New Trier Document

Round 2 vs Lane Tech MB

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The unconditional affirmation of human life is a violent form of oppression
which denies the possibility of value to death and reifies a master-slave
dichotomy that is a precondition for oppression
Baudrillard 02 (Jean, The Spirit of Terrorism: Hypotheses on Terrorism, LB)
All the same, we should try to get beyond the moral imperative of unconditional respect
for human life, and conceive that one might respect, both in the other and in oneself,
something other than, and more than, life (existence isnt everything, it is even the least
of things): a destiny, a cause, a form of pride or of sacrifice. There are symbolic stakes
which far exceed existence and freedom - which we find it unbearable to lose, because
we have made them the fetishistic values of a universal humanist order. So we cannot
imagine a terrorist act committed with entire autonomy and freedom of conscience.
Now, choice in terms of symbolic obligations is sometimes profoundly mysterious - as in
the case of Romand, the man with the double life, who murdered his whole family, not
for fear of being unmasked, but for fear of inflicting on them the profound
disappointment of discovering his deception. Committing suicide would not have
expunged the crime from the record; he would merely have passed the shame off on to
the others. Where is the courage, where the cowardice? The question of freedom, ones
own or that of others, no longer poses itself in terms of moral consciousness, and a
higher freedom must allow us to dispose of it to the point of abusing or sacrificing it.
Omar Khayyam: Rather one freeman bind with chains of love than set a thousand
prisoned captives free. Seen in that light, this is almost an overturning of the dialectic of
domination, a paradoxical inversion of the master-slave relationship. In the past, the
master was the one who was exposed to death, and could gamble with it. The slave was
the one deprived of death and destiny, the one doomed to survival and labour. How do
things stand today? We, the powerful, sheltered now from death and overprotected on
all sides, occupy exactly the position of the slave; whereas those whose deaths are at
their own disposal, and who do not have survival as their exclusive aim , are the ones
who today symbolically occupy the position of master.
We have internalized the blackmail of security, encasing ourselves in cellophane to
ensure our shelf lives. This view reduces the body to a diseased object in need of
protection and insurance, making life nothing more than a process of continual
mortification.
Baudrillard 76 (Jean, certified badass, Symbolic Exchange and Death, pp. 177-180,
Sage Publications, LB)
Security is another form of social control, in the form of life blackmailed with the
afterlife. It is universally present for us today, and 'security forces' range from life
assurance and social security to the car seatbelt by way of the state security police force.
'Belt up' says an advertising slogan for seatbelts. Of course, security, like ecology, is an
industrial business extending its cover up to the level of the species: a convertibility of

accident, disease and pollution into capitalist surplus profit is operative everywhere . But
this is above all a question of the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you
of your own death, which everybody dreams of, as the darkness beneath their instinct of
conservation. It is necessary to rob everyone of the last possibility of giving themselves
their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system. Again, in
this symbolic short-circuit, the gift-exchange is the challenge to oneself and one's own
life, and is carried out through death. Not because it expresses the individual's asocial
rebellion (the defection of one or millions of individuals does not infringe the law of the
system at all), but because it carries in it a principle of sociality that is radically
antagonistic to our own social repressive principle. To bury death beneath the contrary
myth of security, it is necessary to exhaust the gift-exchange. Is it so that men might live
that the demand for death must be exhausted? No, but in order that they die the only
death the system authorises: the living are separated from their dead, who no longer
exchange anything but the form of their afterlife, under the sign of comprehensive
insurance. Thus car safety mummified in his helmet, his seatbelt, all the paraphernalia
of security , wrapped up in the security myth, the driver is nothing but a corpse, closed
up in another, non-mythic, death , as neutral and objective a s technology, noiseless and
expertly crafted. Riveted to his machine, glued to the spot in it, he no longer runs the
risk of dying, since he is already dead. This is the secret of security, like a steak under
cellophane : to surround you with a sarcophagus in order to prevent you from dying Our
whole technical culture creates an artificial milieu of death . It is not only armaments
that remain the general archetype of material production , but the simplest machine
around us constitutes a horizon of death, a death that will never be resolved because it
has crystallised beyond reach . fixed capital of death, where the living labour of death
has frozen over, as the labour force is frozen in fixed capital and dead labour. In other
words, all material production is merely a gigantic 'character armour' by means of which
the species means to keep death at a respectful distance . Of course, death itself
overshadows the species and seals it into the armour the species thought to protect itself
with . Here again , commensurate with an entire civilisation , we find the image of the
automobile-sarcophagus: the protective armour is just death miniaturised and become a
technical extension of your own body The biologisation of the body and the
technicisation of the environment go hand in hand in the same obsessional neurosis.
The technical environment is our over-production of pollutant, fragile and obsolescent
objects. For production lives, its entire logic and strategy are articulated on fragility and
obsolescence . An economy of stable products and good objects is indispensable: the
economy develops only by exuding danger, pollution, usury, deception and haunting.
The economy lives only on the suspension of death that it maintains throughout
material production , and through renewing the available death stocks , even if it means
conjuring it up by a security build up: blackmail and repression . Death is definitively
secularised in material production, where it is reproduced on a large scale as capital.
Even our bodies, which have become biological machinery, are modelled on this
inorganic body, and therefore become, at the same time , a bad object, condemned to
disease , accident and death. Living by the production of death, capital has an easy time
producing security' it's the same thing. Security is the industrial prolongation of death,

just as ecology is the industrial prolongation of pollution . A few more bandages on the
sarcophagus. This is also true of the great institutions that are the glory of our
democracy' Social Security is the social prosthesis of a dead society (,Social Security is
death ! ' - May '68) , that is to say, a society already exterminated in all its symbolic
wheels, in its deep system of reciprocities and obligations, which means that neither the
concept of security nor that of the 'social' ever had any meaning. The 'social' begins by
taking charge of death . It's the same story as regards cultures that have been destroyed
then revived and protected as folklore (d. M. de Certeau, ' La beaute du mort' [in La
culture au pluriel, Paris: UGE, 1 974]) . The same goes for life assurance, which is the
domestic variant of a system which everywhere presupposes death as an axiom . The
social translation of the death of the group - each materialising for the other only as
social capital indexed on death. Death is dissuaded at the price of a continual
mortification : such is the paradoxical logic of security In a Christian context, ascesis
played the same role. The accumulation of suffering and penitence was able to play the
same role as character armour, as a protective sarcophagus against hell. And our
obsessional compulsion for security can be interpreted as a gigantic collective ascesis, an
anticipation of death in life itself: from protection into protection, from defence to
defence, crossing all jurisdictions, institutions and modern material apparatuses, life is
no longer anything but a doleful, defensive book-keeping, locking every risk into its
sarcophagus. Keeping the accounts on survival, instead of the radical compatibility of
life and death. Our system lives off the production of death and pretends to manufacture
security. An about-face? Not at all, just a simple twist in the cycle whose two ends meet.
That an automobile firm remodels itself on the basis of security (like industry on antipollution measures) without altering its range, objectives or products shows that
security is only a question of exchanging terms. Security is only an internal condition of
the reproduction of the system when it reaches a certain level of expansion, just as
feedback is only an internal regulating procedure for systems that have reached a certain
point of complexity.
The affs biological understanding of life and death turns the body into a
diseased object in need of continual mortification. This results in the
emergence of two communities: that of the living in opposition to that of the
dead and dying. The attempt to secure a community from the excess of
death is part and parcel with the sustainment of life as natural, biological
existence and death as the ultimate end. This initial split formed the basis
for all exclusion, making war, genocide, and discrimination both inevitable
and omnipresent through the repression of symbolic exchange
Robinson 12
(Andrew, a smart scholar dude. Writes about the baud man, The Rise of
Capitalism and Exclusion of Death, 2012, http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/intheory-baudrillard-2, LB)
Symbolic exchange or rather, its suppression plays a central role in the emergence of
capitalism. Baudrillard sees a change happening over time. Regimes based on symbolic

exchange (differences are exchangeable and related) are replaced by regimes based on
equivalence (everything is, or means, the same). Ceremony gives way to spectacle,
immanence to transcendence. Baudrillards view of capitalism is derived from Marxs
analysis of value. Baudrillard accepts Marxs view that capitalism is based on a general
equivalent. Money is the general equivalent because it can be exchanged for any
commodity. In turn, it expresses the value of abstract labour-time. Abstract labour-time
is itself an effect of the regimenting of processes of life, so that different kinds of labour
can be compared. Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of
economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the reality-principle. It is a kind
of sorcery, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. It subtly shifts the
social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same.
Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the
production of value. To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value. This
creates an immense regime of social exchange. However, this social exchange has little
in common with symbolic exchange. It ultimately depends on the mark of value itself
being unexchangeable. Capital must be endlessly accumulated. States must not collapse .
Capitalism thus introduces the irreversible into social life, by means of accumulation.
According to Baudrillard, capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death.
Capitalism tries to abolish death through accumulation. It tries to ward off ambivalence
(associated with death) through value (associated with life). But this is bound to fail.
General equivalence the basis of capitalism is itself the ever-presence of death. The
more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their
own death. Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The attempt to abolish death
through fixed value is itself deathly. Accumulation also spreads to other fields. The idea
of progress, and linear time, comes from the accumulation of time, and of stockpiles of
the past. The idea of truth comes from the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Biology
rests on the separation of living and non-living. According to Baudrillard, such
accumulations are now in crisis. For instance, the accumulation of the past is
undermined, because historical objects now have to be concealed to be preserved
otherwise they will be destroyed by excessive consumption. Value is produced from the
residue or remainder of an incomplete symbolic exchange. The repressed, market value,
and sign-value all come from this remainder. To destroy the remainder would be to
destroy value. Capitalist exchange is always based on negotiation, even when it is
violent. The symbolic order does not know this kind of equivalential exchange or
calculation. And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a non-reversible
aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other.
It is also this regime which produces scarcity Baudrillard here endorses Sahlins
argument. Capitalism produces the Freudian death drive, which is actually an effect of
the capitalist culture of death. For Baudrillard, the limit to both Marx and Freud is that
they fail to theorise the separation of the domains they study the economy and the
unconscious. It is the separation which grounds their functioning, which therefore only
occurs under the regime of the code. Baudrillard also criticises theories of desire,
including those of Deleuze, Foucault, Freud and Lacan. He believes desire comes into
existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic. Liberated

energies always leave a new remainder; they do not escape the basis of the unconscious
in the remainder. Baudrillard argues that indigenous groups do not claim to live
naturally or by their desires they simply claim to live in societies. This social life is an
effect of the symbolic. Baudrillard therefore criticises the view that human liberation can
come about through the liberation of desire. He thinks that such a liberation will keep
certain elements of the repression of desire active. Baudrillard argues that the processes
which operate collectively in indigenous groups are repressed into the unconscious in
metropolitan societies. This leads to the autonomy of the psyche as a separate sphere. It
is only after this repression has occurred that a politics of desire becomes conceivable.
He professes broad agreement with the Deleuzian project of unbinding energies from
fixed categories and encouraging flows and intensities. However, he is concerned that
capitalism can recuperate such releases of energy, disconnecting them so they can
eventually reconnect to it. Unbinding and drifting are not fatal to capitalism, because
capitalism itself unbinds things, and re-binds things which are unbound. What is fatal to
it is, rather, reversibility. Capitalism continues to be haunted by the forces it has
repressed. Separation does not destroy the remainder. Quite the opposite. The
remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double
or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of
the forgotten dead. Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from
the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the obscene, which
is present in excess over the scene of what is imagined. This is different from theories
of lack, such as the Lacanian Real. Baudrillards remainder is an excess rather than a
lack. It is the carrier of the force of symbolic exchange. Modern culture dreams of radical
difference. The reason for this is that it exterminated radical difference by simulating it.
The energy of production, the unconscious, and signification all in fact come from the
repressed remainder. Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with monstrosity,
with radical difference. The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous
groups. But for Baudrillard, it did the same thing to itself first destroying its own
indigenous logics of symbolic exchange. Indigenous groups have also increasingly lost
the symbolic dimension, as modern forms of life have been imported or imposed. This
according to Baudrillard produces chronic confusion and instability. Gift-exchange is
radically subversive of the system. This is not because it is rebellious. Baudrillard thinks
the system can survive defections or exodus. It is because it counterposes a different
principle of sociality to that of the dominant system. According to Baudrillard, the
mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic
challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at bay. The affective
charge of death remains present among the oppressed, but not with the properly
symbolic rhythm of immediate retaliation. The Church and State also exist based on the
elimination of symbolic exchange. Baudrillard is highly critical of Christianity for what
he takes to be a cult of suffering, solitude and death. He sees the Church as central to the
destruction of earlier forms of community based on symbolic exchange. Baudrillard
seems to think that earlier forms of the state and capitalism retained some degree of
symbolic exchange, but in an alienated, partially repressed form. For instance, the
imaginary of the social contract was based on the idea of a sacrifice this time of

liberty for the common good. In psychoanalysis, symbolic exchange is displaced onto the
relationship to the master-signifier. I havent seen Baudrillard say it directly, but the
impression he gives is that this is a distorted, authoritarian imitation of the original
symbolic exchange. Nonetheless, it retains some of its intensity and energy. Art, theatre
and language have worked to maintain a minimum of ceremonial power. It is the reason
older orders did not suffer the particular malaise of the present. It is easy to read certain
passages in Baudrillard as if he is bemoaning the loss of these kinds of strong
significations. This is initially how I read Baudrillards work. But on closer inspection,
this seems to be a misreading. Baudrillard is nostalgic for repression only to the extent
that the repressed continued to carry symbolic force as a referential. He is nostalgic for
the return of symbolic exchange, as an aspect of diffuse, autonomous, dis-alienated
social groups. Death plays a central role in Baudrillards theory, and is closely related to
symbolic exchange. According to Baudrillard, what we have lost above all in the
transition to alienated society is the ability to engage in exchanges with death. Death
should not be seen here in purely literal terms. Baudrillard specifies early on that he
does not mean an event affecting a body, but rather, a form which destroys the
determinacy of the subject and of value which returns things to a state of
indeterminacy. Baudrillard certainly discusses actual deaths, risk-taking, suicide and so
on. But he also sees death figuratively, in relation to the decomposition of existing
relations, the death of the self-image or ego, the interchangeability of processes of life
across different categories. For instance, eroticism or sexuality is related to death,
because it leads to fusion and communication between bodies. Sexual reproduction
carries shades of death because one generation replaces another. Baudrillards concept
of death is thus quite similar toBakhtins concept of the grotesque. Death refers to
metamorphosis, reversibility, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective
transformation, as well as physical death. According to Baudrillard, indigenous groups
see death as social, not natural or biological. They see it as an effect of an adversarial
will, which they must absorb. And they mark it with feasting and rituals. This is a way of
preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify . Such a non-signifying
event is absolute disorder from the standpoint of symbolic exchange. For Baudrillard,
the wests idea of a biological, material death is actually an idealist illusion, ignoring the
sociality of death. Poststructuralists generally maintain that the problems of the present
are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions. For Baudrillard, the division
between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are
founded. After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining
particular groups the mad, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women
and so on to particular segregated situations. The definition of the normal human has
been narrowed over time. Today, nearly everyone belongs to one or another marked or
deviant category. The original exclusion was of the dead it is defined as abnormal to be
dead. You livies hate us deadies. This first split and exclusion forms the basis, or
archetype, for all the other splits and exclusions along lines of gender, disability,
species, class, and so on. This discrimination against the dead brings into being the
modern experience of death. Baudrillard suggests that death as we know it does not
exist outside of this separation between living and dead. The modern view of death is

constructed on the model of the machine and the function. A machine either functions
or it does not. The human body is treated as a machine which similarly, either functions
or does not. For Baudrillard, this misunderstands the nature of life and death. The
modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity. The subject needs a
beginning and an end, so as to be reducible to the story it tells. This requires an idea of
death as an end. It is counterposed to the immortality of social institutions. In relation
to individuals, ideas of religious immortality is simply an ideological cover for the real
exclusion of the dead. But institutions try to remain truly immortal. Modern systems,
especially bureaucracies, no longer know how to die or how to do anything but keep
reproducing themselves. The internalisation of the idea of the subject or the soul
alienates us from our bodies, voices and so on. It creates a split, as Stirner would say,
between the category of man and the un-man, the real self irreducible to such
categories. It also individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others.
The symbolic haunts the code as the threat of its own death. The society of the code
works constantly to ward off the danger of irruptions of the symbolic.
To embrace death is the ultimate resistance to the system it is only by
refusing the ideas of life can we break the system
Robinson 2012
(Robinson, Andrew, political theorist, Baudrillard master, also has a great smile "Jean
Baudrillard: Catastrophe and Terrorism." Ceasefire Magazine RSS. N.p., 7 Dec. 2012.
Web. 10 Aug. 2014. http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-13/>, LB)
The accidental or violent death gains special significance in western culture as the only
kind of death which is talked about. According to Baudrillard, we are fascinated with
violent death because it is the last refuge of the energies associated with sacrifice and
ritual. This turns death into a revolutionary force. In a system where life is ruled by
value and utility, death becomes a useless luxury, and the only alternative. Every
unapproved death now becomes subversive. This is why murderers, outlaws and
terrorists are fascinating. Death, sex, violence and madness all become fascinating,
because in the western system, they are not exchanged. They are repressed. Suicide for
instance becomes an act of resistance: in self-immolations, suicide bombings, suicides in
defiance of prison or asylum regimes. Baudrillard also sees a suicidal implication in
revolts likely to provoke repression, in attacks on ones own neighbourhood, and so on.
Suicide is threatening to the system because no reply is possible. It carries the logic of
symbolic exchange. It is total defeat for the system to be unable to achieve total
perfection. Another example is mass resistance to the enforcement of safety. According
to Baudrillard, the masses constantly resist the imposition of security and safety on
them. For instance, they oppose road safety measures, or fail to apply workplace safety
rules. Baudrillard thinks this is a way for people to seize back a bit of control over their
lives, at the expense of the risk of death. Since power is founded in letting live, in the
deferral of the death of the slave, it cannot be defeated by staying alive. A radical
response would be an immediate death. Firstly, there are cases where death as such is
used politically suicide bombing, self-immolation and so on. Secondly, death might be

thought of in terms of high-risk activism: facing death rather than go on conforming, as

in the revolts in Syria, Libya and Egypt, or in certain kinds of risky direct action such as
chaining oneself to a railtrack. This stance of death before dishonour, of refusing the
systems work-or-die or conform-or-else, is also implicit in every radical
nonconformity, however far it seems from a real risk of death. Thirdly, death can also be
thought of as social death or symbolic death, as self-transformation, becoming-other,
the death of the ego (or false self), or as something akin to a Zizekian Act. Baudrillard
claims that the masses are constantly resisting the system by giving it fatal responses.
They are contributing to the systems self-destruction by refusing to put in any energies
from outside it.

Shipping
LNG explosion is less likely than winning several lotteries simultaneously
Farrell 2007 analyst for the Naval War College Review and Camber Corporation, US
Naval Academy Grad (Richard, US Naval War College Review, 60.3, "Maritime
terrorism: focusing on the probable",
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Maritime+terrorism:+focusing+on+the+probable.a0169380022)
A recent study by the ioMosaic Corporation draws upon field measurements,
operational information, and engineering information on LNG vessels gathered over the
last sixty years. (49) It takes into account terrorism and other twenty-first-century
threats. The overall conclusion is straightforward--that in the highly unlikely event of a
very large scale release of liquified natural gas on land or water, significant effects will
be felt in the immediate vicinity. (50) However, the zone of impact would not extend
anywhere close to the thirty miles predicted by some groups. (51) As long as an LNG
vapor cloud is unconfined, it will not explode. A cloud reaching a populated area would
quickly find an ignition source and burn back to the spill site before it could cover large
numbers of people. If inflicting mass casualties is the terrorist goal, LNG facilities and
tankers are not good targets. (52)
*FOOTNOTE 50*
(50.) According to Kalelkar et al. (p. 4), available data and explosion dynamics indicate
that it is not possible to detonate LNG vapors, even with an explosive charge on a
storage tank, unless the LNG vapors contain high fractions of ethane and propane (more
than 20 percent). They claim that the likelihood of this scenario is equivalent to winning
the Powerball or Megabucks lottery several times simultaneously. For impact, p. 22.
Economic rationality allows for the worst form of violence capitalism is
no longer the trading of the real but the symbolic that turns the case
Bifo 11
(Franco, pretty clever scholar, activist and Marxist, After the Future, 2011, LB)
More than ever, economic rationality is at odds with social rationality. Economic science
is not part of the solution to the crisis: it is the source of the problem. On July 18th 2009
the headline of The Economist read: What went wrong with economics? The text is an
attempt to downplay the crisis of the Economics profession, and of economic
knowledge. For neoliberal economists the central dogma of growth, profit and
competition cannot be questioned, because it is identified with the perfect mathematical
rationality of the market. And belief in the intrinsic rationality of the market is crucial in
the economic theology of neoliberalism. But the reduction of social life to the rational
exchange of economic values is an obsession that has nothing to do with science. Its a
political strategy aimed to identify humans as calculating machines, aimed to shape
behavior and perception in such a way that money becomes the only motivation of
social action. But it is not accurate as a description of social dynamics, and the conflicts,

pathologies, and irrationality of human relationships. Rather, it is an attempt at creating

the anthropological brand of homo calculans that Foucault (2008) has described in his
seminar of 1979/80, published with the title The Birth of Biopolitics. This attempt to
identify human beings with calculating devices has produced cultural devastation, and
has finally been showed to have been based upon flawed assumptions. Human beings do
calculate, but their calculation is not perfectly rational, because the value of goods is not
determined by objective reasons, and because decisions are influenced by what Keynes
named animal spirits. We will never really understand important economic events
unless we confront the fact that their causes are largely mental in nature, say Akerlof
and Shiller (2009: 1) in their book Animal Spirits, echoing Keyness assumption that the
rationality of the market is not perfect in itself. Akerlof and Shiller are avowing the crisis
of neoliberal thought, but their critique is episteme. Animal Spirits is the title of an other
book, by Matteo Pasquinelli (2008). Pasquinellis book deals with bodies and digits, and
parasites, and goes much deeper in its understanding of the roots of the crisis than its
eponymous publication: Cognitive capitalism emerges in the form of a parasite: it
subjects social knowledge and inhibits its emancipatory potential (Pasquinelli 2008:
93). Beyond the computer screen, precarious workers and freelancers experience how
Free Labor and competition are increasingly devouring their everyday life (Pasquinelli
2008: 15). Pasquinelli goes to the core of the problem: the virtualization of social
production has acted as the proliferation of a parasite, destroying the prerequisites of
living relationships, absorbing and neutralizing the living energies of cognitive workers.
The economic recession is not only the effect of financial craziness, but also the effect of
the de-vitalization of the social field. This is why the collapse of the economic system is
also the collapse of economic epistemology that has guided the direction of politics in
the last two centuries. Economics cannot understand the depth of the crisis, because
below the crisis of financial exchange there is the crisis of symbolic exchange. I
mean the psychotic boom of panic, depression, and suicide, the general decline of desire
and social empathy. The question that rises from the collapse is so radical that the
answer cannot be found in the economic conceptual framework. Furthermore, one must
ask if economics really is a science? If the word science means the creation of concepts
for the understanding and description of an object, economics is not a science. Its object
does not exist. The economic object (scarcity, salaried labor, and profit) is not an object
that exists before and outside the performative action of the economic episteme.
Production, consumption, and daily life become part of the economic discourse when
labor is detached and opposed to human activity, when it falls under the domination of
capitalist rule. The economic object does not pre-exist conceptual activity, and economic
description is in fact a normative action. In this sense Economics is a technique, a
process of semiotization of the world, and also a mythology, a narration. Economics is a
suggestion and a categorical imperative: Money makes things happen. It is the source of
action in the world and perhaps the only power we invest in. Life seems to depend on it.
Everything within us would like to say that it does not, that this cannot be. But the
Almighty Dollar has taken command. The more it is denied the more it shows
itself as Almighty. Perhaps in every other respect, in every other value, bankruptcy
has been declared, giving money the power of some sacred deity, demanding to be

recognized. Economics no longer persuades money to 111 behave. Numbers cannot

make the beast lie down and be quiet or sit up and do tricks. At best, economics is a
neurosis of money, a symptom contrived to hold the beast in abeyance. Thus
economics shares the language of psychopathology inflation, depression, lows and
highs, slumps and peaks, investments and losses. (Sordello 1983) From the age of the
enclosures in England the economic process has been a process of production of scarcity
(scarcification). The enclosures were intended to scarcify the land, and the basic means
of survival, so that people who so far had been able to cultivate food for their family
were forced to become proletarians, then salaried industrial workers. Capitalism is
based on the artificial creation of need, and economic science is essentially a technique
of scarcification of time, life and food. Inside the condition of scarcity human beings are
subjected to exploitation and to the domain of profit-oriented activity. After scarcifying
the land (enclosures) capitalism has scarcified time itself, forcing people who dont have
property other than their own life and body, to lend their life-time to capital. Now the
capitalist obsession for growth is making scarce both water and air. Economic science is
not the science of prediction: it is the technique of producing, implementing, and
pushing scarcity and need. This is why Marx did not speak of economy, but of political
economy. The technique of economic scarcification is based on a mythology, a narration
that identifies richness as property and acquisition, and subjugates the possibility of
living to the lending of time and to the transformation of human activity into salaried
work. In recent decades, technological change has slowly eroded the very foundations of
economic science. Shifting from the sphere of production of material objects to the
semiocapitalist production of immaterial goods, the Economic concepts are losing their
foundation and legitimacy. The basic categories of Economics are becoming totally
artificial. The theoretical justification of private property, as you read in the writings of
John Locke, is based on the need of exclusive consumption. An apple must be
privatized, if you want to avoid the danger that someone else eats your apple. But what
happens when goods are immaterial, infinitely replicable without cost? Thanks to
digitalization and immaterialization of the production process, the economic nomos of
private property loses its ground, its raison detre, and it can be imposed only by force.
Furthermore, the very foundation of salary, the relationship between time needed for
production and value of the product, is vanishing. The immaterialization and
cognitivization of production makes it almost impossible to quantify the average time
needed to produce value. Time and value become incommensurable, and violence
becomes the only law able to determine price and salary. The neoliberal school, which
has opened the way to the worldwide deregulation of social production, has fostered the
mythology of rational expectations in economic exchange, and has touted the idea of a
self-regulation of the market, first of all the labor-market. But self-regulation is a lie. In
order to increase exploitation, and to destroy social welfare, global capitalism has used
political institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO), not to mention the military enforcement of the political decisions
of these institutions. Far from being self-regulated, the market is militarily regulated.
The mythology of free individuals loyally competing on the base of perfect knowledge of
the market is a lie, too. Real human beings are not perfect rational calculating machines.

And the myth of rational expectations has finally crashed after the explosion of the real
estate mortgage bubble. The theory of rational expectation is crucial in neoliberal
thought: the economic agents are supposed to be free to choose in a perfectly rational
way the best deal in selling and buying. The fraud perpetrated by the investment
agencies has destroyed the lives of millions of Americans, and has exposed the
theoretical swindle. Economic exchange cannot be described as a rational game , because
irrational factors play a crucial role in social life in general. Trickery, misleading
information, and psychic manipulation are not exceptions, but the professional tools of
advertisers, financial agents, and economic consultants. The idea that social
relationships can be described in mathematical terms has the force of myth, but it is not
science, and it has nothing to do with natural law. Notwithstanding the failure of the
theory, neoliberal politics are still in control of the global machine, because the criminal
class that has seized power has no intention of stepping down, and because the social
brain is unable to recompose and find the way of self-organization. I read in the New
York Times on September 6th 2009: After the mortgage business imploded last year,
Wall Street investment banks began searching for another big idea to make money. They
think they may have found one. The bankers plan to buy life settlements, life
insurance policies that ill and elderly people sell for cash, depending on the life
expectancy of the insured person. Then they plan to securitize these policies, in Wall
Street jargon, by packaging hundreds of thousands together into bonds. They will then
resell those bonds to investors, like big pension funds, who will receive the payouts
when people with the insurance die. The earlier the policyholder dies, the bigger the
return, though if people live longer than expected investors could get poor returns or
even lose money. Imagine that I buy an insurance policy on my life (something I would
absolutely not do). My insurer of course will wish me a long life, so Ill pay the fee for a
long time, while he should pay lots of money to my family if I 113 die. But some
enlightened finance guru has the brilliant idea of insuring the insurer. He buys the risk,
and he invests on the hope that I die soon. You dont need the imagination of Philip K.
Dick to guess the follow up of the story: financial agents will be motivated to kill me
overnight. The talk of recovery is based on necronomy, the economy of death. Its not
new, as capitalism has always profited from wars, slaughters and genocides. But now the
equation becomes unequivocal. Death is the promise, death is the investment and the
hope. Death is the best future that capitalism may secure . The logic of speculation is
different from the logic of spectacle that was dominant in late-modern times. Spectacle
is the mirrorization of life, the transfer of life in the mirror of spectacular accumulation.
Speculation is the subjugation of the future to its financial mirror, the substitution of
present life with future money that will never come, because death will come before. The
lesson that we must learn from the first year of the global recession is sad: neoliberal
folly is not going away, the financial plungers will not stop their speculation, and
corporations will not stop their exploitation, and the political class, largely controlled by
the corporate lobbies, is unwilling or unable to protect society from the final assault. In
1996 J. G. Ballard (1996: 188) wrote: the most perfect crime of all when the
victims are either willing, or arent aware that they are victims. Democracy
seems unable to stop the criminal class that has seized control of the economy, because

the decisions are no longer made in the sphere of political opinion, but in the
inaccessible sphere of economic automatism. The economy has been declared the basic
standard of decision, and the economists have systematically identified Economy with
the capitalist obsession of growth. No room for political choice has been left, as the
corporate principles have been embedded in the technical fabric of language and
imagination.
Trade doesnt solve war
Goldstone 2007 (P.R., PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science and a
member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
He is a non-resident research fellow at the Center for Peace and Security Studies,
Georgetown University, AlterNet, September 25,
http://www.alternet.org/audits/62848/?page=entire)
Many hope trade will constrain or perhaps pacify a rising China, resurgent Russia, and
proliferation-minded Iran, as it well may. Nonetheless, any prudent analysis must
incorporate caveats drawn from states' particular political economy of security policy. In
non-democratic states, however important global markets may be to the economy in
aggregate, elites will be most sensitive to sectoral interests of their specific power base.
This mismatch can cause systematic distortions in their ability to interpret other states'
strategic signals correctly when genuine conflicts of interest emerge with a nation more
domestically constrained. Leadership elites drawn from domestic-oriented,
uncompetitive, or non-tradable constituencies will tend to discount deterrent signals
sent by trading partners whose own domestic institutions favor those commerceoriented interests, believing such interests make partners less likely to fulfill their
threats. For example, one reason the BJP government of India decided to achieve an
open nuclear weapons capability was that its small-business, domestic-oriented heart
constituency was both less vulnerable to trade sanctions and less willing to believe that
the US would either impose or long sustain such sanctions, given its own increased
economic interests in India. Sometimes, deterrent signals may not be sent at all, since
one nation's governing coalition may include commerce-dependent groups whose
interests prevent state leaders from actually undertaking necessary balancing responses
or issuing potent signals of resolve in the first place; the result can be fatally muddled
strategy and even war -- as witness the series of weak attempts before the First World
War by finance-dominated Britain to deter "Iron and Rye"-dominated Germany. The
emergence of truly global markets makes it all the less plausible under most
circumstances that a revisionist state will be unable to find some alternative source of
resources or outlet for its goods. Ironically, the more the international economy
resembles a true global marketplace rather than an oligopolistic economic forum, the
less likely it would appear that aggressors must inevitably suffer lasting retaliatory cutoffs in trade. There will always be someone else with the capability to buy and sell.

Royal concludes neg the next page says decline disincentives saber
rattling
Royal, their author, 10director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S.
Department of Defense (Jedediah, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the
Problem of Economic Crises, published in Economics of War and Peace: Economic,
Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 217, google books)
There is, however, another trend at play. Economic crises tend to fragment regimes and
divide polities. A decrease in cohesion at the political leadership level and at the
electorate level reduces the ability of the state to coalesce a sufficiently strong
political base required to undertake costly balancing measures such as
economic costly signals. Schweller (2006) builds on earlier studies (sec, e.g.,
Christensen, 1996; Snyder, 2000) that link political fragmentation with decisions not to
balance against rising threats or to balance only in minimal and ineffective ways to
demonstrate a tendency for states to 'underbalance'. Where political and social cohesion
is strong, states are more likely to balance against rising threats in effective and costly
ways. However, 'unstable and fragmented regimes that rule over divided polities will be
significantly constrained in their ability to adapt to systemic incentives; they will be least
likely to enact bold and costly policies even when their nation's survival is at
stake and they are needed most' (Schweller, 2006, p. 130).

Terrorism
Too late to solveRussia no longer trusts anything we do
Cohen, 2/28/12 [Professor, Russian Studies at New York University, America's Failed
(Bi-Partisan) Russia Policy, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-f-cohen/usrussia-policy_b_1307727.html?ref=politics&ir=Politics]
In short, the United States is farther from a partnership with Russia today than it was
more than twenty years ago.
Third: Who, it must be asked, is to blame for this historic failure to establish a
partnership between America and post-Soviet Russia? In the United States, Moscow
alone is almost universally blamed. The facts are different. There have been three
compelling opportunities to establish such a partnership. All three were lost, or are
being lost, in Washington, not in Moscow.
- The first opportunity was following the end of the Soviet Union, in the 1990s. Instead,
the Clinton administration adopted an aggressive triumphalist approach to Moscow.
That administration tried to dictate Russia's post-Communist development and to turn
it into a U.S. client state. It moved the U.S.-led military alliance, NATO, into Russia's
former security zone. It bombed Moscow's remaining European ally, Serbia. And along
the way, the Clinton administration broke strategic promises made to Moscow.
- The second opportunity for partnership was after 9/11, when the Bush administration
repaid Russian President Vladimir Putin's extraordinary assistance in the U.S. war
against the Taliban in Afghanistan by further expanding NATO to Russia's borders and
by unilaterally withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which Moscow
regarded as the linchpin of its nuclear security.
- Now, since 2008, the Obama administration is squandering the third opportunity, its
own "re-set," by refusing to respond to Moscow's concessions on Afghanistan and Iran
with reciprocal agreements on Russia's top priorities, NATO expansion and missile
defense.
In short, every opportunity for a U.S.-Russian partnership during the past twenty years
was lost, or is being lost, in Washington, not in Moscow.
Fourth: How to explain, we must also ask, such unwise U.S. policies over such a long
period? The primary explanation is a policy-making outlook, or ideology, that has
combined the worst legacy of the Cold War with the worst American reaction to the end
of the Soviet Union.
- Washington's two most consequential (and detrimental) decisions regarding postSoviet Russia have continued the militarized approach of the Cold War: to move
NATO eastward; and to build missile defense installations near Russia's borders.
- At the same time, Washington's triumphalist reaction to the end of the Soviet state
produced a winner-take-all diplomatic approach that has been almost as aggressive.
Consider the three primary components of this so-called diplomacy:

1. Presumably on the assumption that Russia's interests abroad are less legitimate than
America's, Washington has acted on a double-standard in relations with Moscow. The
unmistakable example is that while creating a vast U.S.-NATO sphere of military and
political influence around Russia, Washington adamantly denounces Moscow's quest for
any zone of security, even on its own borders.
2. Similarly, U.S. negotiations on vital issues have been based on the premise (called
"selective cooperation") that Moscow should make all major concessions while
Washington makes none. And on rare occasions when Washington did promise major
concessions, it reneged on them, NATO's eastward expansion being only the first
instance. (Can anyone who doubts this generalization cite a single meaningful
concession -- any substantive reciprocity -- that Moscow has actually gotten from the
United States since 1992?)
3. Meanwhile, presumably on the assumption that Russia's political sovereignty at home
is less than our own, Washington has pursued intrusive "democracy-promotion"
measures that flagrantly trespass on Moscow's internal affairs. This practice began in
the 1990s with actual directives from Washington to Moscow ministries and with
legions of onsite U.S. "advisers" and it continues today -- recently, for example, with the
American vice president lobbying in Moscow against Putin's return to the Russian
presidency and with the new U.S. ambassador's profoundly ill-timed meeting with
leaders of Moscow's street protests.
In short, blaming Putin for anti-Americanism in Russia, as the U.S. State Department
and media do, ignores the real cause: Twenty years of American military and diplomatic
policies have convinced a large part of Russia's political class (and intelligentsia)
that Washington's intentions are aggressive, aggrandizing and deceitful -- anything but
those of a partner. (In that context, part of the Russian elite has criticized Putin for
being "pro-American.")

