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Aneient Philosophy 5
Mathesis Publications, Inc.

The Political Intention of Aristotle's Moral Philosophy

P.A. Vander Waerdt

Aristotle's moral philosophy forms part of his comprehensive political science

(1tOAL'tLX1}), but contemporary scholars have generally neglected the relation of his ethical

writings to the Polities. Richard Bodes' purpose in his important study, Le philosophe
et la eite, is to restore Aristotle's moral philosophy to the political framework in which
it was conceived and presented. He refutes the widely if often tacitly held assumption
that Aristotle's ethical works expound an 'autonomous moral science' (Gauthier and
Jolif 1959, ii:1, 1-2, 10-12), and he argues that the purpose ofpolitical science is practical rather than theoretical: to provide the actual or potential statesman with the training
in legislative science (cpPOV1}<lLt; VO~08&'tLX1}) necessary to legislate weH. The account
of legislation and forms of regime provided in the Polities, Bodes argues, is intended
to enable the statesman to put the teaching on human eudaimonia advanced in the
Nieomaehean Ethies into effect. This thesis is certainly correct, being supported as
it is by extensive and unambiguous evidence, but it is not so original as Bodes claims,
for he unfortunately has overlooked the two most important previous discussions of
the subject (Trepanier 1963, Cashdollar 1973; also Flashar 1971, Koumakis 1979), each
of which anticipates his thesis. But Bodes' study is the most comprehensive to date,
and his iHuminating and detailed examination ofthe evidence is particularly welcome
in view of the failure of much contemporary scholarship to understand the political
intention of Aristotle's moral philosophy.
Bodes' argument divides into an introduction, five chapters and a conclusion. Taking
as his starting-point the programmatic introduction of the EN in which Aristotle designates his inquiry as a sort of political science {1tOAL'tLX1} 'tLt;, 1094b11), explains why
youths are not proper auditors of political science (1095a2-3), and specifies the proper
methodology for inquiry into this subject (1095a30-b8), Bodes assembles a wide variety of evidence in his first chapter concerning the common design of the EN and Polities. He adduces particularly the ancient view that Aristotle's inquiry into character
('t1X ~81}) is the first component of political science, the lack of any reference in the
Corpus Aristotelieum to 1}8LX1} or 1}8LX1} l1tL<l'tTt~1}, and Aristotle's consistent designation of the doctrine of the ethical writings as political science. In his second chapter
Bodes considers the statesman's role by way of a detailed analysis of EN x 9. He
argues that legislative science regulates moral education not only for the city but for
households and cities as weH; that this science, which enables one to turn others toward

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virtue, is found not among the sophists or politicians, but in Aristotle' s teaching on
political science. The statesman once properly educated serves as the apxt'tEx'tWV who
lays down the end in accordance with which his fellow-citizens are educated. In his
third chapter, apparently responding to Jaeger, Bodes forestalls the objection that
Aristotle' s conception of his inquiry into 'ta ~91l as political science is a Platonizing
stage of his thought later superseded in a development from a 'morale politique' to
a 'morale individuelle' by arguing that the Eudemian Ethics presupposes an identical
doctrine of political science (1236b39-1237a3), that connexions between EN x 9 and
various texts such as Politics vii-viii sometimes considered 'early' are to be explained
by their common intention, and that the EN represents the final stage of Aristotle's
thinking on political science. In his last two chapters Bodes reviews the evidence
for the originally oral character of the treatises, arguing that the EN differs from the
EE in being intended for an audience larger than Aristotle's school, and then considers in detail the character expected of this audience. In abrief conclusion, Bodes
maintains that the statesman must always legislate in conformity with the regime in
force, even if it promotes inferior ends: bis knowledge of 'questions ethiques' is intended
merely to correet imperfeetions in a regime' s system of law, not to promote ends higher
than the regime' s.
Much in these chapters beyond Bodes' general thesis commands assent. I am not
persuaded, however, that he has explained the intention informing Aristotle' s presentation of political science successfully, and in this discussion I should like to consider
some difficulties in his interpretation. In the first place, one cannot understand this
intention without settling the complex problems concerning the relation of the two
ethical writings to the Politics, but Bodes does not even consider whether the extant
Politics conforms to the program of political science announced in the EN, and his
evasion of the philological issues at stake leads hirn to misunderstand its structure
and philosophical motivation. Second, Bodes fails to recognize, much less explain,
the perplexing manner of Aristotle'sexposition of political science in the EN and Politics, the first of which is designated 1tOAt'ttX~ 'ttt; but which somehow abstracts from
all of the considerations such as the regime and its laws and customs which in practice, Aristotle holds, govern the individual's education, and the second of which-in
its extant form-contains no thematic account or synthesis of how the teaching on
moral education in the ethical writings is to be related to the various forms 'of regime
and their divergent educational programs. So long, however, as the philosophical motivation for this procedure and the doctrinal incompleteness of the teaching on virtue
and education in the EN remain unexplained, most scholars will continue to treat the
ethical works as expounding an 'autonomous moral science' even though, as Bodes
rightly argues, this assumption is untenable. Third, Bodes' interpretation of how to
square the account of the moral education of individuals in the ethical writings with
the doctrine that their education must conform to the regime in force is mistaken,
and consequently he misunderstands Aristotle' s thinking on education, the role of the
statesman in educating his fellow-citizens, and Aristotle' s intention in educating the
statesman. Fourth, Bodes' attempt to relate the EN and Politics as end to means,
the one providing the statesman with knowledge of 'le bien humain (ordre de la fin)'
and the other knowledge of 'les regimes constitutionnels (ordre des moyens)' is unsatis-

