Professional Documents
Culture Documents
..Applicants
Versus
State of Uttarakhand & another
.Opposite parties
petitioners
have
(3)
It is pleaded that
(5)
of six weeks.
(7)
for the petitioner, and learned counsel for the State, and
after going through the papers on record, as an interim
measure it is directed that further proceedings in
criminal complaint case no. . 2912 of 2010, State vs.
Yogendra Kumar Rai and others, relating to offences
punishable under section
Police
Court No. - 46
Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 3322 of 2010
Petitioner :- Re: In The Matter Of Matrimonial Disputes
Respondent :- State Of U.P. & Others
Petitioner Counsel :- P.N. Gangwar
Respondent Counsel :- Govt. Advocate,Abhay Raj Singh,Pankaj Naqvi
Hon'ble Amar Saran,J.
Hon'ble Shyam Shankar Tiwari,J.
bar have been reminded of their noble profession and their noble
tradition and of their responsibility to ensure that the social fibre of
family life is preserved by desisting from over-implicating all inlaws and their relations as accused persons in 498-A IPC reports,
and from filing exaggerated reports. They are also to make an
endeavour to bring about amicable settlements to this essentially
human problem. It has also been rightly pointed out in Sushil
Kumar Sharma v Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3100 (para 18)
whilst upholding the vires of section 498-A IPC, that it should be
ensured that complaints are not filed with oblique motives by
unscrupulous litigants so that a "new legal terrorism" is not
unleashed, and that the well-intentioned provision is not misused.
In Kans Raj v State of Punjab, AIR 2000 SC 2324, it has been held
that there is a tendency in cases of 498-A IPC and 304 B IPC to
rope in a large number of in-laws of the victim wife, and not only
the husband. In para 5 of the law report it has been observed:
"....In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to seek conviction for
maximum people, the parents of the deceased have been found to
be making efforts for involving other relations which ultimately
weaken the case of the prosecution even against the real accused
as appears to have happened in the instant case."
Specifically as a result of the interaction and suggestions which
emerged after a dialogue with the Advocates and officials, this
Court requires to formulate its opinion on the following points:
1. Whether registration of an FIR is mandatory once an
aggrieved woman or the eligible family members as
specified under section 198A Cr.P.C approaches the police
station giving information that an offence under section
498A IPC or allied provisions such as under section D.P.
Act or under section 406 I.P.C have been committed by the
(a) when information as to the commission of any such offence is given against any person
by name and the case is not of a serious nature, the officer in charge of a police station
need not proceed in person or depute a subordinate officer to make an investigation on the
spot;
(b) if it appears to the officer in charge of a police station that there is no sufficient ground
for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the case. However in such
situations the police officer is to mention in his report the reasons for not investigating the
case. In the second case, where a police officer is of the opinion that there is no sufficient
ground for investigating a matter, he is to also inform the informant of his decision.
The proviso (b) to section 157 (1) Cr. P. C. has been discussed in
paragraphs No. 53 and 54 in Bhajan Lal (supra). The law report
clarifies that clause (b) of the proviso permits a police officer to
satisfy himself about the sufficiency of the grounds even before
entering on an investigation. However, at that stage, the
satisfaction that on the allegations, a cognizable offence
warranting investigation is disclosed, has only to be based on the
F.I.R. and other materials appended to it, which are placed before
the Police Officer. Therefore, if it appears to the Police Officer that
the matrimonial dispute between the spouses is either not of a
grave nature or is the result of a conflict of egos or contains an
exaggerated version, or where the complainant wife has not
received any injury or has not been medically examined, he may
even desist or defer the investigation in such a case.
Recently by Act No. 5 of 2009, the newly introduced section 41
(1) (b), has been given effect to from 1.11.2010. This sub-section
provides that if some material or credible information exists of an
accused being involved in a cognizable offence punishable with 7
years imprisonment or less with or without fine, the Police Officer
has only to make an arrest, if he is satisfied that such arrest is
necessary (i) to prevent such person from committing any further
proceedings.
The I.G. (Public Grievances) and others present rightly
pointed out that a time frame must be laid down for
concluding the mediation proceedings as when an aggrieved
wife approaches the police for relief, because she has been
subjected to cruelty. If the matter is unduly prolonged in the
mediation process, the delay could act as a shield to protect
the accused from facing the penalty of law, causing
frustration and bitterness for the aggrieved wife. Notice
should as far as possible be served personally on the accused
and the parties should be directed to appear before the
Mediation Centre within a week or 10 days of the lodging of
the report by the aggrieved wife or family members.
Thereafter we think, that as far as possible, the mediation
proceedings should be concluded within two months of the
first appearance of both the parties before the Mediation
Centre.
6. Who should be the members of the mediation cell in the
district?
The Mediation Cell in the district should be headed by the
Secretary of the Legal Services Authority in the district, (at
present, the Civil Judge, Senior Division has been made the
Secretary), other panel or retainer lawyers appointed by the
District Legal Services Authority, other lawyers, who
volunteer for giving free services before the Mediation
centre, especially female lawyers should also be made
members of the Mediation Cell. It is also desirable to have
three or four social workers (especially female) in the Cell.
A female police officer of the rank of Dy. S.P. may also be
appointed an ex-officio member of the Mediation Cell.
7. Procedure to be followed by the police when a report of a
Government
Advocate,
Sri
Ashok
Mehta,
This is an UNCERTIFIED copy for information/reference. For authentic copy please refer to certified copy
only. In case of any mistake, please bring it to the notice of Deputy Registrar (Copying).
Equivalent Citation: 2011 (75) ACC 763
Court No. 46
Case: Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 17410 of 2011
Petitioner: Shaukin
Respondent: State of UP and others
Petitioner counsel: Mrs. Tabassum Hashimi, Ashwani Kumar Srivastava
Respondent counsel: Government Advocate
"
5.The directions were issued by the DGP's circular dated 3.10.11 to the subordinate police officials to
clarify that ordinarily the police shall not immediately arrest accused persons wanted in matters
punishable with imprisonment upto 7 years. This limitation was subject to the exceptions mentioned in
the aforesaid amended sections.
6.By the present order we proceed to explain the import and meaning of the amended provisions
41(1)(b) and 41 A Cr.P.C, and to give some illustrations where accused could be arrested straightaway on
the lodging of the FIR, and other illustrations where immediate arrests may not be needed, because we
think that in many cases the police is still routinely proceeding to arrest accused persons even if they are
involved in offences punishable with up to 7 years imprisonment, in contravention of the express terms
of sections 41(1)(b) or 41 A Cr.P.C.
7.It would be useful to extract the material provisions, sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A, which have been
introduced by Act No. 5 of 2009, with effect from 1.11.2010 and also section 170(1) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, here :
41. When police may arrest without warrant. -- (1) Any police officer may without an order from a
Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest any person -(a)------------------
(b) against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or
a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment
for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years whether with or
without fine, if the following conditions are satisfied, namely:(i) the police office has reason to believe on the basis of such complaint, information, or suspicion that
such person has committed the said offence;
(ii) the police office is satisfied that such arrest is necessary-(a) to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or
(b) for proper investigation of the offence; or
(C) to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering with
such evidence in any manner; or
(d) to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted
with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the police
officer; or
(e) as unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court whenever required cannot be ensured,
and the police officer shall record while making such arrest, his reasons in writing.
Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the
provisions of this sub-section, record the reasons in writing for not making the arrest. 41 A. Notice of appearance before police officer- (1) The police officer shall in all cases, where the arrest
of a person is not required under the provisions of sub-section(1) of section 41, issue a notice directing
the person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been
received,or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence, to appear before
him or at such other place as may be specified in the notice.
(2) Where such a notice is issued to any person, it shall be the duty of the person to comply with the
terms of the notice.
(3) Where such person complies and continues to comply with the notice, he shall not be arrested in
respect of the offence referred to in the notice unless, for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of
the opinion that he ought to be arrested.
(4) Where such person, at any time, fails to comply with the terms of the notice or is unwilling to
identify himself, the police officer may, subject to such orders as may have been passed by a competent
court in this behalf, arrest him for the offence mentioned in the notice.
170. Cases to be sent to Magistrate when evidence is sufficient. -(1) If, upon an investigation under this
Chapter, it appears to the officer in charge of the police station that there is sufficient evidence or
reasonable ground as aforesaid, such officer shall forward the accused under custody to a Magistrate
empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report and to try the accused or commit
him for trial, or if the offence is bailable and the accused is able to give security, shall take security from
him for his appearance before such Magistrate on a day fixed and for his attendance from day to day
before such Magistrate until otherwise directed.
8.The import of the said provisions is that normally where an accused has been named in the FIR, and
the offence is punishable with upto 7 years imprisonment, the arrest of the accused may not be
necessary at the initial stage and his attendance may be secured by issuing a notice to him to appear
before the police officer under section 41 A Cr.P.C. In such cases it would be advisable to arrest the
accused only after sufficient evidence of his involvement in the crime has been collected and the charge
sheet needs to be submitted. Under section 170(1) Cr.P.C. it has been provided that on completion of
investigation if sufficient evidence has been collected the accused shall be forwarded in custody to the
Magistrate concerned, unless he has been released on bail (if the offence was bailable), in which event
security may be taken for his appearance before the Magistrate. This practice of not arresting the
accused straightaway and arresting them only after sufficient evidence has been collected is normally
followed by the CBI, and CB (CID) in their investigations.
9.Where however the accused has not been named in the FIR, or at the time when the co-accused have
been picked up, for example in a case of vehicle theft or recovery of other stolen goods, or where the
co-accused has been arrested while committing a crime, and he names another accused as also having
participated in the crime, whose custodial interrogation may be necessary and the police officer is of the
opinion that the disclosure furnishes credible information or gives rise to reasonable suspicion for
inferring that this accused whose arrest is sought could also be involved, or there are chances that such
an accused would abscond or not respond to a notice under section 41A to appear, looking to the
nature of the crime and the background of the particular accused, these maybe appropriate cases where
immediate arrests may be needed. Likewise where the accused whose arrest is sought appears to be
habitually engaged in committing crimes or appears to be participating in some organized crimes, and
there is probability of the accused repeating the offence, these would also be circumstances where it
may be necessary to arrest such accused without delay.
10.However in a case under section 498 A IPC where the wife subject to violence has gone back to her
"maika" following the violence, it may not be necessary in a particular case to immediately arrest the
husband and other family members who have been made accused in the FIR until adequate evidence
has been collected, as she is unlikely to encounter violence when she is away from her "sasural." In E.C.
Act offences again where the licences of a ration card dealer named in the FIR has been suspended, he
may not have any opportunity to again indulge in blackmarketing or to commit a new offence under the
E.C. Act. Here too arrests can be deferred until sufficient evidence to submit a charge sheet has been
collected, when he needs to be produced before the trial court. But where the dealer is trying to obtain
affidavits from ration card holders and it appears that he is trying to win over witnesses, then it may be
open to the police to arrest him straight away. We have mentioned these examples as illustrations for
situations where arrests may or not be immediately needed and they are by no means exhaustive.
11.It is with the objective of striking a balance on the need to provide the Constitutional protection from
arbitrary arrest guaranteed under Article 21 and the restraint on arrests for offences punishable with
imprisonment up to 7 years, subject to certain exceptions as provided for under section 41(1)(b) Cr.P.C.
and the need of the police to carry out its investigation without interference, that we have refrained
from passing blanket orders staying the arrests of the accused in all such cases.
12.But we do expect the police officer to record reasons in a bona fide and honest manner, why it has
become necessary to arrest the accused in a particular case punishable with imprisonment with upto 7
years. The police officer should not mechanically and routinely write down in the case diary that there is
likelihood of the accused running away, or presume that the accused would not respond to the notice to
appear under section 41 A Cr.P.C, or that he would tamper with the evidence, unless there are strong
reasons with concrete material for taking such a view, and this satisfaction along with the concrete
reasons for taking the view need to be spelt out clearly in the case diary before the accused is arrested.
13.Thus strong reasons are needed for arresting an accused with respectable antecedents, who is an
income tax payee with roots in the community, and a permanent abode, no history of earlier
abscondance or non-cooperation with the police and who is not likely to tamper with the evidence or to
again commit a crime unless he is immediately arrested.
14.The propriety, honesty and genuiness of the reasons given for arrests in particular cases punishable
with imprisonment up to seven years and whether they conform to the requirements of sections
41(1)(b) and 41 A Cr.P.C. therefore need to be strictly monitored by the superior officers, i.e. C.O.s/
S.P.s/SSPs or DIGs in the districts, as has been emphasized in the DGP's circular dated 3.10.11. We make
it clear that in the event that this Court finds that the accused who are wanted in cases punishable with
up to 7 years imprisonment are being arrested in a routine and mechanical matter, without the
existence of the conditions necessary for arresting them as mentioned in sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A
Cr.P.C. this Court will have no hesitation in summoning the concerned police officers or even the
superior police officers and they may even have to face contempt charges. For persistent unwarranted
arrests in such matters in violation of the provisions of sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A and the DGP's circular
dated 3.10.11. we may even recommend disciplinary action against such errant police officers to the
DGP, U.P.
15.Section 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure also requires production of the case diary before
the Magistrate before whom the accused is produced for remand.
16.Section 167(1) reads thus:
167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours. ----(1) Whenever any
person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed
within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the
accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer
making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the
nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter presecribed relating to the case,
and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate.
17.As rightly pointed out in Bir Bhadra Pratap Singh v D.M., Azamgarh, 1959 Cri.L.J 685 the forwarding of
case diary entries under section 167(1) Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality, and the Magistrate is not
simply to "rubber stamp" the prayer of the police officer seeking remand of the accused, but he is to
apply his judicial mind to satisfy himself that the requirements of law are met when the police produces
an accused for remand. At the time of granting the remand we expect the Magistrate to examine the
case diary for satisfying himself whether the police officer's reasons for immediate arrest in the cases
punishable with imprisonment upto 7 years was held by him in a bona fide manner and whether the
reasons for remand are restricted to the pre-conditions for arrest mentioned in the newly introduced
sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A Cr.P.C. The Magistrate needs to closely examine as to how the police officer
could reach a conclusion that unless the accused was arrested he would repeat the offence, or why
without arrest the investigation could not proceed, or whether the particular accused was as a matter of
fact likely to cause the evidence to disappear, or would tamper with the evidence, or the accused would
try and influence witnesses, or without arrest the particular accused would not appear in Court. These
opinions of the police officer are to be based on concrete material and cannot be the mere ipse dixit of
the officer. If he finds that no genuine reasons which accord with the requirements of sections 41(1)(b)
and 41 A exist the Magistrate may even refuse to grant remand to the accused, and allow the accused to
be released on a personal bond with a direction to appear before the competent court or before the
police when called upon to do so, with or without security.