Their impacts happen on the plane of debate- accepting terrorism is key to

reject fear mongering
Robinson 2012
(Robinson, Andrew, political theorist, Baudrillard master, also has a great smile "Jean
Baudrillard: Catastrophe and Terrorism." Ceasefire Magazine RSS. N.p., 7 Dec. 2012.
Web. 10 Aug. 2014. http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-13/>, LB)
He sees this prefigured in terrorism, hostage taking, and sacrifical martyrdom: the
terrorist or the hostage is sacrificed and the system has nothing to offer in return .
Terrorism returns to the field of symbolic exchange. It both mirrors the systems own
violence, and shows a glimpse of the symbolic violence which is beyond it, and hence is
its own death. Baudrillard seems to be thinking mainly of leftist groups such as the Red
Army Fraction when he discusses terrorism, although he admits that his account of
terrorist effects runs against the ideology of such groups. Terrorism, uniquely, confronts
the system in this way, in broad daylight. It is the last way in which the system is

checked. It is violence and derision carried to the limit, beyond what the system can
bear. Yet terrorism is insufficient to bring down the system. It does not succeed in giving
death a meaning, the dead are annulled by indifference, and the system responds with
its own nihilism, a nihilism of neutralisation. It puts us in an era of events without
consequences, where the event ends in its televised representation. Terrorism is the
ecstatic growth of violence or politics. It is an ascension to limits without any rules of the
game. It tries desperately to disrupt the functioning of the systems daily deterrence or
terror by replacing the systems organised, systematic death with elective death. In order
not to be taken hostage, it takes others hostage. Yet the hostage is suddenly shown to
represent nothing, to be seen by the system as dispensable. Even a politician such as
Aldo Moro is shown to be dispensable. Terrorism proclaims inexchangeability from the
start. This, for Baudrillard, makes it utopian. It experimentally stages an impossible
exchange, and thus makes visible the disappearance of exchange and of the social
contract. For Baudrillard, contracts are an illusion in any case. Even in capitalism,
everything is really about stakes and defiance, the destruction of meaning and
subjectivity, not contracts. The death of the contract is the return of symbolic exchange.
The complicity between terrorists and the media is for Baudrillard central to their
power. Terrorism is a superconductive event it affects not simply specific sites, but
entire systems. It occurs in the non-places of the system, such as airports the same
spaces from which the world is now managed. It opens the era of the transpolitical, in
which terror replaces alienation. Terrorism is already in some sense simulated
terrorism, performed for the media. It is a special effect. On some level, terrorism is
isomorphic with the masses. It is non-representative, but of a similar kind. We are all
hostages, since were vulnerable to precarious risks outside our control, and used as
dissuasive arguments against others uses of power (against nuclear attacks, against a
general strike and so on). Terrorism radicalises and performs this hostage status. It
tends ultimately to become a destruction of all meaning without objectives and goals,
representation, solidarity and so on. Like natural disaster, it is a subjectless subversion.
Terrorism is not so much violent in itself as the source of a violent spectacle, a theatre of
cruelty. It returns to the level of the pure symbolic challenge, counterposing this
challenge to the systems models. It breaks down fixed boundaries because terrorist,
hostage, audience and power become inetrchangeable. For instance, it is usually
impossible to determine whether a mediatised terrorist figure (such as Baader, Che, Bin
Laden, Zarqawi, perhaps Saddam or Gaddafi) was murdered, committed suicide, or
died in battle. This indeterminacy is part of the romanticism, the fascination of
terrorism. (Getting into arguments about what really happened is seen by Baudrillard as
a trap which returns us to the field of meaning). Terrorism is not simply state terrorism
by groups without political power. State terrorism is ultimately given its lifeblood by
truth and meaning. It seeks a mobilisation against terrorism around the values of truth,
meaning and the code. Terorrism counterposes to it a superior, meaningless form of
violence. It counterposes an imaginary realm to the real, which carries implosion and
destruction into the heart of the real and of power. It seeks to provoke the system into
an excess of reality which will cause it to collapse.

Relations with China fail but no impact to hostility

Blackwill 2009 former US ambassador to India and US National Security Council
Deputy for Iraq, former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (Robert
D., RAND, The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic RecessionA
Caution, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP275.pdf,
WEA)
Alternatively, will the current world economic crisis change relations between China and
the United States in a much more positive and intimate direction, producing what some
are calling a transcendent G-2? This seems improbable for seven reasons. First, the
United States and China have profoundly different visions of Asian security. For
Washington, maintaining U.S. alliances in Asia is the hub of its concept of Asian
security, whereas, for Beijing, Americas alliance system is a destabilizing factor in Asian
security and over time should wither away. These opposing concepts will be an enduring
source of tension between the two sides. Second, these two countries systematically
prepare for war against one another, which is reflected in their military doctrines, their
weapons procurement and force modernization, and their deployments and military
exercises. As long as this is the case, it will provide a formidable psychological and
material barrier to much closer bilateral relations. Third, the United States is critical of
Chinas external resource acquisition policy, which Washington believes could threaten
both American economic and security interests in the developing world. Fourth, despite
their deep economic dependence on each other, U.S.-China economic relations are
inherently fragile. China sells too much to the United States and buys too little, and the
United States saves too little and borrows too much from China. This will inevitably lead
to a backlash in the United States and a Chinese preoccupation with the value of its
American investments. Fifth, Chinese environmental policy will be an increasing
problem, both for U.S. policymakers who are committed to bringing China fully into
global efforts to reduce climate degradation and for Chinese leaders who are just as
determined to emphasize domestic economic growth over international climate regimes.
Sixth, China and the United States have wholly different domestic political
arrangements that make a sustained entente difficult to manage. Americans continue to
care about human rights in China, and Beijing resents what it regards as U.S.
interference in its domestic affairs. This will be a drag on the bilateral relationship for
the foreseeable future. And seventh, any extended application by Washington of
Chimerica, as Moritz Schularick of Berlins Free University has called it,23 would so
alarm Americas Asian allies, beginning with Japan, that the United States would soon
retreat from the concept.24
Nevertheless, these factors are unlikely to lead to a substantial downturn in U.S.-China
bilateral ties. In addition to their economic interdependence, both nations have
important reasons to keep their interaction more or less stable. As Washington wants to
concentrate on its many problems elsewhere in the world, especially in the Greater
Middle East, Beijing prefers to keep its focus on its domestic economic development and
political stability. Neither wants the bilateral relationship to get out of hand. In sum, a

positive strategic breakthrough in the U.S.-China relationship or a serious deterioration

in bilateral interaction both seem doubtful in the period ahead. And the current
economic downturn will not essentially affect the abiding primary and constraining
factors on the two sides. Therefore, the U.S.-China relationship in five years will
probably look pretty much as it does todaypart cooperation, part competition, part
suspicionunaffected by todays economic time of troubles, except in the increasing
unlikely event of a cross-strait crisis and confrontation.

2nc

Shipping
We can only live once we go beyond life, the rejection of death only
facilitates a biopolitical survivalism wherein we become the living dead
Zizek 2003
(Slavoj, pretty ratchet dude, The puppet and the dwarf, 2003, LB)
Insofar as death and life designate for Saint Paul two existential (subjective)
positions, not objective facts,we are fully justified in raising the old Pauline question:
who is really alive today?1What if we are really alive only if and when we engage
ourselves with an excessive intensity which puts us beyond mere life? What if, when
we focus on mere survival, even if it is qualified as having a good time, what we
ultimately lose is life itself? What if the Palestinian suicide bomber on the point of
blowing himself (and others) up is, in an emphatic sense, more alive than the
American soldier engaged in a war in front of a computer screen hundreds of miles away
from the enemy, or a New York yuppie jogging along the Hudson river in order to keep
his body in shape? Or, in terms of the psychoanalytic clinic, what if a hysteric is truly
alive in her permanent, excessive, provoking questioning of her existence, while an
obsessional is the very model of choosing a life in death? That is to say, is not the
ultimate aim of his compulsive rituals to prevent the thing from happeningthis
thing being the excess of life itself? Is not the catastrophe he fears the fact that, finally,
something will really happen to him? Or, in terms of the revolutionary process, what if
the difference that separates Lenins era from Stalinism is, again, the difference between
life and death? There is an apparently marginal feature which clearly illustrates this
point: the basic attitude of a Stalinist Communist is that of following the correct Party
line against Rightist or Leftist deviation in short, to steer a safe middle course; for
authentic Leninism, in clear contrast, there is ultimately only one deviation, the Centrist
onethat of playing it safe, of opportunistically avoiding the risk of clearly and
excessively taking sides.There was no deeper historical necessity, for example, in the
sudden shift of Soviet policy from War Communism to the New Economic Policy in
1921 it was just a desperate strategic zigzag between the Leftist and the Rightist line,
or, as Lenin himself put it in 1922, the Bolsheviks made chapter 4 all the possible
mistakes.This excessive taking sides, this permanent imbalance of zigzag, is
ultimately (the revolutionary political) life itselffor a Leninist, the ultimate name of
the counterrevolutionary Right is Center itself, the fear of introducing a radical
imbalance into the social edifice. It is a properly Nietzschean paradox that the greatest
loser in this apparent assertion of Life against all transcendent Causes is actual life itself.
What makes life worth living is the very excess of life: the awareness that there is
something for which we are ready to risk our life (we may call this excess freedom,
honor, dignity, autonomy, etc.). Only when we are ready to take this risk are we
really alive. So when Hlderlin wrote: To live is to defend a form, this form is not
simply a Lebensform, but the form of the excess-of-life, the way this excess violently
inscribes itself into the life-texture. Chesterton makes this point apropos of the paradox
of courage: A soldier surrounded by enemies, if he is to cut his way out, needs to

combine a strong desire for living with a strange carelessness about dying. He must not
merely cling to life, for then he will be a coward, and will not escape. He must not
merely wait for death, for then he will be a suicide, and will not escape. He must seek his
life in a spirit of furious indifference to it; he must desire life like water and yet drink
death like wine.

K
Deathmaking DA
Bjork 92 (Rebecca, Past Coach and Debater, Symposium: Women in Debate:
Reflections on the Ongoing Struggle, 1992 - Effluents and affluence: The Global
Pollution Debate, LB)
While reflecting on my experiences as a woman in academic debate in preparation
for this essay, I realized that I have been involved in debate for more than half of my
life. I debated for four years in high school, for four years in college, and I have been
coaching intercollegiate debate for nine years. Not surprisingly, much of my identity
as an individual has been shaped by these experiences in debate. I am a person who
strongly believes that debate empowers people to be committed and involved
individuals in the communities in which they live. I am a person who thrives on the
intellectual stimulation involved in teaching and traveling with the brightest
students on my campus. I am a person who looks forward to the opportunities for
active engagement of ideas with debaters and coaches from around the country. I am
also, however, a college professor, a "feminist," and a peace activist who is
increasingly frustrated and disturbed by some of the practices I see being
perpetuated and rewarded in academic debate. I find that I can no longer separate
my involvement in debate from the rest of who I am as an individual. Northwestern I
remember listening to a lecture a few years ago given by Tom Goodnight at the
University summer debate camp. Goodnight lamented what he saw as the debate
community's participation in, and unthinking perpetuation of what he termed the
"death culture." He argued that the embracing of "big impact" arguments--nuclear
war, environmental destruction, genocide, famine, and the like-by debaters and
coaches signals a morbid and detached fascination with such events, one that views
these real human tragedies as part of a "game" in which so-called "objective and
neutral" advocates actively seek to find in their research the "impact to outweigh all
other impacts"--the round-winning argument that will carry them to their goal of
winning tournament X, Y, or Z. He concluded that our "use" of such events in this
way is tantamount to a celebration of them; our detached, rational discussions
reinforce a detached, rational viewpoint, when emotional and moral outrage may be
a more appropriate response. In the last few years, my academic research has led me
to be persuaded by Goodnight's unspoken assumption; language is not merely some
transparent tool used to transmit information, but rather is an incredibly powerful
medium, the use of which inevitably has real political and material consequences.
Given this assumption, I believe that it is important for us to examine the "discourse
of debate practice:" that is, the language, discourses, and meanings that we, as a
community of debaters and coaches, unthinkingly employ in academic debate. If it is
the case that the language we use has real implications for how we view the world,
how we view others, and how we act in the world, then it is imperative that we
critically examine our own discourse practices with an eye to how our language does
violence to others. I am shocked and surprised when I hear myself saying things like,
"we killed them," or "take no prisoners," or "let's blow them out of the water." I am

tired of the "ideal" debater being defined as one who has mastered the art of verbal
assault to the point where accusing opponents of lying, cheating, or being
deliberately misleading is a sign of strength. But what I am most tired of is how
women debaters are marginalized and rendered voiceless in such a discourse
community. Women who verbally assault their opponents are labeled "bitches"
because it is not socially acceptable for women to be verbally aggressive. Women who
get angry and storm out of a room when a disappointing decision is rendered are
labeled "hysterical" because, as we all know, women are more emotional then men. I
am tired of hearing comments like, "those 'girls' from school X aren't really
interested in debate; they just want to meet men." We can all point to examples
(although only a few) of women who have succeeded at the top levels of debate. But I
find myself wondering how many more women gave up because they were tired of
negotiating the mine field of discrimination, sexual harassment, and isolation they
found in the debate community. As members of this community, however, we have
great freedom to define it in whatever ways we see fit. After all, what is debate except
a collection of shared understandings and explicit or implicit rules for interaction?
What I am calling for is a critical examination of how we, as individual members of
this community, characterize our activity, ourselves, and our interactions with others
through language. We must become aware of the ways in which our mostly hidden
and unspoken assumptions about what "good" debate is function to exclude not only
women, but ethnic minorities from the amazing intellectual opportunities that
training in debate provides. Our nation and indeed, our planet, faces incredibly
difficult challenges in the years ahead. I believe that it is not acceptable anymore for
us to go along as we always have, assuming that things will straighten themselves
out. If the rioting in Los Angeles taught us anything, it is that complacency breeds
resentment and frustration. We may not be able to change the world, but we can
change our own community, and if we fail to do so, we give up the only real power
that we have.
Double bind either the aff's impacts have too short a timeframe for the
round to spillover or they're not true and FIAT is an independent reason
to vote negative overstretches the will and causes limitless nihilism
Antonio 1995 [Robert; Professor of Sociology at the University of Kansas;
Nietzsches Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History; American
Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995]
While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of
autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals)
in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross
fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others,
asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed
in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but
actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social
self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the
social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness."

Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing

overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and
unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do
(Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous
rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows,"
"abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and
superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you
genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no
more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell
the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals"
(Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268,
300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine
attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate
in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to
be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94).
Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259)
stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal
while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might
miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is
merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain
compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense
and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and
faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the
fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity).
The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership.
Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and
praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick"
harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born
physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd;
they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all
according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the
masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more
urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god,
prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly
combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled
ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168;
1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).LB

1nr

Shipping
No econ impact
Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of
International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, Force in Our
Times, Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe
conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new
interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A
zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in
nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties,
which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back
old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it
is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the
members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that
economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed
states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally
have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme
versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is
hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict
leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by
impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only
become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved
by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as
outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in
my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn
without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad
times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war
thinkable.
Recent conflicts prove there is zero correlation between economic decline
and war
Barnett 9 Thomas, Senior Managing Director of Enterra Solutions LLC, Contributing
Editor and Online Columnist for Esquire, The New Rules: Security Remains Stable
Amid Financial Crisis,Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, http://www.aprodex.com/thenew-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx
When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was
ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing
conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now,
as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging
markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize
how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact
whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-

dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the

global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in
the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic
struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by
Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the
Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the
opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger
(followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost twodecade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the
various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts,
insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent RussiaGeorgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel
v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process
wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied
down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-intoPakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both
leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug
efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up
with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty
much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something.
Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and
training local forces.
They treat the world as an experiment to be managed
Baudrillard, 94 (Jean, The Illusion of the End, 1994, LB)
Such a very American hallucination this ocean, this savannah, this desert, this virgin
forest reconstituted in miniature, vitrified beneath their experimental bubble. In the
true spirit of Disneyland's attractions, Biosphere 2 is not an experiment, but an
experimental attraction. The most amazing thing is that they have reconstituted a
fragment of artificial desert right in the middle of the natural desert (a bit like
reconstituting Hollywood in Disneyworld). Only in this artificial desert there are neither
scorpions nor Indians to be exterminated; there are only extraterrestrials trained to
survive in the very place where they destroyed another, far better adapted race, leaving
it no chance. The whole humanist ideology - ecological, climatic, micro-cosmic and
biogenetic - is summed up here, but this is of no importance. Only the sidereal,
transparent form of the edifice means anything - but what? Difficult to say. As ever,
absolute space inspires engineers, gives meaning to a project which has none, except the
mad desire for a miniaturization of the human species, with a view perhaps to a future
race and its emergence, of which we still dream. . . The artificial promiscuity of climates
has its counterpart in the artificial immunity of the space: the elimination of all
spontaneous generation (of germs, viruses, microbes), the automatic purification of the
water, the air, the physical atmosphere (and the mental atmosphere too, purified by
science). The elimination of all sexual reproduction: it is forbidden to reproduce in

Biosphere 2; even contamination from life [Ie vivant] is dangerous; sexuality may spoil
the experiment. Sexual difference functions only as a formal, statistical variable (the
same number of women as men; if anyone drops out, a person of the same sex is
substituted). Everything here is designed with a brain-like abstraction. Biosphere 2 is to
Biosphere 1 (the whole of our planet and the cosmos) what the brain is to the human
being in general: the synthesis in miniature of all its possible functions and operations:
the desert lobe, the virgin forest lobe, the nourishing agriculture lobe, the residential
lobe, all carefully distinct and placed side by side, according to the analytical imperative .
All of this in reality entirely outdated with respect to what we now know about the brain
- its plasticity, its elasticity, the reversible sequencing of all its operations. There is, then,
behind this archaic model, beneath its futuristic exterior, a gigantic hypothetical error, a
fierce idealization doomed to failure. In fact, the 'truth' of the operation lies elsewhere,
and you sense this when you return from Biosphere 2 to 'real' America, as you do when
you emerge from Disneyland into real life: the fact is that the imaginary, or
experimental, model is in no way different from the real functioning of this society. Just
as the whole of America is built in the image of Disneyland, so the whole of American
society is carrying on - in real time and out in the open - the same experiment as
Biosphere 2 which is therefore only falsely experimental, just as Disneyland is only
falsely imaginary. The recycling of all substances, the integration of flows and circuits,
non-pollution, artificial immunity, ecological balancing, controlled abstinence,
restrained jouissance but, also, the right of all species to survival and conservation - and
not just plant and animal species, but also social ones. All categories formally brought
under the one umbrella of the law - this latter setting its seal on the ending of natural
selection. It is generally thought that the obsession with survival is a logical consequence
of life and the right to life. But, most of the time, the two things are contradictory. Life is
not a question of rights, and what follows on from life is not survival, which is artificial,
but death. It is only by paying the price of a failure to live, a failure to take pleasure, a
failure to die that man is assured of survival. At least in present conditions, which the
Biosphere principle perpetuates. This micro-universe seeks to exorcize catastrophe by
making an artificial synthesis of all the elements of catastrophe. From the perspective of
survival, of recycling and feedback, of stabilization and metastabilization, the elements
of life are sacrificed to those of survival (elimination of germs, of evil, of sex). Real life,
which surely, after all, has the right to disappear (or might there be a paradoxical limit
to human rights?), is sacrificed to artificial survival. The real planet, presumed
condemned, is sacrificed in advance to its miniaturized, air-conditioned clone (have no
fear, all the earth's climates are air-conditioned here) which is designed to vanquish
death by total simulation. In days gone by it was the dead who were embalmed for
eternity; today, it is the living we embalm alive in a state of survival. Must this be our
hope? Having lost our metaphysical utopias, do we have to build this prophylactic one?
What, then, is this species endowed with the insane pretension to survive - not to
transcend itself by virtue of its natural intelligence, but to survive physically,
biologically, by virtue of its artificial intelligence? Is there a species destined to escape
natural selection, natural disappearance - in a word, death? What cosmic cussedness
might give rise to such a turnabout? What vital reaction might produce the idea of

survival at any cost? What metaphysical anomaly might grant the right not to disappear
- logical counterpart of the remarkable good fortune of having appeared? There is a kind
of aberration in the attempt to eternalize the species - not to immortalize it in its
actions, but to eternalize it in this face-lifted coma, in the glass coffin of Biosphere 2.We
may, nonetheless, take the view that this experiment, like any attempt to achieve
artificial survival or artificial paradise, is illusory, not from any technical shortcomings,
but in its very principle. In spite of itself, it is threatened by the same accidents as real
life. Fortunately. Let us hope that the random universe outside smashes this glass coffin.
Any accident will do if it rescues us from a scientific euphoria sustained by drip-feed.

Terrorism
No cards

Round 3 vs Carrolton DC

1nc

1nc
The unconditional affirmation of human life is a violent form of oppression
which denies the possibility of value to death and reifies a master-slave
dichotomy that is a precondition for oppression
Baudrillard 02 (Jean, The Spirit of Terrorism: Hypotheses on Terrorism, LB)
All the same, we should try to get beyond the moral imperative of unconditional respect
for human life, and conceive that one might respect, both in the other and in oneself,
something other than, and more than, life (existence isnt everything, it is even the least
of things): a destiny, a cause, a form of pride or of sacrifice. There are symbolic stakes
which far exceed existence and freedom - which we find it unbearable to lose, because
we have made them the fetishistic values of a universal humanist order. So we cannot
imagine a terrorist act committed with entire autonomy and freedom of conscience.
Now, choice in terms of symbolic obligations is sometimes profoundly mysterious - as in
the case of Romand, the man with the double life, who murdered his whole family, not
for fear of being unmasked, but for fear of inflicting on them the profound
disappointment of discovering his deception. Committing suicide would not have
expunged the crime from the record; he would merely have passed the shame off on to
the others. Where is the courage, where the cowardice? The question of freedom, ones
own or that of others, no longer poses itself in terms of moral consciousness, and a
higher freedom must allow us to dispose of it to the point of abusing or sacrificing it.
Omar Khayyam: Rather one freeman bind with chains of love than set a thousand
prisoned captives free. Seen in that light, this is almost an overturning of the dialectic of
domination, a paradoxical inversion of the master-slave relationship. In the past, the
master was the one who was exposed to death, and could gamble with it. The slave was
the one deprived of death and destiny, the one doomed to survival and labour. How do
things stand today? We, the powerful, sheltered now from death and overprotected on
all sides, occupy exactly the position of the slave; whereas those whose deaths are at
their own disposal, and who do not have survival as their exclusive aim , are the ones
who today symbolically occupy the position of master.
We have internalized the blackmail of security, encasing ourselves in cellophane to
ensure our shelf lives. This view reduces the body to a diseased object in need of
protection and insurance, making life nothing more than a process of continual
mortification.
Baudrillard 76 (Jean, certified badass, Symbolic Exchange and Death, pp. 177-180,
Sage Publications, LB)
Security is another form of social control, in the form of life blackmailed with the
afterlife. It is universally present for us today, and 'security forces' range from life
assurance and social security to the car seatbelt by way of the state security police force.
'Belt up' says an advertising slogan for seatbelts. Of course, security, like ecology, is an
industrial business extending its cover up to the level of the species: a convertibility of

accident, disease and pollution into capitalist surplus profit is operative everywhere . But
this is above all a question of the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you
of your own death, which everybody dreams of, as the darkness beneath their instinct of
conservation. It is necessary to rob everyone of the last possibility of giving themselves
their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system. Again, in
this symbolic short-circuit, the gift-exchange is the challenge to oneself and one's own
life, and is carried out through death. Not because it expresses the individual's asocial
rebellion (the defection of one or millions of individuals does not infringe the law of the
system at all), but because it carries in it a principle of sociality that is radically
antagonistic to our own social repressive principle. To bury death beneath the contrary
myth of security, it is necessary to exhaust the gift-exchange. Is it so that men might live
that the demand for death must be exhausted? No, but in order that they die the only
death the system authorises: the living are separated from their dead, who no longer
exchange anything but the form of their afterlife, under the sign of comprehensive
insurance. Thus car safety mummified in his helmet, his seatbelt, all the paraphernalia
of security , wrapped up in the security myth, the driver is nothing but a corpse, closed
up in another, non-mythic, death , as neutral and objective a s technology, noiseless and
expertly crafted. Riveted to his machine, glued to the spot in it, he no longer runs the
risk of dying, since he is already dead. This is the secret of security, like a steak under
cellophane : to surround you with a sarcophagus in order to prevent you from dying Our
whole technical culture creates an artificial milieu of death . It is not only armaments
that remain the general archetype of material production , but the simplest machine
around us constitutes a horizon of death, a death that will never be resolved because it
has crystallised beyond reach . fixed capital of death, where the living labour of death
has frozen over, as the labour force is frozen in fixed capital and dead labour. In other
words, all material production is merely a gigantic 'character armour' by means of which
the species means to keep death at a respectful distance . Of course, death itself
overshadows the species and seals it into the armour the species thought to protect itself
with . Here again , commensurate with an entire civilisation , we find the image of the
automobile-sarcophagus: the protective armour is just death miniaturised and become a
technical extension of your own body The biologisation of the body and the
technicisation of the environment go hand in hand in the same obsessional neurosis.
The technical environment is our over-production of pollutant, fragile and obsolescent
objects. For production lives, its entire logic and strategy are articulated on fragility and
obsolescence . An economy of stable products and good objects is indispensable: the
economy develops only by exuding danger, pollution, usury, deception and haunting.
The economy lives only on the suspension of death that it maintains throughout
material production , and through renewing the available death stocks , even if it means
conjuring it up by a security build up: blackmail and repression . Death is definitively
secularised in material production, where it is reproduced on a large scale as capital.
Even our bodies, which have become biological machinery, are modelled on this
inorganic body, and therefore become, at the same time , a bad object, condemned to
disease , accident and death. Living by the production of death, capital has an easy time
producing security' it's the same thing. Security is the industrial prolongation of death,

just as ecology is the industrial prolongation of pollution . A few more bandages on the
sarcophagus. This is also true of the great institutions that are the glory of our
democracy' Social Security is the social prosthesis of a dead society (,Social Security is
death ! ' - May '68) , that is to say, a society already exterminated in all its symbolic
wheels, in its deep system of reciprocities and obligations, which means that neither the
concept of security nor that of the 'social' ever had any meaning. The 'social' begins by
taking charge of death . It's the same story as regards cultures that have been destroyed
then revived and protected as folklore (d. M. de Certeau, ' La beaute du mort' [in La
culture au pluriel, Paris: UGE, 1 974]) . The same goes for life assurance, which is the
domestic variant of a system which everywhere presupposes death as an axiom . The
social translation of the death of the group - each materialising for the other only as
social capital indexed on death. Death is dissuaded at the price of a continual
mortification : such is the paradoxical logic of security In a Christian context, ascesis
played the same role. The accumulation of suffering and penitence was able to play the
same role as character armour, as a protective sarcophagus against hell. And our
obsessional compulsion for security can be interpreted as a gigantic collective ascesis, an
anticipation of death in life itself: from protection into protection, from defence to
defence, crossing all jurisdictions, institutions and modern material apparatuses, life is
no longer anything but a doleful, defensive book-keeping, locking every risk into its
sarcophagus. Keeping the accounts on survival, instead of the radical compatibility of
life and death. Our system lives off the production of death and pretends to manufacture
security. An about-face? Not at all, just a simple twist in the cycle whose two ends meet.
That an automobile firm remodels itself on the basis of security (like industry on antipollution measures) without altering its range, objectives or products shows that
security is only a question of exchanging terms. Security is only an internal condition of
the reproduction of the system when it reaches a certain level of expansion, just as
feedback is only an internal regulating procedure for systems that have reached a certain
point of complexity.

1nc
Interpretation the oceans are distinct from the seabed floor that lies
beneath them
MarBEF 13 (Marine Biodiversity and Ecosystem Functioning, funded by the
European Union, open oceans, http://www.marbef.org/wiki/open_oceans,
accessed 7/7/14)
The open oceans or pelagic ecosystems are the areas away from the coastal boundaries
and above the seabed. It encompasses the entire water column of the seas and the
oceans and lies beyond the edge of the continental shelf. It extends from the tropics to
the polar regions and from the sea surface to the abyssal depths. It is a highly
heterogeneous and dynamic habitat. Physical processes control the biological activities
and lead to substantial geographic variability in production.
Violation the Aff increases exploration and/or development in the seabed
not the ocean they are ecologically and legally distinct
Berkman 11 (July 2011, Paul Berkman is head of the Arctic Ocean
Geopolitics Programme at the Scott Polar Research Institute, University of
Cambridge, and research professor at Bren School of Environmental
Science & Management, Race for the Arctic: Let the North Pole be a pole of
peace, http://www.global-briefing.org/2011/07/let-the-north-pole-be-a-pole-ofpeace/, accessed 7/3/14)
In considering ways to shore up peace in the Arctic Ocean, it is useful to draw a clear
distinction between the sea floor (Figure 2a) and the overlying water column (Figure
2b). Ecologically and legally distinct, the sea floor and overlying water column reveal
alternative jurisdictional configurations for Arctic and non-Arctic nations alike to share
in strategies that can both promote cooperation and prevent conflict in the Arctic Ocean.
Standards
a. Limits the topic is already massive they allow the Aff to do anything
in the entire mass of ocean water and do anything to explore or develop
the seabed because exploration and development mean nothing, a
strict interpretation of oceans is the only way to limit a realistically
unmanageable topic.
b. Topic Education they shift the focus of debates to seabed development
instead of genuine ocean development, which kills predictable clash and
core topic learning.
c. Extra Topicality its not okay for the Aff to develop both the ocean and
the seabed. If we win that seabed exploration/development is distinct
then its not within the gambit of Aff topical fiat.
Topicality is a voting issue competitive equity and jurisdiction

Storage
Anti-terror effort increasing- key to peace
CBS News 10 (4/13, African Army Chiefs Unites Against Desert Terrorism,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/13/ap/africa/main6391626.shtml, MAT)
(AP) ALGIERS, Algeria (AP) - Army chiefs from seven African nations gathered Tuesday
in Algiers to coordinate efforts against a regional al-Qaida offshoot and arms and drugs
traffickers that roam across their porous common borders in the Sahara. Their goal is to
boost cross-border patrols and surveillance, so that al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, or
AQIM, and other criminal groups can't increase their footprint over the no man's land
stretching across the Sahara, the world's largest desert. Army chiefs of staff are
"discussing issues of defense and common security, to lift possible misunderstandings
and establish a common strategy against migratory threats," said Gen. Ahmed Gaid
Salah, the Algerian army chief of staff and meeting host, according to the state news
agency APS. Other nations attending included Libya, Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso,
and Mauritania. All join borders in the Sahara and the sprawling semi-desert region to
its south, known as the Sahel, an area the size of western Europe regularly plagued by
insecurity and local rebellions. The threat has increased since AQIM, formed in 2006,
reached beyond its bases in northern Algeria to other African nations, where it has taken
dozens of tourists hostage and has increasingly bonded with traffickers. The army
summit in Algiers follows a similar meeting last week by intelligence chiefs. "It's a very
important step toward regional security," said Mhand Berkouk, a Sahara specialist who
teaches international relations at Algiers University. He said Algeria is wooing Nigeria to
join the group, because AQIM has increasingly been recruiting among Islamist
extremists there, and because Nigeria is the only other country in the region to have a
significant air force that could help patrol the zone. "The real challenge has been how
terrorists have teamed up with organized crime," said Berkouk. While arms traffickers
have long operated in the region, the Sahara has now also become a route for cocaine
and hashish transit. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and others say South
American traffickers land large cargos on the west African coast, from where the drugs
are then shipped to Europe via the desert. DEA agents posing as rebels from Colombia
recently nabbed three suspected traffickers in Mali, whom they say were operating with
ties to AQIM. While the al-Qaida offshoot's business is expanding in the desert, its cells
in northern Algeria continue to regularly target government forces. A bomb injured a
police officer and another was defused this month in the Kabylie region east of Algiers,
where seven security guards were also slain in a terrorist ambush. AQIM was suspected
in both incidents. Algerian media reported Tuesday that the army had launched one of
its largest-ever offensives against terror camps in northern Algeria. The operation,
labeled "en-Nasr," or victory, targets some 300 known terrorists, the Liberte daily
newspaper reported, quoting anonymous security officers. Officials could not comment
on the operation because an Algerian emergency law bans security officers from talking
to journalists on the record.