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factory: the statesman hardly uses his knowledge of legislation simply as the means \
to attain ends fixed by his knowledge of 'questions ethiques', for he legislates, in the
first instance, in accord with the ends promoted by his city's regime, and it is only
through the double teleology which underlies the program of political science elaborated in iv 1 that one can understand how the statesman in legislating is to make use
of the teaching of the ethical writings.
In the space here allowed it is impossible to settle these complex issues. What follows is of necessity only a small selection, but I believe a fair on~, of the criticism
suggested by reflection upon Bodes' arguments. Since much of what I shall say is
critical, let me emphasize that I consider Le philosophe et La cite an important contribution, and my criticism is intended as areturn for all I have learned from pondering
it and as astimulus for further investigation.
Bodes' assumption that the EN and Politics in their extant form represent a unified exposition of Aristotle' s teaching on political science requires reconsideration.
The Politics as we have it: (a) quotes the EE, not the EN; (b) it diverges significantly
from the investigation announced in EN x 9; and (c) it is incomplete: it lacks Aristotle' s promised 'discourses on the regimes' in which he will have explained a host
of central issues bearing on 'les rapports entre morale et politique'. One cannot grasp
the structure and intention of Aristotle's work without understanding these facts.
(a) Bodes never mentions the important fact that all citations of the ~atXot AOIOt
in the Politics (126la30, 1280al8, 1282b20, 1295a36, 1332a8, 1332a22; cf. Meta. 981b25)
refer to the EE and the common books (which Bodes considers Eudemian) rather
than the EN (cf. Jaeger 1923, 297-299; Dirlmeier 1962, 111-115; Kenny 1978, 5-8).
This fact alone refutes Bodes' assumption that the EN and Politics were planned as
a unit. If the Politics cites the EE because it was written before the EN, which is the
best solution (contra Kenny 1978, 224-229), the priority ofthe Politics to the EN may
prove important. For although the EE is also an inquiry into political science, it is
not explicitly conceived as part of a larger enterprise, and consequently a Politics written
as its complement may not fulfill the program of political science outlined in the EN.
(Bodes is certainly wrong to assert that the EE 'ne se presente pas clairement, ni
dans son introduction, ni nulle part ailleurs, comme une enquete politique ou destinee
au politique' [133], for Aristotle plainly addresses his inquiry to the statesman
[1216b35-39, accepting Richards' 't~ 1tOAt'ttX~], and 1216b26-1217aI8 in fact explains
the method which must be followed to bring about the conjunction between what is
good in itself and what is good for oneself which it is the purpose of political science
to produce [1236b39-1237a3]; cf. 1216al0-37 with 1153b7-25, 1214a30-b5, 1215bl-5;
1216bI8-25 with EN 1112bll-14; 1218a33-35; 1218bll-16 with 1141b21-1142al1; 1234b22-23;
and, in the common books, 1130b25-29 with 1276bI6-1277b32; 1137bI7-24; 1152bl-5).
At the least, as we shall see shortly, the extant Politics does not fully embody the
investigation into legislation and the forms of regime which, Aristotle says, is necessary to complete his 'philosophy concerning human affairs' (1181b12-24). Perhaps
Bodes should not be criticized for neglecting the close doctrinal and terminological
connexions between the EE and Politics ii, vii-viii (cf. Bendixen 1856, 578-581;
Dirlmeier 1962, 112), which deserve serious study, since one could weIl conclude that
the divergence between the program of the EN and the extant Politics i~ not matched

