Dialectics of Citizenship

Hypatia, Inc.
Dialectics of Citizenship
Author(s): Ruth Lister
Source: Hypatia, Vol. 12, No. 4, Citizenship in Feminism: Identity, Action, and Locale (Autumn,
1997), pp. 6-26
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Hypatia, Inc.
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Dialecticsof Citizenship
RUTH LISTER
Elementscomprisinga set of buildingblocksfor a feministreconstructionof

as a statusanda practice;
mightinclude:a criticalsynthesisof citizenship
citizenship
the inclusivesideof citizenship(withinand acrossnation-states);the
strengthening
principleof differentiateduniversalism,addressingtensionsbetweenan analysis
and
standingat theheartof citizenship;
groundedin differenceand theuniversalism
a challengeto thebinarythinkingthatconstrainsthearticulationof women'sclaims
to citizenship.
Feminist citizenship theorists face a dual question: whether a concept

originallypredicatedon the very exclusion of women can be reformulatedso
as satisfactorilyto include and not simply append them; and in doing so,
whether it can give full recognition to the different and shifting identities
women simultaneouslyhold. In other words, is the very idea of a "womanfriendly citizenship" contradictory both because citizenship is inherently
woman-unfriendlyand exclusionary,and becausethe category"woman"itself
representsa false universalismwhich replicates that of traditionalconstructions of citizenship?In this article, I propose a set of building blocks for a
feminist reconstructionof citizenshipthat addressesthese questions.
My argument is twofold. First, refashionedwithin a feminist framework,
citizenshipprovidesan invaluablestrategictheoreticalconcept for the analysis
of women'ssubordinationand a potentially powerfulpolitical weapon in the
struggleagainstit. Moreover,it throwsa searchinglight on difference,despite
its universalist roots. Second, a dialectical approach best enables us to ride
the tensions inherent in such a reconstruction in a way which opens up our
theoretical and political choices. This point is illustratedwith reference to
a number of feminist debates which impinge on women's claims to full
citizenship.
Hypatiavol. 12, no. 4 (Fall 1997) ? by Ruth Lister
Ruth Lister
CITIZENSHIP
AS STATUSAND PRACTICE
My startingpoint is to reformulateand bringtogether the two greathistorical traditionsof citizenship,those of liberalismand civic republicanism,in a
critical synthesis. In these traditions, citizenship is understoodas involving
respectivelyrightsand political obligation, the formerprioritizingthe individual, the latterthe interestsof the widercommunity.These elements have been
conceptualizedas citizenshipas a statusversuscitizenshipas a practice(Oldfield
1990). The broadercontemporary"dutiesdiscourse,"which emphasizesobligation more generallyand in particularpaid workobligations,is not my focus
here; but its relevance for feminist politics should be noted, particularlyin
relationto the vexing questionof the value to be placedon careas a citizenship
obligation.
Today,most rights-basedaccounts of citizenshiptake as their startingpoint
T. H. Marshall'scelebratedexposition of its three elements, which extended
the liberalformulationof civil and political rights to embracealso the social
(Marshall1950). Despite earlierskepticismtowardtraditionalformulationsof
citizenshiprightsamong some feminists and other radicals,the case has been
made for extending those formulationsto embracenew categoriesdemanded
by social movements.Two sets of rights, in particular,can be identifiedin this
context. Firstare reproductiverights,which can be seen both as an extension
of the civil-political-social rights triad and as inseparable from it. Their
importanceto women'sautonomyand democraticparticipationhas been a key
tenet of modem feminism and has now been given official recognition by
bodies such as the United Nations. Second is the right to participate in
decisionmaking in a range of spheres, reflected, in the context of welfare
institutions, in demands for user-involvement and greater democratic
accountability.
Here, a rights-basedconception of citizenship as status shades into an
emphasison citizenship as practice, closer to the civic republicantradition.
The renaissance today of this tradition, particularlyin the United States,
representsa reaction against the individualismof the previously dominant
liberalcitizenshipparadigm.The reclaimingof active, collective politics as the
essence of citizenship is pivotal to contemporarycivic republicanismand in
particularto its appropriation,suitably modified, by some feminists, most
notably MaryDietz (1987). Others,while attractedby the portrayalof citizenship as active political participation, remain critical of some of civic
republicanism'sother key tenets (Young 1989, 1990; Phillips 1991, 1993).
Potentially problematic for feminists are its demanding nature, which has
particularimplicationsfor women, disadvantagedby the gendereddivision of
time; its narrowconception of the "political"built on a generallyrigidseparation of public and private spheres; and its uncritical appeal to notions of
universality,impartiality,and the common good. Without pursuingthe arguThis content downloaded from 163.178.101.228 on Sat, 05 Sep 2015 18:38:53 UTC
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ments in detail here (see Lister 1998), it is possible to develop a model of

political citizenship based partly on civic republicanism which is more
"woman-friendly."
In particular,this model has to embrace a broad definition of political
citizenship, in contrast to the model of classical civic republicanism,which
confines political citizenshipto the formalpolitical sphereof government.A
broaddefinition would include both the process of negotiation with welfare
institutions,frequentlyconductedby women, and the kindsof informalneighborhood politics in which women tend to take the lead, in contrast to their
underrepresentationin the formal political system. These forms of political
activism are important for citizenship from the perspective of their impact
both on the wider community and on the individuals involved. From the
collective perspective,they can serve to defend and extend the rights shared
by other community membersand to promote "social capital," the value of
which has been emphasizedby RobertD. Putnamas a prerequisitefor effective
public policy and as an expression of healthy citizenship (1993). From the
perspective of the individual, involvement in collective action can boost
self-confidence,as individuals(and this has been particularlytrue of women)
come to see themselves as political actorsand effective citizens.
The same is not always true of engagement with formal politics, which
women often experience as more alienating than empowering,although this
does not constitute an alibi for women's continued exclusion from formal
political power. Nor does it mean that formal politics itself can be left
untouched.The relationshipbetween formaland informalpolitics needs to be
recast so that the formeris more open to the latter.An example is that of the
women'scommittees establishedby the formerGreaterLondon Council and
some other British local authorities in the 1980s. Through the use of open
meetings, consultation exercises, and co-options, these committees made a
concerted effortto involve marginalizedgroupsof women and therebyprovide
a link between them and local government.Although not totally successfulnot least becausethey became a forumfor divisive identity politics-they did
go some way towardforging new relationshipsbetween formal and informal
modes of politics.
Thus, fromthe perspectiveof the self-developmentof the individualcitizen,
the significance of which is emphasizedby a numberof civic republicans,as
well as that of the widercommunity,it makessense to adopt a more inclusive
notion of what counts as citizenship.In this way,ourunderstandingof political
citizenshipceases to be rooted in the experiences of men and divorced from
those of women (Jonesand Jonasdottir,1988). However,in casting citizenship
as a demanding political obligation, classic civic republicanismcontained a
male bias from the outset. The ideal citizen of classical republicanismwas
largelyfreed from the necessity of laboringor of meeting his bodily requirements; this was facilitated by the ranks of noncitizens-women and slaves.
Ruth Lister
Today,the gendereddivision of domestic labor and time similarlyprivileges

