DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS:

ABUEVA vs WOOD G.R. No. L-21327 January 14, 1924

JOHNSON, J

The parties:

Petitioners are members of the Independence Commission. The creation of the

commission was ratified and adopted by the Philippine Legislature on the 8th day of
March, 1919. Twenty six of the petitioners are members of the House of
Representatives and four are members of the Senate of the Philippine Islands and
they all belong to the democratic party;

Respondents are Leonard Wood, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands,

Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas, Presidents of the Independence Commission.
Sued as well are the Acting Auditor, the Executive Secretary and the Secretary of
the Independence Commission.

This is an original action commenced in the Supreme Court by the petitioners for
the writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to exhibit to the petitioners and to
permit them to examine all the vouchers and other documentary proofs in their
possession, showing the disbursements and expenditures made out of the funds of
the Independence Commission.

FACTS:

By Act No. 2933 the Legislature of the Philippine Islands provided for a standing
appropriation of one million pesos(P1,000,000) per annum, payable out of any funds

in the Insular Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, to defray the expenses of the
Independence Commission, including publicity and all other expenses in connection
with the performance of its duties; that said appropriation shall be considered as
included

in

the

annual

appropriation

for

the

Senate

and

the

House

of

Representatives, at the rate of P500,000 for each house, although the appropriation
act hereafter approved may not make any specific appropriation for said purpose;
with the proviso that no part of said sum shall be set upon the books of the Insular
Auditor until it shall be necessary to make the payment or payments authorized by
said act

Petitioners averred that as members of the Independence Commission they are

legally obliged to prevent the funds from being squandered, and to prevent any
investments and illicit expenses in open contravention of the purposes of the law.
Petitioners have verbally and by writing requested the respondents to permit them
to examine the vouchers and other documentary proofs relating to the expenditures
and payments made out of the funds appropriated for the use of the Independence
Commission.

Respondents have denied and continue denying to permit the petitioners from
examining said vouchers and documentary proofs.

ISSUE: Can the Court compel the respondents to address the claims of the
petitioners

HELD:

1. Leonard Wood, as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and head of the

executive department of the Philippine Government, is not subject to the
control or supervision of the courts.
2. Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas, as Chairman of the Independence
Commission, are mere agents of the Philippine Legislature and cannot be
controlled or interfered with by the courts.
3. As for the auditor, the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action
because section 24 of the Jones Law provides that: The administrative
jurisdiction of the Auditor over accounts, whether of funds or property, and all
vouchers and records pertaining thereto, shall be exclusive
The determination of whether the accounts of the expenses of the Commission of
Independence should be shown to the plaintiffs or not is a question of policy and
administrative discretion, and is therefore not justiciable.

The United States vs. H.N. Bull GR L-5270Jan 15, 1910

Facts:

On the 2nd of December 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of

animals named Standard commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila,
Philippines. It was found that said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 677 heads
of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and proper suitable means for
securing the animals which resulted for most of the animals to get hurt and others
to have died while in transit. This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts
No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Constitution. It is however contended that
cases cannot be filed because neither was it said that the court sitting where the
animals were disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships not
licensed under Philippine laws, like the ship involved.
Issue:

Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a
foreign ship while inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. The offense, assuming that it originated in Formosa, which the Philippines
would have no jurisdiction, continued until it reached Philippine territory which is
already under jurisdiction of the Philippines. Defendant is thereby found guilty, and
sentenced to pay a fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.

No court of the Philippines has jurisdiction over any crimes committed in a foreign
ship on the high seas, but the moment it entered into territorial waters, it
automatically would be subject to the jurisdiction of the country. Every state has
complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. The Supreme Court of
the United States has recently said that merchant vessels of one country visiting the
ports of another for the purpose of trade would subject themselves to the laws
which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain.

CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).

Facts

On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the
peace and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the
Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of
the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office.

The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of
State John Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and
author of this opinion), but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adamss
term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming
that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adamss
term.

William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the

peace. Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ
of mandamus to compel Jeffersons Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver
the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to any courts appointed, or persons
holding office, under the authority of the United States.

Issues: Does Marbury have a right to the commission?

Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?

Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and
determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void?

Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond
what is specified in Article III of the Constitution?

Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?

Holding and Rule (Marshall)

Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.

The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executives constitutional
power of appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when
the last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed.
The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by President
Adams.

Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. The very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever
he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that
protection.

Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the
performance of that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to
resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing the commission, appointed
Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United
States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the
verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal
right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver
which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a
remedy.

Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine
whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void.

It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those
who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of
each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any

ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must
govern the case to which they both apply.

No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction
beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution.

The Constitution states that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all
cases affecting

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall
be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction. If
it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the
judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that
body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If Congress
remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has
declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made
in the Constitution, is form without substance.

No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus.

To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise

of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate
jurisdiction.

It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the
proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although,

therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an

officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original
action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.

Disposition: Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesnt get the
commission.

WRIT OF MANDAMUS [Latin, We comand.] A writ or order that is issued from a court
of superior jurisdiction that commands an inferior tribunal, corporation, Municipal
Corporation, or individual to perform, or refrain from performing, a particular act,
the performance or omission of which is required by law as an obligation.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).

Facts

On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the
peace and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the
Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of
the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office.

The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of
State John Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and
author of this opinion), but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adamss
term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming
that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adamss
term.

William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the

peace. Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ
of mandamus to compel Jeffersons Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver
the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to any courts appointed, or persons
holding office, under the authority of the United States.

Issues

Does Marbury have a right to the commission?

Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?

Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and
determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void?

Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond
what is specified in Article III of the Constitution?

Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?

Holding and Rule (Marshall)

Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.

The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executives constitutional
power of appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when
the last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed.

The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by President
Adams.

Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. The very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever
he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that
protection.

Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the
performance of that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to
resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing the commission, appointed
Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United
States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the
verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal
right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver
which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a
remedy.

Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine
whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void.

It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those
who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of
each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any
ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must
govern the case to which they both apply.

No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction
beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution.

The Constitution states that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all
cases affecting

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall
be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction. If
it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the
judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that
body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If Congress
remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has
declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made
in the Constitution, is form without substance.

No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus.

To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise

of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate
jurisdiction.

It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the
proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although,
therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an
officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original
action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.

Disposition: Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesnt get the
commission.

WRIT OF MANDAMUS [Latin, We comand.] A writ or order that is issued from a court
of superior jurisdiction that commands an inferior tribunal, corporation, Municipal
Corporation, or individual to perform, or refrain from performing, a particular act,
the performance or omission of which is required by law as an obligation.

JOSE A. ANGARA vs THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936
LAUREL, J.:

Facts:

In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates
voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the
Province of Tayabas.

On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as

member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the
most number of votes.

On December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose
A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions N0.8
confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no
protest had thus far been filedo. Praying, among other-things, that said respondent

be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of
Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified

Issue:

Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative?

HELD:

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It

obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the
fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For
example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the
legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This,
however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law
notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or
three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also
the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the
other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the
sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the
appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its
members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to

determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define
their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly
controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises
the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

Conclusion:

(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the
theory of separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.

(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and
duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.

(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the
agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the
only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries.

(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and
appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one
branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the
source of all authority.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with

specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of

classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the
governments.

(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into
effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of their elective members.

(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised
by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.

(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was
full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter
alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing
protests.

( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an
independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan
influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National
Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the
manner of conducting said contests.

(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the
Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole

judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also
section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the
time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and
manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any,
and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is
not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the
privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member
against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and
cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the
time within which protests against the election of any member of the National
Assembly should be filed.

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein
petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of
December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor
prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.

Tanada vs Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051

After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was
overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was

Lorenzo Taada who belonged to the Citizens Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the
other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to
choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members
comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the
majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one
minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority
were filled in by the NP. Taada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So
did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP
senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in
his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that
the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political
question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is
vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Taada and Macapagal was not to
raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public
opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD:

No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable
question. The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not
being asked by Taada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being
raised by Taada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET
are valid which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a separate and
independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.

But how should the gridlock be resolved?

The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the
minority members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the
Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that would fill in the
minority seats (even though those will come from the majority party). This is still
valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting)
concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations
like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.
IMMUNITIES