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by doctrinal divergence (so, e.g., Rowe 1977). But one must consider how weIl the
extant Politics fulfills the program of the EN to understand the plan and intention of
Aristotle' sexposition of political science.
(b) It is generally agreed that the outline at EN 1181b12-24 does not introduce the
extant Politics. It alludes only to books ii (bI5-17), v-vi (bI7-20; cf. 1289b23-26,
1301aI9-25, 1316b31-36) and vii-viii (b20-21). Moreover, the further investigation of
how each ofthe regimes is ordered and what laws and customs it uses (b22) is absent
from our Politics. This fact is of great importance, for the emphasis on legislation
throughout EN x 9 does not square weIl with the character of our Politics, which investigates the regimes and does not-as is plain from the programmatic remarks at the
beginning of books ii-viii-provide the account of legislation which Aristotle says is
necessary to bring his inquiry to completion. Bodes admits in passing (96) that
1181b12-24 does not introduce the extant Politics but does not grasp the significance
of this fact. The discrepancy usually has been explained away in one of two ways.
The first is exemplified by Bodes' subsequent attempt (l983b) to argue that Aristotle
did not really mean to undertake the investigation he here outlines. The second is to
declare 1181b12-24 spurious, a solution with a long history none of the examples of
which, including the recent attribution of this passage to Theophrastus (Lord 1981b,
472-474), is at all convincing. Both approaches are misguided. There nlay be room
for legitimate disagreement over how much revision Aristotle intended for the
Nicomachean version of the Polities, but its internal evidence proves beyond doubt
that EN 1181b12-24 is genuine and accurately reflects his intention for its revision.
Above all, the promised account of how each of the regimes is ordered and which
laws and customs it uses is paralleled by several unfulfilled forward references which
show that Aristotle planned to complete his Polities with an account of legislation,
considered in light of the various forms of regime which lay down the end to which
the laws are directed-precisely the investigation promised in EN x 9. Thus Aristotle
dismisses at the first stage in his argument a discussion of whether it is expedient
for a general to hold office for life on the ground that this is more the form of inquiry
into laws than into the regime (1286a2-7); at a later stage, when the forms of regime
have been investigated, Aristotle will consider their laws. This interpretation is confirmed by his programmatic statement in Polities iv 1 that the statesman, in order to
aid existing regimes, must know not only the various forms of regime but also which
laws are suited to which regime; the laws are laid down to suit the regime, and hence
the statesman must first have a general knowledge of the regimes if he is to legislate
weIl (1289a5-25). This passage explains why the inquiry into legislation called for
in EN x 9 necessarily entails the general inquiry into regimes to which the extant Polities is devoted, as weIl as why that inquiry must precede the one into legislation
(1181b12-15); and EN 1181b22 together with the evidence just mentioned as weIl as unfulfilled forward references in books iv (1300b5-9) and vi (1316b40-1317al)-hence iv and
vi cannot be taken as the promised inquiry into legislation-demonstrate conclusively
that Aristotle planned to follow his inquiry into the various regimes, which culminates
in the account of the best regime in books vii-viii, with one into the laws appropriate
not only to the best regime but to the others as weIl (cf. also Rhet. 1366aI9-22, which
may refer to a discussion more extensive than that of our Polities). So 1181b12-24 together

