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Grisha's Radar «Fry-Off»

Air Power Australia - Australia's Independent Defence Think Tank

Air Power Australia NOTAM

13th April, 2008

Colonel of Aviation Grigoriy "Grisha" Medved

(retd)

Contacts: Dr Carlo Kopp Peter Goon

Mob: 0437-478-224 Mob: 0419-806-476

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Su-35 demonstrator w ith exposed I rbis-E phased array. T he now w ell established trend in
Russian sensors for BVR combat is increasing range performance and countermeasures
resistance. T he 20 kiloWatt peak pow er class I rbis E ESA radar is the most pow erful in its
class. (KnAAPO). [Click for more ...]

Good Friends,
Grisha has some new stories to tell. Two new radio locators [Ed: radars] to discuss. NIIR
Fazotron make Zhuk-AE for MiG-35, and plan much bigger Zhuk-ASE for Flankers, Tikhomirov
NIIP make IRBIS-E for Su-35BM. These are in English say 'very hot items' and performance
in these radio locators like best Amerikanski radio locators. Now we have fry-off contest to
see who does what to who – and first.
Make observation. To dazzle enemy, need three factors: power, antenna size and duty cycle.
Chuck often laugh at big Russki warplane, but as Comrade Stalin used to saying, ‘quantity
has a quality of its ow n.’ In these big FARs [Ed: FAR=ESA; AFAR=AESA radars] 'quantity of
channels has a quality of its ow n.’
This time, the 960 mm size of the Sukhoi antenna has many uses. More power, sharper
beam, more signal detect, more place to remove heat. Amerikanski AFAR modules now
better than Fazotron modules, but Russia catch soon. Sukhoi can take better AFAR modules
in IRBIS-E or ZHUK-ASE upgrade, but Super Hornet, Lightning II and Raptor cannot take
bigger antenna. Then Russki overpower Amerikanski stuff - zap Super Hornet, fry Lightning
II and even burn tail-feathers of Raptor.
So, how to use these new killer-watts and big antenna? Russian I nstitute of Radio Physics

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and Electronics says Zhuk-AE and IRBIS-E see Super Hornet outside AIM-120D range.
Lightning II only safe from head on and if clean – two Sukhois fly around Lightning II in
pincer manoeuvre to take side or rear shot. Sukhoi has choice of missiles – R-172, R-37, R-
27 and R-77M. RVV-AE-PD ready soon.
Here is Su-35 fight tactic. Detect APG-79 / APG-81 radio locator transmissions long way out
with Khibiny complex [Ed: Radio Frequency Surveillance (RFS) system] and big FAR antenna,
climb to 15,000 metres and Mach 1.5. W hen detect Super Hornet or Lightning II, fire salvo,
and turn 110 degrees while directing missiles to Amerikanski fighter. IRBIS-E has hydraulic
slew on antenna, so can retreat and still guide missiles. Give AIM-120D long chase – he
not catch Grisha.

Amerikanski think to use AFAR to blow up incoming missiles. Russian I nstitute of Radio
Physics and Electronics think of this too. Have upgrade kit for all new style Russki
missiles. Add protection to radio-locator inputs, and antenna servoes. Take old radio fuze
out and replace with laser fuze, cover hole with metal grid so no energy gets inside. Body
covered with special coating to spread radio waves and stop radio locator energy getting
inside to fry electronika.
Self guidance head [Ed:seeker] software upgrade tilt antenna reflection away from target so
use phase steering to track. Lot of SHF absorber material [Ed: RAM - radar absorbent
material] behind self guidance head. Some fancy shapes near rocket motor exhaust to
spread creeping radio location wave. This upgrade not cost much, but send reflection away
from target so missile get very close to target before detection, and make much harder to
kill with AFAR beam. Also, salvo firing force AFAR radio locator to jump beam between
incoming missiles.