male citizens. The notion of political participationas an obligation thus runs
the risk of casting out from the body of citizens all those unable to meet its
demandingrequirements,and of creating another source of self-criticismfor
alreadyoverburdenedwomen. The classical republicanmodel's dependence
on an exclusive minority of citizens largely unencumbered by the demands
of everyday living is one reason it cannot simply be translated into the
context of twentieth-century democracies, and why feminists cannot
accept it uncritically. Instead, it is possible to recast participatorypolitical
citizenship in terms of rights and opportunities rather than obligations,
thereby shifting the focus to the conditions which either undermine or
promote its expression(Held 1987).
Critical Synthesis
The rearticulationof both the liberaland republicancitizenshiptraditions
in waysthat aremore inclusive than their originalformulationsindicateshow,
while they remain conceptually different, they do not necessarilyhave to
conflict; indeed, they can be seen as mutually supportive, even if tensions
between them remain. An example is the interaction between social and
political citizenship, which has been key in the development of women's
position as citizens in the twentieth century.The nature of the social rights
that have emergedhas partlyreflectedthe extent to which women have been
involved in their construction. Conversely, the extent of women's political
involvement has partly reflected the nature of the social and reproductive
rights they have achieved, and their mobilizationhas been, partly,a function
of their relationshipwith the welfarestate.
This helps to underlinethe importanceof a dialectical approach,if citizenship is to provide a useful tool for feminist theory and action. A roundedand
fruitfultheorizationof citizenship, that can be of potential value to women,
has to embrace both individual rights (particularlysocial and reproductive
rights) and political participation, and has also to analyze the relationship
between the two (Sarvasy and Siim 1994). For feminists adopting this
approach, citizenship emerges as a dynamic concept in which process and
outcome stand in a dialectical relationship.At the core of this conceptualization lies the idea of human agency.1Citizenshipas participationrepresentsan
expressionof human agency in the political arena,broadlydefined;citizenship
as rightsenables people to act as agents, individuallyor in collaborationwith
others. Moreover,citizenshiprights are not fixed. They remain the object of
political strugglesto defend,reinterpret,and extend them. Who is involved in
those struggles,where they are placed in the political hierarchy,and what
political power and influence they can wield will help to determine the
outcomes of such struggles.Such a conceptualizationof citizenshipis particuThis content downloaded from 163.178.101.228 on Sat, 05 Sep 2015 18:38:53 UTC
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larlyimportantin challenging the constructionof women (not least, minority

groupwomen) as passivevictims,while keepingsight of the discriminatoryand
oppressivemale-dominatedpolitical, economic, social, and cultural institutions that still deny women full citizenship. People can be, at the same time,
both the subordinateobjects of hierarchicalpowerrelationsand subjectswho
are agents in their own lives, capable of exercising power in the "generative
sense of self-actualization"(Giddens 1991).
Uniting citizenship as a status and citizenship as a practice does not,
however, mean that the former is conditional on the latter. We need to
distinguishbetween two formulations:to be a citizen and to act as a citizen
(Kymlickaand Norman 1994). To be a citizen, in the legal and sociological
sense, means to enjoy the rightsof citizenshipnecessaryfor agency and social
and political participation.To act as a citizen involves fulfillingthe potential
of that status.Those who do not fulfil that potential do not cease to be citizens.
To suggest otherwise is once again to create a measuringrod against which
women are more likely to fall short because of their continued domestic
responsibilities,and one which could deny the citizenshipof those constrained
by severe disability,chronic illness, or infirmity.2
ACROSSNATION-STATES
EXCLUSION/INCLUSION:
This reinterpretationof the two citizenshiptraditionshas been informedby

the principleof inclusiveness.This principleinvolves strengtheningthe inclusive side of citizenship'scoin while explicitly acknowledging, and as far as
possible challenging, its exclusionaryside both within and at the bordersof
nation-states. The latter means that the thinking involved in a feminist
reconstructionof citizenship, as both a status and a practice,has to adopt an
internationalistand multilayeredperspective. It is only through such a perspective, which also draws on the language of human rights, that we can
addressthe limitations of citizenshipwhich are thrown into relief by growing
numbersof migrantsand asylumseekers.The existence of significantnumbers
of non-citizens within and of would-be entrants to national polities raises
questionsabout the natureof legal, political, and social citizenshiprights and
the conditions underwhich they are granted.
A multilayeredconceptualizationof citizenship loosens its bonds with the
nation-state,so that citizenshipis defined over a spectrumwhich extends from
the local to the global, reflecting local and regional pressuresfor greater
political autonomyon the one hand and globalizingtendencies on the other.
In particular,the notion of global citizenship, which reflects at the international level the rightsand responsibilitiesassociatedwith national citizenship,
offersa tool to challenge, or at least temper,citizenship'sexclusionarypower.
It does so in two main ways,both of which involve a link between citizenship
and humanrights.First,the frameworkof globalcitizenshipencouragesa focus
Ruth Lister
11
on the responsibilitiesof the moreaffluentnation-statestowardthose that lack

