LAND TITLE CASE DIGESTS

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LACBAYAN vs. SAMOY (2011)

FACTS:
Betty Lacbayan and Bayani Samoy met through common friend
in 1978. Despite Samoys being already married, their relationship
developed until Lacbayan gave birth to Samoys son.
During their illicit relationship, they (together with 3
incorporators) were able to establish a manpower services company.
5 parcels of land were also acquired during said period & were
registered in Lacbayan and Samoys names as husband and wife.
Lacbayan initially lived with her parents but in 1983, she left her
parents & resided in the property located in Malvar. Then she and
son transferred to property in Zobel, then finally transferred to
property in Don Enrique Heights.
Eventually, their relationship turned sour & decided to part ways
in 1991. So they both agreed to divide their properties & terminate
their business partnership by executing Partition Agreement.
Initially, Samoy agreed to Lacbayans proposal that properties in
Malvar and Don Enrique Heights will be assigned to her while the 3
other will go to Samoy. However when Lacbayan wanted additional
demands to be included in partition agreement, Samoy refused.
31 May 99: Lacbayan filed complaint for judicial partition,
averring that she and Samoy lived as husband and wife without
benefit of marriage & they worked together as business partners,
acquiring real properties amounting to P15.5M.
10 Feb 2000: RTC rendered decision, dismissing complaint for
lack of merit, giving weight to Lacbayans own admission that the
properties were acquired not from her own personal funds but from
the income of the manpower services company which she owns a
measly 3.33% share.
Lacbayan appealed to CA. CA likewise denied.
ISSUE: 1) WON an action for partition precludes a settlement on the
issue of ownership
2) WON the Torrens title over disputed properties was
collaterally attacked in the action for partition
HELD:
Petition is bereft of merit.
The determination as to the existence of co-ownership is
necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. The first phase
of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a
partition is proper and may be made by voluntary agreement of all
the parties interested in the property. The second phase commences
when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition" directed by the court.
Anent issue of collateral attack: no dispute that a Torrens
certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked but this is not
material to the case at bar.
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and
not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued
by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title
referred to by law means ownership, which is, more often than not,
represented by that document.
Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter only
serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. The
certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of
ownership. In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the
name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the
certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other
parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to
the issuance of the certificate of title.
Another issue on WON Samoys assent to the initial partition
agreement serves as an admission against interest, that Samoy is

Marry Suan notes

deemed to have admitted existence of co-ownership between him

and Lacbayan: negative. Samoy is not allowed by law to waive
whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed
properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good
customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law.