VOID MARRIAGES

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARTURO MENDOZA, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-5877
September 28, 1954
The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding him guilty
of the crime of bigamy and sentencing him to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of from 6 months and 1 day to 6
years, with costs.
The following facts are undisputed: On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis were married in Marikina, Rizal.
On May 14, 1941, during the subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema in the City of
Manila. On February 2, 1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted another marriage with
Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of
bigamy.
The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and void and, therefore, non-existent,
having been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and that his third
marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after
the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues that, even assuming that appellant's second marriage
to Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a previous judicial annulment of said
bigamous marriage; and the case of People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited.
The decision invoked by the Solicitor General, rendered by the Court of Appeals, is not controlling. Said case is essentially
different, because the defendant therein, Jose Cotas, impeached the validity of his first marriage for lack of necessary
formalities, and the Court of Appeals found his factual contention to be without merit.
In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted during the existence of
his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the appellant
contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as follows:1wphl.nt
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by
a competent court.
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first
spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as
distinguished from mere annulable marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema
was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally
considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent court.1wphl.nt
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de officio so ordered.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-10016
February 28, 1957

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding appellant guilty of bigamy. The facts are not
disputed and, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a certain
Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu (Exhibits "1" and "1-A"). While his marriage with
Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage
with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City.
The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who was then an employee of the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomesa, a clerk in the said office (Exhibit "A" and testimonies of
Eulogio Giroy and complainant Maria Faicol). After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established
residence in Iloilo. As the accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he
maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his first wife, Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City on August
5, 1939 (Exhibit "2"). After Maria Gorrea's death, and seeing that the coast was dear in Cebu, the accused
brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a teacher-nurse.
It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, for it appears that in
1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment in the hands of the
accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing
treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C.
Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu. (See Exhibits "C", "D", "E" and "F")
The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasangin Sibonga, Cebu, on October 3,
1953, Although the accused made an attempt to deny his previous marriage with Maria Faicol, the Court,
however, believes that the attempt is futile for the fact of the said second marriage was fully established not only
by the certificate of the said marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one of the
sponsors of the wedding, and the identification of the accused made by Maria Faicol. (See Exhibits "A" and "B";
t.s.n. pp. 32-33, 40, 41, hearing of April 27, 1954).
The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the
filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage
with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the
judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter. Authorities given for this ruling are 5 Viada,
5th edition, 651; 35 American Jurisprudence, Marriage, Sec. 46, p. 212; Bickford vs. Bickford, 74 N. H. 466, 69 A. 579.
Appellant in this Court relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] 4767). In this case the
majority of this Court declared:
The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. There is
here no pretense that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first

spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to
render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a subsequent court.
We are of the very weighty reasons by Justice Alex Reyes in the dissent in the case above-quoted But this weighty
reasons notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle of strict construction of penal laws in favor of the accused, which
principle we may not ignore, seems to justify our stand in the above-cited case of People vs. Mendoza. Our Revised
Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of
nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would
or should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation already adverted
to.
It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was
not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was
a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted,
with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.

SERAFIA G. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, MARIA CLEMENTE and THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PAOMBONG, BULACAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-43905 May 30, 1983

The reversal of respondent Court's Order, dismissing petitioner's suit for her "declaration ... as the lawful surviving spouse
of deceased Amado Tolentino and the correction of the death certificate of the same", is sought in this Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
The records disclose that Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent herein, Maria
Clemente, at Paombong, Bulacan, on November 1, 1948 (Annex "C", Petition), while his marriage with petitioner, Serafia
G. Tolentino, celebrated on July 31, 1943, was still subsisting (Annex "A", Petition).
Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy in Criminal Case No. 2768 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II,
which Court, upon Amado's plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the corresponding penalty. After Amado had served the
prison sentence imposed on him, he continued to live with private respondent until his death on July 25, 1974. His death
certificate carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse Maria Clemente."
In Special Proceedings No. 1587-M for Correction of Entry, petitioner sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse
in the death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her name. The lower Court dismissed the petition
"for lack of the proper requisites under the law" and indicated the need for a more detailed proceeding,
Conformably thereto, petitioner filed the case below against private respondent and the Local Civil Registrar of
Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as the lawful surviving spouse, and the correction of the death certificate of
Amado. In an Order, dated October 21, 1976, respondent Court, upon private respondent's instance, dismissed the case,
stating:
The Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants in this case, thru counsel Atty. Hernan E. Arceo, for the
reasons therein mentioned, is hereby GRANTED. Further: (1) the correction of the entry in the Office of

the Local Civil Registrar is not the proper remedy because the issue involved is marital relationship; (2)
the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction because as prescribed under Art. 108, read together with
Art. 412 of the Civil Code publication is needed in a case like this, and up to now, there has been no
such publication; and (3) in a sense, the subject matter of this case has been aptly discussed in Special
Proceeding No. 1587-M, which this Court has already dismissed, for lack of the proper requisites under
the law.
In view of the above dismissal, all other motions in this case are hereby considered MOOT and
ACADEMIC.
SO ORDERED. 1
Thus, petitioner's present recourse mainly challenging the grounds relied upon by respondent Court in ordering dismissal.
We rule for petitioner.
First, for the remedy. Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the correction of entry contemplated in Article 412 of the
Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a judicial declaration that she is the lawful surviving
spouse of the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the correction of the entry in the death certificate of said
deceased. The suit below is a proper remedy. It is of an adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary
proceeding. A claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. Private respondent, as the
individual most affected; is a party defendant, and has appeared to contest the petition and defend her interests. The
Local Civil Registrar is also a party defendant. The publication required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is not absolutely necessary for no other parties are involved. After all, publication is required to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established. 2 Besides, even assuming that this is a proceeding under Rule 108, it was the Court that was caned upon to
order the publication, 3 but it did not. in the ultimate analysis, Courts are not concerned so much with the form of actions
as with their substance. 4
Second, for the merits. Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the
necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no better proof of marriage than the
admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage. 5 The second marriage that he contracted with private
respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. 6 No
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. 7 It can be safely concluded, then, without need
of further proof nor remand to the Court below, that private respondent is not the surviving spouse of the deceased
Amado, but petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be
validly made.
Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, the other issues raised need no longer be discussed.
In fine, since there is no question regarding the invalidity of Amado's second marriage with private respondent and that the
entry made in the corresponding local register is thereby rendered false, it may be corrected. 8 While document such as
death and birth certificates, are public and entries therein are presumed to be correct, such presumption is merely
disputable and will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy. 9
WHEREFORE, the Order, dated October 21, 1975, of respondent Court is hereby set aside and petitioner, Serafia G.
Tolentino, hereby declared the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado Tolentino. Let the corresponding correction be
made in the latter's death certificate in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan.
No costs.

SOORDERED.
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City,
herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on
July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva
Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A.
Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia,
while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the
first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the
issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against
both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia
asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of
the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of
therespondent Judge(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution based on
"agreed facts;" and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties
because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid
until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly
married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such
fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded
VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners, vs. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for the resolution of the Court is
whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of Manila should be suspended in view
of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the
latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant
City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of
First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII of said court. The
information was filed based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September
26, 1978, which action was docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the ground that private
respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no
previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner
Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was
solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by
private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or second
marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and deported themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26,
1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code
pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by
private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can
proceed.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs.
Relova. 1 The order further directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his grounds for suspension of
proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than
that cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.
The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April 14, 1980, for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. 3 It is one based
on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. 4 A prejudicial question

usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in
a criminal case. 5
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's
guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz
B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained
through deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on the ground of
force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only sometime later when he was
required to answer the civil action for anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by the case
of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be applied to the present case. Said case states that:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case
does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the
suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such
marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his
act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of
bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for
bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be
indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground
of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the
civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should
be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage
was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the
case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must
be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not
abused much less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained
by the use of threats, force and intimidation.
Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case and as such it
should be the one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the case at bar is markedly different. In
the aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having contracted a second
marriage while a previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed an action for annulment
on the ground of duress, as contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was private respondent Paz B. Abayan,
petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was
obtained through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a
judgment was already rendered in the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was null and void, thus
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no such
judgment in the civil case.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial
questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against
the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence

and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the
same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The
records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with private
respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's
averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence
in entering a subsequent marriage is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit
which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and
one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was private respondent who
eventually filed the civil action for nullity.
Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was only when Civil Case No. E-02627 was
filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the solemnization of the second marriage that
petitioner came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the use of force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private respondent until November 1978, when the
latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously married.
In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent Judge did not err in his earlier order.
There is no pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627 before proceedings in the criminal
action for bigamy can be undertaken.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated
April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant, vs. ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 Decem ber 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent
Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second marriage
and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting.
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five (5) attempts to
serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one place to another, such that he could not
be found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and
a half, with still no answer from the respondent, the Court noted respondent's success in evading service of the complaint
and the Court's Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law
until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him" in the instant
case. 3
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order. In his
Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her
representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A.

Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their
conjugal residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the
child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that his marriage to
complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. 4
In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that Jason
was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical resemblance to
respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a
dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus
which happened to be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by
respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospital bills arising by
reason of her pregnancy.
The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred; by a Resolution
dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.

Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set the case for
hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and presented her
evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another hearing
on 19 August 1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once again did not appear despite
notice to do so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still another hearing for 2
October 1986, notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should he fail once more to appear, the
case would be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating
Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to have waived his right to present evidence and declared the case submitted
for resolution. The parties were given time to submit their respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on 8
December 1986. Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this Court. The
Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following manner:
Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she and
respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High School
(tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was single (id.);
respondent was aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent started courting her
but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and respondent] moved to Manila
were they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law student at the Lyceum University
(tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting her, this time with more persistence (ibid,
p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since she was married but he [respondent] explained to her
that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12);
convinced by his explanation and having secured favorable advice from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite her
[complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her status explaining that since her marriage
was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were married
before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986,
pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 18); all
through their married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in 1981, complainant supported
respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting from his parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was
unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out later that respondent married a certain
Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case for abandonment of
minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was subsequently filed before Branch II of the
City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No. 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise
filed a case for bigamy against respondent and Helina Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of

Pangasinan, where a prima facie case was found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally,
complainant filed an administrative case against respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was
employed, which case however was considered closed for being moot and academic when respondent
was considered automatically separated from the service for having gone on absence without official
leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage on 14
July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan
Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's prior
marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to
the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage
with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was
necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place, respondent
has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the
second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into believing that her
prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins
to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer,
knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held
that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his
first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina
Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted, he
convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still legally single
and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law
school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents. After respondent had
finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and
without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.
Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently displayed, not only his
unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose and responsibility of his
gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9
In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar and to
sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:
It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as claimed by
complainant, it does not speak well of respondent's moral values. Respondent had made a mockery of
marriage, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil Code). 11
In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he made a dupe
of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities while
dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his
marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative of a
character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13

10

We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a
second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and supported him
through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with
Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral
conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of
respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this error
forthwith.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of
Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar
Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be
circularized to all the courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.
In re Instate of the deceased Marciana Escao.
ANGELITA JONES., petitioner-appellant-appellee, vs. FELIX HORTIGUELA, as administrator, widower and
heir, oppositor-appellant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-43701
March 6, 1937

This is an appeal taken from the order issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu on March 14, 1935 , in the intestate
proceedings of the deceased Marciana Escao, denying thereby: (1) the motion to appoint a new administrator and (2) to
set aside the order of May 9, 1932, declaring the heirs of said deceased; (3) holding it unwarranted to declare that the
properties of the intestate estate are paraphernal properties of said deceased, but reserving to the parties the right to
discuss which of said properties are paraphernal and which are conjugal; (4)setting aside the order of January 10, 1933.
granting to the administrator fees in the sum of P10,000, and that of June 26, 1933, approving the project of portion and
the final account; and (5) ordering the presentation of another project of partition and final account.

As Marciana Escao had died intestate, her widower Felix Hortiguela was appointed judicial administrator of her entire
estate, and in an order issued on May 9, 1932, Angelita Jones, her daughter by her first marriage, and Felix Hortiguela,
her widower by her second marriage, were declared her only heirs. In a motion filed with the conformity of the guardian of
the heiress Angelita Jones, Felix Hortiguela, as administrator, prayed that his fees, as such, be fixed at P10,000 which
was granted by the court in its order of January 10, 1933. The administrator later presented an inventory of the properties
left by said deceased Marciana Escao, a final account of his administration, and a project of partition of the intestate
estate wherein he adjudicated to himself a part of the estate in payment of his share of the conjugal properties and his
usufructuary right, and the remaining part to Angelita Jones. The latter, who was a minor, was represented in the
proceedings by her guardian Paz Escao de Corominas. The project of partition and final account were approved in an
order of June 26, 1933, and the properties were turned over to the respective grantees by virtue thereof.

On May 3, 1934, the heiress Angelita Jones, then married to Ernesto Lardizabal, filed a motion alleging that she was the
only heir of her mother, the deceased Marciana Escao; that there never was a valid marriage between her mother and
Felix Hortiguela or that had such marriage been celebrated, it was null and void; and even granting that it were valid, Felix

11

Hortiguela was not entitled to a share in usufruct of one-third of the inheritance; that the petitioner was a minor and that
during the hearing of the intestate proceedings she had not been assisted by counsel but was represent by the same
attorney of Felix Hortiguela; that during said proceedings there had been committed many errors and inaccuracies which
impaired her rights and that the fees of P10,000 charged by the administrator were highly unreasonable and
unconscionable. She prayed: (a) for the reopening of the proceedings; (b) that her husband appointed special
administrator without bond; (c) that her mother's alleged marriage to Felix Hortiguela be declared null and void; (d) that
the partition of the properties made by administrator or Hortiguela be declared null and void that petitioner be declared the
only universal heir of her deceased mother; and (e) that in case there was a valid marriage between Felix Hortiguela and
Marciana Escao, Hortiguela be declared not entitled to the widower's usufruct; the errors in the administrator's account
be corrected; the latter be granted a remuneration of only P4 a day, and new partition of the properties be made.

After Hortiguela's answer had been filed and the evidence for both parties received, the court issued the order of March
14, 1935, the provisions of which are stated in the first paragraph of this decision. Both parties appealed therefrom.
The principal question upon the resolution of which depends that of the others, is whether or not Felix Hortiguela's alleged
marriage to Marciana Escao was celebrated.

It is a fact that in December, 1914, Marciana Escao married Arthur W. Jones in the suburban catholic church of San
Nicolas, Province of Cebu. On January 10, 1918, Jones secured a passport to go abroad and thereafter nothing was ever
heard of him. In October, 1919, proceedings were institute in the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Leyte, at the instance
of Marciana Escao, to have her husband judicially declared an absentee. On the 25th of said month, the court issued an
order declaring Arthur W. Jones an absentee from the Philippine Islands pursuant to the provisions of article 186 of the
Civil Code, with the proviso that said judicial declaration of absence would not take effect until six months after its
publication in the official newspapers. Said order directed the publication thereof in the Official Gazette and in the
newspaper "El Ideal". Pursuant thereto, said order was published in the Official Gazette during the month of December,
1919, and January, February, March, April, May and June, 1920. On April 23, 1921, the court issued another order for the
taking effect of the declaration of absence, publication thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and in "El Ideal."
On May 6, 1927, Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escao were married before the justice of the peace of Malitbog, Leyte,
and they signed the certificate of marriage.

Now, Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to have been made not in the order of
October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and that from the latter date to May 6, 1927, the date of the celebration of
the marriage, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed; and in accordance with section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders, No.
68, the marriage so contracted by Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escao is null and void. This court does not believe so.
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee.
The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable
the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the time of the celebration of the marriage
(section III, paragraph 2, General orders, No. 68).

12

In accordance with the foregoing legal provision, the absence of Marciana Escao's former husband should be counted
from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to
May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful.

For some unknown reason not attributable, of course, to the fault or negligence of Felix Hortiguela or Marciana Escao,
the marriage contracted does not appear recorded in the marriage register of the municipality of Malitbog. Angelita Jones
assigns as one of the errors of the court its having declared that failure to record said marriage does not affect the efficacy
and validity thereof.

On this point, the court a quo very correctly stated as follows:

Section VIII of General Orders, No. 68, as amended, provides that the person solemnizing the marriage must
transmit the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, and failure to transmit such certificate shall be fined
not less than twenty-five and not more than fifty dollars; but does not provide that failure to transmit such
certificate to the municipal secretary annuls the marriage. Interpreting this legal provision, the Supreme Court, in
its decision of September 5, 1931 (Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil., 1 ) said:

"The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the latter
was in articulo mortis failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not
invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its
validity were not present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one said
requisites."