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with the unfulfl1led forward references in the Politics are evidence of Aristotle' s intention to revise the Politics into the work on legislation and the forms of regime called
for in EN x 9.
(c) The unfulfilled forward references in the Politics (cf. Stocks 1927, 180-183) are
crucial for the interpretation of its argument, for they show that Aristotle planned to
fulfill his promise to reconsider not only his account of the moral education of members of the household (1260b8-20), but also the educational programs appropriate to
the various regimes (cf. 1337aI4-18, 1335b2-5, 1336b24-27, 1338a32-36, 1339bl0-ll,
1341b38-40), and the contents of book 1 generally, including (natural?) slavery
(1330a25-33; cf. 1264a34-36, 1285aI9-22; [Ps.-Ar.] Oec. 1334a23-b22) and acquisition (1326b30-39; cf. 1280a22-128la8). In these 'discourses on the regimes' (1260b8-20),
Aristotle planned to reconsider legislation in light of the different forms of regime
and different natural characters of their citizen bodies, and thereby to fulfill the promise of EN 1181b22 to explain the laws and customs appropriate to each form of regime.
Explanation of the philosophical issues at stake in this reconsideration is complex and
must await another occasion, but these 'discourses on the regimes' obviously provide
the key to the relation between the account of moral education in the ethical writings
and the divergent educational programs which promote the divergent ends of the various forms of regime.
Bodes' neglect of these fundamental issues is unfortunate. His failure to understand the structure of political science prevents hirn from considering the doctrinal
issues at stake within Aristotle' s own framework, with some serious consequences
for the philosophical interpretation. In a volume whose main purpose is to show that
the EN and Politics together are intended to provide the statesman with the knowledge
necessary to legislate weIl, Bodes does not even recognize that the discussion of legislation which Aristotle says is necessary to complete his education does not appear
in the extant Politics. His failure to see that Aristotle planned in the 'discourses on
the regimes' to reconsider education in light of the divergent ends promoted by the
various forms of regime results in misunderstanding. How is the account in the ethical writings of the moral education of individuals related to the doctrine that their
education must conform to the regime in force? Bodes thinks that the statesman uses
knowledge of 'questions ethiques' merely to correct deficiencies in the laws and educational programs which promote a regime' s ends, not to improve those ends, but this
view is untenable: first, it is not any 'connaissance des questions ethiques' which enables astatesman to correct a deficient educational program, but rather practical wisdom (cpp6vl1aL~) concerning the regimes and their laws (1289a5-25); and second, in
legislating the statesman seeks to turn the city to the good life even as he seeks to
preserve its form of regime (see pp. 86-88 below). Bodes recognizes that the statesman must establish an educational program which corresponds to his city' s form of
regime and not merely imitate that elaborated for the best regime in books 7 and 8,
and his insistence that education can only be understood in light of the form of regime
which necessarily informs it provides a welcome corrective to the fashionable but misguided practice (e.g., in the 'synoptic' account of Burnyeat 1980) of ignoring the fact
that education always takes place in regimes which promote particular and varying
ends. But to the crucial question of why Aristotle in his ethical works chose to give

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an account of education which abstracts from the dependence of virtue upon the form
of regime governing the individual's education Bodes provides no answer and so
fails to explain their doctrinal incompleteness.
To understand the reason for Aristotle' s procedure one must consider his introduction of 6Ull6~ (spiritedness) in the political psychology of Politics vii 7 as a fundamental criterion in distinguishing the natural characters of various peoples and their
corresponding capacity for political freedom. Here he specifies the natural qualities
the citizens of the best regime must possess to follow its educational program and
way of life:
Clearly those who are to be readily guided to virtue by the legislator should be both endowed with thought (OLCtV01}'tLXOU~) and spirited
(6UllOE.LOE.L~) in their nature. (1327b36-38; cf. 1332b8-10, 1334b7-8)
In his ethical writings Aristotle does not explain how 6Ull6~ is a necessary precondition for education in virtue, and the complex question of the relation between the moral
psychology of the ethical writings, the political psychology of vii 7 and the theoretical
psychology of the De Anima must await another occasion. But the natural differences
among various peoples that Aristotle sketches in vii 7 considerably complicates his
exposition of political science: since different peoples possess different natural characters (they may lack 6Ull6~ or OLcXVOLCt or both) , there are correspondingly different forms
of regime and educational programs to promote the different ways of life of which
they are capable. Hence, in presenting his teaching on political science, Aristotle must
avoid making his account of the individual' s moral education dependent upon the ends
and educational progranl of any particular regime, in order to take into account the
variety of regimes in which education takes place. It is this problem, 1 take it, that
motivates the plan Aristotle adopts for his exposition of political science.
To consider this problem properly one would have to give more thought than Bodes
apparently has done to the difficulties Aristotle faced in presenting his teaching on
political science. In the first place, political science has three components-that which
studies the individual, the household, and the city-each of which Aristotle found
necessary to treat in partial independence from the others. In his extant writings Aristotle does not explain how these components of political science are related to each other,
although EE 1218b12-16 is suggestive:
So that the good itself would be this-the end of the goods prac.ticable for man. And this is the good that comes under the supreme
of all the practical sciences, which is political science and economics
and practical wisdom; for these states differ from the others in the
fact that they are supreme (whether they differ at all from one
another must be discussed later on).
I take it that the peculiar phrasing of b13-14 is intended to suggest that a single science,
political science, is architectonic over the goods practicable for man, but that this science
divides into three components, each of which is also supreme in its own sphere ('tOLCt'tCtL
[bI5] refers back to U1tO 't~v XUPLCtV [bI3]; cf. 1141b21-1142all); so this passage shows
pace Bodes 83-84) that Aristotle uses the term 1tOAL'tLX1l both to refer to the unified
science as a whole and to that part concemed more stricdy with the city. On 1218b12-16
Bodes comments 'cette distinction d' apparence rigoreuse s'estompe considerable-

