to exacerbate the tensions in the international political climate of the period. Instead, in periods of high uncertainty and insecurity such as the 1890 to 1914
interval, those states attempting to promote world order must acknowledge the need
of a rising power to be recognized for its achievements and accepted for its positive
contributions. While preserving their own security and the means to that security,
the other powers in the system must learn to adapt to rising power.34 They must
engage the newcomer and bind it into a series of coalitions that both give it a sense
of security and at the same time guarantee the security of its neighbors.
Conversely, when a potentially disruptive state is in significant relative decline as
was Hitlers Germany, the other major powers must balance and oppose its claims
to greater role as well as its aggression. A state whose relative power is declining no
longer can make claims on the system for a larger foreign policy role. By attempting
to appease such a power, the other members of the system only invited aggression.
Unfortunately, the actions of Britain, France, Russia, and the United States from
1937 to 1939 signaled to Hitler that they did not care whether he canceled the neutrality of the Rhineland, intimidated Austria, or violated the sovereignty of the Czech
state. True, they were reeling from the prior war (France and Britain), seeking isolation
(United States), or brooding about a deal between dictators (Soviet Union). They
were also trying to unlearn mistakes made prior to 1914 that had caused Germanys
outburst in WWI. But they failed to recognize that the structural situation in the last
decades of the nineteenth century was entirely different from the structural situation
between the wars. Like many historical treatments today, they conflated Wilhelmian
Germany and Nazi Germany as well as the structural settings. They attempted to
use the medicine appropriate for the earlier period as a prescription for the ills of the
latter. By trying to undo the mistakes of the earlier period with inappropriate role
adjustments in the latter, the architects of world order fueled Hitlers aggression.
The correct strategy was to respond to a rising Germany with deference and engagement, adapting to its thirst for recognition with ascription of legitimate roles. The
correct strategy for a declining Germany under Hitler was to demonstrate early that
expansion was illegitimate and that it would not work. Power cycle theory elucidates
these two tragic historical lessons. WWII showed that states ignore the balance of
power at their period and that illegitimate interests must never be appeased. WWI
showed that states ignore power-role equilibrium at their peril and that rising power
cannot be halted. The bounds of the system constrain relative growth and future
role opportunity, and when expectations long deferred suddenly are foreclosed, the
urgent demand for redress of this sense of injustice, and to relieve the structural
disequilibrium, provokes the tragedy of world war.
Recognition is an important instrument in the toolkit of decision-makers contemplating appropriate and viable adjustment to structural change. Among the possible
leadership roles a state may assume, recognition establishes which roles are considered
legitimate within a stable world order. Wisely used, recognition can enhance the prospects for peace while, in conjunction with a proper use of defensive capability, helping
bolster territorial security. But if denied or wrongly used, whether in ignorance or in
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defiance of structural change, any of these instruments of adaptation will disappoint
the purported peacemaker.
Notes
1. Doran 1991, 93.
2. This analysis of World War I from the power cycle perspective draws heavily on the
authors detailed theoretical and historical assessment (Doran 1991). The first published account of the theory (Doran 1971) examined the failed hegemonic attempts of the Spanish
Habsburgs under Philip II, of France under Louis XIV, and of France under Napoleon. A
compact presentation, including the essentials of its application to WWI, is Doran 2003,
1350.
3. On the nature of the concept of foreign policy role as established in power cycle
theory, see Doran 1991, 3033; Doran 2003, 1415, 2532.
4. Kissinger 1994; Evera 1985; Sagan 1986; Trachtenberg 1990; Williamson and May
2007; Hamilton and Herwig 2004; Kagan 1995; Snyder and Jervis 1999; Hamilton and
Herwig 2004. For early debates, see Albertini 19521957; Fischer 1967; Geiss 1967.
5. Honneth 1996; Wendt 1999.
6. Lindemann 2001.
7. Honneth 1999, and the contribution to this volume.
8. Murray provides evidence of this gap in her contribution to this volume.
9. I am grateful to Thomas Lindemann for this reference.
10. This thesis should not be confused with claims that France and Russia started the war,
which could be true only in a very narrow technical sense affected by mobilization times.
Zuber 1999; Zuber 2002; critique by Mombauer 2005.
11. Lieber 2007, 155191.
12. Wohlforth 1999. Wohlforth 2009, 2857, claims that status competition and status
dissonance can become possible causes of war only when a unipolar system moves into a system
he characterizes as balanced. Status dissonance without unipolarity is central in Midlarsky
1975.
13. Doran 1989, 371401; Doran 1991, 79100, 134140. Doran 2003, 2838.
14. Doran 1991, 104107.
15. Doran 1971.
16. Gilpin 1981.
17. Modelski 1978; Thomson 1988.
18. Organski and Kugler 1980.
19. Quoted in Lindemann 2001, 224226.
20. Ibid., 264.
21. Steinberg 1966; Schweller 2008, 42.
22. Stadelmann 1948.
23. Fischer 1967; Levy 1990/91; Copeland 2000; Trachtenberg 1990/91.
24. Feldman 1967.
25. Ibid., 23.
26. Dehio [1948] 1962.
27. Ritter 1956.
4/18/11 12:36 PM

28. Doran 2000; Doran 2003, 26, 3738. See also the discussion of non-rationality by
Ringmar in the introduction to this volume.
29. Maier 1988, 588.
30. Nye 1988. Doran 1991, 4043.
31. Paul et al. 2004; Ikenberry 2002.
32. Levy and Thompson 2005, 133, distinguish maritime from land-based efforts to
balance. For a traditional view of the balance of power, see Mearsheimer 2001.
33. See Doran 1991, 144151; Doran 1995.
34. The requirements and strategies for adaptation and adjustment are articulated in Doran
1991, 169171, 182186.
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Albertini, Luigi. 1952. Origins of the War of 1914, 3 Volumes. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Copeland, Dale C. 2000. The Origins of Major War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Dehio, Ludwig. (1948) 1962. The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power
Struggle. New York: Vintage Books.
Doran, Charles F. 1971. Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath. Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press.
. 1980. Modes, Mechanisms, and Turning Points: Perspectives on the Analysis of
the Transformation of the International System. International Political Science Review
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. 1989. Systemic Disequilibrium, Foreign Policy Role, and the Power Cycle: Challenges
for Research Design. Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (3): 371401.
. 1991. Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Centurys End. Cambridge:
. 1995. The Power Cycle and Peaceful Change: Assimilation, Equilibrium, and
Conflict Resolution. In Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the PostCold War Era, edited by John A. Vasquez, Sanford M. Jaffe, James Turner Johnson, and
Linda Stamato. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
. 2000. The Rationality of Nonrationality in the Power Cycle Theory of Major War:
Confronting the Principles of the Single Dynamic. Washington, DC.
. 2003. Economics, Philosophy of History, and the Single Dynamic of Power Cycle
Theory: Expectations, Competition, and Statecraft. International Political Science
Review 24 (1): 1350.
Evera, Stephen Van. 1985. Why Cooperation Failed in 1914. World Politics 38 (1): 80117.
Feldman, Gerald D., ed. 1967. German Imperialism, 19141918: The Development of a Historical Debate. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Fischer, Fritz. 1967. Germanys Aims In The First World War. New York: W. W. Norton.
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Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig. 2004. Decisions For War, 19141917. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
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Honneth, Axel. 1996. The Struggle for Recognition. London: MIT Press.
Ikenberry, G. John, ed. 2002. America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Kagan, Donald. 1995. On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace. New York:
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Kissinger, Henry A. 1994. Diplomacy: The History of Diplomacy and the Balance of Power.
New York: Simon & Schuster.
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Balancing in Europe, 14951999. Security Studies 14: 133.
Lieber, Keir A. 2007. The New History of World War I and What It Means for International
Relations Theory. International Security 32 (2): 155191.
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Practice in the 21st Century. 1st ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
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Stadelmann, Rudolf. 1948. Die Epoche der deutsch-englischen Flottenrivalitt. In Deutschland und Westeuropa. Wurttemberg: Laupheim.
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Chapter 7
Recognition, Disrespect, and

the Struggle for Morocco
Rethinking Imperial Germanys Security Dilemma
Michelle Murray
If the flag of the state is insulted, it is the duty of the State to demand satisfaction, and if satisfaction is not forthcoming, to declare war, however trivial
the occasion may appear, for the State must strain every nerve to preserve
for itself the respect which it enjoys in the state system.
Heinrich von Treitschke 1
The origins of the First World War have played an important role in the development of international relations theory, helping to inspire the principal concept in
structural realist theory: the security dilemma. The security dilemma explains how
states with fundamentally compatible goals, namely security, nevertheless end up in
competition and war. This happens when the power a state acquires for security can
render others more insecure and compel them to prepare for the worst.2 That is, a
security dilemma exists when the capabilities a state builds for its own defense and
security decreases the security of others.3 These states respond in kind with military
buildups of their own, the result of which is an action-reaction spiral that leads to
security competition and sometimes war. The central insight of security dilemma
theory is that states pursuing nothing more than security and self-defense can end
131
4/18/11 12:36 PM
132 Michelle Murray

up acting as if they are aggressors, creating a self-fulfilling prophesy of competition
and insecurity.
Accordingly, the dominant view that has emerged on the origins of the First
World War is that none of the European great powers wanted war but fought one
because of misperceptions, militaristic domestic ideologies, and mobilization schedules. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand initiated a diplomatic crisis,
triggered alliance commitments among the great powers and set in motion military mobilization schedules. When Serbia rejected Austria-Hungarys ultimatum,
Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, prompting a partial military mobilization
in Russia. Fearing the disadvantage that would come from not being prepared if
attacked, all of the European great powers began to prepare for war. This created
a self-fulfilling prophecy: as these preparations turned to full-scale militarymobilizations, neighboring states felt compelled to respond in kind with full-scale
mobilizations of their own. Under these conditions, the incentives to launch a
preemptive war increased to the degree that striking the first offensive blow [was]
considered advantageous compared to waiting to be attacked.4 By August 1, this
spiral had wound too tightly, and Germany declared war on Russia and two days
later, on France. When Germany violated Belgian neutrality, Britain was drawn into
the war. By mid-August what started out as a localized conflict between AustriaHungary and Serbia had escalated into full-scale European war. World War I is
considered an exemplary instance of the security dilemma because the pressures of
the international system drove states seeking only security into competitive arming
practices, which quickly escalated to war.
Recent work in history and political science, however, has put this understanding
of the origins of the warand Germanys role in precipitating itinto doubt.5 It
is clear that since at least 1890, Imperial Germany was a fundamentally dissatisfied
power, eager to disrupt the status quo and to achieve its expansive goals by bullying
if possible, by war if necessary.6 Its bold naval policy represented a direct challenge
to British naval hegemony, designed to bring Germany to the rank of a world power.
On the continent, it pursued a belligerent foreign policy, assuming a more vocal
role in European politics and often threatening great power war over trivial colonial
disagreements. What is more, Keir Lieber has forcefully argued that Germany went
to war eyes wide open, prepared for a costly and protracted war in order to achieve
its goal of dominating the European continent.7 In short, it seems apparent that decisions regarding the use of force in 1914 did not lead tragically to an unwanted war,
but rather were part of a deliberate strategy designed to achieve very particular ends.
But for what ends was this risky and aggressive foreign policy devised? In this
chapter, I argue that Germanys foreign policy was designed to secure recognition
of its status as a world power. By 1890 Germany was the strongest power on the
European continent; however, its power beyond Europe was insignificant, and its
prospects for enlarging it there were rapidly diminishing.8 As British diplomat Eyre
Crowe observed, Germany had won [its] place as one of the leading, if not, in fact,
the foremost power on the European continent, but over and beyond the European
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Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco 133

Great Powers there seemed to stand World Powers, within which Germany had not yet
secured its place.9 One part of German strategy to achieve world-power status involved
instigating a series of crises over the independent status of Morocco. From a material
perspective Morocco was of little value to Germany who held no vital economic or
security interests in the region. Rather, Germanys principal interest in Morocco was
about identity, as Germany struggled to establish and defend its status among the
systems world powers. During each of the Moroccan crises German demands to be
treated as an equal on par with the other world powers went unrecognized, leading
to an intense spiral of social insecurity to which Germany responded with increased
belligerence. The consequence was the emergence of a keen awareness of the balance
of power in Europe, which sparked a costly arms race that contributed to the outbreak
of war. The struggle for recognition centered in the Moroccan Crises, I argue, reveals
how the experience of disrespect can lead to the material competition traditionally
attributed to the security dilemma.
The chapter proceeds in three parts. In the first section, I briefly outline a social
theory of international politics which argues that in addition to physical security,
states also want recognition of their identities from significant Others. My rendering
of the struggle for recognition in international politics argues that in response to the
experience of disrespect and to secure recognition, states ground their identities in the
material practices associated with their desired status, which for great powers involves
maximizing material power. The materialization of identity isolates the state from
the social insecurity associated with identity formation in anarchy. Next, I apply this
argument to the two Moroccan Crises, each of which played an important role in
precipitating the First World War. In challenging France and Britain over the status
of Morocco, Germany sought to secure its status among the world powers. Finally, I
conclude with some implications for international relations theory.
Recognition and Disrespect in World Politics

Mainstream theories of security generally assume that all states share the same interestphysical securityand that their pursuit of this interest is conditioned by the
balance of power. This paints a materialist picture of international politics where state
survival is equated with state materiality, and threats to survival are understood only
in terms of material capabilities. Theorists of recognition in international politics,
however, have challenged this narrow motivational assumption to argue that concerns
over identity importantly shape states security interests and motivate foreign policy
behavior.10 As Erik Ringmar has argued, not only physical, but also social survival
is at stake in international politics.11 A secure identity is essential for state survival
because the state requires a stable identity in order to be a subject in the international
systemthat is, identity provides the sense of who the state is, its location within the
social order, and given the first two, how it is prepared to act to achieve its interests.12
Without a stable sense of self, states cannot define or realize their interests and hence
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134 Michelle Murray

cannot be secure. Thus, one of the principal motivations of states in anarchy is to
gain recognition of their identities.13
Recognition is a social act that ascribes to a state some positive status, whereby
its identity is acknowledged and reinforced as meaningful by a significant Other,
and thus the state is constituted as a subject with legitimate social standing.14 The
struggle for recognition describes the process through which states attempt to gain the
recognition of their significant Others and become subjects of a particular kind in the
social order. In this formulation, identities are determined inter-subjectivelyones
attitude, or disposition, toward another only emerges in that states encounter with its
significant Other, and therefore, who or what a state becomes is the outcome of many
intersecting and overlapping sequences of action and response.15 The representations
that occur during the course of these interactions are the most important aspects of
state interaction, for through them the meaning of state identity is contested, made,
and reproduced, and hence states are able to define and realize their global interests.
This process of identity construction involves the state making a claim to a particular identity and representing other states in correspondingly meaningful counter-roles,
what Alexander Wendt has termed role-taking and alter-casting.16 The international system is shaped by a social structure that relates a states self-understanding
to institutionalized role-positions, which define the behavioral norms appropriate to
a particular identity. Roles are structural positions that exist by virtue of shared ideas
about the nature of Self and Other, and place states in specific relationships vis--vis
other subjects in the system.17 Role-taking thus involves choosing from the available
representations of the self that a state holds and identifying which role in the social
structure corresponds to that self conception.
Consider, for example, the role position of great power. Neorealism takes great
power status as a self-evident reflection of material power and thus a pre-existing
property of those states that possess the requisite kind and level of capabilities.18 A
recognition approach, in contrast, argues that great power is an identity sustained
through a role structure that grants a recognized set of states special rights and standing in relation to non-great powers.19 These special rights and duties have historically
included being able to exclusively determine their own affairs as well as playing a
leading role in determining the direction and shape of international affairs, but beyond this, they have varied over time as constitutive norms that define this identity
have changed. At the turn of the twentieth century, when Germany made its bid to
join the ranks of the great power, this leadership role included direct control over
and exploitation of much of the world through colonial empires, as the great powers
collectively, though not without contestation, decided how to carve up the colonized
world. Today it involves a monopoly on second-strike nuclear capability and a seat
on the United Nations Security Council.
This social definition of great power underscores how role identities cannot exist without states occupying positions in a social structure and following behavior
norms toward Others possessing relevant counter-identities.20 And therefore, the act
of making a claim to a particular role position necessarily involves alter-casting, as the
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state is at the same time casting others into the corresponding counter-roles that make
their identity meaningful in the first place. Just as there cannot be a teacher without
a student, there cannot be a great power without a non-great power. Identities are
always defined in relation to others, and role positions play an important part in this
process by identifying the boundaries between identity groups such that those inside
the collective recognize each other as subjects who because of their common social
position share traits and abilities that are accorded a certain level of social standing
over those who are not part of the collective.21 International politics is in large part
about negotiating the boundaries of these collective identities, as states struggle over
who is and who is not included in the group.
Because identities are formed inter-subjectively in this way, the process of establishing and maintaining an identity in international politics is wrought with insecurity
as interaction always holds the possibility that a states self-understanding will not
be recognized. When a state is recognized, this insecurity is mitigatedits identity
and status as a political actor is secured and it is free to pursue the interests associated
with that identity unhindered. If a states identity is not recognized, however, it suffers
disrespect because in being denied membership in the collective, the recognitionseeking state can be represented as illegitimate or second-rate. With the meaning
of its identity called into question, the state can no longer function as a positively
informed self and thus cannot pursue the interests that follow from its perceived
identity. In response to the insecurity associated with the experience of disrespect,
states engage in a struggle for recognition, which can become the motivational impetus for conflict among states.22
The struggle for recognition holds the possibility of producing conflict among
states because in response to the experience of disrespect, states ground their aspirant
identities in concrete material practices. Material practices are an effective expression
of an identity because the material world gives substance to the recognition-seeking
states aspiring social identity and allows the state to experience its social status as a
brute fact, rather than as the uncertain effect of an ongoing political practice of social
construction.23 Practices are socially recognized forms of activity that are repeated
over time and done on the basis of what states learn from others, which in turn
reproduce an inter-subjective reality that gives meaning to particular identities.24
The practices coupled with an identity are defined by constitutive norms, specified
by the social structure, which identify the actions that will cause [other states] to
recognize that identity and respond to it appropriately.25 For this reason it is always
by way of performance to collectively known generative schemes that actors are empowered and gain the social status they desire.26 For example, one pillar of Germanys
strategy to achieve its place in the sun among the established world powers was a
full-scale challenge to British naval hegemony, which included building a large fleet
of battleships stationed in the North Sea. Being a world power necessitates that others recognize you as such, and this is accomplished in part through conformity to a
ritualized set of material practices. At the time, powerful navies, anchored in a fleet
of battleships, were symbolic of the political power of the state and embodiment of
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136 Michelle Murray

the nation, the hallmark of world-power status. Therefore, in building a powerful
navy, Germany thought that it could create a display of military force so great that
Britain simply could not ignore it, allowing Germany to secure recognition of its
status as a world power.27
As this example illustrates, state identities are instantiated in practices. In materializing a socially produced identity, the state appears to have sovereign control
over the meaning of its identity. By presenting its aspiring identity as a fait accompli, the state demands that it be recognized as it already really is, thereby forcing its
significant Other(s) to recognize it. This has the effect of isolating the state from
the uncertainty and social insecurity associated with inter-subjective identity formation, giving the temporary illusion that it can alone determine its identity. Moreover, by grounding the states aspirant identity in the material practices known to
constitute that identity, it appears as if this identity pre-exists social interaction
and therefore is not dependent on the experience of inter-subjectivity. The material
world reflects back to the state the identity it seeks, lending relative stability to the
inter-subjective world by reducing social uncertainty about the status of identity.
In the case of great power politics, then, the accumulation of material capability is
not always an act of conscious obedience to something external like the balance
of power, but rather, an act of self-realization that attempts to secure identity.28 In
what follows, I apply this theoretical argument to the two Moroccan Crises the
preceded the First World War and argue that in challenging France and Britain
over the status of Morocco, Imperial Germany sought to secure recognition of its
identity among the European great powers and that the resultant arms race was
symptomatic of this social process.
The Struggle for Morocco

During the decade preceding the outbreak of the First World War, Germany became
embroiled in a series of crises over the status of Morocco, each of which threatened
general war and contributed to the overwrought environment that led to the July
Crisis. German involvement in Morocco has always been puzzling from a strictly
material perspective. Germanys material interests in the country at the time were
nugatory, as Germany had no important economic or security interests in Morocco;
its overall volume of trade there ranked third among the great powers and as such
was not part of Germanys vital interests.29 Rather, Germanys foremost interest in
Morocco lay in its relationship to Germanys status among the established great
powers and the fear that its position among those states was unrecognized.30 In what
follows, I show how the mis-recognition and consequent disrespect that Germany
suffered at the hands of the other great powers over the Moroccan question played
an important role in motivating Germanys arming decisions in the lead-up to the
war. That is, social insecurity over Germanys identity as a great power precipitated
the material competition among the great powers.
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The First Moroccan Crisis, 19051906

The First Moroccan Crisis grew out of the imperial rivalries of the European great
powers, particularly France and Germany, and hence Morocco was directly connected
to each states identity as a great power. France had long had an interest in Morocco,
as geographically it was central to French imperial interests in North Africa. During
the 1890s, France worked hard to consolidate its North African Empire, completing
agreements with Great Britain, Germany, and Spain to gain desired territories. This
left only Moroccoa country almost enclosed by French territoryas unclaimed
by the French. Accordingly, for France, Morocco became an object whose acquisition
had come to be understood as necessary to the completion of its ambitions in the
region and maintenance of its position among the world powers.31
For a long time, France maintained a policy toward Morocco that supported the
status quo: not allowing any other power to gain undue influence there or permitting
Morocco to reform itself away from French interests, but stopping short of officially
incorporating it into the French Empire.32 This stance reflected the agreement reached
in the Madrid Convention of 1880, which specified the rights and obligations that
the great powers had vis--vis Morocco and assured that no single great power would
assume too large a role in the internal affairs of the country by maintaining an open
door policy for any great power that wanted to do business there.33 Maintaining a
colonial empire was a practice important to the constitution of great-power identity,
and so in this way, the Madrid Convention helped to define the behavioral norms
constitutive of that identity.
In the early part of the twentieth century, French interest in Morocco began to
grow, as the Moroccan question came to be seen as paramount to French national
and imperial interests. By 1903 nearly every political party within France saw the
Moroccan question as a priority of French foreign policy and considered its claims
to predominance there as superior to those of any other great power.34 The strength
of the French empire, and therefore Frances corresponding identity as a great power,
came to rest with Morocco and securing French dominance there. Therefore, looking to secure its position in Morocco, France approached Britain for an agreement
that would settle the Moroccan question in its favor, and on April 8, 1904, the two
states signed the Entente Cordiale.35 This friendly understanding was primarily
concerned with colonial expansion, consisting of three documents that resolved differences between the two states in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, thus strengthening
each states empire. The most important component of the agreement, however, was
the third document, which concerned France and Britains standing in Morocco.
In return for France relinquishing its rights and interests in Egypt to Britain, the
British agreed to respect Frances special status and pledged diplomatic support for
French involvement in Morocco. The Entente Cordiale did not formally absorb
Morocco into the French empire, but France alone would make all of the decisions
concerning the internal affairs of Morocco. Thus, the practical intent behind the
Entente Cordiale was to eventually make Morocco a French protectorate.36 The
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138 Michelle Murray

