Aristotle On Focal Meaning and The Unity of Science

Aristotle on Focal Meaning and the Unity of Science
Author(s): Michael T. Ferejohn

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 25, No. 2, Aristotle Number (1980), pp. 117-128
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Aristotleon Focal Meaning and the Unity of

Science
MICHAELT. FEREJOHN
This study owes its impetus to a group of suggestionsput forwardby

G. E. L. Owen in his 1960article,"Logicand Metaphysicsin Some Earlier
Works of Aristotle".1In that work, Owen gives predominantlytextual
argumentsfor the chronologicalschemerepresentedby the followingthree
theses.
(I) In the earliest works of the Corpus (including those treatiseswhich comprise
the Organon),Aristotlewas convinced that the verb "to be" [Fivasland its cognates
were ambiguous expressions,and that this ambiguity foredoomed the Platonicand
Academic programof constructinga single, unified, and all-encompassingscience
of Being.
(I1) During an intermediatestage of Aristotle'sdevelopment (representedby the
seventh book of the EudemianEthics), he regularlynoticed and worked with the
possibilityof systematic,or non-accidental,ambiguity,though he did not view this
possibilityas having any bearingon his negative claim in (I).
(111) In Metaphysicsr2, which reportshis mature views on this subject,Aristotle
finally struckupon the discoverythat the verb "to be" itself was a case of systematic
ambiguity (of a sort which Owen labelsfocal meaningambiguity). Moreover, this
discovery influenced him to reverse his previous estimation of the prospects for a
universalscience, and even to resurrectin the Metaphysicsthe Platonicprogramthat
he himself had dismissed as futile in his earlierworks.
Mostof what I have to say concerns(III).Whatwill be at issue,however,is

not its truth.That matter is put beyond serious dispute by the relatively
plain structureof MetaphysicsF2. The chapteropens with the observation
that the expressionov, which I shall translatehere as "existent",is "saidin
many ways" [roXXxCasXiyCTaLJ,but that this ambiguityis not the sort
Aristotlecalls simple "homonymy"(whereintwo or morewhollyunrelated
meanings come to be associated with a single expressionas a result of
etymologicalhappenstance).Rather, the various applications2of ov are
said to be interrelatedin that they all "make reference to (or "point
toward")a one" 11Tp4Os
gvJ(1003 a 33), which remarkOwen paraphrasesas
saying that the term hasfocal meaning.Then, after a few lines of sketchy
argumentation(which will be scrutinizedbelow), Aristotle extractsfrom
this the "obvious"conclusion(cf. 8Xov oivvat 1003b 15) that the study of
beings,qua beings, falls within the scope of a single science.
117

But even though(III) is securelygroundedin the textof Metaphysicsr2,

it nonetheless presents somethingof an impedimentto full and precise
understandingof Aristotle'sdoctrines.This is becausehe neverexplainsin
adequatedetailjust howthe differentapplicationsof ov are all supposedto
"Spointtowardsa one." Nor do his essentiallyprogrammaticremarksat
1003a 33 - b 15 more than hint at the line of reasoningby whichhe moves
from the missingfocal meaninganalysisof ov to his "'obvious"conclusion
(which is anything but obvious) that there can or must be an all-encompassingfield of inquiry which studies the totalityof existent things.
Owen's(III)thereforesetsbeforeus two exegeticalprojects,the completion
of one of whichwill be necessaryfor the other.We have firstto reconstruct
the focal meaning analysis of 6v which is presupposedbut not stated in
Metaphysics172.From this reconstructionwill emerge materials,in the
form of premises, which can then be used in combination with supplementary principles drawn from Aristotle's theory of demonstrative
science to develop a plausible interpretation of the argument of
Metaphysics 172.
The Elements of Focal Meaning Analysis
What, first of all, is the sort of the things that are supposed to "point
towardsa one" in the case of a rirpos?v term?Owen infuses a distinctly
intensionalcharacterinto this conditionwhen he paraphrasesAristotleas
saying that all the senses of a Tpos'Evterm "have one focus, one common
element."3But this is to irmportan alien ontology into a philosophical