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ment dans la rt~alite concrete, du fait que tou individu, malgre son autonomie, vit dans
une familIe et dans une Cite, et que toute familIe, malgre son autonomie, fait partie
d'une Cite' (127). Of course this is true: the fact that men have families and live in
cities makes the distinction between practical wisdom, economies, and political science
artificial. But.this fact only illustrates the difficulties Aristotle faced in presenting his
teaching on political science. He holds that the individual's education depends upon
the form of his regime which in turn, however, depends upon the natural character
of the citizen body; and, as the ethnology of vii 7 clearly shows, the conjunction of
9u1l6~ and 8LcXVOLCX in the citizen body of the best regime, which is the necessary precondition for its way of life (dedicated to philosophy [cf. Lord 1982, 196-202; Vander
Waerdt 1985b]), does not characterize all peoples or even all Greek peoples. How
then is Aristotle to present a teaching on the moral education of the individual which
takes into account variety of regimes in which that education occurs?
However one explains the relation between Aristotle's moral and political
psychology-i.e., whatever the precise role of aU1l6~ in education-, any account of
education which abstracts from the forms of regime and their corresponding ends,
laws and educational programs clearly is incomplete, and thus the account of virtue
and education in the EN is incomplete. But this incompleteness was unavoidable in
Aristotle's presentation of political science. Different peoples have different natural
characters, and consequently different forms of regime and educational programs are
suitable to different peoples. But the individual's education is decisively informed
by the ends promoted by his city's regime. Hence one might expect Aristotle to treat
the various forms of regime before considering the individual's education. But Aristotle
could hardly have considered the various regimes without first considering the best
regime, from which the others in some sense are deviations. To present his teaching
on political science in this order, however, he would have had to consider the best
regime' s way of life before he had considered the best way of life of the individual.
But he holds that one's view of the best way of life for the city as a whole derives
from a view of the best way of life for the individual (cf. 1323a14-21, 1324a5-13 and
vii 1-3 generally). So Aristotle had to treat the individual's eudaimonia before considering the various regimes; he had to treat education in abstraction from the regimes
and then reconsider it- in his promised 'discourses on the regimes'- in light of the
various forms of regime and the natural character of the citizen bodies appropriate
to each. His account of moral education in the EN abstracts from the forms of regime
and from the natural role of aU1l6~ in education-from the political face of virtue, as
it were-and hence is intentionally incomplete; but the evidence cited above shows
that Aristotle planned in his 'discourses on the regimes' (1260b8-20) to reconsider
the virtue and education of members of the household in light of the different ends
promoted by the various forms of regime. In this reconsideration he will have related
his various accounts of virtue and education and thereby revealed the unity of political science as a whole.
These comments concerning the philosophieal motivation of Aristotle's presentation of political science have the merit of explaining its structure as attested by the
evidence collected above and of suggesting how the doctrinal teaching of the EN on
virtue and education is fundamentally incomplete without the reconsideration sup-

