Peirces sign theory and pragmatic maxim

the problem of abstract nouns

Tamara Stojanovi
Dept. of Semiotics, Tartu University
Tiigi 78, 50410 Tartu, Estonia
10.01.2011.

Introduction
Abstract nouns are opposed to concrete nouns, and while the latter refer to objects
available to our senses (e.g. table, arrhythmia, river etc), the former refer to entities which
are more difficultly graspable. Nouns like friendship, captivity, democracy and education
have seemingly quite an obvious meaning, but once we try to define them we find ourselves on a
slippery slope. The Oxford Online Dictionary of English offers this definition for friendship:
the emotions or conduct of friends; the state of being friends, then as a countable noun a
relationship between friends: she formed close friendships with women or in a different context
a state of mutual trust and support between allied nations. Although I doubt that many people
would disagree with the above definition of friendship on a general level, we can see that in
everyday life people can engage in quite heated discussions precisely because they have different
conceptions of friendship. Let us give some examples: I always keep the secrets of my friends.
Friendship is above all about trust ; What kind of friendship is this if I have to do all the
work? ; I cannot tolerate lying in friendship ; We love each other very much and this is why
our friendship will last forever!. From these examples we can see that sometimes people include
very different emotions and conducts in their definition of friendship. So, this makes the
meaning of friendship and other abstract nouns very problematic. In addition, their meaning,
more precisely the actions they entail, is not fixed in time and space. For instance, the word
education implied different ways of conduct in the times of Ancient Greece, during the Middle
Ages and in our modern times. We can reach the same conclusion if we compare the educational
practices of several different countries. Still, it is fascinating that the modern definition of

education from the Oxford Online Dictionary is adequate for all those cases: the process of
receiving or giving systematic instruction, especially at a school or university ; the theory and
practice of teaching a body of knowledge acquired while being educated ; information
about or training in a particular subject. Therefore we wonder: How is it possible that one
words definition can be so universal and at the same time the practice associated with it so
diverse? Is it (only) because the words employed (process, instruction, knowledge etc.) are
also abstract? Is it sufficient to define an abstract noun in order to grasp its full meaning, or is it
necessary to associate it with specific practice? And what is the full meaning of an abstract
noun? We can rephrase these questions in semiotic terms: What is the reference of abstract
nouns? What is their signified? And most importantly - how is generated their interpretant? In
fact, friendship, education, captivity and democracy are first of all words. Moreover, they
are signs, entities that stand for something else, in our case concepts. We want to describe the
connection between the abstract word, the concept it stands for and peoples interpretation of that
concept. In order to do that, we will turn to Charles Sanders Peirce, his pragmatic maxim and his
sign theory.

Abstract nouns
Before immersing ourselves in the semiotic descriptions of abstract nouns we will first
give a more detailed description of abstract nouns and point out some of their main features.
In English grammars abstract nouns are most often opposed to concrete nouns which are
accessible to the senses, observable measurable etc. Therefore, abstract nouns are typically nonobservable and non measurable. (Quirck et al. 1985:247) In the framework of cognitive
grammar, abstract nouns are most often a product of relational concepts being viewed as thinglike. (Radden, Dirven 2007:78) For instance, the relational concept to be married becomes
marriage. Let us observe the following sentences: 1) We were married for 17 years. 2) Our
marriage lasted for 17 years. The relational concept suffered reification and the second sentence
shows that it has now a new ontological existence. This shift is called ontological metaphor.
(Radden, Dirven 2007:78) The counterpart of reification in language is nominalization, the
transformation of verbs (to marry marriage), adjectives (happy happiness) and even
nouns (friend friendship) into abstract nouns. Reifications here can also be understood as

the process of abstraction, i.e. the process of creation of higher concepts from the real and
concrete ones. However, not all abstract nouns are derived, as the example of horror shows, but
all concepts associated with abstract nouns have in common the aforementioned status of
things, they seem to be having a stable existence of their own. (Radden, Dirven 2007:79) In
other words, reification is a transformational or creative process which results in the formation of
concepts that have the features of autonomous objects or things distinct from the thinking
subject. This implies that these objects acquire the capacity to act, to be acted upon, examined,
changed, used etc in the sphere of thought. It is quite difficult to describe them and it is
impossible to show them as they do not have a counterpart in the plane of physical objects.
Therefore, since reification is a process of abstraction, it is logical, in order to reach an
understanding of the object to perform an opposing procedure, a certain concretization: to
relate those concepts to the plane of physical objects, i.e. to take into account their sensible
effects. We will speak of those effects in the framework of Peirces semiotic and pragmatic
theory.