Maybe Chuck not thinking of attack geometry. Grisha likes towed decoys – when missile
warning complex [Ed: MAW S] goes off, turn to put incoming missile 130 degrees off nose so
decoy masks aircraft. Amerikanski AFAR sweep 60-70 degrees off nose, so to fry missile,
Chuck must turn to face incoming. This time aircraft mask decoy. Not so good. I think Chuck
very brave or very stupid to rely on AFAR to blow up missiles. This tactic may blow up in his
face and cook his own pidgeon.
Of course, two can play the ‘fry the missile’ game. Su-35 has OLS-35 detector to see hot
missile incoming, so have two complex to find missile. Turn radio locator antenna on
incoming missile, so Snow Leopard can jump and fry its brain with 20 KiloWatts. New
Fazotron Zhuk-ASE AFAR even better. More kiloW atts so can fry more AIM-120D.
Maybe Chuck in Super Hornet or JSF with little AFAR antenna should think more about
warming Pizza than stopping our Vympels [Ed: Russian missile manufacturer].

Critical Analysis
Dr Carlo Kopp, SMAIAA, MIEEE, PEng

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 Editor APA

The notion of using a high power electronically steered radar to 'fry' the onboard electronics
of a guided missile is neither new nor particularly original. The idea emerged during the
1990s in the aftermath of the debate surrounding E-bombs and other electromagnetic
weapons. The essence of the concept is that modern missile seekers and guidance systems
are complex digital electronic devices which can suffer electronic upsets or even electrical
damage if exposed to microwave radiation of sufficiently high intensity.

The reasoning behind this regime of electronic attack is that rather than to deceive the
inbound missile as to the location of the target, i.e. defending aircraft, the target actively
defends itself by using the very high power rating of the radar and its exceptional
beamsteering agility - virtually identical for all electronically steered US AESAs and Russian
hybrid ESAs or AESAs - to illuminate the incoming missile and cause either an upset to its
guidance electronics or lethal electrical damage to its analogue and/or digital electronic
hardware.

The idea was so popular during this period that it spawned a specialised product, the
ground based Raytheon Vigilant Eagle, essentially a very large AESA radar intended to
protect airliners from shoulder launched missile attacks by illuminating them with an
microwave beam of very high power to cause electronics failures. There are however some
important differences between fighter borne AESA/ESA radars and the multiple square metre
array of the Vigilant Eagle system, primarily in the intensity of microwave illumination they
can produce.

To what extent are claims of using a fighter AESA radar as a microwave beam weapon to
electrically kill inbound missiles reasonable?

A senior US Air Force officer was quoted in the September 5, 2005, issue of Aviation Week &
Space Technology , thus: "AESA radars on fighter aircraft aren't particularly suited to create
w eapons effects on missiles because of limited antenna size, pow er and field of view ...".

This observation is entirely correct, for a number of good technical reasons. These all have
to do with how much microwave power is needed to disrupt or damage electronic
components versus how much power can be delivered by a fighter carried radar into the
target missile.

A number of studies have been performed in recent years to determine the electrical field
strengths needed to achieve disruptive and lethal effects against electronic equipment,
mostly in the context of High Power Microwave weapons such as E-bombs. The results are
essentially that electrically lethal effects are produced at field strengths of kiloVolts/metre,
and disruptive effects at hundreds of Volts/metre. These studies generally involved
commercial electronic equipment, rather than hardened military equipment, and usually
involved direct exposure of the equipment to microwave radiation.
If we plot the achievable field strength against distance, for a number of Russian phased
array radars, we get interesting results:

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Potentially lethal effects are produced only inside 100 metres range, and disruptive effects
at distances of the order of one kilometre. Radars with lesser power-aperture performance,
such as the APG-79 (Super Hornet) and APG-81 (JSF) would produce lesser effect at a given
distance. T his is contingent on the assumption that the internal electronics of the missile
are exposed to the full intensity of the impinging microw ave beam.

The latter is very optimistic for a variety of reasons. Microwave radiation can couple into a
missile via two paths.
1. Direct coupling occurs when an antenna is illuminated and becomes a path into the
internals of the missile. Typical air to air missiles have a nose mounted seeker antenna
pointing at the target, and if equipped with a radio or radar proximity fuse, side
mounted fuse antennas, and if the missile is built for beyond visual range combat, an
aft mounted datalink antenna.
2. Indirect coupling occurs when radiation enters the target via a path other than an
antenna, such as through a gap between panels or some other exposed area, such as
the bulkhead openings behind the missile's radome or infrared window.
Fighter radars largely operate in the X-band (~7 to 12 GHz). The most frequency agile
AESAs might be capable of covering most or all of this band, but no more. At the upper end
of the X-band, the physical spacing of antenna elements restricts how far the antenna can
be steered, and at the lower end of the band, the cutoff frequency of the individual
elements comes into play.