No nuclear terrorwe cite better experts

Pinker, 11 [Steven, professor of psychology at Harvard University, The Better Angels of
our Nature Why Violence Has Declined, ISBN: 067002295, for online access email
alexanderdpappas@gmail.com and I will forward you the full book]
Though conventional terrorism, as John Kerry gaffed, is a nuisance to be policed rather
than a threat to the fabric of life, terrorism with weapons of mass destruction would be
something else entirely. The prospect of an attack that would kill millions of people is
not just theoretically possible but consistent with the statistics of terrorism. The
computer scientists Aaron Clauset and Maxwell Young and the political scientist
Kristian Gleditsch plotted the death tolls of eleven thousand terrorist attacks on log-log
paper and saw them fall into a neat straight line.261 Terrorist attacks obey a power-law
distribution, which means they are generated by mechanisms that make extreme events
unlikely, but not astronomically unlikely. The trio suggested a simple model that is a bit
like the one that Jean-Baptiste Michel and I proposed for wars, invoking nothing fancier
than a combination of exponentials. As terrorists invest more time into plotting their
attack, the death toll can go up exponentially: a plot that takes twice as long to plan can
kill, say, four times as many people. To be concrete, an attack by a single suicide
bomber, which usually kills in the single digits, can be planned in a few days or weeks.
The 2004 Madrid train bombings, which killed around two hundred, took six months to
plan, and 9/11, which killed three thousand, took two years.262 But terrorists live on
borrowed time: every day that a plot drags on brings the possibility that it will be
disrupted, aborted, or executed prematurely. If the probability is constant, the plot
durations will be distributed exponentially. (Cronin, recall, showed that terrorist
organizations drop like flies over time, falling into an exponential curve.) Combine
exponentially growing damage with an exponentially shrinking chance of success, and
you get a power law, with its disconcertingly thick tail. Given the presence of weapons of
mass destruction in the real world, and religious fanatics willing to wreak untold
damage for a higher cause, a lengthy conspiracy producing a horrendous death toll is
within the realm of thinkable probabilities. A statistical model, of course, is not a crystal
ball. Even if we could extrapolate the line of existing data points, the massive terrorist
attacks in the tail are still extremely (albeit not astronomically) unlikely. More to the
point, we cant extrapolate it. In practice, as you get to the tail of a power-law
distribution, the data points start to misbehave, scattering around the line or warping it
downward to very low probabilities. The statistical spectrum of terrorist damage
reminds us not to dismiss the worst-case scenarios, but it doesnt tell us how likely they
are. So how likely are they? What do you think the chances are that within the next five
years each of the following scenarios will take place? (1) One of the heads of state of a
major developed country will be assassinated. (2) A nuclear weapon will be set off in a
war or act of terrorism. (3) Venezuela and Cuba will join forces and sponsor Marxist
insurrection movements in one or more Latin American countries. (4) Iran will provide
nuclear weapons to a terrorist group that will use one of them against Israel or the

United States. (5) France will give up its nuclear arsenal. I gave fifteen of these scenarios
to 177 Internet users on a single Web page and asked them to estimate the probability of
each. The median estimate that a nuclear bomb would be set off (scenario 2) was 0.20;
the median estimate that a nuclear bomb would be set off in the United States or Israel
by a terrorist group that obtained it from Iran (scenario 4) was 0.25. About half the
respondents judged that the second scenario was more likely than the first. And in doing
so, they committed an elementary blunder in the mathematics of probability. The
probability of a conjunction of events (A and B both occurring) cannot be greater than
the probability of either of them occurring alone. The probability that you will draw a
red jack has to be lower than the probability that you will draw a jack, because some
jacks you might draw are not red. Yet Tversky and Kahneman have shown that most
people, including statisticians and medical researchers, commonly make the error.263
Consider the case of Bill, a thirty-four-year-old man who is intelligent but also
unimaginative, compulsive, and rather dull. In school he was strong in mathematics but
undistinguished in the arts and humanities. What are the chances that Bill plays jazz
saxophone? What are the chances that he is an accountant who plays jazz saxophone?
Many people give higher odds to the second possibility, but the choice is nonsensical,
because there are fewer saxophone-playing accountants than there are saxophone
players. In judging probabilities, people rely on the vividness of their imaginations
rather than thinking through the laws. Bill fits the stereotype of an accountant but not of
a saxophonist, and our intuitions go with the stereotype. The conjunction fallacy, as
psychologists call it, infects many kinds of reasoning. Juries are more likely to believe
that a man with shady business dealings killed an employee to prevent him from talking
to the police than to believe that he killed the employee. (Trial lawyers thrive on this
fallacy, adding conjectural details to a scenario to make it more vivid to a jury, even
though every additional detail, mathematically speaking, ought to make it less
probable.) Professional forecasters give higher odds to an unlikely outcome that is
presented with a plausible cause (oil prices will rise, causing oil consumption to fall)
than to the same outcome presented naked (oil consumption will fall).264 And people
are willing to pay more for flight insurance against terrorism than for flight insurance
against all causes.265 You can see where Im going. The mental movie of an Islamist
terrorist group buying a bomb on the black market or obtaining it from a rogue state and
then detonating it in a populated area is all too easy to play in our minds eye. Even if it
werent, the entertainment industry has played it for us in nuclear terrorist dramas like
True Lies, The Sum of All Fears, and 24. The narrative is so riveting that we are apt to
give it a higher probability than we would if we thought through all the steps that
would have to go right for the disaster to happen and multiplied their
probabilities. Thats why so many of my survey respondents judged an Iran-sponsored
nuclear terrorist attack to be more probable than a nuclear attack. The point is not that
nuclear terrorism is impossible or even astronomically unlikely. It is just that the
probability assigned to it by anyone but a methodical risk analyst is likely to be too high.
What do I mean by too high? With certainty and more probable than not strike me
as too high. The physicist Theodore Taylor declared in 1974 that by 1990 it would be too
late to prevent terrorists from carrying out a nuclear attack.266 In 1995 the worlds

foremost activist on the risks of nuclear terrorism, Graham Allison, wrote that under
prevailing circumstances, a nuclear attack on American targets was likely before the
decade was out.267 In 1998 the counterterrorism expert Richard Falkenrath wrote that
it is certain that more and more non-state actors will become capable of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons acquisition and use.268 In 2003 UN ambassador
John Negroponte judged that there was a high probability of an attack with a weapon
of mass destruction within two years. And in 2007 the physicist Richard Garwin
estimated that the chance of a nuclear terrorist attack was 20 percent per year, or about
50 percent by 2010 and almost 90 percent within a decade.269 Like television weather
forecasters, the pundits, politicians, and terrorism specialists have every incentive
to emphasize the worst-case scenario. It is undoubtedly wise to scare governments
into taking extra measures to lock down weapons and fissile material and to monitor
and infiltrate groups that might be tempted to acquire them. Overestimating the risk,
then, is safer than underestimating itthough only up to a point, as the costly invasion
of Iraq in search of nonexistent weapons of mass destruction proves. The professional
reputations of experts have proven to be immune to predictions of disasters that never
happen, while almost no one wants to take a chance at giving the all-clear and ending up
with radioactive egg on his face.270 A few brave analysts, such as Mueller, John
Parachini, and Michael Levi, have taken the chance by examining the disaster scenarios
component by component.271 For starters, of the four so-called weapons of mass
destruction, three are far less massively destructive than good old-fashioned
explosives.272 Radiological or dirty bombs, which are conventional explosives
wrapped in radioactive material (obtained, for example, from medical waste), would
yield only minor and short-lived elevations of radiation, comparable to moving to a city
at a higher altitude. Chemical weapons, unless they are released in an enclosed space
like a subway (where they would still not do as much damage as conventional
explosives), dissipate quickly, drift in the wind, and are broken down by sunlight.
(Recall that poison gas was responsible for a tiny fraction of the casualties in World War
I.) Biological weapons capable of causing epidemics would be prohibitively expensive to
develop and deploy, as well as dangerous to the typically bungling amateur labs that
would develop them. Its no wonder that biological and chemical weapons, though far
more accessible than nuclear ones, have been used in only three terrorist attacks in
thirty years.273 In 1984 the Rajneeshee religious cult contaminated salad in the
restaurants of an Oregon town with salmonella, sickening 751 people and killing none.
In 1990 the Tamil Tigers were running low on ammunition while attacking a fort and
opened up some chlorine cylinders they found in a nearby paper mill, injuring 60 and
killing none before the gas wafted back over them and convinced them never to try it
again. The Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo failed in ten attempts to use biological
weapons before releasing sarin gas in the Tokyo subways, killing 12. A fourth attack, the
2001 anthrax mailings that killed 5 Americans in media and government offices, turned
out to be a spree killing rather than an act of terrorism. Its really only nuclear weapons
that deserve the WMD acronym. Mueller and Parachini have fact-checked the various
reports that terrorists got just this close to obtaining a nuclear bomb and found that all
were apocryphal. Reports of interest in procuring weapons on a black market grew

into accounts of actual negotiations, generic sketches morphed into detailed blueprints,
and flimsy clues (like the aluminum tubes purchased in 2001 by Iraq) were
overinterpreted as signs of a development program. Each of the pathways to nuclear
terrorism, when examined carefully, turns out to have gantlets of improbabilities. There
may have been a window of vulnerability in the safekeeping of nuclear weapons in
Russia, but today most experts agree it has been closed, and that no loose nukes are
being peddled in a nuclear bazaar. Stephen Younger, the former director of nuclear
weapons research at Los Alamos National Laboratory, has said, Regardless of what is
reported in the news, all nuclear nations take the security of their weapons
very seriously.274 Russia has an intense interest in keeping its weapons out of the
hands of Chechen and other ethnic separatist groups, and Pakistan is just as worried
about its archenemy Al Qaeda. And contrary to rumor, security experts consider the
chance that Pakistans government and military command will fall under the control of
Islamist extremists to be essentially nil.275 Nuclear weapons have complex interlocks
designed to prevent unauthorized deployment, and most of them become radioactive
scrap metal if they are not maintained.276 For these reasons, the forty-seven-nation
Nuclear Security Summit convened by Barack Obama in 2010 to prevent nuclear
terrorism concentrated on the security of fissile material, such as plutonium and highly
enriched uranium, rather than on finished weapons. The dangers of filched fissile
material are real, and the measures recommended at the summit are patently wise,
responsible, and overdue. Still, one shouldnt get so carried away by the image of garage
nukes as to think they are inevitable or even extremely probable. The safeguards that are
in place or will be soon will make fissile materials hard to steal or smuggle, and if they
went missing, it would trigger an international manhunt. Fashioning a workable nuclear
weapon requires precision engineering and fabrication techniques well beyond the
capabilities of amateurs. The Gilmore commission, which advises the president and
Congress on WMD terrorism, called the challenge Herculean, and Allison has
described the weapons as large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and
inefficient.277 Moreover, the path to getting the materials, experts, and facilities in
place is mined with hazards of detection, betrayal, stings, blunders, and bad luck. In his
book On Nuclear Terrorism, Levi laid out all the things that would have to go right for a
terrorist nuclear attack to succeed, noting, Murphys Law of Nuclear Terrorism: What
can go wrong might go wrong.278 Mueller counts twenty obstacles on the path and
notes that even if a terrorist group had a fifty-fifty chance of clearing every one, the
aggregate odds of its success would be one in a million. Levi brackets the range
from the other end by estimating that even if the path were strewn with only ten
obstacles, and the probability that each would be cleared was 80 percent, the aggregate
odds of success facing a nuclear terrorist group would be one in ten. Those are not our
odds of becoming victims. A terrorist group weighing its options, even with these overly
optimistic guesstimates, might well conclude from the long odds that it would better off
devoting its resources to projects with a higher chance of success. None of this, to
repeat, means that nuclear terrorism is impossible, only that it is not, as so many people
insist, imminent, inevitable, or highly probable.

War in the modern era exists more in the image of it being fought than in
reality; wars are conducted via public opinion polls, the media, and so on,
with military action just as an afterthought. To avoid war, we must oppose
its simulation to give it authority through images is to make it real.
Baudrillard in 94 [Jean, The Illusion of the End p. 62-65]
When the prospect of an atomic clash disappeared once and for all , when it got lost in
space with Star Wars, it had to be tested in simulated form, in a miniature war-game
where the possibility of annihilating the enemy could be checked out. But,
symptomatically, care was taken not to go that far: Saddam, who will, in the end, have
been nothing but that fairground dummy you shoot at from point-blank range, had to
be saved. It was just a second-hand scenario. So this military 'orgy' wasn't an orgy at
all. It was an orgy of simulation, the simulation of an orgy. A German word sums all
this up very well: Schwindel, which means both giddiness and swindle, loss of
consciousness and mystification. The Americans fought the same war in respect of
world opinion -via the media, censorship, CNN, etc. - as they fought on the
battlefield. They used the same 'fuel air' explosives in the media, where they draw all
the oxygen out of public opinion. The amnesia about it is, in itself, a confirmation of
the unreality of this war. Overexposed to the media, underexposed to memory. Builtin obsolescence, as with any consumer article. . . Forgetting is built into the event
itself in the profusion of information and details, just as obsolescence is built into the
object in the profusion of useless accessories. If you take one-thousandth of what you
see on the TV news to heart, you're done for. But television protects us from this. Its
immunizing, prophylactic use protects us from an unbearable responsibility. Its effect
and its images self-destruct in the mind. So is this the zero degree of communication?
Certainly, it is: people fear communication like the plague. There was no exulting
after the Gulf War either (and yet, it was a victory, wasn't it?). There was, rather, a
flight into amnesia and hypocrisy. A botched operation, even in surgical terms: its
labours produced nothing, even the two hundred thousand dead produced nothing,
apart from that marvellous miscarriage, the New World Order. It was a war without
results, but not without an aftermath. Once past the dilemma of the reality/unreality
of the war, we are back in the pure and simple reality of political ignominy, in the
most odious Realpolitik: the Shi'ites, the Kurds, the calculated survival of Saddam ...
Here, the most fervent defenders of the war's reality end up conceding that perhaps
nothing has in fact happened. But they prejudge this from the absence of an outcome;
they do not judge the event itself. Which shows them to be just as much engaged in
Realpolitik as anyone else. The question is not whether one is for or against war, but
whether one is for or against the reality of war. Analysis must not be sacrificed to the
expression of anger. It has to be directed in its entirety against reality, against
manifestness - here against the manifest reality of this war. The Stoics contest the
very self-evidence of pain, when the body's confusion is at its height. Here, we must
contest the very self-evidence of war, when the confusion of the real is at its height.
We must hit out at the weak point of reality. It's too late afterwards: you're stuck with
the 'acts of violence', stuck in realist abjection. In a little time, as we get some
distance from it, or even now, with a little imagination, it will be possible to read La

guerre du Golfe n'a pas eu lieu * as a science-fiction novel, as the anticipation, right in
the thick of things, of the event as a fictional scenario - something into which it will
surely be turned later. Like Borges' chronicling of cultures which never existed. By
making transparent the non-event of the war, you give it force in the imagination somewhere other than in the 'real time' of news where it simply peters out. You give
force to the illusion of war, rather than become an accesssory to its false reality.
Anyhow, the book has fallen - quite logically - into the same black hole as the war. It
has faded as quickly as the event whose absence it denounced. It was a successful
non-event, like the Agency, like appearing on television. All this is as it should have
been since it dealt with something which did not take place. It was the simulacrum of
Helen that was at the heart of the Trojan War. The Egyptian priests had held on to the
original (we do not know what became of it) when she set out again with Paris for
Troy. But, even without the magic of the priests, Helen was in any case merely a
simulacrum, since the universal form of beauty is as unreal as gold, the universal
form of all commodities. Every universal form is a simulacrum, since it is the
simultaneous equivalent of all the others - something it is impossible for any real
being to be. There are many analogies between the Trojan and Gulf wars. Before the
expedition, Menelaus called all the warriors of the Greek world to arms, just as Bush
did with all the nations of the 'free world'. The incubation period of the war was very
long (seven years in the case of Troy, seven months for the Gulf War) and the final
phase was very rapid in both cases. The Greek victory was won at great cost to the
victors, whom the gods punished relentlessly (the murder of Agamemnon,
Clytaemnestra, Orestes, etc.). What will be the fate of the 'victors' of the Gulf War?
Admittedly, this time the war did not take place. This difference leaves the Americans
some hope, the gods having no real cause to avenge themselves. If the Helen of the
Trojan War was a simulacrum, what was the Gulf War's Helen? Where was there
simulacrum here, except in the simulacrum of war itself ?

Advantage 2
Multiple alt causes to Asian stability
UN 6 (United Nations, Sixty-first session August 2006, Request for the inclusion of a
supplementary item in the agenda of the sixty-first session: A proactive role for the
United Nations in maintaining peace and security in East Asia,
http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:sjdJQwBI0UJ:www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/public/Data/681698871.doc+asean+
%22east+asia
%22+war+resolution+mediation&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a)
Rapid economic and trade development in East Asia has depended upon peace in the
region, and whether or not growth continues relies heavily upon the maintenance of this
peace and security. However, long-standing potential threats to East Asian peace and
security, which include such issues as ethnic tensions, historical hatred and territorial
disputes, have not been properly removed, and some of them have openly surfaced. In
addition, there are new factors for potential conflict and other non-traditional threats to
security, such as competition for energy and other resources, terrorism and
environmental degradation, which could trigger regional political confrontations and
even military conflicts. While these are causing much uncertainty in East Asia, what
concerns us more is that multilateral cooperation mechanisms in the region only play a
very limited role in security issues, and have no function with regard to collective
military security. Hence the region cannot cope effectively with the ever-more
complicated security challenges.
China will take threatening action now because of the way the U.S. has
represented it.
Pan 2004
Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of
Arts, at Deakin University, August 2004, Discourses Of China In International
Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 207-208
My critical analysis of Western IR literature on China in the previous two chapters might
well be objected to for the reason that it ignores the hard facts on the ground. For
example, liberal scholars may point out that the opportunity for convergence is clearly real,
for the Chinese themselves are talking about opening up, global integration, and joining track
with international norms. Similarly, realist observers may contend that because the
Chinese are caught up with nationalist fervour and realpolitik ideas and busy with military
build-up and sabre-rattling in the Taiwan Strait, the China threat is more than just a
discursive construct. To some extent, these observers are right. Both the China threat and
China as opportunity theses have certain empirical qualities, and they were so
acknowledged in the previous two chapters. Having said that, however, I want to suggest

that the existence of the threat or opportunity reality in China says more about the selffulfilling consequences of Western discourse as social construction than about its
objective truth status. In other words, these trends are not pregiven, but have much to do
with the very ways in which China has been so constructed by Western discursive
practice. More specifically, in the first half of this chapter, I want to illustrate how Chinas
transformation into a more responsible member in the international community is largely a
product of the Western liberal conception of it, which is in many ways self-fulfilling in
practice. I argue, moreover, that this self-fulfilling prophecy also has its own limitations and
paradoxical implications for Chinas foreign relations. Thus, in spite of, or perhaps because
of, its shaping power on Chinese perceptions and foreign behaviour, this discourse is unlikely
to remake a homogeneous China in the image of the West. In the second half, I will look at
how the Western realist discourse on China proves to be also a self-fulfilling prophecy with
even more dangerous practical implications. But first let me begin with the constitutive
influence of the (neo)liberal discourse on China.

Russian threat constructions are rooted in western racism

Jger, Norweigan Institute of International Affairs and the Copenhagen Peace Research
Institute, 2k
(yvind, Peace and Conflict Studies 7.2, Securitizing Russia: Discoursive Practice of the
Baltic States, http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=18)
The Russian war on Chechnya is one event that was widely interpreted in the Baltic as a
ominous sign of what Russia has in store for the Baltic states (see Rebas 1996: 27;
Nekrasas 1996: 58; Tarand 1996: 24; cf. Haab 1997). The constitutional ban
in all three states on any kind of association with post-Soviet political
structures is indicative of a threat perception that confuses Soviet and postSoviet, conflating Russia with the USSR and casting everything Russian as a
threat through what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) call a
discursive "chain of equivalence". In this the value of one side in a binary opposition is
reiterated in other denotations of the same binary opposition. Thus, the value "Russia" in a
Russia/Europe-opposition is also denoted by "instability", "Asia", "invasion", "chaos",
"incitement of ethnic minorities", "unpredictability", "imperialism", "slander
campaign", "migration", and so forth. The opposite value of these markers ("stability",
"Europe", "defence", "order", and so on) would then denote the Self and thus conjure up an
identity. When identity is precarious, this discursive practice intensifies by shifting onto a
security mode, treating the oppositions as if they were questions of political existence,
sovereignty, and survival. Identity is (re)produced more effectively when the oppositions are
employed in a discourse of in-security and danger, that is, made into questions of
national security and thus securitised in the Wverian sense. In the Baltic
cases, especially the Lithuanian National Security Concept is knitting a chain
of equivalence in a ferocious discourse of danger. Not only does it establish
"[t]hat the defence of Lithuania is total and unconditional," and that

"[s]hould there be no higher command, self-controlled combat actions of

armed units and citizens shall be considered legal." (National Security
Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 1, 2) It also posits that [t]he power of civic
resistance is constituted of the Nations Will and self-determination to fight
for own freedom, of everyone citizens resolution to resist to [an] assailant or
invader by all possible ways, despite citizens age and [or] profession, of
taking part in Lithuanias defence (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch.
7, Sc. 4). When this is added to the identifying of the objects of national
security as "human and citizen rights, fundamental freedoms and personal
security; state sovereignty; rights of the nation, prerequisites for a free
development; the state independence; the constitutional order; state
territory and its integrity, and; cultural heritage," and the subjects as "the
state, the armed forces and other institutions thereof; the citizens and their
associations, and; non governmental organisations,"(National Security
Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 2, Sc. 1, 2) one approaches a conception of security in which the
distinction between state and nation has disappeared in all-encompassing securitisation.
Everyone is expected to defend everything with every possible means. And when the list of
identified threats to national security that follows range from "overt (military)
aggression", via "personal insecurity", to "ignoring of national
values,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 10) the National Security
Concept of Lithuania has become a totalising one taking everything to be a
question of national security. The chain of equivalence is established when
the very introduction of the National Security Concept is devoted to a
denotation of Lithuanias century-old sameness to "Europe" and resistance to
"occupation and subjugation" (see quotation below), whereby Russia is
depicted and installed as the first link in the discursive chain that follows. In
much the same way the "enemy within" came about in Estonia and Latvia.
As the independence-memory was ritualised and added to the sense of
insecurity already fed by confusion in state administration, legislation and
government policy grappling not only with what to do but also how to do it
given the inexperience of state institutions or their absence unity behind
the overarching objective of independence receded for partial politics and
the construction of the enemy within. This is what David Campbell (1992) points out
when he sees the practices of security as being about securing a precarious state identity. One
way of going about it is to cast elements on the state inside resisting the privileged identity as the
subversive errand boys of the prime external enemy.
You are the catastrophe market, trading suffering for the ballot and in the
worst form of academic imperialism, you make it inevitable
Baudrillard 94
(Jean, certified badass, Illusion of the End, 1994, LB)
We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the
'other half of the world' [['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and
sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than
oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution

which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the
spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide
appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this
not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their
destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of
history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source. We have
here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is
now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral
predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material
exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of
peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media
nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a
'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing
stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste
and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the wasteproduct of its own history. The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest
of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw
materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection,
humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The
last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the
New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground . Thus,
the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the
Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the
second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work
of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and
catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact,
merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market );
there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we
see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to
the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West. In our defence, it might be said
that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that
we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the
world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its
crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a
sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of
the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in
the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as
the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the
resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is
no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern
Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an
aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed,
they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit
this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural

resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic
cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral
mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its
continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to
now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But
when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point , in accordance with the
implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on
it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they
can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to
produce its own catastrophe for itself , in order to meet its need for spectacle and that
voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious
appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished
sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great
Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we
are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the
other half of the world. Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The
Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the
distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich
world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and
ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other
most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt
to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously
overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in
return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd
financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much
greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural
catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a
veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures.
They feed off images and will continual to replicate them so longer as they
are deemed profitable
Baudrillard, 94 (Jean, The Illusion of the End, 1994, LB)
In the case of the Romanian revolution, it was the faking of the dead in Timisoara which
aroused a kind of moral indignation and raised the problem of the scandal of
'disinformation' or, rather, of information itself as scandal. It was not the dead that were
the scandal, but the corpses being pressed into appearing before the television cameras,
as in the past dead souls were pressed into appearance in the register of deaths . It was
their being taken hostage, as it were, and our being held hostage too, as mystified TV
viewers. Being blackmailed by violence and death, especially in a noble and
revolutionary cause, was felt to be worse than the violence itself, was felt to be a parody
of history. All the media live off the presumption of catastrophe and of the succulent
imminence of death. A photo in Liberation, for example, shows us a convoy of refugees
'which, some time after this shot was taken, was to be attacked by the Iraqi army'.

Anticipation of effects, morbid simulation, emotional blackmail. It was the same on

CNN with the arrival of the Scuds. Nothing is news if it does not pass through that
horizon of the virtual, that hysteria of the virtual - not in the psychological sense, but in
the sense of a compulsion for what is presented, in all bad faith, as real to be consumed
as unreal. In the past, to show something up as a fake, we said: 'It's just play-acting', 'It's
all romance!', 'It's put on for the cameras!'. This time, with Romania and the Gulf War,
we were able to say, 'It's just TV!' Photographic or cinema images still pass through the
negative stage (and that of projection), whereas the TV image, the video image, digital
and synthetic, are images without a negative, and hence without negativity and without
reference. They are virtual and the virtual is what puts an end to all negativity, and thus
to all reference to the real or to events. At a stroke, the contagion of images, engendering
themselves without reference to a real or an imaginary, itself becomes virtually without
limits, and this limitless engendering produces information as catastrophe. Is an image
which refers only to itself still an image? However this may be, that image raises the
problem of its indifference to the world, and thus of our indifference to it - which is a
political problem. When television becomes the strategic space of the event, it sets itself
up as a deadly self-reference, it becomes a bachelor machine. The real object is wiped
out by news not merely alienated, but abolished. All that remains of it are traces on a
monitoring screen. Many Romanian eyewitness accounts speak of being dispossessed of
the event in this way, deprived of the lived experience they have of it by being
submerged in the media network, by being placed under house arrest in front of their
television screens. Spectators then become exoterics of the screen, living their revolution
as an exoticism of images, themselves exogenous, touristic spectators of a virtual
history. From the moment the studio becomes the strategic centre, and the screen the
only site of appearance, everyone wants to be on it at all costs, or else gathers in the
street in the glare of the cameras, and these, indeed, actually film one another. The
street becomes an extension of the studio, that is, of the non-site of the event, of the
virtual site of the event. The street itself becomes a virtual space. Site of the definitive
confusion of masses and medium, of the real-time confusion of act and sign. There is no
will to communicate in all this. The only irresistible drive is to occupy this non-site, this
empty space of representation which is the screen. Representation (political
representation too) is currently a trough of depression - meteorological depression which the media fill up with their turbulences, with the same consequences as occur
when any kind of space is suddenly depressurized. The highest pressure of news
corresponds to the lowest pressure of events and reality [Ie reel].The same unrealism in
the Ceausescu trial. It is not the judicial procedure itself which is scandalous but the
video tape, unacceptable as the only, bloodless trace of a bloody event. In the eyes of the
whole world, this will remain an event forever suspect, for the sole reason of its strangely obscene - scenic abduction. This hidden jury, its voice striking out against the
accused, these defendants we are forced to see even though they are virtually dead, these
dead prisoners shot a second time to meet the needs of news. One might even wonder
whether the actors in this staged event were not deliberately trying to make themselves
seem suspect in the eyes of world opinion, as though playing at sabotaging their image.
At the same time, the Ceausescu trial was pulled off perfectly as a video production,

betraying a sharp sense of the image function, the blackmail-function, the deterrencefunction. Deep down, the intuitive grasp of these things has grown more sophisticated
over there, in the shadow of dictatorship, than it has with us. We have nothing to teach
them. For, if the Romanians themselves got high on this media speculation which served
them as a revolutionary aphrodisiac, they also dragged all the Western media into the
same news demagogy. By manipulating themselves, they caused us spontaneously to
swallow their fiction. We bear the same responsibility as they do. Or, rather, there is no
responsibility anywhere. The question of responsibility cannot even be raised. It is the
evil genius of news which promotes such staging. When information gets mixed in with
its source, then, as with sound waves, you get a feedback effect - an effect of interference
and uncertainty. When demand is maximal (and everywhere today the demand for
events is maximal), it short-circuits the initial situation and produces an uncontrollable
response effect. That is, ultimately, why we do the Romanians an injustice when we
accuse them of manipulation and bad faith. No one is responsible. It is all an effect of
the infernal cycle of credibility. The actors and the media sensed obscurely that the
events in Eastern Europe had to be given credibility, that that revolution had to be lent
credibility by an extra dose of dead bodies. And the media themselves had to be lent
credibility by the reference to the people. Leading to a vicious circle of credibility, the
result of which is the decredibilizing of the revolution and the events themselves. The
logical sequence of news and history turns back against itself, bringing, in its cyclical
movement, a kind of deflation of historical consciousness. The Americans did just the
same in the Gulf War. By the excessive nature of their deployment and stagecraft, by
putting their power and news control so extravagantly to the test, they decredibilized
both war and news. They were the Ubus of their wn power, just as the Romanians were
the Ubus of their own mpotence. Excess itself engenders the parody which invalidates
the facts. And, just as the principle of economics is wrecked by financial speculation, so
the principle of politics [Ie politique] and history is wrecked by media speculation.
Economic rationality allows for the worst form of violence capitalism is
no longer the trading of the real but the symbolic that turns the case
Bifo 11
(Franco, pretty clever scholar, activist and Marxist, After the Future, 2011, LB)
More than ever, economic rationality is at odds with social rationality. Economic science
is not part of the solution to the crisis: it is the source of the problem. On July 18th 2009
the headline of The Economist read: What went wrong with economics? The text is an
attempt to downplay the crisis of the Economics profession, and of economic
knowledge. For neoliberal economists the central dogma of growth, profit and
competition cannot be questioned, because it is identified with the perfect mathematical
rationality of the market. And belief in the intrinsic rationality of the market is crucial in
the economic theology of neoliberalism. But the reduction of social life to the rational
exchange of economic values is an obsession that has nothing to do with science. Its a
political strategy aimed to identify humans as calculating machines, aimed to shape
behavior and perception in such a way that money becomes the only motivation of

social action. But it is not accurate as a description of social dynamics, and the conflicts,
pathologies, and irrationality of human relationships. Rather, it is an attempt at creating
the anthropological brand of homo calculans that Foucault (2008) has described in his
seminar of 1979/80, published with the title The Birth of Biopolitics. This attempt to
identify human beings with calculating devices has produced cultural devastation, and
has finally been showed to have been based upon flawed assumptions. Human beings do
calculate, but their calculation is not perfectly rational, because the value of goods is not
determined by objective reasons, and because decisions are influenced by what Keynes
named animal spirits. We will never really understand important economic events
unless we confront the fact that their causes are largely mental in nature, say Akerlof
and Shiller (2009: 1) in their book Animal Spirits, echoing Keyness assumption that the
rationality of the market is not perfect in itself. Akerlof and Shiller are avowing the crisis
of neoliberal thought, but their critique is episteme. Animal Spirits is the title of an other
book, by Matteo Pasquinelli (2008). Pasquinellis book deals with bodies and digits, and
parasites, and goes much deeper in its understanding of the roots of the crisis than its
eponymous publication: Cognitive capitalism emerges in the form of a parasite: it
subjects social knowledge and inhibits its emancipatory potential (Pasquinelli 2008:
93). Beyond the computer screen, precarious workers and freelancers experience how
Free Labor and competition are increasingly devouring their everyday life (Pasquinelli
2008: 15). Pasquinelli goes to the core of the problem: the virtualization of social
production has acted as the proliferation of a parasite, destroying the prerequisites of
living relationships, absorbing and neutralizing the living energies of cognitive workers.
The economic recession is not only the effect of financial craziness, but also the effect of
the de-vitalization of the social field. This is why the collapse of the economic system is
also the collapse of economic epistemology that has guided the direction of politics in
the last two centuries. Economics cannot understand the depth of the crisis, because
below the crisis of financial exchange there is the crisis of symbolic exchange. I
mean the psychotic boom of panic, depression, and suicide, the general decline of desire
and social empathy. The question that rises from the collapse is so radical that the
answer cannot be found in the economic conceptual framework. Furthermore, one must
ask if economics really is a science? If the word science means the creation of concepts
for the understanding and description of an object, economics is not a science. Its object
does not exist. The economic object (scarcity, salaried labor, and profit) is not an object
that exists before and outside the performative action of the economic episteme.
Production, consumption, and daily life become part of the economic discourse when
labor is detached and opposed to human activity, when it falls under the domination of
capitalist rule. The economic object does not pre-exist conceptual activity, and economic
description is in fact a normative action. In this sense Economics is a technique, a
process of semiotization of the world, and also a mythology, a narration. Economics is a
suggestion and a categorical imperative: Money makes things happen. It is the source of
action in the world and perhaps the only power we invest in. Life seems to depend on it.
Everything within us would like to say that it does not, that this cannot be. But the
Almighty Dollar has taken command. The more it is denied the more it shows
itself as Almighty. Perhaps in every other respect, in every other value, bankruptcy

has been declared, giving money the power of some sacred deity, demanding to be
recognized. Economics no longer persuades money to 111 behave. Numbers cannot
make the beast lie down and be quiet or sit up and do tricks. At best, economics is a
neurosis of money, a symptom contrived to hold the beast in abeyance. Thus
economics shares the language of psychopathology inflation, depression, lows and
highs, slumps and peaks, investments and losses. (Sordello 1983) From the age of the
enclosures in England the economic process has been a process of production of scarcity
(scarcification). The enclosures were intended to scarcify the land, and the basic means
of survival, so that people who so far had been able to cultivate food for their family
were forced to become proletarians, then salaried industrial workers. Capitalism is
based on the artificial creation of need, and economic science is essentially a technique
of scarcification of time, life and food. Inside the condition of scarcity human beings are
subjected to exploitation and to the domain of profit-oriented activity. After scarcifying
the land (enclosures) capitalism has scarcified time itself, forcing people who dont have
property other than their own life and body, to lend their life-time to capital. Now the
capitalist obsession for growth is making scarce both water and air. Economic science is
not the science of prediction: it is the technique of producing, implementing, and
pushing scarcity and need. This is why Marx did not speak of economy, but of political
economy. The technique of economic scarcification is based on a mythology, a narration
that identifies richness as property and acquisition, and subjugates the possibility of
living to the lending of time and to the transformation of human activity into salaried
work. In recent decades, technological change has slowly eroded the very foundations of
economic science. Shifting from the sphere of production of material objects to the
semiocapitalist production of immaterial goods, the Economic concepts are losing their
foundation and legitimacy. The basic categories of Economics are becoming totally
artificial. The theoretical justification of private property, as you read in the writings of
John Locke, is based on the need of exclusive consumption. An apple must be
privatized, if you want to avoid the danger that someone else eats your apple. But what
happens when goods are immaterial, infinitely replicable without cost? Thanks to
digitalization and immaterialization of the production process, the economic nomos of
private property loses its ground, its raison detre, and it can be imposed only by force.
Furthermore, the very foundation of salary, the relationship between time needed for
production and value of the product, is vanishing. The immaterialization and
cognitivization of production makes it almost impossible to quantify the average time
needed to produce value. Time and value become incommensurable, and violence
becomes the only law able to determine price and salary. The neoliberal school, which
has opened the way to the worldwide deregulation of social production, has fostered the
mythology of rational expectations in economic exchange, and has touted the idea of a
self-regulation of the market, first of all the labor-market. But self-regulation is a lie. In
order to increase exploitation, and to destroy social welfare, global capitalism has used
political institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO), not to mention the military enforcement of the political decisions
of these institutions. Far from being self-regulated, the market is militarily regulated.
The mythology of free individuals loyally competing on the base of perfect knowledge of

the market is a lie, too. Real human beings are not perfect rational calculating machines.
And the myth of rational expectations has finally crashed after the explosion of the real
estate mortgage bubble. The theory of rational expectation is crucial in neoliberal
thought: the economic agents are supposed to be free to choose in a perfectly rational
way the best deal in selling and buying. The fraud perpetrated by the investment
agencies has destroyed the lives of millions of Americans, and has exposed the
theoretical swindle. Economic exchange cannot be described as a rational game , because
irrational factors play a crucial role in social life in general. Trickery, misleading
information, and psychic manipulation are not exceptions, but the professional tools of
advertisers, financial agents, and economic consultants. The idea that social
relationships can be described in mathematical terms has the force of myth, but it is not
science, and it has nothing to do with natural law. Notwithstanding the failure of the
theory, neoliberal politics are still in control of the global machine, because the criminal
class that has seized power has no intention of stepping down, and because the social
brain is unable to recompose and find the way of self-organization. I read in the New
York Times on September 6th 2009: After the mortgage business imploded last year,
Wall Street investment banks began searching for another big idea to make money. They
think they may have found one. The bankers plan to buy life settlements, life
insurance policies that ill and elderly people sell for cash, depending on the life
expectancy of the insured person. Then they plan to securitize these policies, in Wall
Street jargon, by packaging hundreds of thousands together into bonds. They will then
resell those bonds to investors, like big pension funds, who will receive the payouts
when people with the insurance die. The earlier the policyholder dies, the bigger the
return, though if people live longer than expected investors could get poor returns or
even lose money. Imagine that I buy an insurance policy on my life (something I would
absolutely not do). My insurer of course will wish me a long life, so Ill pay the fee for a
long time, while he should pay lots of money to my family if I 113 die. But some
enlightened finance guru has the brilliant idea of insuring the insurer. He buys the risk,
and he invests on the hope that I die soon. You dont need the imagination of Philip K.
Dick to guess the follow up of the story: financial agents will be motivated to kill me
overnight. The talk of recovery is based on necronomy, the economy of death. Its not
new, as capitalism has always profited from wars, slaughters and genocides. But now the
equation becomes unequivocal. Death is the promise, death is the investment and the
hope. Death is the best future that capitalism may secure . The logic of speculation is
different from the logic of spectacle that was dominant in late-modern times. Spectacle
is the mirrorization of life, the transfer of life in the mirror of spectacular accumulation.
Speculation is the subjugation of the future to its financial mirror, the substitution of
present life with future money that will never come, because death will come before. The
lesson that we must learn from the first year of the global recession is sad: neoliberal
folly is not going away, the financial plungers will not stop their speculation, and
corporations will not stop their exploitation, and the political class, largely controlled by
the corporate lobbies, is unwilling or unable to protect society from the final assault. In
1996 J. G. Ballard (1996: 188) wrote: the most perfect crime of all when the
victims are either willing, or arent aware that they are victims. Democracy

seems unable to stop the criminal class that has seized control of the economy, because
the decisions are no longer made in the sphere of political opinion, but in the
inaccessible sphere of economic automatism. The economy has been declared the basic
standard of decision, and the economists have systematically identified Economy with
the capitalist obsession of growth. No room for political choice has been left, as the
corporate principles have been embedded in the technical fabric of language and
imagination.