In another case (U. S. vs. De Vera, 28 Phil., 105), the court said:

"Certificate issued pursuant the provisions of section 20 of the Municipal Code by municipal secretaries,
marriages recorded in their respective registers, are not the only ones that can attest and prove such facts to such
an extent that other proofs established by law may not be presented or admitted at trial, when through the
omission or fault either of the municipal secretary himself or of the person who solemnized the marriage, it was
not duly entered or recorded in the municipal register."

Furthermore, Marciana Escao believed Arthur W. Jones to be dead when she contracted her second marriage. Her
daughter Angelita Jones herself was of the same belief, since she lived with her mother after the latter had married
Hortiguela, treated Hortiguela as her true stepfather, and lived and traveled with him together with her mother. She
certainly would not have behaved so if she had not believed her father to be dead. Still furthermore, according to section
334, No. 24, of the Code of Civil Procedure, a person not heard from in seven years is presumed to be dead.

13

Inasmuch as Felix Hortiguela was lawfully married to Marciana Escao and was divorced from her at the time of her death
there is no doubt that he is entitled to inherit in usufruct, not only in testate but also in intestate succession, as in the
present case (6 and 7 Manresa, pages 497-499 and 134-141, respectively).

Therefor, there is no reason to annul the order of May 9, 1932, declaring that the heirs of the deceased were her widower
and her daughter Angelita Jones. Neither is there any reason to annul the order of June 26, 1933, approving the partition
of the properties of the intestate estate.

The inaccuracies and error attributed to the administrator Felix Hortiguela in Angelita Jones' motion and alleged therein as
one of the grounds for asking for the reopening of any assignment of error. It should, therefore, be considered that the
petitioner has desisted from her intention relative to this alleged ground for the nullity of the proceedings.

As to the administrator's fees, the evidence shows that of the P10,000 granted by the court to Hortiguela as his own sum
of P8,000 for the latter's professional services in this as well as in other cases affecting the estate of his deceased wife.
Taking into consideration the nature of and the amount involved in this and in the other cases wherein Attorney Faelnar
has rendered his services this court is of the opinion that the sum of P8,000 paid by the administrator is a reasonable and
moderate compensation. Angelita Jones' objection to the effect that she had no reason to contribute to the payment of
Faelnar's fees is untenable, considering the fact that said attorney's professional services were rendered for the benefit of
the administration of the estate of the deceased Escao prior to the controversy provoked by said heiress. As to the
remainder of P2,000, said administrator is entitled to collect the sum of P4 for every day employed by him as such, and
considering the importance of the inheritance in question and the time elapsed since the inception of the administration
proceedings this court is of the opinion that the sum of P2,000 is an adequate compensation for said administrator's
services.

Lastly, had the court jurisdiction to set aside, as it did, the order of January 10, 1933, approving the administrator's fees
and the order of June 26, 1933, approving the partition and the final account? Had the court jurisdiction to order the
presentation of another project of partition and final account? These are the questions raised by Felix Hortiguela and this
court is of the opinion that said orders having therefrom, the court has lost jurisdiction that no appeal was ever taken
therefrom, the court has lost jurisdiction over the case and it could not resume it under section 113 of the Code of Civil
Procedure or under section 598 thereof because the above-cited section refer to grounds other than those upon which
Angelita Jones' motion of May 3, 1934, is based.

For all the foregoing consideration this court reverses the appealed order of March 14, 1935, in so far as it set aside the
order of January 10, 1933, relative to the administrator's fees and the order of June 26, 1933, approving the final account
and the project of portion, and in so far as said order of March 14, 1935, required the presentation of a new project of
partition; denied the appointment of Angelita Jones husband as administrator; affirms the order of May 9, 1932, relative to
declaration of heirs; and holds it unwarranted to make a finding as to whether or not the properties of this intestate estate
are paraphernal properties of the deceased Marciana Escao reserving to the parties the right to discuss which are
paraphernal and which are conjugal properties. So ordered.

14

Petition for the presumption of death of Nicolai Szatraw. CONSUELO SORS, petitioner-appellant.
G.R. No. L-1780
August 31, 1948

Pleading under oath that she is the lawful wife of Nicolas Szatraw, a Polish citizen, to whom she was married in Manila on
November, 1936, whom she bore a child named Alexis Szatraw born on 8 September 1937, with whom she had lived from
the time they were married until February, 1940, when her husband, on the pretext that he would call on some friends,
departed from the conjugal abode carrying the child along with him and never returned, about whose whereabouts she
made inquiries from among her husband's friends and countrymen and learned that her husband and child had left for
Shanghai, where, according, however, to information obtained from Polish citizens who had arrived from that place, he
and the child had not been seen and could not be found; that all her efforts to know the whereabouts of her husband and
child were in vain; and that, because of her husband's absence for more than seven years during which she has not heard
any news from him and about her child, she believes that he is dead, Consuelo Sors prays that her husband be declared
dead and that her parental authority over her child, should the latter be alive and later on appear, be preserved.
The foregoing facts pleaded in the petition were proved. The evidence further shows that she and her husband did not
acquire any property during their marriage and that his life was not insured.

Upon the foregoing evidence the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it is not for the settlement of the
estate of the absentee, and because the rule of evidence establishing the presumption that a person unheard from in
seven years is dead, does not create a right upon which a judicial pronouncement of a decree may be predicated. The
petitioner has appealed.

The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear that he possessed
property brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property during his married life with the petitioner. The
rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact
that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be
invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for
decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot
be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced
nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final
determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for
the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he
be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration
that the petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a
declaration that the petitioner's husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not
improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to
that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that
reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved

15

in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the
parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and
obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final judgement, or such right or status
determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree, then the judgement on the subject of the controversy, or
the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no
collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is. therefore, clear that a judicial declaration
that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris
tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. Proof of actual death of the
person presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding
to have such particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had
not been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period
within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a
petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court should
not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act.

Little effort is necessary to perceive that a declaration such as the one prayed for by the petitioner, if granted, may make
or lead her to believe that the marital bonds which bind her to her husband are torn asunder, and that for that reason she
is or may feel free to enter into a new marriage contract. The framers of the rules of court, by the presumption provided for
in the rule of evidence in question, did not intend and mean that a judicial declaration based solely upon that presumption
may be made. A petition for a declaration such as the one filed in this case may be made in collusion with the other
spouse. If that were the case, then a decree of divorce that cannot be obtained or granted under the provisions of the
Divorce Law (Act No. 2710) could easily be secured by means of a judicial decree declaring a person unheard from in
seven years to be presumptively dead. This is another strong reason why a petition such as the one presented in this
case should not be countenanced and allowed. What cannot be obtained directly under the provisions of Divorce Law
could indirectly be secured under the provisions of Rule 123, section 69 (x). Obviously, the latter must not be made to
prevail over the former.

The order appealed from is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs is made, because no adverse party appeared in this
Court and in the court below.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to
assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive
of his frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to

16

resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1of the Court of
Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab
initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were
married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between
them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the
sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be
to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be
an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband
and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of
insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital
duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria
Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by
the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

17

The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of
the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application
thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the
marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown
opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the
application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or
her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole,
tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is
enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the
instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus
made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and
duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities
and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote
that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other.
There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert

18

testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr.
Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is
better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each
other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to
fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at
all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-visexisting law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and
Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank
these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996,
which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity

19

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of
such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the

20

decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even
more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.

LENI O. CHOA, petitioner, vs. ALFONSO C. CHOA, respondent.

[G.R. No. 143376. November 26, 2002]

Though interlocutory in character, an order denying a demurrer to evidence may be the subject of a certiorari
proceeding, provided the petitioner can show that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion; and that appeal in due
course is not plain, adequate or speedy under the circumstances. Indeed, when the plaintiffs evidence is utterly and
patently insufficient to prove the complaint, it would be capricious for a trial judge to deny the demurrer and to require the
defendant to present evidence to controvert a nonexisting case. Verily, the denial constitutes an unwelcome imposition on
the courts docket and an assault on the defendants resources and peace of mind. In short, such denial needlessly delays
and, thus, effectively denies justice.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 16, 2000
Decision[1] and the May 22, 2000 Resolution [2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53100. The decretal portion
of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. [3]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. [4]

The Facts

21

Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children were born, Cheryl Lynne
and Albryan. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch
51, a Complaint[5] for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 938098. Afterwards he filed an Amended Complaint [6] dated November 8, 1993 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
petitioner based on her alleged psychological incapacity.