The pragmatic maxim

In order to make sense of abstract nouns, i.e. of the concepts they stand for, it is essential
for us to become familiar with Peirces pragmatic maxim.
In 1877 Peirce published in Popular Science Monthly the essay The Fixation of Belief
and in 1878 the essay How to Make Our Ideas Clear which represent the very beginning of his
theory of pragmatism, or how he will call it later pragmaticism. While the first essay is focused
on the notions of Doubt and Belief as well as on the four methods of inquiry, the central part of
the second is the pragmatic maxim: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of
these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (Buchler 1950:31) This definition,
which we will analyze more in detail later, is derived from Peirces idea that every process of
thinking, or better to say, every process of inquiry has for its sole purpose the production of an
opinion and consequently a habit. (Buchler 1950:29). By inquiry Peirce means the struggle to
attain a state of belief (Buchler 1950:10) which was initiated by the state of doubt. Peirces

doubt is not a methodological, Cartesian doubt, but a living, genuine doubt which originates,
when due to some surprise, a belief is shaken. Also, it would be wrong to think of the Peircian
notions of doubt and belief in the context of religious thought. What Peirce had in mind is, in
fact, a theory of scientific investigation, which starts with an authentic question (doubt) and ends
with knowledge (belief, opinion and habit). The only method of attaining true belief is the
scientific method, which is the only method not to have any constraints. Unlike this, the other
three methods, the method of tenacity, the a priori method, and the method of authority do not
open all the options for the inquirer, i.e. they restrict his investigation to the attainment and
defense of some beliefs. In other words they are all somewhat ideological1. Further on, Peirce
states that belief has three functions: First, it is something that we are aware of; second, it
appeases the irritation of doubt; and, third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of
action, or, say for short, a habit. (Buchler 1950:28) The relation between belief and habit is
what concerns us most here, as we will see later on that rules of action characterize also the
relation between concepts and a type of interpretant.
So, once he formulated the starting and ending point of scientific investigation 2 Peirce
directed his attention to the concepts to which the process of reasoning gives rise: We think only
in signs. These mental signs are of mixed nature; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts. If
a man makes a new symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts. (CP 2.302) And it is the
meaning of those intellectual concepts that pragmatism is intent on finding. (CP 5.8) Here we
return to our starting point the pragmatic maxim: The word pragmatism was invented to
express a certain maxim of logic, which, as was shown at its first enouncement, involves a whole
system of philosophy. The maxim is intended to furnish a method for the analysis of concepts. A
concept is something having the mode of being of a general type which is, or may be made, the
rational part of the purport of a word. (CP 8.191) The pragmatic maxim is here defined as
method and if we take into consideration its formulation given in the beginning, we can conclude
that it is a method for clarifying concepts. According to Peirce there are three steps one must
make in order to attain the full mastery of a meaning of a concept: firstly, one should have
such a clear idea of a concept in order not to confuse it with any other; then a logical analysis
should be performed in order to delimit all the elements of the concept; finally, one should
1

Peirce was against all that was in the way of inquiry and he formulated this idea as the First Rule of Logic: Do not
block the way of inquiry
2
This shows Peirces tendency to make philosophy more scientific