2nc

K
Deathmaking DA
Bjork 92 (Rebecca, Past Coach and Debater, Symposium: Women in Debate:
Reflections on the Ongoing Struggle, 1992 - Effluents and affluence: The Global
Pollution Debate, LB)
While reflecting on my experiences as a woman in academic debate in preparation
for this essay, I realized that I have been involved in debate for more than half of my
life. I debated for four years in high school, for four years in college, and I have been
coaching intercollegiate debate for nine years. Not surprisingly, much of my identity
as an individual has been shaped by these experiences in debate. I am a person who
strongly believes that debate empowers people to be committed and involved
individuals in the communities in which they live. I am a person who thrives on the
intellectual stimulation involved in teaching and traveling with the brightest
students on my campus. I am a person who looks forward to the opportunities for
active engagement of ideas with debaters and coaches from around the country. I am
also, however, a college professor, a "feminist," and a peace activist who is
increasingly frustrated and disturbed by some of the practices I see being
perpetuated and rewarded in academic debate. I find that I can no longer separate
my involvement in debate from the rest of who I am as an individual. Northwestern I
remember listening to a lecture a few years ago given by Tom Goodnight at the
University summer debate camp. Goodnight lamented what he saw as the debate
community's participation in, and unthinking perpetuation of what he termed the
"death culture." He argued that the embracing of "big impact" arguments--nuclear
war, environmental destruction, genocide, famine, and the like-by debaters and
coaches signals a morbid and detached fascination with such events, one that views
these real human tragedies as part of a "game" in which so-called "objective and
neutral" advocates actively seek to find in their research the "impact to outweigh all
other impacts"--the round-winning argument that will carry them to their goal of
winning tournament X, Y, or Z. He concluded that our "use" of such events in this
way is tantamount to a celebration of them; our detached, rational discussions
reinforce a detached, rational viewpoint, when emotional and moral outrage may be
a more appropriate response. In the last few years, my academic research has led me
to be persuaded by Goodnight's unspoken assumption; language is not merely some
transparent tool used to transmit information, but rather is an incredibly powerful
medium, the use of which inevitably has real political and material consequences.
Given this assumption, I believe that it is important for us to examine the "discourse
of debate practice:" that is, the language, discourses, and meanings that we, as a
community of debaters and coaches, unthinkingly employ in academic debate. If it is
the case that the language we use has real implications for how we view the world,
how we view others, and how we act in the world, then it is imperative that we
critically examine our own discourse practices with an eye to how our language does
violence to others. I am shocked and surprised when I hear myself saying things like,
"we killed them," or "take no prisoners," or "let's blow them out of the water." I am

tired of the "ideal" debater being defined as one who has mastered the art of verbal
assault to the point where accusing opponents of lying, cheating, or being
deliberately misleading is a sign of strength. But what I am most tired of is how
women debaters are marginalized and rendered voiceless in such a discourse
community. Women who verbally assault their opponents are labeled "bitches"
because it is not socially acceptable for women to be verbally aggressive. Women who
get angry and storm out of a room when a disappointing decision is rendered are
labeled "hysterical" because, as we all know, women are more emotional then men. I
am tired of hearing comments like, "those 'girls' from school X aren't really
interested in debate; they just want to meet men." We can all point to examples
(although only a few) of women who have succeeded at the top levels of debate. But I
find myself wondering how many more women gave up because they were tired of
negotiating the mine field of discrimination, sexual harassment, and isolation they
found in the debate community. As members of this community, however, we have
great freedom to define it in whatever ways we see fit. After all, what is debate except
a collection of shared understandings and explicit or implicit rules for interaction?
What I am calling for is a critical examination of how we, as individual members of
this community, characterize our activity, ourselves, and our interactions with others
through language. We must become aware of the ways in which our mostly hidden
and unspoken assumptions about what "good" debate is function to exclude not only
women, but ethnic minorities from the amazing intellectual opportunities that
training in debate provides. Our nation and indeed, our planet, faces incredibly
difficult challenges in the years ahead. I believe that it is not acceptable anymore for
us to go along as we always have, assuming that things will straighten themselves
out. If the rioting in Los Angeles taught us anything, it is that complacency breeds
resentment and frustration. We may not be able to change the world, but we can
change our own community, and if we fail to do so, we give up the only real power
that we have.
Double bind either the aff's impacts have too short a timeframe for the
round to spillover or they're not true and FIAT is an independent reason
to vote negative overstretches the will and causes limitless nihilism
Antonio 1995 [Robert; Professor of Sociology at the University of Kansas;
Nietzsches Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History; American
Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995]
While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of
autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals)
in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross
fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others,
asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed
in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but
actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social
self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the

social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness."

Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing
overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and
unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do
(Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous
rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows,"
"abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and
superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you
genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no
more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell
the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals"
(Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268,
300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine
attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate
in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to
be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94).
Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259)
stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal
while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might
miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is
merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain
compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense
and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and
faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the
fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity).
The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership.
Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and
praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick"
harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born
physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd;
they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all
according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the
masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more
urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god,
prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly
combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled
ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168;
1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).LB

1nr

Storage
No cards

Advantage 2
No cards

Round 6 vs HH Dow

1nc

1nc
The 1acs justified with moralizing politics that distances us from
responsibility
Bauman, 95(Zygmunt, Professor of sociology at the University of Leeds, Life in fragments. Essays in
postmodern Moralities, 1995)
In effect, the focus of moral concerns has been shifted from the self-scrutiny
of the moral actor to the philosophical/political task of working out the
prescriptions and proscriptions of an ethical code; meanwhile the
responsibility for the responsibilitythat is the responsibility for deciding that
practical steps the responsibility requires to be taken and what steps are not called for
(go beyond the call of duty)has been shifted from the moral subject to supraindividual agencies now endowed with exclusive ethical authority. From the
moral actors points of view, the shift has much to be commended. (Indeed, this shift
was one of the main reasons why the surrender of autonomy could be credibly
represented as emancipation and increase of freedom). Having reduced the vague
notoriously under defined responsibility to a finite list of duties or obligations,
it spares the actor a lot of anxious groping in the dark, and helps to avoid the
gnawing feeling that the account can never be closed, the work never finally done. The
agony of choice (Hannah Arendts tyranny of possibilities) is largely gone, as is the
bitter aftertaste of a choice never ultimately proved right. The substitution of rulefollowing for the intense, yet never really successful, listening to infuriatingly taciturn,
moral impulses, results in the almost unimaginable feat of not just absolving
the actor from the personal responsibility for the wrongs done, but freeing
the actor from the very possibility of having sinned. More promptly than the
equivalent religious remediesbecause in advance, before the act has been
committedthe guilt is eliminated from choice, which is now simplified to the
straightforward dilemma of obedience or disobedience to the rule. All in all,
the modern shift from moral responsibility to ethical ruling offered a compensatory
drug for an ailment induced by another modern accomplishment: the foiling of many
determines threat once kept the actors actions within tight and strictly circumscribed
limits, so producing an unencumbered, disembodied personality that is allowed. ( and
forced to) self-define and self-assert. To the moral self, modernity offered freedom
complete with patented ways of escaping it. In what are commonly called postmodern
times the modern ailment of autonomy persists, while the compensatory drug is not
longer available on the National Ethical Service prescriptions. It can be purchased only
in the free market, in the thick of the cutthroat publicity war between drug companies
calling each others bluff, extolling their own products and undercutting the claims of
the competition. With the state ethical monopoly (and indeed, the states desire for
monopoly) in abeyance, and the supply of ethical rules by and large privatized and
abandoned to the care of the marketplace, the tyranny of choice returns, though this
time it taxes not so much the moral competence, as the shopping skills of the actor. The
actor is responsible not for the contents with which the responsibility has

been filled, but for the choice of an ethical code from among many, each of
which ports expert endorsement and/or the
Thats cause inevitable violence and prevents us from embracing ethics
Bauman, 95(Zygmunt, Professor of sociology at the University of Leeds, Life in fragments. Essays in
postmodern Moralities, 1995)
(Reject the gendered language)**
Such conditionsconditions without which there would be no camps and no genocide,
conditions which turned the unthinkable into realityare accomplishments of our
modern civilization, and in particular of three features which underlie, simultaneously,
its glory and its misery: the ability to act at a distance, the neutralization of the
moral constraints of action, and its gardening posturethe pursuit of
artificial, rationally designed order. That one can kill today without ever
looking the victim in the face, is a banal observation. Once sinking a knife into
the body, or strangling, or shooting at close distance have been replaced with
moving dots over a computer screenjust like one does in amusement
arcade games or on the screen of a portable Nintendothe killer does not need to
be pitiless; he does not have the occasion to feel pity. This is, however, the most
obvious and trivial, even if the most dramatic, aspect of action at a distance. The less
dramatic and spectacular manifestations of our new, modern, skills of distant action are
more consequential yetall the more so for not being so evident. They consist in
creating what may be called a social and psychological, rather than a merely physical
and oplical, distance between actors and the targets of their actions. Such social
psychological distance is produced an reproduced daily, and ubiquitously, and on a
massive scale, by the modern management of action, with its three different, yet
complementary aspects. First, in a modern organization every personally performed
action is a mediated action, and every actor is cast in what Stanley Milgram called the
magnetic state: almost no actor ever has a chance to develop the authorship attitude
towards the final outcome of the operation, since each actor is but an executor of a
command and giver of another; not a writer, but a translator of someone elses
intentions. Second, there is the horizontal, functional division of the overall task:
each actor has but a specific, self-contained job to perform and produces an
object with no written-in destination, no information on its future uses; no
contribution seems to determine the final outcome of the operation, and most retain
but a tenuous logical link with the ultimate effecta link which the
participants may be in good conscience claim to be visible only in retrospect.
Third, the targets of the operation, the people who by design or by default are
affected by it, hardly ever appear to the actors as total human beings, objects
of moral responsibility and ethical subjects themselves. As Michael Schluter and David
Lee wittily yet aptly observed, in order to be seen at the higher levels you have to be
broken up into bits and most of you thrown away. As a result, most actors in

organizations deal not with human beings, but with facets, features,
statistically represented traits; while only total human persons can be
bearers or moral significance. The global impact of all these aspects of
modern organization is what I have called borrowing the term from the vocabulary of
the medieval Churchthe moral adiaphorization of action: for all practical
purposes, the moral significance of the ultimate and combined effect of
individual actions is excluded from the criteria by which individual actions
any measure. And so the latter are perceived and experienced as morally
neutral. More exactly out with the same effect. The fragmentation of the objects of
action is replicated by the fragmentation of actors. The vertical and horizontal
division of the global operation into partial jobs makers every actor into a roleperformer. Unlike the person, the role-performer is an eminently replaceable and
exchangeable incumbent of a site in the complex network of tasksthere is always a
certain impersonality, a distance, a less-than-authorship relationship between the roleperformer and the role performed. In none of the roles is the role-performer a whole
person, as each roles performance engages but a selection of the actors skills and
personality features, and in principle should neither engage the remaining parts nor
spill over and affect the rest of the actors personality. This again makes the roleperformance ethically adiophoric: only total persons, only unique persons
(unique in the sense of being irreplaceable in the sense that the deed would remain
undone without them) can be moral subjects, bearers of moral responsibility
but modern organization derives its strength from its uncanny capacity for
splitting the fragmentation, while on the other hand providing occasions for the
fragments to come together again has never been modern organizations forte. Modern
organization is the rule of nobody. It is, we may say, a contraption to the float
responsibilitymost conspicuously, moral responsibility.
Alt: Reject the affs justification of moral assistance --- individualism is the
best way to solve
Bauman, 95(Zygmunt, Professor of sociology at the University of Leeds, Life in fragments. Essays in
postmodern Moralities, 1995)
One modern possible interpretation of what is happening is that post-modernity
preserves the precious gain of modernitythe unencumbered autonomy of the actor
while simultaneously removing the price tag and the strings that modernity attacked to
it. Now, at long last, you may eat your cake and have it too. (Or, rather, as cakes tend to
get stale and unappetizing faster than beforeyou may eat your cake and recycle it .)
Post modernity (or, more appropriately still in this context, late modernity), one hears
time and again, is the ultimate crowing of the modern dream of freedom and of the long
and tortuous effort to make the dream come true. So let us celebrate the world
unencumbered by imagined obligations and fake duties. With universal
principles and absolute truths dissipated or kicked out of fashion, it does not matter

much anymore what personal principles and private truth one embraces (the embrace
must be never tight anyway) and follows (the following need not be too loyal and
committed, to be sure). Does it or does it not matter?this is the question. And it
remains a questionperhaps the crucial, constitutive question of postmodern (late
modern) life. One might say with considerable conviction that precisely the opposite to
the postmodernist account of post modernity is the case; that the demise of the
power-assisted universals and absolutes has made the
responsibilities of the actor more profound and, indeed, more
consequential, than ever before. One might say with still greater conviction, that,
between the demise of universal absolutes and absolute universals on the other hand
and everything goes license on the other. One would rather say that it is precisely
because of the demise of the allegedly unified and ostensibly unique ethical code,
that the regulative idea of moral responsibility may rise into full flight . Choices
between good and evil are still to be made, this time, however, in full daylight,
and with full knowledge that a choice has been made. With the smokescreen
of centralized legislation dispersed and the power-of-attorney returned to the
signatory, the choice is blatantly left to the moral persons own devices. With
choice comes responsibility. And if choice is inevitable, responsibility is unavoidable.
Will this new condition make us do good things more often than before and evil things
less often? Will it make better beings? Neither a yes nor a no answer can be
responsibly given to those questions. As always, the moral situation is one of inherent
ambivalence and would not be moral without a choice between good and vil. What this
new condition does spell out, however, is the prospect of a greater
awareness of the moral character of our choice, and seeing their moral
content more clearly.

1nc
The judge should affirm the 1ac without their use of the state
There is no connection between the recommendations of the 1AC and
material agency.
Schlag 90 (Pierre, professor of law at the University of Colorado, Stanford Law
Review, lexis, AM)
In fact, normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even
though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do
it. For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference
principle n31 into effect, or to restructure [*179] the doctrinal corpus of the first
amendment? "In the future, we should. . . ." When was the last time you were in a
position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic
republicans, or Hercules surrogates? Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly
concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its
own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and
resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences,
normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical
purposes, its only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a few law students -persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative
advice into effect.
The question of what should be done is the wrong questiontheir
description of the status quo as a fixed, describable place is a lie. Talking in
terms of should is pointless and guarantees fascism.
Schlag 91 (Pierre, Professor of Law at the University of Colorado, 139 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, April, Heinonline, AM)
For these legal thinkers, it will seem especially urgent to ask once again: 'What should
be done? How should we live? What should the law be? These are the hard questions.
These are the momentous questions. And they are the wrong ones. They are wrong
because it is these very normative questions that reprieve legal thinkers from
recognizing the extent to which the cherished "ideals" of legal academic thought are
implicated in the reproduction and maintenance of precisely those ugly "realities" of
legal practice the academy so routinely condemns. It is these normative questions that
allow legal thinkers to shield themselves from the recognition that their work product
consists largely of the reproduction of rhetorical structures by which human beings can
be coerced into achieving ends of dubious social origin and implication. It is these very
normative questions that allow legal academics to continue to address (rather lamely)
bureaucratic power structures as if they were rational, morally competent, individual
humanist subjects. It is these very normative questions that allow legal thinkers to
assume blithely that-in a world ruled by HMOs, personnel policies, standard operating

procedures, performance requirements, standard work incentives, and productivity

monitoring they somehow have escaped the bureaucratic power games. It is these
normative questions that enable them to represent themselves as whole and intact, as
self-directing individual liberal humanist subjects at once rational, morally competent,
and in control of their own situations, the captain of their own ships, the Hercules of
their own empires, the author of their own texts. It isn't so.5 And if it isn't so, it would
seem advisable to make some adjustments in the agenda and practice of legal thought.
That is what I will be trying to do here. Much of what follows will no doubt seem
threatening or nihilistic to many readers. In part that is because this article puts in
question the very coherence, meaningfulness, and integrity of the kinds of normative
disputes and discussion that almost all of us in the legal academy practice.
It absolves us of our personal responsibilities because we rely on the state
to solve problems link turns the aff
Kappeler, 95- (Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)
We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and
diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and
politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective
irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and
where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal
acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential
responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are
indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to
command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their
decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of
responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power
take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our
own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our
apparent `powerlessness and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political
disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel
secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say,
the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such
events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for
the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into
thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own
judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own
sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any
relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections
between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that
we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent
lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also
individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and
unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major

powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war,
because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the
major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned
with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of ` What
would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister
or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the
only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell
there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter
out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no
possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously
desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the
UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war',
`I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral
revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or
participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `noncomprehension: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for
working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological
current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the
advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you',
our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' our
readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one
of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its
violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our
feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war
and violence. destining of revealing insofar as it pushes us in a certain direction.
Heidegger does not regard destining as determination (he says it is not a fate which
compels), but rather as the implicit project within the field of modern practices to
subject all aspects of reality to the principles of order and efficiency, and to pursue
reality down to the finest detail. Thus, insofar as modern technology aims to order and
render calculable, the objectification of reality tends to take the form of an increasing
classification, differentiation, and fragmentation of reality. The possibilities for how
things appear are increasingly reduced to those that enhance calculative activities.
Heidegger perceives the real danger in the modern age to be that human beings will
continue to regard technology as a mere instrument and fail to inquire into its essence.
He fears that all revealing will become calculative and all relations technical, that the
unthought horizon of revealing, namely the concealed background practices that make
technological thinking possible, will be forgotten. He remarks: The coming to presence
of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will
be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the
unconcealedness of standing-reserve. (QT, 33) 10 Therefore, it is not technology, or
science, but rather the essence of technology as a way of revealing that constitutes the
danger; for the essence of technology is existential, not technological. 11 It is a matter
of how human beings are fundamentally oriented toward their world vis a vis
their practices, skills, habits, customs, and so forth. Humanism contributes to this

danger insofar as it fosters the illusion that technology is the result of a collective human
choice and therefore subject to human control. 12

1nc

The affirmative regurgitates the suffering of the Makah Tribe in exchange

for the ballot which creates the most unethical form of academia
Baudrillard 96 (jean, perfect crime, 1996, LB)
Our reality: that is the problem. We have only one, and it has to be saved. `We have to
do something. We can't do nothing.' But doing something solely because you can't not
do something has never constituted a principle of action or freedom. Just a form of
absolution from one's own impotence and compassion for one's own fate. The people of
Sarajevo do not have to face this question. Where they are, there is an absolute need to
do what they do, to do what has to be done. Without illusion as to ends and without
compassion towards themselves. That is what being real means, being in the real. And
this is not at all the `objective' reality of their misfortune, that reality which `ought not
to exist' and for which we feel pity, but the reality which exists as it is -- the reality of an
action and a destiny. This is why they are alive, and we are the ones who are dead. This
is why, in our own eyes, we have first and foremost to save the reality of the war and
impose that -- compassionate -- reality on those who are suffering from it but who, at
the very heart of war and distress, do not really believe in it. To judge by their own
statements, the Bosnians do not really believe in the distress which surrounds them. In
the end, they find the whole unreal situation senseless, unintelligible. It is a hell, but an
almost hyperreal hell, made the more hyperreal by media and humanitarian
harassment, since that makes the attitude of the whole world towards them all the more
incomprehensible. Thus, they live in a kind of spectrality of war -- and it is a good thing
they do, or they could never bear it. But we know better than they do what reality is,
because we have chosen them to embody it. Or simply because it is what we -- and the
whole of the West -- most lack. We have to go and retrieve a reality for ourselves where
the bleeding is. All these `corridors' we open up to send them our supplies and our
`culture' are, in reality, corridors of distress through which we import their force and
the energy of their misfortune. Unequal exchange once again. Whereas they find a kind
of additional strength in the thorough stripping-away of the illusions of reality and of
our political principles -- the strength to survive what has no meaning -- we go to
convince them of the `reality' of their suffering -- by culturalizing it, of course, by
theatricalizing it so that it can serve as a point of reference in the theatre of Western
values, one of which is solidarity. This all exemplifies a situation which has now become
general, in which inoffensive and impotent intellectuals exchange their woes for those of
the wretched, each supporting the other in a kind of perverse contract -- exactly as the
political class and civil society exchange their respective woes today, the one serving up
its corruption and scandals, the other its artificial convulsions and inertia. Thus we saw
Bourdieu and the Abb Pierre offering themselves up in televisual sacrifice, exchanging
between them the pathos-laden language and sociological metalanguage of
wretchedness. And so, also, our whole society is embarking on the path of
commiseration in the literal sense, under cover of ecumenical pathos. It is almost as

though, in a moment of intense repentance among intellectuals and politicians, related

to the panic-stricken state of history and the twilight of values, we had to replenish the
stocks of values, the referential reserves, by appealing to that lowest common
denominator that is human misery, as though we had to restock the hunting grounds
with artificial game. A victim society. I suppose all it is doing is expressing its own
disappointment and remorse at the impossibility of perpetrating violence upon itself.
The New Intellectual Order everywhere follows the paths opened up by the New World
Order. The misfortune, wretchedness and suffering of others have every-- where become
the raw material and the primal scene. Victimhood, accompanied by Human Rights as
its sole funerary ideology. Those who do not exploit it directly and in their own name do
so by proxy. There is no lack of middlemen, who take their financial or symbolic cut in
the process. Deficit and misfortune, like the international debt, are traded and sold on in
the speculative market -- in this case the politico- intellectual market, which is quite the
equal of the late, unlamented military--industrial complex. Now, all commiseration is
part of the logic of misfortune [malheur]. To refer to misfortune, if only to combat it, is
to give it a base for its objective repro-- duction in perpetuity. When fighting anything
whatever, we have to start out -- fully aware of what we are doing -- from evil, never
from misfortune. And the theatre of the transparence of Evil is truly there -- at Sarajevo.
The repressed canker which corrupts all the rest, the virus of which Europe's paralysis is
already the symptom. Europe's furniture is being salvaged at the GATT talks, but it is
being burned at Sarajevo. In a sense, this is a good thing. The specious, sham Europe,
the Europe botched up in the most hypocritical upheavals, is scuppering itself at
Sarajevo. And, in this sense, we might almost see the Serbs as providing the unofficial
litmus test, as demystifying that phantom Europe -- the Europe of technodemocratic
politicians who are as triumphalist in their speeches as they are deliquescent in their
actions. But that is not, in fact, what is really going on here. The real story is that the
Serbs, as the vehicles of ethnic cleansing, are at the forefront of the construction of
Europe. For it is being constructed, the real Europe, the white Europe, a Europe
whitewashed, integrated and purified, morally as much as economically or ethnically. It
is being victoriously constructed at Sarajevo and, in this sense, what is happening there
is not an accident at all, but a logical, ascendant phase in the New European Order, that
subsidiary of the New World Order, everywhere characterized by white fundamentalism,
protectionism, discrimination and control. It is said that if we just leave things to
happen at Sarajevo, we shall be the next to get it. But we already have got it. All the
European countries are undergoing ethnic cleansing. This is the real Europe, taking
shape in the shadow of the Parliaments, and its spearhead is Serbia.
The impact is disempowerment the 1acs call for the ballot allows the
system to simulate its own death their commodification of suffering is a
form of perverse capital expenditure that negates their ability to
effectualize material change
Baudrillard 90 (Jean, Simulacra and Simulations, slim_)

The conjunction of the system and its extreme alternative like two ends of a curved
mirror, the "vicious" curvature of a political space henceforth magnetized, circularized,
reversibilized from right to lek a torsion that is like the evil demon of commutation, the
whole system, the infinity of capital folded back over its own sur&ce: transfinite? And
isn't it the same with desire and libidinal space? The conjunction of desire and value, of
desire and capital. The conjunction of desire and the law; the ultimate joy and
metamorphosis of the law (which is why it is so well received at the moment): only
capital takes pleasure, Lyotard said, before coming to think that we take pleasure in
capital. Overwhelming versatility of desire in Deleuze: an enigmatic reversal which
brings this desire that is "revolutionary by itself, and as if involuntarily, in wanting what
it wants," to want its own repression and to invest paranoid and fascist systems? A
malign torsion which reduces this revolution of desire to the same fundamental
ambiguity as the other, historical revolution. All the referentials intermingle their
discourses in a circular, Moebian compulsion. Not so long ago sex and work were
savagely opposed terms: today both are dissolved into the same type of demand.
Formerly the discourse on history took its force from opposing itself to the one on
nature, the discourse on desire to the one on power: today they exchange their signifiers
and their scenarios. It would take too long to run through the whole range of operational
negativity, of all those scenarios of deterrence which, like Watergate, try to revive a
moribund principle by simulated scandal, phantasm, murder - a sort of hormonal
treatment by negativity and crisis. It is always a question of proving the real by the
imaginary; proving truth by scandal; proving the law by transgression; proving work by
the strike; proving the system by crisis and capital by revolution; and for that matter
proving ethnology by the dispossession of its object (the Tasaday). Without counting:
proving theater by anti-theater; proving art by anti-art; proving pedagogy by antipedagogy; proving psychiatry by anti-psychiatry, etc., etc. Everything is metamorphosed
into its inverse in order to be perpetuated in its purged form. Every form of power, every
situation speaks of itself by denial, in order to attempt to escape, by simulation of death,
its real agony. Power can stage its own murder to rediscover a glimmer of existence and
legitimacy. Thus with the American presidents: the Kennedys are murdered because
they still have a political dimension. Others - Johnson, Nixon, Ford - only had a right to
puppet attempts, to simulated murders. But they nevertheless needed that aura of an
artificial menace to conceal that they were nothing other than mannequins of power. In
olden days the king (also the god) had to die - that was his strength. Today he does his
miserable utmost to pretend to die, so as to preserve the blessing of power. But even this
is gone. To seek new blood in its own death, to renew the cycle by the mirror of crisis,
negativity and anti-power: this is the only alibi of every power, of every institution
attempting to break the vicious circle of its irresponsibility and its fundamental
nonexistence, of its deja-vu and its deja-mort.