the resourcesto translatehuman rights (as defined by the U.N. to embrace
economic, social, and cultural rights) into effective citizenship rights. This
follows Kathleen B. Jones'ssketch of a feminist stance that "stressesthe global
parametersof the responsiblecitizen'sobligations"(1994, 269). The importance for feminism of placing citizenship in a global context is underlinedby
the evidence that women in poorer nations, as managersof poverty and
suppliersof "flexiblelabor,"bearthe greaterburdenof the policies of the richer
nations and the internationaleconomic institutions,such as the International
MonetaryFund,that representthose interests.
Second, the relationshipbetween citizenship and human rights opens up
the possibility of a more inclusionarystance toward nation-state outsiders:
migrantsand asylumseekers. Although the mainstreammigrationliterature
tends to assumethat these groupsaremale, it is estimatedthat women account
for abouthalf of all internationalmigrationand for just underhalf the refugee
population (United Nations, 1995). It is ironic that, at a time when the power
of the nation-state is being curtailedby both globalizingforces and internal
fissaparityand devolutionarypressures,its role in regulatingthe boundariesof
exclusion through the laws governing immigrationand asylumis being executed with increasingaggressivenessin the world'smore affluentsocieties.
The relationshipbetween citizenship and human rights is a complex one.
One formulationis that supplied by Rainer Baubock.First,he suggests,the
right to the citizenship of an identifiable state is itself a basic human right.
Second, humanrightsand citizenshiprightssharea common language:human
rights representthe "cornerstone"of citizenship rights and "a universalized
form of citizenship, transcending boundariesof state membership"(1994,
247). As such they are increasinglya referencepoint for feministssuccessfully
claiming human rights as women'srights,reflected most notably in the 1995
BeijingU.N. Women'sConferenceDeclaration.Citizenshiprightsderivefrom
human rightsas the necessarycondition for human agency,so that the former
could be said to representthe specificinterpretationand allocationby individual nation-states of the more abstract, unconditional, and universalizable
human rights.
There is, though, a tension between the dictates of human rights and the
right of nation-statesto exercise sovereigntyin the control of access to their
territories.Here universalrightsand more narrowlycircumscribedcitizenship
(and residence) rights can come into conflict. Nevertheless, by the same
token, the discourseof human rights representsa resourcefor migrantsand
asylum seekers, counterpoised against the exclusionary boundaries around
citizenship and membershipdrawnby individualnation-states.International
human rights law, if enforced by more effective institutions of global governance, could circumscribenation-states'powersto exclude "outsiders"by the
implementation of an internationallyagreed-on set of principles, including
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the principleof non-discrimination.The notion of globalgovernancehas been

promoted by the U.N. and also by an international Commission on Global
Governance, both of which look to a strengthenedand democratizedU.N.,
with the addition of an Economic SecurityCouncil, as providingthe foundation stone.3 David Held (1995), who has begun to sketch out the framework
for a cosmopolitangovernance,likewise looks to a reformedand strengthened
U.N., along with the development of regional parliaments,such as the European Parliament,in the shorterterm. In the longer term, he envisages, inter
alia, a directly elected global parliament of democratic peoples and the
entrenchment of cosmopolitan democratic law. Such visions may appear
fanciful in the context of the current world order; nevertheless they are
increasinglybeing promotedthroughexisting internationalforums.
Citizenship as practice is also being furtheredat the internationallevel by
the embryonicgrowth of a global civil society, through which social movements and nongovernmental organizations can pursue their goals across
national borders.As they have done at the local level, women are playing an
active role in this alternativeforumfor citizenshippolitics, often making use
of electronic communications(Gittler 1996; Pettman 1996). The U.N. summits of the 1990s have demonstratedthe strength of international women's
organizationsand lobbies,as witnessedin their ability to shape the agendaand
outcome of both the 1995 BeijingConference on Women and the 1994 Cairo
Conference on Population and Development. However, as at the national
level, this does not justify women's exclusion from the actual and potential
arenasof global power.
A DIFFERENTIATED
UNIVERSALISM
Within nation-states, the exclusion of women has been pivotal to the

historical,theoretical,and political constructionof citizenship.The appropriation of citizenship as a concept of potential value to feminism involves a
number of steps. The first is to expose how, hidden under the cloak of false
universalism,that exclusion has been not accidental but integral to both
historical traditionsof citizenship. This situation affects the terms on which
women are today admitted to citizenship. Second, a similarchallenge to the
false universalismof the category"woman"means that a feminist reinterpretation of citizenship must integrate a gender analysis into a broaderunderstanding of the significance of difference.The featuresof the genderedmask
worn by citizenship'sexclusionaryface also bear the imprintof other dimensions of exclusion. Social divisions such as class, "race,"disability,and sexuality interactwith gendereither to aggravateor to modifyits impacton women's
citizenshipstatus and potential. Nevertheless, recognition of how differences
within the category "woman"mediate women's relationship to citizenship
does not have to mean abandoningthe categoryaltogether.To the extent that
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13
women, in their diversity,sharea citizenshipstatuswhich is, at best, marginal,

