Bueno, Jaycel P.

LLB 2-E

Natural Resources and Environmental Law Cases

G.R. No. L-65935 September 30, 1988

FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NESTOR B.
SUGA JR., respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

FACTS:

A case for damaged was filed by Nestor B. Sunga Jr. a

businessman. He purchased a passenger minibus Mazda from the
Motor center, Inc. at Calasiao, Pangasinan and for which he
executed a promissory note. A chattel mortgage was executed by
him in favor of the Motor center, Inc. The Chattel Mortgage and
Assignment was assigned to the Filinvest Credit Corporation (FCC)
with the conformity of the plaintiff. Nestor Sunga claimed that the
minibus was seized by two (2) employees of the FCC upon orders of
the branch manager Mr. de los Santos, who claimed that he was
delinquent in the payments of his vehicle. The vehicle was recovered
from the Crisologo Compound which was later released by Rosario
Fronda Assistant Manager of the Filinvest. The police blotter shows

that Nestor Sunga and T/Sgt. Isidro Pascual sought the assistance
of the Dagupan police and one Florence Onia of the Filinvest
explained that the minibus was confiscated because the balance
was already past due. After verification that his accounts are all in
order, Florence Onia admitted it was their fault. The motor vehicle
was returned to the plaintiff upon proper receipt.

The trial court rendered a decision ordering the FCC to pay

the plaintiff the following damages, to wit: Moral Damages:
P30,000.00,
Loss

on

Actual

Income
Damages:

of

the

minibus

P500.00,

for

Litigation

three

days:

expenses:

P600.00,
P5,000.00

and Attorney's Fees: P10,000.00. The FCC filed an appeal with the
Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court of Appeals. The latter
promulgated its decision affirming the decision of the trial court
except with regard to the moral damages which, under the
circumstances of the accounting error incurred by Filinvest, is
hereby increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent court, Intermediate Appellate Court,

now the Court of Appeals, acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in increasing the amount of moral
damages.

HELD:

Yes, the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack of jurisdiction in increasing the amount of moral
damages.

The Supreme Court held that the respondent court committed

a grave abuse of discretion in increasing extravagantly the award of
moral damages and in granting litigation expenses. In those
respects, the petition is granted and to that extent the questioned
decision is modified. There is no gainsaying that the plaintiffappellee (respondent Sunga did not appeal from the decision of the
trial court which awarded him the sum of P30,000.00 by way of
moral damages. Well settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that
whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case an appellee who has not
himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any
affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the
court below. Verily the respondent court disregarded such a well
settled rule when it increased the award for moral damages from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, notwithstanding the fact that the private
respondent did not appeal from the judgment of the trial court, an
act indicative of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The award of litigation expenses in the sum of
P5,000.00 is disallowed, there being no price for litigation.

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding
Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A.
ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN,respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

FACTS:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) Legal and

Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan
was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without
first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from
the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources. Also, the LLDA issued a
Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan,
Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities,
to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind
of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite. The
dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government
of Caloocan.
ISSUE:

Whether the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a

cease and desist order.

HELD:

Yes, the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a cease
and desist order under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927.

It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has

only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise
a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers
as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In
the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in
the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease
and desist order" is, perforce, implied.

LLDA was meant to deal with cases which might possibly arise
where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such
broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its
laudabe objective. The writs of mandamus and injunction which are
beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the
proper courts.

G.R. Nos. L-66870-72 June 29, 1985

AGAPITO MAGBANUA, INENIAS MARTIZANO, CARLITO
HERRERA, SR., PAQUITO LOPEZ, AND FRANCISCO
HERRERA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SECOND SPECIAL
CASES DIVISION), EDUARDO, BUTCH, DIEGO AND NENA All
Surnamed PEREZ, respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

FACTS:

Magbanua and the other five petitioners are share tenants of

an agricultural land owned by the private respondents. The
petitioners alleged in the case they filed in the trial court that the
private respondents diverted the free flow of water from their farm
lots which caused portions of their landholdings to dry up to their
great damage and prejudice. The trial court rendered a decision
in favor of the petitioners. They were maintained as agricultural
lessees and granted each one of them the amount of P10,000 as
moral & exemplary damages and P5,000 for the attorneys fees to be
paid by the private respondents. However, the private respondents
appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court which
affirmed the decision of the trial court but removed the award of
payment of damages and attorneys fees granted to the petitioners.
The IAC said in removing the damages award that there was no
evidence that private respondents acted fraudulently or in bad
faith, and no reason either in the recovery of attorneys fees
under Article 2208, Civil Code. The petitioners filed in the Supreme
Court for the reinstatement of the damages and attorneys fees
awarded by the trial court, on the ground that the IAC committed a
grave abuse of discretion in removing the said award.