18.There would be no impediment in the Magistrate remanding the accused to judicial custody at later
stages as authorized under section 41(1)(b)(ii)(e) and section 170(1) Cr.P.C. when the accused is
produced before the Magistrate and the case diary shows that sufficient evidence for submitting a
charge sheet has been collected. Needless to mention that in case the accused has already secured bail,
then the police officer would be disentitled to arrest an accused person for seeking his remand because
the charge sheet is to be submitted. The accused could then be summoned to appear by the Magistrate
taking cognizance of the offence in exercise of powers under section 204 Cr.P.C.
19.If accused who are required in cases punishable with upto 7 years sentence are not routinely
arrested by the police, or are granted bail by the lower court itself, without any undue delay in disposing
of their bail applications, and in appropriate cases the facility of releasing the accused on interim bails
on personal bonds pending consideration of their regular bails with or without security with a direction
to appear when required is also extended to them, as has been laid down in the Apex Court Court in Lal
Kamlendra Pratap Singh V State of U.P., (2009) 4 SCC 437, the Full Bench in Amaravati and another v
State of U.P., 2005 Cri.L.J. 755, and the Division Bench in Sheoraj Singh @ Chuttan v State of U.P. and
others, 2009(65) ACC 781, considerable time of the High Court could be spent more productively in
hearing single judge and two judge appeals, or bails in grave matters. At present we find that most of
the High Court single and division benches on the criminal side are engaged in considering an
inordinately large number of applications for bail, applications under section 482 Cr.P.C., and Division
Bench criminal writ petitions in such matters punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years, which could
easily be dealt with by the Magistrates and Sessions Courts.
DIRECTIONS:
20.We therefore direct the Magistrates that when accused punishable with upto 7 years imprisonment
are produced before them remands may be granted to accused only after the Magistrates satisfy
themselves that the application for remand by the police officer has been made in a bona fide manner
and the reasons for seeking remand mentioned in the case diary are in accordance with the
requirements of sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A Cr.P.C. and there is concrete material in existence to
substantiate the ground mentioned for seeking remand. Even where the accused himself surrenders or
where investigation has been completed and the Magistrate needs to take the accused in judicial
custody as provided under section 170(1) and section 41(1)(b)(ii)(e) Cr.P.C, prolonged imprisonment at
this initial stage, when the accused has not been adjudged guilty may not be called for, and the
Magistrates and Sessions Courts are to consider the bails expeditiously and not to mechanically refuse
the same, especially in short sentence cases punishable with upto 7 years imprisonment unless the
allegations are grave and there is any legal impediment in allowing the bail, as laid down in Lal
Kamlendra Pratap Singh V State of U.P., (2009) 4 SCC 437, and Sheoraj Singh @ Chuttan v State of U.P.
and others, 2009(65) ACC 781. The facility of releasing the accused on interim bail pending consideration
of their regular bails may also be accorded by the Magistrates and Sessions Judges in appropriate cases.
21.The Magistrate may also furnish information to the Registrar of the High Court through the District
Judge, in case he is satisfied that a particular police officer has been persistently arresting accused in
cases punishable with upto 7 year terms, in a mechanical or mala fide and dishonest manner, in
contravention of the requirements of sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A, and thereafter the matter may be
placed by the Registrar in this case, so that appropriate directions may be issued to the DGP to take
action against such errant police officer for his persistent default or this Court may initiate contempt
proceedings against the defaulting police officer.
22.The District Judges should also be directed to impress upon the remand Magistrates not to routinely
grant remands to police officers seeking remand for accused if the pre-conditions for granting the
remands mentioned in sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A Cr.P.C. are not disclosed in cases punishable with 7
year terms, or where the police officer appears to be seeking remand for an accused in a mala fide
manner in the absence of concrete material. The issue of compliance with sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A
Cr.P.C and the directions of this Court in this regard may also be discussed in the monthly meetings of
the District Judges with the administration and the superior police officials.
23.We are also of the view that the Registrar General may issue a circular within a period of one month
with directions to the Sessions Courts and Magistrates to monitor and oversee the applications for
remand sought by the arresting police officers and to comply with the other directions mentioned
herein above.
24.The DGP, U.P. is directed to send a status report with better particulars by the next listing as to the
extent to which arrests are only being effected in cases punishable with upto 7 years imprisonment
strictly in accordance with the conditions mentioned in sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A Cr.P.C. We are not
satisfied by the mechanical incantation of the words by the police of 72 U.P. districts: " /
."
25.As already indicated above we are of the view that by routinely mentioning in the case diary that a
particular condition referred to in sections 41(1)(b) or 41 A Cr.P.C. has been met for seeking police
remand, would not provide adequate reason for effecting the arrest. The DGP is also directed to
circulate the present order to all subordinate police officers.
26.We are also of the view that the UP Legal Services Authority be directed to bring out pamphlets for
distribution in the legal literacy camps etc., or even issue news paper announcement with headings such
as "
," informing the public that henceforth accused
wanted in cases punishable with upto 7 years imprisonment would get relief and not be routinely
arrested because of the recent amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure, which has been enforced
from 1.11.2010.
27.Let a copy of this order be sent to the DGP, U.P., Member Secretary, U.P. SLSA and District Judges in
all districts of U.P. for compliance and communication to all the concerned judicial magistrates before
whom the accused are produced for remand by the police officers within ten days.
28.Let a copy of this order be also furnished to the learned Government Advocate forthwith.
29.Let a compliance report be submitted by the DGP, U.P., Member Secretary, U.P. SLSA and District
Judges by the next listing. The said authorities may also indicate the difficulties if any, faced in complying
with the aforesaid directions.
List on 14.12.2011.
Dated: 11.10.2011
Ishrat
......Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana and another
.....Respondents
CORAM:
Present:
meantime, he actually suffered serious ailments and ultimately, died due to the
attitude of his son Manoj Kumar Saini.
solemnization of marriage, the complainant lodged a complaint against petitionerSanjiv Kumar, brother-in-law(Jeth), his wife Suman, sister-in-law(Jethani) and
Rani, mother-in-law, inter alia, with the allegations that they started pressurizing
her, to bring more money from her parents. They did not give any share out of
property and demanded Rs.2-3 lacs. According to the complainant that, she left
her matrimonial home due to fear and started residing with her younger sister. She
apprehended danger to her life, as she was unable to fulfill their demand of dowry.
In the background of these allegations, a criminal case was registered against the
petitioner and his other co-accused, by way of FIR No.258 dated 20.04.2008
(Annexure P-5), on accusation of having committed the offence punishable under
Sections 498-A, 406 and 506/34 IPC, by the police of Police Station City, Rohtak.
3.
The petitioner-accused did not feel satisfied with the initiation of the
criminal prosecution against him and preferred the present petition, to quash the
impugned FIR(Annexure P-5), invoking the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C.
5.
the complainant performed inter-caste love marriage with Manoj Kumar Saini
against the wishes of his father, who had disowned him. They were residing
separately. Ultimately, his father died due to shock.
complainant and her husband started misbehaving with his family members.
Manoj Kumar Saini tried to forcibly enter into the house with the help of
miscreants, then the mother of the petitioner submitted an application to the police
as well as to the higher authorities. It was alleged that the petitioner, who was a
practicing Lawyer, had shifted from Rohtak and practiced from September 2001 to
January 2004 at Chandigarh. After the death of his father, he has again shifted to
Rohtak.
started harassing his family members. They wanted to forcibly occupy the house
and illegally demanded share in the property. When the mother of the petitioner
refused to give him the property, then Manoj Kumar Saini with the connivance of
his wife(complainant), managed to lodge the FIR(Annexure P-5) against the
petitioner, in order to take the revenge. It has been specifically pleaded in para 15
of the petition as under:That from facts and circumstances narrated above, it is clear that
registration of FIR against the petitioner is clear cut misuse of the
provisions of Section 498-A/406 IPC. From the facts narrated above, it is
clear that the complainant and Manoj Kumar had solemnized the love
marriage without consent of the family of the petitioner. The petitioner
actually being an elder brother of Manoj Kumar has been involved in the
present case. Otherwise, question of harassment and raising a demand of
dowry does not arise. The fact of the matter is that not only the petitioner
but the entire family of the petitioner is being harassed by Manoj Kumar
and the complainant with active connivance.
wife failed to achieve the target to get share in the property, now they in
concert with each other i.e. husband and wife, got registered the FIR and
complaint under provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 so that the
petitioner, his mother and sister get involved in the litigation and,
ultimately, would agree to share the property with them. Thus, on this score
alone, the FIR registered against the petitioner is totally baseless and the
allegations levelled in the FIR cannot be taken against the petitioner at
all.
6.
events in detail, in all, the petitioner claimed that he has been falsely implicated, in
order to take revenge and wreak vengeance by the complainant with the
connivance of his younger brother Manoj Kumar Saini, with the intention to
illegally get share in the property. On the strength of aforesaid grounds, the
petitioner sought to quash the impugned FIR(Annexure P-5), in the manner
depicted hereinabove.
7.
The respondents refuted the prayer of the petitioner and filed their
After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, going through the
record with their valuable help and after considering the entire matter deeply, to
my mind, the instant petition deserves to be accepted in this context.
9.
the complainant was solemnized with Manoj Kumar Saini on 06.07.2002, whereas
the present FIR was lodged against the petitioner, his wife and mother on
20.04.2008(i.e., after a period of six years). During the course of investigation, the
story of the complainant was disbelieved qua wife and mother of the petitioner and
they were found innocent. Only petitioner, brother-in-law(Jeth) of the complainant
was charged for the commission of the indicated offences.
10.
show that complainant-Anju Saini was residing separately with her husband Manoj
Kumar Saini and daugher Manvi. Manoj Kumar Saini was disowned by his father.
Manoj Kumar and the complainant broke open the lock of the house and his
mother Rani reported the matter to the police, to take action against them, vide
complaint dated 15.07.2006(Annexure P-2). She moved another complaint dated
16.08.2007(Annexure P-3) to the SHO, Police Station City, Rohtak. The incident
of trespassing by the complainant and her husband was published by virtue of
publication(Annexure P-4).
11.
This is not the end of the matter. Again, the complainant has also
filed another separate complaint(Annexure P-6) against the accused under Sections
12, 17 to 20 and 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
and Section 498-A IPC, to which, the petitioner filed the reply(Annexure P-7).
The proceedings(Annexure P-8) were also initiated under Sections 107/151 Cr.P.C.
between the parties. Manoj Kumar Saini, husband of the complainant, lodged
another FIR No.680 dated 18.09.2009(Annexure P-9) under Sections 323, 324 and
34 IPC against the petitioner, his wife and two other unknown persons. In other
words, it stands proved on record that the complainant and her husband were
residing separately from the family of the petitioner, which falsifies the claim of
the complainant contained in the FIR(Annexure P-5), wherein she stated that her
mother-in-law started pressurizing her for bringing money. They tried to illegally
trespass the house of his mother Rani and she reported the matter to the police.
There is a long line of complaints between the parties.
12.
The only allegations alleged against the petitioner, his wife and
mother, were that they started pressurizing her for bringing more money. The wife
and mother of the petitioner were found innocent by the police during the course of
investigation. That means, the story of the complainant relatable to them has
already been disbelieved even by the investigating agency. Once it is proved that
the complainant and her husband were residing separately, whereas the petitioner
was residing separately, in that eventuality, how, when, where, in what manner and
in whose presence, the dowry articles were entrusted to him at the time of intercaste love marriage or the petitioner has treated her(complainant) with cruelty and
in what manner, he is remotely connected with the commission of the indicated
offences, remains an unfolded mystery. The complainant with the connivance of
her husband appears to have maliciously and vexatiously involved the petitioner in
this case, in order to wreak vengeance and to take the revenge, after the expiry of
period of six years from solemnization of their marriage.
13.
are assigned to the petitioner in the FIR. The only allegations assigned to the
present petitioner are that, he asked that they cannot bear their expenses and will
not give anything out of their property, bring Rs.2-3 lacs from your mother,
otherwise they will burn her alive. Thereafter due to fear, she left her matrimonial
home. The allegations are as vague as anything and no specific role or overt-act is
attributed to the petitioner. Above all, it is highly impossible to believe that the
petitioner(who is brother-in-law(Jeth) of the complainant) would treat her with
cruelty in connection with and on account of demand of dowry.
14.
penal provisions of the offences punishable under Sections 406 and 498-A IPC,
there must be specific allegations/overt acts and prima facie material against the
petitioner to indicate that the dowry articles were actually entrusted to him and he
misappropriated the same. The in-laws and other relations cannot, in all cases, be
held to be involved in the demand of dowry. In cases, where such accusation is
made, the overt acts attributed to such persons, other than husband, are required to
be prima facie established. By mere conjectures and implications, such relations
cannot be held to be involved for the offences relating to the demand of dowry,
which are totally lacking in the present case. As the Bench mark, all the essential
ingredients to constitute the offences and element of the complicity of petitioner,
in case Preeti Gupta & Another v. State of Jharkhand & Another 2010(7) SCC
667. Having interpreted the provisions of Section 498-A IPC, it was ruled as under
(paras 30 to 36) :30. It is a matter of common experience that most of these complaints under section 498-A IPC are
filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues without proper deliberations. We come across a large
number of such complaints which are not even bona fide and are filed with oblique motive. At the same
time, rapid increase in the number of genuine cases of dowry harassment are also a matter of serious
concern.
31. The learned members of the Bar have enormous social responsibility and obligation to ensure that
the social fiber of family life is not ruined or demolished. They must ensure that exaggerated versions of
small incidents should not be reflected in the criminal complaints. Majority of the complaints are filed
either on their advice or with their concurrence. The learned members of the Bar who belong to a noble
profession must maintain its noble traditions and should treat every complaint under section 498-A as a
basic human problem and must make serious endeavour to help the parties in arriving at an amicable
resolution of that human problem. They must discharge their duties to the best of their abilities to ensure
that social fiber, peace and tranquility of the society remains intact. The members of the Bar should also
ensure that one complaint should not lead to multiple cases.
32.
Unfortunately, at the time of filing of the complaint the implications and consequences are not
agony and pain to the complainant, accused and his close relations.
33. The ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty and protect the innocent.
To find out the truth is a herculean task in majority of these complaints. The tendency of implicating
husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon. At times, even after the conclusion of
criminal trial, it is difficult to ascertain the real truth. The courts have to be extremely careful and
cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while
dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment of husband's close relations who had
been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided
would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complaint are required to be
scrutinized with great care and circumspection. Experience reveals that long and protracted criminal
trials lead to rancour, acrimony and bitterness in the relationship amongst the parties. It is also a
matter of common knowledge that in cases filed by the complainant if the husband or the husband's
relations had to remain in jail even for a few days, it would ruin the chances of amicable settlement
altogether. The process of suffering is extremely long and painful.