it is appropriateto deploy the theoretical and political tool of gender.
The thirdstep is to addressthe tension between such an analysis,grounded
in difference,and the universalismthat standsat the heart of citizenship.The
solution is not to abandoncitizenship as a universalistproject,for to do so is
also to abandon its "emancipatorypotential" that strikes such a political
resonancefor many people (Vogel 1988; Riley 1992). Without the promiseof
the universal, against which the denial of full and genuine citizenship to
women and minoritygroupscan be measuredand claims for inclusion can be
directed, the concept of citizenshiploses its political force. Helpfulhere is Iris
MarionYoung'sdistinction between universalityas impartiality,"in the sense
of the adoption of a general point of view that leaves behind particular
affiliations,feelings, commitmentsand desires,"which she rejectsas a fiction,
and the "universalityof moral commitment" to the equal moral worth and
participationand inclusion of all persons(1990, 105). It is in this latter sense
that citizenship cannot be divorced from its universalistroots. Thus our goal
should be a universalism that stands in creative tension to diversity and
difference and that challenges the divisions and exclusionary inequalities
which can stem from diversity.
The underlyingprinciple that can guide us is that of a differentiated
universalism,which embodiesthe creative tension between universalismand particularity or difference. This draws on contemporaryradical political theory,
which is seeking to "particularize"
the universalin the searchfor "anew kind
of articulationbetween the universal and the particular"(Mouffe 1993, 13;
Benhabib 1992; Gunew and Yeatman1993).4The applicationof the principle
of differentiateduniversalismyields an enriched understandingof citizenship
both as a statusand a practice.
A Politics of Solidarityin Difference
Takingcitizenshipas a practice,the principleof differentiateduniversalism
is embodiedin Anna Yeatman'sconceptualizationof a "politicsof difference,"
which involves "a commitment to a universalisticorientation to the positive
value of differencewithin a democraticpolitical process."This requiresboth
"aninclusivepolitics of voice and representation"and "areadinesson the part
of any one emancipatorymovement to show how its particularinterest in
contesting oppressionlinks into and supportsthe interestsof other movements
in contesting differentkinds of oppression"(Yeatman1993, 231; 1994).
At the theoretical level, it is possibleto drawfromthe rich literaturein this
areaa numberof elements that would constitute such a politics of solidarityin
difference.First,and underpinningthe others, must be some kind of "framework agreement"of political values, or "grammarof political conduct," that
providesthe foundationsfor citizen engagement.This, Chantal Mouffe(1992)
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suggests, is more compatible with modem democratic pluralism than the

notion of a "common good" enshrined in traditional civic republicanism.
Second, a key feature of this political syntax is a commitment to valuing
difference,as built into the very fabricof the political project and embracing
a nonessentialist conceptualization of the political subject as made up of
manifold, fluid identities which mirrorthe multiple differentiationof groups.
Which identities individuals choose to identify with politically cannot be
taken either as a given or as static. A group-differentiatedpolitics which asks
the individualcitizen to identify with just one aspect of her identity runs the
riskof fragmentationat the individualas well as the grouplevel.
The third plank is a commitment to dialogue.This commitment has been
expressedunder a numberof rubrics;most notably, "dialogic,""deliberative,"
or "communicative"democracy.Underlying them is Habermas'snotion of a
"communicativeethic," which emphasizesthe crucial role of free and open
public communicationand deliberationbetween citizens as the basis of democratic political legitimation. This has been used critically by a number of
feministpolitical theoristswho envisagesuch publicdialogueas the framework
for the articulationof difference in which diverse voices, particularlythose
normally excluded from public discourse,have an equal right to be heard.
Unlike Habermashimself, for those feministsthe point of such dialogueis not
to arriveat agreementon "the"general interest, but instead to promote the
development of views and the exercise of judgement,having taken account of
differentviewpoints.
This commitment to dialogue is premisedon the belief that it enables new
positions to emergeas other viewpoints are acknowledged.The importanceof
dialoguein which "eachgroupbecomes better able to considerother groups'"
standpoints without relinquishing the uniqueness of its own standpoint or
suppressingother groups'partial perspectives is underlined also by Patricia
Hill Collins as typical of Afrocentric feminist thought (1991, 236). Nira
Yuval-Davis (1997), drawing on the work of a group of Italian feminists,
calls this a process of "rooting" and "shifting," in which participants
remain rooted in their own identities and values but at the same time are
willing to shift views in dialogue with those of other identities and values.
This, Yuval-Davis suggests, represents a "transversal"dialogue or politics,
which depends on participantsavoiding uncriticalsolidarityand the homogenization of "the other."
How to turn such theoretical ideas into practical realities is, of course,
anotherquestion. As Yuval-Daviswarns,in some situations,conflicting interests are not reconcilablein this way and, by and large,political systemsdo not
providethe time and space for such dialogue.Moreover,there is a tendency to
underestimatethe difficultiessome groups,in particularthe poor and economically marginalized,would have in entering the dialogue in the first place.
Nevertheless,we can point to examplesto show that such a transversalpolitics
Ruth Lister
15
is possible.To take just two fromconflict areas:duringthe periodof transition

to the new South Africa, a Women'sNational Coalition was formed,which
represented an "extraordinaryconvergence of women across geographical,
racial,class, religiousand political lines"and "aforumthroughwhich women
who harboreddeep animositiescould also identifycommon concerns"(Kemp
et. al., 1995, 150-51). Through a process of dialogue and negotiation and
despitefissuresand disagreements,the coalition drafteda Women'sCharterfor
EffectiveEquality,which gave women in their diversitya voice in the writing
of the new constitution. The opportunityto have a voice at such a historic
time, combined with a focus on a clear, specific goal, is believed to have
providedthe impetusto work throughthe differencesthat existed.
A second example can be found in Northern Ireland.In a photo essay,titled
"DifferentTogether,"Cynthia Cockbum describeshow a form of transversal
politics is being pursuedby Belfastwomen'scenters:
Individualwomen hold on to their political identities-some
long for a united Ireland,others feel deeply threatenedby the
idea. But they have identifieda commonalityin being women,
being community based and being angry at injustice and
inequality,that allows them to affirmand even welcome this
and other kinds of difference.(1996a, 46)
Two Belfast women who gave evidence to the Northern IrelandOpsahl
Commissionexplainedthat, in their experience,cooperationwaseasier"when
the deliberationsand activities are directed towardsthe issueswhich matter"
in women'slives, by which they meant the struggleto improvethe qualityof
life in the disadvantaged communities in which they lived.5 Cockbum
(1996b), drawing also on women's projects in Bosnia and Israel, found a
number of factors which facilitated working across communal divisions,
including a clear practical focus and a sensitivity in defining agendas. Each
case revealed a commitment to working with the "other" and an affirmation of "difference."This was combined with an acknowledgment of differences within each group and of the fluidity of ethnic identities, as well as a
willingness to look outward; for instance, in Belfast, to women in local
Indian and Chinese communities. None of this was easy; but these examples suggestthat with commitment,it is possibleto forgea politics of solidarity
in difference.
ParticularizingRights
With regardto citizenshipas a status,the common representationof citizenship rights as abstractand universalwould seem to make them ratherunamenable to a politics of difference.Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguishtwo
complementaryapproachesto incorporatingdiversityand differenceinto the
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conceptualization of citizenship rights without sacrificing the principle of