Entente Cordiale replaced years of intermittent conflict between Britain and France
with a friendly relationship and laid the groundwork for future French action in
Morocco.
The Entente Cordiale, however, was a direct violation of the Madrid Convention
and thus inflamed Germany, who considered itself to be a great power and as such
understood itself as having a right to be consulted on issues surrounding colonial
expansion. After all, the Madrid Convention preserved equality among the great
powers in their dealings with Morocco. Therefore, when France cleared its plans
for Morocco with Britain but deliberately excluded Germany from these dealings,
it effectively denied Germany recognition and represented Germany as an inferior
power. Shortly after the signing of the Entente Cordiale, Chancellor Bernhard von
Blow took note of this disrespect: they did not even show us the consideration of
informing Berlin and Vienna of the contents of the 1904 treaty ... in the face of this
chain of French aggressions, it seemed necessary to remind Paris again of the German
Empire.37 While Germanys material interests in Morocco were small, the insult to
its identity demanded a response, and on June 3, 1904, Baron von Holstein issued a
memorandum that expressed this concern very clearly. He wrote,
even more alarming would be the injury to Germanys prestige, if we sat still whilst German interests were being dealt with without our taking a part. It is the duty of a Great
Power not merely to protect its territorial frontiers, but also the interests lying outside
them ... we can never admit that France, as Moroccos neighbour, has a stronger right
to Morocco than we have.38
Holstein went on to argue, not only for material reasons, but also in order to protect
[its] prestige, Germany must protest against Frances intention to acquire Morocco.39
From Germanys perspective, allowing the French intrusion into Morocco to go unchallenged would be tantamount to relinquishing its status as a great power.
In spite of German warnings, France continued to pursue its expansionist foreign
policy in Morocco, hoping to officially add this area to its growing North and West
African Empire.40 In January, French foreign minister Thophile Delcass visited Fez
with a series of proposals meant to turn Morocco into a French protectorate, forcing
the Sultan into accepting reforms for the police, the banks, and the army, all to be
carried out with French assistance.41 By once again disregarding Germany, France
ensured that Morocco would be the site of Germanys struggle for recognition as a
great power.
Germanys initial reaction to Delcasss plan was to assert its rights as a great
power by continuing to support Moroccan independence and prevent France from
gaining undue power in North Africa. Simply asserting its support for Moroccan
independence, however, was not enough to stabilize Germanys identity as a great
power. Because identities are instantiated in practices, Germany had to back up its
recognition claims with behavior appropriate to the role of great power; that is, Germany had to act like a great power in order to be a great power. On March 31, 1905,
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Berlin materialized its stance on Morocco when Kaiser Wilhelm visited Tangier to
directly challenge French claims to Morocco. During an excited speech, the kaiser
reaffirmed Moroccan independence and asserted that Germany should have advantages equal to those of other countries.42 The German message was indisputable: the
kaiser had pointedly told the French that Germany knew how to defend its interests
in Morocco and would do so.43 The kaisers performance in Tangier signaled to the
world Germanys intention to make an issue out of Morocco, inflamed France, and
started an international crisis.
Delcass initially tried to placate Berlin by pledging to maintain the open door
policy put in place by the Madrid Convention and allowing Germany continued
access to commerce in the country. For Germany, however, a simple return to the
status quo would do little to reverse the injury it had suffered to its identity, and
instead insisted on calling a conference to secure the recognition of the international
community. Germany figured that given the terms of the Madrid Convention, the
other great powers would surely support its position on the Moroccan question and
recognize its status as a great power. Contrary to this expectation, the great powers
were reluctant to call a conference without French approval first, and so not only had
France disrespected Germany, but in refusing to enforce the terms of the Madrid
Convention, the international community as a group had also failed to recognize
Germanys status as a great power and the colonial rights that followed from that
identity.44
In response to this denial of recognition, Germany turned to material intimidation by threatening Frances physical security in order to achieve the recognition it
demanded. German overtures for war increased, and on June 4, Germany directly
threatened France with general war over Morocco, insisting that if France took steps
toward formally occupying the country, Germany would defend its position with force.
It is clear that Germany never intended to actually go to war with France, and in fact
the threat was made without even considering material preparations. Rather, it was
primarily a political performance appropriate to its desired role in the international
order. In threatening France, Germany had asserted its perceived right to an equal
claim to Morocco, attempting to force France to recognize its identity.
In the face of German threats, the French position began to crumble; and the
more France appeared to be susceptible to these threats, the greater German bellicosity grew, culminating in Germany making it clear that if Britain and France
formed a formal alliance, it would wage war.45 Germany had backed France against
a wall, forcing it to consider its ability to confront Germany in war. In a meeting
of the French Cabinet on June 6, the ministers of war and the navy were consulted
over the preparedness of the French armed forces for war with Germany, and when
both ministers confirmed that France indeed was not prepared for war, Delcass
was forced to resign, signaling a changed direction in French foreign policy.46 The
German threats had their desired effect, and for a moment satiated Germanys recognition demands: Germany appeared to have the international influence associated
with the role of great power.
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140 Michelle Murray

A conference to settle the Moroccan question began in early 1906, and all of the
major European powers were involved. German objectives at the Algeiras Conference
were clear and remained consistent with its earlier position: as Metternich argued,
in German eyes it was a matter of defending our rights ... unluckily the Moroccan
question has swelled into one of prestige. If it again looked as if France, jointly with
England, was ready to resort to arms in the settlement of it, we should be absolutely
forced to oppose the French demands even more bluntly, although the Germans did
not renew this threat of war after Delcasss resignation.47 Because Germanys interest
in Morocco still revolved around the states connection to German identity as a great
power, any settlement had to reflect this concern. Surprisingly, though, support for
Germany at Algeiras was not forthcoming, and when the delegates signed a general
act that ended the conference, Germany had been handed another disappointing
defeat, as Frances special privileges and position vis--vis Morocco were recognized.
France (along with Spain) took control of the police force and assumed a dominant
position in the Moroccan bank, which essentially amounted to economic control of
the country.48 While Morocco was not officially made into a French protectorate,
France retained unofficial control over Morocco.
The military balance of power had little effect on the outcome at Algeiras. Once
France agreed to the conference, the central issue surrounding Morocco became
whether German demands for recognition would be met (through either compensation or the granting of more rights) and whether Britain and France were prepared
to prevent Germany from dictating affairs in Europe.49 Thus, the Algeiras Agreement handed Germany a humiliating defeat at the hands of the other great powers
who had failed to recognize its role as a European great power. Algeiras amounted
to a denial of recognition because Germanys claims at the conference were based on
the idea of equality so central to meaningful recognition: Germany, as a signatory to
the Madrid Convention, deserved the same rights as the other great powers involved
in Morocco and so in guaranteeing France special standing in Morocco, the great
powers had represented Germany as an inferior state. As Blow commented at the
conclusion of the conference: the dignity of the empire could not allow these rights
to be ignored. [Germany was] not to be treated as a quantit ngligeable.50
The First Moroccan Crisiswhich I have argued arose out of concerns over
identity and statusand its settlement at Algeiras had profound effects in setting
Europe on the path to war by stimulating arms production in France, Britain, and
Germany and encouraging balance-of-power thinking among these states. In the wake
of Algeiras, Germany became preoccupied with its weakness and so responded to
the mis-recognition of Algeiras by grounding its identity in the material practices
constitutive of great power status in an attempt to secure its voice in European affairs.
In the years following the First Moroccan Crisis, Germany intensified its commitment
to Weltpolitik. Weltpolitik, or world policy, was Germanys strategy for achieving
world power status, which included expanding its colonial empire and building a naval
capability meant to rival Britain. In 1908, Germany announced a new supplement to
the Navy Law that called for the building of additional Dreadnought-style battleships.51
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While Germany suffered the most significant mis-recognition at Algeiras, the
crisis produced considerable uncertainty about Frances ability to maintain its status
as a great power: would France be able to defend its interests on its own, or was it
simply a satellite of Great Britain? The British government had vigorously supported
Delcass and his firing caused Britain to worry about Frances standing as a great
power: Delcasss dismissal or resignation under pressure from the German government displayed a weakness on the part of France, which indicated that [it] could not
at present be counted on as an effective force in international politics.52 One of the
defining characteristics of a great power was its ability to determine its own affairs
and pursue its global interests unhindered. The First Moroccan Crisis menaced
France with the specter of satellite status in Europe, subject to the demands of its
aggressive eastern neighbor and dependent upon the goodwill of Britain and Russia
to secure its interests outside of Europe.53
Faced with the potential humiliation associated with satellite status, France turned
its attention toward hardening its identity as a great power by building up its military
strength relative to Germany. By increasing its military capability, France sought to
demonstrate to important alliesnamely Britainits status as a great power. Shortly
after the crisis, France began surveillance of Germanys borders to give warning of
possible German mobilization; military leaves were curtailed and supplies readied
for war. A trial mobilization took place, as France undertook medium-term and
short-term measures to prepare its military for war.54 French leaders understood that
it had to be able to credibly threaten war in the future in order to demonstrate to the
international community that it was not a satellite state, but rather an independent
great power able to protect its global interests.
Perhaps the most important consequence of the First Moroccan Crisis, however,
was that it drew Britain into continental politics by stimulating Franco-British cooperation and raising suspicions about German intentions. Britain had concluded
that its own security was intimately tied to that of France and as such, a second
overthrow of France by Germany would end in aggrandizement of Germany to an
extent which would be prejudicial to the whole of Europe, and might therefore be
necessary for Great Britain in [its] own interests to lend France [its] active support
should war of this nature break out.55 For the first time in thirty years, it began
to contemplate the use of its army in a continental war, entertaining plans to use
the British expeditionary force in defense of Belgium and France on the European
continent.56 These plans included a complete program of military reorganization
that enabled Britain to send upward of 100,000 troops to France within a month
of mobilization.57 As British interests became centered on the continental balance
of power, its own identity as a world power became tied to Frances position as an
independent great power and centered on opposition of Germany.58 While Germanys
behavior in Morocco was intended to secure its voice in European affairs, instead the
crisis had the effect of increasing German diplomatic isolation (which only further
increased its social insecurity) and setting in to motion a preoccupation with military
force that would haunt the great powers as they moved forward.
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142 Michelle Murray
The Agadir Crisis, 1911

The Algeiras Agreement did little to resolve the political questions surrounding
Morocco, and in the years following the First Moroccan Crisis, French foreign
policy was dominated by questions related to Morocco and its continued policy of
penetration pacifique in that country.59 By 1911, Frances ever-expanding political
role in the internal affairs of Morocco had bled into the economic sphere, and when
a French diplomat claimed that France finds itself in spite of the Algeiras Act and
the Moroccan Accord on the way to full sovereignty in Morocco, it had become
clear that France planned to formally incorporate Morocco into its empire in the
very near future.60 For Germany, Morocco was still intimately connected to its larger
role in world affairs, and it looked toward Morocco as an opportunity to score a
coup in world politics that would efface what [was] regarded as Germanys earlier
humiliations.61 Accordingly, when France occupied Fezsending 15,000 French
troops to the Moroccan capitalthe second crisis over Morocco erupted between
France and Germany.
The French occupation was a direct violation of the Algeiras Agreement and
Franco-German agreement of 1908, both of which explicitly forbade the French
from undertaking any sort of military occupation of Morocco without the expressed
consent of the other great powers. Germanys material interests in Morocco had not
changed, but it feared that signing an agreement like Algeiras and then allowing it
to be overturned without its rightful consent would do considerable damage to its
prestige and influence in the international system.62 And so, on July 1, 1911, Germany
sent the gunboat Panther to anchor off of Agadir, a Moroccan port on the Atlantic
Ocean, in a spectacular demonstration of armed diplomacy against the French occupation. Alfred von Kiderlen-Wchter, the new state secretary of the Foreign Office,
figured that Germany could assert its power in Morocco by seizing control of two
ports on the western coast of Morocco, Adagir and Mogador.63 This would force
France to either retreat from its occupation or to allow Germany to keep western
Morocco, thereby reinforcing German rights in Morocco and as a great power. The
justification for German demands would be an insistence that the Algeiras Agreement be upheld. There is evidence that French leaders wanted to negotiate a secret
deal with Germany to avoid another confrontation over Morocco, and so Germany
could have achieved its interests without such bellicosity.64 But Berlin wanted more
than a settlement; it needed a visible success, a demonstration of German power, a
gesture of respect and a gain in prestige, and that called for open intimidation.65 A
few weeks later, Berlin demanded almost the entire French Congo in exchange for
recognizing Morocco as a French protectorate, or alternatively, called for the observance of the Algeiras Agreement which mandated Morocco remain independent.66
In doing this, Germany presented France with a fait accompli of its own: no matter
which of the two options France chose, it would affirm Germanys status as great
power by either compensating Germany as an equal great power or returning to the
pre-occupation status quo.
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Initially, and as Kiderlen-Wchter had suspected, support from Frances allies
was not immediately forthcoming. Russia was not interested in another Moroccan
crisis, fearful of a European war breaking out over what it considered a trivial colonial
concern, and Britain was cautious about becoming involved in another crisis given its
own escalating tensions with Germany. Upon learning of the Panthers leap at Agadir,
France asked Britain to send a warship to Mogador, in order to intimidate Germany
and show that Britain was standing on the side of France.67 Britain agreed to offer
France diplomatic support and encouraged it to make concessions to Germany in the
French Congo in order to settle the dispute, but stopped short of offering support in
war, unless Germany intended to inflict on France a humiliation that would jeopardize its great power status.68 Despite Britains willingness to support concessions for
Germany, Berlin was not forthcoming in making its intentions clear and in general
treated Britain as if it had no right at all to have a voice on the Moroccan question.69
This stubbornness on the part of Germany worried Britain, and by July 21, Grey
had persuaded the previously reserved Cabinet to take a stronger line against the
Germans, making it clear that if Franco-German negotiations failed, Britain would
insist on taking part in the settlement of the Moroccan question. Later that evening,
David Lloyd Georgethe chancellor of the exchequer and in general an advocate of
a moderate position on Germanydelivered a speech at the London Mansion House
Banquet, which unequivocally outlined the British position on Agadir:
I believe it is essential in the highest interests, not only of this country, but of the world,
that Britain should at all hazards maintain her place and prestige amongst the Great
Powers of the world ... If a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could
only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won
by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where her
interests were vitally affected as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations,
then I say emphatically that peace at the price would be a humiliation intolerable for
a great country like ours to endure.70
The Mansion House speech revealed Britains experience of disrespect and represented a public calling into line of Germany: Britain would not tolerate German
bellicosity or allow Germany to dictate affairs on the continent.71 A few days later,
Grey met with Metternich to discuss the Moroccan question and a solution to the
crisis. Metternich reiterated that Germany had no particular interest in Morocco
but just wanted proper compensation elsewhere; but he also protested the tone and
message of the Mansion House speech and refused to have any German response or
compromise tied to that speech. Metternich insisted that linking a German statement on Morocco to the Mansion House speech would represent Germany as inferior
to Britain, calling into question its rights in the Moroccan Crisis and permanently
jeopardizing its position within the international system. Metternich then stressed
that if its demands were not recognized, it would be forced to uphold the Algeiras
Agreement by force of arms.72
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144 Michelle Murray

German bellicosity, however, had once again backed Germany into a position in
which achieving any of its goals was near impossible. The Mansion House speech
made it clear that if the Agadir Crisis did escalate to war, then Germany would face
both France and Britain and likely Russia. And moreover, Britains stalwart support
of France meant that any resolution that came through a conference would most
likely not be in Germanys favor. Negotiations over Morocco proceeded slowly, with
both France and Germany reluctantly giving and taking in relation to their original
positions. In the final phase of negotiations, France refused to relent any further, putting responsibility for peace on the Germans. With the possibility of war hanging in
the background, Germany finally recognized the French protectorate over Morocco
and in exchange received a substantially smaller part of the French Congo.73 The
Second Moroccan crisis was over, and once again, Germany had suffered a denial
of recognition that badly damaged its international standing at the hand of France.
The defeat over Agadir was especially humiliating for Germany given its extreme
belligerence in the lead up to negotiations. As David Herrmann notes, the Panthers
leap at Agadir was a dramatic political performance and assertion of world power.
And so when this failed to produce the desired results, Germany was painfully confronted with its inability to engage in this sort of gunboat diplomacy and forced to
face its subordinate status.74
The Agadir Crisis dramatically increased the likelihood of major power war in
Europe. The crisis roused suspicion regarding German intentions among the great
powers. In France, Agadir strengthened public support for mobilization, and Britain
and France completed plans for the rapid delivery of the British Expeditionary Force
to the continent in the event of war. The most profound effects of Adagir, however,
concerned Germany and the military expansion it undertook in the wake of the crisis. In response to its defeat at Agadir and the social insecurity associated with this
experience of disrespect, Germany began to harden its identity as a great power by
dramatically increasing its material capability, a decision that all realized would lead
to a land arms race among the great powers. Germanys capitulation at Adagir was
forced in part by the realization that should war break out, it would face a two-front
war against Britain, France, and Russia. At the 1912 annual mobilization conference,
Helmuth von Moltke confirmed that preparations for mobilization were influenced
by the outcome at Agadir and that Germany would not be humiliated again in future
crises.75 In 1912, the Reichstag passed an army law that readied the German army for
war at all times.76 From this point on, the peacetime strength of the German army was
increased by two new permanent corps, and over the next four years, more regular,
permanent, technical formations and machine-gun units would all be added.
Overall, these improvements significantly increased Germanys military capability
and shifted the focus of German foreign policy away from colonial ambitions and back
to the continent, for as Adagir had demonstrated, it was understood that world-power
status could not be secured without a strong continental position. The effect of this
transformed understanding of the balance of power was that Germany had become an
encircled power and war had come to be seen as inevitable, as the lesson of Agadir for
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Germany was that only a war would hold any guarantee of changing the status quo
in [its] favor. 77 The struggle for recognition set in place the self-fulfilling prophecy
that would culminate in war: the Germans regarded themselves as responding to
a threat from all sides, but at the same time took the plunge in full expectation that
their rivals would react, and that war would only be a matter of time. 78
Rethinking Imperial Germanys Security Dilemma

The struggle over Morocco played an important role in precipitating the First World
War. In the decade before the July Crisis, Germany instigated a series of diplomatic
crises over the independent status of Morocco. As I argued previously, these crises
centered not on a dispute over material interests, but rather revolved principally
around questions of identity and status, as Germany sought to secure its place among
the systems great powers. In each crisis, Germany demanded its rights in Morocco
be recognized in accord with the existing treaties regulating great-power behavior in
the region. When such recognition was not forthcoming, the experience of disrespect
motivated a struggle that played an important role in driving the arming decisions
that led to war. By 1914, an obsession with the balance of material power on the
continent pervaded great-power thinkingespecially in Germany. This belief in the
inevitability of war played a decisive role in escalating the July Crisis.
The importance of the Moroccan Crises in leading the great powers to war should
not be overstated. In the years before the wars outbreak, the great powers found
themselves in an extremely complex social and material environment, and many
factors beyond Morocco contributed to the insecurity that spiraled to war in 1914.
Taking a closer look at the great powers struggle over Morocco, however, reveals
an important and often-overlooked dynamic at work in causing the Great War: the
struggle for recognition. A shortcoming of much of the literature on the origins of
the war is that it focuses almost exclusively on the events of 1914 and reads back
generalizations about prewar diplomacy off of this singular event.79 Concerns over
status and identity figured prominently in the Bosnian Crisis of 1908 and the Balkan Wars, when Russia and Austria-Hungary each struggled to maintain a sphere
of influence in the Balkans as a condition of their great-power status. Together this
suggests that 1914 was an environment mired in tremendous social uncertainty, as the
great powers sought to defend and secure their identities in the international order.
The struggle for recognition also has important implications for international
relations theory. Security dilemma theory has come to be seen as the most powerful
explanation for the security competition that seems to plague great-power politics
in the modern era. The argument I propose here reveals another dimension of the
security dilemma: that social uncertainty about the status of an identity can motivate
the competitive arming practices traditionally attributed to the security dilemma.
This is because in response to the experience of disrespect that comes with a denial of
recognition, great powers ground their identities in the material practices constitutive
4/18/11 12:36 PM
146 Michelle Murray

of that status. In this context, the accumulation of material capability is a strategy that
great powers pursue in order to obtain recognition and reduce the insecurity associated
with the social formation of their identities as great powers. Thus, the competitive
arming practices of the great powers are not just the result of material insecurityas
extant security dilemma teaches usbut also social insecurity about the status of
identity. This argument inverts the traditional relationship between the material and
social forces acting on states in anarchy, with the apparent security dilemma being a
symptom of a larger social process, not an intrinsic feature of life in anarchy.
Recognizing the importance of social forces, like the struggle for recognition in
motivating states relationships with the material world, sheds new light on cases of
historical importance as well brings important insights to contemporary security
policy. As Charles Doran shows, a recognition lens goes a long way to clear up many
of the puzzles surrounding the origins of the war, thus potentially offering a more
powerful explanation for its outbreak.80 Moreover, recognizing that Imperial Germany
may have faced a social security dilemma in the years before 1914 leads to important
conclusions about the inevitability of great-power conflict. Had the great powers
been able to accommodate Imperial Germanys rise into the European social order,
then perhaps it would not have pursued such a vigorous armament program, thus
avoiding the spiral of insecurity that lead to war. While I would argue that given the
uncertainties of identity formation, the struggle for recognition among great powers
will always have powerful tendencies toward competition, any social approach to
great-power politics holds the possibility that states can accommodate each other
through careful diplomacy and special attention to what peer competitors want.81
Notes
1. As quoted in Offer 1995, 216
2. Herz 1950, 157.
3. Jervis 1978, 169.
4. Sagan 1991, 113.
5. Lieber 2007, 155191. Most accounts of the war argue that Germany bore greater
responsibility for its outbreak, although they still view the war as an unintended consequence.
6. Kagan 1995, 209.
7. Lieber 2007, 156. Lieber effectively shows that Germany was prepared for a long and
bloody war; however, although he clearly is writing from the perspective of an offensive realist,
he does not develop an argument as to what motivated German decision-making.
8. Steinberg 1965, 18.
9. Crowe 1928, 403.
10. In addition to the chapters in this volume, for structural treatments of recognition
and international relations, see Greenhill 2008, 343368; Ringmar 2002, 115136; Wendt
2003, 491542.
11. Ringmar 2002, 116.
12. In this way, state identity corresponds to what Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper
4/18/11 12:36 PM

call a situated subjectivity. See Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 17. On the importance of identity
to state survival, see Weber 1998, 7795; Biersteker and Weber 1996, 121; Campbell 1992.
13. For a fuller account of my conceptualization of the struggle for recognition in international politics, see Murray 2008, 3990.
14. Honneth 1995, viii.
15. Ibid., xii; Markell 2003, 13.
16. Wendt 1999, 328329.
17. Ibid., 249.
18. Waltz 1979, 131; Mearsheimer 2001, 5.
19. Bull [1977] 1995, 196.
20. Wendt 1999, 227.
21. Honneth 1995, 123.
22. Ibid.,138.
23. Markell 2003, 112.
24. Barnes 2001, 27; Wedeen 2002, 720.
25. Hopf 1998, 173.
26. Ashley 1986, 292.
27. For a fuller discussion of the Germanys naval program as a struggle for recognition,
see Murray 2008.
28. Ashley 1986, 294.
29. Staley 1932, 52.
30. In what follows, I use the terms world power and great power interchangeably.
While there is a distinction to be made between the two in terms of the role positions to which
they refer, the states involved in the Moroccan Crises tend to use the terms interchangeably.
31. Anderson 1930, 5.
32. Ibid., 6.
33. Kagan 1995, 146. It also guaranteed special rights for foreign nationals, which included
exemption from taxation. See Rolo 1969, 126.
34. Anderson 1930, 6.
35. For a comprehensive history on the origins of the Entente Cordiale, see Rolo 1969.
36. To be fair, France was not the only state given the authority to interfere in the internal affairs of Morocco; the agreement also put parts of Morocco under Spanish control.
As Anderson notes, What was meant was that the international status of the land should
be respected. However, the terms of the secret articles foresaw a future change even in that;
and it can hardly be called showing a nice regard for Moroccos international and sovereign
independence for two alien Powers to set a time limit to the right of commercial liberty in
that land. That Morocco, an independent state, would eventually be partitioned into French
and Spanish protectorates was evident to anyone with an understanding of contemporary
political practices. See Anderson 1930, 102.
37. Blow 1931, 121.
38. German Diplomatic Documents 1928, 220.
39. Ibid., 220221.
40. Stokesbury 1981, 19.
41. Hayne 1993, 126; Herrmann 1996, 38.
42. The Landing of Wilhelm II in Tangier 1905.
43. Craig 1978, 318.
4/18/11 12:36 PM
148 Michelle Murray

44. Spain and Italy suggested the matter be settled directly between France and Germany,
and Russia, preoccupied with its war against Japan, took little interest in continental politics.
Britain, obliged both by honor and interest, continued to fully support France. Anderson
1930, 209
45. Ibid., 230.
46. Interestingly, Delcass saw German threats as a bluff and advocated taking a hard line
against Germany as a matter of national prestige, but his position was not shared by the prime
minister, who considered the military situation as decisive. See Herrmann 1996, 5254.
47.
German Diplomatic Documents 1930, 23; Herrmann 1996, 54.
48. The Act of Algeiras of April 1907 gave France and Spain control of all eight Moroccan
ports with the provision that those at Casablanca and Tetouan should have mixed police. A
state bank was established that was open to all nations but gave special privilege to France.
Hayne 1993, 142.
49. Herrmann 1996, 55.
50. Blow 1931, 232.
51. The 1908 naval supplement was an important development because it inaugurated the
Anglo-German naval race. When in 1906 Britain decided to meet Germanys challenge by
redistributing its fleet and introducing the Dreadnought, it effectively made Germanys vision
of naval hegemony impossible. The German economy was not powerful enough to sustain a
naval program on par with Britain and maintain its continental defense commitments. In spite
this impossibility, Germany continued with its plans for naval expansion. On the impossibility
of German naval ambition, see Herwig 1991, 221283; Glaser 2004, 62; Kennedy 1970, 51;
Murray 2008, 1819.
52. As quoted in Anderson 1930, 232.
53. Stevenson 1996, 70.
54. Ibid., 71.
55. Kagan 1995, 150.
56. Ibid., 149.
57. Herrmann 1996, 56.
58. The First Moroccan Crisis represented one source of growing British insecurity because
the crisis involved only one pillar of Germanys strategy for world power status. Of course
Germanys naval program directly threatened British interests, and so as German insecurity
grew and its commitment to Weltpolitik intensified, British attention to the German threat
also increased.
59. Edwards 1963, 483. In 1909, France and Germany sought to correct some of the
faults of Algeiras by signing the Franco-German Agreement on Morocco, which gave France
principal political rights in Morocco and Germany equivalent economic rights. See Mercer
[1996] 2009, 157; Stevenson 1996, 181.
60. As quoted in Barlow 1971, 86.
61. Herrmann 1996, 148.
62. Stevenson 1996, 183.
63. Herrmann 1996, 148.
64. Kagan 1995, 170.
65. Ibid., 170
66. Albertini 1952, 171.
67. Kagan 1995, 170.
4/18/11 12:36 PM

