GUMPIC

84. Heirs of Domingo Valientes V Ramos

GR No. 157852; 638 SCRA 444
December 15, 2010
FACTS: Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of Valientes who, before his death, was the owner of a land which was mortgaged by
him in 1939 to secure his loan to spouses Belen. Through an allegedly forged deed of sale between Valientes and spouses Belen, the
latter obtained the TCT in their name in 1969.
Upon the death of spouses Belen, their heirs executed an EJS with partition and sale in favour of private respondent Minor.
In 1998, petitioners filed a complaint for the cancellation of TCT and reconveyance. Minor filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
forum shopping and litis pendentia which was affirmed by the RTC. On appeal, the CA agreed that there was no forum shopping,
however, it held that the case can not prosper on the grounds of prescription and laches, hence, the appeal.
ISSUE: Is the petitioners action for reconveyance or quieting of title barred by prescription or laches?
RULING: Yes, their action had already prescribed because they failed to file it within the ten year period. In an action for reconveyance
of property not in his possession, the said action shall prescribe in 10 years from date of registration of deed but if he is in possession,
the action does not prescribe. In the case, petitioners are not in possession of the property, the action should have therefore been filed
within 10 years from issuance of TCT in 1969, however they were only able to file it after 29 years (1998).
85. National Power Corporation V Diato-Bernal
GR No. 180979; 638 SCRA 660
December 15, 2010
FACTS: In order to complete the construction of structures and steel posts for NAPOCORs Transmission Line Project, it filed an
expropriation suit against respondent in 1997 in order to acquire easement of right of way over respondents property. The parties filed
a partial compromise agreement to the RTC, and the RTC proceeded to determine the amount of just compensation. Thereafter, the
commissioners, appointed by the RTC to determine the fair market value of the property, submitted their report to the RTC
recommending that the just compensation be at P 10,000.00/sqm gauged as of 1999. NAPOCOR filed an opposition asserting that it
was not substantiated by any official documents or registered deeds of sale of the subject property's neighbouring lots. That the report
was not based on any document evidenced is hearsay and should be disregarded by the court and the property should be P
3,500.00/sqm considering the resolution of PAC-Cavite, which was denied by the RTC. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial courts
decision.
ISSUE: Is NAPOCORs contention correct?
Ruling: Yes. The conclusions made by the commissioners were highly speculative and devoid of any actual and reliable basis. This is
so because the market values of the subject propertys neighbouring lots were not supported by any corroborative documents and were
mere estimates. It is also settled that just compensation is ascertained as of the time of taking, which usually coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. In the case, the trial court overlooked the fact that the recommended just
compensation was gauged as of 1999 or 2 years after the complaint was filed in 1997 which should have been the basis in determining
just compensation. Clearly, the recommended just compensation in the commissioners report is unacceptable.
86. Sps. Chua V Hon Pedro Gutierrez
GR No. 172316; 637 SCRA 552; December 8, 2010
FACTS: Herein petitioners, allegedly bought townhouse unit 320 from Benito in July 20, 1994. Meanwhile, in November 1994, private
respondent filed with the RTC a suit for collection against Benito and issuance of writ of attachment which later was inscribed in the title
of Benito.
On January 5, 1995, petitioners registered the deed of absolute sale with the register of deeds. A new title was issued to them;
however the notice of writ of attachment was carried.
The RTC thereafter rendered a decision finding Benito liable to private respondent. It however, excluded the townhouse unit
320 from attachment. The respondent appealed to the CA and prayed for the inclusion of TU320 in the attachment which was later
granted. Aggrieved, the petitioners moved to quash the writ of execution of levy on attachment on the ground that they are not the
judgment debtors and the property levied upon was already sold to them prior to the institution of the suit. The motion was denied.
ISSUE: WON registered writ of attachment is superior over that of an unregistered deed of sale.
RULING: The registered writ of attachment shall prevail over the unregistered deed of sale. This is so because the writ of attachment
was registered earlier than the deed of sale. Under Sec 51 of PD 1529, it states that the act of registration shall be the operative act to

convey or affect land insofar as third persons are concerned. In the case, Petitioners cannot escape the fact that when they registered
the Deed of Absolute Sale on January 5, 1995, a writ of attachment was already inscribed on the title as early as November 18, 1994.
87. Federico Jarantilla, Jr. V Antonieta Jarantilla et al.
GR No. 154486; 636 SCRA 299
December 1, 2010
FACTS:
ISSUES:
RULING:
88. Gepiga Vda. De Soco V Fermina Vda. De Barbon
GR No. 188484; 636 SCRA 553
December 6, 2010
FACTS:
ISSUES:
RULING:
89. Sps. Abad et al. V Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation and Magdiwang Realty Corp.
GR No. 189239; 636 SCRA 247
FACTS: Respondents, co-owners of lots, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners before the MeTC. Respondents
alleged that petitioners, through tolerance, had occupied the subject lots since 1980 but ignored their repeated demands to vacate
them. Petitioners countered that there is no possession by tolerance for they have been in adverse, continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the lots for more than 30 years; and that respondents predecessor-in-interest, Pilipinas Development Corporation, had
no title to the lots.
The MeTC rendered judgment in favour of the plaintiff (herein respondents) on the ground that no payments were given by the
petitioners. On appeal, the RTC reversed the decision of the lower court holding that since there is no tolerance right from the start of
possession sought to be recovered, the case of unlawful detainer will not prosper. On appeal, the CA reinstated the MeTCs decision.
Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Is the CA correct in reinstating the MeTCs decision?
Ruling: Yes. This is because the petitioners entry upon the land was with respondents tolerance from the date and fact of entry. It has
been held that a person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against them.
90. Evangeline Imani V Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
FACTS: Petitioner signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent, with her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound
themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs. Later, CPDTI obtained loans but later
defaulted in the payment. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit and a motion for execution respectively, against CPDTI and
its sureties, including herein petitioner.
The sheriff levied on a property covered by TCT registered in the name of petitioner. A public auction was conducted and the property
was awarded to Metrobank, as the highest bidder. Metrobank directed the surrender of title which was denied by petitioner. She argued
that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership; as such, it cannot be held answerable for the liabilities incurred by CPDTI
to Metrobank. Neither can it be subject of levy on execution or public auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for the nullification of the levy on
execution and the auction sale, as well as the certificate of sale in favor of Metrobank. The RTC ruled in favour of petitioner but the
decision was reversed by the CA. Petitioner appealed to the SC raising the same defense and asserting that the property was a road
right of way.
ISSUE: Are the contentions of petitioner correct?
RULING: No. This is so because the petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove her contentions. In her first contention,
petitioner utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership which would not make the
property be made to answer her obligation. Mere presentation of her title bearing that the land was registered in her name married to
Sina Imani is no proof that property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Her second contention asserting that the property is a
road right of way must be rejected because it was raised for the first time in the petition to the SC. This issue is barred by estoppel and
is therefore not given any weight.