systemwhere it has no place. Aristotle'susual mannerof theorizingabout
languageproceedswithoutreferenceto such intensionalentitiesas meanings and senses. Instead, his style of analysischaracteristicallymakes do
with a relativelylean ontology containing nothing more than pieces of
language(wordsand phrases)and the extra-linguisticentitiesthey signify
?V
[an%uaLvwJ(i.e. standfor, or denote4).Hence, an explicationof the nrrp6s
condition which is framed in this limited ontology will be considerably
truerto Aristotlethan the intensionalreadinggiven to it by Owen.
A firststep towardsthis morerestrainedinterpretationwill be to develop
a generalunderstandingof ambiguityalong these lines. We may begin by
termthereis a veryspecial
notingthatcorrespcndingto everyunambiguous
phrase,called its logos,which not only signifiespreciselythe same thingor
things signified by the term, but also stands with it in a quite intimate
relation which approximateswhat we now think of as synonymy (De
Interpretatione 21 a 30-4, Prior Analytics 49 b 5, Topics 101 b 39 - 102 a 1,
118

130a 39, 142b 2-6, 147b 13-5, 149a 1-2, b 3-5). Now what distinguishes
termsthat are "said in many ways"is that they do not have such unique
logoi. There is instead for an ambiguous term a pluralityof logoi each
having a distinct signification.
This way of dealing with ambiguityis clearlyevidencedin the statement

of the focal meaningconditiongiven at NicomacheanEthics 1096b 23-9:
But in what sense are different things called good?... Is it because they are all
derivativeof a single thing [&q' vbse'LvaL],
or [i.e. equivalently]because they are all
directedtowardsa single thing[-rp6s Ev OVVTEXEVJ . . .?
The proposalbeing consideredhereis thatthe verythingsthatarecalled by

the name "good"(that is, all of the various significataof this ambiguous
term) are so called because they themselvesare all Trrpos
Ev(or acp' ev&s5).
Thus, what qualifiesa term as havingfocal meaningis that even though it
has a pluralityof logoi with distinctsignifications,at the same time all of
these significata"makereferenceto (or "point towards")a one".
Of course,thereis generallymuchmoreto knowabouta relationthanthe
sortof relatait takes,and this discrepancyis nowheremoreevidentthan in
the passagejust quoted, wherethe entireburden f makingfocal meaning
ambiguityintelligibleis made to reston the crypticphrase'pos 'E'v.
Of the
two reasonablyliteral ways of translatingthis key piece of Aristotelian
terminology,one ("makesreferenceto a one")is as hopelesslyvague as the
other ("pointstowardsa one") is intolerablymetaphorical.It is therefore
necessary to look elsewhere in the Corpus to ascertain precisely what
relationis being assertedof the significataof a TposEvterm.
Perhaps Aristotle's fullest exposition of this relation is found at
EudemianEthicsH2, 1236a 15-23.His avowed purposethereis to analyze
an ambiguity in the term "friendship",but the passage also contains a
substantialamountof informationconcerningthe ambiguityof "medical"
(atpiXOV],
one of his favoriteexamplesof focal meaningambiguity.After
first noting that "friendship"is neither univocal [xota''?v] nor strictly
homonymous(a 16-17),Aristotlegoes on to specify the sort of systematic
ambiguityit has in common with "medical".
... [the variouskindsof friendship]all make referenceto a certainone, and that one
is primary[Trrp,TovJ,
just as in the case of "medical":we call a soul medical, and also
a body, and an instrument, and an operation, but the term is applied properly
[xvpLAs]
to that Imedicallwhich is primary.
Two critical pieces of new information are divulged in these lines. The first is
that the "'one"9towards which the various significata of a urposievterm all
point is not something external to them, but is drawn from their own
119

numbers. So, in Aristotle's example, the "one" towards which all the
various kinds of "medicals"point is itself a certain kind of "medical"
(identified a few lines later at a 21 as the kind doctor[6 Larpos], or alternativelyas the classof doctors,whichconstitutea unityin the sensethatthey
are all "one in species" or "one in logos"6).The second point, which
matches this in importance,is that what distinguishesthe significatum
which serves as the "focus" of a 'rrpos?v term is its priority over the
remainingpartsof the term'soverallextension.
Eud. Ethics 1236a 17-20 thereforeobviates furtherexegeticalreliance
9v;but its own explanatoryvalueis at once
on the problematicphrase,'Ipbos
called into question with the observationthat the terms"prior"[lTpo'reposJ
are themselvesexpressionsthatAristotleregularly
and "primary"[rp&wros]
characterizesas "said in many ways."7 Fortunately,Aristotle himself
disarmsthispotentialconfusionin the verynext lines(a 20-1)by specifying
that the sortof primacyhe has in mind is thatwhichhe elsewhererefersto
and whichhe explicatesin termsof
as "logicalprimacy"[X4Xoy; 1Tp&rosJ,8
logos-inclusion:
The primary is that whose logos is contained in [the logoil of all [the rest].
[a 20-21]
With this specification,we may now formulatean Aristoteliandefinitionof