34. Before parting with this case, we would like to observe that a serious relook of the entire provision
is warranted by the legislation. It is also a matter of common knowledge that exaggerated versions of
the incident are reflected in a large number of complaints. The tendency of over implication is also
The criminal trials lead to immense sufferings for all concerned. Even ultimate acquittal in the
trial may also not be able to wipe out the deep scars of suffering of ignominy. Unfortunately a large
number of these complaints have not only flooded the courts but also have led to enormous social unrest
affecting peace, harmony and happiness of the society. It is high time that the legislature must take into
consideration the pragmatic realities and make suitable changes in the existing law. It is imperative for
the legislature to take into consideration the informed public opinion and the pragmatic realities in
consideration and make necessary changes in the
relevant provisions of law. We direct the Registry to send a copy of this judgment to the Law
Commission and to the Union Law Secretary, Government of India who may place it before the Hon'ble
Minister for Law & Justice to take appropriate steps in the larger interest of the society.
36. When the facts and circumstances of the case are considered in the background of legal principles set
out in preceding paragraphs, then it would be unfair to compel the appellants to undergo the rigmarole of a
criminal trial. In the interest of justice, we deem it appropriate to quash the complaint against the
appellants. As a result, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. Consequently, this appeal is
allowed.
16.
Again, this Court has also considered this aspect of the matter in
cases Harjinder Kaur and others v. State of Punjab 2004(4) RCR(Criminal) 332;
Labh Singh and others v. State of Haryana 2006(2) RCR (Criminal) 296; Rakesh
Kumar and others v. State of Punjab and others 2009(2) RCR (Criminal) 565;
Mohinder Kaur & Others v. State of Punjab & Another 2010 (2) RCR(Criminal)
597, Paramjit Kaur v. State of Punjab 2011(5) RCR (Criminal) 686 and the
judgment dated 17.1.2012 rendered in case Ritu Khurana and another v. Brij Lal
Chopra CRM No.M-8227 of 2010; wherein it was held that the allegations
against the relatives of the husband were vague and there is growing tendency to
come out with inflated and exaggerated allegations roping in each and every
relation of the husband, things have now taken a reverse trend and the women are
abusing beneficial provisions of Section 498-A IPC.
17.
petitioner has been falsely implicated by the complainant and her husband in this
case, has considerable force and the contrary contentions on behalf of learned
counsel for the complainant-respondent pale into insignificance, stricto sensu
deserve to be and are hereby repelled under the present set of circumstances. The
ratio of law laid down in the aforesaid judgments mutatis mutandis is fully
attracted to the facts of the present case and is the complete answer to the problem
in hand.
18.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1674
OF 2012
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 10547/2010)
..Appellants
Versus
. Respondents
JUDGMENT
GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.
1.
at
Allahabad
in
Crl.
Miscellaneous
Page1
observation
that
the
question
of
territorial
proceedings on
however
granted
interim
The High
protection
to
authorities not to
the
issue
under
Section
482
Cr.P.C.
was
The
thus
to them to move the trial court, have filed this appeal for
quashing the proceedings which had been initiated on
the basis of a case lodged by the respondent No.2 Smt.
Shipra Mehrotra (earlier known as Shipra Seth) against
2
Page2
her husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-inlaw and sister-in-law. This appeal has been preferred
by the sister-in-law, who is appellant No.1 and brotherin-law of the complainant, who is appellant No.2.
3.
No.2
Smt.
Shipra
Thana
Daraganj,
Allahabad
wherein
the
at Eros
who is appellant
in
Chennai
and
is
getting
salary
of
3
Page3
4
Page4
and stated that she will not ask her parents for money,
Shyamji,
on
instigation
of
other
accused-family
To escape
5
Page5
5.
The
He never
On 15.7.2003
complainant heard some conversation of her mother-inlaw and sister-in-law from which it appeared to her that
they want to kill the complainant in the night only.
Thereupon the complainant apprised her father of the
situation on phone to which her father replied that he
will call back her father-in-law and she should go with
6
Page6
For many
7
Page7
At
8
Page8
On
the
basis
of
the
complaint,
the
9
Page9
of the
with
mala
fide
intentions
to
harass
the
But the
cannot
be
construed
as
legal
and
proper
1
Page10
of the
1
Page11
limits
Section
482
Cr.P.C.
in
the
facts
and
had no
father
which
indicate
material
contradictions
1
Page12
the family
of her ex-husband
to move
and raise
as to whether it has
1
Page13
14.
that during the pendency of this case, the complainantrespondent No.2 has obtained
an ex-parte decree of
to be a
against
the
sister
and
brother
of
the
1
Page14
and
her
husband
between the
Shyamji
Mehrotra
of
against the
The
1
Page15
the criminal
of the
appellants.
16.
Court
the
petition
under
Section
482
the
1
Page16
in
legal basis
for the
The learned
Judges were
not
living
husband.
with
Their
the
family
of
the
Lordships
of
the
1
Page17
Supreme Court
initiating
the
proceedings
under
the
Dowry
The
The
1
Page18
still remained as
to
dispute
without
allegation
of
active
1
Page19
also
in a matrimonial
dispute, this Court had held that the High Court should
have quashed the complaint
arising out of
to
and
live
peacefully.
But
little
matrimonial
skirmishes suddenly
erupt
which often
counselled and
arrayed as accused
by
2
Page20
was to prevent
the wife
settling earlier.
be a different
with
jurisdiction
2
Page22
In
the
instant
case,
the
question
of
arising
out
criminal
case,
But in
fresh
and
to prolong the
2
Page23
stands
lacks ingredients
appears
but
what
we
wish
to
emphasize
by
2
Page24
the entire
2
Page25
Shyamji
on the ground of
petition
on
the
solitary
ground
of
territorial
2
Page26
torture
to the complainant
2
Page27
27.
as
the
complainant-respondent
No.2
without
in so far as
J
(T.S. Thakur)
J
(Gyan Sudha Misra)
New Delhi,
October 17, 2012
2
Page28
prosecution with
(A.K. Sharma)
Judge
PB
1
wp2999-13.doc
C
ou
rt
.. Respondents
ig
h
Date
ba
y
1]
: S. C. DHARMADHIKARI &
G.S. PATEL, JJ
P.C.:
CORAM
om
2966 to urge that the Supreme Court has held that this court
can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India even if the complaint is filed in the State of Nagaland
on the footing that the cause of action has arisen within its
territorial jurisdiction.
C
ou
2]
rt
2
wp2999-13.doc
ig
h
ba
y
om
3]
3
wp2999-13.doc
rt
C
ou
ig
h
ba
y
4]
om
5]
4
wp2999-13.doc
rt
C
ou
ig
h
ba
y
om
(S. C. DHARMADHIKARI, J)
(G.S.PATEL,J)
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1022 OF 2008
Bhola Ram
..Appellant
Versus
State of Punjab
..Respondent
JUDGMENT
Madan B. Lokur, J.
1.
Bhola Ram was rightly convicted by both the Trial Court and
the High Court for having caused the dowry death of Janki
Devi, an offence punishable under Section 304-B and Section
498-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). In our opinion, Bhola
Ram deserves an acquittal since there is no evidence
inculpating him.
The facts:
Crl. Appeal No.1022 of 2008
Page 1 of 17
Page1
2.
demand for Rs. 10,000/- was made by Janki Devis in-laws for
the purchase of a car. Janki Devis father PW-2 Nath Ram
borrowed this amount from PW-1 Nirbhai Singh for meeting
Crl. Appeal No.1022 of 2008
Page 2 of 17
Page2
Nath Rams wife, informed Nath Ram about Janki Devi being
ill-treated on account of Nath Rams inability to meet the
Crl. Appeal No.1022 of 2008
Page 3 of 17
Page3
Page 4 of 17
Page4
the
basis
of
the
above
details
and
further
Page 5 of 17
Page5
all
four
ingredients
were
established
by
the
prosecution.
13. It was further held that Darshan Ram, Bhola Ram and
their mother Vidya Devi were living together in the same
house at village Mehma Sarja and that they had demanded
additional
dowry
from
Janki
Devis
family.
However,
found that Darshan Ram, Bhola Ram and Vidya Devi, by their
attitude and behaviour, caused Janki Devi to take the
extreme step of taking her own life. These three accused
were accordingly convicted for offences punishable under
Section 304-B and Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 7 years with
fine for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC and 2
Crl. Appeal No.1022 of 2008
Page 6 of 17
Page6
Page 7 of 17
Page7
Page 8 of 17
Page8
Page 9 of 17
Page9
Page 10 of 17
Page10
Page 11 of 17
Page11
Page 12 of 17
Page12
Page 13 of 17
Page13
Page 14 of 17
Page14
the husband with all his relatives into the net of Section 304B of the IPC.
32. It was contended by learned counsel for the State that
Darshan Ram, Bhola Ram and Vidya Devi were living
together at village Mehma Sarja and so their active
involvement in the dowry death cannot be ruled out. While
these persons may be staying together, it does not lead to
any positive conclusion that each one of them was actively
involved in demanding additional dowry from Janki Devi and
also behaving in a cruel or humiliating manner towards her
resulting in her consuming poison to end her life. In cases of
this nature which attract a reverse onus of proof, the least
that is expected of the prosecution to bring home a charge
under Section 304-B of the IPC is to adduce some evidence
to suggestively implicate a relative, in this case, to
suggestively implicate Bhola Ram both in the demands for
additional dowry and harassment or cruelty. Such evidence
is not available on record and so the mere fact that all the
members of Darshan Rams family were living together at
village Mehma Sarja, would not alter the factual situation.
Crl. Appeal No.1022 of 2008
Page 15 of 17
Page15
Conclusion
34. Based on the evidence available on record (or the lack
of it) we have no doubt that the appeal filed by Bhola Ram
ought to be allowed.
delivery.
The
dowry
death
took
place
on
6 th
Page 16 of 17
Page16
....J.
(Ranjana Prakash
Desai)
....J.
(Madan B. Lokur)
New Delhi;
November 11, 2013
Page 17 of 17
Page17
VINEET VATS
..... Appellant
Mr. Raman Sahney, Adv.
Through:
versus
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI
..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Feroz Khan Ghazi, APP.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K.JAIN
JUDGMENT
V.K.JAIN, J. (Oral)
In the night intervening 6/7.2.2000, deceased Vimmi was brought
by the appellant, who is her husband, to Sodhi Nursing Home, she
having consumed insecticide.
home.
concerned SDM was informed, who reached the spot and recorded the
statement of Shri Ram Kumar Sharma, father of the deceased. In the
aforesaid statement, Shri Ram Kumar Sharma inter alia stated that his
daughter Vimmi @ Vimla was married to the appellant Vineeet Vats on
9.11.1995. He further stated that on being informed by his son-in-law at
about 5:00 a.m., he reached Sodhi Nursing Home where his daughter
Page 1 of 16
was found dead. He alleged that Vimmi had been murdered by her
father-in-law, Gyan Chand; mother-in-law, Kamla; and brother-in-law,
Sunit @ Kalu. He also alleged that earlier the aforesaid three persons
used to beat his daughter and harass her in connection with dowry. He
desired legal action against the aforesaid three persons as well as against
the appellant Vineet though there was no allegation of cruelty or
maltreatment against him.
2.
Page 2 of 16
Smt. Santosh Sharma alleged that her younger daughter Usha got
Page 3 of 16
4.
and 304B of IPC was filed against as many as seven (7) persons
including the appellant Vineet.
Page 4 of 16
discharged by the learned trial court vide order dated 2.12.2000. The
learned counsel for the appellant submits that the order discharging the
other accused persons was challenged before this Court but the
challenge did not succeed.
6.
box as PW2 and inter alia stated that mother-in-law and father-in-law of
Vimmi had asked the appellant to bring Rs.3.00 lakh from his in-laws
and had turned her daughter and son-in-law out of the house. She then
arranged a rented accommodation in Ashok Vihar and paid Rs.25,000/as pagri. She further alleged that the brother-in-law of Vimmi and other
relatives continued to harass her even at the rented house in Ashok
Vihar by beating her and insisting that she should bring more money.
She also alleged that they used to receive telephone calls from the
father-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased who alleged that
Vimmi and her husband had taken away Rs.25.00 lakh from their house.
The witness claimed that the appellant told them that he cannot
pull without a car and thereupon they gave Rs.2.00 lakh to him for
purchasing a car, which he actually purchased. However, after 2-3
months the car was sold by him and they were informed that the sale
proceeds had been invested in an FDR.
Page 5 of 16
did not harass the deceased in any manner and did not subject her to
cruelty prior to the wedding of her younger daughter. Though, it has
come in her deposition that the appellant had demanded a car and the
demand was satisfied by giving Rs.2.00 lakh to him, she does not claim
that her daughter Vimmi was subjected to any kind of cruelty or
harassment by the appellant in connection with the demand of a car.
Mere demand of a car, without subjecting the deceased to any cruelty or
without harassing her in any manner in connection with the said demand
does not constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A of IPC
particularly when it was not linked to the marriage and was sought for
the purpose of convenience alone though it may possibly constitute an
offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Page 6 of 16
8.
Page 7 of 16
daughter used to tell him that her in-laws used to harass her, raise
demand of dowry and beat her. He specifically named the father-in-law,
mother-in-law, husband and younger brother of the appellant alleging
demand of dowry and harassment of the deceased by them. However,
he did not specify when and in what manner, deceased Vimmi was
harassed by the appellant. It would be appropriate to note here that in
his statement before the SDM Ex.PW3/A this witness had not made any
allegation whatsoever of any demand of dowry or harassment of the
deceased at the hand of the appellant Vineet. In the aforesaid statement
he had blamed only the father-in-law, mother-in-law and brother-in-law
of the deceased and had alleged that the aforesaid persons used to harass
Page 8 of 16
in the witness box as PW4. She inter alia stated that Vineet and coaxed
her (deceased) for a Maruti Car from his in-laws, which they purchased
and gave to Vineet.
Harkishan Nagar house, Vimmi used to come to them and tell them that
her in-laws, and her husband used to assemble at the said house and
Page 9 of 16
threat/harass her and pressurize her to bring Rs.3.00 lakh and withdraw
the criminal cases which Vimmi had lodged against them. She further
stated that in the last week of November, 1999, Vimmi came to their
house and told her that the previous night her parents-in-law, brother-inlaw, maternal uncle of Vineet, his aunt, Satyawati and Purender had
come to their house in Guru Harkishan Nagar tortured her, and given her
beatings so that she would bring Rs.3.00 lakh and withdraw the criminal
cases. However, the aforesaid allegations do not find any mention in the
depositions of the parents or the brother of the deceased. The aforesaid
part of the deposition of this witness, to my mind, cannot be believed for
the reason that it finds no corroboration from the parents and brother of
the deceased. Had Vimmi made such a complaint to this witness, she
would have immediately brought it to the notice of her mother-in-law
and her husband. It would be difficult to accept that the aforesaid
witness would not bring such a serious incident involving her sister-inlaw to the notice of the parents and brother of the aggrieved person. The
aforesaid witness was examined by the Investigating Officer on
13.2.2000, i.e., six (6) days after her death, and there is no explanation
from the prosecution for not examining her soon after she had died. In
any case, I am not inclined to accept that the witness would not have
Page 10 of 16
brought the incident to the notice of her parents and brother even after
the death of Vimmi. Had she done that her parents and brother would
have stated so in their statement to the SDM as well as during their
deposition in the court.