68. Great Britain, Foreign Office 1926, 405; Stevenson 1996, 184.
69. Albertini 1952, 330.
70. Ibid., 330; Great Britain, Foreign Office 1926, 412.
71. Herrmann 1996, 185.
72. Albertini 1952, 331.
73. The French protectorate over Morocco and the Congo was the major element of the
agreements. In addition, Germany received two strips of territory along the Ubangui and
Sangha, and a small slice of territory near Monda Bay. In order to give the appearance of
reciprocity, France received the Bec de Canard in the Cameroons and a narrow panhandle
strip south of Lake Chad. See ibid., 332.
74. Herrmann 1996, 149.
75. Mombauer 2001, 130.
76. The Reichstag also passed a new supplementary naval law, which kept German battleship construction at a high rate, thereby continuing the naval antagonism with Britain.
77. Mombauer 2001, 125.
78. Herrmann 1996, 172.
79. Stevenson acutely makes this point in framing his own argument on the origins of the
war. See Stevenson 1997, 126127.
80. Doran this volume. One of the more important puzzles for Neorealist theory is the
timing of the war. According to the distribution of capability in the system, Germany should
have gone to war in 1905when it was clearly the most preponderant state on the continent
and Russias defeat in the Russo-Japanese War left it weakened and unable to participate in
a European war. See Schroeder 1972, 323.
81. This can be an important lesson for US foreign policy, as it deals with the problems
of nuclear proliferation and the rise of China. If proliferators want recognition, this will
call for a dramatically different nonproliferation strategy than one based on narrow security interests. Likewise, if Chinas rise is marked by a desire to assume its place among
the existing great powers, then the US must formulate a foreign policy that responds
accordingly.
Bibliography
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Anderson, Eugene Newton. 1930. The First Moroccan Crisis, 19041906. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Ashley, Richard. 1986. The Poverty of Neorealism. In Neorealism and Its Critics, edited by
Robert O. Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press.
Barlow, Ima Christina. 1971. The Agadir Crisis. Hamden: Archon Books.
Barnes, Barry. 2001. Practice as Collective Action. In The Practice Turn in Contemporary
Theory. New York: Routledge.
Biersteker, Thomas J., and Cynthia Weber. 1996. The Social Construction of State Sovereignty. In State Sovereignty as Social Construct, 121. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. 2000. Beyond Identity. Theory and Society 29 (1).
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Campbell, David. 1998. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
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London: His Majestys Stationery Office.
Doran, Charles F. 2011. World War I from the Perspective of Power Cycle Theory: Recognition, Adjustment Delusions, and the Trauma of Expectations Foregone. In The
International Politics of Recognition, edited by Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar.
Boulder: Paradigm.
Edwards, E. W. 1963. The Franco-German Agreement on Morocco, 1909. English Historical Review 78 (308).
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Glaser, Charles L. 2004. When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational Versus Suboptimal
Arming. International Security 28 (4).
Great Britain, Foreign Office. 1926. British Documents on the Origins of the War, 18981914,
Volume 7. London: His Majestys Stationery Office.
Greenhill, Brian. 2008. Recognition and Collective Identity Formation in International
Politics. European Journal of International Relations 14 (2): 343368.
Hayne, M. B. 1993. The French Foreign Office and the Origins of the First World War, 1898
1914. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Herrmann, David G. 1996. The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War.
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Relations Theory. International Security 32 (2): 155191.
Markell, Patchen. 2003. Bound by Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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4/18/11 12:36 PM
Chapter 8
Self-Identification, Recognition,
and Conflicts
The Evolution of Taiwans Identity,
19492008
Yana Zuo
Taiwans identity reconstruction, characterized by its self-denial of its conventional

Chinese identity, has led to massive identity confusion within the Taiwanese people;
it has also transformed the cross-Taiwan Strait relationship to the point where, despite
Beijing and Washingtons joint efforts, the dispute has become even more difficult
to resolve. By the end of Chen Shui-bians presidency in late May 2008, the crossTaiwan Strait relationship was characterized by increasing animosity. The aim of
this chapter is to show how Taipeis shifting self-identification and its struggle for
diplomatic recognition, based on its self-identification, have complicated Taipeis
relationship with Beijing. The future of the cross-Taiwan Strait relationship is still
full of uncertainty and unpredictability, although there has been some progress since
the KMT won back power in 2008.1
In fact, Taiwans self-identification and international recognition had been
problematized by Beijings continuous success in joining the international society as
the sole legitimate government of China even before the end of the Cold War. The
breakdown of Taipeis diplomatic relationship with Washington and the Republic of
153
4/18/11 12:36 PM
154 Yana Zuo

Chinas (ROC hereafter) withdrawal from the UN in the 1970s caused a dramatic
shift in the ROCs international status. Taipeis self-identification in relation to the
mainland was shifted from The ROC is the sole legitimate government of the Chinese nation, including both the mainland and Taiwan to Taipei and Beijing share
China sovereignty as equals and further to Taiwan is sovereign and independent
from China. However, due to Beijings strong opposition to Taipeis new position,
Taipeis newly defined identities failed to be recognized by international society, and
the cross-Taiwan Strait relationship was further complicated and the confrontation
intensified.
Yet, within the discipline of international relations, there has been scant attention paid to the question of identity politics in the context of Taiwan. This article
seeks to contribute to a more adequate understanding of the issue of recognition
and its impact on international relations. It does so by looking at the historical
evolution of Taiwans self-identification, its struggle for external recognition from
both Mainland China and the broader international community, and the impact
Taiwans struggle for diplomatic recognition has had on the cross-Taiwan Strait
relations since the 1940s.
The next section explores the change of Taiwans self-identification and its struggle
for international recognition. The conclusion addresses the implications this study has
for understanding both the cross-Taiwan Strait relationship and the role of recognition in identity formation. While providing an account of change and continuity
in Taiwans self-identification and its struggle for recognition, this study ultimately
demonstrates that recognition matters a great deal to international relations. The
formation of an identity is not effectual if the new identity has not been recognized
by outside communities. When a state re-identifies itself, it demands recognition
from the international community for its newly claimed identity. A states struggle
for recognition might lead to instability and insecurity when its self-identification
clashes with how it is identified in the eyes of other actors. However, the shift of both
self-identification and of the demanded recognition was long neglected by scholars.
This chapter aims to bridge that gap. By the same token, the role that mainstream
constructivists have assigned to identity lacks a historical perspective. Yet, there are
some theorists, such as Mlada Bukovansky and Ted Hopf, who have engaged with
history while investigating the conceptions of identity, none of them have looked at
the process of an identitys historical evolution. More specifically, by revisiting the
historical events of the French Revolution, Bukovansky observes the constitutive
force that ideas of legitimacy factors have on state identity.2 Drawing largely from
domestic sources, such as literature and newspapers, Hopf compares and contrasts the
discourses of identity in the USSR in 1995 and in Russia in 1999.3 He then ultimately
links these identities with foreign policies to demonstrate how the domestic societys
attitudes toward foreign states affect a state and its decision-makers understandings
of other states. Different from the work aforementioned, this chapter follows the
journey of Taiwans identity evolution since the 1940s to explore how recognition
matters to identity formation.
4/18/11 12:36 PM
Self-Identification, Recognition and Conflicts 155
I. 1940s to 1988: Consolidating the One China Identity

When the government of the ROC first retreated to Taiwan in 1949 after the KMT
was defeated by the CCP in the Chinese Civil War, it identified itself as the sole legitimate government of the whole Chinese nation, including both mainland China
and Taiwan. The ROC managed to maintain diplomatic recognition based on its
self-identification until the early 1970s. Taipei was still a member of the Security
Council until Beijing was seated in the UN, and Taipei withdrew from the organization at the same time in 1972. The loss of its UN membership, together with
the Washington-Beijing rapprochement in later days, caused a diplomatic crisis for
Taipei. Those two events effectively caused international de-recognition of the ROCs
identity as the sole legitimate government of China.
Right after the PRCs establishment, the USSR, the East European states from the
Communist Camp, and other Asian nationalist countries set up diplomatic relations
with the PRC, and some of the western countries, such as Sweden, also switched
their diplomatic relationship.4 Beijing actively sought international recognition and
more and more countries turned to the mainland. Taipeis strategy to compete with
Beijing in the international arena was a zero-sum principle. The core of this principle was that if a state diplomatically recognized the PRC, the ROC would break
its diplomatic ties with that state. This strategy proved to be counter-productive for
Taipei. By 1971, the number of states that recognized Beijing was for the first time
larger than those that recognized Taipei, and the gap has grown bigger and bigger
ever since (see Table 1).5
Table 1: Numbers of states recognizing Taipei and Beijing (19501990)a

Year
Number of countries having

diplomatic relationship with Taipei
1950 44
1960 59
1966 66
1969 69
1970 67
1971 56
1972 43
1974 32
1976 26
1979 23
1980 23
1983 24
1985 23
1988 22
1989 26
1990 28
Number of countries having

diplomatic relationship with Beijing
23
42
51
50
54
74
92
104
118
127
130
135
138
141
136
139
a Wei, 1993:2.
4/18/11 12:36 PM
156 Yana Zuo

In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a boost to the PRCs diplomatic relations and
international status. More than eighty countries set up diplomatic relations with the
PRC from 1971 to 1989, which increased the number of countries that recognized
the PRC to more than one hundred.6 During the same period, only twelve of them
established or re-established diplomatic relations with the ROC, which made a total
number of twenty-six countries with formal diplomatic relationships with the ROC.
Most of the countries that tied with Taipei diplomatically were underdeveloped
countriesonly Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and South Africa were relatively powerful states.7 It became unrealistic for Taipei to maintain that the ROC was the sole
legitimate government representing the nation of China.
The most influential issue impacting the ROCs recognition in the wider world
was the establishment of the PRC-US diplomatic relationship. The ROC allied
itself with the United States in the early 1950s, which blocked the CCPs military
takeover and facilitated the KMTs rule in Taiwan.8 The alliance also granted the
ROC the legitimacy to operate as the representative of China in the international
community for a few decades. However, as the PRC-Soviet split became more and
more obvious in the late 1950s, the West showed increasing signs of wishing to
engage with Mao and his government, which also opened a new chapter of the
PRC-US relationship.9 The United States eventually turned to the PRC and set up
diplomatic relations in 1979.
The diplomatic de-recognition from Washington, Taipeis formal ally, was a severe
blow. The international recognition of Taipei as the sole legitimate government of
China was fading away, which threatened Taipeis existing identity as the legitimate
government of the Chinese nation. Prior to the American de-recognition, Taipei had
already lost its membership in the UN.
The PRC knocked on the UNs door not long after it took control over the
mainland. Yet after almost a decade of effort to improve its international status and
the upsurge in the establishment of diplomatic relations with Asian, African, and
Latin American countries, the PRC government not only had de facto control over
Mainland China but also successfully had the UN General Assembly put the issue
of Chinas representation on the UN agenda in 1961.
Different US administrations proposed different approaches to Chiang Kai-shek,
the ROCs then president, regarding a solution to the two-Chinas problem.10 However, for Taipei, Chinas sovereignty could not be shared or divided. Chiang asserted,
the idea of two Chinas is what I [am] strongly against ... [it is] only an illusion11.
He also said, regarding [the] USs proposal ... as a plan to bring about a two Chinas
arrangement in the UN, the ROC would have no part of such proposals and would
withdraw from UN rather than be party to them.12
In his address, To All Chinese Patriots Referring to the UN Issue, Chiang Kaishek said, Based on the principle of zero-sum ... the ROC intends to withdraw
from the UN, of which it was one of the founding members before the 2758 (XXVI)
resolution was put into practice. Meanwhile, we clarify that the ROC government
4/18/11 12:36 PM

and all Chinese people will not accept the legitimacy of the resolution on the grounds
that it has violated the UN Charter.13 Clearly, Taipei still identified itself as the sole
legitimate government of China representing the whole nation, both Taiwan and
the mainland.
The loss of its membership in the UN in 1972 posed a severe challenge to the
ROCs self-identification as the legal representative of China, or even more dramatically, as an acceptable actor in the international community. After withdrawing from
the UN, the ROC also lost its membership in many other international organizations.
For example, despite being one of the twenty-three founding members of the General
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the ROC was expelled from the organization in October 1971.14 In accordance with the zero-sum rule, the ROC also lost its
membership in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) when
the PRC joined these two institutions.15 Having lost its diplomatic ties with other
states while losing membership in international organizations, Taipei was forced into
international isolation. A crisis of identity thus followedthe consequence of global
de-recognition was de-legitimization of the ROC government and the collapse of its
identity as the legitimate representative body of China.
Neither international isolation nor re-identifying the ROC was acceptable for
Taipei, and instead, Chiang Ching-kuo found a third way: pragmatic diplomacy
aimed at changing the international context for the ROC without challenging its
self-identification as the sole legitimate governing body of China.16 The essence of
this policy was to expand bilateral and multilateral trade, as well as cultural, technological, sports, and even military and political relationships. The channel was
economic diplomacy, while treating political reform and anti-communism as the
core means to acquire recognition.17 However, Taipei failed to secure recognition on
these terms. Due to the PRCs strong opposition to the use of any names which had
official implications since they would represent a challenge to the PRCs legitimacy
as the sole lawful government of China,18 Taiwan was during this period forced to
join and re-join ten governmental international organizations under the name of
Chinese Taipei.19
In this way, the world gradually turned to Beijing and recognized Beijings legitimate claim to represent the Chinese nation; Taipeis insistence on representing the
nation became meaningless. Taipeis identity based on its self-identification as the sole
legitimate representative body of China was de-recognized by the international community. This shows that a states self-identification is valid only when it is recognized
by the international society. This case also demonstrates that de-recognition could take
an identity apart, and when it happens, it could lead to an identity crisis for a state.
Yet history did not stop here. An identity is something we cannot live without
Taipei could not preserve its identity and it needed to construct a new one.20 In
responding to the circumstance, Taipei re-identified itself in relation to the PRC and
even in relation to the idea of China. It started a new journey to acquire international
recognition for its new self-identification.
4/18/11 12:36 PM
158 Yana Zuo
II. 19882000: Pursuing Dual Recognition

After Chiang Ching-kuos sudden death in 1988, he was succeeded by Lee Teng-hui.
Lee identified the ROC and the PRC as equals, sharing the sovereignty of China.
While accepting the PRCs legitimacy in the mainland, Taipei now attempted to
operate in the international community as an equal of the PRC, rather than claiming
that it legitimately represented the whole nation of China. Lee Teng-huis primary
policy was to keep the ROC alive in the international community.21 The strategy
was labeled dual recognition. This position reflected a move away from the previous
position: the ROC was no longer the sole legitimate government of China and the PRC
was not an illegitimate entity that had usurped power. Beijing strongly re-affirmed
the one China policy and successfully blocked Taipeis access to the international
community as an independent and sovereign entity. Although Taiwan successfully
won the worlds sympathy for its political reforms and economic miracles, it was not
able to win recognition diplomatically.
Lee used the vast resources of government to expand Taiwans international relations and stressed the political separateness of the two regimes.22 In order to acquire
diplomatic recognition as an equal of Beijing, Taipei was actively seeking to join
international organizations and to develop diplomatic relationship with other states.
Lees first step was to send delegates to attend the Asian Development Banks (ADB)
conference held in Beijing. This was the first time the ROC sent delegates since the
bank changed the ROCs name to Taipei, China after the PRC won its bid for the
membership in 1986.23
Since 1991, Taiwan has also tried to re-join the UN, and in 1993, seven LatinAmerican countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan sent a letter to UN
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali urging him to put the matter of Taiwan
on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. The newsletter issued by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) on September 22, 1994 emphasized that Our attempt
to rejoin the UN does not challenge the CCP governments membership in the UN,
neither does it exclude the unification of China.24 However, Taipeis application
was not successful.
In another effort to achieve dual recognition and cohabit with the PRC in
the international community, the ROC used dollar diplomacy. Its main targets
were Southeast Asia, Central and South America, and Africa. Beginning in 1993,
the ROC adopted a Go South policy to encourage Taiwans businesses to invest
in Southeast Asia. The Go South policy did not bring the ROC a diplomatic
breakthrough due to Southeast Asian countries insistence on separating politics
and economicseconomically, they tried to absorb Taiwans investments, and
politically, they remained faithful to the PRCs interpretation of the one China
policy and recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government. Taipei failed to be
recognized as an equal of Beijing.
The dollar diplomacy in Central and South America and some African states
was also challenged by Beijing. The PRCs economic growth in the last few decades
4/18/11 12:36 PM

made it possible for Beijing to also play dollar diplomacy in relation to the same
parts of the world. The competition from Beijing was massive and consequently the
ROC, by the end of Lees tenure, had lost most of its formal diplomatic ties in Africa,
including its strongest ally, South Africa. Taipei did not have any breakthrough on
the diplomatic front.
With the lifting of Martial Law in 1987, Taiwan gradually transformed its political
system into a democratic one, and it was recognized by the international community
as one of the most vivid democracies in Asia.25 In 1993, the Clinton administration
reviewed its Taiwan policy and reported to Congress on September 27, 1994 with
the conclusion that the island had made remarkable political and economic progress
and that, in light of this fact, it was wrong to maintain the same stance to the ROC
as in 1979. There were voices urging support for the other China.26 If the US interests were well served by supporting democracy and human rights abroad, as most
Americans believed, then such support must entail treating the ROC and its leaders
with respect and dignity.27
President Clinton agreed to issue a visa to Lee Teng-hui for a visit to his alma
mater, Cornell University, on May 22, 1995. As Lee made clear, the purpose of his
trip was to win international recognition of Taiwan as a political entity.28 On June
9, 1995, he delivered an Olin Lecture titled What the People Want Is Always in
My Heart. Here Lee appealed to the international community to treat the ROC
in Taiwan fairly and reasonably. In his conclusion, Lee highlighted that he acted
with the people in my heart and that he knew what his people would like to say
to the world: We are here to stay; we stand ready to help; and we look forward to
sharing the fruits of our democratic triumph.29
Lee Teng-huis visit to the United States in 1995 ignited the PRC governments
anger. The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) carried out large military maneuvers
in July 1995 and March 1996, involving missile launches and live-fire tests in areas
within one hundred miles of Taiwan.30 The reason for this anger is perhaps explained
by Qian Qichen, the PRCs vice premier and foreign minister at that time, who noted
in his autobiography, Ten Stories of a Diplomat, that Lees visit to the United States
broke a seventeen-year record of no visits to the United States from Taiwans highestranking governmental official. He continues that the PRC considered this event as a
provocation and counter-attacked accordingly.31 Qian himself called the American
ambassador J. Stapleton Roy on May 23 and protested vigorously against the US
decision to grant Lee a visa; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC announced
that the minister of defenses scheduled visit to the United States would be suspended
and mutual, ministry-level visits and other negotiations were canceled. On June 16,
the Chinese ambassador to the United States, Li Daoyu, informed the United States
about the very serious and negative consequences caused by Lee Teng-huis visit.
The Taiwanese journalist Huiying Zhang argues that the PRC was fairly tolerant of Lees efforts to expand Taiwans space in the international community before
his visit to the United States in 1995, given that the PRC was so concerned about
cleaning up its image as a brutal regime after the Tiananmen incident.32 Immediately
4/18/11 12:36 PM
160 Yana Zuo

after Lees visit to the United States, the PRC started to put limits on Taiwans role
on the global stage. The PRCs response shocked the United States, and after rounds
of direct confrontations with the PRC, it is reported that Clinton passed a letter to
Jiang Zemin in 1995 explicitly stating that the United States did not support a one
China, one Taiwan policy or a two Chinas policy.33 Also the United States did not
support Taiwanese independence or Taiwanese membership in organizations requiring statehood.34 The policy was later made official during the 1997 Clinton-Jiang
summit and it became known as the three nos promise.
This effectively broke US relations with Taiwan, and the CCP government became
less tolerant toward Taipeis effort to raise its international profile. Lees visit to the
United States and its subsequent consequences made most states realize that Lees
visits to other countries would impact their relationships with the PRC and would
also possibly affect the stability of the Asia-Pacific region and even the world. As a
result, they chose to avoid such a scenario. Inevitably this reaction prevented Lee from
exerting his strength to further lift Taiwans international profile.35 Lee Teng-huis
1995 visit to the United States served as the dividing point for the cross-Taiwan Strait
relationship and also for Taipeis international space.36
During Lees administration, Taipei moved away from the position that it was the
sole legitimate government of China and re-identified itself as an equal of Beijing in
the international community. Lee did not attempt to represent all Chinese people,
and the people in his heart were those living in Taiwan. Beijings refusal to recognize
Taiwans new identity, particularly after Lees 1995 visit to the United States, blocked
Taipeis access to the international society. By 2000 when Lee stepped down as the
ROCs president, the ROCs goal of achieving equal international recognition with
the PRC had failed. Taipeis effort to cohabit with the PRC and gain global dual
recognition was unsuccessful. South Korea, the last country in Asia to maintain
diplomatic relationship with Taipei, established a diplomatic relationship with the
mainland in 1992. By the same token, South Africa, the most influential nationstate still maintaining diplomatic relations with the ROC, broke those relations with
Taiwan and recognized the PRC in 1997.
The PRCs refusal to renegotiate Taipeis position was based on its long-held
position that the PRC, and only the PRC, could represent the Chinese nation. From
Taipeis perspective, the battle across the Taiwan Strait was over once it had accepted
the PRCs legitimacy in the mainland.37 However, for Beijing, this new position seemed
to be even less acceptable because it threatened to divide China. For the PRC, the
cross-strait debates still involved a competition between political regimes. And the
ROC, as the defeated side in the Civil War, can in no way be an equal of the PRC
or the legal international representative of the island of Taiwan. Taipeis attempt to
reformulate its identity turned the question of Taiwans status into a salient issue on
Beijings agenda. The PRC started to further tighten its Taiwan policy, particularly
after 2000 when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidential election. The PRCs refusal to renegotiate the ROCs identity did not prevent the latter
from insisting on a re-identification and this further formalized the split.
4/18/11 12:36 PM
III. 20002008: Seeking Taiwanese Independence

In 2000, the DPP, Taiwans pro-independence party, won the ROC presidency with
the election of Chen Shui-bian. This development ended over half a century of KMT
rule in Taiwan. The ROCs identity has undergone substantial change ever since.
Having moved a step forward from Lee Teng-huis position, the DPP government
explicitly identified Taiwan as a sovereign and independent state from China and tried
to expand its international role. In an effort to acquire international recognition for
its radical position on Taiwans relationship with the mainland, the DPP government
drew contrasts between democratic and peace-loving Taiwan and Chinathe
biggest threat to the regional stability and a rogue state. 38
According to Taipeis reports on foreign policy, the main strategy of the DPP
government from 2000 to 2007 was to participate in international organizations.39
For state-to-state diplomatic relations, apart from some vague statements such as
upgrading our relationship with other states, the summary of the ROCs reports
on foreign relations do not effectively demonstrate that Taipei had a clear goal about
what it intended to achieve and how it was going to achieve it.40 In the foreign
policy reports, Taipei merely set the goal as consolidating the existing diplomatic
relationships.41
Taipei still invested heavily in developing diplomatic relationships with other states,
although the island was experiencing an economic downturn. Yet Taipeis dollar diplomacy did not serve as an effective strategy to acquire international recognition for
its self-defined sovereignty and independent status. The PRC was taking advantage
of its fast-growing economy and stepped up its dollar diplomacy program, and the
PRCs economy was far stronger.42 At the same time, Beijing was using its political
leverage to develop and expand contacts with Taipeis friends in Latin America and
the Caribbean. In September 2004, Beijing sent a peacekeeping team to Haiti, one
of Taipeis formal diplomatic allies. This could have potentially diminished Taipeis
diplomatic ties with other states, which could have seriously affected Taiwans ability
to act on the world stage as well as its international status.43 During Chens tenure
from May 2000 to May 2008, Taipei did not make any real progress in its formal
diplomatic relationship with individual states.44
Taipei knocked on the doors of key international institutions, and the World
Health Organization (WHO) was a primary target. When the ROC left the UN,
it also lost its membership in the WHO. Taipei started to make a bid to re-enter
the WHO in 1997. In 2003, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) broke
out in both Mainland China and Taiwan. The Taiwanese government took the
opportunity to proclaim that health is not a political issue; disease and medical
care have no national boundaries, in order to join the WHO.45 The Foundation of
Medical Professionals Alliance in Taiwan also worked on a project called Taiwan
for the WHO: it argued that Taiwans absence from the WHO was an abuse of
Taiwanese human rights.46 Taipei was also keen to link its WHO bid with other
events in world affairs, such as the anti-terror war, in order to gain further leverage.
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162 Yana Zuo

As the Foundation of Medical Professionals argued, While global terrorism rises,
Taiwan may become a dangerous missing part of the worldwide anti-terrorism network, if it is still left out of the doors of important international organizations.47
Taipei called for each country to apply its moral conscience when considering
whether to support Taiwans bid.48
From 2007, Taipei pursued its membership in the WHO under the name of
Taiwan, but due to WHOs requirement for membershipstatehoodthe PRC
blocked the bid. Taipei also sought membership in the United Nations.49 This was not
a new policythe KMT government attempted to rejoin the UN since 1993. What
made the DPP governments bid historic was that the DPP re-identified Taiwans
position and sought to join the UN under the name of Taiwan. In President Chen
Shui-bians letter to Ban Ki-Moon and Wang Guangyathe PRCs ambassador to
the UN, who also served as rotating president of the UN Security Councilin July
2007, Chen first condemned the international community for not respecting the
dignity of Taiwans people and labeled Taiwans exclusion from the UN as political
apartheid, which was unfair, incomprehensible and unbearable. Chen characterized Taiwan as a country that advocates the universal values of freedom, democracy,
human rights, and peace and its identity is denied and security threatened since
it was excluded from the UN.50
Chens letter to Ban Ki-Moon was returned by the UN citing the UNs General
Assembly Resolution 2758(XXVI), which recognizes the PRC as the lawful representative of the Chinese nation to the world body. Wang Guangya commented that
Beijing firmly opposed Taipeis blatant attempt at splitting China, and he added
that Taiwan is part of China ... and ... it is ... not eligible to participate [in the
UN] in whatever name and under whatever pretext.51
Taipeis effort to obtain international recognition as an independent and sovereign
state fuels conflicts across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing pressed the United States to
intervene against Taipeis moves to drag Taiwan further away from China, despite
the fact that Beijing had stressed that the issue was a domestic one that should be
left to the Chinese across the strait to deal with. The US National Security Council
Acting Senior Director Dennis Wilder said at a White House press conference,
Membership in the United Nations requires statehood. Taiwan, or the Republic
of China, is not at this point a state in the international community.52 The US
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas J. Christensen also said that frontal
assaults on Beijings sensitivities are bound to fail and, at the end of the day, leave
Taipei further behind.53
Despite all the efforts the DPP government made to consolidate an independent
Taiwanese identity, they received little recognition from outsiders. Beijing strongly
rejected any attempt to renegotiate Taiwans identity in relation to Chinathe one
China policy could not possibly be altered. With its fast-growing economic and
political power, Beijing successfully blocked Taipeis bids to join any international
organizations that required statehood. After all, an independent Taiwan was not
compatible with the interests of other states, even for the United Statessupporting
4/18/11 12:36 PM