If the aim is to couple into the missile via its seeker antenna, this will only be feasible for
older semi-active homing missiles like the AIM-7 and R-27R series, which rely on
illumination by the launch aircraft and thus must operate in the same band as the radar
guiding the missile. Most active radar guided missile seekers operate in the Ku-Band or
above it, as a result of which most of the impinging X-band radiation will couple in very
poorly as the missile antenna is designed for half the wavelength, or less, compared to an
X-band radar. Another consideration is that many missile seekers in this class will include
active protection devices designed to protect the sensitive receiver circuits from leakage
from the missile's transmitter circuits. So what X-band radiation can get in via the antenna
is apt to be soaked up by the protection devices.

Radar fuses and datalink antennas are potentially more susceptible to penetration as they
are low gain designs which are inherently wideband, and likely to lack protection devices.
However, the fuse antennas point sideways relative to the target until the missile is within
milliseconds of impact, and the datalink antenna is always pointing away from the target.
Therefore the combination of antenna location and low gain makes them poor candidates for
delivering a lethal dose of X-band radiation. The electronic warfare literature is very specific
about the challenges in jamming these channels, as exceptionally high power is required for
effect. Microwave lethal effect requires even more power.

Indirect coupling via cables and through hole apertures behind an antenna or infrared seeker

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 head, or via the missile umbilical connector on its back should also be considered, as these
are the only other apertures usually available on an air to air missile.

The former might be feasible if the missile designers did not take care to put protection
devices and proper shielding in. If the drive transistor on the antenna gimbal servo melts,
the missile will be killed. Unfortunately for the attacker in this game, such components are
very robust, and shielding and protection devices easy to add in.

T he bottom line in this game is that other than some very specific missile types w ith X-
band antennas, and specific vulnerabilities in particular active radar guided or infrared
homing missiles, the opportunities to deliver lethal electrical damage w ith forseeable
fighter radar technology w ill not be many. T he defensive countermeasures an opposing
missile designer can apply are neither expensive nor technically difficult to implement. Most
w ould not require replacement of the missile seeker, but rather depot level fixes w hich
could be applied during scheduled missile servicings.
Footnote:
So Colonel Medved's arguments stand up to scrutiny here, and only a very courageous air
force w ould
Col. Grisha relyison
Medved usingretired
a former a fighter
fighterradar
pilot. to burn out an incoming missile guidance system in
a real combat environment.

Air Power
Further Australia Website - http://www.ausairpower.net/
Reading:
Air Power Australia Research and Analysis - http://www.ausairpower.net/research.html
1. C Kopp, Considerations on the use of airborne X-band radar as a microwave directed-energy weapon,
Journal of Battlefield Technology, vol 10, issue 3, Argos Press Pty Ltd, Australia, pp. 19-25.
2. Air Power Australia - April 2008 - Flanker Radars in Beyond Visual Range Air Combat
3. Air Power Australia - March 2008 - The Russian Philosophy of Beyond Visual Range Air Combat
4. Air & Space Power Chronicles, Maxwell AFB - 1995 - The Electromagnetic Bomb - a Weapon of Electrical
Mass Destruction - Russian Translation Part 1 , Russian Translation Part 2 , Mirror@GlobalSecurity.org,
Mirror@APA
5. RAAF APSC Working Paper 50, An Introduction to the Technical and Operational Aspects of the
Electromagnetic Bomb
6. Fulghum D.A., E-10 Radar Secretly Designed To Jam Missiles; MP-RTIP radar, built for the E-10 aircraft, has
been secretly designed to jam cruise missile electronics, Aviation Week & Space Technology, Volume 162,
May 30, 2005, p. 24. URL: http://esc.hanscom.af.mil/ESC-
PA/The%20Integrator/2005/July/07072005/07072005-14.htm , accessed April 2008.
7. Fulghum, D.A., Barrie D., Radar Becomes A Weapon, Aviation Week and Space Technology, Volume 162
Number 8 Sep 2005, URL: http://www.space4peace.org/articles/radar_becomes_weapon.htm.
8. Fulghum, D.A., Zap It’s Here, Aviation Week and Space Technology, Volume 163 Number 9 Sep 2005, pp52.
9. Piotrowski, A., Susceptibility of a personal computer to radar, International Conference RADAR 2003,
Adelaide, 3-5 September 2003.

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