Translating misery into capital is a perverse system of neoimperial

academia---vote negative to reject their cherry-picking of misery and refuse
to engage in the trauma economy
Tomsky 11 (Terri, Ph.D in English from U-British Columbia, postdoctoral fellow in
cultural memory at the University of Alberta From Sarajevo to 9/11: Travelling
Memory and the Trauma Economy, Parallax Volume 17, Issue 4, 2011)
In contrast to the cosmopolitization of a Holocaust cultural memory,1 there exist
experiences of trauma that fail to evoke recognition and subsequently, compassion
and aid. What is it exactly that confers legitimacy onto some traumatic claims and
anonymity onto others? This is not merely a question of competing victimizations,
what geographer Derek Gregory has criticized as the process of cherry-picking
among [ . . . ] extremes of horror, but one that engages issues of the international
travel, perception and valuation of traumatic memory.2 This seemingly arbitrary
determination engrosses the emigre protagonist of Dubravka Ugresics 2004 novel,
The Ministry of Pain, who from her new home in Amsterdam contemplates an
uneven response to the influx of claims by refugees fleeing the Yugoslav wars: The
Dutch authorities were particularly generous about granting asylum to those who
claimed they had been discriminated against in their home countries for sexual
differences, more generous than to the wars rape victims. As soon as word got
round, people climbed on the bandwagon in droves. The war [ . . . ] was
something like the national lottery: while many tried their luck out of genuine
misfortune, others did it simply because the opportunity presented itself.3
Traumatic experiences are described here in terms analogous to social and
economic capital. What the protagonist finds troubling is that some genuine
refugee claimants must invent an alternative trauma to qualify for help: the problem
was that nobodys story was personal enough or shattering enough. Because death
itself had lost its power to shatter. There had been too many deaths.4 In other
words, the mass arrival of Yugoslav refugees into the European Union means that war
trauma risks becoming a surfeit commodity and so decreases in value. I bring up
Ugresics wry observations about traumas marketability because they enable us to
conceive of a trauma economy, a circuit of movement and exchange where
traumatic memories travel and are valued and revalued along the way. Rather than
focusing on the end-result, the winners and losers of a trauma lottery, this article
argues that there is, in a trauma economy, no end at all, no fixed value to any given
traumatic experience. In what follows I will attempt to outline the system of a trauma
economy, including its intersection with other capitalist power structures, in a
way that shows how representations of trauma continually circulate and, in that
circulation enable or disable awareness of particular traumatic experience across
space and time. To do this, I draw extensively on the comic nonfiction of MalteseAmerican writer Joe Sacco and, especially, his retrospective account of newsgathering
during the 19921995 Bosnian war in his 2003 comic book, The Fixer: A Story From
Sarajevo.5 Sacco is the author of a series of comics that represent social life in a

number of the worlds conflict zones, including the Palestinian territories and the
former Yugoslavia. A comic artist, Sacco is also a journalist by profession who has
first-hand experience of the way that war and trauma are reported in the
international media. As a result, his comics blend actual reportage with his
ruminations on the media industry. The Fixer explores the siege of Sarajevo (1992
1995) as part of a larger transnational network of disaster journalism, which also
critically, if briefly, references the September eleventh, 2001 attacks in New York
City. Saccos emphasis on the transcultural coverage of these traumas, with his comic
avatar as the international journalist relaying information on the Bosnian war,
emphasizes how trauma must be understood in relation to international circuits of
mediation and commodification. My purpose therefore is not only to critique
the aesthetic of a travelling traumatic memory, but also to call attention to the
material conditions and networks that propel its travels. Travelling Trauma
Theorists and scholars have already noted the emergence, circulation and effects of
traumatic memories, but little attention has been paid to the travelling itself. This is a
concern since the movement of any memory must always occur within a material
framework. The movement of memories is enabled by infrastructures of power,
and consequently mediated and consecrated through institutions. So, while some
existing theories of traumatic memory have made those determining politics and
policies visible, we still dont fully comprehend the travel of memory in a global age
of media, information networks and communicative capitalism.6 As
postcolonial geographers frequently note, to travel today is to travel in a world
striated by late capitalism. The same must hold for memory; its circulation in this
global media intensive age will always be reconfigured, transvalued and even
commodified by the logic of late capital. While we have yet to understand the
relation between the travels of memory (traumatic or otherwise) and capitalism,
there are nevertheless models for the circulation of other putatively immaterial things
that may prove instructive. One of the best, I think, is the critical insight of Edward
W. Said on what he called travelling theory.7 In 1984 and again in 1994, Said wrote
essays that described the reception and reformulation of ideas as they are
uprooted from an original historical and geographical context and propelled across
place and time. While Saids contribution focuses on theory rather than memory, his
reflections on the travel and transformation of ideas provide a comparison which
helpfully illuminates the similar movements of what we might call travelling trauma.
Ever attendant to the historical specificities that prompt transcultural
transformations, the Travelling Theory essays offers a Vichian humanist reading of
cultural production; in them, Said argues that theory is not given but made. In the
first instance, it emanates out of and registers the sometimes urgent historical
circumstances of its theorist. Subsequently, he maintains, when other scholars take
up the theory, they necessarily interpret it, additionally integrating their own social
and historical experiences into it, so changing the theory and, often, authorizing it in
the process. I want to suggest that Saids birds eye view of the intellectual circuit
through which theory travels, is received and modified can help us appreciate the
movement of cultural memory. As with theory, cultural memories of trauma are lifted

and separated from their individual source as they travel; they are mediated,
transmitted and institutionalized in particular ways, depending on the structure
of communication and communities in which they travel. Said invites his
readers to contemplate how the movement of theory transforms its meanings to such
an extent that its significance to sociohistorical critique can be drastically
curtailed. Using Luka css writings on reification as an example, Said shows how a
theory can lose the power of its original formulation as later scholars take it up
and adapt it to their own historical circumstances. In Saids estimation, Luka
css insurrectionary vision became subdued, even domesticated, the wider it
circulated. Said is especially concerned to describe what happens when such theories
come into contact with academic institutions, which impose through their own
mode of producing cultural capital, a new value upon then. Said suggests
that this authoritative status, which imbues the theory with prestige and the
authority of age, further dulls the theorys originally insurgent message.8
When Said returned to and revised his essay some ten years later, he changed the
emphasis by highlighting the possibilities, rather than the limits, of travelling
theory. Travelling Theory Reconsidered, while brief and speculative, offers a look at
the way Luka css theory, transplanted into yet a different context, can flame [ . . . ]
out in a radical way.9 In particular, Said is interested in exploring what happens
when intellectuals like Theodor Adorno and Franz Fanon take up Luka cs: they
reignite the fiery core of his theory in their critiques of capitalist alienation and
French colonialism. Said is interested here in the idea that theory matters and that as
it travels, it creates an intellectual [ . . . ] community of a remarkable [ . . . ] affiliative
kind.10 In contrast to his first essay and its emphasis on the degradation of
theoretical ideas, Said emphasizes the way a travelling theory produces new
understandings as well as new political tools to deal with violent conditions and
disenfranchized subjects. Travelling theory becomes an intransigent practice that
goes beyond borrowing and adaption.11 As Said sees it, both Adorno and Fanon
refuse the emoluments offered by the Hegelian dialectic as stabilized into resolution
by Luka cs.12 Instead they transform Luka cs into their respective locales as the
theorist of permanent dissonance as understood by Adorno, [and] the critic of
reactive nationalism as partially adopted by Fanon in colonial Algeria.13 Saids set
of reflections on travelling theory, especially his later recuperative work, are
important to any account of travelling trauma, since it is not only the problems of
institutional subjugation that matter; additionally, we need to affirm the occurrence
of transgressive possibilities, whether in the form of fleeting transcultural affinities or
in the effort to locate the inherent tensions within a system where such travel occurs.
What Said implicitly critiques in his 1984 essay is the negative effects of exchange,
institutionalization and the increasing use-value of critical theory as it travels within
the academic knowledge economy; in its travels, the theory becomes practically
autonomous, uncoupled from the theorist who created it and the historical context
from which it was produced. This seems to perfectly illustrate the international circuit
of exchange and valuation that occurs in the trauma economy. In Saccos The Fixer,

for example, it is not theory, but memory, which travels from Bosnia to the West, as
local traumas are turned into mainstream news and then circulated for consumption.
By highlighting this mediation, The Fixer explicitly challenges the politics that make
invisible the maneuvers of capitalist and neoimperial practices. Like Said, Sacco
displays a concern with the dissemination and reproduction of information and its
consequent effects in relation to what Said described as the broader political
world.14 Saids anxiety relates to the academic normativization of theory (a
tame academic substitution for the real thing15), a transformation which, he
claimed, would hamper its uses for society. A direct line can be drawn from
Saids discussion of the circulation of discourse and its (non)political effects, and the
international representation of the 19921995 Bosnian war. The Bosnian war existed
as a guerre du jour, the successor to the first Gulf War, receiving saturation coverage
and represented daily in the Western media. The sustained presence of the media had
much to do with the proximity of the war to European cities and also with the
spectacular visibility of the conflict, particularly as it intensified. The bloodiest
conflict to have taken place in Europe since the Second World War, it displaced two
million people and was responsible for over 150,000 civilian casualties.16 Yet despite
global media coverage, no decisive international military or political action took place
to suspend fighting or prevent ethnic cleansing in East Bosnia, until after the
massacre of Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995. According to Gregory Kent,
western perceptions about the war until then directed the lack of political will within
the international community, since the event was interpreted, codified and dismissed
as an ethnic, civil war and humanitarian crisis, rather than an act of (Serbian)
aggression against (Bosnian) civilians.17 The rather bizarre presence of a large
international press corps, hungry for drama and yet comfortably ensconced
in Sarajevos Holiday Inn amid the catastrophic siege of that city,
prompted Jean Baudrillard to formulate his theory of the hyperreal. In an article for
the Paris newspaper Liberation in 1993, Baudrillard writes of his anger at the
international apathy towards the Bosnian crisis, denouncing it as a spectral war.18
He describes it as a hyperreal hell not because the violence was in a not-so-distant
space, but because of the way the Bosnians were harassed by the [international]
media and humanitarian agencies.19 Given this extensive media coverage, it is
important to evaluate the role of representative discourses in relation to
violence and its after effects. To begin with, we are still unsure of the consequences of
this saturation coverage, though scholars have since elaborated on the racism framing
much of the media discourses on the Yugoslav wars.20 More especially, it is the
celebrity of the Bosnian war that makes a critical evaluation of its current status in
todays media cycle all the more imperative. Bosnias current invisibility is
fundamentally related to a point Baudrillard makes towards the end of his essay:
distress, misery and suffering have become the raw goods circulating in a global age
of commiseration.21 The demand created by a market of a sympathetic, yet
selfindulgent spectators propels the global travel of trauma (or rather, the
memory of that trauma) precisely because Bosnian suffering has a resale value
on the futures markets.22 To treat traumatic memory as currency not only

acknowledges the fact that travelling memory is overdetermined by capitalism;

more pertinently, it recognizes the global system through which traumatic memory
travels and becomes subject to exchange and flux. To draw upon Marx: we can
comprehend trauma in terms of its fungible properties, part of a social relation [that
is] constantly changing with time and place.23 This is what I call the trauma
economy. By trauma economy, I am thinking of economic, cultural, discursive and
political structures that guide, enable and ultimately institutionalize the
representation, travel and attention to certain traumas. The Trauma Economy in Joe
Saccos The Fixer Having introduced the idea of a trauma economy and how it might
operate, I want to turn to Sacco because he is acutely conscious of the way
representations of trauma circulate in an international system. His work exposes the
infrastructure and logic of a trauma economy in war-torn Bosnia and so echoes some
of the points made by Said about the movement of theory. As I examine Saccos
critical assessment of the Bosnian war, I want to bear in mind Saids discussion about
the effects of travel on theory and, in particular, his two contrasting observations:
first, that theory can become commodified and second, that theory enables
unexpected if transient solidarities across cultures. The Fixer takes up the notion of
trauma as transcultural capital and commodity, something Sacco has confronted in
his earlier work on Bosnia.24 The Fixer focuses on the story of Neven, a Sarajevan
local and the fixer of the comics title, who sells his services to international
journalists, including Saccos avatar. The comic is set in 2001, in postwar Sarajevo
and an ethnically partitioned and economically devastated Bosnia, but its narrative
frequently flashes back to the conflict in the mid- 1990s, and to what has been
described as the siege within the siege.25 This refers not just to Sarajevos three and
a half year siege by Serb forces but also to its backstage: the concurrent
criminalization of Sarajevo through the rise of a wartime black market economy from
which Bosniak paramilitary groups profited and through which they consolidated
their power over Sarajevan civilians. In these flashbacks, The Fixer addresses Nevens
experience of the war, first, as a sniper for one of the Bosniak paramilitary units and,
subsequently, as a professional fixer for foreign visitors, setting them up with
anything they need, from war stories and tours of local battle sites to tape recorders
and prostitutes. The contemporary, postwar scenes detail the ambivalent friendship
between Neven and Saccos comic avatar. In doing so, The Fixer spares little detail
about the economic value of trauma: Nevens career as a fixer after all is reliant
on what Sacco terms the flashy brutality of Sarajevos war.26 Even Neven admits
as much to his interlocutor, without irony, let alone compassion: When massacres
happened, Neven once told me, those were the best times. Journalists from
all over the world were coming here.27 The Fixer never allows readers to
forget that Neven provides his services in exchange for hard cash. So while
Neven provides vital indeed for Saccos avatar often the only access to the stories
and traumas of the war, we can never be sure whether he is a reliable witness or
merely an opportunistic salesman. His anecdotes have the whiff of bravura about
them. He expresses pride in his military exploits, especially his role in a sortie that
destroyed several Serb tanks (the actual number varies increasingly each time the tale

is told). He tells Sacco that with more acquaintances like himself, he could have
broken the siege of Sarajevo.28 Nevens heroic selfpresentation is consistently
undercut by other characters, including Saccos avatar, who ironically renames him a
Master in the School of Front-line Truth and even calls upon the reader to assess the
situation. One Sarajevan local remembers Neven as having a big imagination29;
others castigate him as unstable30; and those who have also fought in the war reject
his claims outright, telling Sacco, it didnt happen.31 For Saccos avatar though,
Neven is a godsend.32 Unable to procure information from the other denizens of
Sarajevo, he is delighted to accept Nevens version of events: Finally someone is
telling me how it was or how it almost was, or how it could have been but finally
someone in this town is telling me something.33 This discloses the true value of the
Bosnian war to the Western media: getting the story right factually is less important
than getting it right affectively. The purpose is to extract a narrative that evokes an
emotional (whether voyeuristic or empathetic) response from its audience. Here we
see a good example of the way a traumatic memory circulates in the trauma economy,
as it travels from its site of origin and into a fantasy of a reality. Nevens mythmaking
whether motivated by economic opportunism, or as a symptom of his own
traumatized psyche reflects back to the international community a counter-version
of mediated events and spectacular traumas that appear daily in the Western media.
It is worth adding that his mythmaking only has value so long as it occurs within
preauthorized media circuits. When Neven attempts to bypass the international
journalists and sell his story instead directly to a British magazine, the account of his
wartime action against the 43 tanks is rejected on the basis that they dont print
fiction.34 The privilege of revaluing and re-narrating the trauma is reserved for
people like Saccos avatar, who has no trouble adopting a mythic and hyperbolic
tone in his storytelling: it is he, Neven, who has walked through the valley of the
shadow of death and blown things up along the way.35 Yet Nevens urge to
narrate, while indeed part of his job, is a striking contrast to the silence of
other locals. When Sacco arrives in Sarajevo in 2001 for his follow-up story, he finds
widespread, deliberate resistance to his efforts to gather first-hand testimonies.
Wishing to uncover the citys terrible secrets, Sacco finds his research has stalled,
as locals either refuse to meet with him or cancel their appointments.36 The
suspiciousness and hostility Sacco encounters in Sarajevo is a response precisely to
the international demand for trauma of the 1990s. The mass media presence during
the war did little to help the citys besieged residents; furthermore, international
journalists left once the drama of war subsided to the last offensives
grinding up the last of the last soldiers and civilians who will die in this
war.37 The media fascination with Sarajevos humanitarian crisis was as intense as
it was fleeting and has since been described as central to the ensuing compassion
fatigue of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the
casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of
Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war
and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the
appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords

defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other
ethnic loyalty. For not only is Sacco ignorant about the muddled ethnic realities of the
war, its moral ambiguities and its key players but he also wants to hear Nevens
shamelessly daring and dirty account of the war, however unreliable. As Sacco
explains, hes a little enthralled, a little infatuated, maybe a little in love and what is
love but a transaction.39 Neven a hardened war veteran provides the goods, the
first-hand experience of war and, for Saccos avatar, that is worth every
Deutschemark, coffee and cigarette. He explains in a parenthetical remark to his
implied reader: I would be remiss if I let you think that my relationship with Neven is
simply a matter of his shaking me down. Because Neven was the first friend I made in
Sarajevo . . . [hes] travelled one of the wars dark roads and Im not going to drop him
till he tells me all about it.40 Saccos assertion here suggests something more than a
mutual exploitation. The word friend describing Saccos relationship to Neven is
quickly replaced by the word drop. Having sold his raw goods, Neven finds that the
trauma economy in the postwar period has already devalued his experience by
disengaging with Bosnias local traumas. As Sacco suggests, the war moved on and
left him behind [ . . . ] The truth is, the war quit Neven.41 The Neven of 2001 is not
the brash Neven of old, but a pasty-looking unemployed forty-year old and recovering
alcoholic, who takes pills to prevent his anxiety attacks.42 His wartime actions lay
heavily on his conscience, despite his efforts to stash [ . . . ] deep his bad
memories.43 The Fixer leaves us with an ironic fact: Neven, who has capitalized on
trauma during the war, is now left traumatized and without capital in the postwar
situation. Juxtaposing Traumas in a Global Age Saccos depiction of the
trauma economy certainly highlights the question of power and exploitation, since so
many of the interactions between locals and international visitors are shaped by the
commodity market of traumatic memories. And while The Fixer provides a new
perspective of the Bosnian war, excoriating the profit-seeking objectives of both the
media and the Bosnian middle-men amid life-altering events, its general point about
the capitalistic vicissitudes of the trauma economy is not significantly different from
that sustained in the narratives of Aleksandar Hemon, Rajiv Chandrasekaran or Art
Spiegelman.44What distinguishes Saccos work is the way it also picks up the
possibility described in Edward Saids optimistic re-reading of travel: the potential
for affiliation. As I see it, Saccos criticism isnt leveled merely at the moral grey zone
created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of
representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate
trauma in different ways. been described as central to the ensuing compassion
fatigue of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the
casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of
Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war
and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the
appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords
defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other
ethnic loyalty. For not only is Sacco ignorant about the muddled ethnic realities of the
war, its moral ambiguities and its key players but he also wants to hear Nevens

shamelessly daring and dirty account of the war, however unreliable. As Sacco
explains, hes a little enthralled, a little infatuated, maybe a little in love and what is
love but a transaction.39 Neven a hardened war veteran provides the goods, the
first-hand experience of war and, for Saccos avatar, that is worth every
Deutschemark, coffee and cigarette. He explains in a parenthetical remark to his
implied reader: I would be remiss if I let you think that my relationship with Neven is
simply a matter of his shaking me down. Because Neven was the first friend I made in
Sarajevo . . . [hes] travelled one of the wars dark roads and Im not going to drop him
till he tells me all about it.40 Saccos assertion here suggests something more than a
mutual exploitation. The word friend describing Saccos relationship to Neven is
quickly replaced by the word drop. Having sold his raw goods, Neven finds that the
trauma economy in the postwar period has already devalued his experience by
disengaging with Bosnias local traumas. As Sacco suggests, the war moved on and
left him behind [ . . . ] The truth is, the war quit Neven.41 The Neven of 2001 is not
the brash Neven of old, but a pasty-looking unemployed forty-year old and recovering
alcoholic, who takes pills to prevent his anxiety attacks.42 His wartime actions lay
heavily on his conscience, despite his efforts to stash [ . . . ] deep his bad
memories.43 The Fixer leaves us with an ironic fact: Neven, who has capitalized on
trauma during the war, is now left traumatized and without capital in the postwar
situation. Juxtaposing Traumas in a Global Age Saccos depiction of the trauma
economy certainly highlights the question of power and exploitation, since so many of
the interactions between locals and international visitors are shaped by the
commodity market of traumatic memories. And while The Fixer provides a new
perspective of the Bosnian war, excoriating the profit-seeking objectives of both the
media and the Bosnian middle-men amid life-altering events, its general point about
the capitalistic vicissitudes of the trauma economy is not significantly different from
that sustained in the narratives of Aleksandar Hemon, Rajiv Chandrasekaran or Art
Spiegelman.44What distinguishes Saccos work is the way it also picks up the
possibility described in Edward Saids optimistic re-reading of travel: the potential
for affiliation. As I see it, Saccos criticism isnt leveled merely at the moral grey zone
created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of
representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate
trauma in different ways. suffering.48 Instead, the panel places Saccos
(Anglophone) audience within the familiar, emotional context of the September 11,
2001 attacks, with their attendant anxieties, shock and grief and so contributes to a
blurring of the hierarchical lines set up between different horrors across different
spaces. Consequently, I do not see Saccos juxtaposition of traumas as an instance of
what Michael Rothberg calls, competitive memory, the victim wars that pit winners
against losers.49 Sacco gestures towards a far more complex idea that takes into
account the highly mediated presentations of both traumas, which nonetheless
evokes Rothbergs notion of multidirectional memory by affirming the solidarities of
trauma alongside their differences. In drawing together these two disparate events,
Saccos drawings echo the critical consciousness in Saids Travelling Theory essay.
Rather than suggesting one trauma is, or should be, more morally legitimate than the

other, Sacco is sharply attentive to the way trauma is disseminated and recognized in
the political world. The attacks on theWorld Trade Centre, like the siege of Sarajevo,
transformed into discursive form epitomize what might be called victim narratives. In
this way, the United States utilized international sympathy (much of which was
galvanized by the stunning footage of the airliners crashing into the towers) to launch
a retaliatory campaign against Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. In contrast, Bosnia in
1992 faced a precarious future, having just proclaimed its independence. As we
discover in The Fixer, prior to Yugoslavias break-up, Bosnia had been ordered to
return its armaments to the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which were then placed
into the hands of the rebel Serbs, leaving the Bosnian government to build an army
almost from scratch.50 The analogy between 9/11 and 1992 Sarajevo is stark:
Sarajevos empty landscape in the panel emphasizes its defencelessness and isolation.
The Fixer constantly reminds the reader about the difficulties of living under a
prolonged siege in a city that is cut off and being starved into submission.51 In
contrast, September 11, 2001 has attained immense cultural capital because of its
status as a significant U.S. trauma. This fact is confirmed by its profound visuality,
which crystallized the spectacle and site of trauma. Complicit in this process, the
international press consolidated and legitimated the events symbolic power, by
representing, mediating and dramatizing the trauma so that, as SlavojZ izek
writes, the U.S. was elevated into the sublime victim of Absolute Evil.52 September
11 was constructed as an exceptional event, in terms of its irregular circumstances
and the symbolic enormity both in the destruction of iconic buildings and in the
attack on U.S. soil. Such a construction seeks to overshadow perhaps all recent
international traumas and certainly all other U.S. traumas and sites of shock. Saccos
portrayal, which locates September eleven in Sarajevo 1992, calls into question
precisely this claim towards the singularity of any trauma. The implicit doubling and
prefiguring of the 9/11 undercuts the exceptionalist rhetoric associated with the
event. Saccos strategy encourages us to think outside of hegemonic
epistemologies, where one trauma dominates and becomes more
meaningful than others. Crucially, Sacco reminds his audience of the cultural
imperialism that frames the spectacle of news and the designation of
traumatic narratives in particular. Postwar Bosnia and Beyond 2001 remains,
then, both an accidental and a significant date in The Fixer. While the (Anglophone)
world is preoccupied with a new narrative of trauma and a sense of historical rupture
in a post 9/11 world, Bosnia continues to linger in a postwar limbo. Six years have
passed since the war ended, but much of Bosnias day-to-day economy remains coded
by international perceptions of the war. No longer a haven for aspiring journalists,
Bosnia is now a thriving economy for international scholars of trauma and political
theory, purveyors of thanotourism,53 UN peacekeepers and post-conflict nation
builders (the ensemble of NGOs, charity and aid workers, entrepreneurs, contractors,
development experts, and EU government advisors to the Office of the High
Representative, the foreign overseer of the protectorate state that is Bosnia). On the
other hand, many of Bosnias locals face a grim future, with a massive and
everincreasing unemployment rate (ranging between 35 and 40%), brain-drain

outmigration, and ethnic cantonments. I contrast these realities of 2001 because

these circumstances a flourishing economy at the expense of the traumatized
population ought to be seen as part of a trauma economy. The trauma economy, in
other words, extends far beyond the purview of the Western media networks. In
discussing the way traumatic memories travel along the circuits of the global media, I
have described only a few of the many processes that transform traumatic events into
fungible traumatic memories; each stage of that process represents an exchange that
progressively reinterprets the memory, giving it a new value. Media outlets seek to
frame the trauma of the Bosnian wars in ways that are consistent with the aims of
pre-existing political or economic agendas; we see this in Sacco just as easily
as in Ugresics assessment of how even a putatively liberal state like the Netherlands
will necessarily inflect the value of one trauma over another. The point is that in this
circulation, trauma is placed in a marketplace; the siege of Sarajevo, where an
unscrupulous fixer can supply western reporters with the story they want to hear is
only a concentrated example of a more general phenomenon. Traumatic memories
are always in circulation, being revalued in each transaction according to the logic of
supply and demand. Victim and witness; witness and reporter; reporter and
audience; producer and consumer: all these parties bargain to suit their different
interests. The sooner we acknowledge the influence of these interests, the closer we
will come to an understanding of how trauma travels.

Structural violence

Culture is not something that can be stockpiled of accumulated, but is

instead devalued as more of it is produced. Attempting to spread that
culture leads to an over accumulation of that resource and eventually a
Black Sunday of that value system
Baudrillard, 96 (Jean, The Global and the Universal, 1996, CP)
Culture is a form of glory - it implies notion of sovereignty. Identity is
AND
, they are part of the pure and simple discount of degradable products.
You dont actually do anything
Koslow 12
(Scott. "IJBS - Volume 9-2 July 2012." Occupy Wall Street - Sipping on Jesus Juice
with Genet and Jean Baudrillard. N.p., July 2012. Web. 01 Aug. 2014.
http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol9_2/v9-2-koslow.html, LB)
OWS finds themselves caught in the same trap which Genet stumbled into. They've been
promised they can succeed, that if they go to college they will get a better paying job,
that the sky's the limit. When they find this to be untrue, they shout back about big
business and corporatism. But every time the Occupiers complain about low wages, the
media talking heads accuse them of feeling entitled to a job they haven't earned. When
they want student loan debt forgiven, they just want a name-brand education at Harvard
or Yale, despite knowing they can't afford it. When they ask for universal healthcare,
they are socialists. The Occupiers try to fire back. They insist that big businesses in the
US are the real problem. Corporations have too much power, they are controlling the
political process, they cause deprivation at home and abroad, they are utterly immoral;
but it comes as a surprise to no one that Exxon and BP are exploitative, or that major US
banking firms use usurious lending practices. Of course, all these claims (on both sides)
are accurate. Many of the Occupiers feel there should be a right to a living wage, that
students should be able to attend a good school regardless of class, that some socialist
principles are acceptable. But the instant they move on these fronts they have lost. They
plead their innocence, insisting the true source of current troubles lies outside
themselves, in the community. The real cause is this endlessly accelerating machine of
accumulation, which gives out loans, only to package the debt, sell them, and buy back
the derivatives at a profit, constantly drawing further and further from all foundation or
support. But this is a system that has long been done with truth. Jean Baudrillard wrote
that: When you're in a trap, you're in a trap. There's no point fighting on a terrain
where the models for neutralizing opposition are strongest, where you're up against the
spiraling trap of a system that is master both of the positive and of the negative
(Baudrillard, 2008). Truth is precisely the snare which grabs them, and dangles them
aloft before the community. This is what precisely what happened to Genet. He was cast
off as immoral, and tried to atone, to fight his immorality. And this is what is happening

the OWS. The reality is plain, it lies unconcealed since the recent banking crisis. The
kaleidoscope of the media reflects it back to us, inflecting it with notes of Super PACs,
media bias, anti-Christian hatred, and so on. Yet these lenses are mere distractions from
what is clear on every channel: corporations dominate the political system of the US,
and have shaped the laws to serve them over individual workers. We all know this, there
is no need to argue. But that is the only thing demanded of OWS or of the US people as a
whole. They should speak, debate, argue endlessly from classroom to
boardroom to legislature to Zuccotti Park. They should take to the streets, take to
Twitter, take to Facebook, demand 24 hour media coverage so that there is instant
feedback and interactivity, so they are constantly caught up in who is really to blame, so
that being political is as easy as signing online and clicking on Like. When being
political is as easy as going to a website and clicking a link, what excuse do we have not
to speak? When changing the world is as easy as camping out in New York City, what
excuse do you have not to mobilize? So speak out! Sign petitions! Speak loud and proud,
and don't forget to write your own personalized placard which the media may capture
on video and pick up on. I support raising the capital gains tax and forgiving student
loan debate, but not grants to green-energy companies; healthy school lunches but not
road improvements. And most importantly, I am political. I am moral. This is
approaching the culmination of what Baudrillard describes as the removal of all
barriers, leaving us with total interactivity and turning liberation into a duty, a moral
obligation[.] (Baudrillard, 2005:50). They must fight their immorality, to prove that
they are correct. This only of the effect of reviving our faith in a political system which
no longer even has values for us to believe in. All that capital asks of us is to receive it as
rational or to combat it in the name of rationality, to receive it as moral or to combat it
in the name of morality (Baudrillard, 1994:15). Vote Democrat or Republican, drink
Pepsi or Coke, laud or abhor the president, it makes no difference. Either way, we
remain caught in a helicoid spiral of blame and renegotiation which ultimately has no
center or end. Either way we remain concerned with getting to the bottom of things,
finding the reality of the matter. And then we are committed to that reality and creating
a corrective to it. Either way, we legitimize and remain indebted to a democratic process
of deliberation which has aired and considered our demands, but merely found them
wanting, perhaps not popular enough or unrealistic. Either way we resuscitate the
public morality. This gives anyone an avenue and an impetus to speaknd if one speaks
persuasively enough to the masses, we believe we will change government policy. So we
remain committed to deliberation and protesting. Even if OWS or such speaking in
general were to have an effect, it would be only a minor renegotiation of existing
policy, so that perhaps an investment firm will be fined or closed, while the users are
ensnared more and more in a system where someone else will immediately take the
firm's place. When OWS formulates lists of demands, politicians accommodate minor
planks that are popular like ending corporate personhood and use that to prove that
they listen to the activists, that they are good democrats. Simultaneously, they disregard
the majority of the platform, anything that would have a radical political effect. This
only allows politicians to claim OWS as supporters, while doing nothing to change the
nature of the political system. As long as OWS state traditional political demands, they

can be appeased and accommodated, losing any critical power they have, and becoming
yet more beholden to a system they are trying to oppose. Such a logic is explored by
Spanos (1992, 2000, and 2008) to great effect. He explains that the political elite will
alternately accommodate that is, recognize, bring in, and assimilate or banish
reject as politically impossible all challenges. Obama takes the voice of citizens, and
welds it to their cause to claim it as support. Simultaneously, he says he would push for
their radical demands, but they're just not realistic right now. Petitioners are assimilated
as Obama supporters, while all radicality is banished].

Extinction

Liberation is liquidated and their revolution is terminally non-unique.

There is no longer a risk of political change as all movements have already
happened The only revolutions left are simulated copies of the originals
that fail to actualize change
Baudrillard, 93 (Jean, The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena,
1993, LB)
If I were asked to characterize the present state of affairs, I would describe it as 'after the
orgy' . The orgy in question was the moment when modernity exploded upon us, the
moment of liberation in every sphere . Political liberation, sexual liberation, liberation of
the forces of production, liberation of the forces of destruction, women's liberation,
children's liberation, liberation of unconscious drives, liberation of art. The assumption
of all models of representation, as of all models of anti-representation. This was a total
orgy an orgy of the real, the rational, the sexual, of criticism as of anti-criticism, of
development as of the crisis of development. We have pursued every avenue in the
production and effective overproduction of objects, signs, messages, ideologies and
satisfactions . Now everything has been liberated, the chips are down, and we find
ourselves faced collectively with the big question: WHAT DO WE DO NOW THE ORGY
IS OVER? Now all we can do is simulate the orgy, simulate liberation. We may pretend
to carry on in the same direction, accelerating, but in reality we are accelerating in a
void, because all the goals of liberation are already behind us, and because what haunts
and obsesses us is being thus ahead of all the results - the very availability of all the
signs, all the forms, all the desires that we had been pursuing. But what can we do? This
is the state of simulation, a state in which we are obliged to replay all scenarios precisely
because they have all taken place already, whether actually or potentially. The state of
utopia realized, of all utopias realized, wherein paradoxically we must continue to live as
though they had not been. But since they have, and since we can no longer, therefore,
nourish the hope of realizing them, we can only 'hyper-realize' them through
interminable simulation. We live amid the interminable reproduction of ideals,
phantasies, images and dreams which are now behind us, yet which we must continue to
reproduce in a sort of inescapable indifference. The fact is that the revolution has well
and truly happened, but not in the way we expected. Everywhere what has been
liberated has been liberated so that it can enter a state of pure circulation, so that it can
go into orbit. With the benefit of a little hindsight, we may say that the unavoidable goal
of all liberation is to foster and provision circulatory networks. The fate of the things
liberated is an incessant commutation, and these things are thus subject to increasing
indeterminacy, to the principle of uncertainty. Nothing (not even God) now disappears
by coming to an end, by dying. Instead, things disappear through proliferation or
contamination, by becoming saturated or transparent, because of extenuation or
extermination, or as a result of the epidemic of simulation, as a result of their transfer
into the secondary existence of simulation. Rather than a mortal mode of disappearance,

then, a fractal mode of dispersal. Nothing is truly reflected any more - whether in a
mirror or in the abyssal realm (which is merely the endless reduplication of
consciousness). The logic of viral dispersal in networks is no longer a logic of value;
neither, therefore, is it a logic of equivalence. There is no longer any such thing as a
revolution" of values - merely a circumvention or involution of values . A centripetal
compulsion coexists with a decentredness of all systems, an internal metastasis or
fevered endogenic virulence which creates a tendency for systems to explode beyond
their own limits, to override their own logic - not in the sense of creating sheer
redundancy, but in the sense of an increase in power, a fantastic potentialization
whereby their own very existence is put at risk.
Extinction Framing generates violence The drive for survival necessitates
the creation of the other and the body as enemies to be eliminated. The
AFFs universal endorsement of survival conceals its inextricable violent
underbelly: genocide and war.
Bauman 92 /Zygmunt, Prof. Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Leeds,
Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies, Cambridge: Polity Press, Pg. 33-39/
Inescapably, as Elias Canetti wrote, 24 man is a survivor: `the most elementary and
obvious form of success is to remain alive'. We are not just alive; at every moment we
are still alive. Success is always an `until further notice' success; it is never final. It must
be repeated over and over again. The effort can never grind to a halt. Survival is a
lifelong task. Its energizing, creative potential in never exhausted. Whatever is left of it
will be just locked up, in one felt swoop, at the moment of death. Canetti insists that
survival is not identical with the old and trivial notion of self-preservation'. The idea of
self-preservation, sometimes conceived of as an instinct, sometimes as a rational choice,
hides or beautifies the gruesome truth of survival. Survival is targeted on others, not on
the self. Though we never live through our own death, we do live through the deaths of
the others, and their death gives meaning to our success: we have not died, we are still
alive. Thus `the desire for a long life which plays such a large part in most cultures really
means that most people want to survive their contemporaries. They know that many die
early and they want a different fate for themselves.' I would not conceive of my own
performance as a success if it were not for the fact that performances of others proved
unsuccessful; I can only measure my own performance against those other
performances. I want to know what I should do to escape or to postpone the others' lot
-- to outlive others. Others die of smoking; perhaps if I don't smoke, I'd survive them? At
the radical extreme of survival, says Canetti, looms murder: `He wants to kill so that he
can survive others; he wants to stay alive so as not to have others surviving him.' This
wish can be silenced, even denied, indignantly, by consciousness -- but it cannot be
really effaced: `Only survival at a distance in time is wholly innocent.' 25 The cynicism
with which the wish of survival is inevitably, though self-ashamedly, infused, comes
blatantly into the open during war -- that socially sanctioned, legitimate murder: the
declared purpose is then `to limit our casualties', and anyone knows, even if refrains
from spelling it out, that the price of that limiting is multiplying the dead on the other

side of the battleline. Kill, so that you and your beloved shalt not be killed. Declaration
of war means suspension of the guilt and shame that the wish of survival spawns at
`normal' times. That normally carefully concealed wish now emerges from hiding,
dressed as the noble mission of fighting evil empires or disarming the enemies of
mankind, be they carriers of disease that saps the civilized life or spoilers of harmonious
world order. It shapes itself up as liberation, restoration of order, or crusade; it ends up
as genocide. The survivor's `most fantastic triumphs have taken place in our own time,
among people who set great store by the idea of humanity ... The survivor is mankind's
worst evil, its curse and perhaps its doom.' 26 War is, admittedly, an extreme case -- but,
Canetti insists, it shows in a spectacular way what is always there, though hidden;
survival is never wholly innocent when re-forged into action. This is a dramatic, tragic
vision of the inner tendency of survival. One wonders to what extent this tendency is
truly inner (or innate); one is entitled to suspect that the destructive edge of survival is
sharpened (and even more probably directed) by the socially organized setting in which
the activity of survival takes place. It is this setting that may (or may not) arrange the
survival as a zero-sum game, and then split the habitat into a part that is threatening
and has to be subdued or better still annihilated, and another part whose well-being
enhances the chance of my own survival; this is what most societies have been doing all
along, and continue to do. Like other in-built qualities of the human predicament, the
impulse of survival is the stuff of which societies are patched together. Even though this
impulse is not the society's creation, it is keenly, skilfully and on the whole effectively
manipulated by society; it is, as a rule, socially managed -- in a way that for one reason
or another is deemed useful. It is deployed to build and preserve boundaries of states,
nations, races, classes. It is invoked, explicitly or tacitly, whenever hostility is to be
directed, but also whenever loyalty to the cause and group solidarity are called for. It is
not just, and not necessarily destructive in its application. But if it can be put effectively
to non-destructive uses, it is because of its destructive potential. One of such uses can be
traced back to what Norman O. Brown dubbed the Oedipal project: 27 `The project of
becoming God -- in Spinoza's terms, causa sui.' The Oedipal project is a flight from
infantile dependency, a wish to become `the father of himself'. This stage in
development always arrives, and once it arrives it is invariably directed against the
parents, the true embodiment of dependency -- and this whatever the parents do and
however they behave. The Oedipal project is a drive to emancipation that cannot be
achieved unless the bond of dependency is broken. However, the deepest, the ultimate
dependency is that on one's own mortal body -- that ultimate limit of autonomy; for this
reason the battle cannot be won. Oedipal project is just a first `trial skirmish' in a long
series of battles doomed to defeat (though the hubbub of successive skirmishes silences
for a while, perhaps a long while, the thought of the final debacle). The causa sui project
stays unfulfilled, and as long as it is unfulfilled it generates the energy needed to wage
ever new battles. It also needs ever new battlefields and war strategies, so that the
struggle may continue while each successive engagement is lost. The tragic paradox is
that the undeclared purpose of the struggle is gaining exclusive mastery over one's own
body (and thus, by proxy, surviving its unsurvivable mortality). The dream of survival
constitutes the body as the most important of targets , as own body is the mortal side of