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plied by the Politics. Both points are essential if one is to recognize that Aristotle' s
conception of the inquiry of the EN as political science shapes not merely his presentation but his doctrine as weIl. In failing even to raise the question of how the teaching
of the EN is incomplete without the Politics Bodes robs himself of the strongest evidence against the notion that Aristotle' s moral philosophy represents an 'autonomous
moral science'.
Bodes relates the EN to the Politics as end to means in Aristotle' s doctrine of practical wisdom, claiming that the former provides the statesman with knowledge of 'le
bien humain (ordre de la fin)' and the latter with knowledge of 'les regimes constitutionnels (ordre des moyens)' (79-80, 118-121, 221-225). Of course the statesman's view
concerning the best way of life for his city will depend upon his view of the best way
of life for the individual (cf. vii 1-3). But he certainly does not use his knowledge
of legislation simply as the means to attain the end fixed by his knowledge of the human
good, for he legislates, in the first instance, in conformity to the ends promoted by
his city's regime (the full significance of this point would be clearer if we 'possessed
the 'discourses on the regimes'). In fact, Bodes does not seem to have formulated
cogently the problem at stake: how will the statesman use his knowledge ofthe eudaimonia of the individual in laying down laws to foster eudaimonia in the city? What
use will he make of the teaching of the ethical writings?
In a proper investigation one would have to consider the relation between the virtues and the various regimes, that is, the particular character each regime promotes
(cf. Rhet. 1365b21-1366a16; Pol. 1310a12-18, 1337a14-18; 1309a36-39, 1276b30-33,
1284a1), as weIl as the double teleology whereby the statesman in preserving a regime
also seeks to turn it toward the good life (see pp. 86-88 below). But to refute Bodes'
end-means model it suffices to raise the question of the relation between the best way
of life for the individual and for the city: if the city is capable only of an analogue
of the highest activity of the individual (cpLAoaocp(cx 9E.Wp'Y}'tLxr)), then the best way of
life for the city and individual will diverge, and even in the case of the best regime
the statesman will not simply attempt to establish the best way of life for the individual;
in the case of inferior regimes, obviously, the question of how the statesman will employ
his knowledge of the ethical writings is even more complex. Bodes wholly assimilates Aristotle' s inquiry into character to political science, denying it any autonomy
at all; thus in attempting to demonstrate the 'caractere politique de I' entreprise' of
the EN (80-92) he claims, for example, that 'la eite n'est pas une idee, mais une realite, a laquelle on doit assimiler le bien de tous et de chacun' (89) or 'meme dans
ce qu' il a de moins politique-et de plus noble-a savoir son intelligence contemplative, l'homme reste encore resolument tributaire de la politique' (88). These are typical examples of a tendency which culminates in the radical identification of moral
virtue with citizen virtue (224). Bodes can hold such views only by consistently disregarding the tension between the city and man which necessarily arises from the fact
that man' s highest end and perfection lies in the non- or trans-political activity of
theoretical contemplation (cf. Strauss 1964, 25-29, 49). He might have avoided these
errors had he considered how the statesman will be guided in legislating in the best
regime. Does the philosophy to which it is dedicated coincide with that of the individual
described in EN x?

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Bodes assumes them to be identical (e.g., 88n47, 137n1, 224), although it is difficult to believe that he has given the matter serious thought. This misunderstanding
would have been avoided had he read Lord's cogent demonstration that the account
of the best way of life for the individual and city in Politics vii 1-3 abstracts from
the question of the best way of life for the individual, the philosophicallife, and deals
with it only in relation to the question of the best way of life for the city (see Lord
1978; Vander Waerdt 1985b). The city is capable only of an analogue of the best way
of life of the individual, for the philosophy to which the best regime devotes itself
is not theoretical contemplation but rather the leisured culture which constitutes the
closest approximation to the philosophical life possible on the level of politics.
If it be true that the best way of life possible for the city and individual diverge,
it is difficult to resist the conclusion that each of the components of political sciencepractical wisdom, economies, and political science-is partially autonomous or sovereign in its own sphere: the prudent household manager will not necessarily be a good
statesman, as Aristotle argues in book 1 against the identification of the forms of rulership with one another by Plato (Polit. 258e-26Oe; cf. 292c-293a, 300c-301b) and Xenophon (Mem. iii.4.12, iii.6.14), although by acquiring legislative practical wisdom he
may become like Pericles, skilled in managing his own affairs as weIl as those of the
household and city (cf. 1140b8-11, 1142a7-10). Bodes has overlooked the partial autonomy of an investigation into political matters from one into character because he has
failed to think through what is at stake in the transition of EN x 9. To explain the
intention informing Aristotle' s presentation of political science one would have to
explain why Aristotle had to treat the individual, the household and the city independently of and in partial abstraction from one another, but Bodes seems content to
argue that the EN is a political inquiry without ever seriously considering why Aristotle
chose to present his teaching on political science in separate treatises and what principles unify his exposition of the three components of political science. Consequently
he never makes tolerably clear the precise sense in which the ethical writings are a
political inquiry.
In his survey of the ancient evidence, Bodes argues convincingly that the assumption underlying Andronicus' constitution of the Corpus, that Aristotle intended to
elaborate a complete philosophical system the constituent sciences of which would
correspond to his treatises, is mistaken and that many of the interpretive terms and
categories popularized by the ancient commentators involve serious misunderstanding of Aristotle' s doctrine. (Lord 1986 argues [against Bodes 1973 inter alios] that
the early Peripatetics rather than Andronicus played the decisive role in the consitution ofthe Corpus; but Andronicus' position in any event is revealing ofthe scholarly
tradition generally.) Yet Bodes' account of their interpretation of political science
goes no further than to observe that the ancients considered the logically anterior inquiry
concerning character to form a unity with the logically posterior inquiry concerning
regimes, and in some cases it would have been more illuminating had Bodes considered what might be learned from the ancients' views rather than simply used them
as a foil. Moreover, by failing even to raise the question of when the notion of an
'autonomous moral science' did arise in Peripatetic philosophy Bodes obscures the
historical background of the later tradition. The early Peripatetic author of the Magna