common and equal rights,which in itself is necessaryfor the accommodation
of difference.
The first approachis to recognizethat rights can be particularizedto take
account of the situation of specific groups, both in the reactive sense of
counteracting past and present disadvantages,which may underminegroup
members'position as citizens, and in the proactivesense of affirmingdiversity,
particularlywith regardto culturaland linguisticrights.Examplesof the former
are affirmativeaction programsand the kind of wide-rangingdisabilitydiscriminationlegislationenacted in the United States. Examplesof the latterare
the specificpolitical, legal, and collective rightsenjoyed by indigenousAmerican Indians in parallel with their rights as U.S. citizens (Young 1990), and
languagepolicies that officiallyrecognizethe languagesof significantminority
ethnic groups, as in Australia (Castles 1994). It must be acknowledged,
though, that such attempts to rearticulatethe relationshipbetween the universal and the particularare politically charged.This is most evident in the
United States where the growth of the Hispanic communityhas led to pressuresfor Englishto be declaredthe official languagein some cities and where
affirmativeaction policies have been renderedunlawfulfollowing the passage
of Proposition209 in California.
Moreover,the "multi-cultural"model of citizenship,which could be said to
underpinsome of these policies, is not without its problems,particularlyfrom
a feminist perspective. First, it runs the risk of treating cultural groups as
homogeneous, ignoring,for instance, differencesof gender,age, sexuality,and
class, and of essentializing and freezing cultural differences (Yuval-Davis
1997). Helpfulhere is the distinction made by Will Kymlickain his treatiseon
multiculturalcitizenship (1995). On the one hand are minority rights that
promote the interests of minority groupsin relation to the majority;on the
other are rightsthat allow minoritygroupsto imposerestrictionson their own
members'individualrightsin the name of traditionalauthoritiesand practices.
Supportfor the former,but not the latter,Kymlickaargues,helps to ensurenot
just equality between groupsbut freedom and equality within groups.Even
though, as he acknowledges,maintainingsuch a distinction might be difficult
in practice, and leaves open the question of whose interpretationof minority
rights holds sway, it does offer a possible frameworkfor addressingclaims for
minority group rights while recognizing divergent interests within groups.
Conversely,the multiculturalmodel risksending up as a mereliberaltoleration
of diversity,confined to the "private"sphere,ratherthan a genuine acceptance
and recognition of such diversity in the "public"(Galeotti 1993). Given the
has
difficulties raised by multiculturalism,the notion of "transculturalism"
reducwithout
been suggestedas a means of acknowledgingculturalidentities
ing people to static and uniformculturalgroups.6Its implications,both theoretical and political, would need furtherexploration.
Ruth Lister
17
The second approach,advocatedby David Taylor(1989, 27), is to anchor

citizenshiprightsin a notion of need, in that need can be seen as dynamicand
differentiated,as againstthe universaland abstractbasisof rights.This formulation is useful in opening up the political dynamics of the relationship
between needs and rightsin citizenshipstruggles,or Nancy Fraser's"politicsof
needs interpretation"(1989), which involves a series of strugglesover the
legitimationof "competingneeds discourses,"the interpretationof needs, and
their translation into rights. An example is the challenge by the disability
movement to medicalizedneeds discourseswhich underminethe citizenship
rights of disabledpeople. Taylor'sdistinction between needs as differentiated
and rightsas abstractand universalis, however,somethingof an oversimplification. As I have just suggested,rightscan be differentiatedon a groupbasis;
and Doyal and Gough'stheory of needs (1991), on which Taylordraws,is, as
he himself notes, rooted in a universalistic understandingof basic human
needs that are then subjectto differentculturaland historicalinterpretations.
This suggests that both needs and rights should be understood as tiered,
embracingboth the universaland the differentiatedand standingin a dynamic
relationshipto each other throughthe "politicsof needs interpretation."
ARTICULATING
WOMEN'SCLAIMSTO CITIZENSHIP
The principleof differentiateduniversalismcan also be appliedto the terms

on which women's claims to citizenship, as both a status and a practice, are
articulated. Typically, women have been faced with a choice between a
universalisticclaim based on the principle of our equality with men and a
particularisticclaim based on our differencefrom them. These claims represent, on the one hand, a gender-neutral,and on the other a gender-differentiated model of citizenship. In both cases, it is a male standardagainst which
women's citizenship is being measured,and difference is conceptualized in
binary rather than pluralistic terms. Overlapping oppositions are those
between the universalisticethic of justice and the particularisticethic of care,
and between the ideals of independenceand interdependence.
The dangersof pursuingthe chimera of a gender-neutralcitizenship ideal
have been underlined elsewhere (Jones 1990; Vogel 1994). Such an ideal
would requirewomen, as the price of their admissionto citizenship,to adapt
to a templatefashionedin a male imageand would ignorehow the bodypolitic
denies the body female. In this way,the issueof women'scitizenshipis treated
by those who subscribeto this ideal as purely quantitative, relating to our
presence or absence in the citizen ranks,ratherthan qualitative, concerning
the very natureof citizenship.To force women into the mold createdby male
citizenshipparadigmscould stunt and contort the processof self-development
that is pivotal to human agency and citizenship.
18
Hypatia
The alternativeof a gender-differentiatedcitizenshipis no less problematic.