the self, and -- with its procreative function -- is also the instrument through which
individual immortality has been expropriated by the species. The body is the `natural
enemy' of survival, and the only uncontrived enemy. A paradox indeed -- and the seat of
perhaps the deepest and most hopeless of ambivalences: in the struggle aimed at the
survival of the body, the would-be survivors meet the selfsame body as the arch-enemy.
But let us note that even in the `struggle of liberation' targeted against one's own body it
is always the socially set framework of dependence that injects meaning into the
experience of the lack of mastery. These battlefronts are, like all others, socially drawn.
And it is the selfsame society which has articulated the aims of the struggle and drawn
the battlelines, that also supplies the weapons and the strategies with which the battles
can be fought. It is therefore on this interface that the survival impulse of the developing
individual meets and merges with the self-perpetuating processes of sociality. Society, in
other respects the hostile field of competitors against which one's own survival can be
measured and hopefully asserted, appears simultaneously as the armoury of survival's
weapons, trusty ally, source of succour, encouragement, and hope. Society fares no
better than the body: it also emerges from the existential predicament as a monster of
ambivalence: half-friend, half-enemy the object and the means of the struggle. The
impulse of survival renders both the body and society ambivalent. Yet all ambivalence it
spawns seem to pale into insignificance when compared to its own. Survival is torn apart
by a contradiction no amount of lies may assuage; an inner split resulting in a constant
outpouring of guilt which can be no more placated than its source can be drained.
Philippe Aris 28 suggested that the spectres of `la mort de Moi' (self-death) and `la
mort de Toi' (Thou-death) were crystallization points of two successive (respectively,
eighteenth-century, Enlightenment, and nineteenth-century Romanticism), and to an
extent mutually exclusive, attitudes towards death. We may surmise instead that the two
terrors are just twin aspects of the hopelessly ambivalent sentiment gestated and
sustained by the impulse of survival at all ages of human existence. My own survival, as
we have seen before, cannot be savoured otherwise than as a macabre privilege over the
others, less fortunate. Yet these others may be, and more often than not are, the very
meaning of my existence -- the uppermost value which makes my life worth living; the
very sense of being alive: life is communicating with others, being with others, acting for
others and being addressed, wanted, lifted into importance by the need of others and by
the bid they make for my attention and sympathy. The death of others may be a
benchmark for my own survival success, but it is the life of others which made that
success desirable in the first place, as well as is making it now worthy of effort. After all,
I want to survive mostly because the thought of all that communication, intercourse,
loving, being loved -- all that grinding suddenly to a halt is so unbearable. My desire to
survive is all the stronger the richer and more satisfying is that experience of being with
others. The world without my seeing it or fantasizing it is unimaginable; but the image
of a world emptied of others, a world that testifies to my ultimate triumph as a survivor,
is unbearable. (The `sole survivor's' plight is no less a nightmare than death; after all, it
shows what death is about, it is a mirror-image of death; moreover, only if reflected in
that imaginary mirror can death be visualized in all its brutal truth.) More immediately,
the exit of every person that inhabits my life and stands between sense and

senselessness, fullness and void, impoverishes that life of mine which feeds and in turn
feeds on the drive to survival. Is not survival, therefore, a self-destructive and selfdefeating impulse? Is not it the case that it can fulfil itself only in its defeat? The core of
all callousness, cruelty and brutality, the survival impulse seems also to be the fount of
sociability. It is neither selfish nor selfless; or perhaps it is both, and cannot but be both
at the same time. In a tormented, self-immolating and painful way it implements the
order of nature: it seals the bond between individual self-preservation effort and the
survival of the species. By mobilizing the emotional and rational faculties of individuals,
its practice fulfils and reinforces the logical and pragmatic interdependence between
perpetuity of the species and the temporal existence of its members. Its innate
ambivalence has itself a survival value. It is an ambivalence all the same, and an acute
one with that. One would expect therefore a drive to separate the inseparable -- a
favourite point of entry for all societal managerial skills and ambitions; a stuff from
which all man-made, `cultured', contrived social order is made. Making distinctions,
discriminating, setting apart, classifying, is culture's foremost mark, craft and tour de
force. In its intentions (though hardly ever in its practical accomplishments) culture is a
war of attrition declared on ambivalence. Its promise is to separate the grain from the
chaff in all their incarnations -- be they called truth and falsehood, beauty and ugliness,
friends and enemies, or good and evil. Its job is to see that the world is well mapped and
well marked, so that confusion will have little chance to arise. Its ambition is to make
the world hospitable by eliminating the torments of choice where no fully satisfying
choice seems available. Its struggle -- futile yet unstoppable -- is to cut the ambivalent
human predicament into a multitude of logically and pragmatically unequivocal
situations. Obviously, the poignantly ambivalent survival impulse is the prime candidate
for such treatment. Individual survival makes no sense and offers no allurement without
survival of others; but then such others as are needed for survival to remain attractive
and to make sense may be -- should be -- separated from the rest of the others who are
not. This is exactly what society, through its `culturing' effort, achieves -- or at least tries
hard to achieve. `The others' are divided into those who support, and those who
threaten survival. The uncompromising, overwhelming self-assertion of the species is
split into more palatable and easier-to-manage tribal interests. The `inside' and the
`outside' are thereby created and carefully demarcated. Inside -- unity, cooperation and
mutual love. Outside -- wilderness, vigilance and fight. My tribe is to be spared all
casualties at all costs. Among the costs (or are they costs at all? Are they not, to be frank,
gains?), the most indispensable of all is `collateral damage' inflicted on the enemy tribe
once it has been appointed `the target' and, as targets are meant to be, is `hit' and
`neutralized'. My tribe's survival has been offered what it demands: a measure of callous
self-love and a measure of loving co-operation with others. Only such others as are
earmarked for love, and the others selected for callous treatment, are no more the same
others. In Reinhold Niebuhr's words, tribal patriotism `transmutes individual
unselfishness into national egoism'. 29 Murders which the survival impulse clamours for
are no more clouded with the sorrow with which la mort de Toi tends to inject the
survivor. The killed is not Tu, and so the murder is not a murder. The haunting
contradiction of human survival has been resolved. The resolution is greatly helped by

the ingenious game of universality and particularity: by the uncanny talent of

particularity to dress up as universality. Most instances of collectivized survival
succeeded in what Rgis Debray described as `melting the meanness of chauvinism
with the generosity of messianism'. 30 Universality, the code-name for unbound
inclusion, is deployed as a tool of exclusion. Once the cause in the service of which the
survival impulse is mobilized (the cause that ennobles survival exertions, legitimizes
them, cleans them of the gnawing suspicion of selfishness, immorality, a sociality) has
been proclaimed universal, nothing is left outside; or, rather, whatever has been left
outside is now non-entity: it does not count, it has no value left, its destruction is not
counted among the costs of survival. At best, the leftovers are waste to be disposed of for
the sake of the health and sanity of that which has been marked for survival. If the
leftovers had feelings and gumption, they would, surely, rejoice in their destruction,
which has been sealed as a necessary and universally beneficent event the moment the
boundaries of universality closed outside their abode. They would sing merrily on the
way to the sewage gutters.

2nc

Structural violence
No cards

Extinction
No cards

PIC
tag
Antonio 1995 [Robert; Professor of Sociology at the University of Kansas; Nietzsches
Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History; American Journal of
Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995]
While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of
autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in
specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross
fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking
themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in
simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The
role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator
suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly
amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness,
spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes,
meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others
might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp.
302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to
hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing
them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked,
"Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . .
[Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to
tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals"
(Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300,
302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine
attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in
enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a
"stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94).
Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated,
"One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while
reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on
something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to
throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend
their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and
anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense
of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to
role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill
any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine
ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively
and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions.
Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations
of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing,

arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of
the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more
urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince,
class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination
of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the
way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89,
303-4).LB

Suffering
They feed off images and will continual to replicate them so longer as they
are deemed profitable
Baudrillard, 94 (Jean, The Illusion of the End, 1994, LB)
In the case of the Romanian revolution, it was the faking of the dead in Timisoara which
aroused a kind of moral indignation and raised the problem of the scandal of
'disinformation' or, rather, of information itself as scandal. It was not the dead that were
the scandal, but the corpses being pressed into appearing before the television cameras,
as in the past dead souls were pressed into appearance in the register of deaths . It was
their being taken hostage, as it were, and our being held hostage too, as mystified TV
viewers. Being blackmailed by violence and death, especially in a noble and
revolutionary cause, was felt to be worse than the violence itself, was felt to be a parody
of history. All the media live off the presumption of catastrophe and of the succulent
imminence of death. A photo in Liberation, for example, shows us a convoy of refugees
'which, some time after this shot was taken, was to be attacked by the Iraqi army'.
Anticipation of effects, morbid simulation, emotional blackmail. It was the same on
CNN with the arrival of the Scuds. Nothing is news if it does not pass through that
horizon of the virtual, that hysteria of the virtual - not in the psychological sense, but in
the sense of a compulsion for what is presented, in all bad faith, as real to be consumed
as unreal. In the past, to show something up as a fake, we said: 'It's just play-acting', 'It's
all romance!', 'It's put on for the cameras!'. This time, with Romania and the Gulf War,
we were able to say, 'It's just TV!' Photographic or cinema images still pass through the
negative stage (and that of projection), whereas the TV image, the video image, digital
and synthetic, are images without a negative, and hence without negativity and without
reference. They are virtual and the virtual is what puts an end to all negativity, and thus
to all reference to the real or to events. At a stroke, the contagion of images, engendering
themselves without reference to a real or an imaginary, itself becomes virtually without
limits, and this limitless engendering produces information as catastrophe. Is an image
which refers only to itself still an image? However this may be, that image raises the
problem of its indifference to the world, and thus of our indifference to it - which is a
political problem. When television becomes the strategic space of the event, it sets itself
up as a deadly self-reference, it becomes a bachelor machine. The real object is wiped
out by news not merely alienated, but abolished. All that remains of it are traces on a
monitoring screen. Many Romanian eyewitness accounts speak of being dispossessed of
the event in this way, deprived of the lived experience they have of it by being
submerged in the media network, by being placed under house arrest in front of their
television screens. Spectators then become exoterics of the screen, living their revolution
as an exoticism of images, themselves exogenous, touristic spectators of a virtual
history. From the moment the studio becomes the strategic centre, and the screen the
only site of appearance, everyone wants to be on it at all costs, or else gathers in the
street in the glare of the cameras, and these, indeed, actually film one another. The
street becomes an extension of the studio, that is, of the non-site of the event, of the
virtual site of the event. The street itself becomes a virtual space. Site of the definitive

confusion of masses and medium, of the real-time confusion of act and sign. There is no
will to communicate in all this. The only irresistible drive is to occupy this non-site, this
empty space of representation which is the screen. Representation (political
representation too) is currently a trough of depression - meteorological depression which the media fill up with their turbulences, with the same consequences as occur
when any kind of space is suddenly depressurized. The highest pressure of news
corresponds to the lowest pressure of events and reality [Ie reel].The same unrealism in
the Ceausescu trial. It is not the judicial procedure itself which is scandalous but the
video tape, unacceptable as the only, bloodless trace of a bloody event. In the eyes of the
whole world, this will remain an event forever suspect, for the sole reason of its strangely obscene - scenic abduction. This hidden jury, its voice striking out against the
accused, these defendants we are forced to see even though they are virtually dead, these
dead prisoners shot a second time to meet the needs of news. One might even wonder
whether the actors in this staged event were not deliberately trying to make themselves
seem suspect in the eyes of world opinion, as though playing at sabotaging their image.
At the same time, the Ceausescu trial was pulled off perfectly as a video production,
betraying a sharp sense of the image function, the blackmail-function, the deterrencefunction. Deep down, the intuitive grasp of these things has grown more sophisticated
over there, in the shadow of dictatorship, than it has with us. We have nothing to teach
them. For, if the Romanians themselves got high on this media speculation which served
them as a revolutionary aphrodisiac, they also dragged all the Western media into the
same news demagogy. By manipulating themselves, they caused us spontaneously to
swallow their fiction. We bear the same responsibility as they do. Or, rather, there is no
responsibility anywhere. The question of responsibility cannot even be raised. It is the
evil genius of news which promotes such staging. When information gets mixed in with
its source, then, as with sound waves, you get a feedback effect - an effect of interference
and uncertainty. When demand is maximal (and everywhere today the demand for
events is maximal), it short-circuits the initial situation and produces an uncontrollable
response effect. That is, ultimately, why we do the Romanians an injustice when we
accuse them of manipulation and bad faith. No one is responsible. It is all an effect of
the infernal cycle of credibility. The actors and the media sensed obscurely that the
events in Eastern Europe had to be given credibility, that that revolution had to be lent
credibility by an extra dose of dead bodies. And the media themselves had to be lent
credibility by the reference to the people. Leading to a vicious circle of credibility, the
result of which is the decredibilizing of the revolution and the events themselves. The
logical sequence of news and history turns back against itself, bringing, in its cyclical
movement, a kind of deflation of historical consciousness. The Americans did just the
same in the Gulf War. By the excessive nature of their deployment and stagecraft, by
putting their power and news control so extravagantly to the test, they decredibilized
both war and news. They were the Ubus of their wn power, just as the Romanians were
the Ubus of their own mpotence. Excess itself engenders the parody which invalidates
the facts. And, just as the principle of economics is wrecked by financial speculation, so
the principle of politics [Ie politique] and history is wrecked by media speculation.

1nr

K
AND the belief that our activism must respond to political conditions
through political institutions appeals is what nullifies our ethical potential
and makes ethical transformation impossible --- turns case and solvency
Hershock, 99[Scholar at the East-West Center. Changing the Way Society Changes The Journal of Buddhist Ethics,
Vol 6. 1999. MUSE)
I have argued at some length (Hershock, 1999) that evaluating technologies on the basis of the tools they
generate commits us to taking individual users and not the dramatic patterns of our lived interdependence
as the primary locus of evaluation. In doing so, we effectively exclude from consideration precisely that
domain in which the values informing our technological bias have the most direct bearing on the quality of
our personal and communal conduct -- the movement of our shared narration. This has led to a stubborn
and at times even righteous blindness regarding our slippage into a new era of colonization -- a
colonization, not of lands or cultural spheres, but of consciousness as such. Indeed, the disposition to
ignore the critical space of interdependence has been so thoroughly prevalent that the conditions of
possibility for this new form of colonialism are widely championed -- in both the "developed" and the
"developing" world -- as essential to establishing and safeguarding our individual and collective dignity, a
crucial component of our growing equality and autonomy. By using the same information technologies
employed by those individuals and institutions perpetrating and perpetuating the inequitable distribution of
power and wealth, social activists may have enjoyed the opportunity to "beat them at their own game ."
However, they have also insured that everyone remains on the same playing field, playing the same game.
Social activist successes have in this way blinded us to our deepening submission to technologies of
control and the consequent depletion of precisely those attentive resources needed to meaningfully accord
with our changing circumstances and contribute to them as needed. The costs of such blindness are
practically limitless. The more "successful" a technology is, the more indispensable it become s. That is, all
technologies are liable to crossing thresholds beyond which they generate more new problems than they
solve. Because technologies arise as patterns of value-driven conduct, they function as ambient amplifiers
of our individual and cultural karma -- our experience-conditioning, intentional activity. In crossing the
threshold of their utility, technologies create the karmic equivalent of a gravitational black hole, funneling all
available attention-energy into themselves. For the dominant technological lineage correlated with the rise
of liberal democracy and the imperative for social activism, this has meant an intensification of our karma
for both controlling and being controlled. The more successfully we extend the limits of control, the more we
extend the range of what can and must be controlled. In capsule form: the better we get at getting what we
want, the better we get at wanting; but the better we get at wanting, the better we get at getting what we
want, though we won't want what we get. This karmic circularity is pernicious, and the attention-energy
invested in it to date has already brought about an epidemic depletion of precisely those resources needed
for realizing dramatically satisfying -- and not merely factually sufficient -- solutions to our troubles, both
personal and communal. The methodological irony of social activism is that it does not free us from
dependence, but rather sustains its very possibility. This is not as paradoxical as it might sound. Insuring
our independence by means of restructuring the institutions that mediate our contact with one another
renders us dependent on those institutions -- on the structure, and hence the technologies, of our

mediation. In consequence, our freedom comes to be increasingly dependent on the rationalization and
regulation of our relationships with one another -- the realization of secure and yet generic co-existence.
Just as the technology-driven transformation of societies in the industrial and post-industrial eras has
involved an ever more detailed refinement of class divisions and labor categories, social activism advances
through an ever more varied identification of populations in need of guaranteed freedoms. In valorizing
both autonomy and equality, social activism denies our dramatic interdependence and tacitly endorses notseeing (avidy) or not-attending to the full set of conditions sponsoring our present situation. Although
unique and deeply local patterns of injustice may be important in building a legal case, the work of social
activism is not to encourage our liberating intimacy with such patterns. Rather, it consists of constructing
legal mechanisms for exerting reformative control over institutional structures and the processes by means
of which (generically) given individuals play or are forced to play particular roles therein. Unfortunately, as
generic 'women', 'children', 'workers', or 'minorities', the beneficiaries of social activism are effectively cut off
from precisely those aspects of their circumstances, relationships, and self-understanding which provide
them with the resources necessary for locally realizing meaningful -- and not merely factual -- alternatives
to the patterns of injustice in which they find themselves embedded. Among the products of social activism
are thus virtual communities of individuals having no immediate and dramatically responsive relationship
with one another -- individuals who have relinquished or been deprived of intimate connection with the
causes and conditions of both their troubles and those troubles' meaningful resolution. With no intended
disregard of the passion many activists bring to their work, social activism has aimed at globally reengineering our political, economic and societal environments in much the same way that our dominant
technological lineage has been committed to re-making our world -- progressively "humanizing" and
"rationalizing" the abundantly capricious natural circumstances into which we human beings have found
ourselves "thrown." This shared strategic genealogy is particularly disturbing, suggesting that -- like all
technologies oriented toward control -- social activism is liable to rendering itself indispensable. If the
history of social activism is inseparable from the rise and spread of influential technologies and subject to
similar accelerating and retarding conditions, so is its future. Social Activist Strategy: Legally Leveraging
Institutional Change While it has become common practice to decry the excessive legalism of
contemporary societies, the ramifications of strategic collusion between social activism and the way we
have technically and legally tooled our factual co-existence have remained largely unattended. In part, this
is because the legal bias of social activism has appeared so incontestably "practical." Legislation allows for
directly restructuring power relations and negotiating justice at the "highest" possible levels. The legislative
process has also become the dominant technology for mediating divergent claim s about the facts of our
(often troubled) co-existence and for preserving "fair" definitions of 'being right' and 'being wronged'.

Round Doubles vs GBS AS

1nc

1nc
Interpretation -- Oceans are the water column that lies above the
continental shelf
MarBEF 13 (Marine Biodiversity and Ecosystem Functioning, funded by the European
Union, open oceans, http://www.marbef.org/wiki/open_oceans, accessed 7/7/14)
The open oceans or pelagic ecosystems are the areas away from the coastal boundaries
and above the seabed. It encompasses the entire water column of the seas and the
oceans and lies beyond the edge of the continental shelf. It extends from the tropics to
the polar regions and from the sea surface to the abyssal depths. It is a highly
heterogeneous and dynamic habitat. Physical processes control the biological activities
and lead to substantial geographic variability in production.

Violation the plan develops ports, not the Earths oceans. Ports are
distinct.
LII No date (Legal Information Institute, citing US Code Title 18, Part I, Chapter 1,
26, 18 U.S. Code 26 - Definition of seaport,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/26, accessed 7/3/14)
As used in this title, the term seaport means all piers, wharves, docks, and similar
structures, adjacent to any waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to
which a vessel may be secured, including areas of land, water, or land and water under
and in immediate proximity to such structures, buildings on or contiguous to such
structures, and the equipment and materials on such structures or in such buildings.
And, Coasts are part of the land next to the water, but not part of the ocean
itself
Random House Dictionary, 2014 (via dictionary.com,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/coast)
coast [kohst] noun 1. the land next to the sea; seashore: the rocky coast of Maine.
Standards
a. Limits the topic is already massive exploration and development
mean the Aff can do anything if we allow the Aff to explore or develop
anywhere the topic would be unmanageable
b. Topic Education they shift the focus of debates to port and coastal
development instead of genuine ocean development, which kills
predictable clash and core topic learning
c. Extra Topicality its not okay for the Aff to develop both the ocean and a
port. If we win that they are distinct then its not within the scope of Aff
topical fiat

1nc
Debate is death ports act as the perfect example of a museum of useless
information which no longer carries any meaning for us, rather is a
strategic aff because we can reuse it over and over again. For the past 4
years, ports have become our relic, our sign for replication and
accumulation
Baudrillard 76 (Jean, dead philosopher, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Sage
Publications, LB)
Pursued and censured everywhere , death springs up everywhere again. No longer as
apocalyptic folklore , such as might have haunted the living imagination in certain
epochs; but voided precisely of any imaginary substance, it passes into the most banal
reality, and for us takes on the mask of the very principle of rationality that dominates
our lives. Death is when everything functions and serves something else , it is the
absolute, signing, cybernetic functionality of the urban environment as in Jacques Tati's
film Play- Time. Man is absolutely indexed on his function, as in Kafka. the age of the
civil servant is the age of a culture of death. This is the phantasm of total programming,
increased predictability and accuracy, finality not only in material things, but in
fulfilling desires. In a word, death is confused with the law of value - and strangely with
the structural law of value by which everything is arrested as a coded difference in a
universal nexus of relations. This is the true face of ultra-modern death, made up of the
faultless, objective, ultra-rapid connection of all the terms in a system . Our true
necropolises are no longer the cemeteries, hospitals, wars, hecatombs; death is no
longer where we think it is, it is no longer biological , psychological, metaphysical, it is
no longer even murder' our societies' true necropolises are the computer banks or the
foyers, blank spaces from which all human noise has been expunged, glass coffins where
the world's sterilised memories are frozen . Only the dead remember everything in
something like an immediate eternity of knowledge, a quintessence of the world that
today we dream of burying in the form of microfilm and archives, making the entire
world into an archive in order that it be discovered by some future civilisation. The
cryogenic freezing of all knowledge so that it can be resurrected , knowledge passes into
immortality as sign-value . Against our dream of losing and forgetting everything, we set
up an opposing great wall of relations, connections and information, a dense and
inextricable artificial memory, and we bury ourselves alive in the fossilised hope of one
day being rediscovered. Computers are the transistorised death to which we submit in
the hope of survival . Museums are already there to survive all civilisations, in order to
bear testimony But to what? It is of little importance. The mere fact that they exist
testifies that we are in a culture which no longer possesses any meaning for itself and
which can now only dream of having meaning for someone else from a later time . Thus
everything becomes an environment of death as soon as it is no longer a sign that can be
transistorised in a gigantic whole, just as money reaches the point of no return when it is
nothing more than a system of writing. Basically, political economy is only constructed
(at the cost of untold sacrifices) or designed so as to be recognised as immortal by a

future civilisation, or as an instance of truth. As for religion , this is unimaginable other

than in the Last Judgement, where God recognises his own . But the Last Judgement is
there already, realised: it is the definitive spectacle of our crystallised death . The
spectacle is, it must be said , grandiose. From the hieroglyphic schemes of the Defense
Department or the World Trade Center to the great informational schemes of the media,
from siderurgical complexes to grand political apparatuses, from the megapolises with
their senseless control of the slightest and most everyday acts: humanity, as Benjamin
says, has everywhere become an object of contemplation to itself. I ts self-alienation has
reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure
of the first order ('The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', in
Illuminations [tr. Harry Zohn , ed. Hannah A rendt, London : Jonathan Cape, 1 970] , p.
244) For Benjamin, this was the very form of fascism , that is to say, a certain
exacerbated form of ideology, an aesthetic perversion of politics, pushing the acceptance
of a culture of death to the point of j ubilation . And it is true that today the whole
system of political economy has become the finality without end and the aesthetic
vertigo of productivity to us, and this is only the contrasting vertigo of death. This is
exactly why art is dead: at the point of saturation and sophistication, all this j ubilation
has passed i nto the spectacle of complexity itself, and all aesthetic fascination has been
monopolised by the system as it grows into its own double (what else would it do with its
gigantic towers, its satellites, its giant computers, if not double itself as signs?) . We are
all victims of production become spectacle, of the aesthetic enjoyment Uouissance] , of
delirious production and reproduction , and we are not about to turn our backs on it, for
in every spectacle there is the immanence of the catastrophe . Today, we have made the
vertigo of politics that Benjamin denounces in fascism , its perverse aesthetic
enjoyment, into the experience of production at the level of the general system. We
produce the experience of a de-politicised , deideologised vertigo of the rational
administration of things, of endlessly exploding finalities. Death is immanent to political
economy, which is why the latter sees itself as immortal . The revolution too fixes its
sights on an immortal objective , in the name of which it demands the suspension of
death , in the interests of accumulation. But immortality is always the monotonous
immortality of a social paradise . The revol ution will never rediscover death unless it
demands it immediately. Its impasse is to be hooked on the end of political economy as
a progressive expiry, whereas the demand for the end of political economy is posed right
now, in the demand for immediate life and death . In any case, death and enjoyment,
highly prized and priced, will have to be paid for throughout political economy, and will
emerge as insoluble problems on the 'day after' the revolution . The revolution only
opens the way to the problem of death, without the least chance of resolving it. In fact,
there is no 'day after' , only days for the administration of things. Death itself demands
to be experienced immediately, in total blindness and total ambivalence . But is it
revolutionary? If political economy is the most rigorous attempt to put an end to death,
it is clear that only death can put an end to political economy

The topic is dead All we ever do is regurgitate the same information, the
same advantages, the same extinction and the same pathetic affirmatives in
an attempt to solve for the same impacts every single time
Reid-Brinkley 12 (Shanara Rose Reid-Brinkley, Assistant Professor of African
American Studies and Communications as well as the Director of Debate at the
University of Pittsburgh, The Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley Interview, 2/13/12,
http://puttingthekindebate.com/2012/04/02/the-dr-shanara-reid-brinkley/)
Dr. Reid-Binkley: Now here is the fear. If that was the only answer, the debate
community would do research, but it would be just to cut cards and nothing really would
change. So it cant stop at research, but that is literally step one: go do some reading.
That would really help you have a language and a vocabulary for talking when you are
engaging these teams that will produce very good debates. So when people say that they
dont think that what performance/movement teams are doing is intellectual, its
because they have already decided that they are anti-intellectual. Whereas they are very
much so intellectuals, as a matter of fact they are few of the debaters in our community
producing scholarship rather than regurgitating it. Our very frame of reference on how
to engage in debate is about the regurgitation of information, rather than the production
of it. That is where I think we have gone wrong, which is also why we are not having
good we are not able to advertise to our administrations in a way that makes debate
something that administrations really really want to support and fully fund. And the
reason is because we made it such this isolated solipsistic game that people who are
really interested in knowledge production dont necessarily see their relationship to it.
We are losing tenure stream jobs for debate directors in our community. The reason is
because our community is becoming more and more disconnected from the academy.
What we can do in terms of how we produce scholarship for debate, in debate rounds, is
that we need to change our focus from the regurgitation of information that is already
produced in the academy to an engagement with it so that we are producing new
knowledge. So rather than saying the only way you can have a plan for what to do
different with democracy assistance is to find what the USFG has already defined it as,
and get authors who, you have to find a solvency advocate for whatever change you are
going to make. So somebody has already produced that idea and gotten it into print.
Stupid! Stupid. We are so smart, this community of people, I have never been around
smarter people than the people in the debate community. Thats why I find it exciting.
Because Im really smart, so I enjoy talking to other smart people. And, we are just not
making use of the intelligence, the intellectual power that is at a debate tournament,
especially when you get to the top of the game, it is amazingly powerful. I have met
graduate students and professors that are nowhere near as smart as some of our
undergraduates their senior year at the height of their ability to compete. Just have not.
Odekirk: Amen. Dr. Reid-Brinkley: Given that this is the case, why are we not producing
knew knowledge? Rather than coming at a plan as I have to have a solvency advocate
who has already defined this, and I have to define this in the context of exactly how the
USFG has previously defined it. I think we should be producing new arguments about
what democracy assistance should look like and be like through the USFG. So rather
than having a solvency advocate you would have evidentiary support to change parts of

your argument. Just like writing an academic paper. If all academic papers were was
regurgitation of someone elses argument, it would never get published. The whole point
of academic scholarship is for you to identify whats being said in the field or around a
particular issue and whats missing from that, and then you do something to
demonstrate why that thing thats missing in that scholarship should be there, and you
make an argument about how we need to expand our understanding of this situation.
Does that make sense to you? So it doesnt make sense that the ways we in which we
engage in policy making is to simply chain it out to what something else someone has
already thought of. When we have all this intellectual power, we should be producing
new policy. That would be the change. That would change our very way of thinking
about what the game is that we are playing, and what its potential connection is to both
the academy but also politics. And that would create the space for teams who want to
talk about anti-blackness or teams that want to talk about the defining nature of gender
and how we engage in policy. It would allow all these different things because our very
frame of reference for understanding what the game is that we are engaging in would
change, it would open up fields of literature, it would make sense that people are saying
we need a three tier methodology where we look at organic intellectuals we look at other
scholars and we look at our personal experience, guess what, thats how you write a [ed]
academic paper now. Odekirk: Strong. Dr. Reid-Brinkley: How about you just get with
the program? Odekirk: Its so obvious, but Ive never seen it. You are so right, but Im
having a major a-ha moment right now, to be honest. You are so [ed] right. Its also so
been there my whole life, but I have literally never thought that, and.. duh. Dr. ReidBrinkley: Yeah, thats how I feel about it, like duh! Know what I mean? Then we have a
much better argument to make to our administrations about the significance of our
programs, we can start connecting debate tournament final rounds to whats going on in
public policy research institutions. What we produce could literally provide an entrance
for our arguments to actually affect public policy because of the intellectual power our
community holds. Why are we not making use of the things that would get our programs
support? It doesnt make sense to me. Thats why debate is collapsing to this very small
small small society. Once that collapse between the NDT and CEDA happened, have you
watched the community shrink over time? It just has gotten smaller. And it will continue
to get smaller, because we will continue to disconnect ourselves from the academy. But
why are we not in conversations on a consistent basis with our authors? Duh!? This is
why whats happening in black debate. Is more fascinating than what is happening
anywhere else. Im really interested in Spurlock interviewing Spanos about debate. Im
interested in the fact that Damiyr & Miguel, members of the Towson squad, me and
some other black debate people got invited by Dylan Rodriguez to appear at the
American Studies Conference to talk about whats happening in debate and activism and
scholarship around blackness in issues like prison, etc. Im interested in that, because
these scholars are like woah, yall are talking about this stuff here? and they are like
watching video links of the students debating, and like theyre on our Resistance
homepage. I have created a Facebook Resistance page thats private that all of the
movement and its coalition members are on. So, I get requests, I put you on if you are a
coalition member, Wilderson is on there, Dylan Rodriguez is on there, Sexton is on

there, you know what I mean? And, we justthats what debate should look like.
Academics should be participating, they shouldnt control it, but you should be able to
come talk to us in our theories about the topic. How about that? You dont need to write
evidence for you about the Arab Spring for me to describe to you why my work on
African American culture and hip hop are relevant to thinking about whats going on in
the Arab Spring. I simply am teaching you to chain my theory through another example.
Thats how you write an academic paper. You take somebody elses theory, and you dont
just map it exactly on to what it is that you are working on. You have to figure out what
the relationship is between the two. Thats the kind of stuff we could produce as a
community, every year, on topics. We just are not taking advantage of that. And, in that
process, because of how we have defined debate, it is exclusionary. We do have these
ideal debaters who look like white males, white straight men with money and class, and
those white men who dont fit that, are few and far between. They often get up there, but
they still is sort of like a little weird, because you dont perform white masculinity
middle to upper class in an appropriate manner, so they are cool with you, but youre
still freaky. We make those kinds of judgments because we are just so insulated. Our
thinking is so small. Smaller than it what we should and could be. And, thats my debate
future. Thats my vision of what it could look like, my dream that lets me walk around at
tournaments and be okay with the fact that supposedly Im despised by the elites,
higher-ups in the community, and people that used to be my friends, and that would
speak to me on a regular basis and that I would run up to and hug, avoid my eyes in the
hallway. Or that Im not qualified to write about debate, but neither is Spanos because
he was an outsider, but Im not qualified to write about it because Im an insider. But,
Casey Harrigan, and Jarrod Atchison, and Pannetta arethere is no question of their
qualifications. Im sorry, I thought I got a PhD from the number one program in rhetoric
in the country. Im sorry, I thought that was the case. I thought I was a national award
winning scholar, for my writing, published writing. I thought that was the case, and that
would make me somehow qualified to talk about debate a little bit but, clearly not.
But, once your black. Once you say your black, then your biased.
Thus we choose to sacrifice the 1AC. We sacrifice the Good, safe sex,
puppies, ice cream, life, death, black, white, day night, wrong right, and the
community. We sacrifice debate.
Mbembe 06. Achille Mbembe, senior researcher at the Institute of Social and
Economic Research at the University of the Witwatersrand, Faces of Freedom: Jewish
and Black Experiences, Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies,
7:3, pg. 298
There is another version of liberation we encounter in black imagination. It is predicated
on an understanding of politics as a form of asceticism, or even as a sacrificial act.
Liberation as a sacrificial movement is a very consuming process. Through
sheer human will, the self is sacrificed to the future common good. This is not
far from martyrdom. One form of life is killed for another to be sustained. In fact, to
strive for freedom is to court death and, if need be, to accept the responsibility of

ones own death, as made clear by Nelson Mandela during the Rivonia Trial (Long
Walk to Freedom). Death, in this case, is the door to life that which lays open the
truth of life, the life that lives by sacrificing itself. It is a sacrifice that is consummated
for all, hence its redemptive character. What black experiences of martyrdom
(Cabral, Lumumba, Um Nyobe`, and many others) seem to reflect is the fact that one
cannot be free if one is caught in the immediacy of being, in the empirical prison of
life. In other words, if freedoms goal is to preserve life, the idea that life must be
preserved at all costs (the principle of survival) is not necessarily conducive to
freedom. Selflessness is necessary to achieve freedom. To achieve freedom, one
must be ready to transcend oneself in death, or at least to come into close contact
with ones master: death. From Martin Luther King to Mandela, this absolute
authority granted to death or the possibility of death, this otherworldliness of freedom,
is a fundamental aspect of modern black narratives of redemption. Then there is the
relation between freedom and violence. Whether theorized or not, the practice of
violence in the name of the struggle for liberation or for that matter, survival was a
common feature of many political movements. Like the Jewish critic Walter Benjamin,
Fanon relies on an explicit notion of experience in this case the colonial experience to
lift the interdiction against killing as a legitimate means to obtain freedom. Unlike
Benjamin though, the lifting of the taboo of killing is not justified theologically, but
situationally. Unlike Benjamin, too, Fanon is not burdened by a Hebrew Bible or a
rabbinical or Mosaic law. The Fanonian practice of violence is not aimed to enact any
divine will or to instantiate any divine transcendence. Fanon simply believes that
colonialism, as violence in its natural state, will yield only when confronted by a greater
violence. Life, he adds, can only spring up again out of the rotting corpse of
the settler.