Ev ambiguity:
'IpOs
(FM) A term T hasfocal meaningiff (i) T is "said in many ways",and (ii) one of
T's many logoi is non-reciprocally contained in T's remaining logoi (i.e. its
significataare logically priorto theirs).
Now in the case of i'aTpLx6v,(FM) dictates that the things most properly
called "'medical"(i.e. doctors) are logically prior to every other kind of

"medical",and in fact the remainderof the passageunderstudy(a 22-3) is
aimed at showingjust that.
During this procedure,Aristotle'sanalysis develops a slight wrinkle
which will become importantlaterbecausethe device he uses to smoothit
over will be crucialto the parallelanalysisof "existent"developedin the
betweenterm(i.e.
next section.By relyingon the generalintersubstitutivity
"name"[5vopa])and logos,Aristotleactuallyundertakesto show at a 22-3
that the name ratherthan the logos of the logicallyprimary"medicals"is
containedin the non-primarylogoi of the term. But this shift presentsan
is after all an ambiguous term, it
immediate difficulty. Since kaTpLxOv
would appearthat all of its significatashare a common name, and that is
LavrpLxvitself. But if this is so, it would seem to be impossible,on Aristotle's strategy,to isolate any logicallyprimary"medicals"becauseany logos
120

would eithercontain the name of all "medicals"or else the name of none.
Such a result would leave the focal meaning analysis of "medical"in
shambles.
Aristotle'sreactionto this difficultyis to introduceas the "name"of the
logically primary "medicals" the genuine noun-expression "doctor"
whichhe then treatsas synonymouswith the "proper"application
[LxTpos],
of LaTpLX6V,but not with its degeneratefellows. This may be viewed as
bringingsomething more than grammarinto the identity conditions for
namesbecauseit impliesboth (i) that the same namecan take on different
grammatical appearances (e.g. LaTpos and the proper application of
can funcLaTpLxov), and (ii) that a single grammaticalform (e.g. atrpLx6v)
tion as differentnames.9In any case, this identificationmustbe understood
if Aristotle'streatmentof "medical"is to hold together,for it is larposand
not the other which is shown to be implicit in the non-primarylogoi of
"medical" at a 22-3.
For example, a medical instrumentis an instrumenta doctorwould use, whereasthe
logos of [medical]instrumentis not contained in that of doctor.
The Focal Meaning Analysis of "Existent"
As I am understandingthe use of ov in Metaphysics1r2(e.g. at 1003a 33),

this participlefunctionsas an adjectivefallingwithinthe existentialrole of
the verb "to be". It thereforecarriesa meaning very close to that of the
English adjective,"existent".Construedin this way, the term has an extensionencompassingnot only what are now roughlytermed"objects"(of
varioussorts),but the entirerangeof Aristotelian"entities"inventoriedin
Categories 4 (1 b 25-8). Now, in keeping with the framework of analysis
establishedin the lastsection,the presentorderof businessis to identifythe

various sorts of "existents"into which the all-inclusiveextension of this
ambiguoustermresolves,and then show that one of these sortsis logically
priorto the rest.
The opening lines of MetaphysicsZ settle the firstof these issues, for at
1028a 12-3 the distinctsignification-rangesof bv are unmistakablyidentified as the ultimate ontological divisions which play the title role in
10Moreover,Aristotle'sexplicitdeclarationjust a few lines later
Categories.
(a 15) leaves no doubt as to which of the categoriesfunctionsas the "one"
towardswhich all the others point; it is that which stands at the head of
virtuallyeverylist of categoriesgiven in the Corpus,and which is referred
to alternativelyas "Substance"[oviu.o]or "What-is-it"['r(iarLv].All that is
needed, then, to show that ov satisfies (FM), is a demonstrationthat
121

Aristoteliansubstancesare logicallypriorto the contentsof the restof the

categories.
There is no great difficulty in identifyingthe "name"of the logically
primary"existents",for Aristotleuses preciselythe samegrammaticalploy
to obtainit that we saw him use in his focal meaninganalysisof iaTpLxOv
in
EudemianEthics.Just as there he introduces the noun LaTposas the "name"
of the logicallyprimary"medicals",so in MetaphysicsZ and r he takesthe
noun ",substance" [ov'xa] as synonymous with "'existent" in its proper
application(cf. 1028a 15,and esp. 1003b 5-19).