ISSUE:

Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court committed a grave

abuse of discretion in removing the awards of moral, exemplary and
attorneys fees.

HELD:

Yes, the IAC committed a grave abuse of discretion in removing

the awards.

The Supreme Courtr granted the reinstatement of the award of

moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees, subject to
modification of the amount. Art 2219, Civil Code states that moral
damages may be recovered when a person wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy. Under Art 2232, Civil Code, In contract and quasicontracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant
acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner. Art 2208, Civil Code states that attorneys fees can be
recovered, among
others,
when
exemplary
damages
are
awarded. The private respondents acted in an oppressive manner in
closing the free flow of water into the farm lots of the petitioners in
order to make the latter vacate their landholdings. The closure
caused losses on the petitioners farm lots. The foregoing entitled
the petitioners to payment of moral and exemplary damages, and as
such, entitled them also to the recovery of attorneys fees. And so
the SC granted the payment to each of the petitioners in the
amount of P1000 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary damages,
and P1000 for attorneys fees payable by the private respondents.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

Oposa, et. al vs. Factoran

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:

This case is a class suit brought by 44 children, through their

parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of their
generation as well as those generations yet unborn. Aiming to stop
deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, seeking to have him cancel all
the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease
and desist from accepting and approving more timber license
agreements. The children invoked their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity
as parens patriae. The petitioners claimed that the DENR
Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was
contrary to the highest law of humankind which is the natural law
and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation. The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking
the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the children have the legal standing to file the case.
HELD:
Yes, the children have the legal standing to file the case.
The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the
children had the legal standing to file the case based on the concept
of intergenerational responsibility. Their right to a healthy
environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that
environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court
recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations.
Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must
give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the
interest of public welfare.

G.R. No. 74816 March 17, 1987

ERNESTO R. RODRIGUEZ, JR., ERNESTO LL. RODRIGUEZ III,
SACHA DEL ROSARIO, JOSE P. GENITO, ZENAIDA Z.

RODRIGUEZ, and ENECERIO MONDIA, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DAYTONA
CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Plaintiffs filed an action for abatement of a public nuisance
with damages against defendant. After four extensions of time to file
an answer by defendant, Daytona moved to dismiss the case for lack
of jurisdiction and cause of action. Motions denied, defendant was
declared in default and authorized plaintiffs to present evidence ex
parte. The facts of the case at bar shows that there is other nearby
residents who were prejudiced by the Daytona Corp. for the running
of its business. It affected their health and property. But in this
case, the delay of the respondents to answer is questionable and
contrary to law.
ISSUE:

Whether respondents are liable for damages.

HELD:

Yes, the respondents are liable for damages.

Respondents are liable for damages except for nominal

damages based on the discretion of the court, instead, moral and
actual damages were awarded because sufficient evidence had
supported

as

such.

G.R. No. 94759

January 21, 1991

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NARCISO T. ATIENZA as Presiding
Judge, Bulacan, RTC, and HON. VICENTE CRUZ, Acting Mayor
and the MUNICIPALITY OF STA. MARIA, BULACAN, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS:

Technology Developers, a corporation engaged in the

manufacture and export of charcoal briquette, received a letter from
acting mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full cessation of its plant in
Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan until further order, and requesting its
Plant Manager to bring before the office of the mayor its building
permit, mayor's permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environment and
Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit.
Technology Developers undertook to comply with the request
to produce the required documents. It sought to secure the Region
III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution
Permit although prior to the operation of the plant, a Temporary
Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation was issued to it.
Petitioners also sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to
secure a mayors permit but were not entertained.
Eventually, the acting mayor ordered that the plant premises
be padlocked, effectively causing the stoppage of operation. This
was done without previous and reasonable notice.
Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the

acting mayor with Bulacan Regional Trial Court (RTC), alleging that
the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion.
The RTC found that the issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction was proper, ordering the acting mayor to
immediately revoke his closure order and allow Technology
Developers to resume its normal business operations until the case
has been adjudicated on the merits.
Upon Motion for Reconsideration, the Provincial Prosecutor
presented evidence as to the allegation that "Due to the
manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used, the
fumes coming from the factory may contain particulate matters
which are hazardous to the health of the people. As such, the
company should cease operating until such a time that the proper
air pollution device is installed and operational."
Reassessing the evidence, the RTC set aside its order granted
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The Court of Appeals
denied Technology Developer's petition for certiorari for lack of
merit.

