RepublicofthePhilippines

SupremeCourt
Manila

ARTUROM.DECASTRO,
Petitioner,

versus

JUDICIALANDBARCOUNCIL
(JBC)andPRESIDENTGLORIA
MACAPAGALARROYO,
Respondents.
xx
JAIMEN.SORIANO,
Petitioner,

versus

JUDICIALANDBARCOUNCIL
(JBC),
Respondent.
xx
PHILIPPINECONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION(PHILCONSA),
Petitioner,

versus

JUDICIALANDBARCOUNCIL
(JBC),
Respondent.
xx
INREAPPLICABILITYOF
SECTION15,ARTICLEVIIOF
THECONSTITUTIONTO
APPOINTMENTSTOTHE
JUDICIARY,
ESTELITOP.MENDOZA,
Petitioner,
xx
JOHNG.PERALTA,

ENBANC

G.R.No.191002

G.R.No.191032

G.R.No.191057

A.M.No.1025SC

G.R.No.191149

Petitioner,
versus

JUDICIALANDBARCOUNCIL
(JBC).
Respondent.
xx
PETERIRVINGCORVERA

CHRISTIANROBERTS.LIM

ALFONSOV.TAN,JR.

NATIONALUNIONOFPEOPLES
LAWYERS

MARLOUB.UBANO

INTEGRATEDBAROFTHE
PHILIPPINESDAVAODELSUR
CHAPTER,representedbyits
ImmediatePastPresident,ATTY.
ISRAELITOP.TORREON,andthe
latterinhisownpersonalcapacityas
aMEMBERofthePHILIPPINE
BAR

MITCHELLJOHNL.BOISER

BAGONGALYANSANGBAYAN
(BAYAN)CHAIRMANDR.
CAROLINAP.ARAULLO
BAYANSECRETARYGENERAL
RENATOM.REYES,JR.
CONFEDERATIONFORUNITY,
RECOGNITIONANDADVANCE
MENTOFGOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES(COURAGE)
CHAIRMANFERDINANDGAITE
KALIPUNANNGDAMAYANG
MAHIHIRAP(KADAMAY)
SECRETARYGENERALGLORIA
ARELLANOALYANSANG

NAGKAKAISANGKABATAAN
NGSAMBAYANANPARASA
KAUNLARAN(ANAKBAYAN)
CHAIRMANKENLEONARD
RAMOSTAYOANGPAGASA
CONVENORALVINPETERS
LEAGUEOFFILIPINO
STUDENTS(LFS)CHAIRMAN
JAMESMARKTERRY
LACUANANRIDONNATIONAL
UNIONOFSTUDENTSOFTHE
PHILIPPINES(NUSP)
CHAIRMANEINSTEIN
RECEDESCOLLEGEEDITORS
GUILDOFTHEPHILIPPINES
(CEGP)CHAIRMANVIJAE
ALQUISOLAandSTUDENT
CHRISTIANMOVEMENTOF
THEPHILIPPINES(SCMP)
CHAIRMANMA.CRISTINA
ANGELAGUEVARRA

WALDENF.BELLOand
LORETTAANNP.ROSALES

WOMENTRIALLAWYERS
ORGANIZATIONOFTHE
PHILIPPINES,representedby
YOLANDAQUISUMBING
JAVELLANABELLEZA
ALOJADODEMAISIPTERESITA
GANDIONCOOLEDANMA.
VERENAKASILAG
VILLANUEVAMARILYNSTA.
ROMANALEONILADEJESUS
andGUINEVEREDELEON.
Intervenors.
xx
ATTY.AMADORZ.TOLENTINO,
JR.,(IBP
GovernorSouthernLuzon),and
ATTY.ROLANDB.INTING
(IBPGovernorEasternVisayas),
Petitioners,

G.R.No.191342

versus

JUDICIALANDBARCOUNCIL
G.R.No.191420
(JBC),

Respondent.
xx Present:
PHILIPPINEBARASSOCIATION,
PUNO,C.J.,
INC.,
CARPIO,
Petitioner,
CORONA,

CARPIOMORALES,

VELASCO,JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDODECASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,
versus
DELCASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA,JR.,

PEREZ,and

MENDOZA,JJ.

JUDICIALANDBARCOUNCIL
andHEREXCELLENCYGLORIA Promulgated:
March17,2010
MACAPAGALARROYO,
Respondents.
xx

DECISION

BERSAMIN,J.:

ThecompulsoryretirementofChiefJusticeReynatoS.PunobyMay17,2010occursjustdays
after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the event actually
happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas. May the incumbent President appoint his
successor,consideringthatSection15,ArticleVII(ExecutiveDepartment)oftheConstitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporaryappointmentstoexecutivepositionswhencontinuedvacanciesthereinwillprejudice

publicserviceorendangerpublicsafety?WhatistherelevanceofSection4(1),ArticleVIII
(Judicial Department) of the Constitution, which provides that any vacancy in the Supreme
Court shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof, to the matter of the
appointmentofhissuccessor?MaytheJudicialandBarCouncil(JBC)resumetheprocessof
screening the candidates nominated or being considered to succeed Chief Justice Puno, and
submitthelistofnomineestotheincumbentPresidentevenduringtheperiodoftheprohibition
underSection15,ArticleVII?Doesmandamuslietocompelthesubmissionoftheshortlistof
nomineesbytheJBC?

PrecsoftheConsolidatedCases

PetitionersArturoM.DeCastroandJohnG.PeraltarespectivelycommencedG.R.No.
[1]
[2]
191002 and G.R. No. 191149 as special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus,
prayingthattheJBCbecompelledtosubmittotheincumbentPresidentthelistofatleastthree
nomineesforthepositionofthenextChiefJustice.

In G.R. No. 191032,

[3]
Jaime N. Soriano, via his petition for prohibition, proposes to

prevent the JBC from conducting its search, selection and nomination proceedings for the
positionofChiefJustice.

[4]
thePhilippineConstitution

InG.R.No.191057,aspecialcivilactionformandamus,

Association (PHILCONSA) wants the JBC to submit its list of nominees for the position of
Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010,
because the incumbent President is not covered by the prohibition that applies only to
appointmentsintheExecutiveDepartment.

[5]
InAdministrativeMatterNo.1025SC, petitionerEstelitoM.Mendoza,aformerSolicitor
General, seeks a ruling from the Court for the guidance of the JBC on whether Section 15,
ArticleVIIappliestoappointmentstotheJudiciary.

[6]
which the Court consolidated on March 9, 2010 with the petitions

In G.R. No. 191342,

earlierfiled,petitionersAmadorZ.Tolentino,Jr.andRolandB.Inting,IntegratedBarofthe

Philippines (IBP) Governors for Southern Luzon and Eastern Visayas, respectively, want to
enjoinandrestraintheJBCfromsubmittingalistofnomineesforthepositionofChiefJustice
tothePresidentforappointmentduringtheperiodprovidedforinSection15,ArticleVII.

All the petitions now before the Court pose as the principal legal question whether the
incumbentPresidentcanappointthesuccessorofChiefJusticePunouponhisretirement.That
question is undoubtedly impressed with transcendental importance to the Nation, because the
appointmentoftheChiefJusticeisanyPresidentsmostimportantappointment.

A precedent frequently cited is In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon.

Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of
[7]
Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively (Valenzuela), by
whichtheCourtheldthatSection15,ArticleVIIprohibitedtheexercisebythePresidentofthe
powertoappointtojudicialpositionsduringtheperiodthereinfixed.

In G.R. No. 191002, De Castro submits that the conflicting opinions on the issue
expressed by legal luminaries one side holds that the incumbent President is prohibited from
makingappointmentswithintwomonthsimmediatelybeforethecomingpresidentialelections
anduntiltheendofhertermofofficeasPresidentonJune30,2010,whiletheotherinsiststhat
the prohibition applies only to appointments to executive positions that may influence the
electionand,anyway,paramountnationalinterestjustifiestheappointmentofaChiefJustice
duringtheelectionbanhasimpelledtheJBCtodeferthedecisiontowhomtosenditslistofat
[8]
leastthreenominees,whethertotheincumbentPresidentortohersuccessor. Heopinesthat
theJBCistherebyarrogatinguntoitselfthejudicialfunctionthatisnotconferreduponitbythe
Constitution,whichhaslimitedittothetaskofrecommendingappointeestotheJudiciary,but
hasnotempoweredittofinallyresolveconstitutionalquestions,whichisthepowervestedonly
in the Supreme Court under the Constitution. As such, he contends that the JBC acted with
graveabuseofdiscretionindeferringthesubmissionofthelistofnomineestothePresident
and that a final and definitive resolution of the constitutional questions raised above would
diffuse(sic)thetensioninthelegalcommunitythatwouldgoalongwaytokeepandmaintain
stabilityinthejudiciaryandthepoliticalsystem.

[9]

In G.R. No. 191032, Soriano offers the view that the JBC committed a grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction when it resolved unanimously on

January18,2010toopenthesearch,nomination,andselectionprocessforthepositionofChief
JusticetosucceedChiefJusticePuno,becausetheappointingauthorityforthepositionofChief
JusticeistheSupremeCourtitself,thePresidentsauthoritybeinglimitedtotheappointmentof
theMembersoftheSupremeCourt.Hence,theJBCshouldnotinterveneintheprocess,unless
anomineeisnotyetaMemberoftheSupremeCourt.

[10]

Foritspart,PHILCONSAobservesinitspetitioninG.R.No.191057thatunorthodox
and exceptional circumstances spawned by the discordant interpretations, due perhaps to a
perfunctoryunderstanding,ofSec.15,Art.VIIinrelationtoSecs.4(1),8(5)and9,Art.VIIIof
theConstitutionhavebredafrenziedinflammatorylegaldebateontheconstitutionalprovisions
mentionedthathasdividedthebenchandthebarandthegeneralpublicaswell,becauseofits
dimensionalimpacttothenationandthepeople,therebyfashioningtranscendentalquestionsor
issuesaffectingtheJBCsproperexerciseofitsprincipalfunctionofrecommendingappointees
totheJudiciarybysubmittingonlytothePresident(nottothenextPresident)alistofatleast
three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy from which the
[11]

members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts may be appointed.

PHILCONSA further believes and submits that now is the time to revisit and review
Valenzuela,thestrangeandexoticDecisionoftheCourtenbanc.

[12]

PeraltastatesinhispetitioninG.R.No.191149thatmandamuscancompeltheJBCto
immediately transmit to the President, within a reasonable time, its nomination list for the
position of chief justice upon the mandatory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in
compliancewithitsmandateddutyundertheConstitutionintheeventthattheCourtresolves
that the President can appoint a Chief Justice even during the election ban under Section 15,
[13]

ArticleVIIoftheConstitution.

ThepetitionersinG.R.No.191342insistthatthereisanactualcontroversy,considering
thattheJBChasinitiatedtheprocessofreceivingapplicationsforthepositionofChiefJustice
and has in fact begun the evaluation process for the applications to the position, and is
perilouslynearcompletingthenominationprocessandcomingupwithalistofnomineesfor

submissiontothePresident,enteringintotheperiodofthebanonmidnightappointmentson
March 10, 2010, which only highlights the pressing and compelling need for a writ of
prohibitiontoenjoinsuchallegedministerialfunctionofsubmittingthelist,especiallyifitwill
beconewithintheperiodofthebanonmidnightappointments.

[14]

Antecedents

Thesecasestracetheirgenesistothecontroversythathasarisenfromtheforthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three
nomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncilforeveryvacancy.

OnDecember22,2009,CongressmanMatiasV.Defensor,anexofficiomemberofthe
JBC,addressedalettertotheJBC,requestingthattheprocessfornominationstotheofficeof
theChiefJusticebecommencedimmediately.