1nc
The affs rejection of chaos constructs an unreal perfect world opposite
reality that they order themselves to this engenders ressentiment. They
blame the chaos that is a part of them on their neighbor, and try to
eradicated it.
Saurette 96
(Paul Saurette, PhD in political theory at John Hopkins U, in 96 "I mistrust all
systematizers and avoid them': Nietzshce, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in
INternational Relations Theory." Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25 no.
1 page 3-6)
According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas
which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural
framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to , meaning
fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular
community.5 Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic
philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values
which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, .therefore, that to
understand the development of our modem conception of society and politics, we must
reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought.
Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical justification of life on
heroic myths which honoured tragedy and k competition. Life was understood as a
contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering
(Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and .affirmed as inescapable aspects of human
existence.6 However, this incarnation of the will to power as tragedy weakened, and
became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the
self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. -Everywhere
the : instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were.but five steps from excess: the
monstrum-in-animo was a universal danger. No longer willing to accept the tragic
hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought yielded to decadence, a
search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life, while still
giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates' thought became paramount. In
the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that
his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of
degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was coming to an
endAnd Socrates understood that the world had need of him his expedient, his cure
and his personal art of self-preservation. Socrates realised that his search for an
ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearning for
assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to
power. An alternate foundation that promised mastery and control not through
acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent,
and the problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece
tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by
retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In

Nietzsche's words, '[rationality was divined as a saviour...it was their last expedient. The
fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a
state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be
absurdly rational....'9 Thus, Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an
intellectual framework. The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to
understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence
and privileging an idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both
order and disorder however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only
possible by creating a 'Real World* of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an
'Apparent World of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained
within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and^ ignored in relation to the ideal
order of the Real World. Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental
contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and
the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomised model
led to the emergence of a uniquely 'modern'10 understanding of life which could only
view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World . This outlook
created a modern notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could
be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something is to blame.
Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition ressentiment. and argues that it
signalled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of
the Socratic resolution. This contradiction, however, was resolved historically through
the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to
Nietzsche,' ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing
the Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life
could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World,
precisely because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the Real World, As
Nietzsche wrote, I suffer: someone must be to blame for it thinks every sickly sheep.
But his shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: Quite so my sheep! Someone must be to
blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,-you
alone are to blame for yourself '-This is brazen and.false enough: but one thing, is
achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered." Faced, with the collapse of the
Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, 'one was in peril,
one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational.... '12 The genius of the
ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to
Truth by extrapolating ad absurdiuin the Socratic division through the redirection of
ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the Real World was
transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards
which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory
experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action. This subtle transformation of
the relationship between the dichotomised worlds creates the .Will to Order as the
defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian
suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches
for 'the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest. sleep, in short absence of
suffering According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only when the

Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World. The Will to Order, then, is the
aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts of the
moral-Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment of the Will to Order, therefore,
generates two interrelated reactions. First, ressentiment engenders a need actively to
mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal Apollonian Real
World. In order to achieve this," however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a 'truer',
more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established creating an everincreasing Will-to Truth. This self-perpetuating movement creates an interpretative
structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the
ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche suggests, [t]he ascetic ideal has a goal
this goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when
compared with it, petty and narrow; it interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably
with a view to this one goal; it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects,
denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.''1 The
very structure of the Will to Truth ensures that theoretical investigation must be
increasingly ordered, comprehensive, more True, and closer to the perfection of the
ideal. At the same time, this understanding of intellectual theory ensures that it creates
practices which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent World. With this
critical transformation, the Will to Order becomes .the fundamental philosophical
principle of modernity.

Disorder and chaos our inevitable their choice to survive instead of live
directly leads to ressentiment and nihilism this also turns the case since
security politics make violence and warfare inevitable
Der Derian 93 (james, prof of pol sci and U massachusets, the subject of political
violence, 1993, LB)
Nietzsche and Interpretive Realism In the last analysis, "love of the neighbor" is always
something secondary, partly conventional and arbitraryillusory in relation to fear of
the neigh-bor. After the structure of society is fixed on the whole and seems secure
against external dangers, it is this fear of the neighbor that again creates new
perspectives of moral valuation. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche
transvalues both Hobbcss and Marx's interpretations of securi-ty through a genealogy of
modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security,
but to destabilize the intolerable fiaional identities of the past which have been created
out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the
future.33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain
death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and,
finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking
an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which,
once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking
security from alien otherswho are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story
of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful

sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his
reinterprctation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here. One must
begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to
and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil, he
emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think
before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an
organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strengthlife itself is will to
power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results."34 The will to power,
then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its
negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in
Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to
power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings
including self-preservationare produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act
to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for "... life itself is essentially
appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness,
imposition of ones own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation
but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been
imprinted for ages."35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in
life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war. But the denial of this
permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a con-sensual rationality or to hide
from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire
for security is manifested as a collective resentment of differencethat which is not us,
not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven
desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which
produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a
truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In
The Gay Science, Nietzsche asks of the reader "Look, isn't our need for knowledge
precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and
questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids
us to know? And is the jubi lation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over
the restora-tion of a sense of security?**37 The fear of the unknown and the desire for
certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality
become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent
forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything
true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative pro-duces, and is sustained by, the
strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this
generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols-. The causal instinct is thus
conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?*1 shall, if at all possible,
not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of causea cause
(hat is comforting, liber-ating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has
not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for
some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but tor a particularly selected and
preferred kind of explanationthat which most quickly and frequently abolished the
feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual

explanations.38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain
unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility
recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates
a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of
security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of
mistrust and evil experiences."39 The unknowable which cannot be contained by force
or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other
common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as
the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and
composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god."40
For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods:
"Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error, in every single case,
cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing
something 10 be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its 4l causes.
Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this
paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Gencalo gy of Morals,
Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to ones ancestors:
The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplish-ments of the
ancestors that the tribe existsand that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and
accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater, since these
forebears never cease, in their contin-ued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the
tribe new advantages and new strength/2 Sacrifices, honors, obedience arc given but it
is never enough, for The ancestors of the most powerful tribts are bound eventually to
grow to monstrous dimensions through the imagination of growing fear and to recede
into the darkness of the divinely uncanny and unimaginable: in the end the ancestor
must necessarily be transfigured into a god.4i As the ancestors debt becomes embedded
in institutions, the community takes on the role of creditor. Nietzsche mocks this
originary, Hobbesian moment: One lives in a community, one enjoys the advantages of
communality (oh what advantages! we sometimes underrate them today), one dwells
protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and
hostile acts to which the man outside, the "man without peace," is exposed . . . since one
has bound and pledged oneself to the community precisely with a view to injury and
hostile acts.44 The establishment of the community is dependent upon, indeed it feeds
upon, this fear of being left outside. As the castle wall is replaced by written treaty,
however, and distant gods by temporal sovereigns, the martial skills and spiritual
virtues of the noble warrior are slowly debased and dissimulated. The subject of the
individual will to power becomes the object of a collective resentment. The result? The
fear of the external other is transvalued into the "love of the neighbor" quoted in the
opening of this section, and the perpetuation of community is assured through the
internalization and legitimation of a fear that lost its original source long ago. This
powerful nexus of fear, of external and internal otherness, generates the values which
uphold the security imperative. Indeed, Nietzsche locates the genealogy of even
individual rights, such as freedom, in the calculus of maintaining security: - My rights are that pan of my power which others not merely conceded me, but which they wish me

to preserve. How do these others arrive at that? First: through their prudence and fear
and caution: whether in that they expect something similar from us in return
(protection of their rights); or in that they consider that a struggle with us would be
perilous or to no purpose; or in that they sec in any diminution of our force a
disadvantage to themselves, since we would then be unsuited to forming an alliance with
them in opposition to a hostile third power. Then: by donation and cession.45 The point
of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show that the perilous conditions that created the
security imperativeand the western metaphysics that perpetuate ithave diminished
if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life persists: "Our century denies this perilousncss,
and docs so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old
habits of Christian security. Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation."46
Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has
created an even worse danger the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy
of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The
security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity,
uncertainty, paradoxall that makes a free life worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this
lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions: Of future
virtuesHow comes it that the more comprehensible the world has grown the more
solemnities of every kind have decreased? Is it that fear was so much the basic clement
of that reverence which overcame us in the presence of everything unknown and
mysterious and taught us to fall down before the incomprehensible and plead tor
mercy? And has the world not lost some of its charm for us because we have grown less
fearful? With the diminution of our fearrulness has our own dignity and solemnity, our
own fiarsomeness, not also diminished?47 It is of course in Nietzsche's lament, in his
deepest pessimism for the last man, that one finds the celebration of the overman as
both symptom and harbinger of a more free-spirited yet fearsome age. Dismissive of
Utopian engineering, Nietzsche never suggests how he would restructure society; he
looks forward only so far as to sight the emergence of "new philosophers" (such as
himself?) who would restore a reverence for fear and reevaluate the security imperative.
Nietzsche does, however, go back to a pre-Christian, pre-Socratic era to find the
exemplars for a new kind of securi iv. In The Genealogy of Morals^ he holds up Pericles
as an example, for lauding the Athenians for their "rhatbymia"a term that
incorporates the notion of "indifference to and contempt for security."48 It is perhaps
too much to expect Nietzsche's message to resonate in late modern times, to expect, at
the very time when conditions seem most uncertain and unpredictable, that people
would treat fear as a stimulus for improvement rather than cause for retrenchment. Yet
Nietzsche would clearly see these as opportune times, when fear could be willfully
asserted as a force for the affirmation of difference, rather than canalized into a cautious
identity constructed from the calculation of risks and benefits. Like the real. warfare will
no longer have any place - except precisely if the nuclear powers are successful in deescalation and manage to define new space: for warfare. ll' military power. at the cost of
do-escalating this marvelously practical madness to the second power, reestablishes a
setting for warfare. n confined space that is in fact human. then weapons will regain
their use value and their exchange value: it will be possible to exchange warfare. Jean

Baudrillard. Fatal Strategies Fine allegories. Baudrillard would say of Marx and
Nietzsche. Nietzsche's efforts to represent the deeper impulses behind the will to
security, as well as Marx's effort to chart the origins of the struggle for power, to pierce
the veil of false consciousness that has postponed revolution, to scientifically represent
the world-to-be. are just examples ofa representational mirroring. a doubling of late
modernity's cartography of the world-as-it-is. 'For . imperialism.' says Baudrillard. 'that
present-day simulator real. all the real. coincide with their simulation models."'
Baudrillard goes beyond Nietzsche in his interpretation c and the inability of rational
man or the proletariat to fill the void with stable distinctions between the real and the a]
referent. good and evil. In the hyperbolic. often nihilistic visi the task of modernity is no
longer to demystify or disenchant Nietzsche realised. 'with the real world we have also
abolish world" - but to save the reality principle. which in this C354 else. the sovereign
state acting in an anarchical order to maintain and if possible expand its security and
power in the face of penetrative forces. like the ICBM. military (and now civilian)
surveillance sattelites, international terrorist, the telecommunications web. envi ments.
transnational human rights conventions. to name: obvious forces. ln his now familiar
words: 'It is no longer a question of false representation of reality (ideology) but of
concealing the fact that the real is no longer real.
Refuse all attempts to close off alterity in the system the ballot represents
your stance towards the possibility of living instead of surviving
Baudrillard 76 (Jean, certified badass, Symbolic Exchange and Death, 1976, LB)
Security is another form of social control, in the form of life blackmailed with the
afterlife. It is universally present for us today, and 'security forces' range from life
assurance and social security to the car seatbelt by way of the state security police force.
'Belt up' says an advertising slogan for seatbelts. Of course, security, like ecology, is an
industrial business extending its cover up to the level of the species: a convertibility of
accident, disease and pollution into capitalist surplus profit is operative everywhere . But
this is above all a question of the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you
of your own death, which everybody dreams of, as the darkness beneath their instinct of
conservation. It is necessary to rob everyone of the last possibility of giving themselves
their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system. Again, in
this symbolic short-circuit, the gift-exchange is the challenge to oneself and one's own
life, and is carried out through death. Not because it expresses the individual's asocial
rebellion (the defection of one or millions of individuals does not infringe the law of the
system at all), but because it carries in it a principle of sociality that is radically
antagonistic to our own social repressive principle. To bury death beneath the contrary
myth of security, it is necessary to exhaust the gift-exchange. Is it so that men might live
that the demand for death must be exhausted? No, but in order that they die the only
death the system authorises: the living are separated from their dead, who no longer
exchange anything but the form of their afterlife, under the sign of comprehensive
insurance. Thus car safety mummified in his helmet, his seatbelt, all the paraphernalia
of security , wrapped up in the security myth, the driver is nothing but a corpse, closed

up in another, non-mythic, death , as neutral and objective a s technology, noiseless and

expertly crafted. Riveted to his machine, glued to the spot in it, he no longer runs the
risk of dying, since he is already dead. This is the secret of security, like a steak under
cellophane : to surround you with a sarcophagus in order to prevent you from dying Our
whole technical culture creates an artificial milieu of death . It is not only armaments
that remain the general archetype of material production , but the simplest machine
around us constitutes a horizon of death, a death that will never be resolved because it
has crystallised beyond reach . fixed capital of death, where the living labour of death
has frozen over, as the labour force is frozen in fixed capital and dead labour. In other
words, all material production is merely a gigantic 'character armour' by means of which
the species means to keep death at a respectful distance . Of course, death itself
overshadows the species and seals it into the armour the species thought to protect itself
with . Here again , commensurate with an entire civilisation , we find the image of the
automobile-sarcophagus: the protective armour is just death miniaturised and become a
technical extension of your own body The biologisation of the body and the
technicisation of the environment go hand in hand in the same obsessional neurosis.
The technical environment is our over-production of pollutant, fragile and obsolescent
objects. For production lives, its entire logic and strategy are articulated on fragility and
obsolescence . An economy of stable products and good objects is indispensable: the
economy develops only by exuding danger, pollution, usury, deception and haunting.
The economy lives only on the suspension of death that it maintains throughout
material production , and through renewing the available death stocks , even if it means
conjuring it up by a security build up: blackmail and repression . Death is definitively
secularised in material production, where it is reproduced on a large scale as capital.
Even our bodies, which have become biological machinery, are modelled on this
inorganic body, and therefore become, at the same time , a bad object, condemned to
disease , accident and death. Living by the production of death, capital has an easy time
producing security' it's the same thing. Security is the industrial prolongation of death,
just as ecology is the industrial prolongation of pollution . A few more bandages on the
sarcophagus. This is also true of the great institutions that are the glory of our
democracy' Social Security is the social prosthesis of a dead society (,Social Security is
death ! ' - May '68) , that is to say, a society already exterminated in all its symbolic
wheels, in its deep system of reciprocities and obligations, which means that neither the
concept of security nor that of the 'social' ever had any meaning. The 'social' begins by
taking charge of death . It's the same story as regards cultures that have been destroyed
then revived and protected as folklore (d. M. de Certeau, ' La beaute du mort' [in La
culture au pluriel, Paris: UGE, 1 974]) . The same goes for life assurance, which is the
domestic variant of a system which everywhere presupposes death as an axiom . The
social translation of the death of the group - each materialising for the other only as
social capital indexed on death. Death is dissuaded at the price of a continual
mortification : such is the paradoxical logic of security In a Christian context, ascesis
played the same role. The accumulation of suffering and penitence was able to play the
same role as character armour, as a protective sarcophagus against hell. And our
obsessional compulsion for security can be interpreted as a gigantic collective ascesis, an

anticipation of death in life itself: from protection into protection, from defence to
defence, crossing all jurisdictions, institutions and modern material apparatuses, life is
no longer anything but a doleful, defensive book-keeping, locking every risk into its
sarcophagus. Keeping the accounts on survival, instead of the radical compatibility of
life and death. Our system lives off the production of death and pretends to manufacture
security. An about-face? Not at all, just a simple twist in the cycle whose two ends meet.
That an automobile firm remodels itself on the basis of security (like industry on antipollution measures) without altering its range, objectives or products shows that
security is only a question of exchanging terms. Security is only an internal condition of
the reproduction of the system when it reaches a certain level of expansion, just as
feedback is only an internal regulating procedure for systems that have reached a certain
point of complexity.
Our alternative is to Do nothing in the instance of the plan. The refusal to
act accepts the inevitability of struggle, allowing us to understand pain
positively.
Nietzsche, 78 The anti-christ Human, All too Human. Aphorism #284 1878
The means to real peace. No government admits any more that it keeps an army to
satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather the army is supposed to serve for
defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies
one's own morality and the neighbor's immorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as
eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the
reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for
conquest just as much as does our own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army
only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like
nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight. Thus
all states are now ranged against each other: they presuppose their neighbor's bad
disposition and their own good disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as
bad as war and worse. At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars,
because, as I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile
disposition and act. We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense
just as completely as the desire for conquests. And perhaps the great day will come when
people, distinguished by wars and victories and by the highest development of a military
order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifices for these things,
will exclaim of its own free will, "We break the sword," and will smash its entire military
establishment down to its lowest foundations. Rendering oneself unarmed when one had
been the best-armed, out of a height of feelingthat is the means to real peace, which must
always rest on a peace of mind; whereas the so-called armed peace, as it now exists in all
countries, is the absence of peace of mind. One trusts neither oneself nor one's neighbor
and, half from hatred, half from fear, does not lay down arms. Rather perish than hate and
fear, and twice rather perish than make oneself hated and fearedthis must someday
become the highest maxim for every single commonwealth. Our liberal representatives,
as is well known, lack the time for reflecting on the nature of man: else they would know

that they work in vain when they work for a "gradual decrease of the military burden."
Rather, only when this kind of need has become greatest will the kind of god be nearest
who alone can help here. The tree of war-glory can only be destroyed all at once, by a
stroke of lightning: but lightning, as indeed you know, comes from a cloudand from up
high.

arctic
Economic rationality allows for the worst form of violence capitalism is
no longer the trading of the real but the symbolic that turns the case
Bifo 11
(Franco, pretty clever scholar, activist and Marxist, After the Future, 2011, LB)
More than ever, economic rationality is at odds with social rationality. Economic science
is not part of the solution to the crisis: it is the source of the problem. On July 18th 2009
the headline of The Economist read: What went wrong with economics? The text is an
attempt to downplay the crisis of the Economics profession, and of economic
knowledge. For neoliberal economists the central dogma of growth, profit and
competition cannot be questioned, because it is identified with the perfect mathematical
rationality of the market. And belief in the intrinsic rationality of the market is crucial in
the economic theology of neoliberalism. But the reduction of social life to the rational
exchange of economic values is an obsession that has nothing to do with science. Its a
political strategy aimed to identify humans as calculating machines, aimed to shape
behavior and perception in such a way that money becomes the only motivation of
social action. But it is not accurate as a description of social dynamics, and the conflicts,
pathologies, and irrationality of human relationships. Rather, it is an attempt at creating
the anthropological brand of homo calculans that Foucault (2008) has described in his
seminar of 1979/80, published with the title The Birth of Biopolitics. This attempt to
identify human beings with calculating devices has produced cultural devastation, and
has finally been showed to have been based upon flawed assumptions. Human beings do
calculate, but their calculation is not perfectly rational, because the value of goods is not
determined by objective reasons, and because decisions are influenced by what Keynes
named animal spirits. We will never really understand important economic events
unless we confront the fact that their causes are largely mental in nature, say Akerlof
and Shiller (2009: 1) in their book Animal Spirits, echoing Keyness assumption that the
rationality of the market is not perfect in itself. Akerlof and Shiller are avowing the crisis
of neoliberal thought, but their critique is episteme. Animal Spirits is the title of an other
book, by Matteo Pasquinelli (2008). Pasquinellis book deals with bodies and digits, and
parasites, and goes much deeper in its understanding of the roots of the crisis than its
eponymous publication: Cognitive capitalism emerges in the form of a parasite: it
subjects social knowledge and inhibits its emancipatory potential (Pasquinelli 2008:
93). Beyond the computer screen, precarious workers and freelancers experience how
Free Labor and competition are increasingly devouring their everyday life (Pasquinelli
2008: 15). Pasquinelli goes to the core of the problem: the virtualization of social
production has acted as the proliferation of a parasite, destroying the prerequisites of
living relationships, absorbing and neutralizing the living energies of cognitive workers.
The economic recession is not only the effect of financial craziness, but also the effect of
the de-vitalization of the social field. This is why the collapse of the economic system is
also the collapse of economic epistemology that has guided the direction of politics in
the last two centuries. Economics cannot understand the depth of the crisis, because
below the crisis of financial exchange there is the crisis of symbolic exchange. I

mean the psychotic boom of panic, depression, and suicide, the general decline of desire
and social empathy. The question that rises from the collapse is so radical that the
answer cannot be found in the economic conceptual framework. Furthermore, one must
ask if economics really is a science? If the word science means the creation of concepts
for the understanding and description of an object, economics is not a science. Its object
does not exist. The economic object (scarcity, salaried labor, and profit) is not an object
that exists before and outside the performative action of the economic episteme.
Production, consumption, and daily life become part of the economic discourse when
labor is detached and opposed to human activity, when it falls under the domination of
capitalist rule. The economic object does not pre-exist conceptual activity, and economic
description is in fact a normative action. In this sense Economics is a technique, a
process of semiotization of the world, and also a mythology, a narration. Economics is a
suggestion and a categorical imperative: Money makes things happen. It is the source of
action in the world and perhaps the only power we invest in. Life seems to depend on it.
Everything within us would like to say that it does not, that this cannot be. But the
Almighty Dollar has taken command. The more it is denied the more it shows
itself as Almighty. Perhaps in every other respect, in every other value, bankruptcy
has been declared, giving money the power of some sacred deity, demanding to be
recognized. Economics no longer persuades money to 111 behave. Numbers cannot
make the beast lie down and be quiet or sit up and do tricks. At best, economics is a
neurosis of money, a symptom contrived to hold the beast in abeyance. Thus
economics shares the language of psychopathology inflation, depression, lows and
highs, slumps and peaks, investments and losses. (Sordello 1983) From the age of the
enclosures in England the economic process has been a process of production of scarcity
(scarcification). The enclosures were intended to scarcify the land, and the basic means
of survival, so that people who so far had been able to cultivate food for their family
were forced to become proletarians, then salaried industrial workers. Capitalism is
based on the artificial creation of need, and economic science is essentially a technique
of scarcification of time, life and food. Inside the condition of scarcity human beings are
subjected to exploitation and to the domain of profit-oriented activity. After scarcifying
the land (enclosures) capitalism has scarcified time itself, forcing people who dont have
property other than their own life and body, to lend their life-time to capital. Now the
capitalist obsession for growth is making scarce both water and air. Economic science is
not the science of prediction: it is the technique of producing, implementing, and
pushing scarcity and need. This is why Marx did not speak of economy, but of political
economy. The technique of economic scarcification is based on a mythology, a narration
that identifies richness as property and acquisition, and subjugates the possibility of
living to the lending of time and to the transformation of human activity into salaried
work. In recent decades, technological change has slowly eroded the very foundations of
economic science. Shifting from the sphere of production of material objects to the
semiocapitalist production of immaterial goods, the Economic concepts are losing their
foundation and legitimacy. The basic categories of Economics are becoming totally
artificial. The theoretical justification of private property, as you read in the writings of
John Locke, is based on the need of exclusive consumption. An apple must be

privatized, if you want to avoid the danger that someone else eats your apple. But what
happens when goods are immaterial, infinitely replicable without cost? Thanks to
digitalization and immaterialization of the production process, the economic nomos of
private property loses its ground, its raison detre, and it can be imposed only by force.
Furthermore, the very foundation of salary, the relationship between time needed for
production and value of the product, is vanishing. The immaterialization and
cognitivization of production makes it almost impossible to quantify the average time
needed to produce value. Time and value become incommensurable, and violence
becomes the only law able to determine price and salary. The neoliberal school, which
has opened the way to the worldwide deregulation of social production, has fostered the
mythology of rational expectations in economic exchange, and has touted the idea of a
self-regulation of the market, first of all the labor-market. But self-regulation is a lie. In
order to increase exploitation, and to destroy social welfare, global capitalism has used
political institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO), not to mention the military enforcement of the political decisions
of these institutions. Far from being self-regulated, the market is militarily regulated.
The mythology of free individuals loyally competing on the base of perfect knowledge of
the market is a lie, too. Real human beings are not perfect rational calculating machines.
And the myth of rational expectations has finally crashed after the explosion of the real
estate mortgage bubble. The theory of rational expectation is crucial in neoliberal
thought: the economic agents are supposed to be free to choose in a perfectly rational
way the best deal in selling and buying. The fraud perpetrated by the investment
agencies has destroyed the lives of millions of Americans, and has exposed the
theoretical swindle. Economic exchange cannot be described as a rational game , because
irrational factors play a crucial role in social life in general. Trickery, misleading
information, and psychic manipulation are not exceptions, but the professional tools of
advertisers, financial agents, and economic consultants. The idea that social
relationships can be described in mathematical terms has the force of myth, but it is not
science, and it has nothing to do with natural law. Notwithstanding the failure of the
theory, neoliberal politics are still in control of the global machine, because the criminal
class that has seized power has no intention of stepping down, and because the social
brain is unable to recompose and find the way of self-organization. I read in the New
York Times on September 6th 2009: After the mortgage business imploded last year,
Wall Street investment banks began searching for another big idea to make money. They
think they may have found one. The bankers plan to buy life settlements, life
insurance policies that ill and elderly people sell for cash, depending on the life
expectancy of the insured person. Then they plan to securitize these policies, in Wall
Street jargon, by packaging hundreds of thousands together into bonds. They will then
resell those bonds to investors, like big pension funds, who will receive the payouts
when people with the insurance die. The earlier the policyholder dies, the bigger the
return, though if people live longer than expected investors could get poor returns or
even lose money. Imagine that I buy an insurance policy on my life (something I would
absolutely not do). My insurer of course will wish me a long life, so Ill pay the fee for a
long time, while he should pay lots of money to my family if I 113 die. But some

enlightened finance guru has the brilliant idea of insuring the insurer. He buys the risk,
and he invests on the hope that I die soon. You dont need the imagination of Philip K.
Dick to guess the follow up of the story: financial agents will be motivated to kill me
overnight. The talk of recovery is based on necronomy, the economy of death. Its not
new, as capitalism has always profited from wars, slaughters and genocides. But now the
equation becomes unequivocal. Death is the promise, death is the investment and the
hope. Death is the best future that capitalism may secure . The logic of speculation is
different from the logic of spectacle that was dominant in late-modern times. Spectacle
is the mirrorization of life, the transfer of life in the mirror of spectacular accumulation.
Speculation is the subjugation of the future to its financial mirror, the substitution of
present life with future money that will never come, because death will come before. The
lesson that we must learn from the first year of the global recession is sad: neoliberal
folly is not going away, the financial plungers will not stop their speculation, and
corporations will not stop their exploitation, and the political class, largely controlled by
the corporate lobbies, is unwilling or unable to protect society from the final assault. In
1996 J. G. Ballard (1996: 188) wrote: the most perfect crime of all when the
victims are either willing, or arent aware that they are victims. Democracy
seems unable to stop the criminal class that has seized control of the economy, because
the decisions are no longer made in the sphere of political opinion, but in the
inaccessible sphere of economic automatism. The economy has been declared the basic
standard of decision, and the economists have systematically identified Economy with
the capitalist obsession of growth. No room for political choice has been left, as the
corporate principles have been embedded in the technical fabric of language and
imagination.

No arctic conflict
Dyer 12 (Gwynne Dyer, OC is a London-based independent Canadian journalist,
syndicated columnist and military historian., His articles are published in 45 countries,
8/4/2012, "Race for Arctic Mostly Rhetoric",
www.winnipegfreepress.com/opinion/columnists/race-for-arctic-mostly-rhetoric164986566.html)
Russian television contacted me last night asking me to go on a program about the race
for Arctic resources. The ice is melting fast, and it was all the usual stuff about how there
will be big strategic conflicts over the seabed resources -- especially oil and gas -- that
become accessible when it's gone. The media always love conflict, and now that the
Cold War is long gone, there's no other potential military confrontation between
the great powers to worry about. Governments around the Arctic Ocean are beefing
up their armed forces for the coming struggle, so where are the flashpoints and what are
the strategies? It's great fun to speculate about possible wars. In the end I didn't do the
interview because the Skype didn't work, so I didn't get the chance to rain on their
parade. But here's what I would said to the Russians if my server hadn't gone down at

the wrong time. First, you should never ask the barber if you need a haircut. The armed
forces in every country are always looking for reasons to worry about impending
conflict, because that's the only reason their governments will spend money on them.
Sometimes they will be right to worry, and sometimes they will be wrong, but right or
wrong, they will predict conflict. Like the barbers, it's in their professional interest to say
you need their services. So you'd be better off to ask somebody who doesn't have a stake
in the game. As I don't own a single warship, I'm practically ideal for the job. And I
don't think there will be any significant role for the armed forces in the Arctic,
although there is certainly going to be a huge investment in exploiting the region's
resources. There are three separate "resources" in the Arctic. On the surface, there are
the sea lanes that are opening up to commercial traffic along the northern coasts of
Russia and Canada. Under the seabed, there are potential oil and gas deposits that can
be drilled once the ice retreats. And in the water in between, there is the planet's last
unfished ocean. The sea lanes are mainly a Canadian obsession, because the government
believes the Northwest Passage that weaves between Canada's Arctic islands will become
a major commercial artery when the ice is gone. Practically every summer, Prime
Minister Stephen Harper travels north to declare his determination to defend Canada's
Arctic sovereignty from -- well, it's not clear from exactly whom, but it's a great photo
op. Canada is getting new Arctic patrol vessels and building a deep-water naval port and
Arctic warfare training centre in the region, but it's all much ado about nothing. The
Arctic Ocean will increasingly be used as a shortcut between the North Atlantic and the
North Pacific, but the shipping will not go through Canadian waters. Russia's "Northern
Sea Route" will get the traffic, because it's already open and much safer to navigate.
Then there's the hydrocarbon deposits under the Arctic seabed, which the U.S.
Geological Survey has forecast may contain almost one-fourth of the world's remaining
oil and gas resources. But from a military point of view, there's only a problem if there is
some disagreement about the seabed boundaries. There are only four areas where the
boundaries are disputed. Two are between Canada and its eastern and western
neighbours in Alaska and Greenland, but there is zero likelihood of a war between
Canada and the United States or Denmark (which is responsible for Greenland's
defence). In the Bering Strait, there is a treaty defining the seabed boundary
between the United States and Russia, signed in the dying days of the Soviet Union, but
the Russian Duma has refused to ratify it. The legal uncertainty caused by the dispute,
however, is more likely to deter future investment in drilling there than lead to war.
And then there was the seabed-boundary dispute between Norway and Russia in the
Barents Sea, which led Norway to double the size of its navy over the past decade. But
last year, the two countries signed an agreement dividing the disputed area right down
the middle and providing for joint exploitation of its resources. So no war between
NATO (of which Norway is a member) and the Russian Federation. Which leaves the
fish, and it's hard to have a war over fish. The danger is rather that the world's fishing
fleets will crowd in and clean the fish out, as they are currently doing in the Southern
Ocean around Antarctica. If the countries with Arctic coastlines want to preserve this

resource, they can only do so by creating an international body to regulate the fishing.
And they will have to let other countries fish there, too, with agreed catch limits, since
they are mostly international waters. They will be driven to co-operate, in their own
interests. So no war over the Arctic. All we have to worry about now is the fact the ice
is melting, which will speed global warming (because open water absorbs far more heat
from the sun than highly reflective ice), and ultimately melt the Greenland icecap and
raise sea levels worldwide by seven metres. But that's a problem for another day.
No risk of methane bursts hydrates are stable and wont reach
atmosphere recent research proves
Ruppel 12 (Carolyn, US geological service, Gas Hydrates and Climate WarmingWhy
a Methane Catastrophe Is Unlikely, May / June 2012,
http://soundwaves.usgs.gov/2012/06/, 6/26/14) HL
News stories and Web postings have raised concerns that climate warming will release
large volumes of methane from gas hydrates, kicking off a chain reaction of warming
and methane releases. But recent research indicates that most of the worlds gas hydrate
deposits should remain stable for the next few thousand years. Of the gas hydrates likely
to become unstable, few are likely to release methane that could reach the atmosphere
and intensify climate warming. For the most part, warming at rates documented by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for the 20th century should not lead to
catastrophic breakdown of methane hydrates or major leakage of methane to the oceanatmosphere system from gas hydrates that dissociate.