12.
The appellant demanded a car from his in-laws and they either
gave Rs.2.00 lakh in cash to him for the purpose or they purchased a car
and gave it to him.
b.
an old car which he had purchased through a car dealer. The said car
dealer has been examined as DW7.
Page 11 of 16
Chander inter alia stated that in the year 1997, the appellant Vineet
purchased a Maruti car from him through delivery receipt Ex.DW7/A
for a consideration of Rs.1.25 lakh. He also stated that Vineet had paid
Rs.45,000/- to Rs.50,000/- by way of a cheque and rest of the amount
was financed through V.K. Mohan Leasing & Finance, Karol Bagh, a
finance company which has since closed. He also stated that most
probably the cheque was paid by the appellant from his own account.
On the other hand, the prosecution has not given any documentary proof
of either the car having been purchased by the parents of the deceased or
a sum of Rs.2.00 lakh having been paid to the appellant for the purpose.
The father of the deceased Shri Ram Kumar stated in his deposition that
his salary in the year 2000 was Rs.15,500/- per month. He also claimed
that he was earning about Rs.1.00 lakh to Rs.1.25 lakh per annum from
the agricultural land he had in the village. Thus, the total income of this
witness at the relevant time would not be more than about Rs.25,000/per month even if his statement in this regard is taken as wholly correct.
It is difficult to accept that a sum of Rs.2.00 lakh would be available in
cash with a person of such limited means in the year 2000. This was not
the case of the witness that the aforesaid amount of Rs.2.00 lakh was
withdrawn by him from some bank account nor has the prosecution
Page 12 of 16
Page 13 of 16
made by Shri Ram Kumar Sharma, father of the deceased to the SDM
on 7.2.2000, that no such demand was alleged in the aforesaid
statement. The aforesaid demand surfaced only in the statement of Smt.
Santosh Sharma recorded by the SDM on the next day. However, none
of the witnesses told the court as to how much was the expenditure
incurred in the wedding of Usha or how much precisely was the money
demanded by the appellant. This is not the case of the prosecution that
the aforesaid demand was not in the knowledge of the father of the
deceased.
Kumar Sharma would certainly have stated in his statement to the SDM
recorded on 7.2.2000. Even in his deposition in the Court, Shri Ram
Kumar Sharma, father of the deceased did not refer to the alleged
demand of money equivalent to the expenditure incurred by him on the
wedding of his younger daughter. Considering that no such allegation
was made by Shri Ram Kumar Sharma to the SDM, it would not be safe
to rely upon the deposition of other witnesses in this regard because
primarily it is the father of the deceased who could have arranged the
money alleged to have been demanded by the appellant and, therefore,
he could not have been unaware of any such demand.
Page 14 of 16
15.
The aforesaid
Page 15 of 16
had told her parents in the night of 6.2.2000, that they would be shifting
to a new house. The explanation given by the appellant, therefore, finds
some support from the recovery of the burnt piece of newspaper and
burnt saree from the spot and the information which the deceased had
given to her parents in the night of 6.2.2000.
17.
registered was against her in-laws, and the present appellant, was in fact
a witness of prosecution in that case.
18.
has spent about six years in custody is given benefit of doubt and is
acquitted.
The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
One copy of the order be sent to the concerned Jail
Superintendent for information and necessary action.
The LCR be sent back forthwith with a copy of this order.
V.K. JAIN, J.
Page 16 of 16
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.
1144
OF 2014
[Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 8965/2013]
Swapnil and Others
Appellant (s)
Versus
Respondent (s)
JUDGMENT
KURIAN, J.:
Leave granted.
2.
between
the
first
appellant
and
second
2
Page2
Annexure-P5
is
the
Record
of
Proceedings
dated
3
Page3
according
to
the
first
appellant
the
second
2.
3.
5
Page5
7.
8.
9.
got
strained
ever
since
April,
2011,
even
High
Court
missed
these
crucial
points
while
The
accused
appellants
are
discharged.
8
Page8
.....
J.
(SUDHANSU JYOTI
MUKHOPADHAYA)
..
J.
(KURIAN JOSEPH)
New Delhi;
May 9, 2014.
9
Page9
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1277 OF 2014
(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) No.9127 of 2013)
ARNESH KUMAR
..... APPELLANT
VERSUS
.... RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
Page1
happens
to
be
the
husband
of
Leave granted.
air-
brought
supported
his
another woman.
to
the
mother
appellants
and
notice,
threatened
to
he
marry
Page2
driven out of the matrimonial home due to nonfulfilment of the demand of dowry.
Denying
preferred
these
an
allegations,
application
for
the
appellant
anticipatory
bail
in
marriage
is
Section
recent
years.
greatly
498-A
of
The
revered
the
IPC
in
was
institution
this
of
country.
introduced
with
The
fact
that
Section
498-A
is
used
as
weapons
disgruntled wives.
to
get
the
rather
than
shield
by
husband
and
his
relatives
arrested
Page3
published
National
by
Crime
Statistics
Records
Bureau,
Page4
Arrest
brings
humiliation,
curtails
freedom
image
despite
six
decades
of
harassment,
considered
oppression
friend
of
and
public.
surely
The
need
not
for
Not only
The attitude to
Page5
despicable.
that
no
arrest
should
be
made
We
only
thereof.
No
arrest
can
be
made
in
It would be
Page6
after
some
investigation
as
to
the
the
improvement.
decreased.
Legislature
Numbers
of
Ultimately,
the
did
not
arrest
find
any
have
not
Parliament
had
to
1994.
The
value
of
the
proportionality
As
fine,
Section
41(1)(b),
Cr.PC
which
is
Page7
41.
When
police
may
arrest
without
warrant.-(1) Any police officer may without
an order from a Magistrate and without a
warrant, arrest any person
(a)x
investigation
of
the
Page8
by
the
police
officer
only
on
its
Police officer
that
such
arrest
is
necessary
to
or
for
proper
investigation
of
the
Page9
10
evidence
of
the
offence
to
disappear;
or
prevent
such
person
from
making
any
whenever
required
cannot
be
ensured.
by
any
of
the
provisions
aforesaid,
In pith and
Is it really
What
Page10
11
In fine,
reason
to
believe
on
the
basis
of
An
accused
arrested
without
warrant
by
57,
Cr.PC
to
be
produced
before
the
it
is
authorised
by
the
Magistrate
in
Page11
12
The
is
not
exercised
with
the
seriousness
it
in
routine,
Before
casual
and
Magistrate
cavalier
authorises
in
accordance
with
law
and
all
the
does
not
satisfy
the
requirements
of
to
authorise
his
further
detention
and
the
Page12
13
and
its
Magistrate
conclusions
for
in
to
turn
is
arrest
be
and
the
satisfied
that
has
been
satisfied
and
it
is
only
an
accused.
authorising
The
detention
Magistrate
will
record
before
its
own
the said
It
considers
the
arrest
necessary
to
shall
furnish
to
the
Magistrate
the
the
conclusion.
police
Those
officer
shall
had
be
reached
perused
by
its
the
Page13
14
detention,
the
Magistrate
has
to
police
officer
that
one
or
the
other
To this
Page14
15
Page15
16
the
same
scrutiny
by
the
Magistrate
as
aforesaid.
We
are
of
the
opinion
that
if
the
Page16
17
the
police
officers
intentionally
or
which
come
to
the
Court
for
grant
of
We
police
officers
do
not
arrest
accused
In order
registered
but
to
satisfy
themselves
Page17
18
parameters
laid
down
above
flowing
from
police
officers
be
provided
with
which
necessitated
the
forwarding/producing
before
the
Magistrate
the
for
arrest,
accused
further
detention;
(4) The Magistrate while authorising detention
of
the
accused
shall
peruse
the
report
and
only
after
recording
its
to
the
Magistrate
within
two
Page18
19
the
case
with
copy
to
the
Magistrate
of
within
Cr.PC
two
institution
be
served
weeks
of
the
on
the
from
the
case,
which
accused
date
may
of
be
to
aforesaid
police
comply
shall
officers
departmental
with
apart
the
from
concerned
action,
they
directions
rendering
the
liable
for
shall
also
be
as
detention
aforesaid
without
by
the
recording
judicial
Page19
20
Magistrate
concerned
shall
be
liable
for
We
hasten
to
add
that
the
directions
the
Dowry
Prohibition
Act,
the
case
in
transmission
and
ensuring
its
compliance.
Page20
21
had
granted
provisional
bail
to
the
In
the
result,
we
allow
this
appeal,
J
(CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)
J
(PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE)
NEW DELHI,
July 2, 2014.
Page21
ANNEXURE IX:
TRUE COPY OF THE DISCHARGE PETITION FILED BY THE 1ST
PETITIONER IN C.C 656/2009 OF THE COURT OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF
FIRST CLASS-I, VARKALA.
ANNEXURE X:
TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 27.11.2012 DISMISSING
DISCHARGE PETITION FILED UNDER SECTION 245 CR.P.C. IN C.M.P. NO.6457
(A)/2012 IN C.C 656/2009 OF THE COURT OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST
CLASS, VARKALA
ANNEXURE XI:
TRUE COPY OF THE MEDICAL RECORD ISSUED BY THE
MENTYAL HEALTH CENTRE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
ANNEXURE XII:
TRUE COPY OF THE REQUISITION FOR RADIOISOTOPE
INVESTIGATIONS
ISSUED
BY
THE
REGIONAL
CANCER
CENTRE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
ANNEXURE XIII:
TRUE COPY OF THE DISCHARGE CARD ISSUED IN THE NAME
OF THE 4TH PETITIONER
ANNEXURE XIV:
TRUE COPY OF THE VOTER'S IDENTITY CARD ISSUED IN THE
NAME OF THE 4TH PETITIONER
ANNEXURE XV:
TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON JUDGMENT OF HIGH COURT
DATED 18.3.2013 IN CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.2371 OF 2012, AND
CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.2435 OF 2012
ANNEXURE XVI:
CERTIFIED COPY OF ORDER DATED 31.5.2013 IN C.M.P.
NOS.6037(a) & 6457/2013 OF THE COURT OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST
CLASS-I, VARKALA
/TRUE COPY/
P.S TO JUDGE
P.UBAID, J.
~~~~~~~~~~
Crl.R.P. No.1515 of 2013
~~~~~~~~~~~
Dated this the 3rd July, 2014
ORDER
complaint, prima
Accordingly,
Of course, the de
allegations against the in-laws also but, the Court will have
to
evidence
matrimonial dispute.
mind the unhealthy practice these days to arraign all the inlaws or all the inmates of the matrimonial home when the
aggrieved wife proceeds to file complaint against her
husband. Of course, let proper and judicious decision be
taken by the trial court when moved for discharge under
Section 245 (1) of Cr.P.C.
ma
Sd/P.UBAID
JUDGE
/True copy/
P.S to Judge
Yogendra Yadav & Ors vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 21 July, 2014
Yogendra Yadav & Ors vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 21 July, 2014
4. Now, the question before this Court is whether this Court can compound the offences under Sections 326
and 307 of the IPC which are non- compoundable. Needless to say that offences which are non-compoundable
cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Section 320 of the
Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State of Punjab[1]). However, in a given
case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code
having regard to the fact that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victim has no objection,
even though the offences are non-compoundable. In which cases the High Court can exercise its discretion to
quash the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences which involve moral
turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that
will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two
groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High Court
is convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or
tranquility and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about
peace and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the prosecution
becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will
also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace.
5. In Gian Singh this Court has observed that where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having
regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences
are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in
futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is
restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. Needless to say that the above
observations are applicable to this Court also.
6. Learned counsel for the parties have requested this Court that the impugned order be set aside as the High
Court has not noticed the correct position in law in regard to quashing of criminal proceedings when there is a
compromise. Affidavit has been filed in this Court by complainant-Anil Mandal, who is respondent No. 2
herein. In the affidavit he has stated that a compromise petition has been filed in the lower court. It is further
stated that he and the appellants are neighbours, that there is harmonious relationship between the two sides
and that they are living peacefully. He has further stated that he does not want to contest the present appeal
and he has no grievance against the appellants. Learned counsel for the parties have confirmed that the
disputes between the parties are settled; that parties are abiding by the compromise deed and living peacefully.
They have urged that in the circumstances pending proceedings be quashed. State of Jharkhand has further
filed an affidavit opposing the compromise. The affidavit does not persuade us to reject the prayer made by
the appellant and the second respondent for quashing of the proceedings.
7. In view of the compromise and in view of the legal position which we have discussed hereinabove, we set
aside the impugned order dated 4/7/2012 and quash the proceedings in S.C.No.9/05 pending on the file of 2nd
Additional Sessions Judge, Godda. The appeal is disposed of.
(Ranjana Prakash Desai)
(N.V. Ramana)
New Delhi;
July 21, 2014.
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/16923800/
Yogendra Yadav & Ors vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 21 July, 2014
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1498 OF 2014
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.8795 of 2012]
Manohar Singh Appellant
Vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. Respondents
JUDGMENT
(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant is original Accused No. 3. He was tried along with his father Hukum Singh
original Accused No. 1 and his mother Prem Bai
original Accused No. 2 by the Judicial
Magistrate, Dewas (Madhya Pradesh) in Crime Case No. 1680/2009 for offences punishable under Section
498A of the Indian Penal Code (for short, the IPC ) and Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short, the Dowry Act ). By judgment and order dated
29/9/2010 learned Magistrate acquitted the appellant and the other two accused. Being aggrieved by this order
the State of Madhya Pradesh preferred appeal in the Sessions Court, Dewas being Criminal Appeal
No.12/2011. The Sessions Court set aside the order of acquittal and convicted the appellant and two others
under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced them to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment each and to
pay a fine of Rs.500/- each. For offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Act each of them was sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- each, in default, to undergo simple
imprisonment for two months each.
3. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order, the accused carried criminal revision to the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh. The High Court by the impugned order set aside the conviction and sentence of original
Accused Nos. 1 and 2 i.e. the father and mother of the appellant. The conviction of the appellant was,
however, confirmed. His sentence was reduced to six months and fine of Rs.500/- on each count. Both the
substantive sentences were to run concurrently. Being aggrieved by this judgment the appellant filed the
present appeal.