The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his last witness testified, he submitted
his Formal Offer of Exhibits[7] dated February 20, 1998. Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence)[8] dated May 11, 1998. The lower court then allowed a number of pleadings to be filed
thereafter.

Finally, the RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order[9] denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence. It held that
[respondent] established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner] must controvert. [10] After her Motion for
Reconsideration[11] was denied in the March 22, 1999 Order, [12] petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition
for Certiorari,[13] docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory; hence, certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court was not available. The proper remedy was for the defense to present evidence; and if an unfavorable decision was
handed down later, to take an appeal therefrom. [14] In any event, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
respondent judge in issuing the assailed Orders.[15]

The CA also ruled that the propriety of granting or denying a demurrer to evidence rests on the sound exercise of the
[trial] courts discretion.[16] Further, the [p]etitioner failed to show that the issues in the court below [had] been resolved
arbitrarily or without basis.[17]

Hence, this Petition.[18]

The Issues

In her Memorandum,[19] petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

22

1) Upon the denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is she under
obligation, as a matter of inflexible rule, as what the Court of Appeals required of her, to present her evidence, and when
an unfavorable [verdict] is handed down, appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law, despite the palpably and
patently weak and grossly insufficient or so inadequate evidence of the private respondent as plaintiff in the annulment of
marriage case, grounded on psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of The Family Code? Or under such circumstances,
can the extraordinary remedy of certiorari be directly and immediately resorted to by the petitioner; and

2) In upholding the lower courts denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence, did the Court of Appeals wantonly violate,
ignore or disregard in a whimsical manner the doctrinal pronouncements of this Court in Molina (G.R. No. 108763,
February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198) and Santos (G.R. No. 112019, January 14, 1995, 58 SCRA 17)? [20]

Simply stated, the issues are: (1) is certiorari available to correct an order denying a demurrer to evidence? and (2) in
its denial, did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion by violating or ignoring the applicable law and jurisprudence?

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:

Resort to Certiorari

Petitioner argues that the RTC denied her Demurrer to Evidence despite the patent weakness and gross insufficiency
of respondents evidence. Thus, she was entitled to the immediate recourse of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari. Echoing the CA, respondent counters that appeal in due course, not certiorari, is the proper remedy.
We clarify. In general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings.
However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People,[21] this Court declared that appeal -- not certiorari -- in due time
was indeed the proper remedy, provided there was no grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction or oppressive
exercise of judicial authority.

In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court expressly recognize this exception and allow certiorari when the lower
court acts with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of an interlocutory order. Rule 41 provides:
No appeal may be taken from:

23

xxxxxxxxx

(c) An interlocutory order;

xxxxxxxxx

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65. [22]

In turn, Section 1 of Rule 65 reads as follows:

SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari -- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.[23]

Thus, a denial of a demurrer that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
may be assailed through a petition for certiorari.[24] In Cruz v. People, this exception was stressed by the Court in this wise:

Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge interlocutory orders of the
trial court may be subject to exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued with
grave abuse of discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies. [25]

Second Issue:

Denial of Demurrer to Evidence

24

Having established that a writ of certiorari may be issued in exceptional circumstances, this Court is now tasked to
determine whether the present case falls under the exception; that is, whether the RTC indeed committed a patent error or
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect
that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or
sustain the issue.[26] The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to sustain a verdict. [27] In passing
upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. [28]

We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present case, and we are convinced that the evidence against
respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a
declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.

First. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the latters
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These charges included Complaints for
perjury,[29] false testimony,[30] concubinage[31] and deportation.[32] According to him, the filing and the prosecution of these
cases clearly showed that his wife (herein petitioner) wanted not only to put him behind bars, but also to banish him from
the country. He contends that this is very abnormal for a wife who, instead of protecting the name and integrity of her
husband as the father of her children, had acted to the contrary.[33]

We do not agree. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence presented, even if
taken as true, merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient to
establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on
absurdity.

Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction with his documentary offerings,
sufficient to prove petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. He testified in these words:

Q Will you please tell us or explain to the Court what do you mean by psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. What do you mean by that?
A Because before our marriage she was already on the family way, so at that time she even want it aborted by
taking pills. She was even immature, carefree, and she lacked the intention of procreative sexuality.[34]
xxxxxxxxx

25

ATTY. CHUA:
And you consider her that she was carefree, she is psychologically incapacitated? Will you please
elaborate on this what you mean by carefree approximating psychologically incapacitated?
ATTY. MIRANO:
I think we better ask the witness what he means by carefree.
ATTY. CHUA:
Okay.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
She does not help in the household chores, she does not take care of the child, she wants me to hire an
attendant in order to take care of the child. Even when the children were sick she does not bother to let the
children see a doctor.[35]
xxxxxxxxx
STENOGRAPHER (reads back the question of Atty. Chua):
ATTY. CHUA:
Now. From the time of courtship up to the time of your marriage to the defendant, did you notice any
characteristic or traits which you consider as psychological incapacity?
WITNESS:
Sometimes when I cannot visit at her house she gets mad at me, and she wont talk to me when I call her
up by telephone. So, all she wanted for me to visit her everytime and even at the time when I am busy with
some other things. So, I think that is all.[36]

Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about three aspects of petitioners personality;
namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an intention of procreative
sexuality.None of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. Far from it.

In Santos v. CA,[37] this Court clearly explained that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.[38] Said the Court:

26

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's Void and Voidable
Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases). Article 36 of
the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. [39]
Furthermore, in Republic v. Molina,[40] we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a
refusal or a neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. We stressed that a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with
each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems
besetting their marital union.

Sorely lacking in respondents evidence is proof that the psychological incapacity was grave enough to bring about
the disability of a party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In Molina, we affirmed that mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological
incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.[41]

Respondents pious peroration that petitioner lacked the intention of procreative sexuality is easily belied by the fact
that two children were born during their union. Moreover, there is absolutely no showing that the alleged defect was
already existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Third. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of the supposed expert testimony presented by
respondent. His witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity.Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. The pertinent portions of his testimony are quoted thus:

ATTY. CHUA:

27

And then finally and ultimately you reached the conclusion that both parties, meaning the husband and the
wife in the present case have a personality which is normal. That is your conclusion?
WITNESS:
They are normal, but they cannot mix together.
Q. So as a general proposition, both of them are of normal personality, only that they are not compatible with
each other?
A. Yes.
Q. And by normal personality, you mean that neither of them suffer from any personality disorder, bordering on
abnormality?
A. Yes.
Q. But Doctor, is not a fact or a fact of life, that no couple could be or are perfectly match?
A. Precisely, if there is a problem, marital problem, there should be somebody who knows how to handle
marriage, that should try to intervene.
Q. You mean expert advise or services should be needed by the couple?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, if the couple are mature enough and each of them practises what we call maximum tolerance and give
and take, will that serve the purpose?
A. That would served the purpose of getting well.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Meaning to say that the incompatibility could be harmonized?
A. Yes, because they are supposedly normal, but both of them are personally disordered. It cannot be
harmonized. So this case, if only they have tried professional help to take care of their marital problem, it
could have been solved.
Q. Or the situation could have been remedied?
A. Yes. But I would like to say that it must be somebody who is an expert. Not just any from Tom, Dick and Harry
could handle this. That means from the very beginning they have personalities which they were
incompatible. So if anybody would handle that, they will not mix, they will be always quarreling with each
other. They should not have got married.[42]
xxxxxxxxx

28

Q. Yes. So in this present case, your expert opinion was sought by the plaintiff, and you found out that both are
normal?
A. With different personalities. So that they were incompatible.
Q. Normal, simply incompatible.
A. Yes, with personalities different from each other, which I mentioned there in my last page. That they are like
oil and water, immiscible. Like oil and water, they will not mix.
Q. You also mentioned that the plaintiff. Meaning to say the husband told you about the frequent quarrels had
with the wife. Did he ever tell you that was a serious or major quarrel?
A. Actually there was no major quarrel. It was all petty quarrels.[43]
xxxxxxxxx
Q. So the problem of this couple is fundamentally a conflicting personalities?
A. Yes.[44]
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Now, you mentioned that you maybe able to make them reconcile?
A. Yes.
Q. You mean that given the time and opportunity, things could be worked out?
A. Yes.
Q. You mean reconciliation at this stage with expert services, and the advise of those who possess the
necessary [expertise] could be worked out?
A. Yes, as I said it can be done by therapy. Family therapy.[45]
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Doctor, you draw your conclusion that there is psychological inc[a]pacity existing in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. Because of the
A. The incompatibility.
Q. Incompatibility.
A. Yes.[46]

29

His testimony established merely that the spouses had an incompatibility, a defect that could possibly be treated or
alleviated through psychotherapy. We need not expound further on the patent insufficiency of the expert testimony to
establish the psychological incapacity of petitioner.

Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions communicated to him by
respondent. The doctor never conducted any psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done
so. In fact, his Professional Opinion[47] began with the statement [I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is true, x x
x.[48] The expert witness testified thus:

ATTY. CHUA
Q Doctor, in this professional opinion of yours, you gathered most of your material data from the plaintiff who is
the husband?
WITNESS
A Yes. By the way, I requested the husband Alfonso, if it was possible for me to interview Leni, and he said, he
doesnt know.
ATTY. CHUA
Q He doesnt know. Now, Doctor if we were to request you to conduct the same personal interview and written
psychological examination on the part of the wife, [w]ould you be willing to do that?
WITNESS
A Sure for a fee. I maybe able to make them reconcile. [49]

Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely been relayed to
him by respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one
side.Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.

Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess petitioners character, not only through
the descriptions given by respondent, but also through the formers at least fifteen hours [50] of study of the voluminous
transcript of records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to examine the records of
this case, we still find his assessment of petitioners psychological state sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.
As to respondents argument -- that because Dr. Gauzons testimony had never been objected to, the objection raised
thereafter was deemed waived -- the Supreme Court has already ruled on the matter. It held that although the question of
admissibility of evidence could not be raised for the first time on appeal, hearsay or unreliable evidence should be
disregarded whether objected to or not, because it has no probative value. [51]

30

We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a medical examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately.
[52]
Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.

The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence presented by respondent and taken into
account the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. It could then have easily concluded, as we conclude now, that it was
useless to proceed further with the tedious process of hearing contravening proof. His evidence was obviously, grossly
and clearly insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Withal, it was
grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to deny the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this Courts rulings in point. Indeed,
continuing the process of litigation would have been a total waste of time and money for the parties and an unwelcome
imposition on the trial courts docket.

We have already ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or
contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. [53] Any decision, order or resolution of a lower court
tantamount to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion. [54]

There is no reason to believe that an appeal would prove to be a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the case at
bar. An appeal would not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken Orders maintaining
the baseless action of respondent. It would only compel her to go needlessly through a protracted trial, which would
further clog the court dockets with another futile case. [55]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA Decision REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondents Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the
alleged psychological incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

DIANA M. BARCELONA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003]

The Case

31

The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision [1] as well as the 7 August 1997 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order [2] dated 21 January 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial Court refused to
dismiss private respondents Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to state a cause of action and for violation of
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner Diana). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23445
(first petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87. [3] On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a
Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995.

On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana. This
time, the case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24471 (second petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 106 (trial court).

Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First, the second petition fails to state
a cause of action. Second, it violates Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (Circular No. 04-94) on forum
shopping.Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in Support of the
Motion.

The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September 1996 an Order (first order) deferring
resolution of the Motion until the parties ventilate their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed a motion for
reconsideration.However, the trial court, through Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21 January 1997 an
Order (second order) denying the motion. In denying the motion for reconsideration, Judge Pison explained that when the
ground for dismissal is the complaints failure to state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the
petition itself. Judge Pison held that contrary to petitioner Dianas claim, a perusal of the allegations in the petition shows
that petitioner Diana has violated respondent Tadeos right, thus giving rise to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected
petitioner Dianas claim that respondent Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping in filing the second petition. Judge Pison
explained that when respondent Tadeo filed the second petition, the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445) was no
longer pending as it had been earlier dismissed without prejudice.

Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals assailing the
trial courts first order deferring action on the Motion and the second order denying the motion for reconsideration on 14
February 1997. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.

32

Hence, this petition.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in its first order erred in deferring action on the
Motion until after a hearing on whether the complaint states a cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed
out that the trial courts second order corrected the situation since in denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court
in effect denied the Motion. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the allegations in the second petition state a
cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be true.

The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular No. 04-94. To determine the existence of forum
shopping, the elements of litis pendentia must exist or a final judgment in one case must amount to res judicata in the
other. In this case, there is no litis pendentia because respondent Tadeo had caused the dismissal without prejudice of the
first petition before filing the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because there is no final decision on the merits.

Issues

In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the following issues:

I. WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT TADEO VIOLATED SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 0494 IN FAILING TO STATE THE FILING OF A PREVIOUS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE,
ITS TERMINATION AND STATUS.[4]

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Sufficiency of Cause of Action

33

Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to state a cause of action is untenable. A cause of action is
an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of the plaintiff. [5] A complaint states a cause of action
when it contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises; (2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the
right of the plaintiff.[6]

We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. [7] The petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were
legally married at the Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract attached to the
petition. The couple established their residence in Quezon City. The union begot five children, Ana Maria, born on 8
November 1964; Isabel, born on 28 October 1968; Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle born on 7
March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February 1978. The petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time. The petition alleged the non-complied marital obligations in
this manner:

xxx
5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family,
was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters house or would play
tennis the whole day.

6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child, respondent
withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband.

7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of reevaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She further insisted
that she wanted to feel a little freedom from petitioners marital authority and influences. The petitioner argued that he
could occupy another room in their conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondents desire, but no amount of plea and
explanation could dissuade her from demanding that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.

8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to
leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in a condominium located in Greenhills.

9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner waived
his right to the conjugal dwelling in respondents favor through an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
gains. The separation in fact between the petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present time.

34

10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the children. The extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains is hereto attached as Annex C and taken as an integral part hereof.

11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was
conclusively found in the psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the
respondent.

12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is void ab initio and
needs to be annulled. This petition is in accordance with Article 39 thereof.

xxx.[8]

The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases his claim in accordance with Section 1, Rule
8 of the old Rules of Court. [9] Ultimate facts refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of
which the cause of action rests. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of evidence which
establish the material elements.[10]

Petitioner Diana relies mainly[11] on the rulings in Santos v. Court of Appeals[12] as well as in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina.[13] Santos gave life to the phrase psychological incapacity, a novel provision in the Family Code, by
defining the term in this wise:

xxx psychological incapacity should refer to no less than mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. xxx.

Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in cases for annulment of
marriages grounded on psychological incapacity.[14]

Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth
in Santos and Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second petition is defective because it fails to allege the root

35

cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. The second petition also fails to state that the alleged psychological
incapacity existed from the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, the second petition is
devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the second petition did not even state the marital obligations which petitioner
Diana allegedly failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.
Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (new Rules). [15] Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules
provides:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages

x x x.

(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that
either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage
at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity
at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)

Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. [16] The obvious effect of the
new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the
root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are
competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to
allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root
cause of the psychological incapacity.

Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work, respond to and control the human body.
Scientists still do not understand everything there is to know about the root causes of psychological disorders. The root
causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science even as their outward, physical manifestations are
evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the petition to allege are the physical manifestations indicative of
psychological incapacity.Respondent Tadeos second petition complies with this requirement.

The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent Tadeo, the correlative
obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right. In Dulay v. Court of
Appeals,[17]the Court held:

36

In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind
that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset;
this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations
in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed
regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Devt Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing
Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for
lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim
has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]).
xxx. (Emphasis supplied)

A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits all the
factual averments in the complaint. [18] Given the hypothetically admitted facts in the second petition, the trial court could
render judgment over the case.

Forum Shopping

Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that the second petitions certificate of non-forum shopping which
does not mention the filing of the first petition and its dismissal without prejudice violates Circular No. 04-94. [19] Petitioner
Diana refers to this portion of Circular No. 04-94-

1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or other
initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no action or proceeding is pending
in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or
proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d)
if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have
been filed.[20]
2.
Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did not disclose in his certificate of non-forum shopping that he had
previously commenced a similar action based on the same grounds with the same prayer for relief. The certificate of nonforum shopping should have stated the fact of termination of the first petition or its status.

The Court has consistently held that a certificate of non-forum shopping not attached to the petition or one belatedly
filed or one signed by counsel and not the party himself constitutes a violation of the requirement. Such violation can
result in the dismissal of the complaint or petition. However, the Court has also previously held that the rule of
substantial compliance applies to the contents of the certification.[21]

37

In Roxas v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court squarely addressed the issue of whether the omission of a statement on
the prior filing and dismissal of a case involving the same parties and issues merits dismissal of the petition. In Roxas, the
Court ruled:

xxx an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not constitute res judicata and litis
pendentia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings considering
that the evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not present. It is in this light that we ruled in Maricalum
Mining Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission that a liberal interpretation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on
non-forum shopping would be more in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules which is to secure a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

The dismissal of the first petition precluded the eventuality of litis pendentia. The first petitions dismissal did not also
amount to res judicata. Thus, there is no need to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping in the second petition (Civil
Case No. Q-95-24471) about the prior filing and dismissal of the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445).