ISSUE:

Whether the Acting Mayor had authority to order the closure

of the plant

HELD:

Yes, the mayor had authority to order the closure of the plant.
The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the
writ of preliminary injunction sought by petitioner:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that
the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the

environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation

of a business is essentially addressed to the Environmental
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town
has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution,
and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a
permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless
appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to
the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in
the operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the
pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not
only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the
residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its
operation until further orders.
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the
complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after
an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her report
observed that the fumes emitted by the plant goes directly to the
surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has
been installed.
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the
municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a building permit
issued by an official of Makati on March 6, 1987.
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to
operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission on
December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988.
Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit
much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent
any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.
Court takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge
investment in this dollar-earning industry. It must be stressed
however, that concomitant with the need to promote investment and
contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential

imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people,
from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.

G.R. No. 145328 March 23, 2006

EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, MA. ENCARBACION R. LEGASPI,
JAIME BLANCO, JR., ENRIQUE BELO, CARLOS VIAPLANA,
CARL FURER, VIVENCIO TINIO, MICHAEL BRIGGS, ROSA
CARAM, FAUSTO PREYSLER, ROBERT KUA, GEORGE LEE,
GUILLERMO LUCHANGCO, PETER DEE, LUISA MARQUEZ,
ANGELITA LILLES, JUAN CARLOS, HOMER GO, AMADEO
VALENZUELA, EMILIO CHING, ANTONIO CHAN, MURLI
SABNANI, MARCOS ROCES, RAYMUNDO FELICIANO, NORMA
GAFFUD, ALF HOLST, LOURDES P. ROQUE, MANUEL DY, RAUL
FERNANDEZ, VICTORIA TENGCO, CHI MO CHENG, BARANGAY
DASMARIAS, and HON. FRANCISCO B. IBAY, petitioners
vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondent

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:

Sometime in 1996, Respondent National Power Corporation

began the construction of 29 steel poles in connection with its 230
kilo-volt Sucat-Araneta Balintawak Power Transmission Project.
These poles, each of which was 53.4 meters high, were to support
overhead tension cables that would pass through Dasmarias
Village, Makati City, where petitioners homes were located. Trouble

ensued when petitioners discovered some scientific studies, finding

that electromagnetic fields created by high-voltage power lines could
cause a range of illnesses from cancer to leukemia. In a privileged
speech, Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero denounced the
cavalier manner in which Napocor had ignored safety and
consultation requirements. An explanation was demanded by
Representative Arnulfo Fuentebella, chairperson of the House
Committee on Energy.
Respondent admitted that it was still negotiating with
petitioners, and that it had come up with four options to address
the problem: transfer the line, maintain a 12-meter distance from
the village, construct an underground line, or reroute along C-5 and
South Luzon Expressway. These negotiations resulted in an
impasse. On March 9, 2000, petitioners filed a Complaint for
Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Napocor.
Judge Francisco B. Ibay issued an Order temporarily restraining it
from energizing and transmitting high-voltage electric current
through the project. This Order was extended from 2 days to 18
days.
Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for
Certiorari with Prayer for TRO and Preliminary Injunction and
sought the dismissal of the Complaint, on the ground that the trial
court had no jurisdiction. It cited Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1818, which states: Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall
have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case,
dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a
mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project
of the government, or any public utility operated by the government,
including among other public utilities for transport of the goods or
commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any
person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding
with or continuing the execution or implementation of any such
project, or the operation of such public utility or pursuing any

lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or

operation.
While the Petition was pending before the CA, the trial court
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to stop
Napocor from installing high voltage cables and from energizing and
transmitting high-voltage electric current through those cables.[3]
On May 3, 2000, the CA reversed the trial courts Order on the
ground that Section 1 of Presidential Decree 1818 clearly proscribed
injunctions against infrastructure projects. It further cited Supreme
Court Circulars 2-91 and 13-93 dated March 15, 1991, and March
5, 1993, respectively.
Petitioners filed the instant Petition, contending that the
proscription in PD 1818 should not be applied to cases of extreme
urgency, such as when the right to health and safety was hanging
on the balance.
ISSUE:

Whether

the

trial

court

may

temporarily

restrain

or

preliminarily enjoin Napocor from constructing and operating the

29 steel poles or towers, notwithstanding Presidential Decree 1818.