4. On 21/1/2013 the appellant sought permission to implead the complainant i.e. his wife Reena as respondent
No. 2. A statement was made that the appellant was willing to pay monetary compensation to his wife in lieu
of substantive sentence of imprisonment. Permission to implead the complainant-wife Reena was granted. The
appellant was directed to deposit Rs.25,000/- as litigation expenses. Respondent No. 2 was permitted to
withdraw the said amount unconditionally. Subject to deposit, notice was issued to respondent No. 2 to
consider whether the appellant can be asked to pay some suitable monetary compensation to respondent No. 2
in lieu of substantive sentence of imprisonment. On 24/3/2014 counsel for the appellant made a statement that
the matter is likely to be settled. We directed respondent No. 2 wife to remain present in the Court
on 28/3/2014. Accordingly on 28/03/2014 she remained present in the Court. She stated that if the appellant
pays her Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees two lacs fifty thousand only) as compensation, she is ready to settle the
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/16923800/
Yogendra Yadav & Ors vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 21 July, 2014
matter. This Court, therefore, directed the appellant to bring a demand draft of Rs.2,50,000/- in the name of
Reena (respondent No. 2). This Court noted that the said demand draft can be given to her in case after
hearing the parties and considering the legal position, this Court permits settlement at this stage.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh and
learned counsel for respondent No. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for respondent
No. 2 have requested the Court to show leniency in view of the settlement. Counsel for the State of Madhya
Pradesh has opposed this prayer.
6. Section 498-A of the IPC is non-compoundable. Section 4 of the Dowry Act is also non-compoundable. It
is not necessary to state that non- compoundable offences cannot be compounded by a Court. While
considering the request for compounding of offences the Court has to strictly follow the mandate of Section
320 of the Code. It is, therefore, not possible to permit compounding of offences under Section 498-A of the
IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Act. However, if there is a genuine compromise between husband and wife,
criminal complaints arising out of matrimonial discord can be quashed, even if the offences alleged therein are
non-compoundable, because such offences are personal in nature and do not have repercussions on the society
unlike heinous offences like murder, rape etc. (See Gian Singh v. State of Punjab[2]). If the High Court forms
an opinion that it is necessary to quash the proceedings to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to
secure ends of justice, the High Court can do so. The inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of
the Code is not inhibited by Section 320 of the Code. Needless to say that this Court can also follow such a
course.
7. In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab[3], this Court was dealing with a situation where the accused was
charged for offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC, which is a non-compoundable offence. The
parties arrived at a compromise at the stage of recording of evidence. A petition was filed under Section 482
of the Code for quashing of the proceedings in view of the compromise. The High Court refused to quash the
proceedings. This Court set aside the High Court s order and quashed the proceedings in view of the
compromise. While doing so, this Court laid down certain guidelines. In Guideline No.(VII), this Court
considered a situation where a conviction is recorded by the trial court for offence punishable under Section
307 of the IPC and the matter is at appellate stage. This Court observed that in such cases, a mere compromise
between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has
already been convicted by the trial court. This Court observed that in such cases where charge is proved under
Section 307 of the IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime, there was no question of sparing
a convict found guilty of such a crime. The observation of this Court must be read obviously in the context of
a non-compoundable offence under Section 307 of the IPC. It is trite that a non-compoundable offence cannot
be compounded at any stage (See Gyan Singh v. State of Punjab[4]). However, a compoundable offence can
be compounded in view of a compromise, if the Court finds it proper to do so even after conviction if the
appeal is pending.
8. In this case, the appellant is convicted under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced to undergo six months
imprisonment. He is convicted under Section 4 of the Dowry Act and sentenced to undergo six months
imprisonment. Substantive sentences are to run concurrently. Even though the appellant and respondent No.
2-wife have arrived at a compromise, the order of conviction cannot be quashed on that ground because the
offences involved are non-compoundable. However, in such a situation if the court feels that the parties have a
real desire to bury the hatchet in the interest of peace, it can reduce the sentence of the accused to the sentence
already undergone. Section 498-A of the IPC does not prescribe any minimum punishment. Section 4 of the
Dowry Act prescribes minimum punishment of six months but proviso thereto states that the Court may, for
adequate or special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term
which may be less than six months. Therefore, sentence of the appellant can be reduced to sentence already
undergone by him.
Yogendra Yadav & Ors vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 21 July, 2014
9. Now the question is whether a case for reduction of sentence is made out particularly when the appellant
has undergone only seven days sentence out of six months sentence imposed on him. We see no reason why in
this case we should not reduce the appellant s sentence to sentence already undergone by him.
There can be no doubt about the genuine nature of compromise between the appellant and respondent
No.2-wife. The appellant has offered to pay a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- to respondent No.2-wife as compensation.
A demand draft drawn in the name of respondent No.2 is brought to the Court. As directed by us even
litigation costs of Rs.25,000/- has been deposited by the appellant in the Court. Respondent No.2-wife has
appeared in this Court on more than one occasion and requested this Court to take compromise into
consideration and pass appropriate orders. Learned counsel for the parties have requested us to take a kindly
view of the matter. The affidavit filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh opposing the prayer of the parties does
not impress us.
10. We must also note that the trial court had acquitted the appellant. Though the Sessions Court reversed the
order and convicted the appellant for two years, the High Court reduced the sentence to six months. The
appellant and respondent No.2 were married in 2007. About seven years have gone by. Considering all these
circumstances, in the interest of peace and amity, we are of the opinion that the appellant s sentence
must be reduced to sentence already undergone by him.
11. In the circumstances, the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the appellant under Section 498-A of
the IPC and under Section 4 of the Dowry Act is maintained but the sentence awarded to the appellant is
reduced to sentence already undergone by him, subject to the condition that the appellant pays a sum of
Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees two lacs fifty thousand only) to respondent No.2-wife as compensation. Impugned
order stands modified to the above extent.
12. We must note that a Demand Draft in the sum of Rs.2,50,000/- drawn in the name of respondent No.2
Reena has been handed over to her counsel by learned counsel for the appellant on 18/7/2014.
13. In view of this, bail bond of the appellant, if any, stands discharged.
..J.
(Ranjana Prakash Desai)
J.
(N.V. Ramana)
New Delhi;
July 21, 2014.
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1169 OF 2014
SATHIYAMOORTHY AND ORS. Appellants
Versus
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/16923800/
Yogendra Yadav & Ors vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 21 July, 2014
Yogendra Yadav & Ors vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 21 July, 2014
compromise. They submitted that in view of the settlement, this Court may compound the offences as that will
accord a quietus to all disputes between the parties. Counsel submitted that the accused and the complainant
are cousins. After the compromise they have been staying peacefully in the village. It is in the interest of both
sides to bury the hatchet and lead a peaceful life.
6. Offences under Sections 341 and 325 are compoundable. In view of the settlement they can be permitted to
be compounded. However, offences under Sections 148 and 149 of the IPC are not compoundable. Hence,
permission to compound them cannot be granted. However, since the accused and the victim have entered into
a compromise, we feel that it would be in the interest of both sides to reduce the sentence awarded to the
accused under Sections 325 and 341 of the IPC to the sentence already undergone.
7. In Ram Lal and anr. v. State of J & K[5] the accused were convicted for offence under Section 326 of the
IPC, which is non- compoundable. Looking to the fact that the parties had arrived at a settlement and victim
had no grievance, this Court reduced the sentence for the offence under Section 326 to sentence already
undergone by the appellants-accused. We are inclined to follow similar course.
8. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The offences under Sections 341 and 325 of the IPC, for which
the appellants are convicted, are permitted to be compounded because they are compoundable. The appellants
are acquitted of the said offences. The appellants are stated to have undergone more than six months
imprisonment. So far as offences under Sections 148 and 149 of the IPC are concerned, the conviction of the
appellants for the said offences is reduced to the sentence already undergone by them subject to the appellants
paying Rs.30,000/- as compensation to victim-Murugesan. Compensation be paid within three months from
the date of this judgment.
9. This Court has already released the appellants on bail. In view of this order the bail bonds of the appellants
are discharged subject to payment of compensation of Rs.30,000/- as directed by us. If compensation is not
paid consequences will follow.
J.
(Ranjana Prakash Desai)
J.
(N.V. Ramana)
New Delhi;
July 21, 2014.
----------------------[1] (2012) 10 SCC 303
[2] (2012) 10 SCC 303
[3] JT 2014 (4) SC 573
[4] (2012) 10 SCC 303
[5] (1999) 2 SCC 213
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/16923800/
Yogendra Yadav & Ors vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 21 July, 2014
----------------------24
wp312.14.sxw
rt
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ou
INTHEHIGHCOURTOFJUDICATUREATBOMBAY
CRIMINALAPPELLATEJURISDICTION
CRIMINALWRITPETITIONNO.312OF2014
VinodRajkrishanKaushik&ors.
Versus
ig
h
TheStateofMaharashtra.
...Petitioners.
...Respondents.
Mr.A.K.Padhyi/b.A.K.Padhy&Co.advocateforpetitioners.
ba
y
Mr.S.R.Shinde,APPforState.
CORAM:SMT.SADHANAS.JADHAV,J
DATE:JULY25,2014
P.C.:
om
HeardthelearnedCounselforthePetitionersandthelearned
APPforState.
Rule. Rulemadereturnableforthwithwiththeconsentofthe
parties.
ThePetitionerhereinchallengescorrectnessandvalidityofthe
Orderdated16/11/2011passedbythe19 thJointJudicialMagistrate
FirstClass,PunetherebyrejectingtheapplicationbelowExh.26filed
::: Downloaded on - 09/08/2014 16:10:45 :::
wp312.14.sxw
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ou
bythepresentpetitionersseekingdischargeaswellastheorderdated
30thNovember,2013passedinCriminalRevisionApplicationNo.169
of2012passedbytheAdditionalSessionsJudge,Pune.
SuchofthefactsnecessaryforthedecisionofthisWritPetition
ig
h
areasfollows:
PetitionerNos.1and2gotmarriedtothecomplainantMadhvikaon
26/1/2008.ThePetitionerNo.3aswellashiswifewereworkingas
ba
y
SoftwareEngineersatPune.
om
ChaturshrungiPoliceStation,PunebythewifeofthepetitionerNo.3
wp312.14.sxw
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ou
wasconstrainedtoleavefromdoorstepitself.On17/6/2008uncle
andbrotheroftheinformantcametoPuneandtriedtopacifythe
couple.TheyhadalsocontactedwiththePetitionerNos.1and2.It
is alleged that at that time, the petitioners had insisted upon the
ig
h
Station. Sincetheoffenceallegedappearedtobeinthenatureof
ba
y
noncognizableoffence,thepolicehadrecordedoccurrencereport.
AfterreachingUjjainthefirstinformantlodgedadetailedfirst
om
informationreportascontemplatedunderSection154oftheCodeof
Criminal Procedure, 1973 on 18th June, 2008 wherein she had
wp312.14.sxw
rt
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ou
297of2008isregisteredagainstthepresentpetitionersforoffence
punishableunderSection498A,506,406and323readwithSection
34 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 3 and 4 Dowry
ig
h
ProhibitionActon4/7/2008.
Theinvestigationwassetinmotion.Chargesheetwasfiledfor
investigationthatthevaluablesandotherarticlesbelongingto the
firstinformantwereinthecustodyoftheaccusedpersonsandhence,
ba
y
Section406oftheIndianPenalCodewasadded.
om
wp312.14.sxw
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ou
todecidingthematterwithoutallowingtheprosecution toadduce
evidence.
ig
h
ba
y
om
Uponperusalofthechargesheet,theSessionsCourthadformedan
opinionthatalthoughtheoccurrence reportdated17 th June,2008
doesnotdepicttheentirefactsandallegations,itdefinitelyreflects
thatthePetitionerNo.3hadassaultedtheinformantbyhandsinthe
interveningnightof15thJune,2008and16thJune,2008.Ithadalso
arrived at a conclusion that the statements of the witnesses
corroborated the contents of the FIR. The statement of Monika
Agnihotri revealedthatshehadvisitedthe houseoftheinformant
and was restrained by the Petitioner No. 3 from meeting the
wp312.14.sxw
rt
C
ou
informant.TheSessionsCourthadthereforeupheldtheorderpassed
bytheMagistrateandhadrefusedtointerferewiththeorderpassed
bytheMagistrateandtheRevisionApplicationwasdismissed.Hence,
10
ig
h
thisWritPetition.
vehementlyarguedthatinfact,itwasmandatoryuponthe learned
MagistratetodischargethePetitionersonthegroundthatframingof
thechargewouldbefutile.Itwasapparentthattheprosecutionwas
ba
y
initiatedonlytoharassthePetitioners.LearnedCounselhasargued
thatomnibusallegationsarelevelledagainstthePetitionersandfrom
om
bareperusaloftheFIR,itwouldbeapparentthatthefirstinformant
would not be able to substantiate the charges levelled against the
petitioner.ItisarguedthatthemarriageofthePetitionerNo.3and
theinformantwasperformedwithoutacceptinganydowry. Itwas
furtherarguedthatintheapplicationforbailitwasadmittedthatthe
parents of the informant had not given any dowry. It is further
argued that while considering the application seeking bail, the
Petitioner No. 3 has filed an application seeking restitution of
conjugalrightsinthecourtofDelhi. ItisfurtherarguedthatPune
wp312.14.sxw
rt
C
ou
policehadnotdeniedtoregisteroffenceandyetitwasnotregistered
sincenocognisable offencewasmadeoutatthatstage. Thatthe
complainanthaddeniedmedicalexaminationatPune,butpreferred
to subject herself for medical examination after two days. Hence,
ig
h
suchevidenceintheformofinjurycertificateismanipulated.Atthe
timeofdecidingtheapplicationseekingdischarge,accordingtothe
learned Counsel it was incumbent upon the Court to consider the
defenceoftheaccusedalso. Itismentionedinthesynopsistothe
Petitionthaton15thDecember,2010,PrincipalJudge,FamilyCourt,
ba
y
Ujjainhasgrantedadecreeofdivorceinfavourofthecomplainant.
Muchstressislaidupontheinjurycertificatewhichaccordingtothe
om
learnedCounselisaconcocteddocument.
11
Itispertinenttonotethatinparagraph19ofthePetitionitis
contendedthatameresuggestiontothehighlypaidnewlycoupleto
plantobuyahouseinDelhibytakinghomeloanjointly,canneverbe
treatedasademandofdowryortorturefortakingaloanofRs.30
Lakhsforbuyingahouse,asisevidentfromthecontentsoftheemail
Subject:HouseinOmaxeHousing.Itisspecificallycontendedthatin
wp312.14.sxw
rt
C
ou
thefirstoccurrencereportthereisnoavermentinrespectofdowry,
harassmentorbreachoftrustandthesamewasconcoctedatIndore.