It runs the risk of sinking into the sands of an essentialismwhich, in lauding
women's (read mothers') essential nature and values, ignores the differences
between women and servesto trapthem in the privatedomestic sphere.This
could then reinforcewomen'seconomic dependenceandpolitical marginalization. Moreover,historical analysis indicates that such materalist discourses
can all too easily be misappropriatedto the advantageof men, and that it has
proved very difficult to win recognition of the value of caring work in the
construction of social citizenship rights (Lewis and Astrom 1992; Koven and
Michel 1993).
Carol Pateman sums up the difficulties which have for centuries faced
women in their fight for full citizenshipas "Wollstonecraft's
dilemma."
On the one hand they have demandedthat the ideal of citizenship be extended to them, and the liberal-feministagendafor a
"genderneutral"social world is the logical conclusion of one
form of this demand. On the other, women have also insisted,
often simultaneously, as did Mary Wollstonecraft, that as
womenthey have specific capacities, talents, needs and concerns, so that the expressionof their citizenshipwill be differentiated from that of men. Their unpaid work, providing
welfarecould be seen, as Wollstonecraftsaw women's tasks as
mothers,as women'sworkas citizens,justas theirhusbands'paid
work is central to men'scitizenship (1989, 196-97).
The dilemma today,Patemancontinues, lies in the mutual incompatibility
of these two routes to citizenship. The patriarchalwelfare state permitsonly
two options: either women conform to the male citizenship model or they
continue with their tasks as carers,which that model does not and cannot
value. Although theoretically illuminating, Pateman'sconceptualizationof
the dilemmasis, on the face of it, politically paralyzing.While the tension is
clearbetween two routesthat point in differentdirections,are they necessarily
incompatible?Are the outcomes identified by Pateman the only paths available?An alternativeperspective is to arguethat we will have to continue to
straddleboth routes, through the construction of a number of criss-crossing
paths, if we areto redrawthe mapof citizenshipsatisfactorilyto includewomen
in their diversity. The aim has to be to find ways of moving beyond the
dichotomies that underpinthe differentroutes to citizenshipencapsulatedin
Wollstonecraft'sdilemma.
Equalityand Difference
Indeed,much contemporaryfeministwritingon "equalityversusdifference"
has alreadyhelped to clear the path (Bacchi 1990; Meehan and Sevenhuijsen
Ruth Lister
19
1991; Bock and James 1992; Fraser 1996). Increasingly,the dichotomous

pairingof the two is being challengedasrepresentinga logical,conceptual,and
political misconstruction.Equalityand differenceare not incompatible;they
only become so if equality is understoodto mean sameness.Indeed, the very
notion of equality implies differencesto be discountedor taken into account
so that, despite them, people are treated as equals for specific purposes.
Equality and difference are, therefore, better understood as simultaneously
incommensurateand complementaryratherthan antagonistic.The opposite
of equality is inequality.To posit it as difference disguises the relations of
subordination, hierarchy, and consequent disadvantage that underlie the
dichotomy,and servesto distortthe availablepolitical choices.
The problem does not lie in "equality"or "difference"as such, neither
of which feminists can afford to discard, but in their misrepresentation as
opposites (which is not to say that each is not capable of being interpreted
in ways which are problematic for women's citizenship). Joan Scott sees the
resolution of the equality-difference dilemma as a two-step process of
deconstruction that cuts through the underlying dichotomy. The first step,
she posits, is
the systematiccriticism of the operationsof categoricaldifference, the exposureof the kinds of exclusions and inclusionsthe hierarchies-it constructs, and a refusalof their ultimate
"truth."A refusal,however,not in the name of an equalitythat
implies samenessor identity,but rather(and this is the second
move) in the name of an equalitythat restson differences-differences that confound, disrupt, and render ambiguous the
meaning of any fixed binaryopposition ( 1988, 48).
Writing explicitly in the context of citizenship, Wendy Sarvasytakes the
process furtherto arguefor a synthesis of equality and difference.She takes
inspiration from a group of North American post-suffragefeminists who
"gropedfor a theoretical and practicalsynthesis of equalityand differenceas
the basis for women'scitizenship and as the defining characteristicof public
policies in a feministwelfarestate"(1992, 330). They developed a conception
of "the feminist-citizen-motherwho performeda role both gender differentiated and equal"(358). This "citizen-mother"would be validated in her role
but would not be confined to it; she would be a citizen in her own right, both
politically and economically independent.
In this way, motherhood, or more broadly,care, is incorporatedinto the
meaning of citizenship without identifying women solely as mothers and
carers. Pateman (1989), despite her pessimistic reading of Wollstonecraft's
dilemma,suggeststwo further,relatedsteps throughthe impasseshe identifies.
The first is to question the allocation of responsibilityfor the welfare of all
citizens.The second is to problematizemen'srelationshipto citizenshipwhich
20
Hypatia
is built on their freedomfromthe caringresponsibilitiesthat in turn constrain