Taipei involved inflaming relations with the PRC and the cost was simply too high.
Without recognition from outsiders, the policy of the DPP government failed.
However, the gradual change in Taipeis self-identification exhausted Beijings
patience and the cross-Taiwan Strait relationship became increasingly bitter. The
PRC, and its joint efforts with the United States, still failed to prevent the DPP
government from carrying on with its attempts to acquire international recognition
as an independent state. Taipei had gone far beyond what Beijing was willing to tolerate. Indeed, Taipeis series of moves made Beijing less confident about the future of
the cross-Taiwan Strait relationship, although greater integration in both social and
economic spheres generated hope within the PRC government that time might be
on its side. But Taipeis efforts to differentiate itself from the mainland and diminish
its Chineseness proved increasingly unsettling for Beijing.54
Just before the election in February 2000, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State
Council published a white paper with the title The One-China Principle and the
Taiwan Issue, and raised the three ifs, reiterating the conditions under which the
PRC would use military forces to block Taiwans separation.55 Beijing also issued a
law banning secession. This was the first time that Beijing attempted to solve the
cross-Taiwan Strait problems under a legal framework, and it was the Hu Jintao
administrations first step toward approaching the Taiwan issue. The purpose of this
law was opposing and checking Taiwans secession from China, promoting peaceful
national reunification, maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, preserving Chinas sovereignty and territorial integrity, and safeguarding the fundamental
interests of the Chinese nation.56 It clarified that Solving the Taiwan question and
achieving national reunification is Chinas internal affair, which is subject to no
interference by any outside forces.57
The DPP re-drew the boundary between self and otherthe demarcation under
Chens administration was between two separate nations, Taiwan and China.
Chinas sovereignty had gone through dramatic changes in Taipeis narratives since
the 1940sfrom the position that Chinas sovereignty could not be divided and was
represented by Taipei, to one in which Chinas sovereignty was shared between Taipei
and Beijing, and further to the view that Chinas sovereignty does not include Taipei.
By questioning and denying Chinas sovereignty over Taiwan, the DPP intends to
legitimize its long-pursued identity for Taiwana sovereign and independent state.
This represents a radical shift from the original position in 1949, which glorified
China, and it is effectively a form of self-denialMainland China, part of the old
self, has actually become the other.
Beijing fiercely objected to this new position, and the relationship across the strait
went from bad to worse. Taipei identified the issue as one concerning Taiwans survival
as an independent and sovereign nation. This development demonstrates that when
a states identity based on its self-identification clashes with how others define it, it
may lead to instabilities and conflicts. Taipei once again failed to gain diplomatic
recognition in the international community, emphasizing the theoretical point that
a states claim on its identity is weak as long as it remains unrecognized by others.
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164 Yana Zuo
Conclusion
As this chapter has demonstrated, external recognition matters a great deal to a states
identity. To form an identity, the members of a group need to identify with each other
to form a self and also identify against out-groups to form an other (or others).
The nature of identification determines how the boundaries of the self are drawn.58
Identification is more about the image we portray in the eyes of othersthe process
of identification involves how others see and judge our self-recognition.59 People
attribute identity in the process of social interactiona people claim their identity
and audiences make judgments about the claimant. The success of this process always
depends on how the self is being seen and judged.
Taipei failed to acquire diplomatic recognition in the international communityit
failed to maintain its position as the the sole legitimate government of China in
the early days; it failed to cohabit with Beijing as an equal in international society
under Lees tenure; and it failed to operate as an independent and sovereign state under the DPP government. Without external recognition, none of the aforementioned
properties that the government in Taipei has attributed to Taiwan are effectual. How
a state identifies itself is meaningless when they are not recognized by othersit does
not matter whether the non-recognition is caused by de-recognition or an inability
to acquire recognition in the first place.
Identity construction is an ongoing and fluid process. Identities do indeed have
historical roots and they evolve across time. From the sole legitimate government of
China to Taipei and Beijing are equals to Taiwan is sovereign and independent
from China, Taipeis self-identification has changed dramatically.60 Since mainstream
constructivists do not examine identity through a historical lens, they cannot explain
identity change and its impact on international relations.
The attributes embedded in an identity are not stagnant, and when a state reidentifies itself, new recognition is needed. The shift of a states self-identification
calls for changes of external recognition. A states struggle for external recognition
based on its self-identification has huge impacts on international relationsonce
rejected, instability and insecurity might set in. It is particularly true when the shift
of self-identification involves self/other boundary re-drawing.
Taipei has gone beyond identity enhancement or preservationit re-drew the
boundary between self and other. Taipei was in essence attempting to re-identify
its corporate identity, in Wendts term.61 This new development reflected the anomalous nature of the Taiwan case, in comparison to the other divided nations after
the WWII. Although fully equipped with ideological clashes, neither of the Koreas
denied their Koreanness. The Germans moved far ahead. Even before the unification
had taken place, neither side denied their German identity. Although scholars such as
Gebhard Schweigler62 argued that separate identities were formed in two Germanys,
the very nature of the division was revolving around their social identities. Neither of
them was attempting to alter their corporate identity and their Germanness.
4/18/11 12:36 PM

The Chinese case paralleled the other aforementioned cases until the early 1990s.
For a long period of time since 1949, when the ROC government first retreated to
Taiwan, both Taipei and Beijing defined themselves as the legitimate government
representing the whole nation of China and the other one as an illegal and illegitimate
entity. The very start of Taiwans attempt to alter the conventional corporate identity
of being a Chinese state was during Lee Teng-huis tenure. Selfthe ROCdoes
not include the mainland any more since then. The conception of self remains the
same for Beijing, which still identified itself as the legitimate governing body of the
Chinese nation. Beijing rejects being excluded from self and rejects Taipeis new
demarcation between the mainland and Taiwan. The relationship across the Taiwan
Strait has been intensified due to Taipeis radical move to re-identify itself.
Taipei and Beijing are jointly making efforts to break the deadlock again since the
KMT took the office in 2008 with the election of Ma Ying-jeou. Mas administration re-identifies Taiwans future with the mainland and pulled back from the DPPs
radical independent position to the conception of Greater China. Taipei accepted
the WHOs invitation to join the organization under the name of Chinese Taipei
in May 2009. However, it is hard to believe that the cross-Taiwan Strait relationship
is going to be smooth from now on and that Chinese Taipei is the permanent
solution for the cross debates over Taiwans identity. The leaderships across the
Taiwan Strait are still facing severe tests. How will the KMT prepare for the next
presidential election and react to the DPPs identity politics while Mas popularity
plummets because of Taiwans deteriorating economy, along with the recent global
financial crisis? How will Beijing handle issues with regard to Taiwans membership
in international organizations while it has to maintain a benevolent interaction with
Taipei? As long as there is a chance that Taipei would struggle for international recognition for an independent identity, the cross-Taiwan Strait confrontation would
not demise. Germanys unification showed that differences embedded in social
identities do not prevent national unificationtwo political entities who recognize
the common corporate identify, the soul of them, can eventually come together. An
independent Taiwan clashes with how Beijing sees Taiwans identity in relation to
the mainland. Taiwans return to its conventional Chinese identity is called for to
prevent cross-strait conflicts.
Notes
I would like to express my gratitude to Shuyong Guo, Thomas Lindemann, Richard Little,
John Pella, and Erik Ringmar for their insightful comments.
1. KMT, Kuomingtang, also known as the Chinese Nationalist Party. CCP: the Chinese
Communist Party.
2. Bukovansky 1999.
3. Hopf 2002.
4. Foreign Ministry of the PRC 2000.
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166 Yana Zuo

5. Wei 1993, 2.
6. Tien 1989,1136
7. Cai and Wu 1989, 83.
8. See Taylor 2000 for details about the US involvement in the post WWII KMT-CCP
conflict.
9. Taylor 2000.
10. Under the Eisenhower administration, Washington proposed a concept of divided
China and suggested the creation of a new member in the UN for Beijing, and the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations proposed more substantial approaches with the main points
that the ROC and the PRC, as two states, had succeeded China. See Bush 2004.
11. Chiang 1967.
12. Chiang, quoted in Bush 2004, 108.
13. Chiang 1971, 262. Emphasis added.
14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008.
15. Tien 1989, 14
16. Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-sheks son, took the presidency in 1978. When Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975, it was the vice president Yan Jiagan who succeeded, but Jingguo
was the head of the Executive Yuan and the real leader of the ROC from the mid-1960s. See
Taylor 2000.
17. Lee 2004.
18. For example, the name of the ROC would not be acceptable for Beijing.
19. See Tien 1989, 14. Also it is worth noting that the Chinese version for Chinese Taipei is
different across the straitZhonghua Taipei in Taiwan and Zhongguo Taipei in the mainland.
The former is more of a cultural/ethnic term and the latter is more of a political term.
20. For example, Guibernau 1999.
21. Lee 1999.
22. See Chao et al. 2002, 115122.
23. The ROC had been a member of the ADB since 1966. Taipei did not attend the annual conferences until 1989 as a gesture of protest against the ADBs decision to lower its
international status. See Cai and Wu 1989.
24. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1994.
25. Key steps of Taiwans democratization include: legalizing opposition parties, localization of the KMT, direct presidential elections, and so on. For more details about the process
of democratization in Taiwan, see Chao and Myers 1994.
26. Referring to the ROC, a term used in the Senate Report.
27. Chang 1995.
28. Romberg 2003.
29. Lee 1995.
30. Garver 2000.
31. Qian 2003.
32. See Zhang 1996, 170190.
33. Romberg 2003.
34. Kan 2007, 62.
35. Zhang 1996, 243.
36. Su 2003.
37. The National Assembly on April 22, 1991, resolved to abolish the Temporary Provisions
4/18/11 12:36 PM

Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion, and on April 30, Lee Teng-hui announced
that it would be terminated on May 1.
38. Arguments along this line were drawn by various Taiwanese leaders. See, for example,
Chien 2002 and Tung 2007.
39. Tien 2000.
40. See for example, ibid.
41. For example Huang 2006.
42. The GDP (in US $billion) of Taiwan and the mainland between 2003 and 2008
is as follows: 305.4/1,641.0; 331.1/1,931.6; 356.2/2,235.8; 365.5/2,657.8; 383.3/3,280.2;
424.1/4,222.4. Figures are from the World Bank statistics, see http://www.imf.org/external/
ns/cs.aspx?id=28.
43. Dumbaugh and Sullivan 2005, 45. The Congressional Research Service Report.
44. The MOFAs newsletters revealed that during this period of time, Dominica, Macedonia, Nauru, Libya (the third time), Grenada, Senegal, Chad (the second time), Costa Rica
and Malawi switched their recognition from Taipei to Beijing; the Gilbert Islands, Saint Lucia,
switched from Beijing to Taipei with Nauru also re-recognizing Taipei in 2005.
45. Government Information Office 2003.
46. Foundation of Medical Professional Alliance in Taiwan 2008. Added emphasis.
47. Ibid.
48. Government Information Office 2004.
49. Taiwan was invited by the WHO to join the organization as an observer in May 2009.
See Xie 2009.
50. Chen 2007.
51. Wang 2007.
52. Hsu 2007, 1.
53. Christensen 2007.
54. Chineseness, a standard usage within the field of China studies, describes everything
Chinese, including both social and cultural factors as well as political factors, such as state
identity
55. [I]f a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China
in any name, or if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries, or if the Taiwan
authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits reunification through
negotiations, then the Chinese government will only be forced to adopt all drastic measures
possible, including the use of force, to safeguard Chinas sovereignty and territorial integrity
and fulfill the great cause of reunification. Taiwan Affairs Office and Information Office of
the State Council 2000.
56. See NCP 2005. Anti-Secession Law: article 1.
57. Ibid., article 3.
58. See Wendt 1994, 384396.
59. Ibid.
60. There are certainly other sources pushing Taipei to re-identify itself, such as domestic
politics and structural forces. For more details, see Zuo 2009.
61. Corporate identity, in Wendts discussions, is singular, intrinsic, and self-organizing
in quality; it is constitutionally exogenous to otherness and represents only one aspect of a
states identity. However, it is the site or platform for other identities. See Wendt 1994.
62. Schweigler 1975.
4/18/11 12:36 PM
168 Yana Zuo
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H. E. Mr. Ban Ki-moon. Accessed August 16. http://www.china-un.org/eng/dbtxx/
hyxx/zyhdzys/t357129.htm.
Wei, Min. 1993. The Bilateral Diplomacy of the ROC. Taipei: Yeqiang Publishing House.
Wendt, Alexander. 1994. Collective Identity Formation and the International State. American
Political Science Review 88 (2): 384396.
Xie, Yu. 2009. Taiwan Gets Observer Status at WHA. China Daily. Accessed May 19. http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-05/19/content_7791269.htm.
Zhang, Huiying. 1996. The Super Diplomat Lee Deng-hui and His Pragmatic Diplomacy.
Taipei: China Times.
Zuo, Yana. 2009. Taiwans Identity Evolution since the 1940s and Its Impact on the Cross Taiwan
Strait Relationship. PhD dissertation, University of Bristol.
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Chapter 9
Recognition, the Non-Proliferation

Regime, and Proliferation Crises
Alexandre Hummel
Nuclear proliferation is generally seen as a security problem, and decisions by states

to develop nuclear weapons, or to prevent other states from acquiring them, are most
commonly explained with at least some reference to the notion of threat. The idea
that nuclear weapons are a response to a threat and themselves create threats for others
is at the core of the proliferation concept, which is an amended version of the security
dilemma: a mechanistic increase in states military capabilities provoked by a spiral
of reciprocal fear and hostility. According to this conventional logic, strategic-chain
reaction will take place because acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state is likely to
provoke repercussions elsewhere, and the non-proliferation regime is the device states
have found to tackle this problem. For most proliferation analysts, individual choices
by states and their national identity do not heavily matter; what is most important is
the geo-strategic position of states, their alliances, and the state of the international
non-proliferation regime. Realists stress that states in a threatening environment
will inevitably seek a nuclear security guarantee that can only be obtained through
nuclearization or alliance with a nuclear power. Liberals are somewhat more optimistic
and think that an effective regime can be decisive in avoiding a suboptimal situation
of generalized proliferation. Nevertheless, both schools of thought share a common
rationalist, utility-maximizing perspective about nuclear choices: states will balance
between threats, rewards, and costs when considering nuclearization and/or adhesion
to the non-proliferation regime. States that do not want nuclear weapons have every
171
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172 Alexandre Hummel

incentive to join the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to strengthen it in order
to avoid nuclearization by their neighbors. States that do want nuclear weapons will
only join the regime to cheat and will try to violate it at a lesser cost and maximum
benefit. Non-proliferation advocates thus concentrate their efforts on the strengthening of verification provisions in order to distinguish cheaters from honest participants.
This chapter focuses far more on states individual choices, national identity conceptions, and considerations about international fairness. I want to show that choices
about non-conventional weapons are not only a response to threats or inducements
but also involve patterns of recognition-denial and face-saving. This is particularly
true in the nuclear field because the non-proliferation regime is one of the very few
examples of discrimination in international law; it therefore inevitably clashes with
a central feature of the international scene: the myth of sovereign equality. This
tension if further aggravated by the symbolic dimension that nuclear weapons have
takenstates tend to be far more passionate in this field than a cold-blooded security
analysis would suggest. Indeed, an important feature of this debate in the post-1991
world is how a vast ensemble of states feels genuinely hurt by the inconsistencies of
non-proliferation and the attitude of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) that emphasize
a tough line on counter-proliferation while keeping and developing their own nuclear
arsenals. Such normative inconsistencies can be considered a source of symbolic violence, especially when a vast majority of states in the world are not engaged in any
sense toward nuclearization but nevertheless face pressure and increasingly stringent
controls. According to a traditional perspective, this should not be a problem: these
states will comply because it is in their interest to do so. However, a closer look at
the symbolic side of the story shows that the current status of the regime is deeply
resented outside of the Western world. Normative frustration was, for example, a
key cause in the failure of the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference where states were not even able to agree on an agenda due to acrimonious
disagreements. In other words, there is some evidence that, while many states are
truly committed to non-proliferation, they also increasingly resent the unfairness of
counter-proliferation policies.
Approaches focusing on recognition-denial and symbolic violence can thus be
mobilized to understand even hard-core security problems like tensions linked to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In
this chapter, I argue that proliferation criseswhen two or more states enter a confrontation because of proliferation, real or suspectedare not only caused by security
considerations but also frequently encompass emotional dimensions. These crises can
be precipitated and aggravated by patterns of struggle for recognition, which means
that international tension can exist and grow in ways that a purely security-based
approach would not have expected. This is especially true when the state suspected of
regime-violating behavior claims a very elevated self-image. In such a case, the wide
gap between the lowly status of a rogue state and claimed identity can encourage
leaders to engage in confrontational behavior that one cannot only explain through
material considerations. This is because simply giving in to the international diktat
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Recognition, the Non-Proliferation Regime and Proliferation Crises 173

would be equated with a loss of face. If a state sees itself as a proud, exceptional
country, pressures exerted in the name of the non-proliferation regime thus have
every chance to backfire. This pattern could explain why most proliferation crises
since the 1960s have involved countries with a peculiar sense of national identity,
while the ones that have been the most eager to cooperate are states with a freshly
renewed self-imageSouth Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all gave away
their nuclear weapons in the early 1990s.
I will first detail how the normative context surrounding nuclear weapons and
non-proliferation can be a source of frustration and resentment for states. I will then
present two paths that can lead to increased international tension and proliferation
crises at least in part through the struggle for recognition. The first is the case of
states that may fail to comply with the non-proliferation regime despite having no
military nuclear ambitions. The second is the case of states that may twist toward a
quest of nuclear weapons at least in part as a tool for self-affirmation.
The Setting: Normative Ambiguities and

Nuclear Weapons (Non-) Proliferation
On the surface, there is wide acceptance of a norm that is first declaratory: states
will not openly recognize that they seek nuclear weapons or even that they want to
obtain a military nuclear capability. The further spread of nuclear weapons is generally considered to be a bad thing, and only a few academics and military experts
publicly endorse the opposite view that selective proliferation could act as a stabilizing
force in the international system. Proliferation was unanimously labeled as a threat
to international peace and security by the Security Council in 2004, reflecting an
international consensus on this point.1 This widespread agreement has been progressively emerging and reinforcing itself since the middle of the 1960s when the idea of
non-proliferation first took off as an international priority. Before that, the spread of
nuclear weapons was not viewed as a particularly horrendous thing, especially if allies
were concerned. At the same time, countries like France and the Peoples Republic of
China were openly proclaiming, and even boasting, their nuclear ambitions. Since
then, the NPT has gained almost universal adherence and was extended indefinitely
in 1995. It has been supplemented by other agreements like International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ), export
controls or the proposed Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which
all start from the premise that an increase in the number of states armed with nuclear
weapons would be detrimental to regional and global security.
The main evidence pointing to the existence of a taboo stigmatizing open declaration of nuclear ambitions is the fact that all nuclear powers outside of the five NWS
took great care to dissimulate the true nature of their nuclear programs at least until
their first nuclear tests. In 1974, India was the first country to proclaim that its test
was a peaceful nuclear explosion. Israel has always refused to admit that it possesses
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a nuclear force, resorting to ambiguous statements. This attachment to ambiguity
goes far beyond cosmetics as exemplified by the case of Mordechai Vanunu, an Israeli citizen who was convicted of treason and espionage and served eighteen years
in prison for revealing details of the countrys nuclear program. The South African
nuclear program was also kept clandestine until its dismantlement was announced
in 1993. This pattern of concealment, or opaque proliferation, is one of the main
differences between the first nuclear era and the second nuclear age.2. Proliferation is
now opaque because it is widely considered to be bad, forcing states to explore subterranean ways to procure nuclear materials and know-how in order to avoid sanctions
and stigmatization. Even states that finally openly reveal their possession of nuclear
weapons somehow feel the need to justify themselves, citing imperious security reasons and re-affirming their ultimate commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons.
This necessity for proliferators to hide before crossing the threshold and to justify
themselves afterward is usually explained by the fact that most great powers place
non-proliferation as one of their top foreign policy priorities and are ready to punish
states seen as embarking on nuclearization. According to this logic, if non-proliferation
is valued by the great powers to the point that they are ready to intervene militarily
to defend it, it seems more prudent for most states not to embark on the nuclearization course.3 However, a quick look at recent history reveals that power politics
alone cannot explain states unusual shyness when it comes to nuclear ambitions.
Jumping through the threshold in 2006 has not significantly harmed North Koreas
situation, for examplequite the contrary. Ultimately, successful proliferators have
been tacitly accepted into the nuclear club even by the most vocal proponent of
counter-proliferation, as evidenced by American cooperation with India, Israel, and
Pakistan. The fight against proliferation is not always as intense as declarations of
intentions suggest and at least depends on other strategic considerations. It might
even be in the established nuclear powers interest to assist the newcomers in order
to obtain safe proliferation.4
Since the fight against proliferation is not always as resolute as it may seem at
first, denial of military intentions and concealment of existing weapons could also
signal the existence of a wider, prescriptive norm pushing aside the acquisition of a
nuclear force.5 It can be described as an individual inclination for states to abstain
from building nuclear weapons and to avoid helping other states to attain this goal,
as expressed by the rules specified in articles I and II of the NPT. This does not mean
that all states will refrain from building nuclear weapons all the time, or that nuclear
weapons possession is stigmatized, but rather that a vast majority of states do not
consider nuclearization as a legitimate option and expect their counterparts to do the
same, or at least that they say so. The wide diffusion and internalization of this belief
would provide another explanation for the absence of proper nuclear proliferation
that has puzzled strategic theorists since 1945. Many pessimistic anticipations have
indeed been proved wrong over the years, as nuclear weapons have actually been
spreading quite slowly. The NPT is nowadays the arms-control agreement that is
the closest to universality, with 191 state parties. NWFZ, unilateral renunciations
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to nuclear weapons, and even the dismantling of existing arsenals are further signs
pointing toward the rise of the abstention norm, which is, as many other norms, a
standard of oughtness offering states a possibility to affirm their identity as peaceloving, responsible nations.6 The effectiveness of this norm and its constraining effect
on state behavior are questionable since it has suffered notable exceptions, and most
states that respect it do not have the capacities or the utility to build nuclear weapons anyway. However, this relative weakness actually contributes to its popularity
because nuclear abstention is a cheap and easy way for most states to proclaim good
faith and dedication to international peace. Indeed, this possible abstention norm is
somewhat different from the abstinence perspective found in most realist and liberal
accounts of states without nuclear weapons.7 The latter suggests the active repression
of a drive to do something perceived as at least partly attractive, while the former is a
more passive or even unconscious decision not to do something. Nuclear abstention
embedded in the NPT does not seriously constrain most states strategic choices and
is therefore easily embraced.
This abstentionor non-nuclearizationnorm should be carefully distinguished
from the non-proliferation regime that is partially built on it. A regime is an institution
designed to allow and facilitate cooperation between states, whereas nuclear abstention
is an individual prescription that states may feel is legitimate to respect independently
of treaty provisions.8 This is exemplified by the attitude of states that claim to respect
the norm even if they are not, or are not yet, members of the regime. States can adhere to the norm while rejecting the regime, but the opposite is impossible. Another
important difference between non-nuclearization and non-proliferation is that, while
the former is uncontroversially admitted, there is a growing disagreement between
states on the latter. The regime is currently under strain with a widening rift between
the nuclear havesNWS, especially the Western ones, and their allieson one
side, and the have-nots on the other side. This trend was evidenced at the 2005
NPT Review Conference when states were unable to agree on a final document.
This failure of the review process is a direct result of the radicalization of positions
on each side. In 2005, Western NWS refused to even consider discussion on nuclear
disarmament, while many non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) were increasingly
sensible to radical Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) rhetoric.9
Things are further complicated by the fact that some non-proliferation regime
specifications have become symbols of condensation in the international diplomatic
arenathey have been reified and acquired a substance of their own.10 Empirical
research has shown that, in many fields of international negotiation, states do not
look only at their self-interest but pay attention to broader considerations of fairness.11
Agreements that are deemed to be fair have, on an equal-interest basis, more chance
of being accepted and implemented. Even a realist like Scott Sagan concurs in saying
that to be most effective over the long term, even strong powers must craft their policies to take into account the ethical concerns of other actors, including the weak.12
The symbolic and emotional dimension renders the debates about the NPT more
passionate and far-reaching than other arms-control issues. Practical considerations
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are mixed with broader feelings about the international order. The disarmament
component in non-proliferation has for example become a symbol of international
equality and justice. The refusal of NWS to even discuss the question is therefore
taken as an insult and easily leads to accusations of imperialism and arrogance that
reveal resentment far beyond the issue of nuclear weapons. Similarly, NNWS, especially those from the South, pay great attention to provision about the inalienable
right to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which is explicitly
linked to the economic-development issue. Hence, non-nuclearization should, for the
radical NNWS, be only one element in a whole web of norms and rules dedicated to
disarmament and development, whereas Western NWS see it primarily as an end in
itself, a tool to tackle a security problem. This deep dichotomy between the South
and the West leads to multiple divergences both inside and outside the regime, the
main one being the issue of restrictive safeguards on nuclear installations promoted
by Western NWS and denounced by the NAM as a violation of article IV. Other
disagreements include the extent of sanctions, security guarantees, or export controls.
Because of this normative row and the perceived unfairness of their attitude,
Western NWS are frequently under fire, especially during multilateral meetings.
Their position rests on an unresolved underlying tensionthe contradiction between
deterrence and non-proliferation. If one really believes in deterrence, it is not coherent to oppose proliferation as deterrence optimists have long argued.13 On the other
hand, a strong non-proliferation policy can hardly escape reflection on the dangers
of all nuclear weapons, as suggested by proliferation pessimists.14 NWS ignore this
abstract debate and continue to openly rely on deterrence while at the same time
promoting stricter non-proliferation rules. They resort to a third approach to the
consequences of proliferation, political relativism, the idea that the problem is not
so much nuclear weapons as the states that possess them.15 This position is in sharp
contradiction with the disarmament provisions in the NPT, but also somewhat in
disagreement with the non-proliferation grammarthe idea that every additional
nuclearization is bad. These inconsistencies weaken the public position of NWS: they
are increasingly perceived as following egoistically their national interest to the detriment of the common good. This resentment is worsened by the fact that NWS pursue
policies outside the regime that aggravate the existing discrimination between haves
and have-nots, especially export controls and the Proliferation Security Initiative.
The gap between a widely accepted norm and a deficient regime can be interpreted as a source of symbolic violence. This normative battle provides the setting
for two paths that can lead to increased international tensions through patterns of
struggle for recognition. The first one happens when a state will respect the norm
but refuse to comply with regime provisions because it feels that these violate its
sovereignty. Here, the nuclear abstention norm can be superseded by considerations
about sovereignty: a state may have no nuclear weapons but nevertheless be reluctant
to dissipate suspicions because swift compliance with the regime would be seen as
humiliating and detrimental to national independence. In extreme consequences, a
state might even prefer to refuse to acknowledge that it has no nuclear weapons in
4/18/11 12:36 PM

front of international pressure because to do so would be equated with a loss of face.
This reluctance to cooperate in the face of external pressure can lead to a spiral of
suspicion and resentment. The second path happens when states, or groups inside
states, feel that they suffer from recognition-denial because of the non-proliferation
regime and therefore come to consider nuclearization as a tool for national affirmation, a way to redress the inequality inherent in the regime, or at least a way to gain
international attention.
Heavy Words Are So Lightly Thrown:

Proliferation Suspicions and National Pride
As noted earlier, nuclear abstention is an individual prescription states feel is legitimate
to respect, whereas the non-proliferation regime presents itself as a cooperation device
designed to tackle agency problems like free-riding. Hence, a state may consider that
the verification and monitoring provisions included in the regime are superfluous,
or even that the regime itself is pointless because even in its absence, states would
respect a norm that has been widely internalized. According to the NAM line, the
IAEA should ideally be an institution dedicated mainly to assistance, its original
mission, rather than to verification. States advocating a tougher line on proliferation
and monitoring institutions hold the opposite view and promote a strengthening of
verification provisions and safeguards to combat nuclear trafficking. The underlying logic is that, if a state has nothing to hide, it will have no difficulty cooperating
with international monitoring agencies and will easily accept inspections on its soil.
However, the historical record reveals that this is not that simple, with several cases of
states suspected as proliferators actually having no intention to build nuclear weapons
and no functioning program underway. Unwillingness to comply with verification
provisions of the non-proliferation regime when a state is not trying to violate the
non-nuclearization norm cannot easily be explained by power or security considerations. In order to fully understand this apparent enigma, one has to concentrate on
patterns of recognition-denial and face-saving.
Verification provisions are among the most wildly discussed, with some states
considering them insufficient and others finding them already too intrusive and in
contradiction with NPTs article IV. This debate about rules and procedures has for
a long time been one of the most acrimonious within the non-proliferation regime
and may explain why some states prefer to stay outside or on the margins of it. A
state may refuse to adhere to the NPT because it does not want any infringement on
its sovereignty, because it is reluctant to have its sites visited by foreign inspectors at
any time, or because it considers the ability to engage in whatever activity it likes its
right. A state may also ratify the NPT hoping to benefit from article IVs provisions
on free access to nuclear technology, but then ultimately feel frustrated by the balance
between verification and assistance. It is therefore possible to refuse monitoring of
nuclear activities while harboring no real military intentions. On the surface, however,
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this attitude is difficult to distinguish from covered proliferation, in which a state will
deny having nuclear intentions at least until it has a well-advanced enough program
to intimidate other states. Here again, the discrepancy between norm and regime
can lead to tension, suspicion, and ultimately, conflict.
Argentina is a good example of a state that has been unduly suspected of proliferation. The country was for more than twenty years, together with its neighbor Brazil, on
the usual suspects list of proliferators. The situation indeed appeared like a possible
textbook-case of proliferation, with two rival regional powers seeking sensible materials and technologies outside of the non-proliferation regime. Argentinas acquisition
of natural uranium-fueled reactors aroused suspicion, as these were known to be less
cost-efficient but to produce more plutonium than concurrent devices. Clandestine
research on uranium enrichment also caused concern. The 1990 agreement between
Buenos Aires and Brasilia, and the subsequent ratification of the NPT and the Tlatelolco treaty on the Latin America NWFZ by both countries, were therefore generally
saluted as successes of non-proliferation.16 As it appeared, two states of concern were
finally joining the non-proliferation regime, sending a clear signal to other states still
outside of it. However, the most recent research on the Argentinean nuclear program
reveals the absence of any coherent scheme to build a nuclear weapon. The countrys
only military research in the nuclear field was conduced on submarine propulsion,
and no nuclear bomb program was launched. Argentinas attitude is described by
Jacques Hymans as a typical example of sportsmanlike nationalism where leaders
will be very sensitive to national rights and autonomy while not seriously considering equipping themselves with a nuclear force.17 In this perspective, states will value
their self-image over the potential benefits of joining the non-proliferation regime.
According to a former Atomic Energy Commission head, Argentinas leaders refused
to consider signing the NPT at the time of its inceptiona move that would have
been profitable to the national nuclear industrybecause they felt this would mean
a diminution of [their] dignity.18 Non-proliferation pressures in this context therefore have the potential to backfire, pushing the suspected state even further toward
nuclear ambiguity, since clarification and pure compliance could be understood to
mean a loss of face. The whole carrot-and-sticks approach to non-proliferation often
privileged by Western experts can thus be considered humiliating by a state with a
strong sense of national pride.
Although states staying outside the NPT or other arms-control regimes may arouse
suspicion, they cannot be accused of violating international law and obviously cannot
face sanctions in this respect. Their case is therefore somewhat less problematic than
the one of states that are parties to various treaties but do not fully comply with the
verification and monitoring obligations to which they have voluntarily agreed. The
reluctance of these states to accept inspections may of course be explained by the
fact that they harbor clandestine activities. However, there is at least one prominent
example of a state refusing to fully cooperate with international inspectors while
having no prohibited activities under way: Iraq, during the lead-up to the 2003 war.
The unwillingness of Saddam Husseins regime to swiftly accept extensive inspections
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and provide a comprehensive clarification about its activities linked to WMD was
one of the main arguments of those militating for a tough line toward Iraq. According to the logic, if Iraq really had nothing to hide, it would quickly have complied
with non-proliferation when asked to do so. With such an approach in mind, Iraqs
half-hearted cooperation with inspection teams could only be interpreted as a sign
that the country clandestinely owned WMD or was secretly seeking them. Iraqi
proclamations of good faith and willingness to cooperate were dismissed as pure
hypocrisy, a tactic designed to slow down the inspection process and foster division
in the international community. Ultimately, Iraqs alleged failure to comply was taken
as the main argument in support of the invasion.
In the absence of first-hand source material, it is difficult to draw definitive
conclusions about what exactly provoked Iraqi reluctance to fully cooperate and
dismiss doubts about suspect activities. We can nevertheless assume that Saddam
Husseins attitude was not driven by security considerations, as it clearly was in
Iraqs national interest to cooperate. Rapid disclosure of information and full acceptance of inspections would not have avoided the invasion with certainty, but
it would at least have deprived the US administration of a potent argument and
thus weakened support for a war that was already divisive. The only coherent
power-based explanation is that Iraq wanted to maintain some doubt on its WMD
capacities in order to benefit from existential deterrence, but this makes little sense
since the United States was publicly committed to going to war because Iraq was
suspected to have WMD.19 Existential deterrence is something one tries to obtain
before a threat surfaces; it makes no sense to seek it when one is already targeted,
with the main casus belli being precisely this quest for a deterrent. We therefore
need to look at the symbolic side of the story to try to find some logic behind the
events. In his personal account of the 2002 to 2003 events, Hans Blix frequently
insists on the absolute necessity for inspection teams to avoid humiliating the
Iraqis when making requests for access and information. He shows that cooperation was more easily obtained when demands where formulated in a respectful,
diplomatic manner preserving at least the appearance of Iraqi sovereignty.20 For
example, the fact that aerial surveillance of Iraqi sites was to be conducted not
only by American planes but also by French and Russian aircrafts helped to gain
acceptance of the overflights.21 Inspectors also acceded to an Iraqi demand not to
publish any pictures from the destruction of Al Samoud 2 missiles.22 Although
Blix never clearly says that Iraq could simply not openly give in to international
and American pressure or admit that its efforts toward WMD were inconclusive
because this would mean a loss of face, the idea is suggested in his book.23 This
idea also appears in the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) findings.24 We can assume that,
in the case of pure and simple submission, Saddam Husseins image as a ruthless,
charismatic, and independent leader would have been badly damaged, especially
inside the Iraqi and Arab opinion. Acrimonious words and deeds on both sides
also rendered the issue very emotional, thereby making a cold-blooded assessment
of the situation impossible. The Iraqi leader could well have decided that it was
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better and more honorable to lose a war than to simply cede to US pressure. This
does not necessarily mean that recognition-denial and face-saving played a decisive
role during the crisis, but the hypothesis at least deserves attention until further
primary material surfaces.
States can therefore refuse to be fully transparent regarding their nuclear record
for reasons other than just a willingness to hide a secret program and cheat on the
international non-proliferation regime. Non-proliferation and counter-proliferation
advocates often fail to take this possibility into account, thus creating spirals of suspicion and hostility. Another negative effect of the regime is that a state may resent its
perceived unfairness to such a point that it considers defying the non-nuclearization
norm as a way to seek redress and self-affirmation.
Catch Me If You Can: Nuclearization and Self-Image

While a vast majority of states at least pay lip service to the non-nuclearization norm,
some may embark on exactly the opposite course, emphasizing the acquisition of
a nuclear force as not only a security or power benefit but also as a way to foster
national assertiveness and to speak on an equal footing with great powers. Because
perceptions of recognition-denial are essentially inter-subjective, it is possible to have
at the same time a vast majority of states affirming their identities by respecting the
non-nuclearization norm and a minority deciding that they have to build a nuclear
weapons option for exactly the same reason. It is a pervasive myth of international
politics that possession of nuclear weapons is a key criterion to becoming a true
great power, despite the fact that they are useless to obtaining actual gains.25 In fact,
possession of nuclear weapons seems to be more a result than a cause of great power
status, but this rough conjunction can nevertheless exacerbate some states desire
for a national deterrent. In this case, nuclear weapons are valued more as an end
in themselves than as a foreign policy asset. Morgenthau cites nuclear tests as one
prominent example of the policy of prestige when one state will boast its military
capability or its economic might in order to impress its neighbors and rivals and to
obtain recognition.26 He is careful to note that prestige should not automatically be
equated with a frivolous demonstration of force; some leaders may conclude that, for
various reasons, they imperiously need to resort to the policy of prestige or at least
demonstrate some force.27 In the case of nuclear-weapons acquisition, states may be
eager to display their technological abilities and their willingness to play a major
role in international politics by mastering the most formidable absolute weapon.
Reflecting on Frances acquisition of a nuclear force, Raymond Aron noted that this
move had far more to do with considerations about statehood and sovereignty than
with national security.28 States with a strong tendency toward exceptionalism are
particularly sensible to this status-through-nuclearization logic because they are ready
to see themselves as a particular case in the international crowd and may therefore feel
legitimate in derogating to the non-nuclearization norm while acknowledging that
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general proliferation would certainly be a bad thing. The discrimination inherent in
the international regime may thus encourage the existing tendencies of some states
to see themselves as above others, or at least as apart from them. Building nuclear
weapons and joining the so-called nuclear club can be a clear way to demonstrate
assertiveness even thoughand indeed just becausethis means defying the international regime and a widely accepted norm. This leads to a paradoxical effect
of the non-proliferation regime that can, in some cases, contribute to proliferation
instead of stopping it.
The inconsistencies of non-proliferation also exacerbate the tendency of some states
to cherish national pride and independence above observance of international norms.
Individuals and groups who are very sensible to their countrys perceived position
in the world or to moral conceptions of international justice may conclude that the
regime is a source of symbolic violence because of its inequity and the duplicity of
NWS, particularly if they think that their country should enjoy a privileged position
similar to the one granted to these five great powers. This can lead them to consider
that nuclear abstention, although possibly valuable in itself, should not be pursued
because this would mean acquiescing to the humiliating non-proliferation structure.
Acquisition of a nuclear force, or at least of a nuclear capacity, can therefore take on
a very significant symbolic and emotional dimension where nuclearization is equated
with the rejection of an unfair international structure and of a junior position in
international politics.
India is the main example of such a course among states equipped with nuclear
weapons. Indias nuclearization is the longest of all states, with a twenty-four-year
interval between their first nuclear explosion (1974) and ultimate nuclear testing
with the acknowledged possession of weapons (1998). This peculiar course cannot be
explained through security and power considerations alone, since these would suggest
a far quicker process. As much as a progression toward the bomb, Indias complicated
story with nuclear weapons can be interpreted as a succession of decisions not to cross
the threshold of nuclear possession. Confronted with intense domestic pressure in
favor of the bomb, Indian leaders refrained first from building nuclear weapons and
then from deploying them.29 Moral considerations seem to have played an important
part in this process, pushing alternately toward both nuclearization and restraint.
There is a true tendency to reject WMD all the way in India that dates back to
Nehru. Indias first prime minister, who genuinely abhorred nuclear weapons, never
publicly considered the option of building them and was one of the first voices to
call for a test-ban treaty in 1954.30 India was a strong supporter of arms control and
disarmament with a clear willingness to act as a global voice for peace and justice in
international forums. While internal developments may have been more ambiguous,
India maintained its official stance throughout the 1960s: nuclear weapons were bad,
deterrence could not be trusted, and the only ultimate solution was to stop and then
curb the arms race. This position was maintained despite defeat against China in
1962 and the Chinese nuclear tests in 1964, as Indian leaders refused to rush to the
bomb, choosing instead to develop only an option.31
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Ultimately, Indias alternative conception of arms control failed as a large group
of states, including some non-aligned ones, sided with the conception promoted by
the superpowersdiscrimination between NWS and NNWSin exchange for
some concessions on ultimate disarmament. India refused to sign the treaty. The
non-proliferation debate had a great resonance inside Indias strategic elite, leading
to some resentment against the great powers and a strong feeling of injustice.32 Frustration did not provoke nuclear ambitions, as these clearly predate the NPT, but it
undoubtedly strengthened the position of those who were militating in favor of the
acquisition of a nuclear military capability.33 The growing rift between India, the
international regime, and the United States ultimately led to the 1974 peaceful nuclear
explosion. By using this terminology and refraining from building weapons, India
wanted to signal its refusal to obey a rule perceived as unfair while also re-affirming
its Nehruvian abhorrence toward WMD. The country stayed on this line at least
until the 1980s when nuclear weapons were finally built but, at first, not deployed.34
Ultimately, it was again after a heated arms-control debate, the one on CTBT, that
India definitely crossed the threshold of open nuclear weapons possession in 1998.35
This does not mean that Indias nuclearization can unambiguously be described
as a reaction to recognition-denial. Indias attitude in the international discussions
about arms control has frequently displayed characteristics of what Stephen Krasner
calls organized hypocrisy, when a state will claim to adhere to a consensual but
ambiguous norm while actually behaving egoistically in terms of national interests.36
The perceived unfairness of non-proliferation has often been exploited as a pretext,
and its imperfections do not automatically lead to the conclusion that nuclearization
should be pursued. Nevertheless, it would be equally erroneous to refuse to take into
consideration the emotional and symbolical dimension of Indias eventual nuclearization. Normative frustration at least provided bomb supporters with a potent argument
to convince their counterparts that India needed a nuclear force even though the
weapons were inherently bad. Recognition-denial may well have been instrumentalized, but this does not mean that it has no analytical validity, quite the contrary: if
feelings about unfairness are so strong that they can be mobilized to provoke a change
of course, their presence stands as a decisive variable to explain variations in national
policy. An exceptionalist state like India that claims an elevated self-image will feel
humiliated if, in return, it gets only a regular position as a minor player among others. The perceived insult is magnified in the case of non-proliferation by the fact that
some states benefit from the favored position that India is denied. Indeed, some in
India have advocated inclusion in the nuclear club, and there are reasons to think
that, if this would be granted, Indias critique of the regime would become milder.37
This collision between non-nuclearization and non-proliferation leading to nuclearization by defiance can be considered the most extreme case of a general pattern in
which states will play along with a non-proliferation regime they resent for reasons
linked to recognition-denial. The case of states that at least tacitly back suspected
proliferators in international arenas because they are equally or more fed-up with the
counter-proliferation policies of Western NWS is a typical example. This mounting
4/18/11 12:36 PM

defiance and the subsequent difficulty to even agree on an agenda on arms control
have led the NWS to accentuate their tendency to act outside of the regime to combat
proliferation. This, in turn, accentuates the NNWS normative frustration leading
to a perverse spiral further blocking any international agreement on arms control.
Another case of regime defiance is when a state will toy with nuclearization in order to
gain attention and obtain the right to speak on a bilateral footing with great powers.
Nuclear aspirations in North Korea have led to the setting up of a specific diplomatic
mechanism involving all the major powers in the region and dedicated only to this
matter. In addition, a direct negotiation channel between Pyongyang and Washington
has also been opened. Through these diplomatic contacts, North Korea has been able
to exert notable concessions and even ridicule the great powers on several occasions
while escaping strong punishment. This contrasts favorably with the countrys very
limited material capabilities. In this case, the use of nuclear capacities as a bargaining
chip through a form of blackmail has improved North Koreas position, especially if
one takes into account the overall dire situation of the country. Another case were
nuclear intentions have won some bargaining leverage is Libya, a state that, in 2003,
was able to exchange the end of its little-advanced nuclear program and other WMD
activities against re-integration inside the international community. Like North Korea,
Libya was granted a special status and negotiated directly with great powers before
complying fully with IAEA safeguards and other verification provisions. Both cases
were therefore settled mainly outside of the different arms-control regimes. As Hans
Blix wrote, Demands for recognition seem to be an important motive. Recognition
and status may be important to governments that, for various reasons, have been
isolated: for example, Libya, North Korea and Iran.38 In this respect, it is interesting
to note that Teheran has long demanded recognition by the United States and the
opening of high-level bilateral talks.
Conclusion
This chapter does not claim that all proliferation-related crises are linked to struggles
for recognition nor even than most of them are. Material considerations obviously
play an important role in states nuclear choices. More modestly, I aim to point to
a somewhat neglected dimension of the (non-) proliferation debateits emotional
and symbolic dimensions. Demands about disarmament and technological assistance are too easily dismissed as demagogy. There is evidence that a good portion of
the international crowd feels genuinely hurt by ambiguities and inconsistencies in
the non-proliferation regime, most of them being linked to the behavior of NWS.
Immediate nuclear disarmament and free access to technology certainly are utopia
and propaganda themes, but abrupt refusal to even take these highly symbolical issues into consideration appears to have significantly damaged the legitimacy of the
powers that promote a tougher line on non-proliferation. At the 2005 NPT Review
Conference, an Arab state and close US ally, Egypt, was the most virulent critic of
4/18/11 12:36 PM

the NWS position, heavily contributing to the failure of the whole meeting. Cairo
was thus acting as a tacit ally of Iran. In this normative context, a strictly applied
non-proliferation regime has a clear potential to backfire in the most problematic
cases, which it is actually supposed to solve. There are, consequently, reasons to think
that its presence leads to more international tension than what would exist with the
simple individual observance of the non-nuclearization norm. This leads to the conclusion that the regime is ineffective, albeit not for the reason its detractors usually
invokeits inefficiency to prevent cheating by proliferatorsbut rather because the
focus on cheating and excessive suspicion may look like an offense to some states and
like an incitement to proliferate to others.
Notes
1. Nuclear Threat Initiative 2004.
2. Frankel and Cohen 1991, 201ff.
3. This is one of the elements in what T. V. Paul calls prudential realism. See Paul 2000,
232ff.
4. Feaver, and Niou 1996, 209233.
5. This tentative nuclear abstention norm must be carefully distinguished from the far
more established nuclear taboo norm. According to Nina Tannenwald, the taboo stigmatizes
nuclear weapons use but not detention, and its impact on nuclearization choices by states is
only consequential: if the taboo is so strong that no nuclear use can be considered, then deterrence will lose any credibility and nuclear weapons possession will be useless. However, this
is still a remote possibility in Tannenwalds taboo perspective. See Tannenwald 2007, 472ff.
6. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891905.
7. For this abstinence perspective, see Paul 1995, 356ff.
8. In a similar vein, Legro has demonstrated that decisions by states to escalate or not
to escalate accidents involving submarine warfare, strategic bombing, and chemical warfare
during World War II were best explained as individual decisions consisting of a confrontation between norm and identityin this case military culturerather than by traditional
rationalist and internationalist explanations. See Legro 1997, 3163.
9. For accounts of the 2005 Review Conference, see Mller 2005, 3344; Sauer 2006,
333340.
10. On symbols of condensation, see Edelman 1985, 117124.
11. Albin 2001, 282ff.
12. Sagan 2004, 77.
13. Waltz 2003, 345.
14. Feaver 1992, 16087; Sagan 2003, 4687.
15. Lavoy 1995, 695753.
16. For an overview on Argentina and Brazil up to 1990, see Reiss 1995, 4588.
17. Hymans 2006, 141170.
18. Interview with Admiral Oscar Quihillalt in ibid., 144145.
19. Existential deterrence is a version of minimum deterrence in which the slightest doubt
of its nuclear capabilities could offer a state a degree of protection. See Bundy 1988, 735ff.
4/18/11 12:36 PM

The Iraq Survey Group report claims that Saddam Hussein held such a view. See Iraq Survey
Group 2004.
20. Blix 2004, 285ff. I am indebted to Thomas Lindemann for this bibliographical
suggestion.
21. It was as if the humiliation was diminished when the presence of U.S. planes would
be diluted by planes from less hostile countries. Ibid., 120122.
22. The Iraqi side asked us in Baghdad not to publish pictures of the operation, saying
it was painful to them. This might have been true. There was certainly a pride that they had
succeeded in designing and producing these missiles and a corresponding pain in destroying
them. Conceivably this could contain a clue as to why the Iraqis chose to destroy biological
and chemical weapons without inspectors present, as they claimed. They might have felt it
hurt their pride. Ibid., 189.
23. Blix first evocates this explanation in an interrogative manner: Now that we feel nearly
certain that there were no weapons to hide in Iraq, the explanations for the Iraqi reluctance
on the two categories of violations, as on many others, must be sought elsewhere than in a
wish to hide weapons. At the time when we encountered and reported on the reluctance, it
undoubtedly hurt the claim of the Iraqis that they were providing immediate cooperation.
Why where they reluctant in these matters? Self-respect? Pride? Ibid., 151. Later in the book,
he is a bit more affirmative, citing the face-saving hypothesis among elements [that] may
have been relevant. A sense of humiliation might have led the Iraqis to balk at giving the
inspectors access in some cases, especially to various sites they associated with the sovereignty
of their country. Ibid., 265.
24. [Saddam Hussein] sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspectionsto
gain support for lifting sanctionswith his intention to preserve Iraqs intellectual capital
for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Iraq Survey Group 2004,
1. Emphasis added. In the late 1990s, Saddam [sic.] realized he had no WMD capabilities but his ego prevented him from publicly acknowledging that the Iraqi WMD program was
ineffective, according to the former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research
Humam Abd-al-Khaliq Abd-al-Ghafur., Ibid., 35. Emphasis added. Despite these few
twists toward an emotional analysis of Saddam Husseins behavior, the ISG report generally
sticks to the deception thesis and does not investigate in detail the reasons for the failure of
Saddam Hussein to find an optimal balance between national security, the lifting of sanctions, and the preservation of a WMD capacity. It concludes that Iraqs chief objective was
to have sanctions lifted and then only to maintain as much WMD capabilities as possible.
Although this appraisal can coherently explain Iraqs attitude up to 2002, it clearly does
not stand against the record of the 2002/2003 events when the country was threatened
with immediate war. According to the ISG report, Saddams attitude during this period
was plagued by miscalculation and poor decisions, but the reasons for these errors are
not thoroughly discussed. Ibid., 61.
25. Betts 1987, 240ff; Jervis 1989, 266ff.
26. Morgenthau 2006, 8990.
27. Ibid., 9093.
28. Aron 2004, 613615.
29. Hymans 2006, 171203.
30. Perkovich 1999, 1359.
31. Ibid., 6085.
4/18/11 12:36 PM