consider all the habits of conduct that would reasonably develop from the belief in the truth of
the concept. (CP 6.481-482). Conduct is to be understood here in the broadest sense and a habit
of conduct can be a certain way of reasoning or of behavior. Peirce points out that conduct is not
the purport of any symbol but it is the finale of the symphony of thought (CP 5.402 Fn P3 Para
1/3).
With this reasoning, in How to make our ideas clear, Peirce defined the notions of
reality, truth, transubstantiation etc. and he continued applying the pragmatic maxim during
his whole life. His final objective was actually not to only have clear and precise concepts but to
further the development of concrete reasonableness (CP 5.3), in other words to improve
reasoning. However, pragmatism as Peirce saw it, was more than a method of logic. If we take
into account the notions of doubt, belief, inquiry and concept we can say that it is also a theory of
knowledge acquisition. Nevertheless, we will for now leave aside this discussion and focus on
the pragmatic maxim as a method. We have cited so far two formulation of the pragmatic maxim
and we will give now a third one where Peirce relates his intellectual concepts to behavior:
Intellectual concepts, however -- the only sign-burdens that are properly denominated "concepts"
-- essentially carry some implication concerning the general behaviour either of some conscious
being or of some inanimate object, and so convey more, not merely than any feeling, but more,
too, than any existential fact, namely, the "would-acts," "would-dos" of habitual behaviour; and no
agglomeration of actual happenings can ever completely fill up the meaning of a "would-be." But
[Pragmatism asserts], that the total meaning of the predication of an intellectual concept is
contained in an affirmation that, under all conceivable circumstances of a given kind (or under this
or that more or less indefinite part of the cases of their fulfillment, should the predication be
modal) the subject of the predication would behave in a certain general way -- that is, it would be
true under given experiential circumstances (or under a more or less definitely stated proportion of
them, taken as they would occur, that is in the same order of succession, in experience ). (CP
5.467)

However formulated, the essence of the pragmatic maxim remains the same: in order to
grasp the full meaning of a concept, the very concept has to be put in a relation with the habits of
conduct it implies. The purpose of every habitual action is to produce a sensible result, and as
Peirce states Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects. (Buchler, 1950:31) In other
words, a concept is defined by the habitual actions it entails and the sensible effects of such

actions. This way, Peirce constructed a bridge between the most complex metaphysical concepts
and the most concrete actions and that allows us to refer to the maxim as to a method of
concretization. Therefore, whether something is called wine or blood of Jesus, says Peirce,
does not make a difference, since the sensible effects that the object produces are the same.
If we consider the pragmatic in the frame of abstract nouns and the concept they stand
for, we can say that the meaning of those concepts includes the habits of action associated with
them and the sensible effects those actions produce. For instance, the concept of joy implies
certain actions like smiling, jumping, clapping hands which can be sensed by our eyes and ears.
Likewise, the concept of education involves, for example, different ways presenting study
material all of them perceivable by the senses.
The pragmatic maxim is of essential importance for the understanding of abstract
concepts, i.e. abstract objects which result in language in abstract nouns. We have shown that
their meaning is fundamentally related to habits of action. As we stated earlier, the pragmatic
maxim can be understood as a method of concretization or, in our case de-reification. In fact, if
reification is the process of creation of abstract objects which are neatly divided from the
thinking subject, then the maxim constitutes a shift from that object to the subject and its
conduct.
Now, when Peirce applied the maxim in the investigation of the concept of truth, he
came to a very peculiar conclusion: The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all
who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the
real (Buchler, 1950:38). As Peirce saw it, the scientific method as a method of inquiry if carried
far enough by an unlimited community of inquirers, until no further inquiry was possible,
necessarily lead to truth or true opinion. This is equally valid for natural sciences (Peirce gave
the example of velocity of light) and philosophy. However, such conception of truth is idealistic,
since, at least when it comes to abstract terms, it does not seem likely that all the inquirers will
ever agree upon them. This idealism is present as well in the pragmatic maxim in the
hypothetical forms would occur, might have practical bearings, which means that the habitual
actions and sensible effects that should be taken into account when determining a concept, are
not only the present ones but also the possible ones. In other words, the maxim covers the plane
of both reality and eventuality. What is idealistic in this is the fact that no one could ever cover

all the possible eventual circumstances. Furthermore, is someone was to accomplish that, such
belief would be fixed, and such habit established, that there would not be possible any more
surprises and consequently doubts. (CP 4.62) The truth is then the ultimate effect upon the
inquirer.
The above discussion opens the question of the validity of the maxim, or better to say its
applicability. As we see it, it is indeed idealistic to investigate a concept until universal
agreement is reached or to think about all of its possible practical consequences. However, even
if the investigation does not lead us to the ultimate effect, it can lead us to some effects. These
effects are, in fact, the different interpretants of abstract nouns.