women'scitizenshipboth as a statusand a practice.With both steps, the focus
of attention is usefullyshifted from women to men, the gendereddivision of
labor,and widersocietal responsibilitiesforchildrenand others in need of care.
More fundamentally,these steps call into question the meaning of citizenship
itself and the differentialvalue it places on "public"paid work and "private"
unpaidcaringwork.
This shift highlights two other overlappingoppositionsthat have helped to
shape women's articulation of their claims to full citizenship: between the
competing claims of an ethic of care and an ethic of justice or rights, and
between the value of independence as opposed to that of interdependence.
KarenOffen'scharacterizationof the equalityversusdifferencedivision historically as one between "relational" and "individualist" feminism helps to
illuminate how the three sets of dualities interact (Offen 1988). Relational
feminismstresseswomen'sdifferenceand their contributionin the context of
nonhierarchicalrelationships,underpinnedby the values of care and human
interdependence.Individualistfeminism, in contrast, prioritizesthe individual, her rights, and her quest for personal independence or autonomy.The
emphasisis on a more abstractnotion of justice. Offen'sown conclusion from
her historical analysis-that contemporaryfeminism needs to draw on the
strengthsof both currents-supports my own argument.
An Ethic of Justiceand Care
In each case, as arguedin relation to equalityversusdifference,the either-or
choices lead us into a theoretical and political cul de sac. Rather than setting
care and justice in opposition, as mutually exclusive ethics, we need to see
them as complementary, each reinforcing and thereby transformingand
strengtheningthe other.This is acknowledgedby a numberof both justice and
care theorists. Thus, for instance, from within the justice paradigm,Susan
Moller Okin suggeststhat the best theorizingabout justice "has integralto it
the notions of care and empathy,of thinking of the interestsand well-being of
others who may be very differentfrom ourselves"(1989, 15).
Fromwithin the careparadigm,JoanTrontois at similarpainsto makeclear
that she is not setting up an ethic of care in oppositionto one of justice (1993).
She recognizesthe importanceof rightsto the protectionof oppressedindividuals, and suggeststhat care has to be tied to a theory of justice in order to
addressthe conflicts of interestand imbalanceof powerthat can arisebetween
the providersand recipients of care in a context of inequality;to adjudicate
which needs have priority;and to guardagainst the dangersof parochialism,
by which she means that individualscan be indifferentto the needs of others
than those for whom they themselves care. A standard of justice is also
necessary,Trontoconcedes, to assessthe distributionof care tasksand benefits
Ruth Lister
21
and its relationshipto patternsof power;or put anotherway,to disconnect care

from"compulsoryaltruism"(Landand Rose 1985). Thus our understandingof
citizenshipcan be enriched by an ethic of care, while the practiceof care has
to be underwritten by an ethic of justice and the rights associated with
citizenship.
Dependence, Independence,and Interdependence
The synthesisof the ethics of care and of justice also helps us to rethink the
trichotomy of dependence, independence, and interdependence. (Here, the
opposition lies not so much between dependence and independence, with
interdependenceproviding the synthesis, as between dependence and independence and interdependence.)It does so by providinga frameworkin which
due recognition can be given to the interdependencethat is quintessentialto
human relationships-in particular,relationships involving the giving and
receipt of care-while not losing the cutting edge of the longstandingfeminist
critiqueof women'seconomic dependence on men and the negation of rights
and autonomyit entails.
Independencehas traditionallybeen construedas a prerequisitefor citizenship. Some feministshave rightlyquestionedthe sometimesuncriticalacceptance of a discourse of independence and the values it embodies in the
promotionof women'scitizenship.Nevertheless,we also have to guardagainst
uncriticaluse of the languageof interdependencethat runsthe riskof obscuring underlyingunequal relationshipsof dependence and independence. The
unequal power relationship that underpinssome women's economic dependence on men means that the interdependenceof which the dependence is a
part is skewed in men's favor. It is not surprising,therefore, that the other
element of the equation-men's dependence on women for care and servicing
which facilitates their own independence as citizens and workers-is conveniently obscured.Fraserand Gordon (1994, 24) arguethat we need to distinguish between two differentkinds of dependence involved in this relationship
of interdependence.One is "sociallynecessary"dependence,which represents
the need for care, "an inescapablefeatureof the human condition."The other
is "surplus"dependencewhich "isrooted in unjustand potentially remediable
social institutions." The goal would be to end the link between care and
surplusdependency.
More broadly, the argument that the promotion of women's citizenship
requiresboth their economic and their physical autonomy does not have to
entail subscribingto an atomistic liberal individualism.Autonomy, and the
agency that derives from it, is made possible only by the human relationships that nourish it and the social infrastructurethat supportsit. The point
is that if citizenship is to be understood as involving relationships of
interdependence, those relationshipsmust not be distortedby the denial of
22
Hypatia
women'sautonomyor the inequalitiesof power that characterizerelationships

of dependency.
Across the Public-PrivateDivide
Underpinningthe theoretical dichotomies that have distortedour choices,
as well as women's exclusion from full citizenship, has been an even more
fundamentaldichotomy.This is the rigidgenderedseparationof the "private"
or domestic and "public"spheres,in which the formerhas representedparticularity,care,and dependenceand the latteruniversalism,justice,and independence. The rearticulationof this public-privatedivide providesone of the keys
to challenging women'sexclusion at the level of both theory and praxis.This
involves the disruptionof the divide'sgenderedmeaning;recognition of the
ways it is socially and politically constructedand thereforefluid ratherthan
fixed, with differentimplicationsfor differentgroupsof women; and acknowledgment of how, in practice,each side affectsthe other.
This rearticulationilluminateshow the gatewaysto citizenshipfor women
and men are differently shaped by the interaction of public and private
elements. Thus, for instance, we cannot understandthe genderedpatternsof
entry to citizenship in the public sphere without taking into account the
gendereddivision of labor in the private.Similarly,women'streatmentunder
asylum laws, which generally deny refugee status to women fleeing sexual
persecution,is governedby the public-privatedivide. The struggleto control
the meaning and positioning of that divide is central to the projectof engenderingcitizenship,an insight that is usuallystill ignoredor discountedby many
male citizenship theorists. It is one of feminism'sachievements that it has
successfullychallenged the positioningof the divide in relationto a numberof
issuesand has, to some extent, underminedits power.
CONCLUSION:BEYONDDICHOTOMY
The subversionof the public-privatedivide, as it is conventionally understood, exemplifies the approachtaken in this article. From the meaning of
citizenship itself through our understandingof inclusion-exclusion and the
relationshipbetween universalismand difference to some of the theoretical
dilemmasthat have faced feminism,I have attemptedto challenge the binary
thinking that all too often forcesourconceptualand political choices into rigid
and separatecompartments.Deconstructingthe dichotomyto revealhow each
side of a binary division implies and reflects the other is one of poststructuralism's
key tools. The binarythinking that it challenges has been one
of the linchpins of Westernthought since Aristotle and Plato-in contrastto
Ruth Lister
23
Easternthought, which has better understoodthe inter-relationshipsbetween