[15]

In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, therefore, the JBC passed a resolution,
whichreads:

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the
retirementoftheincumbentChiefJusticeHonorableReynatoS.Puno.

Itwillpublishtheopeningofthepositionforapplicationsorrecommendationsdeliberate
onthelistofcandidatespublishthenamesofcandidatesacceptcommentsonoroppositionto
theapplicationsconductpublicinterviewsofcandidatesandpreparetheshortlistofcandidates.

Astothetimetosubmitthisshortlisttotheproperappointingauthority,inthelightofthe
Constitution,existinglawsandjurisprudence,theJBCwelcomesandwillconsiderallviewson
thematter.

18January2010.

(sgd.)
MA.LUISAD.VILLARAMA
ClerkofCourt&
ExOfficioSecretary
JudicialandBarCouncil

Asaresult,theJBCopenedthepositionofChiefJusticeforapplicationorrecommendation,
[16]
viz:

andpublishedforthatpurposeitsannouncementdatedJanuary20,2010,

The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announces the opening for application or
recommendation,ofthepositionofCHIEFJUSTICEOFTHESUPREMECOURT,whichwill
be vacated on 17 May 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice, HON.
REYNATOS.PUNO.

Applications or recommendations for this position must be submitted not later than 4
February2010(Thursday)totheJBCSecretariatxxx:

TheannouncementwaspublishedonJanuary20,2010inthePhilippineDailyInquirer
andThePhilippineStar.

[17]

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio Associate Justice Renato C. Corona Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. and Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated
[18]

January18,2010andJanuary25,2010,respectively.

Otherseitherappliedorwerenominated.VictorFernandez,theretiredDeputyOmbudsmanfor
Luzon, applied, but later formally withdrew his name from consideration through his letter
dated February 8, 2010. Candidates who accepted their nominations without conditions were
Associate Justice Renato C. Corona Associate Justice Teresita J. LeonardoDe Castro
Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion and Associate Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval
(Sandiganbayan). Candidates who accepted their nominations with conditions were Associate
JusticeAntonioT.CarpioandAssociateJusticeConchitaCarpioMorales.

[19]
Decliningtheir

nominationswereAtty.HenryVillarica(viatelephoneconversationwiththeExecutiveOfficer
oftheJBConFebruary5,2010)andAtty.GregorioM.Batiller,Jr.(viatelephoneconversation
[20]

withtheExecutiveOfficeroftheJBConFebruary8,2010).

TheJBCexcludedfromconsiderationformerRTCJudgeFlorentinoFloro(forfailuretomeet

thestandardssetbytheJBCrules)andSpecialProsecutorDennisVillaIgnaciooftheOffice
oftheOmbudsman(duetocasespendingintheOfficeoftheOmbudsman).

[21]

InitsmeetingofFebruary8,2010,theJBCresolvedtoproceedtothenextstepofannouncing
thenamesofthefollowingcandidatestoinvitethepublictofiletheirsworncomplaint,written
report,oropposition,ifany,notlaterthanFebruary22,2010,towit:AssociateJusticeCarpio,
Associate Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice LeonardoDe
Castro,AssociateJusticeBrion,andAssociateJusticeSandoval.Theannouncementcameout
[22]

inthePhilippineDailyInquirerandThePhilippineStarissuesofFebruary13,2010.

Issues

AlthoughithasalreadybeguntheprocessforthefillingofthepositionofChiefJustice
Punoinaccordancewithitsrules,theJBCisnotyetdecidedonwhentosubmittothePresident
itslistofnomineesforthepositionduetothecontroversynowbeforeusbeingyetunresolved.
In the meanwhile, time is marching in quick step towards May 17, 2010 when the vacancy
occursupontheretirementofChiefJusticePuno.

TheactionsoftheJBChavesparkedavigorousdebatenotonlyamonglegalluminaries,
but also among nonlegal quarters, and brought out highly disparate opinions on whether the
incumbentPresidentcanappointthenextChiefJusticeornot.PetitionerMendozanotesthatin
Valenzuela, which involved the appointments of two judges of the Regional Trial Court, the
Court addressed this issue now before us as an administrative matter to avoid any possible
polemicsconcerningthematter,butheopinesthatthepolemicsleadingtoValenzuelawouldbe
miniscule [sic] compared to the polemics that have now erupted in regard to the current
controversy,andthatunlessputtoahalt,andthismayonlybeachievedbyarulingfromthe
Court,theintegrityoftheprocessandthecredibilityofwhoeverisappointedtothepositionof
[23]
ChiefJustice,mayirreparablybeimpaired.

Accordingly, we reframe the issues as submitted by each petitioner in the order of the
chronologicalfilingoftheirpetitions.


G.R.No.191002

a. Does the JBC have the power and authority to resolve the constitutional
questionofwhethertheincumbentPresidentcanappointaChiefJusticeduring
theelectionbanperiod?

b.Does the incumbent President have the power and authority to appoint during
the election ban the successor of Chief Justice Puno when he vacates the
positionofChiefJusticeonhisretirementonMay17,2010?

G.R.No.191032

a.IsthepowertoappointtheChiefJusticevestedintheSupremeCourtenbanc?

G.R.No.191057

a. Is the constitutional prohibition against appointment under Section 15, Article

VII of the Constitution applicable only to positions in the Executive
Department?

b.AssumingthattheprohibitionunderSection15,ArticleVIIoftheConstitution
alsoappliestomembersoftheJudiciary,maysuchappointmentsbeexcepted
because they are impressed with public interest or are demanded by the
exigencies of public service, thereby justifying these appointments during the
periodofprohibition?

c.DoestheJBChavetheauthoritytodecidewhetherornottoincludeandsubmit
the names of nominees who manifested interest to be nominated for the
positionofChiefJusticeontheunderstandingthathis/hernominationwillbe
submitted to the next President in view of the prohibition against presidential
appointmentsfromMarch11,2010untilJune30,2010?

A.M.No.1025SC

a. Does Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution apply to appointments to

positionsintheJudiciaryunderSection9,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution?

b. May President Gloria MacapagalArroyo make appointments to the Judiciary

afterMarch10,2010,includingthatforthepositionofChiefJusticeafterChief
JusticePunoretiresonMay17,2010?

G.R.No.191149

a.DoestheJBChavethediscretiontowithholdthesubmissionoftheshortlistto
PresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyo?

G.R.No.191342

a.DoestheJBChavetheauthoritytosubmitthelistofnomineestotheincumbent
President without committing a grave violation of the Constitution and
jurisprudence prohibiting the incumbent President from making midnight
appointmentstwomonthsimmediatelyprecedingthenextpresidentialelections
untiltheendofherterm?

b.IsanyactperformedbytheJBC,includingthevettingofthecandidatesforthe
position of Chief Justice, constitutionally invalid in view of the JBCs illegal
composition allowing each member from the Senate and the House of
Representativestohaveonevoteeach?

OnFebruary16,2010,theCourtdirectedtheJBCandtheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral
(OSG)tocommentontheconsolidatedpetitions,exceptthatfiledinG.R.No.191342.

On February 26, 2010, the JBC submitted its comment, reporting therein that the next
stageoftheprocessfortheselectionofthenomineesforthepositionofChiefJusticewouldbe
the public interview of the candidates and the preparation of the short list of candidates,
[24]
[25]
Itstated:

includingtheinterviewoftheconstitutionalexperts,asmaybeneeded.

Likewise, the JBC has yet to take a position on when to submit the shortlist to the
properappointingauthority,inlightofSection4(1),ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,
which provides that vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90)
days from the occurrence thereof, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
concerning the ban on Presidential appointments two (2) months immediately before
thenextpresidentialelectionsanduptotheendofhistermandSection261(g),Article
XXIIoftheOmnibusElectionCodeofthePhilippines.

12.SincetheHonorableSupremeCourtisthefinalinterpreteroftheConstitution,theJBCwill
beguidedbyitsdecisionintheseconsolidatedPetitionsandAdministrativeMatter.

OnFebruary26,2010,theOSGalsosubmitteditscomment,essentiallystatingthatthe
incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement by

May17,2010.

The OSG insists that: (a) a writ of prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from
performing its principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees in the
Judiciary(b)theJBCsfunctiontorecommendisacontinuingprocess,whichdoesnotbegin
with each vacancy or end with each nomination, because the goal is to submit the list of
nomineestoMalacaangontheverydaythevacancyarises

[26]
theJBCwasthusactingwithin

itsjurisdictionwhenitcommencedandsetinmotiontheprocessofselectingthenomineesto
be submitted to the President for the position of Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice
[27]
Puno
(c)petitionerSorianostheorythatitistheSupremeCourt,notthePresident,whohas
thepowertoappointtheChiefJustice,isincorrect,andproceedsfromhismisinterpretationof
thephrasemembersoftheSupremeCourtfoundinSection9,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution
[28]
asreferringonlytotheAssociateJustices,totheexclusionoftheChiefJustice
(d)awrit
of mandamus can issue to compel the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the President,
considering that its duty to prepare the list of at least three nominees is unqualified, and the
submission of the list is a ministerial act that the JBC is mandated to perform under the
Constitutionassuch,theJBC,thenatureofwhoseprincipalfunctionisexecutive,isnotvested
withthepowertoresolvewhohastheauthoritytoappointthenextChiefJusticeand,therefore,
[29]
has no discretion to withhold the list from the President
and (e) a writ of mandamus
cannot issue to compel the JBC to include or exclude particular candidates as nominees,
considering that there is no imperative duty on its part to include in or exclude from the list
particularindividuals,but,onthecontrary,theJBCsdeterminationofwhoitnominatestothe
Presidentisanexerciseofadiscretionaryduty.

[30]

The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to
appointmentsintheSupremeCourt.ItarguesthatanyvacancyintheSupremeCourtmustbe
filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution

[31]

that in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of

SupremeCourtJustices,theframersneithermentionednorreferredtothebanagainstmidnight
appointments,oritseffectsonsuchperiod,orviceversa

[32]
thathadtheframersintendedthe

prohibitiontoapplytoSupremeCourtappointments,theycouldhaveeasilyexpresslystatedso
in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department) and that the framers also
incorporatedinArticleVIIIamplerestrictionsorlimitationsonthePresidentspowertoappoint
members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its
insulation from political pressures,

[33]
such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the

establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a
SupremeCourtJustice.

TheOSGpositsthatalthoughValenzuelainvolvedtheappointmentofRTCJudges,the
situationnowreferstotheappointmentofthenextChiefJusticetowhichtheprohibitiondoes
notapplythat,atanyrate,Valenzuelaevenrecognizedthattheremightbetheimperativeneed
for an appointment during the period of the ban, like when the membership of the Supreme
Court should be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or should the voting on a particular
[34]
important question requiring expeditious resolution be divided
and that Valenzuela also
recognized that the filling of vacancies in the Judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest,
most especially if there is any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments
[35]

duringtheperiodoftheprohibition.

Lastly, the OSG urges that there are now undeniably compelling reasons for the
incumbentPresidenttoappointthenextChiefJustice,towit:(a)adelugeofcasesinvolving
[36]
sensitivepoliticalissuesisquiteexpected
(b) the Court acts as the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal(PET),which,sittingenbanc,isthesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,
returns,andqualificationsofthePresidentandVicePresidentand,assuch,hasthepowerto
correctmanifesterrorsonthestatementofvotes(SOV)andcertificatesofcanvass(COC)

[37]

(c)ifhistoryhasshownthatduringordinarytimestheChiefJusticewasappointedimmediately
upontheoccurrenceofthevacancy,fromthetimeoftheeffectivityoftheConstitution,thereis
now even more reason to appoint the next Chief Justice immediately upon the retirement of
ChiefJusticePuno

[38]
and(d)shouldthenextChiefJusticecomefromamongtheincumbent

AssociateJusticesoftheSupremeCourt,therebycausingavacancy,italsobecomesincumbent
upontheJBCtostarttheselectionprocessforthefillingupofthevacancyinaccordancewith

[39]

theconstitutionalmandate.

