PICOP vs Base metals

DOCTRINE
The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuring
PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would
result in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and
supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area.
FACTS
Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation entered into a Mines Operating Agreement with
Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts
over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. On April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines
Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims
Since a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims was located in petitioner PICOP's logging concession
in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement,
whereby, in mutual recognition of each other's right to the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed
Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining claims
Banahaw Mining thereafter converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral Production Sharing
Agreements.
While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights
and interests over thirty-seven mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral
Resources Corporation (Base Metals for brevity). The transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw
Mining in its own right as claim owner, as well as those covered by its mining operating agreement with
CMMCI.
Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved the assignment
made by Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing private
respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its claims
On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Caraga
Regional Office No. XIII an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to private respondent Base Metals'
application on the following grounds:
I. THE APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION AND ISSUANCE OF THE MPSA OF BASE METALS
WILL VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION
IN A CONTRACT
The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB, ruling that the Presidential Warranty of September
25, 1968 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos merely confirmed the timber license granted to
PICOP and warranted the latter's peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of its concession
areas. It was only given upon the request of the Board of Investments to establish the boundaries of
PICOP's timber license agreement. The Presidential Warranty did not convert PICOP's timber license into
a contract because it did not create any obligation on the part of the government in favor of PICOP. Thus,
the non-impairment clause finds no application.

Neither did the Presidential Warranty grant PICOP the exclusive possession, occupation and exploration
of the concession areas covered. If that were so, the government would have effectively surrendered its
police power to control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources.
ISSUE:
w/n the impairment of contracts apply?
HELD
No.
The guaranty is merely a collateral inducement
An examination of the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures PICOP of the
government's commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of its timber license and guarantees
PICOP's peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of
raw materials for its wood processing complex. The warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and
remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of other resources, such as
mineral resources, occurring within the concession.
The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuring
PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would
result in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and
supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area.

Asaphil vs Tuason
DOCTRINE
The allegations in Tuasons complaint do not make out a case for a mining dispute or controversy within
the jurisdiction of the DENR. The controversy falls squarely in the cognizance of the courts
FACTS
Respondent Vicente Tuason, Jr. entered into a Contract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore with
Induplex, Inc., wherein Induplex agreed to buy all the perlite ore that may be found and mined in Tuasons
mining claim located in Taysa, Daraga, Albay. In exchange, Induplex will assist Tuason in securing and
perfecting his right over the mining claim.
Thereafter, Tuason executed on May 29, 1976, an Agreement to Operate Mining Claims in favor of
petitioner Asaphil Construction and Development Corporation.
Later on, Tuason filed with the Bureau of Mines, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), a complaint against Asaphil and Induplex for declaration of nullity of the two contracts, namely,
the Contract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore, and the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims. Tuason
alleged in his complaint that the stockholders of Induplex formed and organized Ibalon Mineral
Resources, Inc. (Ibalon), an entity whose purpose is to mine any and all kinds of minerals, and has in fact
been mining, extracting and utilizing the perlite ore in Ibalons mining claim; that this is in violation of the
condition imposed by the Board of Investments (BOI) on Induplex in its Joint Venture Agreement
The DENR, through the Regional Executive Director, found merit in Induplexs arguments and dismissed
the complaint.
ISSUE:
Does the DENR have jurisdiction to rule on the claim?
HELD

With regard to the issue of jurisdiction, the DENR Regional Executive Director opined that the DENR does
not have jurisdiction over the case, while the MAB ruled that the DENR has jurisdiction.

The Court upholds the finding of the DENR Regional Executive Director that the DENR does not have
jurisdiction over Tuasons complaint.

At the time of the filing of the complaint, the jurisdiction of the DENR over mining disputes and
controversies is governed by P.D. No. 1281, entitled "Revising Commonwealth Act No. 136, Creating the
Bureau of Mines, and for Other Purposes." Particularly, P.D. No. 1281 vests the Bureau of Minesof the
DENR with jurisdictional supervision and control over all holders of mining claims or applicants for and/or
grantees of mining licenses, permits, leases and/or operators thereof, including mining service contracts
and service contractors insofar as their mining activities are concerned. Under Section 7 of P.D. No. 1281,
the Bureau of Mines also has quasi-judicial powers over cases involving the following:

(a) a mining property subject of different agreements entered into by the claim holder thereof with
several mining operators;
(b) complaints from claimowners that the mining property subject of an operating agreement has
not been placed into actual operations within the period stipulated therein; and
(c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the
claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and conditions thereof.
The allegations in Tuasons complaint do not make out a case for a mining dispute or controversy within
the jurisdiction of the DENR. While the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims is a mining contract, the
ground upon which the contract is sought to be annulled is not due to Asaphils refusal to abide by the
terms and conditions of the agreement, but due to Induplexs alleged violation of the condition imposed by
the BOI in its Joint Venture Agreement with Grefco, Inc. Also, Tuason sought the nullity of the Contract for
Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore, based on the same alleged violation. Obviously, this raises a judicial
question, which is proper for determination by the regular courts. A judicial question is raised when the
determination of the question involves the exercise of a judicial function; that is, the question involves the
determination of what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in
controversy