Identifyingthe non-primarylogoi of ov which are supposedto contain
this name proves to be a much more difficult matter.To my knowledge,
there are no explicit references to such expressions anywhere in the
Corpus.And yet Aristotle'spositive insistencethat ov has focal meaning
entails that there must be such logoi. The best course, in the face of this
puzzling textual hiatus, is to work backwardsby first asking what these
logoi must be like, and then determiningif there are suitablyAristotelian
phrases satisfying this characterization.What we are looking for,
therefore,is a single phrase for each non-substantialcategorywhich (i)
containsthe "name"okvo'L,and which(ii) is interchangeablewith ov in all
of its applicationswithin that category.
It will be useful at this point to returnbrieflyto Owen'schronology.In
order to defend his claim (Thesis I1) that the EudemianEthicssignals no
recognitionthat 'ovis a focal meaning term, Owen finds it necessaryto
explain the fact that at 1218a 1-15Aristotlealreadyseems quite awareof
the priority of Substance over the other categories.He quite correctly
discounts this passage on the groundsthat the sort of priorityalluded to
there is not logical priority,but another, "older"sort which is given the
name "naturalpriority"[TC qPVUCL'nrpoTepos]at Categories14b 13, and
which is just the inverseof ontologicaldependence:11
(NP) x is naturally prior to y iff x can exist without y, but y cannot exist without x.
Hence, accordingto Owen, what led Aristotleto reversehimself on the

question of the unity of science was his discoverythat substancesare not
just naturally prior to other rvro,but are logically prior to them as well.
I believe thatthis accountis substantiallycorrectas faras it goes,but that

it leaves out a crucialconnection.On the view I propose,the two sortsof
prioritythat substancesenjoy over non-substancesare not independentof
one another,but actuallyrepresenttwo divergentattemptsby Aristotleto
expressa single ontologicalintuition.Morespecifically,I aim to show that
the same basic anti-Platonicinsightwhich motivatesAristotle'sclaim for
122

the natural primacy of substances also supplies the substitutional

machineryneeded to demonstratetheirlogical primacy.
In view of the fact that the Aristoteliansystemdoesn'tcountenancethe
possibleexistenceof "naked"substances,it is doubtfulthatthe asymmetric
relationof naturalpriorityis capableof fulfillingits intended functionin
Categories (I a 24-6), which is to ground the distinction between substancesand the attributeswhichinherein them.Butthisquestionaside,it is
pretty clear what distinction Aristotle is reaching for: whereas it makes
sense to speak of (primary)substancesas existing simpliciter and not as
modes or features of anything else, items in the other categories must
always be conceived of as existing as qualities, quantities, etc. of substances.
If this muchis accurate,then the pointAristotleis tryingto makeabout the

whole rangeof non-substantial`v'a in Categoriesisjust a generalizationof
the specific point he makes about health at MetaphysicsA3, 1070a 22,
wherehe observesthat "it is when the manis healthythathealthexists."By
employingthe paraphrasetechniquegiven in Categories2 for eliminating
adjectival(or verbal) referencesto non-substancesin simple affirmations
in favorof nominalforms(whereby"a is F" becomes"Fnessinheresin a"),
we may represent the general point (which plays the pivotal role in
Aristotle'sattackon the Platoniccharacterizationof the Formsas "separable" attributes)as a universalprinciple which equates the existence of
non-substantial6vTrowith their inherencein substances.Where "Fness"
denotes any non-substance,
Fness (is an) existent iff Fness inheres in some substance(s).
Now this schematic principle certainly sanctions a pattern of reductive