On March 9, 2010, the Court admitted the following comments/oppositionsin

intervention,towit:

(a) The oppositioninintervention dated February 22, 2010 of Atty. Peter Irving
[40]
Corvera(Corvera)

(b) The oppositioninintervention dated February 22, 2010 of Atty. Christian

RobertS.Lim(Lim)

(c) The oppositioninintervention dated February 23, 2010 of Atty. Alfonso V.

Tan,Jr.(Tan)

(d)Thecomment/oppositionininterventiondatedMarch1,2010oftheNational
UnionofPeoplesLawyers(NUPL)

(e) The oppositioninintervention dated February 25, 2010 of Atty. Marlou B.

Ubano(Ubano)

(f)TheoppositionininterventiondatedFebruary25,2010ofIntegratedBarofthe
PhilippinesDavao del Sur Chapter and its Immediate Past President, Atty.
IsraelitoP.Torreon(IBPDavaodelSur)

(g)TheoppositionininterventiondatedFebruary26,2010ofAtty.MitchellJohn
L.Boiser(Boiser)

(h)Theconsolidatedcomment/oppositionininterventiondatedFebruary26,2010
of BAYAN Chairman Dr. Carolina P. Araullo BAYAN Secretary General
RenatoM.Reyes,Jr.ConfederationforUnity,RecognitionandAdvancement
of Government Employees (COURAGE) Chairman Ferdinand Gaite
Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY) Secretary General Gloria
Arellano Alyansa ng Nagkakaisang Kabataan ng Samayanan Para sa
Kaunlaran(ANAKBAYAN)ChairmanKenLeonardRamosTayoangPagasa
Convenor Alvin Peters League of Filipino Students (LFS) Chairman James
Mark Terry Lacuanan Ridon National Union of Students of the Philippines
(NUSP)ChairmanEinsteinRecedes,CollegeEditorsGuildofthePhilippines
(CEGP) Chairman Vijae Alquisola and Student Christian Movement of the

Philippines(SCMP)ChairmanMa.CristinaAngelaGuevarra(BAYANetal.)

(i) The oppositioninintervention dated March 3, 2010 of Walden F. Bello and

LorettaAnnP.Rosales(Belloetal.)and

(j) The consolidated comment/oppositioninintervention dated March 4, 2010 of

the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines (WTLOP),
represented by Atty. Yolanda QuisumbingJavellana Atty. Belleza Alojado
Demaisip Atty. Teresita GandioncoOledan Atty. Ma. Verena Kasilag
Villanueva Atty. Marilyn Sta. Romana Atty. Leonila de Jesus and Atty.
GuineveredeLeon(WTLOP).

Intervenors Tan, WTLOP, BAYAN et al., Corvera, IBP Davao del Sur, and NUPL take the
positionthatDeCastrospetitionwasbereftofanybasis,becauseunderSection15,ArticleVII,
theoutgoingPresidentisconstitutionallybannedfrommakinganyappointmentsfromMarch
10,2010untilJune30,2010,includingtheappointmentofthesuccessorofChiefJusticePuno.
Hence,mandamusdoesnotlietocompeltheJBCtosubmitthelistofnomineestotheoutgoing
President if the constitutional prohibition is already in effect. Tan adds that the prohibition
againstmidnightappointmentswasappliedbytheCourttotheappointmentstotheJudiciary
madebythenPresidentRamos,withtheCourtholdingthatthedutyofthePresidenttofillthe
vacancieswithin90daysfromoccurrenceofthevacancies(fortheSupremeCourt)orfromthe
submission of the list (for all other courts) was not an excuse to violate the constitutional
prohibition.

IntervenorsTan,Ubano,Boiser,Corvera,NULP,BAYANetal.,andBelloetal.oppose
theinsistencethatValenzuelarecognizesthepossibilitythatthePresidentmayappointthenext
Chief Justice if exigent circumstances warrant the appointment, because that recognition is
obiterdictumandaverthattheabsenceofaChiefJusticeorevenanAssociateJusticedoesnot
causeepicdamageorabsolutedisruptionorparalysisintheoperationsoftheJudiciary.They
insistthatevenwithoutthesuccessorofChiefJusticePunobeingappointedbytheincumbent
President,theCourtisallowedtositandadjudgeenbancorindivisionsofthree,fiveorseven
membersatitsdiscretionthatafullmembershipoftheCourtisnotnecessarythatpetitioner
DeCastrosfearsareunfoundedandbaseless,beingbasedonamerepossibility,theoccurrence
ofwhichisentirelyunsurethatitisnotinthenationalinteresttohaveaChiefJusticewhose
appointmentisunconstitutionaland,therefore,voidandthatsuchasituationwillcreateacrisis
inthejudicialsystemandwillworsenanalreadyvulnerablepoliticalsituation.


ice is imperative for the stability of the judicial system and the political situation in the country
when the electionrelated questions reach the Court as false, because there is an existing law on
filling the void brought about by a vacancy in the office of Chief Justice; that the law is Section 12
of the Judiciary Act of 1948, which has not been repealed by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or any other
law; that a temporary or an acting Chief Justice is not anathema to judicial independence; that the
designation of an acting Chief Justice is not only provided for by law, but is also dictated by
practical necessity; that the practice was intended to be enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, but
the Commissioners decided not to write it in the Constitution on account of the settled practice;
that the practice was followed under the 1987 Constitution, when, in 1992, at the end of the term
of Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, Associate Justice Andres Narvasa assumed the position as
Acting Chief Justice prior to his official appointment as Chief Justice; that said filling up of a
vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice was acknowledged and even used by analogy in the
case of the vacancy of the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, per Brillantes v. Yorac, 192
SCRA 358; and that the history of the Supreme Court has shown that this rule of succession has
been repeatedly observed and has become a part of its tradition.

IntervenorsUbano,Boiser,NUPL,Corvera,andLimmaintainthattheOmnibusElection
Code penalizes as an election offense the act of any government official who appoints,
promotes, or gives any increase in salary or remuneration or privilege to any government
officialoremployeeduringtheperiodof45daysbeforearegularelectionthattheprovision
covers all appointing heads, officials, and officers of a government office, agency or
instrumentality, including the President that for the incumbent President to appoint the next
ChiefJusticeupontheretirementofChiefJusticePuno,orduringtheperiodofthebanunder
the Omnibus Election Code, constitutes an election offense that even an appointment of the
nextChiefJusticepriortotheelectionbanisfundamentallyinvalidandwithouteffectbecause
therecanbenoappointmentuntilavacancyoccursandthatthevacancyforthepositioncan
occuronlybyMay17,2010.

IntervenorBoiseraddsthatDeCastrosprayertocompelthesubmissionofnomineesby
theJBCtotheincumbentPresidentisofftangentbecausethepositionofChiefJusticeisstill
notvacantthattospeakofalist,muchmoreasubmissionofsuchlist,beforeavacancyoccurs
isglaringlyprematurethattheproposedadvanceappointmentbytheincumbentPresidentof
thenextChiefJusticewillbeunconstitutionalandthatnolistofnomineescanbesubmittedby
theJBCifthereisnovacancy.

AlltheintervenorsoppositorssubmitthatSection15,ArticleVIImakesnodistinctionbetween
thekindsofappointmentsmadebythePresidentandthattheCourt,inValenzuela,ruledthat

theappointmentsbythePresidentofthetwojudgesduringtheprohibitionperiodwerevoid.

IntervenorWTLOPpositsthatSection15,ArticleVIIofthe1987Constitutiondoesnot
applyonlytotheappointmentsintheExecutiveDepartment,butalsotojudicialappointments,
contrary to the submission of PHILCONSA that Section 15 does not distinguish and that
Valenzuelaalreadyinterpretedtheprohibitionasapplicabletojudicialappointments.
Intervenor WTLOP further posits that petitioner Sorianos contention that the power to
appoint the Chief Justice is vested, not in the President, but in the Supreme Court, is utterly
baseless, because the Chief Justice is also a Member of the Supreme Court as contemplated
underSection9,ArticleVIIIandthat,atanyrate,thetermmemberswasinterpretedinVargas
v. Rillaroza (G.R. No. L1612, February 26, 1948) to refer to the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court that PHILCONSAs prayer that the Court pass a
resolutiondeclaringthatpersonswhomanifesttheirinterestasnominees,butwithconditions,
shallnotbeconsiderednomineesbytheJBCisdiametricallyopposedtotheargumentsinthe
bodyofitspetitionthatsuchglaringinconsistencybetweentheallegationsinthebodyandthe
reliefprayedforhighlightsthelackofmeritofPHILCONSAspetitionthattheroleoftheJBC
cannot be separated from the constitutional prohibition on the President and that the Court
mustdirecttheJBCtofollowtheruleoflaw,thatis,tosubmitthelistofnomineesonlytothe
next duly elected President after the period of the constitutional ban against midnight
appointmentshasexpired.

Oppositor IBP Davao del Sur opines that the JBC becauseitisneitherajudicialnora
quasijudicialbodyhasnoduty under the Constitution to resolve the question of whether the
incumbentPresidentcanappointaChiefJusticeduringtheperiodofprohibitionthateven if
theJBChasalreadycomeupwithashortlist,itstillhastobowtothestrictlimitationsunder
Section 15, Article VII that should the JBC defer submission of the list, it is not arrogating
untoitselfajudicialfunction,butsimplyrespectingtheclearmandateoftheConstitutionand
that the application of the general rule in Section 15, Article VII to the Judiciary does not
violatetheprincipleofseparationofpowers,becausesaidprovisionisanexception.

Oppositors NUPL, Corvera, Lim and BAYAN et al. state that the JBCs act of
nominating appointees to the Supreme Court is purely ministerial and does not involve the
exerciseofjudgmentthattherecanbenodefaultonthepartoftheJBCinsubmittingthelistof

nominees to the President, considering that the call for applications only begins from the
occurrenceofthevacancyintheSupremeCourtandthatthecommencementoftheprocessof
screeningofapplicantstofillthevacancyintheofficeoftheChiefJusticeonlybeginsfromthe
retirementonMay17,2010,for,priortothisdate,thereisnodefinitelegalbasisforanyparty
toclaimthatthesubmissionornonsubmissionofthelistofnomineestothePresidentbythe
JBCisamatterofrightunderlaw.

Themainquestionpresentedinallthefilingshereinbecauseitinvolvestwoseemingly
conflictingprovisionsoftheConstitutionimperativelydemandstheattentionandresolutionof
this Court, the only authority that can resolve the question definitively and finally. The
imperative demand rests on the everpresent need, first, to safeguard the independence,
reputation, and integrity of the entire Judiciary, particularly this Court, an institution that has
beenunnecessarilydraggedintotheharshpolemicsbroughtonbythecontroversysecond,to
settleonceandforallthedoubtaboutanoutgoingPresidentspowertoappointtotheJudiciary
withinthelongperiodstartingtwomonthsbeforethepresidentialelectionsuntiltheendofthe
presidentialtermandthird,tosetadefiniteguidelinefortheJBCtofollowinthedischargeof
its primary office of screening and nominating qualified persons for appointment to the
Judiciary.

Thus,weresolve.

RulingoftheCourt

LocusStandiofPetitioners

Thepreliminaryissuetobesettlediswhetherornotthepetitionershavelocusstandi.

Black defines locus standi as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

question.