12
ItisamatterofrecordthatthePetitionerNos.1and2werenot
ig
h
residingunderthesameroofalongwiththePetitionerNo.3andthe
firstinformant.TheywereresidingatNoida.Itistheallegationthat
theyusedtovisitPuneandatthattime,therewasharassment.Itis
pertinenttonotethatinthereportdated17/6/2008therewasno
allegationagainstthePetitionerNos.1and2.Hence,thecontention
ba
y
om
PetitionerNos.1and2deservestobedischargedonthegroundthat
theywerelivingseparately.Therearenoallegationsagainstthemin
wp312.14.sxw
rt
C
ou
ground.ItispertinenttonotethattheFamilyCourtatUjjainpassed
decreeofdivorceinfavourofthecomplainantinaDivorcePetition
filedbyher.
ig
h
13
relianceontheJudgmentoftheApexCourtinthecaseofPritiGupta
&anr.v/s.StateofJharkhand&anr.reportedin AIR 2010 SC 3363
whereintheHon'bletheHon'bleApexCourthasobservedthat
a serious relook of the entire provision is warranted by the
ba
y
om
reflectedinaverylargenumberofcases.
The criminal trials lead to immense sufferings for all
concerned.Evenultimateacquittalinthetrialmayalsonotbe
able to wipe out the deep scars of suffering of ignominy.
Unfortunatelyalargenumberofthesecomplaintshavenotonly
floodedthecourtsbutalsohaveledtoenormoussocialunrest
affectingpeace,harmonyandhappinessofthesociety.Itishigh
time that the legislature must take into consideration the
pragmatic realities andmake suitable changesin the existing
law.Itisimperativeforthelegislaturetotakeintoconsideration
the informed public opinion and the pragmatic realities in
wp312.14.sxw
rt
10
C
ou
provisionsoflaw.
Hence, the Hon'ble Apex Court had circulated the copy of the
JudgmenttotheLawCommissionandtotheUnionLawSecretary,
14
ig
h
GovernmentofIndia.
ba
y
withdrawnherselffromthematrimonialhouse.
om
15
Section498AoftheIndianPenalCodereadsthus:
498A.Husbandorrelativeofhusbandofawomansubjecting
hertocruelty.Whoever,beingthehusbandortherelativeof
thehusbandofawoman,subjectssuchwomantocrueltyshall
bepunishedwithimprisonmentforatermwhichmayextendto
threeyearsandshallalsobeliabletofine.Explanation.For
thepurposeofthissection,crueltymeans
(a) anywilfulconductwhichisofsuchanatureasislikelyto
drivethewomantocommitsuicideortocausegraveinjuryor
dangertolife,limborhealth(whethermentalorphysical)of
thewoman;or
(b)harassmentofthewomanwheresuchharassmentiswitha
viewtocoercingheroranypersonrelatedtohertomeetany
unlawfuldemandforanypropertyorvaluablesecurityorison
wp312.14.sxw
rt
11
C
ou
accountoffailurebyheroranypersonrelatedtohertomeet
suchdemand.
Section498AoftheIndianPenalCodecontemplates harassmentof
suchanaturewhichwouldcoercethewifeorherrelativestomeet
ig
h
anyunlawfuldemandforanypropertyorvaluablesecurityortodrive
thewomantocommitsuicideortocausegaveinjuryordangertolife,
limborhealthofthewoman.Recitalsofthefirstinformationreport
inthiscaseonlydiscloseastrayincidentwhichhadoccurredduetoa
verbalaltercationbetweenthehusbandandwifewhichwouldbea
ba
y
naturalaffairbetweenmostofthecouples.Differenceofopinionor
verbalaltercationonaparticularissueorasolitaryincidentwhich
om
termedasharassmentorcruelty.
16
conduct,oraction(usuallyrepeatedorpersistent)thatbeingdirected
ataspecificperson,annoys,alarmsorcausessubstantialemotional
distressinthatpersonandservesnolegitimatepurpose.Emphasisis
beinglaiduponusually,repeatedorpersistent.Inthepresentcase,
it cannot be said that the Petitioner No. 3 was persistent in his
wp312.14.sxw
rt
12
C
ou
medicalexaminationatPunewouldshowthatshehadnoapparent
injuries. The police officer at Chaturshrungi Police Station would
ig
h
havedefinitelynoticedthebruisesifitappearedon hereyesand
otherfeatures.Therefore,therecreepsdoubtastowhetherthesaid
lived.
ba
y
17
apprehensionofbodilyharmwhichendangerslife,limborhealth.In
om
thepresentcase,theCourtisdoubtfulastowhethertheinjurieswere
really caused at the place where the first information report was
wp312.14.sxw
rt
13
C
ou
relativestopacifytherelationsbetweentheyoungcouple.Asagainst
this, the Petitioner No.3hasfiledapetition seekingrestitutionof
conjugalrightswhichreflectshisattitudeandinclinationtoforgive
thecomplainant. ItissurprisingthattheFamilyCourtatUjjainhas
ig
h
passedadecreeofdivorceinthepresentcaseintheyear2010itself.
It is doubtful as to whether a ground was made out for judicial
divorce.
TheHon'bleApexCourtintherecentJudgmentinthecaseof
ba
y
18
separationforaperiodof2yearssothattheinformantcouldgeta
ArneshKumarv/s.StateofBihar&anr.hasobservedthat
om
Thereisphenomenalincreaseinmatrimonialdisputesinrecent
years. The institution of marriage is greatly revered in this
country.Section498AoftheIPCwasintroducedwithavowed
objecttocombatthemenaceofharassmenttoawomanatthe
handsofherhusbandandhisrelatives.ThefactthatSection
498A is a cognizable and nonbailable offence has lent it a
dubiousplaceofprideamongsttheprovisionsthatareusedas
weaponsratherthanshieldbydisgruntledwives.Thesimplest
waytoharassistogetthehusbandandhisrelativesarrested
underthisprovision.
Inthepresentcase,itisamatterofrecordthatthePetitioner
C
ou
19
wp312.14.sxw
rt
14
No.3hadtoundergoincarcerationforaweekbecauseofthefactthat
hewasarrestedunaware.ThePetitionerNo.3wasarrestedon26 th
September, 2008 and was released on bail on 1/10/2008. The
ig
h
PetitionerNo.3wasexposedtosocialobloquyattheplaceofservice
since hewas arrested intheofficei.e.intheTCSoffice andwas
handcuffed. Allthiswouldclearly showthatthecomplainantwas
seekingpersonalvendettawithouttherebeinganysufficientgrounds.
ThecontentionofthelearnedCounselforthepetitionersthat
ba
y
20
thePetitionershadfiledanapplicationundertheRighttoInformation
om
Actwhichshowedthattheuncleofthecomplainantwaspresentin
theirofficeatUjjainonthedaywhenitwasshownthathehadtaken
thecomplainantfromPunetoUjjainneedstobeconsidered.Hehad
notobtainedanyleavetovisitPune.
21 As theHon'bleApexCourthasobserved,itisseenthatinthe
presentcasethedisgruntledwifefiledtheproceedingsunderSection
498A,406,323oftheIndianPenalCode.Soonthereafter,apetition
is filed under the provisions of the Protection of Women from
wp312.14.sxw
rt
15
C
ou
DomesticViolenceAct,2005.Thereaftertheproceedingsareinitiated
intheFamilyCourt.Hence,thehusbandandhisrelativeshavetogo
throughtheordealoflegalproceedingsinthesamecasein3different
courts.Hence,thetimehascometokeepinmindtheobservationsof
abuseofprocessoflaw.
Infact,theGovernmentofMaharashtrahadissuedacircularto
22
ig
h
theHon'bleApexCourtandpassanappropriateorderstopreventan
allPoliceStationthatwheneverthereisacomplaintunderSection
ba
y
498A,theconcernedpoliceofficershouldcalluponboththeparties
and make an effort to bring about reconciliation and give them
om
sufficienttimetocometoterms.Inthepresentcase,itappearsthat
no serious allegations were made at Chaturshrungi Police Station
wp312.14.sxw
rt
16
C
ou
23
ig
h
facts.
Hon'ble Apex Court cited supra, and for the reasons mentioned
hereinabove,thePetitionseekingdischargedeservestobeallowed.
TheWritPetitionisallowedintermsofprayerclause(b).Rule
ba
y
24
(SMT.SADHANAS.JADHAV,J)
om
ismadeabsolute.WritPetitionisdisposedofaccordingly.
the Respondent No.4. After marriage the complainant Tarrannum started residing with her husband and
in-laws. The husband of the h
complainant Tarrannum owned an Indica car. That after one month ig
of the marriage, the in-laws of the complainant started taunting her on one or the other counts. After some
days as the vehicle of her H
husband required repairs, her in-laws asked her to bring Rs.5,000/- from her parents. Therefore her brother
gave an amount of Rs.5,000/-. The record further discloses that as per the complaint, the y
in-laws again demanded a sum of Rs.10,000/- and the said demand ba
was also fulfilled with. The Respondent Nos.1 to 6 used to ill treat and abuse the complainant. The
complainant has further stated that on om
6th November 2007 the Respondent No.7 i.e. the husband of her sister-in-law (Respondent No.4) left his wife
and her mother-in-law on the railway station as they were to go to Gujarat and came to the B
house and while the complainant was alone in the house, he had forcible sexual intercourse with her. The
complainant thereafter lodged a complaint dated 8th December 2007 at Thane Nagar Police ::: Downloaded
on - 28/07/2014 23:50:06 ::: PNP 3/9 ALS75 Station for the offence under Sections 498(A) read with 34 of
the Indian Penal Code against the Respondent Nos.1 to 6 and for the rt
offence under Sections 376 and 506 against the Respondent No.7. ou
The said complaint was registered as Crime No.I-385/2007.
3. The record further discloses that the investigating agency C
investigated the matter and after completion of the investigation submitted a charge-sheet against the
Respondents in the Court of h
Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Thane. The Learned Magistrate ig
committed the said case to the Court of Sessions. After committal of the said case the Trial Court framed
charge below Exhibit 8. The said H
charge was read over to the Respondents in vernacular language to which they denied and claimed to be tried.
The prosecution examined in all eight witnesses in support of its case. The Learned Trial Court y
after recording the evidence and after hearing the parties to the ba
Sessions Case No.158 of 2009 has acquitted all the Respondents from the charges framed against them.
om
4. Heard Smt. V.R. Bhonsale, the learned APP appearing for and on behalf of the State and scrutinized the
record produced by her B
along with the notes of evidence.
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/161342542/
5. As far as charge under Section 498(A) is concerned, the same ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2014 23:50:06 :::
PNP 4/9 ALS75 has been founded on the basis of the allegations made by the complainant Tarrannum against
the Respondent Nos.1 to 6. In her rt
substantive evidence she had stated that after two to three months of ou
her marriage, her husband and his parents started beating and assaulting her. She has further stated that her
husband owned an Indica car and whenever there was any defect in the said car, her C
husband and his parents forced her to bring money from her brother for repairs of the car. That her brother
Sajid on two occasions in the h
year 2005-06 gave an amount of Rs.5,000/- and Rs.10,000/- to them. ig
As the complainant could not give birth to a child, her sister-in-laws used to taunt her has barren. In the
evidence of P.W.3 - Mohd. Rafiq H
Abdul Karim who is the father of the complainant he has stated that he paid Rs.5,000/- once and Rs.10,000/twice to the Respondent No.2 - Noormahamad Gulmahamad Shaikh and despite the fact the y
demand of the Respondents continued. He has further stated that ba
the Respondents used to torture the complainant. The evidence of P.W.4 and P.W.5 who are the brothers of
the complainant also om
discloses that the Respondents used to demand from the complainant to which they have fulfilled and despite
the fact the demand from the Respondents used to continue. After scrutinizing the evidence of B
P.W. 1 - complainant Tarrannum, P.W.3 - Mohd. Rafiq Abdul Karim the father of the complainant and P.W.4
and P.W.5 - the brothers of the complainant, it is clear that they are unable to state when the ::: Downloaded
on - 28/07/2014 23:50:06 ::: PNP 5/9 ALS75 demand was exactly made and when they fulfilled the same. It
appears that their evidence is absolutely vague as far as demand of rt
amount and its fulfillment is concerned. It appears to us that there is ou
material inconsistency in the versions of these witnesses about the demand made by the Respondents and its
alleged fulfillment by them. Thus, according to us the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the C
charge under Section 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code beyond reasonable doubt.
h
6.
ig
The complainant has further alleged that the Respondent Nos.4, 5 and 6 i.e. her sister-in-laws used to taunt her
as the complainant H
could not give birth to a child. They used to address her as "Khali Khoka Hai" and "Banz Hai" and thereby
caused mental cruelty to the complainant. In the testimony the complainant has stated that her y
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/161342542/
The Respondent Nos.3 and 4 said that the Respondent No.7 cannot do such an act and thereafter the
Respondent No.2 i.e. the husband of H
the complainant beat her. Thereafter the in-laws of the complainant called the father of the complainant i.e.
P.W.3 and asked him to take his daughter back. It appears from the record that on 8 th December y
2007 a complaint came to be registered with the police, while the ba
complainant left the house of the Respondents on 18 th November 2007. After registration of the complaint
P.W.8 - Dr. Bhavna Telang om
examined the complainant on 11th December 2007 and after conducting the various examinations P.W.8 - Dr.
Bhavna opined that the patient is habituated to sexual intercourse. B
8. It is to be noted here that the evidence of P.W.3 i.e. the father of the complainant is absolutely vague with
respect to the offence as ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2014 23:50:06 ::: PNP 8/9 ALS75 contemplated under
Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. It is surprising to note that the complainant did not inform her father rt
immediately after the alleged incident of rape. P.W.3 in his testimony ou
did not specify when the incident occurred or when his daughter told him about the said incident. It further
appears that the evidence of P.W.4 and P.W.5 i.e. the brothers of the complainant is not consistent C
with each other and both of them have given different versions. The record discloses that the alleged incident
of rape is dated 6 th h
November 2007. As per the version of the complainant herself she ig
remained silent upto 18th November 2007. It further appears that the complainant did not make any attempt to
inform the said fact even to H
her parents or brothers. It is further important to note that after disclosure of the incident to the parents and
brothers on 18 th November 2007 by the complainant, the complaint came to be lodged y
on 8th December 2007 i.e. after a period of twenty days from 18 th ba
November 2007 and after approximately one month and two days from the alleged occurrence of incident.
The evidence of prosecution om
is absolutely silent about the delay which has caused in lodging of the First Information Report. The
prosecution has not explained the delay caused in lodging the F.I.R. The prosecution has totally failed to B
prove the offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code against the Respondent No.7.
::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2014 23:50:06 ::: PNP 9/9 ALS75
9. After scrutinizing the entire evidence on record, we are of the opinion that the Trial Court has not
committed any error while rt
acquitting the Respondents by its judgment and order dated 26 th ou
September 2013 passed in Sessions Case No.158 of 2009. Hence, the present Criminal Application for leave
to file an Appeal is dismissed. Leave rejected.