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Moralia, who frequently defends the framework of Aristotelian doctrine the philosophieal motivation of whieh no longer is understood (cf. Vander Waerdt 1985a), begins
his work by promising to speak U1ttp ~9LXWV, and insists ~hat ~ 1tEpt 'tcX ~9T} 1tPrti'llrt'tdrt
is not apart of politieal seienee (1181a25-1182al; pace Bodes 84n27 this is not a response
to the Stoies), taking far more pains than Aristotle hirnself to impress upon his audienee
that his subjeet is politieal seienee (cf. 1182bl-6, Tl-32; 1183a3-5, 21-24, 33-35;
1197b28-29); but his interpretation of the politieal intention of moral philosophy is'
unparalleled in the Corpus and obviously is motivated by desire to save Aristotle's
designation of his inquiry as politieal seience. Apparently Aristotle' s presentation of
politieal seienee in separate treatises led even the earliest Peripateties to isolate the
doetrine of the ethieal writings from politieal seienee as a whole; and subsequent eommentators, unable to draw upon a eorreet Peripatetie interpretation of politieal seience,
eould only advanee interpretations of their own whieh have no more authority than
modern ones.
To support his view that Aristotle' s writings on politieal seienee are intended as
a praetieal eontribution to the statesman's edueation, Bodes maintains that they are
exereises in 'seienee pratique' whieh have action rather than theoretieal knowledge
as their end (16, 47-51, 57-59, 77, 92, 96), even though he realizes that Aristotle never
designates the subjeet-matter of politieal seienee as 1tprtX'tLXi} l1tLa't~llT}. Bodes does
not seem to me even to have elearly formulated the question of the theoretieal status
of politieal seience, for he assurnes rather than establishes bis diehotomy between 'ecrits
pratiques' and 'theoretiques' (58), and he strangely attempts to settle the question
through an extended digression on praetieal wisdom, a procedure whieh begs the question and ignores the relevant textual evidenee. To make his argument eogent, Bodes
would have to analyze Aristotle's use of the division between theoretieal, praetieal,
and produetive seiences in his writings on politieal seience; but EE 1214a9-15 (cf. Woods
1982, 199) shows at onee that politieal seienee involves theoretieal philosophy, whieh
Aristotle' s dialeetieal method-a refinement of the tVOO~rt of the many and the learned
whieh eonsiders human affairs by aseending from what is known to his audienee to
what is knowable simply (cf. EN 1095a31-b4, 1098a34-b8, 1145bl-7; EE 1214b28-1215al0,
121626-39, 1217aI8-21, 1220aI5-22; Anal. Post. 71b33-12a5; Jaffa 1952, Irwin 1981)enables hirn to ineorporate into his inquiry whenever appropriate. Moreover, the
methodologieal refleetions of 1216b3-1217a18 show elearly that knowledge ofthe theoretieal seiences, although an end Xrt't' rtu'to, may be useful Xrt'tcX aUllET}XOC; (bI5-17),
and that one of the tasks of the statesman is to be a good judge of when 9Ewptrt is
relevant, i.e., of when it is useful Xrt'tcX aUllET}XOC; and when not (1216b35-1217a7).
So even if Bodes is eorreet in holding that the purpose of politieal seienee is solely
praetieal (but cf. Lord 1982, 30-33), theoretieal philosophy must play an integral role
in the statesman' s edueation.
The best part of Bodes' book is his detailed analysis of EN x 9, in whieh Aristotle
explains why the preeeding ten books must be supplemented by an inquiry into legislation and the forms of regime and which therefore, as Bodes reeognizes, is a key
to understanding his intention in edueating the statesman (for the eritique of sophistie
rhetorie here cf. Lord 1981a). Of partieular importanee is Bodes' eogent demonstration that legislative praetieal wisdom (cpPOvT}aLC; VOllo9E'tLXi}) regulates the edueation of