translationl2wherein every non-substantialapplicationof "existent"can
in favorof nominalforms(whereby"ais F" becomes"Fnessinheresin a"),
be replaced by the phrase "inheresin some substance(s)"(which establishes the logical primacy of Substance),but there is another respect in
whichit is defective.As it stands,the principleimpliesthat thereis just one
meaning of "existent" applicable to all non-substances.But since the
irreducibleambiguityof 6v is preciselywhat defines the ultimatestatusof
the categories,this would reducetheirnumberto two. It may be thatsuch a
streamlinedcategorialtheoryis not philosophicallyobjectionable(cf. e.g.
Leibniz' Substanceand Attribute,and Frege'sConcept and Object),but
our texts show that it is certainlynot Aristotle's(Metaphysics1028a 12-3).
What is missingfrom the principlegiven above, therefore,is some form
of recognitionthat there is a distinctuse of "existent"appropriateto each
of the non-substantialcategories.In addition,if these differentuses of the
123

term are not to collapse into synonymy(by virtue of sharinga common

logos),the correctformulationof this principlewill need to incorporatethe
idea (reflected at Prior Analytics48 b 24, 49 a 6-9, and MetaphysicsA7,
1017a 23-7) that each sort of non-substantialexistenceis equivalent(and
reducible)to a distinct species of inherence-relation.All of this may be
accomplishedby means of correlatedsubscripts:if "Ci" is taken as indicating the non-substantialcategory into which Fness falls, it becomes
possibleto accuratelyrepresentAristotle'santi-Platonicthesisby meansof
a schematicprinciplewhich entailsthe logical primacyof Substance:
(AP) Fness (is an) existentci iff Fness inheresciin some substance(s)
This principle establishes that 6v satisfies (FM) because it permits the

replacementof any non-substantialoccurrence,"existentci",witha discrete
phrase ("inheresci in some substance(s)")containing the name "substance".
In the final section, it will be shown how (AP) combineswith principles
drawnfrom the Aristoteliantheoryof demonstrativescienceset out in the
Analyticsto form the premisesof the argumentfor the unity of sciencein
Metaphysics F2.
TheArgumentforthe Unityof Science

Despite some fairly recent groundbreakingattempts in this direction,13
there has yet to be producedan account of the theory of demonstration
which even attempts to place everythingAristotlesays on this topic in a
unified and intelligibleanalyticalframework.Nonetheless,it will suit our
ratherlimited present purposeshere to work within an admittedlycrude
conception of Aristotelianscience which contains two elements.First, a
demonstrativescience will be conceivedof here as an axiomaticsystemof
statementsor propositionsthatproceedsfroma relativelysmallset of "first
which are assumed in that science, to a largerset of
principles"[&pQXa;
"theorems"which are proved in that science by means of (first figure)
syllogisticinference.Among the &pxatof a given scienceare some,such as
the Laws of Non-Contradiction and Excluded Middle (An. Post.
77 a 10-25),that are "common"[xoLvail to all sciences(but cf. 76 a 38-40),
and others (the &M(L&pxao)which are peculiarto the sciencein question.
Secondly, each science is uniquely determinedby (i) a distinctiveset of
&pxaL',(ii) a distinctiveset of entities it studies (i.e. its genus),and (iii) a
distinctive set of attributes proper to these entities (henceforth its
attribute-set).
Now thereare numerouspassageswhichindicatethatfor a scienceto be
"one", in the sense of being autonomous(as opposed to being merely a
124

subordinatebranchof some otherscience),none of its &pxxi

can be subject
to proof in any other science (An. Post. 87 b 1, and see also 75 b 16,
76 a 10). So, for example, it is intimated at 76 a 10 that harmonics is
subordinateto arithmeticbecausesome of its firstprinciplesare provable
in that wider discipline.This may be representedas a definitionof subordination
(S) Science S is subordinateto science S' iff any of the &apxaof S are provablein S'
On the presentinterpretation,the argumentof MetaphysicsF2 is aimedat