C
(Smt. V.K.Tahilramani, J.)
h
ig (A.S. Gadkari, J.) H
y
ba
om
B
::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2014 23:50:07 :::
4. Surprisingly, in spite of Hari Singh complaining about dowry harassment and notwithstanding the MLC of
Gayatri evidencing either a suicidal or a homicidal death, neither Ashish Mohan PW-8 nor SI Birender PW-10
thought it prudent to get registered an FIR, if not for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC at least for
the offence punishable under Section 498A/304B IPC.
5. Gayatri s post-mortem was conducted on March 17, 2011 by Dr.Santosh Kumar PW-9 who prepared the
post mortem report Ex.PW-9/A on March 17, 2011 recording therein as under:EXTERNAL EXAMINATION
Crl.Appeal No. 210/2013 Page 2 of 16 "No any fresh external injuries were present over the body except the
ligature mark. Ligature mark present on the upper border of thyroid cartilage in the form of groove, base is
dry, hard, leathery, parchment like reddish brown in colour, placed obliquely going towards the posterior
aspect of neck. Total circumference of neck is 32.0 cms. Ligature mark size is 26.0 cms x 1.0 cms. The upper
border of ligature mark is 6.0 cms below form the base of chin and lower border of ligature mark is 10.0 cms
above from the M.sternii. Ligature mark is 3.0 cms below from the right mastoid and 7.0 cms below from the
left mastoid. Ligature mark is incomplete and does not encircle the whole neck and absent at the posterior
aspect of neck on posterior hair line"
XXXXXX
INTERNAL EXAMINATION
"Neck
Hyoid Bone/Thyroid cartilage/Cricoid cartilage/Tracheal Rings & Mucosa/Any Foreign Body in Trachea: On
incision and dissection of neck, no extravasations of blood and clots seen underneath the ligature mark,
underlying tissue of neck, muscles and upto the back of trachea. Skin lying under the ligature mark is dry, pale
ad glistering. Hyoid bone and all cartilages of neck are intact. Mucosa of tracheal lumen is congested and
tracheal lumen contains froth."
6. In his opinion as regards the cause of death he positively opined that death was due to asphyxia from ante
mortem ligature hanging.
7. Regretfully, SI Birender PW-10 did not bother to go and collect the post mortem report of Gayatri on
March 17, 2011 or a day thereafter. He collected the post mortem report only on May 20, 2011 and then
prepared the rukka Ex.PW-10/B at 6.15 P.M. on May 20, 2011 and got registered the FIR Ex.PW-13/A on
May 20, 2011 for offences punishable under Section 498A/304B IPC.
Crl.Appeal No. 210/2013 Page 3 of 16
8. Two lack of concern, the first by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the second by SI Birender are
not the only blemish. Another blemish was by SI Birender PW-10 not investigating the case properly to try
and ascertain whether apart from Mukesh, his parents Dinesh and Krishna Devi were present in the house
when Gayatri was removed to the hospital. It was not known whether it was a case of homicide or suicide. If it
was a case of homicide, who all were present in the house would assume relevance.
9. Insp.Praveen Kumar PW-12 took over the investigation on June 07, 2011 and unfortunately even he did not
try to ascertain whether Gayatri s in-laws were present in the house.
10. Mukesh, his parents Dinesh and Krishna Devi were charged for an offence punishable under Section
498A/34 IPC as also for an offence punishable under Section 304B/34 IPC and alternatively for the offence
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/21870300/
18. A ligature mark is the result of abrasion or compression of the skin by a strangulation device, which
usually has a rough surface. The mark is usually visible as a pale furrow soon after death and after a lapse of
time it turns into a brownish hue as the furrow dries. In cases where the surface of the ligature is very smooth,
the abrasive effect is minimal and the mark is visible as a pale strip of skin or furrow for sometime after death.
If a large amount of material is used, the ligature mark may be the impression of the folds of the cloth, or in
some circumstances there may be no mark at all.
Crl.Appeal No. 210/2013 Page 6 of 16
19. In cases where the cause of death is compression of the neck, ligature mark may be found in two
circumstances: (a) death by hanging, and (b) death by ligature strangulation.
20. It is a well-accepted fact that the ligature mark of hanging and strangulation are not found at same level.
21. Thus, it would be apposite to understand and differentiate between the ligature patterns along with other
external and internal injuries which result from each of the above two situations. A reading of Modi s
Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 23rd ed. 2005 and Burkhard Made, (ed.), Wiley Blackwell, Handbook
of Forensic Medicine, 1st ed.rep.2014 would bring out that hanging entails the suspension of the body by a
ligature around the neck, wherein the constricting force on the neck which causes death happens to be the
weight of the body. The loop of a running knot tightens during suspension and produces a ligature mark which
is horizontal but moving upward towards the chin and in almost every case, above the thyroid cartilage.
22. In cases of complete hanging i.e. suspension of the body with no contact with the ground petechiae
(red/purple spots on the skin) is not present. However in cases of cases of incomplete hanging i.e. where the
body is suspended but has some form of contact to the ground petechiae may found on the eye, face, behind
the ears and in the oral mucosa.
23. In suicidal hanging, the ligature mark usually runs above the thyroid cartilage. In most cases, it lies
between the chin and the larynx. If the noose slips upwards during the hanging, there may be several parallel
marks and broad abrasions, which run upwards. The blood draining from the head and
Crl.Appeal No. 210/2013 Page 7 of 16 pooling around the ligature might lead to a band of red skin above the
ligature furrow.
24. Where a ligature is bound twice or more around the neck, overlapping folds of skin may be caught
between the individual loops, known as skin ridges. Skin blisters filled with fluid in the interior and the
periphery of the ligature, and dried saliva tracks in the mouth may also be found. When the ligature passes
above the larynx, the hyoid bone is pushed obliquely backwards together with the base of the tongue resting
against the posterior wall of the pharynx, which leads to obstruction of air. The tongue is thereby protruded
forward.
25. In addition to the aforementioned external injuries, hanging also entails certain internal injuries.
Haemorrhages are mostly to be found on the clavicles, more rarely on the manubrium sterni. However,
haemorrhages around the laryngeal and hyoid fractures are scarce and almost non- existent.Only in extreme
incidences of trauma, as in falls from a height with the noose around the neck, ruptures of the fasciae and the
neck muscles may be observed.
26. In deaths because of ligature strangulation, petechiae are usually present. It is generally more intense than
in other forms of strangulations because of the strength applied by the arms in tightening the ligature. Just like
the ligature mark produced in death by hanging, the ligature mark is caused by the abrasion of the ligature on
the skin. In the majority of cases, the ligature furrow runs horizontally round the neck on its front and sides. If
the ligature is a wide band of cloth with a smooth surface, the lesion of the stratum corneum may be so
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/21870300/
minimal that no mark is discernible. Non- intense ligature strangulations may simply leave a reddish
hyperaemia on
Crl.Appeal No. 210/2013 Page 8 of 16 the skin of the neck. However, in cases of intense strangulation the
larynx and hyoid bone might suffer a fracture. Occasionally, a fine white foam may adhere to the laryngeal,
tracheal and bronchial walls, which may be streaked with blood The foam accumulates from bronchial
secretion and tidal air during dyspnoea.
27. We reproduce an extract from a research paper by Dr.Dean Hawley, Director of Autopsy Services, Indiana
University of Medicine wherein he discusses the injuries, which result from ligature strangulation:- "The
injuries that may occur include patterned contusions and abrasions caused by fingernails, finger touch pads,
ligatures, or clothing. These injuries are then prone to change over time, with the healing process. Injuries not
at all apparent on the day of death may actually become visible by the next day, as the skin begins to dry and
become more transparent.
In addition to the blunt force injuries of the neck, strangulation produces evidence of asphyxiation, recognized
as pinpoint hemorrhages in the skin, conjunctiva of the eyes, and deep internal organs."
28. The comparison between the ligature marks resulting from hanging and strangulation has been lucidly
discussed in Sadikhusen G.Momin, et. al, Pattern of Ligature Mark in Cases of Compressed Neck in Rajkot
Region: A Prospective Study, J. Indian Acad Forensic Med. Jan-Mar 2012, Vol.34, No.1 as under:
"A running noose can tighten at the time of suspension and may then produce a mark which takes a horizontal
turn but it is likely to be above the thyroid cartilage. Ligature mark depends on the nature and position of the
ligature used, and the time of suspension of body after death. If the ligature is soft, and the ligature removed
immediately after death, there may be no mark. Again, the intervention of a thick and long beard or clothes on
the neck leads to the formation of a slight mark.
Crl.Appeal No. 210/2013 Page 9 of 16 Sometimes, the pattern of the ligature material is impressed on the skin
and a characteristic diagonal mark of the strands found when the rope is used. The wide band of cloth when
used as a ligature on the bare skin may cause a narrow ligature mark, due to tension lines in the stretched
cloth. The mark is a groove or furrow the base is pale, hard leathery and parchment like and margins are red
and congested. Ecchymoses and slight abrasions in the groove are rare, but may be found in some cases for
instance in judicial hanging.
Usually only one mark is found. Multiple marks may be present due to multiple turns around the neck or
upward displacement after application due to fall. The mark is usually situated above thyroid cartilage
between larynx and the chin and is directed obliquely, upwards following the line of mandible and interrupted
at the back or may show an irregular impression of a knot, reaching the mastoid processes behind the ears
towards the point of suspension.
The mark may be found on or below the thyroid cartilage, especially in case of partial hanging. It may be
circular if a ligature is first placed at the nape of neck and then its two ends are brought horizontally forwards
and crossed, and carried upwards to the point of suspension from behind the angle of the lower jaw on each
side. The mark will be circular and oblique if a ligature is passed round the neck more than once. Near the
position of the knot, it is like an inverted "V".In strangulation, ligature may be applied as one turn around the
neck or even less, as homicide have been perpetrated by assailant pulling U shaped ligature against the front
and sides of neck, while standing at the back."
29. The aforementioned research paper referred to a study conducted by the Department of Forensic
Medicine, P.D.U. Medical College and Hospital, Rajkot where a number of cases of death by hanging and
ligature strangulation were examined. It was observed as under: "In all cases of hanging underlying soft
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/21870300/
tissues of neck were pale, white and glistening, ligature mark was incompletely
Crl.Appeal No. 210/2013 Page 10 of 16 encircling the neck in 72 cases (80%) and obliquely present around
the neck all 90 cases (100%) of hanging. In all cases of ligature strangulation underlying soft tissues showed
extravasation of blood."
30. At this stage, a word also needs to be spoken about death by smothering. Smothering is a form of asphyxia
by blockage of external respiratory orifices, or blockage of cavities of nose or mouth. Homicidal smothering is
extremely difficult to detect. Autopsy may reveal asphyxia, but there may not be any corroborative medical
evidence to establish foul play.
31. Having noted as above, keeping in view the external and the internal injuries noted in the post mortem
report, it is apparent that the ligature mark is the only external injury present on the body. There is no other
injury anywhere on the body to evidence any sort of struggle or possible resistance by the deceased. The
ligature mark is present on the upper border of thyroid cartilage as it is in almost all cases of hanging. The
mark is 3 and 7 centimetres below the right and left mastoid i.e. the projections behind each ear respectively.
The position of the above indicates that the ligature mark is horizontal but makes a V . The said
pattern of ligature mark bears considerable similarity to the ligature marks present in bodies where the cause
of death was hanging. In almost all cases of hanging, the ligature mark was present right above the thyroid
cartilage. Thus, the ligature pattern resembles the ligature marks found in cases of death by hanging. Relevant
would it be to note that no extravasation of blood was found under the ligature mark. As earlier noted, all
cases of ligature strangulation showed extravasation of blood in the underlying tissues.
32. Thus, even otherwise there enough material to conclude that the
Crl.Appeal No. 210/2013 Page 11 of 16 deceased was not strangulated to death. The death is by hanging.
There is no possibility of the deceased being forcefully hanged because if it was so she would have resisted
and there would be other injuries on the body.
33. The death being suicidal, the trial court committed a serious error in convicting the appellants for offence
under Section 302 IPC. This brings us to the question whether the appellants can be convicted for offences
punishable under Sections 304B and 498A IPC. A perusal of the record shows that the appellants were
charged for offences punishable under Sections 302/304B/498A/34 IPC. They have been acquitted for
offences punishable under Section 304B and 498A IPC and no leave to appeal petition has been filed by the
State against the impugned judgment nor has any appeal been filed by the complainant against acquittal of the
appellants for the aforesaid offences.
34. In the decision reported as (2001) 2 SCC 577 Shamnsaheb M. Multtani Vs. State of Karnataka a three
judge bench noted that where main ingredients of two cognate offences are common the one punishable with
lesser sentence can be said to be minor offence. Noting that the ingredients of Section 304B IPC were
different from those of Section 302 IPC, the former could not be regarded as minor offence of the latter, it was
held "25. We have now to examine whether, on the evidence now on record the appellant can be convicted under
Section 304-B IPC without the same being included as a count in the charge framed. Section 304-B has been
brought on the statute book on 9-11-1986 as a package along with Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. Section
304-B(1) IPC reads thus:
woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within
seven years of her marriage and it is shown
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/21870300/
Crl.Appeal No. 210/2013 Page 12 of 16 that soon before her death she was subjected to
cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand
for dowry, such death shall be called dowry death, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have
caused her death.
26. In the Explanation to the Section it is said that the word dowry shall be understood as defined in the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
27. The postulates needed to establish the said offence are: (1) Death of a wife should have occurred
otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage; (2) soon before her death she
should have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused in connection with any demand for dowry.
Now reading section 113B of the Evidence Act, as a part of the said offence, the position is this: If the
prosecution succeeds in showing that soon before her death she was subjected by him to cruelty or harassment
for or in connection with any demand for dowry and that her death had occurred (within seven years of her
marriage) otherwise than under normal circumstances "the court shall presume that such person had caused
dowry death".
28. Under Section 4 of the Evidence Act "whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume the
fact it shall regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved". So the court has no option but to
presume that the accused had caused dowry death unless the accused disproves it. It is a statutory compulsion
on the court. However it is open to the accused to adduce such evidence for disproving the said compulsory
presumption, as the burden is unmistakably on him to do so. He can discharge such burden either by eliciting
answers through cross- examination of the witnesses of the prosecution or by adducing evidence on the
defence side or by both.
29. At this stage, we may note the difference in the legal position between the said offence and section 306
IPC which was merely an offence of abetment of suicide earlier. The
Crl.Appeal No. 210/2013 Page 13 of 16 section remained in the statute book without any practical use till
1983. But by the introduction of Section 113A in the Evidence Act the said offence under Section 306 IPC
has acquired wider dimensions and has become a serious marriage- related offence. Section 113A of the
Evidence Act says that under certain conditions, almost similar to the conditions for dowry death the court
may presume having regard to the circumstances of the case, that such suicide has been abetted by her
husband etc. When the law says that the court may presume the fact, it is discretionary on the part of the court
either to regard such fact as proved or not to do so, which depends upon all the other circumstances of the
case. As there is no compulsion on the court to act on the presumption the accused can persuade the court
against drawing a presumption adverse to him.