[41]
In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the

determinationofthelocusstandiofthepetitionersduetotheeverpresentneedtoregulatethe
invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any official action or policy in order to
avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of public officials and offices involved in public
service.Itisrequired,therefore,thatthepetitionermusthaveapersonalstakeintheoutcomeof
the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,

[42]

Inc.:

Thequestiononlegalstandingiswhethersuchpartieshaveallegedsuchapersonal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
[43]
illuminationofdifficultconstitutionalquestions.
Accordingly,ithasbeenheldthatthe
interestofapersonassailingtheconstitutionalityofastatutemustbedirectandpersonal.
Hemustbeabletoshow,notonlythatthelaworanygovernmentactisinvalid,butalso
thathesustainedorisinimminentdangerofsustainingsomedirectinjuryasaresultofits
enforcement,andnotmerelythathesufferstherebyinsomeindefiniteway.Itmustappear
that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
[44]
penaltiesbyreasonofthestatuteoractcomplainedof.

[45]
the Court adopted the direct

It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera,

injurytestfordeterminingwhetherapetitionerinapublicactionhadlocusstandi.There, the
Courtheldthatthepersonwhowouldassailthevalidityofastatutemusthaveapersonaland
substantialinterestinthecasesuchthathehassustained,orwillsustaindirectinjuryasaresult.
[46]
Manila Race Horse Trainers

Vera was followed in Custodio v. President of the Senate,

Association v. De la Fuente,

[47]
[48]
AntiChinese League of the Philippines v. Felix,
and
[49]

Pascualv.SecretaryofPublicWorks.

Yet,theCourthasalsoheldthattherequirementoflocusstandi,beingamereprocedural
technicality,canbewaivedbytheCourtintheexerciseofitsdiscretion.Forinstance,in1949,
[50]

in Araneta v. Dinglasan,

the Court liberalized the approach when the cases had

transcendental importance. Some notable controversies whose petitioners did not pass the
[51]
directinjurytestwereallowedtobetreatedinthesamewayasinAranetav.Dinglasan.

[52]
thisCourtdecidedtoresolve

Inthe1975decisioninAquinov.CommissiononElections,

theissuesraisedbythepetitionduetotheirfarreachingimplications,evenifthepetitionerhad
nopersonalitytofilethesuit.TheliberalapproachofAquinov.CommissiononElectionshas
beenadoptedinseveralnotablecases,permittingordinarycitizens,legislators,andcivic
organizationstobringtheirsuitsinvolvingtheconstitutionalityorvalidityoflaws,regulations,

[53]
andrulings.

However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly

illegalorunconstitutionalexecutiveorlegislativeactionrestsonthetheorythatthepetitioner
representsthepublicingeneral.Althoughsuchpetitionermaynotbeasadverselyaffectedby
theactioncomplainedagainstasareothers,itisenoughthathesufficientlydemonstratesinhis
petitionthatheisentitledtoprotectionorrelieffromtheCourtinthevindicationofapublic
right.

Quiteoften,ashere,thepetitionerinapublicactionsuesasacitizenortaxpayertogain
locusstandi.Thatisnotsurprising,foreveniftheissuemayappeartoconcernonlythepublic
in general, such capacities nonetheless equip the petitioner with adequate interest to sue. In
[54]
Davidv.MacapagalArroyo,
theCourtaptlyexplainswhy:

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in public
[55]
actions.ThedistinctionwasfirstlaiddowninBeauchampv.Silk,
whereitwasheldthatthe
plaintiffinataxpayerssuitisinadifferentcategoryfromtheplaintiffinacitizenssuit.Inthe
former,theplaintiffisaffectedbytheexpenditureofpublicfunds,whileinthelatter,heis
butthemereinstrumentofthepublicconcern.AsheldbytheNewYorkSupremeCourtin
[56]
PeopleexrelCasev.Collins:
Inmatterofmerepublicright,howeverthepeoplearethe
realpartiesItisatleasttheright,ifnottheduty,ofeverycitizentointerfereandseethata
publicoffencebeproperlypursuedandpunished,andthatapublicgrievanceberemedied.
[57]
With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan
held that the right of a citizen and a
taxpayertomaintainanactionincourtstorestraintheunlawfuluseofpublicfundstohis
[58]
injurycannotbedenied.

PetitionersDeCastro(G.R.No.191002),Soriano(G.R.No.191032)andPeralta(G.R.
No.191149)allasserttheirrightascitizensfilingtheirpetitionsonbehalfofthepublicwhoare
directly affected by the issue of the appointment of the next Chief Justice. De Castro and
Soriano further claim standing as taxpayers, with Soriano averring that he is affected by the
continuingproceedingsintheJBC,whichinvolveunnecessary,ifnot,illegaldisbursementof
[59]

publicfunds.

PHILCONSAallegesitselftobeanonstock,nonprofitorganizationexistingunderthe

lawforthepurposeofdefending,protecting,andpreservingtheConstitutionandpromotingits
growth and flowering. It also alleges that the Court has recognized its legal standing to file
[60]

casesonconstitutionalissuesinseveralcases.

InA.M.No.1025SC,MendozastatesthatheisacitizenofthePhilippines,amember
of the Philippine Bar engaged in the active practice of law, and a former Solicitor General,
formerMinisterofJustice,formerMemberoftheInterimBatasangPambansaandtheRegular
BatasangPambansa,andformermemberoftheFacultyoftheCollegeofLawoftheUniversity
ofthePhilippines.

The petitioners in G.R. No. 191342 are the Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines(IBP)forSouthernLuzonandEasternVisayas.Theyallegethattheyhavethelegal
standingtoenjointhesubmissionofthelistofnomineesbytheJBCtothePresident,for[a]n
adjudicationoftheproperinterpretationandapplicationoftheconstitutionalbanonmidnight
appointmentswithregardtorespondentJBCsfunctioninsubmittingthelistofnomineesiswell
withintheconcernofpetitioners,whoaredutyboundtoensurethatobedienceandrespectfor
the Constitution is upheld, most especially by government offices, such as respondent JBC,
whoarespecificallytaskedtoperformcrucialfunctionsinthewholeschemeofourdemocratic
institution. They further allege that, reposed in them as members of the Bar, is a clear legal
interestintheprocessofselectingthemembersoftheSupremeCourt,andintheselectionof
theChiefJustice,consideringthatthepersonappointedbecomesamemberofthebodythathas
constitutionalsupervisionandauthorityoverthemandothermembersofthelegalprofession.
[61]
The Court rules that the petitioners have each demonstrated adequate interest in the
outcomeofthecontroversyastovestthemwiththerequisitelocusstandi.Theissuesbeforeus
areoftranscendentalimportancetothepeopleasawhole,andtothepetitionersinparticular.
Indeed, the issues affect everyone (including the petitioners), regardless of ones personal
interest in life, because they concern that great doubt about the authority of the incumbent
President to appoint not only the successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice, but also
others who may serve in the Judiciary, which already suffers from a far too great number of
vacanciesintheranksoftrialjudgesthroughoutthecountry.

In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive the requirement of legal

standinginfavorofanypetitionerwhenthematterinvolvedhastranscendentalimportance,or
otherwiserequiresaliberalizationoftherequirement.

[62]

Yet,ifanydoubtstilllingersaboutthelocusstandiofanypetitioner,wedispelthedoubt
now in order to remove any obstacle or obstruction to the resolution of the essential issue
squarely presented herein. We are not to shirk from discharging our solemn duty by reason
aloneofanobstaclemoretechnicalthanotherwise.InAgan,Jr.v.PhilippineInternationalAir
[63]
Terminals Co., Inc.,
we pointed out: Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law
becauseinsomecases,suitsarenotbroughtbypartieswhohavebeenpersonallyinjuredbythe
operationofalaworanyothergovernmentactbutbyconcernedcitizens,taxpayersorvoters
who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are not
covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious
[64]

constitutionalquestionsraised.

Justiciability

IntervenorNUPLmaintainsthatthereisnoactualcaseorcontroversythatisappropriate
orripeforadjudication,consideringthatalthoughtheselectionprocesscommencedbytheJBC
isgoingon,thereisyetnofinallistofnomineeshence,thereisnoimminentcontroversyasto
whethersuchlistmustbesubmittedtotheincumbentPresident,orreservedforsubmissionto
theincomingPresident.

IntervenorTanraisesthelackofanyactualjusticiablecontroversythatisripeforjudicial
determination, pointing out that petitioner De Castro has not even shown that the JBC has
already completed its selection process and is now ready to submit the list to the incumbent
President and that petitioner De Castro is merely presenting a hypothetical scenario that is
clearlynotsufficientfortheCourttoexerciseitspowerofjudicialreview.

Intervenors Corvera and Lim separately opine that De Castros petition rests on an
overbroadandvagueallegationofpoliticaltension,whichisinsufficientbasisfortheCourtto
exerciseitspowerofjudicialreview.

Intervenor BAYAN et al. contend that the petitioners are seeking a mere advisory
opiniononwhattheJBCandthePresidentshoulddo,andarenotinvokinganyissuesthatare
justiciableinnature.

IntervenorsBelloetal.submitthatthereexistnoconflictoflegalrightsandnoassertion
ofoppositelegalclaimsinanyofthepetitionsthatPHILCONSAdoesnotallegeanyaction
takenbytheJBC,butsimplyaversthattheconditionalmanifestationsoftwoMembersofthe
Court,accentedbythedividedopinionsandinterpretationsoflegalexperts,orassociationsof
lawyers and law students on the issues published in the daily newspapers are matters of
paramount and transcendental importance to the bench, bar and general public that
PHILCONSAfailsnotonlytociteanylegaldutyorallegeanyfailuretoperformtheduty,but
alsotoindicatewhatspecificactionshouldbedonebytheJBCthatMendozadoesnoteven
attempttoportraythematterasacontroversyorconflictofrights,but,instead,praysthatthe
CourtshouldrulefortheguidanceoftheJBCthatthefactthattheCourtsupervisestheJBC
does not automatically imply that the Court can rule on the issues presented in the Mendoza
petition, because supervision involves oversight, which means that the subordinate officer or
bodymustfirstact,andifsuchactionisnotinaccordancewithprescribedrules,then,andonly
then, may the person exercising oversight order the action to be redone to conform to the
prescribed rules that the Mendoza petition does not allege that the JBC has performed a
specificactsusceptibletocorrectionforbeingillegalorunconstitutionalandthattheMendoza
petitionaskstheCourttoissueanadvisoryruling,nottoexerciseitspowerofsupervisionto
correctawrongactbytheJBC,buttodeclarethestateofthelawintheabsenceofanactual
caseorcontroversy.

Weholdthatthepetitionssetforthanactualcaseorcontroversythatisripeforjudicial
determination.TherealityisthattheJBCalreadycommencedtheproceedingsfortheselection
ofthenomineestobeincludedinashortlisttobesubmittedtothePresidentforconsideration
of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the
positionisnotyetvacant,thefactthattheJBCbegantheprocessofnominationpursuanttoits
rulesandpractices,althoughithasyettodecidewhethertosubmitthelistofnomineestothe
incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial
determination,becausethenextstepsarethepublicinterviewofthecandidates,thepreparation
oftheshortlistofcandidates,andtheinterviewofconstitutionalexperts,asmaybeneeded.

ApartofthequestiontobereviewedbytheCourtiswhethertheJBCproperlyinitiated
the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositorsintervenors that the JBC
couldonlydosooncethevacancyhasoccurred(thatis,afterMay17,2010).Anotherpartis,
ofcourse,whethertheJBCmayresumeitsprocessuntiltheshortlistisprepared,inviewofthe
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint
onefromtheshortlisttofillthevacancyintheSupremeCourt(beittheChiefJusticeoran
AssociateJustice)within90daysfromtheoccurrenceofthevacancy.