32. Ibid., 133145; Frey 2004, 293297.
33. Frey writes that, The negotiations on the NPT in the mid-1960s thus had the paradox
effect of further fuelling Indias nuclear program rather than limiting nuclear proliferation.
Ibid., 29394.
34. Ganguly and Hagerty 2006, 223ff.
35. Frey 2004, 324347.
36. Krasner 1999, 248ff.
37. COMP: keep 1 line for this fn
38. Blix 2008, 49.
Bibliography
Albin, Cecilia. 2001. Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation. 1st ed. Cambridge:
Aron, Raymond. 2004. Paix et guerre entre les nations. Paris: Calmann-Lvy.
Betts, Richard K. 1987. Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance. New York: Brookings Institution Press.
Blix, Hans. 2005. Disarming Iraq: The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction. London:
Bloomsbury.
. 2008. Why Nuclear Disarmament Matters. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Bundy, George. 1988. Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years.
New York: Random House.
Edelman, Murray. 1985. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. University of Illinois Press.
Feaver, Peter D. 1992. Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations. International
Security 17 (3): 160187.
Feaver, Peter D., and Emerson M. S. Niou. 1996. Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn,
Strike, or Assist? International Studies Quarterly 40 (2): 209233.
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization 52 (4).
Frankel, Benjamin, and Avner Cohen, eds. 1991. Opaque Nuclear Proliferation: Methodological
and Policy Implications. London: Routledge.
Frey, Karsten. 2004. Elite Perception and Biased Strategic Policy Making: The Case of Indias Nuclear Build-up. Inaugural Dissertation, Ruprecht-Karls-Universitt Heidelberg.
Ganguly, Sumit, and Devin T. Hagerty. 2006. Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the
Shadow of Nuclear Weapons. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Hymans, Jacques E. C. 2006. The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and
Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
The Iraq Survey Group. 2004. Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI
on Iraqs WMD, Volume 1. http://www.foia.cia.gov/duelfer/Iraqs_WMD_Vol1.pdf.
Jervis, Robert. 1989. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of
Armageddon. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1999. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Lavoy, Peter R. 1995. The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation. Security Studies
4 (4): 695753.
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Legro, Jeffrey W. 1997. Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the Failure of Internationalism.
Morgenthau, Hans J. 2006. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New
York: McGraw-Hill.
Mller, Harald. 2005. A Treaty in Troubled Waters: Reflections on the Failed NPT Review
Conference. International Spectator 40 (3).
Nuclear Threat Initiative. 2004. UN Resolution 1540. http://www.nti.org/db/1540/index
.html.
Paul, T. V. 2000. Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons. Montreal:
McGill-Queens University Press.
Perkovich, George. 1999. Indias Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Reiss, Mitchell. 1995. Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Sagan, Scott D. 2003. The Perils of Proliferation. In The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A
Debate Renewed, edited by Kenneth N. Waltz and Scott D. Sagan, 4687. New York:
W. W. Norton.
. 2004. Realist Perspectives on Ethical Norms and Weapons of Mass Destruction.
In Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives, edited by
Sohail H. Hashmi and Steven P. Lee. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sauer, Tom. 2006. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime in Crisis. Peace Review 18 (3).
Tannenwald, Nina. 2007. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear
Weapons Since 1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1981) 2003. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better.
In The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, edited by Kenneth N. Waltz and
Scott D. Sagan, 345. New York: W. W. Norton.
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4/18/11 12:36 PM
Ch apt e r 10
Recognizing the Enemy

Terrorism as Symbolic Violence
Andreas Behnke
Terror and the Problem of Meaning

The purpose of this chapter is to return again to the question of meaning in al-Qaedas
terrorist acts. It will focus on the Event of 9/11 as the paradigmatic example of such
violence, but the argument is also relevant in a wider context of al-Qaeda-sponsored
violence in London, Madrid, and other places.1 To put the matter simply: What sense
does it make to fly planes into buildings? What possible political purpose can such
an act have? This puzzle has occupied scholars for the last eight years now, and the
answers vary significantly. To return to this question in this essay and to add to the
list of explanations is justified by the conviction that a distinctive, so far over-looked
social mechanism is at play in this act. We need, this essay argues, to recognize the
role of recognition in al-Qaedas actions. More precisely, we need to understand alQaedas desire to become recognized as a political, indeed quasi-sovereign, rather
than criminal actor in the global system. Indeed, as will be argued, it is the extraordinary level of violence, the sublime and horrific nature of its attacks that lead to
this interpretation. In this interpretation, 9/11 was an aesthetic act; that is, an act
that finished in the explosive brilliance [clat] of the beautiful and sublime, that
doubled rivalry for sovereignty.2 Hence, rather than making the act incomprehensible
and utterly meaningless, the horrendous nature of the act in fact gives it meaning.
189
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190 Andreas Behnke

The assessment of 9/11 as inherently (an sich) meaningless, as an act of pure violence
without any purpose beyond itself, relies on interpretations of political order that
cannot account for the violence involved in the contestation over, and the foundation
of, such order.3 Given this truncated notion of the political, scholars such as Michael
Ignatieff or Wolfgang Sofsky have to deduce the meaning(-lessness) of the act from
the act itself and its horrendous characteristics. Thus, for Ignatieff,
[w]hat we are up against is apocalyptic nihilism. The nihilism of their meansthe
indifference to human coststakes their actions not only out of the realm of politics,
but even out of the realm of war itself. The apocalyptic nature of their goals makes it
absurd to believe they are making political demands at all. They are seeking the violent
transformation of an irremediably sinful and unjust world. Terror does not express
a politics, but a metaphysics, a desire to give ultimate meaning to time and history
through ever escalating acts of violence, which culminate in a final battle between
good and evil. People serving such exalted goals are not interested in mere politics.4
And in Sofskys words, The terror campaign [Terrorkrieg] ... aims at killing people
in large numbers, wants to create a scare, to paralyze life through fear.5 Therefore,
a political aim could not be discerned. The attack meant nothing, it was an act of
destruction without a deeper meaning [Hintersinn].6 And finally, what excites the
spectator is the violence itself. It repulses, frightens, entices, and enthrals. 7
As Hans Kippenberg has observed, such an argument can only declare the (political) irrationality of the act and thus ends up in a mere aesthetics of horror.8 This point,
however, deserves closer scrutiny. What is most interesting about both Ignatieffs and
Sofskys statements is that the initial declaration of the meaninglessness of 9/11 ends
up bestowing a particular meaning upon the act. For Ignatieff, the act is aestheticized
and exalted within a Manichean metaphysics. For Sofsky too, 9/11, due to its excessive
violence, becomes a purely aesthetic performance. For both authors, therefore, 9/11
remains outside the realm of politics, as it does not reflect or express any instrumental
rationality. In both cases, the aesthetic, the sublime, and the horrible are defined in
opposition to the political. The acts are actually not meaningless at all; rather, their
meaning cannot be reconciled with the authors respective notions of the political.
This essay will not contest the aesthetic or sublime nature of 9/11. What it takes
issue with is the distinction, indeed opposition, between the realm of aesthetics and
the realm of the political that scholars like Ignatieff and Sofsky employ in order to
condemn the event as politically irrational and hence irrelevant. As will be demonstrated, this distinction is both ontologically unstable and analytically unproductive,
as it elides the crucial role of the sublime in the constitution of sovereign agency. If we
take sovereignty to be a contested concept, not only in terms of its meaning but also
regarding its status as a political objective for different groups, we need to be able to
account for the processes involved in claiming and recognizing it. By ostracizing the
aesthetic and sublime from the horizon of the political, Ignatieff and Sofsky in effect
reify sovereignty and define the contest for sovereignty as irrational and meaningless.
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Recognizing the Enemy: Terrorism as Symbolic Violence 191

Other researchers have offered different interpretations of 9/11 that try to reconcile
the extra-ordinary level of violence with a political purpose. Rather than focusing on
the pure phenomenology of the act itself, these interpretations consider the symbolic
nature of the Event. In Jennifer Bajoreks words,
Terrorism, before it is an act, is a calculation, on the basis of future traces, in anticipation of how traces yet to be made will someday be read. As such it is more than casually
bound up with the complex movements of textuality on both sideson the side ... of
both the sender and the receiver of the message.9
Some post-modern interpretations turn 9/11 into a sign of the aporias of modernity.
For Jean Baudrillard, the attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in
New York become a symbol of a generalized mode of resistance of the singular, of
distinctive cultural and social identities against globalization and its generalized
system of exchange. Faced with a monopolized world, and power consolidated within
a technocratic machine and the dogma of globalization, terrorism is the only viable
form of resistance.10 As such, the terror of globalization meets the globalization of
terror. 9/11 is, therefore, the viral, almost automatic response to the very operation
of the global system. It cannot be explained by reference to Islamic ideology, as such
conceptual boundaries miss the pervasive nature of terrorism. The globe itself is
resistant to globalization.11
While Baudrillard identifies 9/11 as a viral response of the particular or singular
against the discipline and order of globalization, Slavoj iek sees the event rather
as an expression of the modern passion for the Real. The Real is opposed to the
plurality and contingency of everyday social reality. Violence then is the price to be
paid for peeling off the deceptive layers of reality and to reveal the true, unified,
and foundational Truth of the Real. Twentieth-century ideologies, from Nazism to
Stalinism to the radical movements of the Left in the 1960s and 1970s, competed for
the definition, and the realization of the Real through radical, indeed terrorist actions.
This then, according to iek, indicates the fundamental paradox of the passion for
the Real: it culminates in its apparent opposite, in a theatrical spectaclefrom the
Stalinist show trials to spectacular terrorist acts. [The] passion for the Real ends up
in the pure semblance of the spectacular effect of the Real.12
While their respective perspectives differ, both iek and Baudrillard appropriate
the Event of 9/11 by subsuming it into a systemic logic of which 9/11 becomes but one
instance or one case. Its apparently singular and exceptional nature becomes qualified
and limited as the expression of a general principle.13 For Baudrillard, it becomes the
instantiation of a general resistance to the modern project of globalization, while in
ieks interpretation, it appears as the expression of the modern universalist project.
Moreover, and most significantly for the purpose of this essay, in both cases, political
agency vanishes from the analysis.
If we compare the radical interpretations of Baudrillard and iek to the explanations offered by Ignatieff and Sofsky, it becomes apparent that they share a
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192 Andreas Behnke

commonality. Both camps dissolve the aporia of the Event in favor of one structural
principle. For the latter camp, the tension between singularity and appropriation is
resolved in favor of the former, with 9/11 defined by its singular meaninglessness.
For Baudrillard and iek on the other hand, the tension is decided in favor of the
latter. Neither side is therefore willing to recognize the monstrosity of the Event,
its ineluctable suspension between appropriation and unappropriability, between
political purpose (be it resistance or revelation) and the experience of the sublime.
In neither case does the Event become productive, its constitutive potential absorbed
either by insulating the political against the aesthetic and the sublime, or by folding
the latter into a modernist radical political agenda.14
Between these two extremes we can locate approaches that focus in a variety of
ways on the role of social mechanisms related to recognition in international politics.15
The Problem of Recognition and Violence: A Hegelian Turn

Approaches focusing on recognition have produced a number of fascinating insights
into the social grammar of 9/11. For Paul Saurette, the Event of 9/11 can be understood
as an attempt by al-Qaeda to humiliate the United States and thereby to discipline
the humiliated partys behaviour.16 Reinhard Wolf offers a complementary analysis
to Saurettes theory of humiliation. For him, acts like 9/11 can be understood as
attempts to gain respect for al-Qaeda, and for the Islamic community. The focus
of his analysis is therefore less the effects the attacks had on the United States, and
more on the increased reputation and respect for al-Qaeda as an organization that
showed it to the United States.17 However, both Saurette and Wolf seem to rely
in their respective analyses on an ontologically given subject that is either denied
(through humiliation) or granted (through respect) what is duly his. Humiliation
and respect are therefore secondary and regulatory processes that affect the behavior
of ontologically given subjects. In order to function, both humiliation and respect
presuppose the status and standing of the subject as subject.
Yet, as philosophers and political theorists have argued, recognition does not only
influence the conduct of given actors, it also constitutes and establishes their status.
In the international system, one theory at least holds that a state is only a state if
it is recognized as such by the international community.18 Recognition is therefore
not only a regulative but also a constitutive mechanism through which the subject
comes into being.
Drawing on Fichte, Hegel, and Schmitt, Tarik Kochi develops an ethics of recognition that accounts for such a constitutive role. Moreover, and equally significantly,
he demonstrates the inherent relationship between recognition and violence and
exclusion. In doing so, he outlines an approach within which the Event of 9/11 can
be understood as the enactment of a radical claim to sovereignty. Kochi draws on
Hegels account of the constitution of the self through the delineation of the other.
The starting point for this philosophical investigation is the question of how the self
4/18/11 12:36 PM

can be certain that what it intuits as itself (the I) is actually itself and not, in fact
something other?19 The establishment of the I is accomplished by distinguishing
it from what it is not, from the not-I, or the other.20 Knowledge of the self therefore
proceeds through knowledge of the other. Through the experience of the non-self
and its qualities, the self reflectively acquires knowledge of itself. Being is therefore
always mediated being, the knowing subject and the known object are constituted
together, the Is act of thinking is always an act of mediation with its self and with
its other.21 For Hegel, it becomes important to emphasize, contra Fichtefor whom
this process takes place only on the mental or cognitive levelthat the delineation of
the self from its other entails material and physical consequences.22 It involves harm,
destruction, killing, violence.23 To set yourself apart, to differentiate yourself from
what you do not want or desire to be, is therefore violent on the ontological as well as
ontic level. The mediated and therefore always plural nature of the self puts recognition at the center of its successful constitution.24 A successful moment of recognition
is accomplished when each self recognizes itself as mutually recognizing the other.25
What is recognized is not just the other as such, but the other in the self, the necessity of the other in the differential constitution of the self. Recognition involves an
affirmation by the self that a necessary and essential element of itself resides in the
other and the relation of mediation with it.26 While Kochi identifies the sources of
a regulative and pacifying role for recognition in this successful moment of recognition, for the purpose of this essay, it is imperative to recall the inherent relationship
between recognition and violence.27 For Hegel, war plays a productive role in the
international system. War in his view produces and re-affirms the ethical-political
community that organizes itself within a state.28 As Kochi elaborates, Hegel can be
read as developing an account of an ethics of exclusion.29 A state constitutes the
condition of possibility for such a community, as within a state it becomes possible
to create and sustain a set of shared norms, ethics, and customs within a defined territory. War in this view becomes the affirmation of such a community, expressed in
the willingness to put it on the line and fight for its (continued) existence.
The higher significance of war is that, through its agency, ... the ethical health of nations is preserved in their indifference towards the permanence of finite determinacies,
just as the movement of the wind preserves the sea from the stagnation which lasting
calm would producea stagnation which a lasting, not to say perpetual, peace would
also produce among nations.30
As Steven Smith emphasizes, these passages should not be taken as glorifying war.
They are more an argument about what is, conceptually speaking involved in statehood and thus, in sovereignty.31 War makes states, as much as states make war. In
war, the state-sovereign asserts himself in a duel between equals. War can only be
declared by, and conducted between, sovereign entities. Warfare, therefore, contains an
element of recognition within it. It is not an exercise in pure violence, but conducted
according to rules that recognize the sovereign equality of the opponent.
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194 Andreas Behnke

The situation becomes more complicated if we introduce the Partisan. In order
to conceptually accommodate the violence this non-state actor brings into the international society, Kochi suggests expanding the concept of war to include not only
conflict between sovereigns but also conflict about sovereignty. For, as Schmitt reminds
us, the Partisan is a political, rather than a criminal actor; his purpose is not personal
enrichment, but the establishment of a new, different public order.
These partisans are completely modern, they view their acts of violence as that which
will destroy an old legal order and through which a new order will emerge: they wish
to posit, raise up and create a new human order through action, and if necessary,
through violence.32
One might add that in the contest for sovereignty, violence is the only available mode.
For the Partisan, the distinction between legal and political violence is irrelevant.
The Partisan exposes that all sovereign and therefore legitimate power rests on political violence. Many, if not all, political orders have been founded, and maintained
themselves, through terror in its different guises. Legal violence, the law itself, is
in this view a glorified, mystified, and fetishized form of political violence.33 The
designation and de-legitimization of certain forms of violence as terrorism draws
on and reproduces such a naturalization of law. The foundation of law in political violence is made in order to hide it; by its essence, it tends to organize amnesia,
sometimes under the celebration and sublimation of the grand beginnings.34 In order
to appear legitimate, law needs to hide its own foundations in violence and present
itself as self-immanent, as emerging from itself. Confronted with the Sublime, with
the violent or the irrational out of which it itself emerged and yet which it can no
longer acknowledge, the modern (Western) state becomes violent, even terrorist again
in order to destroy it.35 If we reject the mystification and fetishization that produces
the semblance of self-immanence of the sovereign, we can expand the definition of
war as a general act of political violence, and consider terrorism to be a more specific
strategy of violence.36 Yet while Kochi considers terrorism to be the equivalent to
non-sovereign war and thus maintains a residue of the reification of sovereignty
that his argument seeks to deconstruct, for the purpose of this essay, terror shall
be considered the hyper-realization of war and thus, of sovereignty.
We can find support for this conceptualization in Jean-Luc Nancys argument
about war as the techne, the art of sovereignty, as the execution of its Being, as the
carrying out of sovereignty to the limit of its own logic.37 It is in war that sovereignty
comes to itself, shedding the mythology and fetishization of its self-immanence.
War borders on art [as] techne ... as a mode of the execution of Being, as its mode of
finishing in the explosive brilliance [clat] of the beautiful and sublime, that doubled
rivalry for sovereignty that occurs within the blossoming of physis. Moreover, physis no
or one could say that it never takes
longer takes place except as mediated through techne,
38
place in itself, or in any other way, except as the image of the sovereignty of techne.
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The sovereign right to wage war cannot be subjected to law, yet it belongs to it, both
as an origin and as an end. War, Nancy adds, is the Event par excellence, the Event
that suspends and reopens the course of history, the sovereign event. Our kings,
generals, and philosophers have only ever thought of it this way.39 One might add
that lately, al-Qaeda has thought of it in this way, too.
We are now in a position to return to 9/11 as an Event and to understand its role
in the contest(-ation) for sovereignty. 9/11 is such an Event in which recognition as
sovereign is claimed by producing the explosive brilliance of the sublime. To successfully claim sovereign status in international politics requires the ability to produce
the explosive brilliance of the sublime, as well as the recognition of the status by the
addressee of the Event. These two aspects are, as we will argue, inherently related.
Claiming Sovereignty
In order to understand the operation of al-Qaeda, we turn to Carl Schmitts Theorie
des Partisanen.40 Here Schmitt develops a genealogy that traces the historical development and increasing radicalization of the partisan from the Spanish War of Independence to Maos writings. For Schmitt, the distinguishing feature of the Partisan is
his political nature. The Partisan fights on a political front; this sets him apart from
the common thief and criminal, whose motives are aimed at private enrichment.41 As
such, the Partisan fights a public enemy for a public cause. The recognition of this
public and political motivation derives, according to Schmitt, from the involvement
of a third party, usually a state, that supports and instrumentalizes the Partisan for
its own purposes. Both materially and ideologically, the involvement of a state was
historically crucial for the Partisan. It is this recognition by a third party that prevents
the Partisan from sliding back into the realm of the a-political, that is, the criminal.
In the long run, the irregular has to find its legitimacy in terms of the regular, and for
this there are only two options; either the recognition by an extant regular authority,
or the enforcement of a new regularity by its own means.42
With al-Qaeda, a new form of partisan has entered the global political stage.43 AlQaedas cause is no longer defined by the interests of a third party or state. Moreover,
al-Qaeda has radicalized the mobility of the Partisan, and with that has overcome
and transcended his tellurian nature, that is, its ties to a particular geographical
space and political community.44
While the recognition of the political struggle of the traditional Partisan was
tied to the support of a third state, al-Qaeda appears to operate without such direct
support links to states. It defines its goals independent of, and in conflict with, the
state system. As such, al-Qaeda cannot rely on third party states for the recognition
of its political nature. It therefore only has the second option available: to produce
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196 Andreas Behnke

its own sovereign status and to escape the criminalization of its campaign by the
international community.
Unlike traditional partisans, al-Qaeda has to declare its own war to declare its own
sovereignty. Sovereignty becomes autopoietic, as it cannot be derived from third parties
or from international law. It establishes itself through the successful self-designation
as the political enemy in a moment of decision against its designated opponents.
As indicated previously, terrorism, or rather the enactment of terror, should be considered the most radical expression of political violence and war. Following Schmitt, if
political order is based on the production and performance of an intense antagonism
that divides and thereby constitutes communities, terror is but the ultimate expression of such an ontogenetic Event. As William Connolly observes, the territory
of a nation-state is often understood to refer to terra, that is, the earth or land on
which it rests. Yet as he points out, the Oxford English Dictionary suggests that the
form of the word territory derives from terrere: to frighten, with territory being
a place from which people are warned off.45 Terror therefore defines the sublime
brilliance of sovereignty in which enemies are made, and in which al-Qaeda escapes
the slide into the realm of the merely criminal.
Interestingly enough, Osama bin Laden is employing this grammar of terror in
a justification of al-Qaedas strategy. In an interview with the American network
ABC, he explains
[T]errorism can be commendable and it can be reprehensible. Terrifying an innocent
person and terrorizing him is objectionable and unjust, also unjustly terrorizing people
is not right. Whereas, terrorizing oppressors and criminals and thieves and robbers is
necessary for the safety of people and for the protection of their property. There is no
doubt in this. Every state and every civilization and culture has to resort to terrorism
under certain circumstances for the purpose of abolishing tyranny and corruption. Every
country in the world has its own security system and its own security forces, its own
police and its own army. They are all designed to terrorize whoever even contemplates
to attack that country or its citizens. The terrorism we practice is of the commendable
kind for it is directed at the tyrants and the aggressors and the enemies of Allah, the
tyrants, the traitors who commit acts of treason against their own countries and their
own faith and their own prophet and their own nation. Terrorizing those and punishing
them are necessary measures to straighten things and to make them right.46
The monstrosity of 9/11 is therefore nothing but a reflection of the monstrosity of

sovereignty. It deconstructs the claim to self-immanence of political order and lays
bare the foundations of such order in an act of transgression. It founds al-Qaeda
as a representative of a transcendental ummah in a violent act against its other, the
United States. In doing so, it actually conducts a double move. In constituting its
own sovereignty, that is, its status as a (political) enemy rather than a mere criminal,
it also deconstructs American sovereignty.
Death, or identification in a figure of (the) death (which is the entirety of what
we call sacrifice, of which war is a supreme form), provides the aim of sovereignty.47
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Man must fear death as the greatest evil in order for sovereignty to function, to be able
to forget and cover up the void of violence from which it emerges, and to establish an
ontic order.48 Hence the sacrifice of the nineteen al-Qaeda perpetrators on 9/11, their
fearlessness of death, transgresses the limit sovereignty establishes and implodes its
order by inserting radical Islamic belief into its structure. In the words of an al-Qaeda
spokesperson, [t]here are thousands of the Islamic nations youths who are eager to
die just as the Americans are eager to live.49 In this act of sacrifice that deconstructs
the immanence of one political order, another order, another ethical-political community, is constituted a community worth dying for. While the boundaries established by the American sovereign are transgressed and invalidated, a new sovereign
boundary is drawn that does not follow the distinction between life and death, but
the one between Dar al-Islam, the Abode of Islam, the metaphysical space defined
by religious and universal truths found in the Koran, and Dar al-Harb, the Abode
of War, the site of conflict and infidelity, the area in which Islamic law is not (yet)
observed.50 In the definition of the ethical-political community that is established
in this move, death does not define a terminal limit, but a gateway to the final realization of ethical being. What Western political onto-theology would consider the
Beyond, is an integral part of the metaphysical community.51 The deconstruction
of American sovereignty therefore does not aim at the in-statement of a newly defined
secular community, does not define the creation of another state as its goal, but rather
seeks to spread the fear of God among the infidels and demonstrate his superiority.
Here then we encounter the first interplay between terror and recognition in 9/11.
The ethical-political community, and in a sense al-Qaeda as its agent, only become
recognizable in the Event itself. There is no form given to them other than through
the act, no phenomenology other than the experience of the violent strike against
the extant structure of sovereign authority. The specter-like nature of al-Qaeda
that has produced so many fruitless discussions about its precise constitution (an
organization, a franchise, a network, an ideology ... ) refuses and eludes any kind of
fixation. Al-Qaeda only exists through the violent enactment of sovereignty. Whether
this act is ordered by a central core of the organization or executed by self-designated
franchisees is immaterial from this point of view. The recognizability of al-Qaeda
and the claim to sovereign status that affects the violence do not depend on the
precisely identifiable source of the order, but on the nature and extremeness of the
violence. The epistemic recognition (Erkennen) is therefore tied into the recognition
of its status (Anerkennen) as sovereign.
The claim to sovereignty that al-Qaeda produced with 9/11 is therefore a pure
transgression. The constitutive move of sovereignty that hides, mystifies, and mythologizes the violence or coup de force at the foundational moment and that constitutes
the possibility of order remains suspended. While all foundation is transgressive,
not all transgression is foundational.52 The terror of al-Qaeda, as realized in 9/11,
never aims at converting the Event into Order, converting exteriority into interiority
or transcendence into immanence.53 The tension with sovereignty between Event
and Order is radically resolved in favor of the former. Or more precisely, the Order
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198 Andreas Behnke