Peirces sign theory the interpretant

Although there were many changes during the development of his theory of signs, Peirce
was always faithful to its triadic nature. According to this, the sign is composed of three
interdependent elements: the representamen (sign vehicle), the object and the interpretant. The
representamen is the physical form of the sign or, to use Peirces words "A representation is that
character of a thing by virtue of which, for the production of a certain mental effect, it may stand
in place of another thing. The thing having this character I term a representamen [] (CP
1.564) For instance, the stop sign, dilated pupils and the position of the arrow inside the
compass are all representamens. The object is what the sign represents, like in the very much
cited case of smoke representing fire. Finally, the interpretant, the most fascinating feature of
Peirces triad, is the meaning of the sign. "For the proper significate outcome of a sign, I propose
the name, the interpretant of the sign (CP 5.473). So, the relation between the sign and the
object has a meaning only when interpreted. This is radically different from Saussures dyadic
sign structure where the sign/object (signifier/signified) relation generates meaning by virtue of
being part of a system (natural language) and by being related to other signs. This makes the
dyadic system a more static one, focused on structure, while the triadic system stresses the
process, semiosis.
In the case of abstract nouns the representamen is the uttered or written word, for
instance joyand the object which the sign represents is the concept of joy. The interpretant,

i.e. the significant outcome of the sign is, in fact, the meaning of the sign. Peirce distinguished
two main classifications of interpretants: on the one hand there are the immediate, dynamical and
final interpretant and on the other the emotional, energetic and logical interpretant. We will now
analyze the first division.
The immediate interpretant consists in the Quality of the Impression that a sign is fit to
produce, not to any actual reaction. (CP 8.315) It is the very interpretability of the sign, the pure
sign-ness. The immediate interpretant is, as we understand it, just the establishment of the
representamen/object relation, without any interpretation. It is the acknowledgement of that
relation. The Dynamical Interpretant is whatever interpretation any mind actually makes of a
sign (CP 8.315), it is the actual effect a sign has on the interpreter. It can be an emotional effect
or it can be an action (mental or muscular), as when the soldiers drop their weapons to the
ground. The third one is the final interpretant and it is an eventual or conditional meaning of the
sign: it is that which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the
matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached. (CP 8.184). This interpretant is
related with the notion of truth as the ultimate effect of a concept and it is also related to the
notion inquiry, which if advanced enough would lead to a universal agreement. This is an
example of how Peirces pragmatic theory is actually fused with the semiotic one.
The second triad of interpretants is by some authors considered as an analogy to the first
classification and sometimes they are thought to be sub-classes of the dynamical interpretant
(Nth, 1995:44). We are inclined to adopt the latter understanding, since the emotional, energetic
and logical interpretant are all about the effects of the sign on the interpreter. We will now
describe them briefly.
The emotional intepretant is related to the cognitive process of recognition. As Peirce
says, there is always a feeling which we come to interpret as evidence that we comprehend the
proper effect of the sign, although the foundation of truth in this is frequently very slight (CP
5.475) This feeling can be either the first step of interpretation or it can constitute the whole of it,
an example of the latter being works of art. A further significate effect is mediated by the
energetic interpretant which is manifested as effort, muscular or mental, and most importantly it
is a single action. As such, the energetic interpretant cannot possible be the meaning of an
intellectual concept since they are of general nature. Therefore, there is a further effect and
Peirce names it habit-change, a modification of a person's tendencies toward action. (CP

5.475) Habit is defined as [Readiness] to act in a certain way under given circumstances and
when actuated by a given motive (CP 5.480-6) and while a person performs habitual actions, he
or she also imagines various possible situations and circumstances where his or her conduct
could be modified. The notion of habit is, as we saw, a crucial element in Peirces pragmatic
theory and this provides another example of how pragmaticism and semeiotics are interrelated.
We can conclude that the meaning of a sign is far from unified. There are several layers
of sign interpretation starting from the immediate interpretant and ending with the final
interpretant. This layered nature of signs clarifies some issues concerning abstract nouns. Let us
see how.