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individuals and families no less than the city as a whole (cf. 1180al-5, 30-34), for
this suggests that Aristotle' s teaching on political science is intended to enable an
individual to attain virtue for himself and his family even if his regime lacks a proper
system of public education. Unfortunately, however, in regard to the question of how
the statesman williegisiate in inferior regimes, Bodes strangely insists that 'il s'agit,
en I'occurrence, de remedier aux carences du legislateur et non d'edicter des regles
de conduite pretendument meilleures que les normes implicitement recommandees
par la legislation' (113n26). According to this view, with which Bodes concludes his
study (224), moral virtue is solely a function of citizen virtue and the statesman cannot foster virtue independently of the ends promoted by his particular regime. This
view cannot possibly be correct. It betrays fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of political science:
(a) The fact that a father by acquiring legislative practical wisdom thereby becomes
able to turn his children and friends toward virtue shows that, at least in the absence
of a uniform system of public education, the individual may foster moral virtue independently of his regime; there is no suggestion in EN x 9 that a father who lives in an
inferior regime should educate his children in accordance with its inferior ends, and
Aristotle's thematic account of the ends of education in Politics vii 12-13 shows Bodes'
view to be mistaken.
(b) 'The moral virtues cannot be understood as being for the sake of the city since
the city must he understood as heing for the sake of the practice of moral virtue' (Strauss
1964, Zl). The purpose ofthe city is not merely life, but the good life (cf. 1252b29-30,
lZl8bI9-30, 1280a25-1281al0; EN 1160all-30).
(c) Consequently, the statesman's aim is to study how every association may share
in the good life :
It belongs to the good legislator to inquire how a city, a family of
human beings and every other kind of association may share in the
good life and in the eudaimonia that is possible for them. (1325a7-10;
cf. 1333a33-39; EN 1099b30-32, 1103b2-6, 1113b21-26,
1129bI4-1130aI3)
(d) In doing so he will follow the principles of political science as elaborated in
iv 1, where Aristotle distinguishes four tasks for the statesman: to investigate, first,
the best regime where there are no external impediments; second, which regime is
best for which peoples-for which task the statesman will need to know both the best
regime and the best under given circumstances; third, the regime ex hypothesi, so
that he will be able to consider how a given regime could be brought into existence
and then preserved-e.g., in the case where a regime is inferior to the one practicable
under the circumstances; and fourth, the regime which is suited to most cities. In coming
to the aid of a city, whether to establish a new regime or to reform an existing one,
the statesman will be guided by the double teleology which underlies the program
of political science announced in iv 1: his minimal aim will be the regime's preservation, but his higher aim will be to turn it toward the good life and eudaimonia, so
much as circumstances permit. Perhaps the best illustration of this double teleology
is provided by Aristotle's discussion of the two ways of preserving tyranny in book
5: first, the tyrant may seek to humble his subjects, keeping them in mutual distrust

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and incapable of action-thus preserving his power but in no way falling short of wickedness (1313a24-1314a29); or he may attempt to make his rule kingly, goveming in
the interest of his citizens and protecting only his power-thus his rule will become
more honorable, it will endure longer, and his character will become nobly disposed
toward virtue or at least only half-base rather than base (1314b30-1315bl0). This second course of action shows how the tyrant's rule may be tumed toward virtue at the
same time as it is preserved, and the purpose of the statesman's architectonic science
is not merely to legislate in the interest of the regime in force, as Bodes concludes,
but to foster the good life and eudaimonia for others as far as possible through political virtue.
As the foregoing discussion will suggest, fundamental issues remain to be settled
before we may arrive at a satisfactory understanding of the plan and intention of Aristotle' s teaching on political science. But Bodes' work is the most important and original contribution to the study of Aristotle's moral philosophy in recent years, and
scholars would do well to give it careful consideration. *
Princeton University

* Constraints of space have forced me to shorten this discussion considerably, but a full statement of my
own position will appear elsewhere (l985c). I am deeply indebted to David O'Connor for much stimulating
discussion. I am grateful as well to Harold Chemiss, A.E. Raubitschek and Friedrich Solmsen for their
generous advice and encouragement, and to the National Endowment for the Humanities for its fellowship
support.
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