that al-Qaeda envisions can only be constituted in the permanent Event. 9/11 in
particular, and terror in general, therefore constantly mobilizes the supplementary
aspect of sovereignty. All order is constituted in an act of violence, only to disavow
this moment and to produce the semblance of self-immanence. Al-Qaedas terror
holds the latter aspect in constant abeyance and constantly reproduces the sublime
moment of the founding of a transcendental community that exceeds the boundaries
of secular political order. In order to assert this sovereignty, the relevant Event has
to be of such sublime power so as to not leave the addressee any choice to deny it.
From this perspective, 9/11 set a sovereignty trap that the United States and other
Western nations could not escape. Simply put, it was inconceivable to respond to
9/11 with normal measures.
Recognizing Sovereignty
As noted above, the Partisan needs to avoid the criminalization of his practices and
his status. The acts need to be distinctly enacting the Political; they need to produce
exclusive rather than inclusive moves. The act has to be so dramatic and sublime
as to escape the inclusion into the normal criminal and legal disciplinary regime of
states. The act has to become an Event, insubordinate to any extant normative grid.
The Event has to express the monstrous obscenity of sovereignty, instantiating the
excess of violence that brings into being political order and community, yet always
also escapes from it.54 How can such an act be recognized? Recognition, after all, is
usually understood as an inclusive move through which previously excluded actors,
or their so-far ignored grievances, are addressed and incorporated in a shared moral
or political structure.55
Contrary to this conceptualization, derived from social and political dynamics
within domestic society, recognition in the international society entails an exclusionary
logic. Sovereignty is recognized in the acknowledgement of the mutually exclusive
authority over territorially defined space. Recognition thus renounces, rather than
produces, a common moral or legal structure, as the latter is secondary and subordinate
to the assertion of sovereignty. As the latter is the constitutive principle of the international society, any commonalities between states are always derivative and parasitic
upon the initial foundational differentiation of states within it. It is only through this
differentiation and mutual alienation that the inclusion into the international society
via the recognition of sovereign statehood can be accomplished. Here, the positivity
of statehood and territoriality are the referent points for the process of recognition.
In the case of non-state sovereignty and of al-Qaedas terror, the logic of recognition becomes even more complicated. Al-Qaeda never transmogrifies the violent act
of founding into an (apparently) immanent order. Instead, it constantly reiterates the
sublime brilliance of the founding act. Yet such a transgressive Event does not define a
political space because transgression is not a site beyond limits but a nonspace devoid
of positive content.56 Recognition here cannot refer to the positive order established
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by the act, it can only refer to the act itself and recognize it as the instantiation of
a global Partisan that emerges in this act [Erkennen] and as the radicalized act of a
political non-state sovereign [Anerkennen].
The latter process can be discerned in the responses of the West in general, and the
United States in particular, to 9/11. To declare a War on Terror and to institutionalize exceptional measures as part of this war constitute the functional equivalent
of recognizing a claim to sovereignty. The realization that the declaration of a War
on Terror had such an effect among political leaders in the West can be observed in
the recent renunciations of the concept. In 2006, a headline in the British newspaper
Observer read Britain stops talk of war on terror. And the article continued,
A Foreign Office spokesman said the government wanted to avoid reinforcing and
giving succor to the terrorists narrative by using language that, taken out of context,
could be counter-productive.... Whitehall officials believe that militants use a sense
of war and crisis and a clash of civilizations to recruit supporters, and thus the use of
terms such as war, war on terror, or battle can be counter-productive.57
As Joseph Nye elaborates, al-Qaeda and affiliated groups use a simple yet effective
narrative to recruit young Muslims to cross the line into violence.... [It] is the language of war and a narrative of battle that gives recruits a cult-like sense of status and
larger meaning that leads to action. And further, British officials have concluded
that when we use the vocabulary of war and jihad, we simply reinforce al-Qaedas
single narrative and help their recruiting efforts.58
The first such protestation was delivered as early as October 30, 2001, when Michael Howard criticized the natural but terrible and irrevocable error of declaring
war on terror. Contrasting it with the British experience in Palestine, Ireland, Malaya,
and Cyprus, he points out that the
terrorists were not dignified with the status of belligerents: they were criminals, to be
regarded as such by the general public and treated as such by the authorities. To declare
war on terrorists or, even more illiterately, on terrorism is at once to accord terrorists
a status and dignity that they seek and that they do not deserve. It confers on them a
kind of legitimacy.59
All three previously noted authors recognize war as a narrative, or as a discourse

between the human and the other in which certain syntactical rules apply.60 What
all three hint at can be further substantiated with reference to Nancys definition
of the relationship between war and sovereignty. The conferring of legitimacy that
Howard alludes to is the recognition of the political, rather than criminal, status of the
Partisan, the recognition of his status as a representative of a public cause, and above
all his ability to strike in such a fashion so as to elude the normalizing mechanisms
of domestic and international law. To declare war is the prerogative of the sovereign
against the sovereign, and the recognition that the other cannot be subsumed and
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200 Andreas Behnke

disciplined within extant legal structures. War returns conflict to the realm of the
political, in which (legal) order is deconstructed, not executed. As noted, terrorism is
but the most radical form of war as a conflict over the ability to define political order.
Could the events of September 11, 2001, have been dealt with differently? Is it
conceivable that the United States could have responded with a criminalization of
the acts, thus escaping al-Qaedas sovereignty trap? Howard suggests a
police operation conducted under the auspices of the United Nations on behalf of the
international community as a whole, against a criminal conspiracy whose members
should be hunted down and brought before an international court, where they would
receive a fair trial and, if found guilty, be awarded an appropriate sentence 61
only to dismiss this ideal world solution as unlikely, nay, impossible. As he notes,
at stake in the response was also American honor; the outrage and insult that 9/11
meant for the Americans cried for immediate and spectacular vengeance to be inflicted by Americas own armed forces.62
From the perspective of this essay, Howard does not go far enough in his insight
into the impossibility of the normalization and criminalization of 9/11. He seems to
underestimate the meaninglessness of the Event that is reflected in the interpretations
by Ignatieff, Baudrillard, and iek, who either insist on the impossibility of making
sense of it, or who place it within the Grand Narrative of Western Modernityeither
as a virus working against it, or as the radical expression of its logic. In either case,
9/11 remains a void, the Event deprived of any inherent meaning. And as such, it
cannot be subsumed under a criminal or disciplinary regime. Such a move presupposes that the meaning of the act can be ascertained, that a verdict can be passed
on the appropriate sentence. But the Event of 9/11 escapes this logic, its explosive
brilliance of the sublime blinding our sense of justice.
Conclusion: Re-cognizing Recognition

Recognition has become a central concept in critical theory, where it is more often
than not tied to notions of expanding zones of inclusion of social subjects, and, tied
to this, a concept of moral progress within societies. As such, mutual recognition is
expected to resolve conflicts in a peaceful fashion, address grievances, and re-define
and expand the moral code of ethical-political communities.63
In an interesting turn at the end of his treatise on recognition and violence, Tarik
Kochi tries to import this inclusive logic into the grammar of war and terror. He notes
that judgments on the just nature of war are usually partisan judgments in which particular claims of right, a form of life, or an ethical commitment hide behind claims to
universality. Yet on closer inspection, partisan judgments on the rightness of war lose
much of their brilliance. They appear more often as confused, limited, self-contradictory claims over the legitimacy of violence.64 In order to escape this conundrum,
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which only feeds into fanaticism and militancy, Kochi wants to solve the problem of
judgment by turning to a praxis of recognition. Instead of the usual condemnation of
the enemy and its violence, he calls for a different practice: recognizing the ethics of
the others war.65 This recognition seeks to consider that there is a certain rightness
embodies within the others act of war, or that the other might have a right of his own
in his use of war. Any act of violence takes place, and is authorized, within a normative structure, posits an ethical claim, and aims to realize particular potentialities of
political life.66 Such recognition therefore aims at understanding the rightness of our
own moral claims and of our violence in relation to the rightness of the violence of the
other. As such, this process of recognition can lead to an understanding of the rightness
of war that at least approaches a certain level of universality.67
Kochi is careful not to overstate the role recognition can play as a conflict resolution tool. The approach he offers is not an answer to the problem of war, but to the
problem of judgment. Recognition of the possible rightness of the others ethical point
of view might facilitate the pragmatics of negotiation and thus prevent a logic of
extermination. Recognition may moderate conflict, but it cannot abolish it. Yet on
closer inspection, even this modest proposal becomes problematic. The normative
promise of recognition to provide a peaceful settlement of social and political conflicts
cannot be realized within the realm of the international. Here, the recognition is tied
to the constitution of communities and not their regulation. Kochis reflections focus
exclusively on the regulative aspects of recognition, while the constitutive aspects of
recognition, war, and violence are obscured. Recognition therefore only pertains to
the political or ethical grievances and concerns of extant others, not to the formation
of such agents through war. This is all the more surprising as Kochi tries to develop
his concept of recognition through a critical engagement with Hegel.
Yet even on these truncated terms, it seems doubtful that recognition can fulfill
Kochis expectations. Firstly, if it is true that most partisan judgments are confused,
limited, self-contradictory, it remains ultimately unclear how the recognition of such
judgment on the side of the other can really contribute to a better understanding
and open up spaces for political negotiation. The process of recognition that Kochi
describes demands a modicum of coherence and normative structure within the
others judgment. It is difficult to imagine recognition forthcoming for the partisan
judgment that lacks these qualities.
Secondly, Kochis notion of recognition seems to pre-suppose what it claims to
produce. The universal judgment that is supposed to emerge from the recognition
of the others ethics of violence is in fact only conceivable, if a prior shared moral
code is in effect. The possibility of recognizing some rightness in the others violence
requires a common set of values according to which such an assessment can be made.
The other, in other words, is not a radical other; his violence does not reflect the
extreme ontological rift between friend and enemy that is involved in the constitution
of ethical-political communities.68
Kochi also seems to overlook a point here that features prominently in his discussion of Hegels theory of recognition: the ontological subordination of ethics
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202 Andreas Behnke

to sovereignty.69 Only within a regime of sovereignty can moral-truth claims be
articulated and realized in a political context. Any claim to universality is in fact
particularistic, always offered as an expression of a particular point of view of a
distinctive political community.70 The judgment on violence and the decision to go
to war is therefore first and foremost the expression of a desire for sovereignty and
the formation of a different, an alternative, ethical community. We therefore need
to recognize that recognition does not offer a chance to moderate or mitigate the
monstrous effects of sovereignty and war. As the discussion of al-Qaeda and its terror
in this essay has demonstrated, a critical-theoretical engagement with recognition in
the international society should not aim to fulfill the futile and ever-receding goal of
replacing its structure of violence with a diagram of morals. The critique of recognition must instead focus on the constitutive role that it plays in this society and the
space it opens for the articulation of new political subjectivities.
Notes
I would like to thank the editors for their comments on an earlier draft, and the fellow members
of the Liberal Way of War Programme at the University of Reading, in particular Christina
Hellmich, for their respective feedback.
1. I am referring to 9/11 as an Event here in the sense that Jacques Derrida does, that
is, as an act that resists immediate subsumption to a given structure of meaning, a law, or a
truth, yet demands such a move in a dramatic fashion. Yet this appropriation of the Event
falters in the absence of a given horizon of anticipation and experience. Borradori and Derrida
2003, 90. It is therefore the Event-character of this event that induced the search for meaning. One could also say that from a political perspective, an Event suspends and reopens the
course of history, Nancy 2000, 107, as it establishes new points of references, structures of
meaning, and practices out of the aporia of the Events interpretations.
2. Nancy 2000, 122.
3. Cf. Prozorov 2005.
4. Ignatieff 2001.
5. Sofsky 2002, 177.
6. Ibid.,178.
7. Sofsky, 1996, 107.
8. Kippenberg 2004, .
9. Bajorek 2005, 874.
10. Baudrillard 2002.
11. Ibid. Although focusing more on the role of the United States within the system,
Jacques Derrida comes to a similar conclusion. For him, 9/11 constitutes a double suicide,
or a case of suicidal autoimmunity: let us not forget that the United States had in effect
paved the way for and consolidated the forces of the adversary by training people like bin
Laden, who would here be the most striking example. Borradori and Derrida 2003, 95. The
United States, in other words, became the victim of a suicidal, auto-immunitary aggression
on 9/11.
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12. iek 2002, 910.
13. Frow 2003, 69.
14. Borradori and Derrida 2003, 91.
15. Haacke 2005.
16. Saurette 2006, 503.
17. Wolf 2008, 28.
18. This is the constitutive theory of recognition. It is opposed by the declaratory theory,
which considers the recognition of states to be little more than the confirmation of an already
effective statehood. Ultimately, as shall become clear from the following, neither theory fully
grasps the functioning of recognition.
19. Kochi 2009, 139.
20. Ibid., 141.
21. Cf. ibid., 143.
22. Cf. ibid., 137139.
23. Ibid., 141142.
24. Nancy 2000.
25. Kochi 2009, 143.
26. Ibid., 143.
27. Ibid., 135.
28. Cf. Smith 1989, 158.
29. Ibid., 159.
30. Hegel 1991, 361. This is of course a dig against Kants project of Eternal Peace. For
the reason why it is ultimately unjustified, see Behnke 2009.
31. Smith 1989,160.
32. Kochi 2009, 213.
33. Ibid., 209.
34. Derrida 2001, 57.
35. Ringmar 2006.
36. Kochi 2009, 230.
37. Nancy 2000, 118.
38. Ibid., 122.
39. Ibid., 107.
40. Schmitt 1995.
41. Ibid., 21.
42. Ibid., 78.
43. Behnke 2004.
44. Ibid., 30811.
45. Oxford English Dictionary 2008; cf. Connolly 1995, xxii.
46. bin Laden 1998.
47. Nancy 2000, 139.
48. Blits 1989, 426.
49. Ghaith 2001, 252.
50. bin Laden 2002, 174.
51. See the text of the Spiritual Guidance and its critical interpretations in Kippenberger
and Seidensticker 2004. An English translation of the text was published in The Observer on
September 30, 2001 (Last Words of a Terrorist 2001).
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204 Andreas Behnke

52. Prozorov 2005, 95.
53. Ibid., 93.
54. Prozorov 2004, 281.
55. Honneth 1995.
56. Simons 2000, 52.
57. Burke 2006.
58. Nye 2007.
59. Howard 2002, 8.
60. Mansfield 1982, 236.
61. Howard 2009, 9.
62. Howard 2002, 10.
63. Haacke 2005; Honneth 1995; Roberts 2009. See also Allan and Kellers contribution
to this book, in which thick recognition of the others identity becomes a prerequisite for
just peace.
64. Kochi 2009, 250.
65. Ibid., 256.
66. Ibid., 257.
67. Ibid., 257.
68. Schmitt 1991.
69. Cf. Prozorov 2005, 100107.
70. Walker 1993, 63.
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.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=Joseph%20S.%20Nye%20Jr,%202007&st=cse.
Oxford English Dictionary. 1989. Oxford: Oxford University Press.http://dictionary.oed.com.
Prozorov, Sergei. 2004. Three Theses on Governance and the Political. Journal of International Relations and Development 7 (3): 267293.
. 2005. X/Xs: Towards a General Theory of the Exception. Alternatives 30 (1): 81112.
Ringmar, Erik. 2006. Liberal Barbarism and the Oriental Sublime: The European Destruction of the Emperors Summer Palace. Millennium 34 (3): 917933.
Roberts, Neal. 2009. Recognition, Power, and Agency. Political Theory 37 (2): 296309.
Rubin, Barry, and Judith Colp Rubin, eds. 2002. Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle
East: A Documentary Reader. New York: Oxford University Press.
Saurette, Paul. 2006. You Dissin Me? Humiliation and Post 9/11 Global Politics. Review
of International Studies 32 (3): 495522.
Schmitt, Carl. 1991. Der Begriff des Politischen. Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei
Corrolarien. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
. 1995. Theorie des Partisanen. Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen. Berlin:
Duncker & Humblot.
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206 Andreas Behnke

Simons, Jon. 2000. Modernist Misapprehensions of Foucaults Aesthetics. Cultural Values
4 (1): 4057.
Smith, Steven B. 1989. Hegels Critique of Liberalism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Sofsky, Wolfgang. 1996. Traktat ber die Gewalt. Frankfurt: Fischer.
. 2002. Zeiten des Schreckens. Frankfurt: Fischer.
Walker, R. B. J. 1993. Inside/Outside. International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge:
Wolf, Reinhard. 2008. Respekt: Ein unterschtzter Faktor in den Internationalen Beziehungen. Zeitschrift fr Internationale Beziehungen 15 (1): 542.
iek, Slavoj. 2002. Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related
Dates. London: Verso.
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Part III
Conclusions
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4/18/11 12:36 PM
C h a p t e r 11
Concluding Remarks
on the Empirical Study
of International Recognition
Thomas Lindemann
What does recognition mean and how does the concept apply to the empirical study
of international conflicts? This book provided some answers based on theoretical
considerations as well as on empirical case studies of the origins of international
conflict and terrorist violence. Drawing on these theoretical and empirical perspectives, I will formulate some testable hypotheses about recognition and the origins of
war. In the first section, I will propose a definition of non-recognition and explain
why the concept of recognition can be applied to interstate relations. In the second
section, I will formulate some hypotheses about the link between non-recognition
and the origins of war. In a final section, I will outline some methods to empirically
investigate these hypotheses.
Non-Recognition in International Relations

Almost all of the contributions to this book defended an interactionist conception
of non-recognition that includes the offended actors self-conceptions as well as their
confirmation or non-confirmation by others. Drawing inspiration from sociological
theory, we can summarize denials of recognition as the difference between a claimed
209
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210 Thomas Lindemann

self-image and the image we perceive others to give us.1 If there is a rough equivalence between this self-image and how we are treated, our self-image is recognized.
If, on the other hand, we have a more positive image of ourselves than the image of
us projected by others, we are not recognized.2 The recognition of an actor does not
necessarily imply that other actors completely share their self-images but solely that
they treat them according to the way they understand themselves. More than sincere recognition, what matters to actors is to preserve their face in social interaction.
Ideally we should distinguish between two aspects of non-recognition. In the first
case, actors do not feel recognized because their self-descriptions are not confirmed
by other actors. The difficulty in satisfying these hubristic identities (inflated selfdescriptions3) is highlighted by studies of Germanys self-images before World War II,
of the sacred character of Israelis self descriptions, and of the virile self-images (that
is, the cult of physical force and the search for domination) attributed to the Bush administration.4 This identity-related denial of recognition is traditionally described as a
struggle for prestige, and more linked to the subjects identity than to the disrespectful behavior from others.5 In the second case, actors may feel as if they have not been
recognized because socially expected standards of consideration have been violated. In
this volume, the contributions of Charles Doran on Wilhelmian Germanys difficulty
in acquiring responsibilities in line with its potential power, and Alexandre Hummels
study of the discriminatory aspects in the application of the non-proliferation treaty
show how the violation of socially accepted standards of recognition fuel aggressive
reactions.6 These kinds of struggles are best defined as struggles for dignity because
they are motivated by the desire to be considered as a normal member of a community
more than as a special member with a superior identity. Struggles for identity and
dignity are related to each other. For example, Richard Lebows study in this volume
suggests that self-glorification often is the result of a process of stigmatization by which
excluded actors transform their negative differences into something particularly positive, transforming a pariah people into an elected people.
Some may object that it is confusing to define non-recognition as the negative
difference between a self-image and a received image, whether the source of nonrecognition be a grossly inflated self-image or a denial of equality. Indeed, ethically
it would not be justified to recognize actors with inflated self-images. However,
recognition is for most of the authors in this book not a normative concept but an
independent variable: what matters is the actors subjective feeling that they are
not recognized, and it is this symbolic frustration that is a possible motivation to
engage in international conflict.
For many contributions in this book, especially those by Axel Honneth and Reinhard Wolf, transporting the concept of recognition to the field of interstate relations
still appears relatively problematic, at least in its psychological dimension. Does not
such a transposition result in an illegitimate anthropomorphism of the state? 7 Why
should state decision-makers feel offended when the refusal of recognition is directed
at the political entity and not at the person? Only people and not states have a need for
affection or for self-esteem. Moreover, is it not true that bureaucratic and decisional
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Concluding Remarks on the Empirical Study of International Recognition 211

logics inside democratic political entities oblige political decision-makers to contend
with a multitude of political forces? 8 Such a pluralist configuration of power channels
the anger provoked by insults. It is also true that applying the recognition problematic
to interstate relations is tricky from an ethical point of view: it is indeed difficult to
argue in favor of a states basic needs against the rights of individuals.
However, interestingly enough, Honneth and Wolf conclude their arguments
with a strong plea for the application of the concept of recognition to the study of
interstate relations. A sociological argument for such an interstate application is
made in this volume by Philippe Braud, who insists on the identity value that an
abstract institutional entity can possess for the officials of such an institution. In
order for individuals to be able to embrace a role such as that of government leader,
it is necessary for them to be identified at least partially with the institution that has
conferred this role.9 The identification of political officials with their state is all the
more probable when the prestige associated with the institution strongly influences
their personal prestige. In addition, political elites, as opposed to economic ones,
seem to value prestige and power more than wealth. Political activities select alpha
personalities that should be particularly sensitive to recognition denials.10
The representative link (Braud) between the governed and the governing explains why populations seldom are indifferent to attacks on their collective symbols.
Emotional dynamics initiated by an act of contempt against a state are far from
impossible to ignore. The reference markers of collective identity, the founding references of groups, such as religious beliefs, constitute an emotionally invested site.11
An objection, discussed by Honneth and Wolf, asserts that political decision-makers
in modern democracies are so strongly inserted into bureaucratic processes that they
should not easily succumb to such emotional dynamics. Accordingly, only dictators
like Adolf Hitler, Saddam Hussein, or Kim Jong-Il make wounds to their self-esteem
an object of contention. However, emotions are not necessarily individual but can
also be collective, especially if the offense is targeted against a head of state in his or
her official rather than personal capacity. Thus, taking hostage of a co-national or
massacres inside another state can stimulate emotions in the formation of internal
opinion, making it difficult for political decision-makers to remain inactive. Even
an emotionally insensitive decision-maker cannot easily ignore offense felt by his or
her community.12
Interestingly, this perspective invites us to take into account the strategic aspects
of recognition in political decisions. Indeed, as suggested by Honneth, we cannot
assume that decision-makers define interests of power and wealth-maximization
independently of the moral expectations of their constituencies. Moreover, political
decision-makers often instrumentalize questions of identity and pride to find resonance among public opinion. In the first place, they could try to appease the adversarys public opinion through recognition in order to delegitimize waras suggested
by Honneth. Secondly, recognition and non-recognition can be exploited to trigger
international conflict. Bismarcks Ems Dispatch13 offers a good illustration of how
decision-makers may be able to force a war by insulting a nation.
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Strategic calculations concerning recognition apply not only to the domestic arena
but also to the international. The success of a tit for tat strategy in Robert Axelrods
famous game theory tournament shows that people with the reputation to respond
reasonably to provocations have a better chance to succeed in the competition.14 Bearing this in mind, when a state is not preoccupied with its reputation in international
society, it risks losing its authority and independence.15 As the realists would have
it, reputation and credibility are crucially important for a states ability to deter
aggression.16 However, in a Kantian anarchy, founded on the rule of non-violence
and mutual aid instead of military honor, this same strategic interest in preserving
a good reputation can also play in favor of advocating moderate policies.17
Finally, applying the recognition problematic to international relations is an empirical question. It is worth investigating whether political entities with strong national
identities, holistic conceptions of society and states personified by their leadersl tat
cest moiare more vulnerable to offenses than others. The identification with state
entities on the part of different actors will always be variable and multidimensional.
State identification cannot be abstractly postulated without investigating sociologically the variety of historical situations.
The Empirical Study: Some Hypotheses

on Non-Recognition and International Violence
From these premises about a states symbolic motivation, it is possible to formulate
several hypotheses about the link between non-recognition and armed violence.
War, according to the main thesis, will become an option when the perceived net
recognition benefits of war are superior to the perceived net recognition benefits of
peace.18 There is a recognition net benefit when an actor improves his self-image
as conveyed by significant others by choosing a policy. Without claiming that it is
possible to exactly quantify the recognition benefits of war and peace, the assumption that decision-makers only consider the economic and strategic costs of war is
unrealistic. Leaders calculate, subconsciously at least, the symbolic costs and gains
in war. Symbolic calculations have their own particular logic and therefore cannot be
approached in the same way as material benefits.19 Some may argue that for decisionmakers, losing a war always signifies humiliation and thus a loss of face. If this were
true, our calculations could be simplified, since the most powerful would always be
the ones who best preserve their reputation. However, we know that state leaders
may gain reputation and national support even in military defeatespecially when
confronted with an overwhelming power.20
It is thus necessary to consider which types of variables determine the symbolic
benefits of peace and war. First, the symbolic costs depend on identities. War will be
more likely to promote an actors self-image if he has a hubristic identity because actors with inflated self-descriptions are easily offended.21 War can also be an attractive
option if the instigators have few moral feelings of guilt or shame, which is the case
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where the actors fail to positively identify with the victim of the aggressive action.
Second, the interest of a state not to resort to force will depend on whether other
states or non-state actors treat it according to normal standards of recognition. In
this case, the struggle for recognition is not a struggle for a special identity but for
dignity; that is, a socially accepted and generally acknowledged standard of respect.
The identity-motivated recognition struggles and dignity-motivated recognition
struggles represent two modalities of an actors quest for self-esteem. In the first case,
the quest for self-esteem is animated by a strategy of distinction: a positive self-image
is cultivated by exaggerating differences with others and in stressing ones superiority.22 In the second case, actors seek to obtain self-esteem by identifying with a valued
social group and by demonstrating their similarity with other members of a community. The two aspects of recognition are related. It is often by stigmatization that
actors, like Nazi Germany, develop idealized and negative identities that especially
serve to enhance their self-esteem. In other words, an actors strategy of distinction
is often not a choice but a necessity because the valued community does not accept
them.23 Extensive empirical investigations are needed to validate the thesis about the
symbolic origins of wars, and the more modest aim here is to show that the historical
evidence presented in this volume and elsewhere about the origins of interstate wars
is consistent with the hypotheses that follow.
If actors have hubristic identities and do not identify with other actors, and if they
are denied dignity and identity, we can say that war is a probable option because
the symbolic net benefits in favor of war are higher than the symbolic net benefits
of peace. This formula also includes both the emotional and material costs related
to non-recognition. All of the following hypotheses are based on the idea that wars
often occur when self-images are not recognized. The first and second hypotheses
stress the importance of idealized and shared identities while the third and fourth
hypotheses stress the dignity-related aspects of non-recognition. The fifth links
both identity and dignity, since it is through non-recognition of dignity that actors
construct problematic identities that are a possible cause of war.24
Hypothesis 1: Hubristic Identities as a Possible Cause of War