showing that any science whose objects of concern are drawn from a
non-substantialcategorymust be construedas subordinateto a scienceof
Substance. If such an argumentcould be made general for all the nonsubstantialcategories, then since the categoriesrepresentan exhaustive
classificatorysystem, that would elevate the science of Substance to a
position where every science distinct from it could legitimatelybe viewed
as subordinateto it. Therefore,let's arbitrarilyselect one of the non-substantialcategories(Ci) and a science (Si) whose genus is subsumedby that
category,and see how it mightbe arguedon the basisof (AP) and(S) thatSi
is subordinateto the science of Substance.
The sole remainingpremiseof the argumentwill be extractedfromAn.
Post. 76 b 3-7:
Also special to each science are those subjects whose existence it assumes li.e. its
genus], and whoseperse attributeslattribute-set]it studies ... Of the elements in the
genus both the existence and the meaning are assumed, but of their attributesonly
the meaning is assumed [while the existence must be proved].
This passage enunciates the following meta-scientificprinciple, which

places general limitationson what can be demonstratedand what can be
assumedwithin an Aristotelianscience.
(L) Among the &pxai of a given science S are (i) statements which assert the
existence of (some or all of) the elements of the genus of S, (ii) statementswhich
define the genus of S, and (iii) statements which def'ine (all or part of) the
attribute-setof S; however, (iv) statementswhich assertthe existenceof (some or all
of) the elements of the attribute-setof S (i.e. that (some or all of) these attributes
belong to (some or all of) the members of S's genus) are not &pxotof S (but are
instead subject to proof in S).
With the acquisitionof this principle,we have all the materialsneeded to

reconstructAristotle'sargument.On the assumptionthat the genus of Si is
included in category C,, (L) necessitatesthat among the apxaLof Si are
some which assertthe existenceciof the membersof C, belongingto that
genus. However, since (by hypothesis)Ci is non-substantial,(AP) entails
125

thatthese existentialstatementsare all reducibleto statementswhichassert

the inherenceciof those non-substancesin substances.Now if these latter
statements are provable at all, (L) requiresthat they be provable in a
science(S*) whose genus is composedof substances,and whose attributeset is subsumedunderCi. Butsincewe now have the resultthatsome of the
&p-Xaof Si are equivalentto statementssubjectto proof in S*,(S) permits
the conclusionthat Si is subordinateto S*.
I should like to close with a disclaimer.It cannot and should not be
expected that we can read off even the broadestfeaturesof the science of
beingquabeing fromthe structureof the above argument.It wouldnot, for
example,be correctto infer that the science of being will necessarilyhave
an immediatelysubordinatebranch correspondingto each of the nonsubstantialcategories, nor even that a science of substance would be
capable of establishing the existence of all non-substantialoVTa. Such
expectationsemerge out of a mistakenidea of what the argumentis all
about. It is not intended to stand as a conclusiveshowingthat there must
be, or even that there can be, a science of being qua being. Rather,it is
designedto meet and removebut a single a prioriobjectionformulatedin
the EudemianEthics (1217 b 25-35) against the programof constructing
such a science. The objection is that the theory of categories, and its
corollary that there is no single genus containing 'roVTXTar OVTXO,
blocks the
possibilityof there being a science which studies all existents.Aristotle's

response,as I have interpretedit, is to arguethat the theoryof categoriesis
consistentwith the possibilityof a universalscience of being, if by that is
meant a science of being to which all other sciencesof beingci are subordinate.
But Aristotleis fully awarethat the successof this argumentwould not
by itself close the issue in his favor. This can be seen from the fact that
MetaphysicsB 1 ackowledgesat least twelve otherprimafacie objections
thatwouldhave to be overcomebeforethe possibilityof a universalscience
could be guaranteed.
The critical point is this: by choosing in MetaphysicsF2 to meet this
objectionon theoreticalgrounds,he opts against the alternativestrategy
(whichis employedin MetaphysicsZ-9) of revealingenough of the science
of being qua being to allow his audience to see how it circumventshis
earlierobjections.In making this choice, he avoids (for the time being,
anyway)the need to commithimself on the questionsof how preciselythe
science of being qua being is structured,and whether this structure
qualifies the study in all respectsas a legitimate demonstrativescience.
126