The ripeness of the controversy for judicial determination may not be doubted. The
challengestotheauthorityoftheJBCtoopentheprocessofnominationandtocontinuethe
processuntilthesubmissionofthelistofnomineestheinsistenceofsomeofthepetitionersto
compel the JBC through mandamus to submit the short list to the incumbent President the
counterinsistence of the intervenors to prohibit the JBC from submitting the short list to the
incumbent President on the ground that said list should be submitted instead to the next
PresidentthestrongpositionthattheincumbentPresidentisalreadyprohibitedunderSection
15, Article VII from making any appointments, including those to the Judiciary, starting on
May10,2010untilJune30,2010andthecontrarypositionthattheincumbentPresidentisnot
soprohibitedareonlysomeoftherealissuesfordetermination.Allsuchissuesestablishthe
ripenessofthecontroversy,consideringthatforsometheshortlistmustbesubmittedbefore
the vacancy actually occurs by May 17, 2010. The outcome will not be an abstraction, or a
merelyhypotheticalexercise.Theresolutionofthecontroversywillsurelysettlewith finality
the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it
alreadybegan,orthatarereasonspersuadingtheJBCtodesistfromtherestoftheprocess.

We need not await the occurrence of the vacancy by May 17, 2010 in order for the
principal issue to ripe for judicial determination by the Court. It is enough that one alleges
conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but seemingly proscribed by the
Constitution.Areasonablecertaintyoftheoccurrenceoftheperceivedthreattoaconstitutional
interestissufficienttoaffordabasisforbringingachallenge,providedtheCourthassufficient
factsbeforeittoenableittointelligentlyadjudicatetheissues.
doubt,foronlylegalissuesremain.

SubstantiveMerits

[65]
Herein,thefactsarenotin

I
ProhibitionunderSection15,ArticleVIIdoesnotapply
toappointmentstofillavacancyintheSupremeCourt
ortootherappointmentstotheJudiciary

Twoconstitutionalprovisionsareseeminglyinconflict.

Thefirst,Section15,ArticleVII(ExecutiveDepartment),provides:

Section15.Twomonthsimmediatelybeforethenextpresidentialelectionsanduptothe
endofhisterm,aPresidentorActingPresidentshallnotmakeappointments,excepttemporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
serviceorendangerpublicsafety.

Theother,Section4(1),ArticleVIII(JudicialDepartment),states:

Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members.Anyvacancyshallbefilledwithinninetydaysfromtheoccurrencethereof.

In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners, with the exception of Soriano, Tolentino
andInting,submitthattheincumbentPresidentcanappointthesuccessorofChiefJusticePuno
upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the prohibition against presidential
appointmentsunderSection15,ArticleVIIdoesnotextendtoappointmentsintheJudiciary.

TheCourtagreeswiththesubmission.

First.TherecordsofthedeliberationsoftheConstitutionalCommissionrevealthatthe
framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such
meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the
Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to
reflecttheirintentionandmanifesttheirvisionofwhattheConstitutionshouldcontain.

The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the
awesome powers of government among the three great departments, the Legislative (Article
VI),theExecutive(ArticleVII),andtheJudicialDepartments(ArticleVIII).Thearrangement

was a true recognition of the principle of separation of powers that underlies the political
structure, as Constitutional Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna (later a worthy member of the
Court)explainedinhissponsorshipspeech:

We have in the political part of this Constitution opted for the separation of powers in
governmentbecausewebelievethattheonlywaytoprotectfreedomandlibertyistoseparate
and divide the awesome powers of government. Hence, we return to the separation of powers
doctrineandthelegislative,executiveandjudicialdepartments.

[66]

Ascanbeseen,ArticleVIIisdevotedtotheExecutiveDepartment,and,amongothers,it
lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of
appointmentisdealtwithinSections14,15and16oftheArticle.

Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and
qualificationsofMembersoftheSupremeCourt,amongothers.Section4(1)andSection9of
this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court
Justices.Inparticular,Section9statesthattheappointmentofSupremeCourtJusticescanonly
bemadebythePresidentuponthesubmissionofalistofatleastthreenomineesbytheJBC
Section4(1)oftheArticlemandatesthePresidenttofillthevacancywithin90daysfromthe
occurrenceofthevacancy.

HadtheframersintendedtoextendtheprohibitioncontainedinSection15,ArticleVIIto
theappointmentofMembersoftheSupremeCourt,theycouldhaveexplicitlydoneso.They
couldnothaveignoredthemeticulousorderingoftheprovisions.Theywouldhaveeasilyand
surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likelyinSection4(1),ArticleVIII.Thatsuchspecificationwasnotdoneonlyrevealsthatthe
prohibitionagainstthePresidentorActingPresidentmakingappointmentswithintwomonths
beforethenextpresidentialelectionsanduptotheendofthePresidentsorActingPresidents
termdoesnotrefertotheMembersoftheSupremeCourt.

[67]
came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial

Although Valenzuela

appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the
deliberationsoftheConstitutionalCommission.Thereby,theconfirmationmadetotheJBCby
then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the
Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply to the
appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned,
shouldprevail.

Relevantly, Valenzuela adverted to the intent of the framers in the genesis of Section 4 (1),
ArticleVIII,viz:

V.IntentoftheConstitutionalCommission

ThejournaloftheCommissionwhichdrewupthepresentConstitutiondisclosesthatthe
originalproposalwastohaveanelevenmemberSupremeCourt.CommissionerEulogioLerum
wantedtoincreasethenumberofJusticestofifteen.Healsowishedtoensurethatthatnumber
wouldnotbereducedforanyappreciablelengthoftime(evenonlytemporarily),andtothisend
proposed that any vacancy must be filled within two months from the date that the vacancy
occurs.Hisproposaltohavea15memberCourtwasnotinitiallyadopted.Persistinghoweverin
hisdesiretomakecertainthatthesizeoftheCourtwouldnotbedecreasedforanysubstantial
periodasaresultofvacancies,Lerumproposedtheinsertionintheprovision(anenttheCourts
membership)ofthesamemandatethatINCASEOFANYVACANCY,THESAMESHALL
BEFILLEDWITHINTWOMONTHSFROMOCCURRENCETHEREOF.Helateragreedto
suggestions to make the period three, instead of two, months. As thus amended, the proposal
was approved. As it turned out, however, the Commission ultimately agreed on a fifteen
memberCourt.Thus it was that the section fixing the composition of the Supreme Court
came to include a command to fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its
occurrence.

In this connection, it may be pointed out that that instruction that any vacancy shall be
filledwithinninetydays(inthelastsentenceofSection4(1)ofArticleVIII)contrastswiththe
prohibitioninSection15,ArticleVII,whichiscouchedinstrongernegativelanguagethata
PresidentorActingPresidentshallnotmakeappointments

ThecommissionlaterapprovedaproposalofCommissionerHilarioG.Davide,Jr.(nowa
MemberofthisCourt)toaddtowhatisnowSection9ofArticleVIII,thefollowingparagraph:
WITH RESPECT TO LOWER COURTS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE
APPOINTMENT WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST (of
nomineesbytheJudicialandBarCounciltothePresident).Davidestatedthathispurposewas
to provide a uniform rule for lower courts. According to him, the 90day period should be
countedfromsubmissionofthelistofnomineestothePresidentinviewofthepossibilitythat
thePresidentmightrejectthelistsubmittedtohimandtheJBCthusneedmoretimetosubmita
newone.

Ontheotherhand,Section15,ArticleVIIwhichineffectdeprivesthePresidentofhis
appointingpowertwomonthsimmediatelybeforethenextpresidentialelectionsuptotheendof

[68]
histermwasapprovedwithoutdiscussion.

However, the reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission did not advance or
supporttheresultinValenzuela.Fartothecontrary,therecordsdisclosedtheexpressintentof
theframerstoenshrineintheConstitution,upontheinitiativeofCommissionerEulogioLerum,
acommand[tothePresident]tofillupanyvacancythereinwithin90daysfromitsoccurrence,
[69]
TheexchangesduringdeliberationsoftheConstitutional

whichevenValenzuelaconceded.

CommissiononOctober8,1986furthershowthatthefillingofavacancyintheSupremeCourt
withinthe90dayperiodwasatruemandateforthePresident,viz:

MR.DECASTRO.IunderstandthatourjusticesnowintheSupremeCourt,togetherwith
theChiefJustice,areonly11.

MR.CONCEPCION.Yes.

MR.DECASTRO.Andthesecondsentenceofthissubsectionreads:Anyvacancyshall
befilledwithinninetydaysfromtheoccurrencethereof.

MR.CONCEPCION.Thatisright.

MR.DECASTRO.Isthisnowamandatetotheexecutivetofillthevacancy?

MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. That is borne out of the fact that in the past 30

[70]

years,seldomhastheCourthadacompletecomplement.

Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative,
[71]
should not be disregarded. Thereby,

operating to impose a duty that may be enforced

Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a
MemberoftheSupremeCourtwithin90daysfromtheoccurrenceofthevacancy.Thefailure
bythePresidenttodosowillbeacleardisobediencetotheConstitution.
The 90day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite
mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial
interpretationinValenzuelatotheeffectthatSection15,ArticleVIIprevailedbecauseitwas
couchedinstrongernegativelanguage.Suchinterpretationeventurnedouttobeconjectural,in
lightoftherecordsoftheConstitutionalCommissionsdeliberationsonSection4(1),Article
VIII.

HowValenzuelajustifieditspronouncementandresultishardlywarranted.Accordingto

anauthorityonstatutoryconstruction:

[72]

xxx the court should seek to avoid any conflict in the provisions of the statute by
endeavoringtoharmonizeandreconcileeverypartsothateachshallbeeffective.Itisnoteasy
todraftastatute,oranyotherwritingforthatmatter,whichmaynotinsomemannercontain
conflictingprovisions.Butwhatappearstothereadertobeaconflictmaynothaveseemedsoto
thedrafter.Undoubtedly,eachprovisionwasinsertedforadefinitereason.Oftenbyconsidering
theenactmentinitsentirety,whatappearstobeonitsfaceaconflictmaybeclearedupandthe
provisionsreconciled.

Consequently, that construction which will leave every word operative will be favored
over one which leaves some word or provision meaningless because of inconsistency. But a
wordshouldnotbegiveneffect,iftodosogivesthestatuteameaningcontrarytotheintentof
thelegislature.Ontheotherhand,iffulleffectcannotbegiventothewordsofastatute,they
must be made effective as far as possible. Nor should the provisions of a statute which are
inconsistent be harmonized at a sacrifice of the legislative intention. It may be that two
provisionsareirreconcilableifso,theonewhichexpressestheintentofthelawmakersshould
control. And the arbitrary rule has been frequently announced that where there is an
irreconcilableconflictbetweenthedifferentprovisionsofastatute,theprovisionlastinorderof
positionwillprevail,sinceitisthelatestexpressionofthelegislativewill.Obviously,theruleis
subject to deserved criticism. It is seldom applied, and probably then only where an
irreconcilableconflictexistsbetweendifferentsectionsofthesameact,andafterallothermeans
of ascertaining the meaning of the legislature have been exhausted. Where the conflict is
betweentwostatutes,moremaybesaidinfavoroftherulesapplication,largelybecauseofthe
principleofimpliedrepeal.

In this connection, PHILCONSAs urging of a revisit and a review of Valenzuela is

timelyandappropriate.Valenzuela arbitrarily ignored the express intent of the Constitutional
Commission to have Section 4 (1), Article VIII stand independently of any other provision,
least of all one found in Article VII. It further ignored that the two provisions had no
irreconcilableconflict,regardlessofSection15,ArticleVIIbeingcouchedinthenegative.As
judges,wearenottoundulyinterpret,andshouldnotacceptaninterpretationthatdefeatsthe
[73]

intentoftheframers.

Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice on the
premise that Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be
sustained. A misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not be allowed to last after its false
[74]

premises have been exposed.