opposites.
Recent feminist diagnosesof binarythinking'sharmfuleffects highlight its
tendency to promote a logic of subordination,domination, and hierarchy,in
which one side of the binary line is valued at the expense of the other and
relations of exclusion are legitimated.Moreover,binarythinking encourages
essentialismand homogenization,the objectification of "the other,"and the
polarizationof debate, forcing what may be inappropriateeither-orchoices,
and therebydistortingthe untidy realitiesof human experience.
It is, of course, easier to state the problemswith dualistic thinking than to
find a way to move beyond it. The identification of the false dichotomies
characteristicof orthodox, masculineWesternthought can all too easily slip
into a simple reversalof the value attached to the two sides of the binary
divide. While this may be a stage we have to go through,the challenge is to
avoid stalling at the point of substitution of one subordinatedcategory for
another. The approachadopted in this essay has attempted to embrace the
dialectical relationshipbetween the two sides of each of a numberof theoretical divides.Througha processof subversionand criticalsynthesis,the aim has
been to reconstructcitizenshipalong pluralistratherthan dualistlines.
The starting point was to conceptualize citizenship as both status and
practice,with the two elements interactingin a dynamicrelationshipthrough
the notion of human agency.The reinterpretationof the two traditionsfrom
which citizenship as status and practice derives has been informed by the
principleof inclusiveness.This principlewas then appliedto the operationof
citizenship both across and within nation-states. For the former,it pointed
toward the possibilities of global constructions of citizenship as part of a
multilayered,internationalistconceptualizationthat loosens citizenship'sties
with the nation-stateand begins to addressthe exclusionarypowersof nationstates,drawingalso on the discourseof humanrights.Within nation-states,the
principleof a differentiateduniversalismwas suggestedas a means of embracing the tension between differenceand the (false,exclusive) universalismthat
standsat the heart of citizenship.This was then appliedto citizenshipboth as
a practice and a status through a discussion of a politics of solidarity in
difference or transversaldialogue, and the particularizingof rights while
maintaining the principlesof universalismand equality.
These generalbuildingblocksprovidedthe foundationfor tacklingthe more
specific question of women'sclaims to citizenship.The principleof differentiated universalismwas appliedto a numberof key debatesin feminist theory in
an attempt to move beyond the binary divides which so often trap us into
either a gender-neutralor a gender-differentiatedmodel of citizenship,neither
of which is satisfactoryon its own. Thus, I have arguedthat it is not a question
of having to opt for a claim to full citizenshipbasedon eitherwomen'sequality
with or difference from men, inspired by an ethic of eitherjustice or care;
24
Hypatia
premisedon an ideal of eitherthe independent or interdependentcitizen. In

this way,the challenge to binarythinking has providedthe putty that cements
the buildingblocks together.
Reconstructedalong feminist and radicalpluralistlines, citizenshipprovides
a theoretical tool that contributesto the analysisof the structuralconstraints
that continue to face women in their diversity, without denying women's
agency.As an inspirationand a yardstick,it also offersa political tool. What
is still missing is the question of power, which has been more implicit than
explicit in my account but which has to be broughtback into the equation, if
feminist citizenshiptheory is to be of value to a feminist citizenshippraxis.
NOTES
1. My conceptualizationof human agency is influencedby Gould and her articulation of the actions and choices of autonomousactorsas a processof self-development:
"of concretely becoming the person one chooses to be through carryingout those
actions that expressone's purposesand needs" (1988, 47). Her conception of human
agency locates it both in a dialectical relationshipwith social structuresand as embedded in social relations.
2. The question of those whose capacity to exercise citizenship obligations and
rightsis impairedis raisedby Bulmerand Rees (1996) and Meekoshaand Dowse (1997).
3. The commission,which reportedin 1995, was chairedby the prime ministerof
Sweden and the formersecretarygeneralof the BritishCommonwealth.Itsmembership
includeda formerpresidentof the WorldBank.
4. Relevant too are attempts to reconcile the insights of post-modernismwith a
clear anti-oppressivemoralstandpointthroughthe vehicle of a theory of social justice.
See Flax (1992); Squires(1993); and Fraser(1995).
5. The Opsahl Commission, of which I was a member, was an independent
commissionon the futureof Norther Ireland.Itsreport,basedon evidence fromabout
three thousandpeople, was publishedas Pollak (1993).
6. The notion of transculturalismwas suggestedby Philomena Essedat a seminar
on citizenshipand peace, held in Cork, the Republicof Ireland,November 1995.
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Dialectics of Citizenship

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Hypatia, Inc.

Elementscomprisinga set of buildingblocksfor a feministreconstructionof

Feminist citizenship theorists face a dual question: whether a concept

ments in detail here (see Lister 1998), it is possible to develop a model of

Today,the gendereddivision of domestic labor and time similarlyprivileges

larlyimportantin challenging the constructionof women (not least, minority

This reinterpretationof the two citizenshiptraditionshas been informedby

on the responsibilitiesof the moreaffluentnation-statestowardthose that lack

the principleof non-discrimination.The notion of globalgovernancehas been

Within nation-states, the exclusion of women has been pivotal to the

women, in their diversity,sharea citizenshipstatuswhich is, at best, marginal,

suggests, is more compatible with modem democratic pluralism than the

is possible.To take just two fromconflict areas:duringthe periodof transition

conceptualization of citizenship rights without sacrificing the principle of

The second approach,advocatedby David Taylor(1989, 27), is to anchor

The principleof differentiateduniversalismcan also be appliedto the terms

The alternativeof a gender-differentiatedcitizenshipis no less problematic.

1991; Bock and James 1992; Fraser 1996). Increasingly,the dichotomous

is built on their freedomfromthe caringresponsibilitiesthat in turn constrain

and its relationshipto patternsof power;or put anotherway,to disconnect care

women'sautonomyor the inequalitiesof power that characterizerelationships

Easternthought, which has better understoodthe inter-relationshipsbetween

premisedon an ideal of eitherthe independent or interdependentcitizen. In

Castles, Stephen. 1994. Democracyand multi-culturalcitizenship.Australiandebates

Marshall,T.H. 1950. Citizenshipand social class. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity

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