The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of respondent Tadeo to keep the peace between
him and his grown up children. The dismissal happened before service of answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly,
there is nolitis pendentia since respondent Tadeo had already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition
when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the dismissal order was not a
decision on the merits but a dismissal without prejudice.

Circular No. 04-94,[23] now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, must be interpreted and applied to
achieve its purpose. The Supreme Court promulgated the Circular to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of
justice. The Circular should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. [24]
A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of
the family that the state cherishes and protects. [25] In rendering this Decision, this Court is not prejudging the main issue of
whether the marriage is void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court must resolve this issue after trial on
the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. We are merely
holding that, based on the allegations in the second petition, the petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action and does not
violate the rule on forum shopping. Thus, the second petition is not subject to attack by a motion to dismiss on these
grounds.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision dated 30 May 1997 as well as the Resolution dated 7
August 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

38

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.

G.R. No. 149498
May 20, 2004

Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the
decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage
contracted between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her
husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in
the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16,
1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor,
Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which
incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and
promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two
months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991,
respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given address.
Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication.
The trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition,
was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file
a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to
refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the
parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence
submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion to present her
evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence
to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio
Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to make proper entries into the
records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the Court.

39

SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the
petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and
welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of
respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be
traced to respondents mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life. 5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of
Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and
evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo
is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the celebration of the marriage, and
returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for
two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even
visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact
Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to
his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of
the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a family
as a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is
not around and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family life and assist in the upbringing of
their daughter as required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code? 7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina8 and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed
marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio
Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondents failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in
the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically
constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling
short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of
Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.

40

The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial
of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.11 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity
of the marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance of
the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the
fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article
36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one
of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may
be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot
be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

41

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The SolicitorGeneral shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon
1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability." 14 The foregoing guidelines do
not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may
be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
partys psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. 15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshios psychological incapacity to fulfill his
marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He abandoned them a
month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the
Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged
nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family,
no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule,
there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents case had she presented
evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This
respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. 16 There was no showing that the case at bar
was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from
the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it
is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he
must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,not physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 18
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case
involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity,
we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules
merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and
clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general.
Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

42

In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and
protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

[G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision[1] dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment [2] dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol,
Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum
to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution [3] of the
appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of
Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an
exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained
constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get
married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which
was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago [4] at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish,
Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

43

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court
of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds
marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information [5] filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran
[City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.[6]
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his
marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied
upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months
of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and
void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[8] the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a
defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even
if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,[9] which held that the court of a
country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose
of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by
said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the second
marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,[10] everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that
one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial
court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no
marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity
of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be
punished by Article 349[12] of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage
had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense
in a bigamy case.

44

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not
be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 [13] of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to
public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17 [14] of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered
ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v.
People,[15] allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for
good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. [16] However, the denial was by a split
vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined
in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly
declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the
first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES
PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE.
COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE]
PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58
PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY
CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.[17]
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his
defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario
court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon
bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or
acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala
in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a
difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily
follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a
convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[18] which held that
bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 [19] of the Family
Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of
said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention

45

that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil
Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether all
the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has
not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC
of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into
by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil
Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence
of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 [22] and
4[23] of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This simply means that
there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other
words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the
date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married. [24] The records
show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long
become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The
contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the
validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the
instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.[25] In the latter case, the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We
held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted.
One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as void. [26]

46

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first
before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious
rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without
more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy
unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused
and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need
not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and
academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying
herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

G.R. No. 150758
February 18, 2004

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or
subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We hold
that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact
to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual
who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy,
notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990.
The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived
together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had
been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a
marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal
dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. 1

47

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge
German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. 2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she
verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3Villareyes confirmed
that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said
marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity
were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". 6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children.
However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took
place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment
from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from
the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of
said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him
to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS
APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE
AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR
PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN
DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

48

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.12
Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage
to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to
the date on which the second marriage was celebrated. 13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the
crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal. 14
Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first
marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage
contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at
the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes
and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics
Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3,
1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between
Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself
would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public
documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as
follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the
public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was
admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated
between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to
public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995
and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests
as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a
marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the
absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence
of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage
contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact

49

that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against
this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first
marriage, and petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for
validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by
requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the
National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997,
respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accuseds marriage to his second wife, private respondent in
this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second
requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration 20 of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to
Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of
bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws
are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological
capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate
that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid
first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for
distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage,
and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal
liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the
sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the
permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a
marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely
given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) 23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and

50

marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the
presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years
or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas.
Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license
before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date
of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that
said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. 28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself
that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise
of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his
marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the
accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity
of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of
which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the States basic
social institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which
has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall
be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a
duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of
the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

TERESITA C. YAPTINCHAY, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasig Branch; VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY, in her own behalf and in her capacity as Special Administratrix in
the Intestate Estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and JESUS MONZON, MARY YAPTINCHAY ELIGIR,
ERNESTO YAPTINCHAY, ANTONIO YAPTINCHAY, ASUNCION YAPTINCHAY, JOSEFINA Y. YAPTINCHAY, ROSA Y.

51

MONZON, ISABEL Y. VALERIANO, REMEDIOS Y. YAPTINCHAY, FELICIDAD Y. ARGUELLES, MARY DOE and JOHN
DOE, respondents.
G.R. No. L-26462
June 9, 1969
The problem posed in this, an original petition for certiorari, is whether or not this Court in the exercise of its supervisory
powers should stake down as having been issued in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the
respondent judge's order of June 15, 1966 in Civil Case 8873 (Court of First Instance of Rizal) directing petitioner to
deliver to Special Administratrix Virginia Y. Yaptinchay of the estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay the North Forbes
Park property hereinafter described, and to refrain from disturbing or interfering in any manner whatsoever with the latter's
possession thereof, such order having been amended by said respondent judge's subsequent order of June, 28, 1966 in
turn enjoining defendants in said case (private respondents herein) and/or their duly authorized agents or representatives
from selling, disposing, or otherwise encumbering said property in any manner whatsoever pending the termination of said
case. We granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for and directed respondents to return the
possession of the North Forbes Park property to petitioner upon a P50,000-bond.
The controlling facts are the following:
On July 13, 1965, herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay sought in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City
Branch, her appointment first as Special Administratrix and then as regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay who died in Hongkong on July 7, 1965. This is known in the record as Special Proceedings 1944-P. Petitioner
there alleged that the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay had lived with her continuously, openly and publicly as husband and
wife for nineteen (19) years: from 1946 to 1964 at 1951 Taft-Avenue, Pasay City, and from 1964 to July 1965 at 60 Russel
Avenue, Pasay City; that the deceased who died without a will left an estate consisting of personal and real properties
situated in the Philippines, Hongkong and other places with an estimated value of about P500,000; that to petitioner's
knowledge and information, the deceased left three daughters, Virginia Yaptinchay, Mary Yaptinchay Eligir and Asuncion
Yaptinchay, all of age; that on July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties carted away from the residences aforesaid personal
properties belonging to the deceased together with others exclusively owned by petitioner. It was averred that in these
circumstances the appointment of a special administrator to take custody and care of the interests of the deceased
pending appointment of a regular administrator became an urgent necessity.
Upon the foregoing allegations, the court issued on July 17, 1965 an order appointing herein petitioner Teresita C.
Yaptinchay special administratrix of the state of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay upon a P25,000-bond.
To the petition of Teresita C. Yaptinchay, an opposition was registered by Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate
wife, and Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other children, of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay, upon the ground that said
Teresita C. Yaptinchay, not being an heir of the decedent, had no right to institute the proceeding for the settlement of the
latter's estate, much less to procure appointment as administratrix thereof; and that having admittedly cohabited with the
deceased for a number of years said petitioner was not qualified to serve as administratrix for want of integrity. At the
same time, oppositors counter-petitioned for the appointment of Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, daughter of the deceased, as
special administratrix and of Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged surviving spouse, as regular administratrix.
To give oppositors an opportunity to be heard, the probate court, on July 19, 1965, set aside its order of July 17, 1965
appointing petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay special administratrix.
On July 30, 1965, after the parties were heard, the probate court granted counter-petitioners' prayer and named Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay special administratrix upon a P50,000-bond.1awphil.nt