It will not do to merely distinguish Valenzuela from these

cases,fortheresulttobereachedhereinisentirelyincompatiblewithwhatValenzueladecreed.
Consequently,Valenzuelanowdeservestobequicklysenttothedustbinoftheunworthyand

forgettable.

WereverseValenzuela.

Second.Section15,ArticleVIIdoesnotapplyaswelltoallotherappointmentsinthe
Judiciary.

ThereisnoquestionthatoneofthereasonsunderlyingtheadoptionofSection15aspart
ofArticleVIIwastoeliminatemidnightappointmentsfrombeingmadebyanoutgoingChief
ExecutiveinthemoldoftheappointmentsdealtwithintheleadingcaseofAytonav.Castillo.
[75]
Infact,inValenzuela,theCourtsoobserved,statingthat:

xxxitappearsthatSection15,ArticleVIIisdirectedagainsttwotypesofappointments:
(1)thosemadeforbuyingvotesand(2)thosemadeforpartisanconsiderations. Thefirstrefers
to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are
similartothosewhicharedeclaredelectionoffensesintheOmnibusElectionCode,viz.:

xxx

ThesecondtypeofappointmentsprohibitedbySection15,ArticleVIIconsistsoftheso
calledmidnightappointments.InAytonav.Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of
DiosdadoMacapagalasdulyelectedPresident,PresidentCarlosP.Garcia,whowasdefeatedin
hisbidforreelection,becamenomorethanacaretakeradministratorwhosedutywastoprepare
fortheorderlytransferofauthoritytotheincomingPresident.SaidtheCourt:

Thefillingupofvacanciesinimportantpositions,iffew,andsospacedastoafford
some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the
issuanceof350appointmentsinonenightandtheplannedinductionofalmostallofthem
inafewhoursbeforetheinaugurationofthenewPresidentmay,withsomereason,be
regarded by the latter as an abuse of Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being
apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and
other conditions, and thereby to deprive the new administration of an opportunity to
makethecorrespondingappointments.

As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to important
positions which have to be made even after the proclamation of the new President. Such
appointments, so long as they are few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of
deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the
appointees qualifications, can be made by the outgoing President. Accordingly, several
appointmentsmadebyPresidentGarcia,whichwereshowntohavebeenwellconsidered,were
upheld.

Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling. It may not
unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only midnight appointments those made
obviouslyforpartisanreasonsasshownbytheirnumberandthetimeoftheirmakingbut
also appointments presumed made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the

Presidentialelection.

On the other hand, the exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allowing
appointmentstobemadeduringtheperiodofthebanthereinprovidedismuchnarrowerthan
thatrecognizedinAytona.Theexceptionallowsonlythemakingoftemporaryappointmentsto
executivepositionswhencontinuedvacancieswillprejudicepublicserviceorendangerpublic
safety.Obviously,thearticlegreatlyrestrictstheappointingpowerofthePresidentduringthe
periodoftheban.

Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts
and the restriction on the President's power of appointment, it is this Courts view that, as a
general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely, the
preventionofvotebuyingandsimilarevilsoutweighstheneedforavoidingdelaysinfillingup
ofcourtvacanciesorthedispositionofsomecases.Temporaryvacanciescanabidetheperiodof
the ban which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist only once in every six
years.Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by designation.
Butprohibitedappointmentsarelonglastingandpermanentintheireffects.Theymay,asearlier
pointed out, in fact influence the results of elections and, for that reason, their making is

[76]

consideredanelectionoffense.

Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we
have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments
made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to
appointmentsintheJudiciary,becausetheirestablishmentoftheJBCandtheirsubjectingthe
nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate
priorprocessoftheJBCensuredthattherewouldnolongerbemidnightappointmentstothe
Judiciary. If midnight appointments in the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with
irregularities,ormadebyanoutgoingChiefExecutiveinthelastdaysofhisadministrationout
of a desire to subvert the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship,

[77]
the

appointmentstotheJudiciarymadeaftertheestablishmentoftheJBCwouldnotbesuffering
fromsuchdefectsbecauseoftheJBCspriorprocessingofcandidates.Indeed,itisaxiomaticin
statutory construction that the ascertainment of the purpose of the enactment is a step in the
process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment, because the reason for the
enactment must necessarily shed considerable light on the law of the statute, i.e., the intent
hence,theenactmentshouldbeconstruedwithreferencetoitsintendedscopeandpurpose,and
[78]
thecourtshouldseektocarryoutthispurposeratherthantodefeatit.

Also,theinterventionoftheJBCeliminatesthedangerthatappointmentstotheJudiciary
canbemadeforthepurposeofbuyingvotesinacomingpresidentialelection,orofsatisfying

partisanconsiderations.TheexperiencefromthetimeoftheestablishmentoftheJBCshows
that even candidates for judicial positions at any level backed by people influential with the
President could not always be assured of being recommended for the consideration of the
President, because they first had to undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there.
Indeed,thecreationoftheJBCwaspreciselyintendedtodepoliticizetheJudiciarybydoing
awaywiththeinterventionoftheCommissiononAppointments.Thisinsulatingprocesswas
absentfromtheAytonamidnightappointment.

Third.Asearlierstated,thenonapplicabilityofSection15,ArticleVIItoappointments
in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself
when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the
constitutionality of xxx appointments to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming
presidentialelections.Heassuredthatonthebasisofthe(Constitutional)Commissionsrecords,
the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals.

[79]
This

confirmationwasacceptedbytheJBC,whichthensubmittedtothePresidentforconsideration
thenominationsfortheeightvacanciesintheCourtofAppeals.

[80]

The fault of Valenzuela was that it accorded no weight and due consideration to the
confirmationofJusticeRegalado.Valenzuelawasweak,becauseitreliedoninterpretationto
determine the intent of the framers rather than on the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.MuchoftheunfoundeddoubtaboutthePresidentspowertoappointduringthe
period of prohibition in Section 15, Article VII could have been dispelled since its
promulgationonNovember9,1998,hadValenzuelaproperlyacknowledgedandreliedonthe
confirmation of a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission like Justice
Regalado.

Fourth.Ofthe23sectionsinArticleVII,three(i.e.,Section14,Section15,andSection
16)concerntheappointingpowersofthePresident.

Section14speaksofthepowerofthesucceedingPresidenttorevokeappointmentsmade
[81]
and evidently refers only to appointments in the Executive

by an Acting President,

Department.IthasnoapplicationtoappointmentsintheJudiciary,becausetemporaryoracting
appointments can only undermine the independence of the Judiciary due to their being

[82]
The letter and spirit of the Constitution safeguard that independence.

revocable at will.

Also, there is no law in the books that authorizes the revocation of appointments in the
Judiciary.Priortotheirmandatoryretirementorresignation,judgesofthefirstandsecondlevel
courts and the Justices of the third level courts may only be removed for cause, but the
MembersoftheSupremeCourtmayberemovedonlybyimpeachment.

Section 16 covers only the presidential appointments that require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Thereby, the Constitutional Commission restored the
requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments after the requirement was
removed from the 1973 Constitution. Yet, because of Section 9 of Article VIII, the restored
requirementdidnotincludeappointmentstotheJudiciary.

[83]

Section14,Section15,andSection16areobviouslyofthesamecharacter,inthatthey
affectthepowerofthePresidenttoappoint.ThefactthatSection14andSection16referonly
to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also
appliesonlytotheExecutiveDepartment.Thisconclusionisconsistentwiththerulethatevery
partofthestatutemustbeinterpretedwithreferencetothecontext,i.e.thateverypartmustbe
consideredtogetherwiththeotherparts,andkeptsubservienttothegeneralintentofthewhole
enactment.

[84]
ItisabsurdtoassumethattheframersdeliberatelysituatedSection15between

Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the
framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in
ArticleVIII,mostlikelywithinSection4(1)thereof.

Fifth.ToholdliketheCourtdidinValenzuelathatSection15extendstoappointmentsto
theJudiciaryfurtherunderminestheintentoftheConstitutionofensuringtheindependenceof
theJudicialDepartmentfromtheExecutiveandLegislativeDepartments.Suchaholdingwill
tietheJudiciaryandtheSupremeCourttothefortunesormisfortunesofpoliticalleadersvying
for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new
President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself
suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become
beholdentotheappointingauthority.Incontrast,theappointmentbytheincumbentPresident
doesnotrunthesameriskofcompromisingjudicialindependence,preciselybecauseherterm

willendbyJune30,2010.

Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the
incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice
PunowithinthecontextofSection4(1),ArticleVIII,becauseanywaytherewillstillbeabout
45daysofthe90daysmandatedinSection4(1),ArticleVIIIremaining.

The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring
fromChiefJusticePunosretirementbyMay17,2010.ItignorestheneedtoapplySection4(1)
toeverysituationofavacancyintheSupremeCourt.

The argument also rests on the fallacious assumption that there will still be time
remaining in the 90day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII. The fallacy is easily
demonstrable,astheOSGhasshowninitscomment.

Section4(3),ArticleVIIrequirestheregularelectionstobeheldonthesecondMonday
ofMay,lettingtheelectionsfallonMay8,attheearliest,orMay14,atthelatest.Iftheregular
presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such
elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the
prohibitionislongerthanthefullmandatory90dayperiodtofillthevacancyintheSupreme
Court.Theresultisthatthereareatleast19occasions(i.e.,thedifferencebetweentheshortest
possibleperiodofthebanof109daysandthe90daymandatoryperiodforappointments)in
whichtheoutgoingPresidentwouldbeinnopositiontocomplywiththeconstitutionaldutyto
fillupavacancyintheSupremeCourt.ItissafetoassumethattheframersoftheConstitution
could not have intended such an absurdity. In fact, in their deliberations on the mandatory
period for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the
framers neither discussed, nor mentioned, nor referred to the ban against midnight
appointmentsunderSection15,ArticleVII,oritseffectsonthe90dayperiod,orvice versa.
Theydidnotneedto,becausetheyneverintendedSection15,ArticleVIItoapplytoavacancy
intheSupremeCourt,orinanyofthelowercourts.

Seventh.Asamatteroffact,inanextremecase,wecanevenraiseadoubtonwhethera
JBC list is necessary at all for the President any President to appoint a Chief Justice if the
appointeeistocomefromtheranksofthesittingjusticesoftheSupremeCourt.

Sec.9,ArticleVIIIsays:

xxx.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtxxxshallbeappointedbythePresidentfroma
listofatleastthreenomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncilforanyvacancy.Such
appointmentsneednoconfirmation.
xxx

TheprovisionclearlyreferstoanappointeecomingintotheSupremeCourtfromtheoutside,
that is, a nonmember of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the
Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of
whomhavepreviouslybeenvettedbytheJBC.

CanthePresident,therefore,appointanyoftheincumbentJusticesoftheCourtasChief
Justice?

Thequestionisnotsquarelybeforeusatthemoment,butitshouldlenditselftoadeeper
analysis if and when circumstances permit. It should be a good issue for the proposed
Constitutional Convention to consider in the light of Senate President Juan Ponce Enriles
statementthatthePresidentcanappointtheChiefJusticefromamongthesittingjusticesofthe
CourtevenwithoutaJBClist.

II
TheJudiciaryActof1948

TheposturehasbeentakenthatnourgencyexistsforthePresidenttoappointthesuccessorof
ChiefJusticePuno,consideringthattheJudiciaryActof1948canstilladdressthesituationof
havingthenextPresidentappointthesuccessor.

Section12oftheJudiciaryActof1948states:

Section12.VacancyinOfficeofChiefJustice.IncaseofavacancyintheofficeofChief
JusticeoftheSupremeCourtorofhisinabilitytoperformthedutiesandpowersofhisoffice,
theyshalldevolveupontheAssociateJusticewhoisfirstinprecedence,untilsuchdisabilityis
removed,oranotherChiefJusticeisappointedanddulyqualified.Thisprovisionshallapplyto
everyAssociateJusticewhosucceedstotheofficeofChiefJustice.

