Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Edwin Sandoval
What is International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
That branch of Public International Law which governs armed
conflicts to the end that the use of violence is limited and that
human suffering is mitigated or reduced by limiting the means of
military operations and by protecting persons who do not or no
longer participate in the hostilities.
This used to be referred to as "The Laws of War". The cornerstone
of IHL is the Principle of Distinction. Under this principle, persons
engaged in armed conflicts must, at all times, distinguish between
civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives.
The 6 principal legal instruments of IHL are: The Four Geneva
Conventions of 1949, and the Two Additional Protocols of 1977.
Following the Principle of Distinction, "Combatants" are those
directly engaged in the armed conflicts like members of the
regular armed forces, members of the irregular forces (guerillas
and militias), the levee en masse, officers and crew of merchant
marine vessels who forcibly resist attack.
Combatants when captured, should be treated as Prisoners of War
(POWs), who have rights under IHL.
However, there are combatants who are non-privileged, like spies,
saboteurs, mercenaries (soldiers for a fee). They are nonprivileged, because when captured they should not be entitled to
be treated as Prisoners of War although they have that minimum
right to a hearing.
The Rule-Making Power of the Supreme Court (Sec. 5[5], Art. VIII,
1987 Constitution)
Among the powers of the Supreme Court is the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Considering that the GSIS, under its Charter (Sec. 39 of RA 8291),
is exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of
all kinds, is it also exempt from the payment of legal fees?
No. The provision in its Charter exempting the GSIS from all taxes,
assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds cannot operate
to exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This was because,
unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered
Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme
Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987
Constitution removed this power from Congress. Hence, the
Supreme Court now has the sole authority to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. Any
exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by the
Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations
(GOCCs) and local government units (LGUs) will necessarily
reduce the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the SAJF.
Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs
the Courts guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its
independence. (GSIS v. Heirs of Fernando P. Caballero, 632 SCRA 5
[2010])
considered
as
have been receiving, the grant of RATA for every board meeting
they attended, in their capacity as members of the Board of
Directors of the GOCC, in addition to their per diems, does not
violate
the
constitutional
proscription
against
double
compensation (Singson v. COA, 627 SCRA 36 [2010])
park where one may hold a rally even without permit from the
local authorities.
Political rallies during the campaign period are governed by the
Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), not the Public Assembly Act.
Under BP 880, if within 48 hours from the application of a permit
to hold a rally, no acton was taken by the local authorities, the
permit is deemed granted.
If the local authority refuses to issue the permit, or if he wants to
change the venue, he is required to state the reason for such
refusal, or change of venue, to the applicant. The only ground for
the local authority to validly refuse to issue the permit, or change
the venue, is that there is a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the state has the right or duty to prevent or
suppress if the permit is to be granted, such as imminent public
disorder or violence.
Be reminded that any act of government that tends to impair
public assembly, freedom of expression and other fundamental
freedoms, comes to the Court with a heavy presumption of
unconstitutionality. In Reyes v Bagatsing, the Court held that it is
not for the applicant to guarantee that the rally will be peaceful,
but for the mayor who refuses to issue the permit to justify his
refusal, as his act of refusal comes to the court with a heavy
presumption of unconstitutionality.
The local authority may not validly refuse to issue the permit, or
change the venue of the rally, without informing the applicant of
the reason for the refusal to issue the permit or change the venue
of the rally. To do so without informing the applicant, would
constitute grave abuse of discretion on his part. (IBP v Mayor
Atienza)
BP 880 is merely a content-neutral regulation. It does not prohibit
the holding of rallies or public assemblies; it merely regulates.
(Bayan v Exec. Sec. Ermita)
The Calibrated Pre-emptive Response (CPR) policy adopted by the
Arroyo administration in dealing with rallies or public assemblies
which, according to Exec. Sec. Ermita simply means the strict
implementation of the "no permit, no rally rule," is a superfluity if
it means no more than "maximum tolerance" defined by BP 880,
as it will only confuse people. However, if it means more than
Congress
powers.
authorizing
the
President
to
exercise
emergency
The EPIRA law obviously has limited application which deals with
the regulation of the electric power industry. You must be referring
to Section 71 of the EPIRA law which will require joint
congressional resolution to establish additional supply of electric
power. What the President is requesting here is emergency power
in general governed by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.