Abstract nouns as signs

In the introduction, we made several questions concerning abstract nouns: What is the
meaning then of abstract nouns? Is it enough to define in order to grasp their full meaning? What
is their full meaning? How can we explain the discrepancy between dictionary definitions of a
concept and all the different practices associated with it? Peirces pragmatic and semiotic theory
gave us some answers.
First of all, abstract nouns are signs and are as such subject to interpretation and as other
signs have layered meaning. Let us take the example from the beginning, the word friendship.
The immediate interpretant of it would the awareness of the concept friendship, perhaps a
mental image of it. Since there is no interpretation on this level we will proceed further to the
dynamical interpretant. Here we have the distinction into emotional, energetic and logical
interpretant, and already different interpretation may arise. For instance, someone might respond
with one feeling and someone with another, e.g. excitement and joy. The same could happen with
one person on different occasions. Likewise, two persons or one in two situations might think or
react in a different way, they could frown or shrug their shoulders, or they could have different
mental associations that is the energetic interpretant. The essence of the logical interpretant, as
we said, is a habit of behavior, again mental or physical, and that is also individual for every
person. We can conclude then, that all the aspects of the dynamical interpretant are individual
and that they can also vary for one person. In other words, the meaning of abstract nouns on the

level of the dynamical interpretant is individual. This fact accounts for the different practices
associated with abstract nouns. The final interpretant, on the other hand, points towards a more
universal meaning, since that is the meaning every person will arrive to if the word friendship is
sufficiently considered. We can call this ultimate or true meaning, either way we will find the
pragmatic maxim at the core of it the habits of action and sensible effects that the concept
might induce. We are left with the question of dictionary definitions. Can we say that they
represent this true meaning? They certainly aim for it, but whether they succeed in it or not, is
not a question we can answer without further analysis of a representative number of such
definitions. Such task would definitely constitute a different paper.
We can finish by saying that our main question: what is the meaning then of abstract
nouns? should be split into the following ones: for whom? what does he or she feel or act? what
are his or hers habits? what interpretation would be satisfactory for everyone? The answer to
these questions represents the full meaning of an abstract noun.

Conclusion
It is very difficult if not impossible to state the meaning of an abstract noun such as
truth or happiness. This problem often arises in communication and it seems sometimes that
everybody means something else when using the very same term. Our main assumption is that,
since abstract nouns are a product of reification i.e. abstraction, the application of an opposing
process, concretization, would provide important insights concerning their meaning. We
transferred the question of meaning of abstract nouns into the framework of semiotics. More
specifically, we made use of Peirces pragmatic maxim and his sign theory.
The maxim helped us understand better the object of the sign, in our case, a mental
concept. Peirces definition of the maxim allows the concretization of this concept by relating it
with habits of action and sensible effects. This realism is countered by the idealistic notion of
eventuality expressed in the various definition of the maxim by the use of the conditional mode.
However, this ultimate effect is only one of the effect that the abstract noun can have on an
interpreter. By analyzing Peirces classification of interpretants, we determined that abstract
nouns as signs have layered meanings. The dynamical interpretant accounts for the individual

interpretations, while the final interpretant represents their true meaning. Whether such meaning
is to be found is dictionaries, remains a question for some other discussion.
It would also be interesting to see how the process of learning abstract nouns functions,
and whether semiotics, Peirceian or other, could contribute to an easier acquisition of those
terms. Another field where insights concerning abstract nouns are welcome is that of stylistics,
for instance, in terms of effects of abstract nouns on the reader or listener. Also, more theoretical
works, concerning the findings of other philosophers or semioticians could certainly provide
some relevant knowledge in the matter. Perhaps the most fascinating investigation would be the
one that would lead us into Peirces theory of knowledge.

References
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Burks, Arthur W. 1958 The collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. VII-VIII,
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Hartshorne, Charles; Weiss, Paul (Ed.) 1931-1935 The collected papers of Charles Sanders
Peirce, Vol I-VI, Cambridge MA:Harvard University Press (electronic edition)
Nth, Winfried 1995. Handbook of semiotics. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press
Quirck, Randolph; Greenbaum, Sidney; Leech, Geoffrey; Svartvik, Jan 1985. A comprehensive
grammar of English language, New York:Longman
Radden, Gnter; Dirven, Ren 2007. Cognitive English grammar, Amsterdam, Philadelphia:
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http://oxforddictionaries.com