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On August 18, 1965, the special administratrix submitted a preliminary inventory of the assets of the estate of the
deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay. Included amongst these was "[a] bungalow residential house with swimming pool, situated
at Park corner Talisay Road, North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal" adverted to at the start of this opinion.
It was after respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay had been appointed special administratrix that herein petitioner Teresita C.
Yaptinchay made her second move. That was on August 14, 1965. This time, petitioner filed in another branch (Pasig
Branch) of the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for replevin and for liquidation of the partnership supposedly
formed during the period of her cohabitation with Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and for damages. This case was docketed as Civil
Case 8873. 1 Pending hearing on the question of the issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary injunction prayed
for, respondent judge Guillermo E. Torres issued an order of August 17, 1965 temporarily restraining defendants therein
(private respondents here) and their agents from disposing any of the properties listed in the complaint and from
interfering with plaintiff's (herein petitioner's) rights to, and possession over, amongst others, "the house now standing at
North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal."
On August 25, 1965, defendants (private respondents herein) resisted the action, opposed the issuance of the writs of
replevin and preliminary injunction, mainly upon these propositions: (1) that exclusive jurisdiction over the settlement of
the estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay was already vested in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City
Branch in the special proceedings heretofore mentioned (Special Proceedings No. 1944-P); (2) that the present liquidation
case was filed to oust said probate court of jurisdiction over the properties enumerated in this, the second case (Civil
Case 8873); and (3) that plaintiff was not entitled to the remedy of injunction prayed for, her alleged right sought to be
protected thereby being doubtful and still in dispute.
Said defendants (private respondents before this Court) in turn prayed the court for a writ of preliminary injunction to direct
plaintiff (petitioner here) and all others in her behalf to cease and desist from disturbing in any manner whatsoever
defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay's possession amongst others of the North Forbes Park house and to order the removal
from the premises of said North Forbes Park house of the guards, agents and employees installed therein by plaintiff; to
enjoin plaintiff and her agents from entering the aforesaid house and any other real property registered in the name of
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and from interfering with or from disturbing the exercise by Virginia Y. Yaptinchay of her rights and
powers of administration over the assets registered in the name of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and/or in the latter's possession at
the time of his death.
Came the herein disputed order of June 15, 1966 issued in said Civil Case 8873, the pertinent portion of which
reads: "From the pleadings as well as the evidence already submitted and representations made to the court
during the arguments, it appears that one of the properties in dispute is the property located at the corner of Park
Road and Talisay Street, North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal which at the time of the death of the deceased Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay was still under construction and it also appears that after his death said property was among the
properties of the deceased placed under the administration of the special administratrix, the defendant Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay. Information has been given that in the evening of August 14, 1965, the plaintiff was able to dispossess
the special administratrix from the premises in question and that since then she had been in custody of said
house.
While the Court is still considering the merits of the application and counter-application for provisional relief, the
Court believes that for the protection of the properties and considering the Forbes Park property is really under
the responsibility of defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, by virtue of her being appointed Special Administratrix of the
estate of the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay, the Court denies the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction of the plaintiff with respect to the Forbes Park property and the restraining order issued by this Court is
lifted. The Court also orders the plaintiff to cease and desist from disturbing in any manner whatsoever the
defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay in the possession of said property.
WHEREFORE, upon defendant's filing a bond in the amount of P10,000.00, let a writ of preliminary injunction is
requiring the plaintiff, her representatives and agents or other persons acting in her behalf to deliver the
possession of the property located at the corner of Park Road and Talisay Street, North Forbes Park, Makati,

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Rizal to the Special Administratrix Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, and to refrain from disturbing interfering in any manner
whatsoever defendant's possession thereof.
Which, as aforestated, was amended by the court order of June 28, 1966, which in part recites:
Considering that the present case treats principally with the liquidation of an alleged partnership between the
plaintiff and the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay and considering further that said house in North Forbes Park is
included among the properties in dispute, the Court hereby clarifies its Order of June 15, 1966 by enjoining the
defendants and/or their duly authorized agents or representatives from selling, disposing or otherwise
encumbering said property in any manner whatsoever pending the termination of this case.
Petitioner's motion to reconsider the June 15, 1966 order was overturned by respondent judge's order of August 8, 1966,
which recites that:
Considering that defendants, principally Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, took actual or physical possession of the said
properties which were formerly held by the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay and the plaintiff, by virtue of her
appointment and under her authority, as Special Administratrix of the estate of the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay, the
plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied.2
The orders of June 15 and August 8, 1966 triggered the present proceedings in this Court.
1. Petitioner's stance before us is this: As she was occupying the Forbes Park property at the time of the death of Isidro
Yaptinchay, grave abuse of discretion attended respondent judge's order issuing an injunctive writ transferring possession
of said property to respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay.
A rule of long standing echoed and reechoed in jurisprudence is that injunction is not to be granted for the purpose of
taking property out of possession and/or control of a party and placing it in that of another whose title thereto has not been
clearly established. 3 With this as guidepost, petitioner would have been correct if she were lawfully in possession of the
house in controversy when Civil Case 8873 (where the injunctive writ was issued) was commenced in the Pasig
court, and if respondent special administratrix, to whom the possession thereof was transferred, were without right
thereto. But the situation here is not as petitioner pictures it to be. It is beyond debate that with the institution on July 13,
1965 of Special Proceedings 1944-P, properties belonging not only to the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay but also to the
conjugal partnership of said deceased and his legitimate wife, Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, 4 were brought under the jurisdiction
of the probate court, properly to be placed under administration. 5 One such property is the lot at North Forbes Park. 6
With respect to the Forbes Park house, petitioner offers varying versions. In the verified petition before this Court,
petitioner avers "that the construction of said North Forbes Park property was undertaken jointly by petitioner and the
deceased, petitioner even contributing her own exclusive funds therefor." 7 This is a reproduction of an allegation in
petitioner's June 27, 1966 alternative motion for reconsideration or for clarification/amendment of the herein controverted
order of June 15, 1966 in Civil Case 8873. 8 And again, in the affidavit of Teresita C. Yaptinchay dated August 3, 1965, she
spoke of the acquisition of properties, real and personal, in her own words, "through our joint efforts and capital, among
which properties are those situated" in "North Forbes Park." 9 All of which contradict her averment in the amended
complaint dated October 25, 1965 also verified in said Case 8873 to the effect that she "acquired through her own
personal funds and efforts real properties such as ... the house now standing at North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal." 10
But herein private respondents vehemently dispute petitioner's claim of complete or even partial ownership of the house.
They maintain that the construction of that house was undertaken by the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay without her
(petitioner's) intervention and the deceased paid with his own personal funds all expenses incurred in connection with the
construction thereof. 11
It was only after hearing and considering the evidence adduced and the fact that after the death of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay the
Forbes Park house "was among the properties of the deceased placed under the administration of" respondent Virginia Y.