TheprovisioncallsforanActingChiefJusticeintheeventofavacancyintheofficeof
the Chief Justice, or in the event that the Chief Justice is unable to perform his duties and
powers.Ineitherofsuchcircumstances,thedutiesandpowersoftheofficeoftheChiefJustice
shalldevolveupontheAssociateJusticewhoisfirstinprecedenceuntilanewChiefJusticeis
appointedoruntilthedisabilityisremoved.

NotwithstandingthatthereisnopressingneedtodwellonthisperipheralmatteraftertheCourt
hasherebyresolvedthequestionofconsequence,wedonotfinditamisstoconfrontthematter
now.

Wecannotagreewiththeposture.

AreviewofSections4(1)and9ofArticleVIIIshowsthattheSupremeCourtiscomposedofa
ChiefJusticeand14AssociateJustices,whoallshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalist
ofatleastthreenomineespreparedbytheJBCforeveryvacancy,whichappointmentsrequire
noconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments.WithreferencetotheChiefJustice,he
orsheisappointedbythePresidentasChiefJustice,andtheappointmentisneverinanacting
capacity.TheexpressreferencetoaChiefJusticeabhorstheideathattheframerscontemplated
anActingChiefJusticetoheadthemembershipoftheSupremeCourt.Otherwise,theywould
havesimplywrittensointheConstitution.Consequently,torelyonSection12oftheJudiciary
Actof1948inordertoforestalltheimperativeneedtoappointthenextChiefJusticesoonestis
todefytheplainintentoftheConstitution.

Forsure,theframersintendedthepositionofChiefJusticetobepermanent,notoneto
beoccupiedinanactingortemporarycapacity.Inrelationtotheschemeofthingsunderthe
presentConstitution,Section12oftheJudiciaryActof1948onlyrespondstoararesituationin
which the new Chief Justice is not yet appointed, or in which the incumbent Chief Justice is
unabletoperformthedutiesandpowersoftheoffice.Itoughttoberemembered,however,that
itwasenactedbecausetheChiefJusticeappointedunderthe1935Constitutionwassubjectto
theconfirmationoftheCommissiononAppointments,andtheconfirmationprocessmighttake
longerthanexpected.

The appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent President is preferable to
havingtheAssociateJusticewhoisfirstinprecedencetakeover.UndertheConstitution,the

heads of the Legislative and Executive Departments are popularly elected, and whoever are
electedandproclaimedatoncebecometheleadersoftheirrespectiveDepartments.However,
thelackofanyappointedoccupantoftheofficeofChiefJusticeharmstheindependenceofthe
Judiciary, because the Chief Justice is the head of the entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice
performs functions absolutely significant to the life of the nation. With the entire Supreme
Court being the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the Chairman of the
Tribunal.TherebeingnoobstacletotheappointmentofthenextChiefJustice,asidefromits
beingmandatoryfortheincumbentPresidenttomakewithinthe90dayperiodfromMay17,
2010,thereisnojustificationtoinsistthatthesuccessorofChiefJusticePunobeappointedby
thenextPresident.

Historically, under the present Constitution, there has been no wide gap between the
retirementandtheresignationofanincumbentChiefJustice,ononehand,andtheappointment
toandassumptionofofficeofhissuccessor,ontheotherhand.Assummarizedinthecomment
oftheOSG,thechronologyofsuccessionisasfollows:

1.WhenChiefJusticeClaudioTeehankeeretiredonApril18,1988,ChiefJustice
PedroYapwasappointedonthesameday

2.WhenChiefJusticeYapretiredonJuly1,1988,ChiefJusticeMarceloFernan
wasappointedonthesameday

3. When Chief Justice Fernan resigned on December 7, 1991, Chief Justice

AndresNarvasawasappointedthefollowingday,December8,1991

4. When Chief Justice Narvasa retired on November 29, 1998, Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr. was sworn into office the following early morning of
November30,1998

5. When Chief Justice Davide retired on December 19, 2005, Chief Justice
ArtemioPanganibanwasappointedthenextday,December20,2005and

6. When Chief Justice Panganiban retired on December 6, 2006, Chief Justice

Reynato S. Puno took his oath as Chief Justice at midnight of December 6,
[85]
2006.

III
WritofmandamusdoesnotlieagainsttheJBC


MaytheJBCbecompelledtosubmitthelistofnomineestothePresident?

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglectstheperformanceofanactthatthelawspecificallyenjoinsasadutyresultingfroman
[86]
office, trust, or station.
It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one
addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the
[87]

exerciseofajudgmentordiscretioninaparticularway.

For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a
clearlegalrighttotheactdemanded(b)itmustbethedutyofthedefendanttoperformtheact,
because it is mandated by law (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the
dutyenjoinedbylaw(d)theacttobeperformedisministerial,notdiscretionaryand(e)there
isnoappealoranyotherplain,speedyandadequateremedyintheordinarycourseoflaw.

Section8(5)andSection9,ArticleVIII,mandatetheJBCtosubmitalistofatleastthree
nomineestothePresidentforeveryvacancyintheJudiciary:

Section8.xxx

(5)TheCouncilshallhavetheprincipalfunctionofrecommendingappointeestothe
Judiciary.xxx

Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointedbythePresidentfromalistofatleastthreenomineespreparedbytheJudicialand
BarCouncilforeveryvacancy.Suchappointmentsneednoconfirmation.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days
fromthesubmissionofthelist.

However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the
vacancyintheSupremeCourtwithin90daysfromtheoccurrenceofthevacancy,andwithin
90daysfromthesubmissionofthelist,inthecaseofthelowercourts.The90dayperiodis
directedatthePresident,notattheJBC.Thus,theJBCshouldstarttheprocessofselectingthe
candidatestofillthevacancyintheSupremeCourtbeforetheoccurrenceofthevacancy.

UndertheConstitution,itismandatoryfortheJBCtosubmittothePresidentthelistof
nomineestofillavacancyintheSupremeCourtinordertoenablethePresidenttoappointone
of them within the 90day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no
discretiontosubmitthelisttothePresidentafterthevacancyoccurs,becausethatshortensthe
90dayperiodallowedbytheConstitutionforthePresidenttomaketheappointment.Forthe
JBCtodosowillbeunconscionableonitspart,consideringthatitwilltherebyeffectivelyand
illegallydeprivethePresidentoftheampletimegrantedundertheConstitutiontoreflectonthe
qualificationsofthenomineesnamedinthelistoftheJBCbeforemakingtheappointment.

The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the Presidents
mandatory 90day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose
nameswillbeinthelisttobesubmittedtothePresidentlieswithinthediscretionoftheJBC.
Theobjectofthepetitionsformandamushereinshouldonlyrefertothedutytosubmittothe
PresidentthelistofnomineesforeveryvacancyintheJudiciary,becauseinordertoconstitute
[88]
For

unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty.

mandamustolieagainsttheJBC,therefore,thereshouldbeanunexplaineddelayonitspartin
recommendingnomineestotheJudiciary,thatis,insubmittingthelisttothePresident.

Thedistinctionbetweenaministerialactandadiscretionaryonehasbeendelineatedin
thefollowingmanner:

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely
ministerialactordutyisonewhichanofficerortribunalperformsinagivenstateoffacts,
inaprescribedmanner,inobediencetothemandateofalegalauthority,withoutregardto
ortheexerciseofhisownjudgmentupontheproprietyorimproprietyoftheactdone.If
thelawimposesadutyuponapublicofficerandgiveshimtherighttodecidehoworwhen
the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretionorjudgment.

[89]

Accordingly,wefindnosufficientgroundstograntthepetitionsformandamusandtoissuea
writ of mandamus against the JBC. The actions for that purpose are premature, because it is
clearthattheJBCstillhasuntilMay17,2010,atthelatest,withinwhichtosubmitthelistof
nominees to the President to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief
JusticePuno.

IV
WritofprohibitiondoesnotlieagainsttheJBC

In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the conclusion is ineluctable that only the
President can appoint the Chief Justice. Hence, Sorianos petition for prohibition in G.R. No.
191032,whichproposestopreventtheJBCfrominterveningintheprocessofnominatingthe
successorofChiefJusticePuno,lacksmerit.

Ontheotherhand,thepetitionforprohibitioninG.R.No.191342issimilarlydevoidof
merit. The challenge mounted against the composition of the JBC based on the allegedly
unconstitutional allocation of a vote each to the ex officio members from the Senate and the
HouseofRepresentatives,therebyprejudicingthechancesofsomecandidatesfornomination
byraisingtheminimumnumberofvotesrequiredinaccordancewiththerulesoftheJBC,is
notbasedonthepetitionersactualinterest,becausetheyhavenotallegedintheirpetitionthat
they were nominated to the JBC to fill some vacancies in the Judiciary. Thus, the petitioners
lacklocusstandionthatissue.

WHEREFORE,theCourt:

1. DismissesthepetitionsforcertiorariandmandamusinG.R.No.191002andG.R.
No.191149,andthepetitionformandamusinG.R.No.191057forbeingpremature

2.DismissesthepetitionsforprohibitioninG.R.No.191032andG.R.No.191342for
lackofmeritand

3. GrantsthepetitioninA.M.No.1025SCand,accordingly,directstheJudicialand
BarCouncil:

(a)Toresumeitsproceedingsforthenominationofcandidatestofillthevacancy
tobecreatedbythecompulsoryretirementofChiefJusticeReynatoS.Punoby
May17,2010

(b)TopreparetheshortlistofnomineesforthepositionofChiefJustice

(c)TosubmittotheincumbentPresidenttheshortlistofnomineesfortheposition
ofChiefJusticeonorbeforeMay17,2010and

(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other
vacanciesintheJudiciaryandsubmittothePresidenttheshortlistofnominees
correspondingtheretoinaccordancewiththisdecision.

SOORDERED.

LUCASP.BERSAMIN
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

ANTONIOT.CARPIORENATOC.CORONA
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

CONCHITACARPIOMORALESPRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.

AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

ANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURATERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTRO
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

ARTUROD.BRIONDIOSDADOM.PERALTA
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

MARIANOC.DELCASTILLOROBERTOA.ABAD
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.JOSEPORTUGALPEREZ
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

JOSECATRALMENDOZA
AssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the

conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.

REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

[1]
FiledonFebruary9,2010.
[2]
BegunonFebruary23,2010.
[3]
InitiatedonFebruary10,2010.
[4]
CommencedonFebruary11,2010.
[5]
DatedFebruary15,2010.
[6]
FiledonMarch8,2010.
[7]
A.M.No.98501SC,November9,1998,298SCRA408.
[8]
PetitioninG.R.No.191002,pp.34.
[9]
Id.,p.5.
[10]
PetitioninG.R.No.191032,pp.48.
[11]
PetitioninG.R.No.191057,pp.12.
[12]
Id.,p.11.
[13]
PetitioninG.R.No.191149.
[14]
PetitioninG.R.No.191342.
[15]
http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/JBCreCJ.pdf
[16]
http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/jbc_announce_2009/jan22%20%2710.pdf
[17]
CommentoftheJBC,p.3.
[18]
Id.
[19]
Id.,pp.45.
[20]
Id.,p.5.
[21]
Id.
[22]
Id.,p.6.
[23]
PetitioninA.M.No.1025SC,pp.56.
[24]
CommentoftheJBC,p.6.
[25]
Id.,p.7boldemphasisisintheoriginaltext.
[26]
CommentoftheOSG,pp.1314.
[27]
Id.,p.14.