Indeed, it is entirelyconsistentwith what has been said here that Aristotle

was not yet in possessionof answersto these questionswhen he composed
MetaphysicsF2.
WashingtonState University
NOTES
G. E. L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle",in 1.
Ditring and G. E. L. Owen (edd.) Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century.
Gdteburg, 1960.
2 I am using the term "application"here and below as a theoreticallyneutralexpression
which should not be uncriticallyequated in meaning with such metaphysically"loaded"
terms as "sense" or "meaning".I argue below (p. 118) for a specific view as to how the
application of an Aristotelianterm should be characterized.
3 Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics",p. 167.
4 The sorts of things that can serve as significatainclude (I) primarysubstances(concrete
individuals), (2) non-substantial particulars (individual qualities, quantities, times,
places, etc). and (3) the genera and species which contain thingsof these sorts.(1make no
claims here as to whether these genera and species are intensional entities, or simply
classes of entities of sorts(I) and (2).) Also included are even more bizarre"entities"such
as (4) differentiae (e.g. two-footed)and (5) "compounds"1[auv8va6pEval such as white
man.
s I am persuadedby the argumentin J. Owens, The Doctrineof Being in theAristotelian
Metaphysics,Toronto 19632, p. 117-8,that irp6sEvand &p'kv6sare meant to designate the
same condition. Unfortunately,they are also equally obscure.
6 MetaphysicsA6, 1016a 33 - 1016 b 7.
7 Categories10, 14 a 25 - b 24; MetaphysicsAll, 1018 b 9 - 1019a 14.
8 Cf., e.g., Physics 227 a 19.
9 Aristotle'sprocedurehere isprimafacie open to an alternativeinterpretationaccording
to which he uses Bvoluato stand only for genuine nouns (as opposed to noun-phraseslike
To6
LQTpLx6v),
and consequently sees xarp&s
as the only name which applies to "medicals"
of any sort. On this view, being signifiedby an 6vopais a necessarycondition for serviceas
the "focus"of a %Tp6s
Evterm, so that the kind doctoracquires this position in the case of
laTpLx6vby default. This interpretationis suggested (if not entailed) by Ross' general
view (Aristotle'sMetaphysics,vol. I, Oxford 1924, p. 256) that the primacy involved in
focal meaning ambiguity amounts in the end to nothing more than the grammaticalor
etymological priority alluded to in the explication of paronymy given at Categories 1,
I a 12-15.
To go along with J. Owens' general argumentagainst this way of understandingfocal
meaning ambiguity (The Doctrine of Being, p. 111), there are three special reasons for
resisting its application in this instance: (1) it makes all of the logos-inclusion talk at
a 22-3 idle: if the Ross view were correct,it would be hard to see why Aristotle doesn't
simplydefinethe primary"medicals"as those to which the name 6vo%aapplies;(2) taking
such a restrictiveview of bv6pairaleaves Aristotlewith no grammaticalcategoryto cover
such expressions as Tr 'LTpLxOv; (3) most importantly,the Ross view presents a rather
127

unflatteringpicture of Aristotle attemptingto derive significantmetaphysicaland metascientificconclusions from observationsthat he musthave seen were due to the accidents
of etymology.This last point becomes especiallyclear in the case of "existent",the focal
meaning analysis from which he draws his most important conclusions. It is utterly
inconceivablethat Aristotlecould have placed the entire weight of his argumentfor the
unityof science on a perceivedgrammaticalpriorityof the noun ovaia over the adjectival
form 6v, failing all the while to see the obvious fact they are bothparticipialderivativesof
the verb EvaL.
10 But cf. MetaphysicsH2, 1042b 26, where Aristotlesays that E'VatL(and, by implication,
ov) means something different when applied to thresholdsthan it does when applied to
ice. This suggests that there are distinct uses of 5v for different sorts of substances,and
perhaps for different sorts of attributeswithin a given category as well. Owen explains
this discrepancyby suggestingthat the differentkinds of existentswithina categorycould
'e construedby Aristotleas subspeciesof a single kind, but that thiswould still leave him
with an irreducible and insubordinate species of existence for each of his categories
("Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology", in R. Bambrough, New Essays on Plato and
Aristotle,New York 1965,p. 73, n. 2).
11 Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics",p. 172.
12 This pattern of reduction is hinted at (though certainly not developed) at Posterior
AnalyticsB2, 90 a 17, where Aristotleseemingly equates the questions,"Whyis there an
eclipse?"and "Why is the moon eclipsed?".
13 J. Barnes,"Aristotle'sTheory of Demonstration"in J. Barneset al. (edd.) Articleson
Aristotle,vol. 1: Science, London 1975,pp. 65-87; J. Hintikka,"On the Ingredientsof an
AristotelianScience"Nous VI, 1972,pp. 55-69.
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Aristotle On Focal Meaning and The Unity of Science

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