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Yaptinchay, that respondent judge issued the injunction order of June 15, 1966 herein complained of. Worth repeating at
this point is that respondent judge, in his order of August 8, 1966, declared that defendants (private respondents herein),
"principally Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, took actual or physical possession", amongst others, of the North Forbes Park house
"by virtue of her appointment and under her authority, as Special Administratrix."
On this score, petitioner herein is not entitled to the injunction she prayed for below.
2. As well established is the rule that the grant or denial of an injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the court, in the
exercise of which appellate courts will not interfere except in a clear case of abuse. 12
A considerate and circumspect view of the facts and circumstances in this case obtaining will not permit us to tag the
disputed order of June 15, 1966 with the vice of grave abuse of discretion. It is quite true that, in support of the allegation
that the house in North Forbes Park was her exclusive property, petitioner presented proof in the form of loans that she
had contracted during the period when said house was under construction. But evidence is wanting which would correlate
such loans to the construction work. On the contrary, there is much to the documentary proof presented by petitioner
which would tend to indicate that the loans she obtained from the Republic Bank were for purposes other than the
construction of the North Forbes Park home. And this, we gather from pages 17 to 18 of petitioner's memorandum before
this Court; and the affidavit of Teresita C. Yaptinchay, Annex A thereof, which states in its paragraph 4 that she obtained
various loans from the Republic Bank "for her own exclusive account" and that the proceeds thereof "were also used by
affiant both for her business and for the construction, completion and furnishing of the said house at North Forbes Park",
and which cites her seven promissory notes in favor of Republic Bank, Appendices 1 to 7 of said affidavit. Not one of the
promissory notes mentioned reveals use of the proceeds for the construction of the North Forbes Park house. On the
contrary, there is Appendix 2, the promissory note for P54,000 which says that the purpose of the loan for "Fishpond
development"; Appendix 3 for P100,000 for the same purpose; Appendix 5 for P50,000, "To augment working capital in
buying & selling of appliances & gift items"; and Appendix 7 for P1,090,000, "For Agricultural Development". In plain
terms, the fact alone of petitioner's indebtedness to the Republic Bank does not establish that said house was built with
her own funds.
It is in the context just recited that the unsupported assertion that the North Forbes Park house is petitioner's exclusive
property may not be permitted to override the prima facie presumption that house, having been constructed on the lot of
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay (or of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during the existence of his marriage with
respondent Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, is part of the estate that should be under the control of the special administratrix.
3. Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on the provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code be decisive.
Said Article 144 says that: "When man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership." .
But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed by
conditions, the existence of which must first be shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue. 13 One
such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the
acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the
property in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make available the protection or aid
afforded by a writ of injunction. 14 For, the existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial protection is
wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights; 15 nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right. 16
At any rate, it would seem to us that the interests of the parties would be better safeguarded if the controverted North
Forbes Park property be in the hands of the bonded administratrix in the estate proceedings. For then, her acts would be
subject to the control of the probate court.
Finding no error in the disputed orders of respondent judge, the herein petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed, and the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction 17 issued by this Court is hereby dissolved and set aside.

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Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

GLORIA G. JOCSON, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICARDO R. ROBLES, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-23433
February 10, 1968

On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced in the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court an action for the
annulment of her marriage to Ricardo R. Robles (Civ. Case No. E-00013), on the ground that it was bigamous. It was
alleged in the amended complaint that previous to his marriage to plaintiff on May 27, 1958, defendant Robles had
contracted a first marriage with Josefina Fausto, who had instituted a criminal action for Bigamy against the same
defendant in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Crim. Case No. 64124). Plaintiff also demanded from the defendant
moral and exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, claiming that during their cohabitation, she was subjected to
physical maltreatment by her husband, resulting in the premature birth of their first child, who died three days later.
In his answer, defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage. But he charged plaintiffs' parents with having
compelled him by force, threat and intimidation, to contract that marriage with her, notwithstanding their knowledge that he
is a married man; and that said threat and intimidation allegedly persisted until January, 1963 when he was finally able to
get away and live apart from the plaintiff.
Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, on the ground that no genuine issue of fact is involved
in the case. It was claimed that defendant's contention, that his consent to the marriage was secured by force and
intimidation employed upon his person by the relatives of plaintiff, was allegedly supported by the joint affidavit of plaintiff's
father and brother, dated October 28, 1963, attached to the motion (pp. 22-32, Record on Appeal). Plaintiff, on the other
hand, submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings.
On December 23, 1963, defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, the court ruling that before it can
pass upon plaintiff's prayer for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to defendant, there is necessity for proof that when
he contracted marriage with plaintiff, defendant Robles had a previous and subsisting valid marriage. The evidentiary
requirement to establish these facts, according to the court, was not met in the motion for summary judgment. Defendant's
plea to have his marriage declared as having been brought about by force and intimidation, was also denied, the court
finding indications of collusion between the parties in their attempt to secure the nullification of said marriage.
Reconsideration of this order, sought by defendant, was denied on January 18, 1964. And, when both parties failed to
appear at the scheduled hearing on March 9, 1964, the court directed the dismissal of the action.
On April 17, 1964, defendant notified the court below of his intention to appeal to this Court from the
abovementioned orders of December 23, 1963, January 18, 1964, and March 9, 1964. The appeal bond and amended
record on appeal, dated April 15, 1964, were thereafter approved.
It is noted that, as specified in the notice of appeal, defendant is taking exception from the lower court's orders of
December 23, 1963, January 18, 1964, and March 9, 1964; however, there is no indication or certification or proof that the
filing of the appeal notice, bond and record on appeal on April 17, 1964 were made within the reglementary period, as
required by the provisions of Section 6, Revised Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Thereunder, the record on appeal must
contain, not only the full names of all the parties to the proceeding, as well as the pleadings, petitions, motions and orders

56

related to the order or judgment subject of the appeal and which are necessary for the proper understanding of the issue
involved therein, but also "such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time." This requirement, incorporated
in the new Rules of Court to enable the appellate courts to determine without protracted inquiry whether an appeal was
timely made or not, was held to be jurisdictional, failure to comply with which shall cause the dismissal of the
appeal. 1 There is here no showing that the present appeal was perfected within the reglementary period, which datum
should have appeared in the record on appeal.
On the merits, we are satisfied that the Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion for summary
judgment in view of the first paragraph of Articles 88 and 1011 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that expressly prohibit
the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits
annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, this proceeding is hereby dismissed, conformable to Section (a) of Revised
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.

ROMULO TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. HELEN VILLANUEVA and HONORABLE CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge
of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, respondents.
G.R. No. L-23264 March 15, 1974

Petitioner prays for the nullification of the order dated July 29, 1963 of the respondent Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila.

On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to private respondent Helen
Villanueva, alleging that his consent was obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he
discovered that private respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior to the
marriage ceremony; and that they did not live as husband and wife as immediately after the marriage celebration, Helen
Villanueva left his house and her whereabouts remained unknown to him until January, 1962 when he discovered that she
is residing in San Francisco, Cebu. Said marriage was solemnized by Quezon City Judge Mariano R. Virtucio on
September 28, 1959. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No, 43347 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila.
Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen failed to file a responsive pleading,
for which reason petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare her in default and to set the date for the
presentation of his evidence.
In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared private respondent in default, but, pursuant to the provision
of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation to
determine whether collusion exists between the parties, directing the City Fiscal to submit his report within sixty (60) days
from receipt thereof, and, in the event of a negative finding, to represent the State at the trial of the case to prevent
fabrication of evidence; and likewise directed herein petitioner to furnish the City Fiscal with copies of the complaint and
such other documents necessary for the City Fiscal's information and guidance.

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On July 3, 1962, thru counsel, petitioner submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy of his complaint.
Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the case, issued a subpoena to petitioner's counsel requiring him to bring
petitioner with him as well as copies of other documents in connection with the annulment case on August 27, 1962 at
10:00 A.M.
Plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated August 24, 1962, informed Assistant City Fiscal Jose that he could not comply with the
subpoena for it will unnecessarily expose his evidence.
In a motion dated and filed on October 29, 1962, petitioner, thru counsel, prayed the respondent Judge to set the date for
the reception of his evidence on the ground that the City Fiscal had not submitted a report of his findings despite the lapse
of sixty (60) days from July 10, 1962 when he submitted to the City Fiscal a copy of the complaint.
On November 6, 1962, respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion of petitioner unless he submits himself for
interrogation by the City Fiscal to enable the latter to report whether or not there is collusion between the parties.
In an order dated July 29, 1963, respondent Judge dismissed the complaint in view of the fact that petitioner is not willing
to submit himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 101 of
the New Civil Code.
His motions for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied on July 29, 1963 and on April 11, 1964,
petitioner now files his petition to annul said order of July 29, 1963 and to compel the respondent Judge to receive his
evidence.
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for annulment
of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in case of
non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between
the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for
the plaintiff. Thus, Articles 88 and 101 state:
ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the provisions of article 101, paragraph 2, shall be observed.
ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession
of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney
shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the 1950 Civil Code of the Philippines, direct that actions for the
annulment of marriage or divorce shall not be decided unless the material facts alleged in the complaint are proved (Sec.
10, Rule 35, 1940 Rules of Court). The same rule is reiterated in Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1964 Revised Rules, with
"legal separation" being substituted for "divorce", obviously because the present Civil Code does not authorize absolute
divorce.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions of marriage and of
the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the
public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by collusion

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between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than a
mere contract between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to
direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds
(De Ocampo vs. Florenciano, 107 Phil. 35, 38-40; Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, 172; Bigornia de Cardenas vs.
Cardenas, et al., 98 Phil. 73, 78-79; Roque vs. Encarnacion, et al., 95 Phil. 643, 646).
Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is without merit.
WHEREFORE, THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY
DISMISSED. WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.

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