[28]
Id.,p.15.
[29]
Id.,pp.2024.
[30]
Id.,pp.2527.
[31]
Id.,pp.2930.
[32]
Id.
[33]
Id.,pp.3233.
[34]
Id.,pp.3435.
[35]
Id.
[36]
Id.,pp.3536.TheOSGposits:
NationalinterestcompelsthePresidenttomakesuchappointmentforitisparticularlyduringthiscrucialperiodwhen
nationalleadersareseekingfreshmandatesfromthepeoplethattheSupremeCourt,morethanatanyothertime,represents
stability. Hence, a full court is ideal to ensure not only due deliberation on and careful consideration of issues but also
expeditiousdispositionofcases.
Indeed,suchfunctionbecomesespeciallysignificantinviewofthefactthatthisisthefirsttimethatthewholecountrywill
experienceautomatedelections.
[37]
Id.,pp.3637.TheOSGstresses:
ThepossiblefalloutsorseriousaftermathofallowingavacuuminthepositionoftheChiefJusticemaybegreaterand
riskier than the consequences or repercussions of inaction. Needless to state, the appointment of the Chief Justice of this
HonorableCourt(sic)isthemostimportantappointmentvestedbythe1987Constitutionto(sic)thePresident.
[38]
Id.,p.37.
[39]
Id.,p.38.
[40]
FiledbyAtty.PiteroM.Reig.
[41]
BlacksLawDictionary,941(6th Ed.1991).
[42]
G.R.No.155001,May5,2003,402SCRA612.
[43]
CitingKilosbayan,Inc.v.Morato,G.R.No.118910,July17,1995,246SCRA540,562563,citingBakerv.Carr,369U.S.
186,7L.Ed.633(1962).
[44]
CitingKilosbayan,Inc.v.Morato,supraBayanv.Zamora,G.R.No.138570,October10,2000342SCRA449,478.
[45]
65Phil.56.
[46]
G.R.No.117,November7,1945(Unreported).
[47]
G.R.No.2947,January11,1959(Unreported).
[48]
77Phil.1012(1947).
[49]
110Phil.331(1960).
[50]
84Phil.368(1949)
[51]
E.g.,Chavezv.PublicEstatesAuthority,G.R.No.133250,July9,2002,384SCRA152(inwhichtheCourtruledthat the
enforcementoftheconstitutionalrighttoinformationandtheequitablediffusionofnaturalresourcesaremattersoftranscendental
importancewhichclothethepetitionerwithlocusstandi)BagongAlyansangMakabayanv.Zamora,G.R.Nos.138570,138572,
138587,138680,138698,October10,2000,342SCRA449(inwhichtheCourtheldthatgiventhetranscendentalimportanceof
theissuesinvolved,theCourtmayrelaxthestandingrequirementsandallowthesuittoprosperdespitethelackofdirectinjuryto
thepartiesseekingjudicialreviewoftheVisitingForcesAgreement)Limv.ExecutiveSecretary,G.R.No.151445,April11,2002,
380SCRA739(inwhichtheCourt,albeitconcedingthatthepetitionersmightnotfilesuitintheircapacityastaxpayerswithouta
showing that Balikatan 0201 involved the exercise of Congress taxing or spending powers, reiterated Bagong Alyansang
Makabayanv.Zamora,declaringthatcasesoftranscendentalimportancemustbesettledpromptlyanddefinitelyandthestanding
requirementsmayberelaxed)andOsmeav.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.100318,100308,100417,100420,July30,1991,
199SCRA750(inwhichtheCourtheldthatwhereseriousconstitutionalquestionswereinvolved,thetranscendentalimportance
tothepublicofthecasesdemandedthattheybesettledpromptlyanddefinitely,brushingasidetechnicalitiesofprocedure).

[52]
LNo.40004,January31,1975,62SCRA275.
[53]
E.g.,Taadav.Tuvera,G.R.No.63915,April24,1985,136SCRA27(inwhichtheCourtheldthatitissufficientthatthe
petitionerisacitizeninterestedintheexecutionofthelaw,becausethequestionisoneofpublicdutyandtheenforcementofa
publicright,andthepeoplearetherealpartyininterest)Legaspiv.CivilServiceCommission,G.R.No.72119,May29,1987,150
SCRA530(inwhichtheCourtdeclaredthatwhereanassertionofapublicrightisinvolved,therequirementofpersonalinterestis
satisfiedbythemerefactthatthepetitionerisacitizenandispartofthegeneralpublicwhichpossessestheright)Kapatiranng
mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,L. No. 81311, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 371 (in which the Court
disregardedobjectionstotaxpayerslackofpersonalitytosueindeterminingthevalidityoftheVATLaw)Albanov.Reyes,G.R.
No. 83551, July 11, 1989, 175 SCRA 264 (in which the Court pronounced that although no expenditure of public funds was
involvedinthequestionedcontract,thepetitionerwasnonethelessclothedwiththelegalpersonalityunderthedisclosureprovision
oftheConstitutiontoquestionit,consideringitsimportantroleintheeconomicdevelopmentofthecountryandthemagnitudeof
thefinancialconsiderationinvolved,indicatingthatpublicinterestwasdefinitelyinvolved)andAssociationofSmallLandowners
inthePhilippines,Inc.v.Sec.ofAgrarianReform,G.R.No.78742,July14,1989,175SCRA343(inwhichtheCourtruledthatit
hadthediscretiontowaivetherequirementoflocusstandiindeterminingthevalidityoftheimplementationoftheComprehensive
AgrarianReformProgram,althoughthepetitionerswerenot,strictlyspeaking,coveredbythedefinitionofproperparty).
[54]
Davidv.MacapagalArroyo,G.R.No.171396,May3,2006,489SCRA160.
[55]
275Ky91,120SW2d765(1938).
[56]
19Wend.56(1837).
[57]
232NC48,59SE2d359(1950).
[58]
Boldemphasisisintheoriginaltext.
[59]
PetitioninG.R.No.191032,p.2.
[60]
PetitioninG.R.No.191057,pp.34citingthecasesofPHILCONSAv.Gimenez,15SCRA479PHILCONSAv.Mathay,18
SCRA300PHILCONSAv.Enriquez,235SCRA506andLambinov.COMELEC,505SCRA160.
[61]
PetitioninG.R.No.191342,pp.23.
[62]
See,forinstance,IntegratedBarofthePhilippinesv.Zamora,G.R.No.141284,August15,2000,338SCRA81(wherethe
petitionerquestionedthevalidityofthedeploymentandutilizationoftheMarinestoassistthePNPinlawenforcement,asserting
that IBP was the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution,buttheCourtheldthattheIBPhadnotshownthatitwassotasked:Inthiscase,areadingofthepetitionshowsthat
theIBPhasadvancedconstitutionalissueswhichdeservetheattentionofthisCourtinviewoftheirseriousness,noveltyandweight
as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo,
undoubtedlyaggravatedbytheMindanaoinsurgencyproblem,thelegalcontroversyraisedinthepetitionalmostcertainlywillnot
goaway.Itwillstareusinthefaceagain.It,therefore,behoovestheCourttorelaxtherulesonstandingandtoresolvetheissue
now, rather than later, and went on to resolve the issues because the petitioner advanced constitutional issues that deserved the
attentionoftheCourtinviewoftheirseriousness,novelty,andweightasprecedents).
[63]
Supra,note42,p.645.
[64]
Id.
[65]
SeeBuckleyv.Valeo,424U.S.1,113118(1976)RegionalRailReoganizationActCases,419U.S.102,138148(1974).
[66]
RecordofProceedingsandDebatesoftheConstitutionalCommission,Vol.V.,p.912,October12,1998.
[67]
Supra,note6,p.426427,stating:
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the
Presidentspowerofappointment,itisthisCourtsviewthat,asageneralproposition,incaseofconflict,theformershould
yieldtothelatter.Surely,thepreventionofvotebuyingandsimilarevilsoutweighstheneedforavoidingdelaysinfillingup
ofcourtvacanciesorthedispositionofsomecases.Temporaryvacanciescanabidetheperiodofthebanwhich,incidentally
andasearlierpointedout,comestoexistonlyonceineverysixyears.Moreover,thoseoccurringinthelowercourtscanbe
filledtemporarilybydesignation.Butprohibitedappointmentsarelonglastingandpermanentintheireffects.Theymay,as
earlierpointedout,infactinfluencetheresultsofelectionsand,forthatreason,theirmakingisconsideredanelectionoffense.
Tothecontentionthatmayperhapsbeasserted,thatSections4(1)and9ofArticleVIIIshouldprevailoverSection15of
ArticleVII,becausetheymaybeconsideredlaterexpressionsofthepeoplewhentheyadoptedtheConstitution,itsufficesto
pointoutthattheConstitutionmustbeconstruedinitsentiretyasone,single,instrument.
Tobesure,instancesmaybeconceivedoftheimperativeneedforanappointment,duringtheperiodoftheban,notonly

intheexecutivebutalsointheSupremeCourt.Thismaybethecaseshouldthemembershipofthecourtbesoreducedthatit
willhavenoquorumorshouldthevotingonaparticularlyimportantquestionrequiringexpeditiousresolutionbeevenly
divided.Suchacase,however,iscoveredbyneitherSection15ofArticleVIInorSection4(1)and9ofArticleVIII.
[68]
Id.,pp.422423.
[69]
Id.,p.423.
[70]
RecordofProceedingsandDebatesoftheConstitutionalCommission,Vol.V.,pp.632633.
[71]
Dizonv.Encarnacion,G.R.No.L18615,December24,1963,9SCRA714.
[72]
Crawford,Earl.T.,TheConstructionofStatutes,ThomasLawBookCompany,St.Louis,Missouri,262264(1940).
[73]
Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection, G.R. No. 170735, December 17, 2007, 540 SCRA 456, 472
citingEscosurav.SanMiguelBrewery,Inc.,4SCRA285,(1962).
[74]
According to Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984): Although adherence to precedent is not rigidly
required in constitutional cases, any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification. The
special justification for the reversal of Valenzuela lies in its intrinsic unsoundness.
[75]
No.L19313,January19,1962,4SCRA1.
[76]
Supra,note6,pp.424426boldunderscoringsuppliedforemphasis.
[77]
Aytonav.Castillo, supra, note 74, pp. 810 (N.B. In the time material to Aytona, there were judges of the Court of First
Instancewhowereappointedtodistrictsthathadnovacancies,becausetheincumbentshadnotqualifiedforotherdistrictstowhich
theyhadbeensupposedlytransferredorpromotedatanyrate,theappointmentsstillrequiredconfirmationbytheCommissionon
Appointments).
[78]
Crawford,op.cit.,supra,note72,pp.248249.
[79]
Supra,note6,p.413.
[80]Id.
[81]
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President
withinninetydaysfromhisassumptionorreassumptionofoffice.
[82]
Cruz,I.,PhilippinePoliticalLaw,253(2002)alsoRillorazav.Vargas,80Phil.297(1948).
[83]
RecordofProceedingsandDebatesoftheConstitutionalCommission,Vol.V.,p.908,whichindicatesthatinhissponsorship
speechdeliveredonOctober12,1986ontheflooroftheConstitutionalCommission,CommissionerTeofistoGuingonaexplained
that[a]ppointmentstothejudiciaryshallnotbesubjecttoconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments.
[84]
Rodriguez,StatutoryConstruction,171(1999).
[85]
CommentoftheOSG,p.37.
[86]
Section3,Rule65,1997RulesofCivilProcedure.
[87]
JGSummitHoldings,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.124293,November20,2000,345SCRA143.
[88]
Neryv.Gamolo,A.M.No.P011508,February7,2003,397SCRA110,citingMusniv.Morales,315SCRA85,86(1999).
[89]
Espiridionv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.146933,June8,2006,490SCRA273.

. No. 146933, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 273.