HELD:

Yes, the trial court may temporarily restrain or preliminarily

enjoin Napocor from constructing and operating the 29 steel poles
or towers, notwithstanding Presidential Decree 1818.

The Courts Ruling In a unanimous Decision penned by

Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, the Court granted the Petition. It
held that the prohibition contained in Presidential Decree 1818

extended only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders

against administrative acts, in controversies involving facts or the
exercise

of

discretion

in

technical

cases.

It

did

not

cover

controversies involving questions of law, as those involved in the

instant case. What Presidential Decree 1818 aimed to avert was the
untimely

frustration

of

government

infrastructure

projects,

particularly by provisional remedies. Otherwise, the greater good

would suffer from the disruption of the pursuit of essential
government projects or the frustration of the economic development
effort of the nation. PD No. 1818, however, was not meant to be a
blanket prohibition that would disregard the fundamental right to
the health, safety and well-being of a community, guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Indeed, the prohibition was not absolute. It only prohibited
the courts from issuing injunctions against administrative acts
involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases.
Outside this dimension, the Supreme Court declared that courts
could not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or
prohibit administrative acts in cases involving questions of law.
In the case at bar, there was adequate evidence on record to
justify the conclusion that the Napocor project would probably
imperil the health and safety of petitioners. First, petitioners
presented copies of studies linking the incidence of illnesses, such
as cancer and leukemia, to exposure to electromagnetic fields.
Second, the Napocor brochure on its Quezon power project had a
provision that power lines should be located within safe distances
from residences because of the danger concomitant with highvoltage power. Third, documents on record showed that respondent
had made representations that it was looking into the possibility of
relocating the project, and that it had even undertaken a series of
negotiations and meetings with petitioners. These documents and
negotiations suggested that their health concerns were far from
imaginary. If there was indeed no cause for concern, it would not
have come up with options to address their woes.

The Supreme Court held that its circulars on the observance

of PD 1818 did not suggest an unbridled prohibition on the
issuance of writs of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
orders. What these circulars prohibited was the indiscriminate
issuance of court injunctions. They simply enjoined judges to
observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in issuing
temporary restraining orders and in granting writs of preliminary
injunction, so as to avoid any suspicion that these measures were
for considerations other than the strict merits of the case. Thus,
there was nothing in the circulars that would tie the hands of the
courts from issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. This Decision
did not seek to undermine the purpose of the Napocor project,
which was aimed at the common good of the people. But the Court
recognized, too, that the primordial concern should be the farreaching irreversible effects to human safety, rather than the
economic benefits presumed by respondent.

G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987

VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

CORTES, J.:

FACTS:

The petitioner, Legaspi, invokes his constitutional right to

information on matters of public concern in a special civil action for
mandamus against the Civil Service Commission pertaining to the
information of civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed
as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. The standing

of the petitioner was challenged by the Solicitor General of being

devoid of legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities
of government employees for failure of petitioner to provide actual
interest to secure the information sought.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to

information.

HELD:

Yes, the petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to

information.
The court held that when the question is one of public right
and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest
and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted
need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result,
it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested
in the execution of the laws. The Constitution provides the
guarantee of adopting policy of full public disclosure subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law as in regulation in the
manner of examining the public records by the government
agency in custody thereof. But the constitutional guarantee to
information on matters of public concern is not absolute. Under the
Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second
sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national
security.
The court delves into determining whether the information
sought for by the petitioner is of public interest. All appointments in

the Civil Service Commission are made according to merit and

fitness while a public office is a public trust. Public employees
therefore are accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities
to their positions in the government. The court also noted that the
information on the result of the CSC eligibility examination is
released to the public therefore the request of petitioner is one that
is not unusual or unreasonable. The public, through any citizen,
has the right to verify the civil eligibilities of any person occupying
government positions.