Many contributions to this volume suggest that actors with hubristic identities are
particularly vulnerable to narcissistic wounds. Hubristic identities are defined by the
aspiration for recognition by other actors on the international scene of ones superiority,
which is not recognized by other major international actors. For instance, NationalSocialist pretention of racial superiority over other nations is an extreme expression
of such hubristic identity because this pretention is very different from great power
ambitions to participate in international leadership by virtue of international norms
that are formalized. In the first case, superiority is totally subjective and hence disconnected from any international norm of recognition. In the second case, superiority is
recognized by others on the basis of well-established norms. Inflated self-descriptions
are not necessarily restricted to crazy authoritarian leaders.25 However, one can argue
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that these hubristic self-images are better channeled by democratic institutions, to
which these leaders are accountable, than by dictatorships.
There are several links between hubristic identities and war. First, such identities
are more vulnerable than egalitarian identities. Perceiving others actions as insults
initially depends on actors self-image. To paraphrase Alexander Wendt, I cannot
know what insults me if I do not know who I am. Communities conveying hubristic
identities will take every opportunity to feel humiliated, even by minor provocations.
Second, when officials of several states lay claim to superiority over each other,
an identity dilemma emergesones identity assertion implies the non-recognition
of the other.26 Even if respected as equals, actors with hubristic identities are easily
offended if others refuse to admit their own inferiority. Thus hubristic identities are
exposed to the loss of a sense of continuity of the self (ontological insecurity) in case
of their non-confirmation by a significant other.27 Yana Zuos study in this volume
illustrates the link between ontological insecurity and international conflict in the
case of Taiwan, particularly how changes in self-identification demand recognition
by others.
On the other hand, all claims to superiority imply the depreciation of others. An
armed conflict follows when an actor, confronted by anothers identity pretensions,
is not satisfied with having a slave identity.
Third, as Wolf explains, representatives of a culture of prestige are more inclined
to take risks, even at the price of their security and that of their community. State
officials asserting superiority tend to prefer glory to physical security.28 They also
prefer absolute victory, which is more costly but more prestigious, to relative, piecemeal victories. The attempts to conquer Russia by Napoleonic France, then by Nazi
Germany, are typical examples of such foolish taste for high risks.
Moreover, virile identities that are the cult of physical force and the search for
domination are an important factor in explaining the resort to force. Virile identities
can be considered a subtype of hubristic identities stressing physical and mental,
and not intellectual or moral, superiority over others. An entire body of literature
in international relations, as much psychological as feminist, has promoted the importance of virile images as a possible cause of armed confrontations.29 Responses to
provocations can range from verbal protest to the use of force via economic sanctions.
The governmental representatives of a virile culture are the ones most anxious to avoid
an admission of weakness and are, as a consequence, most willing to resort to force.
Thus, as stressed in this volume by Richard Lebow, societies characterized by the
cult of honor did not have the same possibility to make concessions without compromising their identities as Athens, antimilitarist ex-FRG, or contemporary Sweden.30
Hypothesis 2: The Propensity for Armed Aggression between Political Actors

is Higher When There is No Positive Identity Link between Them
A collective identity assumes that others belong to the same community as oneself,
even if our similarity is reduced merely to the affiliation of mankind.31 A collective
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identity also implies identification with others; a minimal emotional participation in
their distress and their needs. Identification rests on the perception that others deserve,
as human beings, protection of their lives.32 The Kantian anarchy of NATO where
member states are identified with others is an illustration. The empirical identification
of a collective identity does not presume that various qualities are objectively shared
by two communities. What counts is instead an awareness of belonging to the same
community, forming an imagined community.33
The prospect of recognition explains why shared identities are a source of peace.
Actors who resort to force against a friendly state for economic and political reasons
contribute to the depreciation of their own imagebecause I identify others as
anathema, I can cut them down without compromising my positive self-image.34 The
colonial European powers did not have any scruples in waging wars of extermination
against African people, whether in the Belgian Congo or German South-West Africa.
At the worst, political actors can even presuppose that others convey values that are
the exact opposite of their own. In this case, others represent a threat to our identity.35
The link between the lack of shared identities and recognition through international violence is explored in this volume by Andreas Behnkes contribution dedicated
to al-Qaeda. When others are stigmatized or when differentiation is valued, actors
may seek recognition through a logic of otherness instead of inclusion. International
society is founded on the affirmation of sovereignty, which entails exclusion by the
acknowledgement of the mutually exclusive authority over territorially defined space.
In such a system, violence is productive in establishing subjectivity. Indeed in war
the state-sovereign asserts himself in a duel between equals (Behnke). Thus 9/11
can be understood as al-Qaedas desire to become recognized as a political, indeed
quasi-sovereign, rather than criminal actor in the global system. However, in adding
to Behnkes analysis, it would be pertinent to investigate not only the designers of
al-Qaedas attacks but also those who carry them out. For this latter group, concrete
experiences of discriminationfor example, by stigmatized Muslims in Western
countriesshould count more than the abstract social fact of sovereignty in the
international system.36
Hypothesis 3: The Denials of Accepted Standards of a States Universal

Dignity to a Particular State Are Likely to Incite Wars
States are not only struggling for individuality but also for dignity. In this perspective,
it is not a desire to affirm ones superiority that is at the origin of a rivalry between
states, but a desire to avoid disregard and the unequal affirmation of superiority by
others. These kinds of recognition struggles are not for a special identity but for
dignity, meaning that states are striving to be recognized as full members of a community. In this case, recognition is strongly linked to the problem of justice.
Many international norms of respect may be open to interpretation, contestation, and therefore to opposite reactions and behaviors. However, it would be rash
to conclude that dignity entirely depends on an actors perceptions. While it is rare
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that an actor will feel offended by the refusal to obtain the annexation of its neighbor, it is more than likely that a state actor will feel non-recognized by violations of
widely accepted norms, such as non-interference in internal affairs. Some norms of
international respect are so deeply anchored in social practices and the expectations
of state actors that their violation universally triggers feelings of non-recognition.
The universal dignity of the state, meaning the abstract respect for an actor as
a member of a community of states and not as an actor with special qualities, is
protected by a great number of conventions. For instance, normal states are recognized by others and engage in official diplomatic relations with them. This kind of
thin recognition implies that each party recognizes the others right to exist and
to continue to exist as an autonomous subject, to quote the contribution of Pierre
Allan and Alexis Keller. A recognized state enjoys the right of territorial integrity.
Thick recognition means treating other states as equal members of a shared community. There are norms that claim respect for the hierarchical status and autonomy
of states. Equal sovereignty means that each state is its own master and free from
any external authority.37 Even small powers will jealously protect their rights, such
as the immunity of their ambassadors and the preeminence of those ambassadors
over lower-ranking diplomats of big powers. Moreover there exist more informal
norms of equal dignity among states. The norm of reciprocity is probably one of the
universal principal components of moral codes. Symmetry in behavior and mutual
renouncement (Allan and Keller) means that nobody suffers any discrimination.
Finally, since the Vienna Alliance (1815) system, there has been the rule among great
powers to integrate all great powers into some common institutions.38 Many studies
suggest that recognition/non-recognition of accepted standards of visibility and equal
dignity is a possible cause of peace and war.39 Newly created state-entities, not fully
recognized in the international community, such as Communist China until 1971
and the Hamas entity in 2008, often use violence to establish themselves as existing
actors in international relations.
In the same way, the denial of equal dignity is an important motivation for interstate conflicts.40 Punitive and discriminating peace treaties, verbal depreciation of the
others status, and harsh injunctions, such as ultimatums, can trigger violent reactions
that aim for the re-establishment of a states threatened dignity.41 Non-recognition of
great powers that have the means to punish the offender will especially fuel humiliation
and violent reactions. Nations treated as parvenu powers (Lebow) such as Wilhelmian Germany (Murray, Doran) or stigmatized powers are more likely to engage in
armed conflicts or displays of military might than integrated and accepted powers.
Thus, Michelle Murray shows in her study how Germanys armament policy
before World War I was an attempt to secure identity in light of its non-recognition.
German demands to be treated as an equal on par with the other great powers went
unrecognized, leading to an intense spiral of symbolic escalation to which Germany
responded with increased belligerence. For Charles Doran, the experience of misrecognition by German decision-makers motivated their brinkmanship in the 1914
July crisis.42 This misrecognition is founded on an unusual lag between Germanys
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power and role in the international system. The origins of World War II are also
linked to the refusal on the part of the Allies of accepted standards of great power
dignity. Lebows study shows how Germanys nationalism was fueled more by those
articles of the treaty that were considered offensive to German honor, such as article
231s guilt clause, than by those inimical to German security.
Hypothesis 4: Attacks on Specific Identities such as a States

Political or Cultural References or a Lack of Empathy Are Also
Likely to Encourage the Outbreak of Armed Conflicts
Non-recognition may hurt a states more particularistic identity as an actor with
specific values and a right to obtain special attention from other members of the
international community. Attacks on specific state identities are identifiable by depreciation of its national values or by the negation of past traumas, as well as indifference
toward the suffering of victims in national catastrophes. There exist two forms of a
states struggle for identity. In the first case, treated in the first hypothesis, states try
to affirm inflated self-descriptions, which produce identity dilemmas. In the second
case, a states struggle for identity is canalized by reference to general international
norms and not incompatible with tolerance of the others culture.
Many legal and moral norms have progressively been developed in the interstate
system to assure respect for a states specific identity. The development of norms
regarding mutual tolerance is linked to the traumatic experience of destructive
religious and ideological wars where state actors realized that without a principle of
internal sovereignty involving the respect for political independence, there would
be a permanent threat to their survival.43 It is easy to show how often this norm of
political tolerance is violated, especially by great powers when they are confronting smaller nations. However, normative expectations of internal sovereignty have
survived even when violated. Thus, states proclaim their right to determine their
political, economic and social systems, without interference.44 Great powers assure
the norm of internal independence in relations among themselves by operational
rules, such as those of peaceful coexistence during the Cold War.45 Furthermore,
offenses against national symbols such as flags are condemned and identified as dommage moral in international law.
Finally, informal international norms endow states with the right to receive some
empathy from others and the reciprocal duty to offer some to others. Some norms
of empathy such as respect for traumatic historical experiences and recognition of
past crimes shape, at least since the end of the Second World War, the normative
expectations of state and non-state actors.46 The lack of empathy reveals itself in
particular by indifference toward human suffering, which is especially offensive in
the context of the rise of humanitarian norms. For this reason, it is important to
examine the reaction of actors if a state suffers a human or natural disaster. Other
experiences of indifference by state actors can be triggered by stressing others difference or insignificance.47
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Some empirical evidencesuch as the case studies about the Versailles treaty
and nuclear non-proliferation presented in this booksupports the thesis that violation of a states specific identity may trigger violence. Concerning the violation of a
states internal sovereignty, the most obvious link connects ideological messianism
and armed conflicts. Thus, homogeneous international orders are more stable than
heterogeneous ones, especially if the latter are governed by powers spreading their
ideology, such as during the Thirty Years War or the French Revolution.48 Classic
Realist scholars such as Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger consider ideological
messianism as a cause of war because it neglects power realities. However, it is also
worth investigating the symbolic effect of political moralism on such state leaders as
Kim Jong-Il or Saddam Hussein. Peaceful international crisis management involving
powers of different types presupposes the recognition of the coexistence principle,
such as during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.
Some empirical studies also show that indifference toward a states fate or its
historical traumas fuels aggressive reactions.49 State actors seek empathy when they
are struck by humanitarian catastrophe. For instance, American leaders were deeply
offended by Saddam Husseins and the Talibans state celebrations of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.50 Peace researchers underline that rhetorical practice stressing differences
between in-group and out-group helps to fuel conflicts, whereas the display of
some empathy toward others by stressing a shared identity often is able to pacify
international conflicts.
Hypothesis 5: Attacks against a States Dignity Are Also Likely

to Encourage Interstate Violence Via the Formation of Stigmatized
Identities which Can Be Transformed into Idealized Identities
The more subjective and inter-subjective aspects of recognitionthe struggle for
inflated self-descriptions and struggle for dignityare related because it is often
through stigmatization that actors develop idealized identities.
The need for the confirmation of an identity by others explains why actors construct their identities while looking at themselves through the eyes of others.51 In the
interstate system, the significant others are normally great powers or neighboring
states. Hubristic and negative identities, such as extreme nationalism or religious
fundamentalism, are often the result of a process of stigmatization, through which
others transform the initially negative difference into a positive quality. The construction of hubristic and negative identities rests on contemptuous behaviors, such
as humiliating peace treaties. The sentence anarchy is what states make of it only
makes sense under the assumption that there are behaviors of recognition that are
likely to turn Hobbesian anarchy into Kantian anarchy.52 It is true that state identities are constructed by domestic processes, but systemic factors such as recognition
and non-recognition from great powers have constantly been minimized in works
about state chauvinism.
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Some empirical studies, such as Lebows contribution to this book, show the
utility in linking non-recognition through stigmatization and state exclusion on the
one hand, and construction of idealized and warlike identities on the other. Thus,
Germanys symbolic humiliation by the Versailles treaty explains partly why National
Socialism could exploit honor-related themes. The development of fundamentalisms
is often exacerbated by external threats and by behaviors of stigmatization.
However, it should be noted that even conciliatory movements within a nationas is suggested by Honneths contributionare not automatically perceived
by another nations public opinion. National political leaders are often able to select
and reinterpret information from the outside world. Indoctrinated by the legends of
backstabbing and strong resentment about the humiliation of Versailles, Germanys
public never fully realized the softening of the Versailles treaty induced by the United
States and Great Britain that took place in the 1920s and against French opposition.53
These concessions were surely too incremental to be of any tangible effect. To be efficient, a politics of recognition has to address itself quite directly and spectacularly
to another states public opinion. Willy Brandts Kniefall to victims of the Warsaw
Ghetto Uprising and Anwar El Sadats speech before the Knesset in 1977 illustrate
the important symbolic dimensions of a politics of recognition.
It is also worth investigatingas suggested by Wolf in our volumewhether hubristic identities could not result from an excess of recognition. Permanently flattered
people progressively develop inflated self-descriptions and are therefore more easily
provoked and prone to risky behavior. Studies of group-think have stressed that
decision-makers whose views are never contested rapidly develop feelings of invulnerability, overconfidence and self-glorification.54 Another possible effect of a submissive
entourage is that such decision-makers find it difficult to confront the international
community that may contradict their inflated self-descriptions.
International Recognition Study Methods

The recognition studies in this volume suggest that all kinds of methods are helpful in understanding or measuring the impact of non-recognition in international
politics: correlation studies, case studies, and more interpretative methods. In
order to investigate a possible co-variation between recognition and international
conflict, it is necessary to objectify non-recognition independently from frustration
and mental states expressed by actors. For instance, it is possible to detect idealized
self-images by analyzing the architectural characteristics of governmental buildings, important statues, military parades, and national ceremonies.55 In the same
way, the lack of shared identities among states can be objectified by the existence of
messianic great powers with differentiated identity types (for example, authoritarian
regimes compared to democratic states) or linguistic analyses such as the frequency
of dichotomous discourses (reinforcing an us and them rhetoric). Dignity-related
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non-recognition is even more easily detected than identity-related non-recognition
because it transgresses inter-subjective standards as opposed to specific ideas held by
some megalomaniac and idiosyncratic actors.56 As already suggested, it is possible
to investigate the extent to which fundamental norms of recognition are formalized
in international relations in a given period. Thus dignity is not an individual mental
state that escapes empirical analysis. The inter-subjective character of identity and
dignity makes it possible to grasp the material existence of non-recognition. Once
objectified, we can establish co-variation between non-recognition and phenomena
such as peace and war. For example, it should be possible to measure whether international orders founded on idealized, virile identities, different identity types, harsh
punishment, and stigmatization of vanquished powers are more war prone than orders
that conform to social standards of recognition. Dorans study of Germanys powerrole gap before World War I is a prime example of how to statistically analyze the
link between non-recognition and international violence.
However, correlations need to be explained and completed by a study of the ways
in which actors understand situations in order to grasp how such objectified nonrecognition is experienced in situ. Are they aware of non-recognition, and is their
understanding of it comparable with the indicators the researcher has constructed?57
The significance of non-recognition will vary as a function of an actors cognitive
map. The study of an actors subjective drives and representations is also important
for grasping the relationship between variables and to identify intervening steps
in the process leading from peace to war.58 For example: Why is it that hubristic
identities lead to war? Is it because they are more vulnerable to provocations, or is it
because actors with such identities are more prone to take risks? It is also very interesting to distinguish different steps of the decision-making process: identification
of non-recognition; evaluation and risk assessments of different policy alternatives;
interaction with the offender and domestic and international audiences; and the final
choice between peace and war.
A first approach to grasping actors subjective understanding is to detect feelings of humiliation. As made clear in this volume, the detection of such emotions
presents considerable problems for the analyst. In this way, the perpetrators of most
wars and international violence justify their actions by the existence of injustices.
To take public indignations at face value means exposing oneself to the risk of circular reasoning: one identifies the refusal of recognition by violence, which is then
explained by the existence of an identity frustration. One way to avoid such circular
reasoning is to scrutinize many more private sources from actors, such as personal
documents that may give a better clue to true motives than do public discourses. It
is also worth examining the rapidity of decisions in order to verify whether they are
spontaneous and thus possibly fueled by emotions.59 Other clues to actors emotions
are their inner circles of advisers, since they get to witness external expressions of
feelings of humiliation, such as outbreaks of anger. However, one should not only
focus on the emotional aspects of recognition but also on its strategic motivation.
Policy-makers may rationally evaluate how a decision affects self-image and reputation
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in domestic and international audiences because their legitimacy depends greatly
on these symbolic factors. Even actors driven by glory or humiliation may carefully
repress immediate emotions to better serve their long-term aims, as is well expressed
in the popular adage, Revenge is a dish best served cold. More strategic expressions
for the quest of recognition can be empirically analyzed by studying the frequency
of words such as reputation or credibility in an actors discourses and by paying
special attention to whether domestic and international challenges to the symbolic
capital of governmental authorities are correlated with a radicalization of decisions
related to international security.60
It is also possible to test explanations in terms of recognition against other explanations, as demonstrated by Lebow and Murrays contributions. We can contrast the
strategic and economic costs and benefits of a decision with recognition-related logics.
However we should avoid turning recognition into a purely residual variable to be
used only when rationalist explanations fail. The reduction of the quest for recognition to emotions such as self-esteem will reduce it to a purely psychological approach,
stressing the limits of rationality. Yet, the quest for rationality is often quite strategic,
and reputation is a resource in the struggle for power and wealth. The works of Frank
Schimmelfennig and Honneth and Hummels articles in this volume suggest how
actors elaborate true presentation strategies, which means that they try to maximize
their self-image and to lessen those of others by instrumentalizing accepted norms
for their political purpose.61 Thus, to test the value of recognition against realist or
liberal approaches, we should also consider the emotional aspects of recognition as
well as its strategic aspects. Such calculations can even be externally deduced by
asking questions about the symbolic net benefits of options related to peace and war.
Epilogue
The contributions in this volume provide tentative evidence for the thesis that
non-recognition matters in international politics. Most of our cases are related to
international conflict and are therefore hard cases for recognition because scholars
expect that here physical survival should easily come before vanity. Against such
intuitive understanding of armed conflicts, the evidence presented in this book suggests that the quest for recognition is as much a cause of international conflict as that
of security concerns or profits in terms of power and economics. Whoever studies
international conflicts should therefore not only pay attention to what actors want
to have but also to how they want to appear and how these self-images are reflected
by others. In this manner, physical violence is often preceded by symbolic violence
(Braud). This diagnosis should also, as Honneth suggests, have normative implications for the prevention of war. The perspective of recognition suggests an alternative
means to the carrot-and-stick approach in the pacification of contentious powers
such as China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran. One should examine in more detail
the recognition aspirations of these states. Such politics of recognition is also aimed
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at internal audiences of the aggressive state in order to delegitimize the war option
for the decision-makers of these states. The politics of recognition is not expensive,
but its benefits can be huge.
Notes
I am grateful for comments provided by Michael Ahmed, Elena Aoun, Philippe Braud, Justin
Cook, Elisabeth Etienne, Volker Heins, Alexandre Hummel, Stephen Humphreys, Peter
Koenigs, Ned Lebow, Christian Olsson, Erik Ringmar, and Reinhard Wolf.
1. Goffman 1999; Braud 1996; Honneth 1996.
2. Lindemann 2010; Wolf 2008.
3. Plato 2008, 4649.
4. White 1970; Saurette 2006.
5. Lebow 2008, 45121; ONeill 2004, 85100; Markey 1999.
6. Doran 1991.
7. Walker 1993, chapter 6; Ashley 1988.
8. Rosen 2005, 5055.
9. Crawford 2000; Braud 1996.
10. Saurette 2006.
11. Braud 2004.
12. Saurette 2006.
13. The Ems Dispatch was an internal message from the Prussian king to Bismarck
related to the French demand that the king should guarantee that he would never approve
the candidacy of a Hohenzollern to the Spanish throne. Bismarck sharpened the dispatch
and released it to the press. It was designed to give the impression that King William I had
insulted the French Ambassador Count Benedetti.
14. Axelrod 1984.
15. Schelling 1960.
16. Tang 2004; Mercer [1996] 2009.
17. Wendt 298299.
18. On materialist rational choice perspectives, see Fearon 1995.
19. See Erik Ringmars introduction.
20. Jervis 1988.
21. Ringmar 1996.
22. Braud 1996, 153169.
23. Elias 2009.
24. Lindemann 2008.
25. Tajfel and Turner 1986.
26. Ringmar 2002.
27. Mitzen 2006.
28. Vertzberger 1998.
29. Tickner 1996; Steinberg 1996.
30. Lebow 2008, 6172 and chapter 3; Rosen 2005.
31. Adler and Barnett 1996.
32. Finnemore 1996.
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33. Anderson 2006.
34. Wendt 1999, 259278.
35. Risse-Kappen 1995.
36. Khosrokavar 2006.
37. Osiander 2001; Bartelson 1995.
38. Bull 1995, 40.
39. Lebow, 2008; Allan and Keller 2006; Lindemann 2001; Ringmar 1996; Schroeder
1994; Doran 1991.
40. Albin 2001, 47.
41. Schroeder 1994; Doran 1991.
42. See also Lindemann 2001.
43. Bull 1995, 35.
44. Cf. General Assembly from October 24, 1970. Anghie 2007.
45. Bull 1995, 41.
46. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9th
December 1948. Anghie 2007.
47. Albin 2001, 26.
48. Aron 1984.
49. Long and Brecke 2003; Scheff 1994.
50. Lindemann 2010.
51. Wendt 1999, 327.
52. Ibid., chapter 7.
53. Cohrs 2008.
54. Janis 1972; Lebow 1981.
55. Abdelal et al. 2009.
56. Farrell 2002, 60.
57. Vennesson 2008, 234236.
58. George and Bennett 2005.
59. Rosen 2005, chapter 2.
60. Bourdieu 1979.
61. Schimmelfennig 2003.
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International Politics of Recognition

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International Politics of Recognition

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The International

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 1

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be transmitted or reproduced

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 2

Cute cats can create outrageous miracles.

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Chapter 1 Recognition between States: On the Moral

Chapter 2 Prickly States? Recognition and Disrespect

Chapter 3 Symbolic and Physical Violence

Part II Empirical Applications

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Chapter 8 Self-Identification, Recognition and Conflicts:

Chapter 9 Recognition, the Non-Proliferation

Chapter 10 Recognizing the Enemy:

Part III Conclusions

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Figure 6.2 Conflicting Messages

Figure 6.3 Expectations Foregone:

Figure 6.4 Power-Role Lag

Figure 6.5 Dynamics of Changing Systems Structure

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Int roduct ion

The International Politics

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The Subjectivity of the State

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The International Politics of Recognition 5

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Recognition and Its Denial

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The International Politics of Recognition 7

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Recognition in International Law and Diplomacy

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The International Politics of Recognition 9

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The International Politics of Recognition 11

The Struggle for Recognition

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The International Politics of Recognition 13

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Giants on Our Shoulders

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The International Politics of Recognition 15

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The International Politics of Recognition 17

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Chapter 3 Symbolic and Physical Violence

Figure 6.2 Conflicting Messages

Figure 6.4 Power-Role Lag