Province of Rizal vs Executive Secretary

DOCTRINE:
The law and the facts indicate that a mere MOA does not guarantee the dumpsites permanent closure.
An order for closure is in order.
FACTS
Garbage was on the rise.
At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, parts of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office of the President, through Proclamation No. 635
dated 28 August 1995, for use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal applications. In fact, this
site, extending to more or less 18 hectares, had already been in operation since 19 February 1990 for the
solid wastes of Quezon City, Marikina, San Juan, Mandaluyong, Pateros, Pasig, and Taguig.
A petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and various concerned citizens for
review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41330, denying, for lack of
cause of action, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and constitutionality of Proclamation
No. 635.
A case to the CA for the closure of the landfill stalled.
ISSUE
Whether or not the landfill is contrary to law
HELD:
SC held that the San Mateo Landfill will remain permanently closed.
Although the petitioners may be deemed to have waived or abandoned the issues raised in their previous
pleadings but not included in the memorandum,certain events we shall relate below have inclined us to
address some of the more pertinent issues raised in the petition for the guidance of the herein
respondents, and pursuant to our symbolic function to educate the bench and bar.
The law and the facts indicate that a mere MOA does not guarantee the dumpsites permanent closure.
The rally and barricade staged by the people of Antipolo on 28 January 1999, with the full support of all
the mayors of Rizal Province caused the MMDA to agree that it would abandon the dumpsite after six
months. In return, the municipal mayors allowed the use of the dumpsite until 20 July 1999.

Were it not for the TRO, then President Estradas instructions would have been lawfully carried out, for as
we observed in Oposa v. Factoran, the freedom of contract is not absolute.

Baguio City vs Masweng

DOCTRINE
Even if respondents had established ownership of the land, they cannot simply put up fences or build
structures thereon without complying with applicable laws, rules and regulations
FACTS
Respondents Joseph Jude Carantes, Rose Carantes and the heirs of Maximino Carantes are in
possession of a 30,368-square meter parcel of land . On June 20, 1997, they obtained Certificate of
Ancestral Land. On the strength of said CALC, respondents secured a building permit from the Building
Official of Baguio City, Teodoro G. Barrozo. Before long, they fenced the premises and began
constructing a residential building thereon.
Soon, respondents received a letterdated February 9, 1999 from Digna D. Torres, the Zone Administrator
of the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), informing them that the house they built had
overlapped PEZAs territorial boundary. Torres advised respondents to demolish the same within sixty
(60) days from notice. Otherwise, PEZA would undertake its demolition at respondents expense.
Without answering PEZAs letter, respondents filed a petition for injunction, with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Baguio City. By
Order dated April 8, 1999, the RTC of Baguio City issued a TRO, which enjoined PEZA to cease and
desist from threatening respondents with the demolition of their house before respondents prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction can be heard. On September 19, 2001, the RTC likewise issued an Order,
which directed the parties to maintain the status quo pending resolution of the case
The trial court ruled that respondents are entitled to possess, occupy and cultivate the subject lots on the
basis of their CALC. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In the assailed Decision dated October
26, 2007, the appellate court echoed the trial courts declaration that the subject lots have been set aside
from the lands of the public domain.
ISSUE: WHether the Petitioner or the City Engineer has the power to issue permits
HELD
SC ruled in the negative.
Respondents being holders of a mere CALC, their right to possess the subject land is limited to
occupation in relation to cultivation. Unlike No. 1,[26] Par. 1, Section 1, Article VII of the same DENR
DAO, which expressly allows ancestral domain claimants to reside peacefully within the domain, nothing
in Section 2 grants ancestral land claimants a similar right, much less the right to build permanent
structures on ancestral lands an act of ownership that pertains to one (1) who has a recognized right by
virtue of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title.
On this score alone, respondents action for injunction must fail. Even if respondents had established
ownership of the land, they cannot simply put up fences or build structures thereon without complying with
applicable laws, rules and regulations

Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel

DOCTRINE
The Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to
carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and
Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined.
FACTS
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their
respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia.
Consummation of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF did not take place, however, for upon
motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOAAD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
Mid 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed
as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public
concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official
copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD,
pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon.
Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUES
1. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING
itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain
in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
DOMAINS)[;]
If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines;
HELD
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory
opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the

power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a
tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.
That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no
serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In previous
cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the
need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility of a public employee,
the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of the
Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the identity of party-list nominees, among others, are matters of
public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as
it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at
large.
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he
failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160,
and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions
but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.

Bangus Fry Fisherfolk vs Lanzanas

DOCTRINE
The jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive writs is limited to acts committed or about to be
committed within their judicial region. Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1818 (PD No.1818) prohibited
courts from issuing injunctive writs against government infrastructure projects
FACTS
On 30 June 1997, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), issued an
Environmental Clearance in favor of respondent National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). The
Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a mangrove area and breeding ground
for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone. Petitioners, claiming to be fisher folks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto
Galera, sought reconsideration of the ECC issuance. Director Principe, however, denied petitioners plea
on 15 July1997. On 21 July 1997, petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the
construction of the mooring facility.
On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers, respondents moved to dismiss the complaint. These
respondents claimed that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies, rendering the complaint
without cause of action. They also asserted that the Manila RTC has no jurisdiction to enjoin the
construction of the mooring facility in Oriental Mindoro, which lies outside the Manila RTCs territorial
jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction is proper
Held:
The jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive writs is limited to acts committed or about to be
committed within their judicial region. Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1818 (PD No.1818) prohibited
courts from issuing injunctive writs against government infrastructure projects like the mooring facility in
the present case. Republic Act No. 8975 (RA No. 8975), which took effect on 26 November 2000,
superseded PD No. 1818 and delineates more clearly the coverage of the prohibition, reserves the power
to issue such writs exclusively with this Court, and provides penalties for its violation.
Section 1.
No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary
injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving gan
infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of
the government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among others public
utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to
prohibit any person or persons, entity or governmental official from proceeding with, or continuing
the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility, or
pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.
Obviously, neither the Manila RTC nor the Oriental Mindoro RTC canissue an injunctive writ to stop the
construction of the mooring facility. Only this Court can do so under PD No. 1818 and later under RA No.
8975. Thus, the question of whether the Manila RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint considering that
its injunctive writ is not enforceable in Oriental Mindoro is academic.