30. But the peculiar situation in respect of an offence under Section 304B IPC, as discernible from the
distinction pointed out above in respect of the offence under Section 306 IPC is this: Under the former the
court has a statutory compulsion, merely on the establishment of two factual positions enumerated above, to
presume that the accused has committed dowry death. If any accused wants to escape from the said catch the
burden is on him to disprove it. If he fails to rebut the presumption the court is bound to act on it.
31. Now take the case of an accused who was called upon to defend only a charge under Section 302 IPC. The
burden of proof never shifts on to him. It ever remains on the prosecution which has to prove the charge
beyond all reasonable doubt. The said traditional legal concept remains unchanged even now. In such a case
the accused can wait till the prosecution evidence is over and then to show that the prosecution has failed to
make out the said offence against him. No compulsory presumption would go to the assistance of the
prosecution in such a situation. If that be so, when an accused has no notice of the offence under Section
304-B IPC, as he was defending a charge under Section 302 IPC alone, would it not lead to a grave
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/21870300/
miscarriage of justice when he is alternatively convicted under Section 304-B IPC and sentenced to the
serious
Crl.Appeal No. 210/2013 Page 14 of 16 punishment prescribed thereunder, which mandates a minimum
sentence of imprisonment for seven years.
32. The serious consequence which may ensue to the accused in such a situation can be limned through an
illustration: If a bride was murdered within seven years of her marriage and there was evidence to show that
either on the previous day or a couple of days earlier she was subjected to harassment by her husband with
demand for dowry, such husband would be guilty of the offence on the language of Section 304-B IPC read
with Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. But if the murder of his wife was actually committed either by a
dacoit or by a militant in a terrorist act the husband can lead evidence to show that he had no hand in her death
at all. If he succeeds in discharging the burden of proof he is not liable to be convicted under Section 304-B
IPC. But if the husband is charged only under Section 302 IPC he has no burden to prove that his wife was
murdered like that as he can have his traditional defence that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge of
murder against him and claim an order of acquittal.
33. The above illustration would amplify the gravity of the consequence befalling an accused if he was only
asked to defend a charge under Section 302 IPC and was alternatively convicted under Section 304-B IPC
without any notice to him, because he is deprived of the opportunity to disprove the burden cast on him by
law.
34. In such a situation, if the trial court finds that the prosecution has failed to make out the case under Section
302 IPC, but the offence under Section 304-B IPC has been made out, the court has to call upon the accused
to enter on his defence in respect of the said offence. Without affording such an opportunity to the accused, a
conviction under Section 304- B IPC would lead to real and serious miscarriage of justice. Even if no such
count was included in the charge, when the court affords him an opportunity to discharge his burden by
putting him to notice regarding the prima facie view of the court that he is liable to be convicted under Section
304-B IPC, unless he succeeds in disproving the presumption, it is possible
Crl.Appeal No. 210/2013 Page 15 of 16 for the court to enter upon a conviction of the said offence in the
event of his failure to disprove the presumption."
35. Thus Sections 304B or 498A IPC not being minor offences of Section 302 IPC, in the absence of an
appeal by the complainant or the State, it is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to convert the conviction for
offence punishable under Section 302 IPC to one under Section 304B or 498A IPC.
36. As the conviction the appellants for offence punishable under Sections 302/34 IPC is illegal, they are
acquitted of the said charge.
37. The appeal is disposed of.
38. The appellants, who are in custody, be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. Copy of the
judgment be sent to Superintendent, Tihar Jail for necessary action.
39. TCR be returned.
(PRADEEP NANDRAJOG)
JUDGE
(MUKTA GUPTA)
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/21870300/
JUDGE
AUGUST 14, 2014
skb
Crl.Appeal No. 210/2013 Page 16 of 16
: Mr.V.Raghavachari for
Mr.Ma.P.Thangavel
For Respondent
: Mr.M.Maharaja,
Additional Public Prosecutor
ORDER
The petitioner was the fifth accused in C.C.No.12 of
2010 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Panruti.
He stood prosecuted along with eight others for alleged offences
under Sections 147, 148 and 323 of IPC. During trial as many
as 12 witnesses were examined and 16 documents were
exhibited on the side of the prosecution.
5.
At
the
outset,
the
learned
Additional
Public
would point out that the lower Court had acquitted him by giving
benefit of doubt. As against the same, neither a revision would
lie nor in such a situation the inherent powers of this Court
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. could be invoked to convert the
said acquittal into one of a honourable acquittal, he contended.
In
appearing
for
the
revision
opinion
that
for
an
authoritative
the following two questions:(i) When Sections 232, 235, 248 and 255
of the Code of Criminal Procedure use only a
simple expression namely "acquittal", without
any adjectives, is it open to the Criminal Courts
to use the expression such as "benefit of
doubt" and " beyond reasonable doubt" etc. ?
and
(ii) Whether this Court has power in
terms of Section 401(1) read with Section
386(d) and (e) of the Code, to alter or
amend the order of "acquittal" of the Trial
Court into one of "honourable acquittal.
12. The Division Bench, after having had elaborate
discussion on the said questions and after having referred to
various judgments of the Supreme Court of U.S.A., the Supreme
Court of Canada as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India,
answered the first question as follows:
40. Therefore, our answer to the first
question is that there is no prohibition in
law for the criminal Courts to use the
expressions such as 'benefit of doubt' and
'beyond reasonable doubt', despite the
fact that Sections 232, 235, 248 and 255
of the Code of Criminal Procedure use only
any
adjectives.
But,
these
have
insofar
no
as
concerned.
criminal
In
jurisprudence,
difference
meaning
In
significance
jurisprudence
civil
law
there
is
between
'disproved'.
or
and
a
'not
service
world
proved'
criminal
is
of
and
jurisprudence,
namely
'not
proved'
and
consequence,
namely
acquittal.
adjectives
used
by
various
acquit
person.
'Proof
beyond
the
petitioner
contention
of
the
would
vehemently
learned
Additional
challenge
Public
the
said
Prosecutor.
But
10
16.
by
the
Division
Bench
on
various
issues
in
11
but, in due
in
his
Lordship's
mind,
requiring
an
authoritative
whether
criminal
court
can
employ
the
expression
The
12
criminal courts.
In
High Court
13
When the
wherein in para 9
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:It is fairly well settled that when
reference is made on a specific issue either
by a learned Single Judge or Division Bench
to a larger Bench i.e. Division Bench or Full
14
the Hon'ble
the
reference
went
on
to
itself
on
15
the Hon'ble
In the
said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was to deal with the
contention that the Full Bench had exceeded its jurisdiction by
enlarging the scope of reference and deciding matters which
were not referred to it by the order dated 13.07.2011 of the
Division Bench. While deciding the said question, the Supreme
Court has taken note of the Rule 4 of the Punjab High Court
Rules which states that Save as provided by law or by these
rules or by special order of the Chief Justice, all cases shall be
heard and disposed of by a Bench of two Judges. The Hon'ble
16
17
Members
and
Chairman
of
the
Public
18
19
position, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:It is true and indisputable, as contended
by Sri A.Raghuvir, the learned senior counsel
that the golden rule that runs through the web
20
Woolmington
Jurisprudence
as
principle
well.
The
to
Indian
Hon'ble
Criminal
Supreme
Court
Law
in
judgment,
the
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court,
referring
to
held: "throughout
the web of the English criminal law the golden thread is always
to be seen that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the
prisoner's guilt subject to what I have already said as to the
defence
of
insanity
and
subject
also
to
any
statutory
21
of
Public
Prosecutions,
(1942)
A.C.
at
11,
22
23
the
cardinal
rule
of
our
criminal
that the test of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not apply
to the accused and if he proves his defence by preponderance of
24
and benefit of
25
26
Judgment
of
acquittal
or
shall,
unless
he
proceeds
in
simple
comparative
reading
of
these
two
35.
On
considering
the
evidence
let
in
by
the
27
that
the
charges
have
not
been
proved
beyond
the Code, the inference is that there was evidence against him,
but he was acquitted either because the charges were not
proved beyond reasonable doubt or that he was extended the
28
Similarly,
or
"giving benefit of doubt" they are not free to use these terms
inappropriately when the accused is acquitted on the ground
that there is no evidence at all against him.
29
doubt
these
expressions
cannot
be
used
30
and
sentence.
As
against
acquittal
or
for
Calling
for
records
to
31
for
and
examine
the
record
of
any
situate
within
its
or
his
local
or
propriety
of
any
finding.
and
if
the
accused
is
in
All
Magistrates,
original
or
appellate
32
33
34
relevant [vide
35
him on the ground that the said sexual intercourse was with the
free consent of the victim and thus, it is not an offence of rape.
36
under Ss.397 and 401 of the Code, for S.397 of the Code,
states that any finding could also be challenged by the
aggrieved. The Division Bench has not adverted to this aspect
of Ss.397 and 401 of the Code. The Division Bench simply has
held that like "any other order", an acquittal cannot be
challenged by an acquitted person. But, the grounds upon which
he was acquitted; the adverse remarks made against him; and
the adverse findings made against him; are all matters, which
fall under the term "findings" as employed in Section 397 of the
Code and therefore they are all revisable.
37
that the finding of the trial court that the acquittal on giving
benefit of doubt is not a finding in terms of S.397 of the Code,
even then, the accused cannot be shown the door to go without
remedy.
at least
can
use
the
expression
honourable
acquittalwhile
wherein, the
expressions
"acquitted
of
"honourable
blame"
"fully
are
coined
by
judicial
38
is
acquitted".
acquitted
When
the
after
full
is
39
acquitting
an
accused,
cannot
use
the
expression
honourable acquittal.
the
accused
simpliciter
without
adding
any
40
"honourable
acquittal"
is
foreign
to
the
criminal
law
acquittal
simpliciter.
In
the
context
of
service
law
41
Chairman,
Service
another],
of
Police
should
discard
all
suggestions
for
an
42
the
explanation
14(b)(iv)
indicates
exhaustive
but
it
that
to
it
specifies
Rule
is
not
certain
is
some
confusion
in
the
can
however
be
appropriately
case
(Supra).
Such
43
is
phenomenally
on the
increase.
Those
who
are
44
Index
Internet
kk / kmk
: yes.
: yes.
23..12..2014
To
1.The Principal Secretary to Government, Home Department,
Fort St. George, Cennai 600 009.
2.The Sub-Inspector of Police, Pudupet Police Station,
Cuddalore District.
3. The Public Prosecutor, Madras High Court.
45
S.NAGAMUTHU,J.
kmk
Crl.R.C.No.684 of 2014
23..12..2014
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.456 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO.6437 OF 2013
TARAMANI PARAKH
APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF M.P. & ORS.
RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT
Leave granted.
2.
November, 2009.
alleging that Respondent No.2 and his parents harassed her with
demand of dowry amounting to cruelty. This led to registration of
FIR being Crime No.15811 under Sections 498-A/34 of IPC at
Police Station Hujrat Kotwali, Gwalior. After investigation, charge
sheet was filed against Respondent No.2 and his parents which
has been registered as Criminal Case No.163/12 before the
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gwalior.
Page1
4.
stated that she did not want to live with her husband.
Thereupon, the respondent filed a divorce petition on 26 th April,
2011 which was pending.
6.
Page2
7.
Court.
8.
The appellant
The appellant
Page3
It was already
If the
against
relatives
who
are
not
generally
Page4
Page5
Page
6 6 of 11
Page6
Page7
12. In Kailash Chandra Agrawal & Anr. vs. State of U.P. &
Ors.
Page8
Page
9 9 of 11
Page9
permissible.
16. The decisions referred to in the judgment of the High
Court are distinguishable. In Neelu Chopra, parents of the
husband were too old.
Page
1 10 of 11
Page10
...J.
[T.S. THAKUR]
....J.
[ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]
NEW DELHI
MARCH 16, 2015
Page
11 11 of 11
Page11
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. and Others
Respondents
JUDGMENT
Dipak Misra, J.
The present appeal projects and frescoes a scenario
which is not only disturbing but also has the potentiality
to create a stir compelling one to ponder in a perturbed
state how some unscrupulous, unprincipled and deviant
litigants can ingeniously and innovatively design in a
nonchalant manner to knock at the doors of the Court, as
if, it is a laboratory where multifarious experiments can
take place and such skillful persons can adroitly abuse
the process of the Court at their own will and desire by
CRL.A.781/12
The
CRL.A.781/12
The loan
treated
as
Non-Performing
Asset
(NPA)
in
submitted
an
application
before
the
District
CRL.A.781/12
After
CRL.A.781/12
Muljibhai
A three-Judge Bench in
Kakadia
and
Anr.
v.
CRL.A.781/12
xxxxx
xxxxx
CRL.A.781/12
CRL.A.781/12
xxxxx
xxxxx
xxxxx
CRL.A.781/12
CRL.A.781/12
10
CRL.A.781/12
11
respondent,
in
October,
2011,
filed
another
It was
CRL.A.781/12
12
CRL.A.781/12
13
CRL.A.781/12
14
In the
CRL.A.781/12
15
the
learned
Additional
Chief
Judicial
CRL.A.781/12
16
CRL.A.781/12
17
CRL.A.781/12
18
CRL.A.781/12
19
To
Magistrate
under
Section
156(3)
of
the
CrPC,
CRL.A.781/12
20
CRL.A.781/12
21
CRL.A.781/12
22
in
Ramdev
Food
Products
Private
CRL.A.781/12
(2014) 2 SCC 1
23
CRL.A.781/12
24
xxx
xxx
xxx
CRL.A.781/12
25
xxx
xxx
xxx
CRL.A.781/12
26
CRL.A.781/12
27
The
We are absolutely
CRL.A.781/12
28
who
is
presently
occupying
the
position
of
CRL.A.781/12
29
It
CRL.A.781/12
30
We have already
CRL.A.781/12
31
pertaining
to
fiscal
sphere,
matrimonial
CRL.A.781/12
32
provision
before
venturing
into
directing
and
needles
to
emphasize,
the
legislative
CRL.A.781/12
33
with
Police
Station,
Bhelupur,
District
Varanasi, U.P.
32. A copy of the order passed by us be sent to the
learned Chief Justices of all the High Courts by the
Registry of this Court so that the High Courts would
circulate the same amongst the learned Sessions Judges
who, in turn, shall circulate it among the learned
Magistrates so that they can remain more vigilant and
diligent while exercising the power under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C.
.......................J.
[Dipak Misra]
.......................J.
[Prafulla C. Pant]
New Delhi
March 19, 2015.