navy
American hegemony is deadthe only thing that remains is a racist
sovereign violence that makes all their impacts and the destruction of
American policy only a matter of inevitability
Gulli 13. Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at
Kingsborough College in New York, For the critique of sovereignty and violence,
http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence, pg.
14
It is then important to ask the question of what power can alter this racism that, as
Foucault says, first develops with colonization, or in other words, with colonizing
genocide (1997: 257). From its first development, we then get to a situation where, as I
noted at the outset of this paper, racist violence becomes a global and biopolitical
regime of terror , a war between two main classes: the war of the political and
financial elites against the class of those who have been dispossessed to various degrees
once again, the violence of the 1% against the 99%. As Foucault says, this is a question
of the technique of power, more than of ideologies (as it was the case with the traditional
type of racism), because the sovereign elites, the State, are well aware of the urgency of
the struggle, the fact that, again, what is left to them is the raw use of the violence
that, as Walter Benjamin (1978) says, informs the law, domination without hegemony.
Especially at the present stage of the world, where information and knowledge make it
unnecessary and thus impossible for the General Intellect or common understanding
and reason to be governed, brutal domination and potentially genocidal methods of
repression seem to be the only instruments left to a decaying and ruthless
global ruling class. Then, the old sovereign power of life and death implies the
workings, the introduction and activation, of racism (Foucault 1997: 258). Foucault
makes the example of Nazi Germany, where murderous power and sovereign power
[were] unleashed throughout the entire social body (p.259) and the entire
population was exposed to death (p.260). But this is today a common and
global paradigm: The sovereign right to kill (ibid.), from cases of police brutality in
the cities to war atrocities throughout the world, has become the most effective way
to deal with a population that refuses to recognize the false legitimacy of the
sovereign, the sovereign right to govern. What Foucault says of the Nazi State
but he acknowledges it applies to the workings of all States (ibid.)shows the
terminal stage of sovereign power : a desperate will to absolute domination no
longer able to count on hegemony: We have an absolutely racist State, an
absolutely murderous State, and an absolutely suicidal State (ibid.). This
certainly shows the crisis of sovereignty as State power, but more broadly, in a
globalized world, it shows the crisis of the sovereign elites, who are facing a final
solution. No one can blame them. Their unintelligent worldview is bound to that. The

hope is that they will not destroy everything before they are gone . Yet, they
will not go by themselves, without the workings of an altering power, bound to inherit
the earth. This is the power of individuation, the dignity of individuation, whose
workings are based on disobedience and care. It is the power of those who, in the age of
biopolitical terror, have nothing to sell except their own skins, (Marx 1977: 295),
reversing the history of racist violence, of conquest, enslavement, robbery, [and]
murder (ibid.).
No Asia warmultiple safeguards and reversible tensions
Feng 10 professor at the Peking University International Studies [Zhu, An Emerging
Trend in East Asia: Military Budget Increases and Their
Impact, http://www.fpif.org/articles/an_emerging_trend_in_east_asia?
utm_source=feed]
As such, the surge of defense expenditures in East Asia does not add up to an arms race.
No country in East Asia wants to see a new geopolitical divide and spiraling tensions in
the region. The growing defense expenditures powerfully illuminate the deepening of a
regional security dilemma, whereby the defensive actions taken by one country are
perceived as offensive by another country, which in turn takes its own defensive
actions that the first country deems offensive. As long as the region doesnt split into
rival blocs, however, an arms race will not ensue. What is happening in East Asia is the
extension of what Robert Hartfiel and Brian Job call competitive arms processes. The
history of the cold war is telling in this regard. Arm races occur between great-power
rivals only if the rivalry is doomed to intensify. The perceived tensions in the region do
not automatically translate into consistent and lasting increases in military spending.
Even declared budget increases are reversible. Taiwans defense budget for fiscal year
2010, for instance, will fall 9 percent. This is a convincing case of how domestic
constraints can reverse a government decision to increase the defense budget.
Australias twenty-year plan to increase the defense budget could change with a
domestic economic contraction or if a new party comes to power. Chinas two-digit
increase in its military budget might vanish one day if the type of regime changes or the
high rate of economic growth slows. Without a geopolitical split or a significant greatpower rivalry, military budget increases will not likely evolve into arms races. The
security dilemma alone is not a leading variable in determining the curve of military
expenditures. Nor will trends in weapon development and procurement inevitably
induce risk-taking behavior. Given the stability of the regional security architecture
the combination of U.S.-centered alliance politics and regional, cooperation-based
security networkingany power shift in East Asia will hardly upset the overall status
quo. Chinas military modernization, its determination to prepare for the worst and
hope for the best, hasnt yet led to a regional response in military budget increases. In
contrast, countries in the region continue to emphasize political and economic
engagement with China, though balancing China strategies can be found in almost
every corner of the region as part of an overall balance-of-power logic. In the last few

years, China has taken big strides toward building up asymmetric war capabilities
against Taiwan. Beijing also holds to the formula of a peaceful solution of the Taiwan
issue except in the case of the islands de jure declaration of independence. Despite its
nascent capability of power projection, China shows no sign that it would coerce Taiwan
or become militarily assertive
over contentious territorial claims ranging from the Senkaku Islands to the Spratly
Islands to the India-China border dispute.
Naval power is inevitable
Kaplan, senior fellow Center for a New American Security, 12/17/8
(Robert, A Gentler Hegemony, Washington Post)
Declinism is in the air. The latest conventional wisdom is that the combination of the
disastrous Iraq war, the military and economic rise of Asia, and the steep recession in
the West has chastened America, ending its period of dominance in world affairs. It is
time for us to be humble.
There is a lot of truth to this, but it goes too far. For decline itself -- as a concept -- is
overrated. Britain's Royal Navy went into relative decline beginning in the 1890s, even
as Great Britain remained powerful enough to help save the West in two world wars over
the next half-century.
The proper analogy may be the Indian Mutiny in 1857 and 1858, after the orientalists
and other pragmatists in the British power structure, who wanted to leave traditional
India as it was, lost sway to Evangelical and Utilitarian reformers who wanted to more
forcefully Christianize India -- to make it in a values sense more like England. The
reformers were good people: They helped abolish the slave trade and tried to do the
same with the hideous practice of widow-burning. But their attempts to bring the fruits
of Western civilization, virtuous as they were, to a far-off corner of the world played a
role in a violent revolt against imperial authority.
Yet the debacle did not signal the end of the British Empire, which expanded for nearly
another century. Rather, it signaled a transition away from an ad hoc imperium fired
occasionally by an ill-disciplined lust to impose its values abroad -- and to a calmer,
more pragmatic and soldiering empire built on trade, education and technology.
That is akin to where we are now, post-Iraq: calmer, more pragmatic and with a military
-- especially a Navy -- that, while in relative decline, is still far superior to any
other on Earth. Near the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy had almost 600 ships; it
is down to 280. But in aggregate tonnage that is still more than the next 17 navies
combined. Our military secures the global commons to the benefit of all nations.
Without the U.S. Navy, the seas would be unsafe for merchant shipping, which, in an era
of globalization, accounts for 90 percent of world trade. We may not be able to control
events on land in the Middle East, but our Navy and Air Force control all entry and exit

points to the region. The multinational anti-piracy patrols that have taken shape in the
Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden have done so under the aegis of the U.S. Navy.
Sure the economic crisis will affect shipbuilding, meaning the decline in the number of
our ships will continue, and there will come a point where quantity affects quality. But
this will be an exceedingly gradual transition, which we will assuage by
leveraging naval allies such as India and Japan.
Then there are the dozens of training deployments around the world that the U.S.
military, particularly Army Special Forces, conducts in any given week. We are all over
Africa, Asia and Latin America with these small missions that increase America's
diplomatic throw-weight without running the risk of getting us bogged down. Aside
from Iraq and Afghanistan, our military posture around the world is generally light,
lethal and highly mobile. We have been quietly reducing land forces in South Korea
while compensating with a more effective air and naval presence. In Colombia, platoonsize numbers of Green Berets have been instrumental in fighting narco-terrorists; in
Algeria, such training teams have helped improve our relationship with that formerly
radical Arab country. Such stripped-down American military deployments garner no
headlines, but they are a formula that works.
The Marines, after becoming virtually desert forces since 2001, will return to their
expeditionary roots aboard amphibious ships in the Greater Indian Ocean and Western
Pacific. American military power is not going away. But instead of being in-your-face, it
will lurk just over the horizon. And that will make all the difference.
In sum, we may no longer be at Charles Krauthammer's "Unipolar Moment," but neither
have we become Sweden. Declinism of the sort being preached will go immediately out
of fashion at the world's next humanitarian catastrophe, when the very people enraged
at the U.S. military because of Iraq will demand that it lead a coalition to save lives. We
might have intervened in Darfur had we not been bogged down in Iraq; after Cyclone
Nargis, our ships would have provided large-scale relief, had Burma's military
government allowed them to proceed. As world population rises, and with vast urban
areas with tottering infrastructures in the most environmentally and seismically fragile
zones, the opportunities for U.S. military-led disaster relief will be legion. The American
military remains a force for good, a fact that will become self-evident in the crises to
come.
Of course we are entering a more multipolar world. The only economic growth over the
next year or two will come from developing nations, notably India and China. But there
are other realities, too. We should not underestimate the diplomatic and moral leverage
created by the combination of the world's most expeditionary military and a new
president who will boast high approval ratings at home and around the world. No power
but the United States has the wherewithal to orchestrate an Israeli-Palestinian peace
deal, and our intervention in Iraq has not changed that fact. Everyone hates the word,
but the United States is still a hegemon of sorts, able to pivotally influence the world
from a position of moral strength.

2nc

Sacrifice Debate
Double bind either the aff's impacts have too short a timeframe for the round to
spillover or they're not true and FIAT is an independent reason to vote negative
overstretches the will and causes limitless nihilism
Antonio 1995 [Robert; Professor of Sociology at the University of Kansas; Nietzsches
Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History; American Journal of Sociology;
Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995]
While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that

persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and
engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement . They look hesitantly to the opinion of
others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed
in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The
role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers
devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already selfindulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by
paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and
unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp.
83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces
persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles,"
playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are
you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an
imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the
genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 23233, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to
others. This

type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of
interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp.
302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks
with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if
one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all
culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual
pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive

leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated

sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role
attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position,
even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests , like
Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless.
But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these
impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative,
scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the
"great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more
urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father
confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and
overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche
1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

tag
Baudrillard 96 (jean, perfect crime, 1996, LB)
Our reality: that is the problem. We have only one, and it has to be saved. `We have to do
something. We can't do nothing.' But doing something solely because you can't not do something has
never constituted a principle of action or freedom . Just a form of absolution from one's own impotence and

compassion for one's own fate. The

people of Sarajevo do not have to face this question. Where they are,
there is an absolute need to do what they do, to do what has to be done. Without illusion as to ends and
without compassion towards themselves. That is what being real means, being in the real. And this is not at all the
`objective' reality of their misfortune, that reality which `ought not to exist' and for which we
feel pity, but the reality which exists as it is -- the reality of an action and a destiny . This is why
they are alive, and we are the ones who are dead. This is why, in our own eyes, we have first and
foremost to save the reality of the war and impose that -- compassionate -- reality on those who
are suffering from it but who, at the very heart of war and distress, do not really believe in it. To
judge by their own statements, the Bosnians do not really believe in the distress which surrounds them.
In the end, they find the whole unreal situation senseless, unintelligible. It is a hell, but an almost hyperreal hell, made
the more hyperreal by media and humanitarian harassment, since that makes the attitude of the whole world
towards them all the more incomprehensible. Thus, they live in a kind of spectrality of war -- and it is a good
thing they do, or they could never bear it. But we know better than they do what reality is,
because we have chosen them to embody it. Or simply because it is what we -- and the whole of the West -- most
lack. We have to go and retrieve a reality for ourselves where the bleeding is. All these `corridors' we open up to send them our
supplies and our `culture' are, in reality, corridors of distress through which we import their force and the energy of their
misfortune. Unequal exchange once again. Whereas they find a kind of additional strength in the thorough stripping-away of the
illusions of reality and of our political principles -- the strength to survive what has no meaning -- we

go to convince them
of the `reality' of their suffering -- by culturalizing it, of course, by theatricalizing it so that it can serve as a point of
reference in the theatre of Western values, one of which is solidarity. This all exemplifies a situation which has now become general,
in which inoffensive and impotent intellectuals exchange their woes for those of the wretched, each supporting the other in a kind of
perverse contract -- exactly as the political class and civil society exchange their respective woes today, the one serving up its
corruption and scandals, the other its artificial convulsions and inertia. Thus we saw Bourdieu and the Abb Pierre offering
themselves up in televisual sacrifice, exchanging between them the pathos-laden language and sociological metalanguage of
wretchedness. And so, also, our whole society is embarking on the path of commiseration in the literal sense, under cover of
ecumenical pathos. It

is almost as though, in a moment of intense repentance among intellectuals and

politicians, related to the panic-stricken state of history and the twilight of values, we had to
replenish the stocks of values, the referential reserves, by appealing to that lowest common
denominator that is human misery, as though we had to restock the hunting grounds with artificial game. A victim
society. I suppose all it is doing is expressing its own disappointment and remorse at the
impossibility of perpetrating violence upon itself. The New Intellectual Order everywhere
follows the paths opened up by the New World Order . The misfortune, wretchedness and suffering of others
have every-- where become the raw material and the primal scene. Victimhood, accompanied by Human Rights as
its sole funerary ideology. Those who do not exploit it directly and in their own name do so by
proxy. There is no lack of middlemen, who take their financial or symbolic cut in the process. Deficit and misfortune,
like the international debt, are traded and sold on in the speculative market -- in this case the
politico- intellectual market, which is quite the equal of the late, unlamented military--industrial
complex. Now, all commiseration is part of the logic of misfortune [malheur]. To refer to misfortune, if only to combat it, is to
give it a base for its objective repro-- duction in perpetuity. When fighting anything whatever, we have to start out -- fully aware of
what we are doing -- from evil, never from misfortune. And the theatre of the transparence of Evil is truly there -- at Sarajevo. The
repressed canker which corrupts all the rest, the virus of which Europe's paralysis is already the symptom. Europe's furniture is
being salvaged at the GATT talks, but it is being burned at Sarajevo. In a sense, this is a good thing. The specious, sham Europe, the
Europe botched up in the most hypocritical upheavals, is scuppering itself at Sarajevo. And, in this sense, we might almost see the
Serbs as providing the unofficial litmus test, as demystifying that phantom Europe -- the Europe of technodemocratic politicians
who are as triumphalist in their speeches as they are deliquescent in their actions. But that is not, in fact, what is really going on

For it is
being constructed, the real Europe, the white Europe, a Europe whitewashed, integrated and
purified, morally as much as economically or ethnically. It is being victoriously constructed at Sarajevo and, in
here. The real story is that the Serbs, as the vehicles of ethnic cleansing, are at the forefront of the construction of Europe.

this sense, what is happening there is not an accident at all, but a logical, ascendant phase in the New European Order, that
subsidiary of the New World Order, everywhere characterized by white fundamentalism, protectionism, discrimination and control.

All the
European countries are undergoing ethnic cleansing. This is the real Europe, taking shape in the
shadow of the Parliaments, and its spearhead is Serbia.
It is said that if we just leave things to happen at Sarajevo, we shall be the next to get it. But we already have got it.

You have to be ready to destroy everything.

Burroughs 88 (William S. Burroughs, Western Lands, 1988, LB)
Scientists always said there is no such thing as a soul. Now they are in a position to
prove it. Total Death. Soul Death. Its what the Egyptians called the Second and
Final Death. This awesome power to destroy souls forever is now vested in farsighted
and responsible men [people] in the State Department, the CIA, and the Pentagon.
Governments fall from sheer indifference. Authority figures, deprived of the
vampiric energy they suck off their constituents, are seen for what they are: dead empty
masks manipulated by computers. And what is behind the computers? Remote control.
Of course. Don't intend to be here when this shithouse goes up. Nothing here
now but the recordings. Shut them off, they are as radioactive as an old joke. Look at
the prison you are in, we are all in. This is a penal colony that is now a Death
Camp. Place of the Second and Final Death. Desperation is the raw material of drastic
change. Only those who can leave behind everything they have ever believed
in can hope to escape.

Nietzsche
No cards

1nr

T
No cards

Navy
US HEGEMONY DANGEROUS IT REPRESENTS A FUSION OF CAPITALISM,
RACISM, AND IMPERIALISM
Carl Boggs, Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , 2005, Planetary Politics: human
rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner, p. 72
The fusion of capitalism, racism, and imperial expansion is deeply rooted in US history. With recent
developments we have not so much a loss of national innocence or betrayal of democracy, much less
any departure from American values, as an intensification of old patterns in a profoundly changed
historical matrix. Traditions and ideals frequently associated with the American experience
democracy, freedom, rights, and so forthappear at the start of the twenty-first century in largely
truncated, distorted, partial form, eroded b y the harsh effects of corporate, government, and
military power swollen by the dictates of empire. Such traditions and ideals, assimilated by large
sectors of the population, can be viewed as sources of legitimation that help sustain unprecedented
concentrations of wealth and power. As in the past, empire cannot long survive without mass belief
systems (nationalism, religion, political ideologies) that justify burdensome adventures and deflect
public attention away from the terrible costs, pain, and material hardships that inescapably
accompany militarism. For most of US history, in fact, widespread acceptance of hegemonic
discourses and practicesinvolving an organic linkage between elites and masseshas endowed the
imperial project with popular energies. In foreign policy more than other realms, US political
leaders have enjoyed a great measure of autonomy, latitude, and credibility even in the face of costly
failures such as Vietnam.

American hegemony is intertwined with racism and sexism

Katzenstein et al 10 (Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, Leila Mohsen Ibrahim and Katherine D. Rubin. Katzenstein is a Professor of American
Studies and professor of Government at Cornell University. Ibrahim and Rubin are PhD candiates at Cornell university. This paper "The Dark Side of
American Liberalism and Felony Disenfranchisement" won the Heinz I. Eulau Award for the best journal article of the calendar year published by
Perspectives on Politics December 2010. Proquest) JA

Two interpretive frameworks provide a conceptual starting point in any analysis of liberal and illiberal traditions within American
democracy. These are the unitary liberalism of Tocquevillean provenance and the multiple-traditions critique of the liberal

hegemony thesis developed by Rogers Smith. 19 The Tocquevillean thesis, as Rogers Smith depicts it, constitutes a longlived "orthodoxy on American identity."20 The Tocquevillean perspective adheres to a view of American history that
identifies the distinctive character of the nation as free-born, unburdened by the givens of aristocracy and status hierarchy. By dint
of this history, Americans are seen as baptized in the waters of egalitarian ideals and liberal beliefs. Racism and other exclusionary
beliefs and practices are bracketed as departures from rather than constitutive of a common national ideological core. In his
multiple-traditions critique, by contrast, Rogers Smith describes this core national culture as an

intertwining of three
distinctive traditions: liberalism, republicanism, and exclusionary forms of Americanism .21The
multiple traditions thesis sees American civic identity as forged through the historical forces of exclusionary as well as egalitarian,
moralistic as well as tolerant, ascriptive as well as achievement-based norms and practices. The

threads of exclusion are

not just visible on the margins. The warp of racism, sexism, and other ascriptive beliefs and
practices is fully intertwined among the weft of liberalism and republicanism.

Warming
Cannot solve alternate causes of methane bursts permafrost is melting due to
warming
Lavelle 12climate science writer at The Daily Climate (Marianne, GOOD GAS BAD GAS,
National Geographic, Dec 2012, Proquest, Accessed 25 June 2014) DZ
The flames confirm that the bubbles are methane, the main component of natural gas. By counting and measuring them, Walter
Anthony is trying to gauge how much methane is rising from Goldstream Lake - and from the millions of similar lakes that now
occupy nearly a third of the Arctic region. The

Arctic has warmed much faster than the rest of the planet in
recent decades, and as the permafrost has melted, old lakes have grown and new ones have
formed. Methane bubbles from their muddy depths in a way that is hard to quantify - until the first
clear ice of fall captures a snapshot of the emissions from an entire lake. Sometimes as Walter Anthony walks that ice, in Alaska,
Greenland, or Siberia, a stamp of her boot is enough to release an audible sigh. Some

lakes, she says, have "hot spots"

where the methane bubbling is so strong that ice never forms, leaving open holes big enough to
spot from an airplane. "It could be 10 or 30 liters of methane per day from one little hole, and it does that all year," she says.
"And then you realize there are hundreds of spots like mat and millions of lakes." By venting methane into the
atmosphere, the lakes are amplifying the global warming that created them: Methane is a potent
greenhouse gas. Carbon dioxide is the main one, because the atmosphere holds 200 times as
much of it. But a given amount of methane traps at least 25 times as much heat- unless you burn
it first. Then it enters the atmosphere as C02. That's the other side of this Jekyll-and-Hyde story: A lot of methane
is being burned these days. In the past decade the technology called hydraulic fracturing, "fracking" for short, has enabled drillers in
the United States to extract natural gas from deeply buried shales they couldn't tap before. Natural gas supplies have surged; prices
have plummeted. Fracking is now spreading around the world, and it's controversial. The gas boom has degraded landscapes and
polluted water. But it has also had environmental benefits. Natural gas burns much cleaner than coal. In part because American
power plants have been switching from coal to cheap gas, U.S. emissions of C02 from fossil fuels fell last year, even as the world set
another record. The catch is, methane

emissions are rising. What's coming out of Arctic lakes is

troubling, Walter Anthony says, because some of it seems to be coming not from bottom mud
but from deeper geologic reservoirs that had hitherto been securely capped by permafrost- and
that contain hundreds of times more methane than is in the atmosphere now. Still, most methane
emissions today come from lower latitudes, and most are related more directly to human activities. A growing amount seems to be
leaking, for instance, from gas wells and pipelines. Just how warm Earth gets this century will hinge in part on how we balance the
good and bad of methane - on how much of it we capture and burn, and how much we inadvertently let loose.

No impact, Methane melting wont cause warmingGeological survey proves

Petersen 2014 - environmental issues reporter [Bo Methane hydrate offshore is tempting, perilous
natural gas Jan 5 http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20140105/PC16/140109725 Accessed June 20, 2014] TA
Releasing gas into the atmosphere The

end of the world is just one doomsday scenario floated about messing
with methane hydrate deposits offshore. As oceans warm, the theory goes, the ice holding the gas
will start to melt, triggering a sequence of events that causes more melting, undersea landslides,
eruptions and the release of large volumes of the lethal gas into the atmosphere. "That essentially fries
the planet," said Richard Charter, senior fellow at the Ocean Foundation, a nonprofit ocean conservation advocate. There's some
scary support for the idea, including the collapse of a huge undersea cliff about 8,000 years ago, apparently caused by the release of
methane hydrates; and that lava flows occasionally cause methane gas explosions. But a

catastrophic melting is not

very likely, the United States Geological Survey has concluded, according to Geoscience News.

Round Octos vs Kinkaid RR

1nc

1nc
The 1acs justified with moralizing politics that distances us from
responsibility
Bauman, 95(Zygmunt, Professor of sociology at the University of Leeds, Life in fragments. Essays in
postmodern Moralities, 1995)
In effect, the focus of moral concerns has been shifted from the self-scrutiny
of the moral actor to the philosophical/political task of working out the
prescriptions and proscriptions of an ethical code; meanwhile the
responsibility for the responsibilitythat is the responsibility for deciding that
practical steps the responsibility requires to be taken and what steps are not called for
(go beyond the call of duty)has been shifted from the moral subject to supraindividual agencies now endowed with exclusive ethical authority. From the
moral actors points of view, the shift has much to be commended. (Indeed, this shift
was one of the main reasons why the surrender of autonomy could be credibly
represented as emancipation and increase of freedom). Having reduced the vague
notoriously under defined responsibility to a finite list of duties or obligations,
it spares the actor a lot of anxious groping in the dark, and helps to avoid the
gnawing feeling that the account can never be closed, the work never finally done. The
agony of choice (Hannah Arendts tyranny of possibilities) is largely gone, as is the
bitter aftertaste of a choice never ultimately proved right. The substitution of rulefollowing for the intense, yet never really successful, listening to infuriatingly taciturn,
moral impulses, results in the almost unimaginable feat of not just absolving
the actor from the personal responsibility for the wrongs done, but freeing
the actor from the very possibility of having sinned. More promptly than the
equivalent religious remediesbecause in advance, before the act has been
committedthe guilt is eliminated from choice, which is now simplified to the
straightforward dilemma of obedience or disobedience to the rule. All in all,
the modern shift from moral responsibility to ethical ruling offered a compensatory
drug for an ailment induced by another modern accomplishment: the foiling of many
determines threat once kept the actors actions within tight and strictly circumscribed
limits, so producing an unencumbered, disembodied personality that is allowed. ( and
forced to) self-define and self-assert. To the moral self, modernity offered freedom
complete with patented ways of escaping it. In what are commonly called postmodern
times the modern ailment of autonomy persists, while the compensatory drug is not
longer available on the National Ethical Service prescriptions. It can be purchased only
in the free market, in the thick of the cutthroat publicity war between drug companies
calling each others bluff, extolling their own products and undercutting the claims of
the competition. With the state ethical monopoly (and indeed, the states desire for
monopoly) in abeyance, and the supply of ethical rules by and large privatized and
abandoned to the care of the marketplace, the tyranny of choice returns, though this
time it taxes not so much the moral competence, as the shopping skills of the actor. The

actor is responsible not for the contents with which the responsibility has
been filled, but for the choice of an ethical code from among many, each of
which ports expert endorsement and/or the
Thats cause inevitable violence and prevents us from embracing ethics
Bauman, 95(Zygmunt, Professor of sociology at the University of Leeds, Life in fragments. Essays in
postmodern Moralities, 1995)
(Reject the gendered language)**
Such conditionsconditions without which there would be no camps and no genocide,
conditions which turned the unthinkable into realityare accomplishments of our
modern civilization, and in particular of three features which underlie, simultaneously,
its glory and its misery: the ability to act at a distance, the neutralization of the
moral constraints of action, and its gardening posturethe pursuit of
artificial, rationally designed order. That one can kill today without ever
looking the victim in the face, is a banal observation. Once sinking a knife into
the body, or strangling, or shooting at close distance have been replaced with
moving dots over a computer screenjust like one does in amusement
arcade games or on the screen of a portable Nintendothe killer does not need to
be pitiless; he does not have the occasion to feel pity. This is, however, the most
obvious and trivial, even if the most dramatic, aspect of action at a distance. The less
dramatic and spectacular manifestations of our new, modern, skills of distant action are
more consequential yetall the more so for not being so evident. They consist in
creating what may be called a social and psychological, rather than a merely physical
and oplical, distance between actors and the targets of their actions. Such social
psychological distance is produced an reproduced daily, and ubiquitously, and on a
massive scale, by the modern management of action, with its three different, yet
complementary aspects. First, in a modern organization every personally performed
action is a mediated action, and every actor is cast in what Stanley Milgram called the
magnetic state: almost no actor ever has a chance to develop the authorship attitude
towards the final outcome of the operation, since each actor is but an executor of a
command and giver of another; not a writer, but a translator of someone elses
intentions. Second, there is the horizontal, functional division of the overall task:
each actor has but a specific, self-contained job to perform and produces an
object with no written-in destination, no information on its future uses; no
contribution seems to determine the final outcome of the operation, and most retain
but a tenuous logical link with the ultimate effecta link which the
participants may be in good conscience claim to be visible only in retrospect.
Third, the targets of the operation, the people who by design or by default are
affected by it, hardly ever appear to the actors as total human beings, objects
of moral responsibility and ethical subjects themselves. As Michael Schluter and David
Lee wittily yet aptly observed, in order to be seen at the higher levels you have to be

broken up into bits and most of you thrown away. As a result, most actors in
organizations deal not with human beings, but with facets, features,
statistically represented traits; while only total human persons can be
bearers or moral significance. The global impact of all these aspects of
modern organization is what I have called borrowing the term from the vocabulary of
the medieval Churchthe moral adiaphorization of action: for all practical
purposes, the moral significance of the ultimate and combined effect of
individual actions is excluded from the criteria by which individual actions
any measure. And so the latter are perceived and experienced as morally
neutral. More exactly out with the same effect. The fragmentation of the objects of
action is replicated by the fragmentation of actors. The vertical and horizontal
division of the global operation into partial jobs makers every actor into a roleperformer. Unlike the person, the role-performer is an eminently replaceable and
exchangeable incumbent of a site in the complex network of tasksthere is always a
certain impersonality, a distance, a less-than-authorship relationship between the roleperformer and the role performed. In none of the roles is the role-performer a whole
person, as each roles performance engages but a selection of the actors skills and
personality features, and in principle should neither engage the remaining parts nor
spill over and affect the rest of the actors personality. This again makes the roleperformance ethically adiophoric: only total persons, only unique persons
(unique in the sense of being irreplaceable in the sense that the deed would remain
undone without them) can be moral subjects, bearers of moral responsibility
but modern organization derives its strength from its uncanny capacity for
splitting the fragmentation, while on the other hand providing occasions for the
fragments to come together again has never been modern organizations forte. Modern
organization is the rule of nobody. It is, we may say, a contraption to the float
responsibilitymost conspicuously, moral responsibility.
Alt: Reject the affs justification of moral assistance --- individualism is the
best way to solve
Bauman, 95(Zygmunt, Professor of sociology at the University of Leeds, Life in fragments. Essays in
postmodern Moralities, 1995)
One modern possible interpretation of what is happening is that post-modernity
preserves the precious gain of modernitythe unencumbered autonomy of the actor
while simultaneously removing the price tag and the strings that modernity attacked to
it. Now, at long last, you may eat your cake and have it too. (Or, rather, as cakes tend to
get stale and unappetizing faster than beforeyou may eat your cake and recycle it .)
Post modernity (or, more appropriately still in this context, late modernity), one hears
time and again, is the ultimate crowing of the modern dream of freedom and of the long
and tortuous effort to make the dream come true. So let us celebrate the world
unencumbered by imagined obligations and fake duties. With universal

principles and absolute truths dissipated or kicked out of fashion, it does not matter
much anymore what personal principles and private truth one embraces (the embrace
must be never tight anyway) and follows (the following need not be too loyal and
committed, to be sure). Does it or does it not matter?this is the question. And it
remains a questionperhaps the crucial, constitutive question of postmodern (late
modern) life. One might say with considerable conviction that precisely the opposite to
the postmodernist account of post modernity is the case; that the demise of the
power-assisted universals and absolutes has made the
responsibilities of the actor more profound and, indeed, more
consequential, than ever before. One might say with still greater conviction, that,
between the demise of universal absolutes and absolute universals on the other hand
and everything goes license on the other. One would rather say that it is precisely
because of the demise of the allegedly unified and ostensibly unique ethical code,
that the regulative idea of moral responsibility may rise into full flight . Choices
between good and evil are still to be made, this time, however, in full daylight,
and with full knowledge that a choice has been made. With the smokescreen
of centralized legislation dispersed and the power-of-attorney returned to the
signatory, the choice is blatantly left to the moral persons own devices. With
choice comes responsibility. And if choice is inevitable, responsibility is unavoidable.
Will this new condition make us do good things more often than before and evil things
less often? Will it make better beings? Neither a yes nor a no answer can be
responsibly given to those questions. As always, the moral situation is one of inherent
ambivalence and would not be moral without a choice between good and vil. What this
new condition does spell out, however, is the prospect of a greater
awareness of the moral character of our choice, and seeing their moral
content more clearly.

1nc
The affirmative regurgitates the suffering of warming victims in exchange
for the ballot which creates the most unethical form of academia
Baudrillard 96 (jean, perfect crime, 1996, LB)
Our reality: that is the problem. We have only one, and it has to be saved. `We have to
do something. We can't do nothing.' But doing something solely because you can't not
do something has never constituted a principle of action or freedom. Just a form of
absolution from one's own impotence and compassion for one's own fate. The people of
Sarajevo do not have to face this question. Where they are, there is an absolute need to
do what they do, to do what has to be done. Without illusion as to ends and without
compassion towards themselves. That is what being real means, being in the real. And
this is not at all the `objective' reality of their misfortune, that reality which `ought not
to exist' and for which we feel pity, but the reality which exists as it is -- the reality of an
action and a destiny. This is why they are alive, and we are the ones who are dead. This
is why, in our own eyes, we have first and foremost to save the reality of the war and
impose that -- compassionate -- reality on those who are suffering from it but who, at
the very heart of war and distress, do not really believe in it. To judge by their own
statements, the Bosnians do not really believe in the distress which surrounds them. In
the end, they find the whole unreal situation senseless, unintelligible. It is a hell, but an
almost hyperreal hell, made the more hyperreal by media and humanitarian
harassment, since that makes the attitude of the whole world towards them all the more
incomprehensible. Thus, they live in a kind of spectrality of war -- and it is a good thing
they do, or they could never bear it. But we know better than they do what reality is,
because we have chosen them to embody it. Or simply because it is what we -- and the
whole of the West -- most lack. We have to go and retrieve a reality for ourselves where
the bleeding is. All these `corridors' we open up to send them our supplies and our
`culture' are, in reality, corridors of distress through which we import their force and
the energy of their misfortune. Unequal exchange once again. Whereas they find a kind
of additional strength in the thorough stripping-away of the illusions of reality and of
our political principles -- the strength to survive what has no meaning -- we go to
convince them of the `reality' of their suffering -- by culturalizing it, of course, by
theatricalizing it so that it can serve as a point of reference in the theatre of Western
values, one of which is solidarity. This all exemplifies a situation which has now become
general, in which inoffensive and impotent intellectuals exchange their woes for those of
the wretched, each supporting the other in a kind of perverse contract -- exactly as the
political class and civil society exchange their respective woes today, the one serving up
its corruption and scandals, the other its artificial convulsions and inertia. Thus we saw
Bourdieu and the Abb Pierre offering themselves up in televisual sacrifice, exchanging
between them the pathos-laden language and sociological metalanguage of
wretchedness. And so, also, our whole society is embarking on the path of
commiseration in the literal sense, under cover of ecumenical pathos. It is almost as
though, in a moment of intense repentance among intellectuals and politicians, related

to the panic-stricken state of history and the twilight of values, we had to replenish the
stocks of values, the referential reserves, by appealing to that lowest common
denominator that is human misery, as though we had to restock the hunting grounds
with artificial game. A victim society. I suppose all it is doing is expressing its own
disappointment and remorse at the impossibility of perpetrating violence upon itself.
The New Intellectual Order everywhere follows the paths opened up by the New World
Order. The misfortune, wretchedness and suffering of others have every-- where become
the raw material and the primal scene. Victimhood, accompanied by Human Rights as
its sole funerary ideology. Those who do not exploit it directly and in their own name do
so by proxy. There is no lack of middlemen, who take their financial or symbolic cut in
the process. Deficit and misfortune, like the international debt, are traded and sold on in
the speculative market -- in this case the politico- intellectual market, which is quite the
equal of the late, unlamented military--industrial complex. Now, all commiseration is
part of the logic of misfortune [malheur]. To refer to misfortune, if only to combat it, is
to give it a base for its objective repro-- duction in perpetuity. When fighting anything
whatever, we have to start out -- fully aware of what we are doing -- from evil, never
from misfortune. And the theatre of the transparence of Evil is truly there -- at Sarajevo.
The repressed canker which corrupts all the rest, the virus of which Europe's paralysis is
already the symptom. Europe's furniture is being salvaged at the GATT talks, but it is
being burned at Sarajevo. In a sense, this is a good thing. The specious, sham Europe,
the Europe botched up in the most hypocritical upheavals, is scuppering itself at
Sarajevo. And, in this sense, we might almost see the Serbs as providing the unofficial
litmus test, as demystifying that phantom Europe -- the Europe of technodemocratic
politicians who are as triumphalist in their speeches as they are deliquescent in their
actions. But that is not, in fact, what is really going on here. The real story is that the
Serbs, as the vehicles of ethnic cleansing, are at the forefront of the construction of
Europe. For it is being constructed, the real Europe, the white Europe, a Europe
whitewashed, integrated and purified, morally as much as economically or ethnically. It
is being victoriously constructed at Sarajevo and, in this sense, what is happening there
is not an accident at all, but a logical, ascendant phase in the New European Order, that
subsidiary of the New World Order, everywhere characterized by white fundamentalism,
protectionism, discrimination and control. It is said that if we just leave things to
happen at Sarajevo, we shall be the next to get it. But we already have got it. All the
European countries are undergoing ethnic cleansing. This is the real Europe, taking
shape in the shadow of the Parliaments, and its spearhead is Serbia.
The impact is disempowerment the 1acs call for the ballot allows the
system to simulate its own death their commodification of suffering is a
form of perverse capital expenditure that negates their ability to
effectualize material change
Baudrillard 90 (Jean, Simulacra and Simulations, 90)
The conjunction of the system and its extreme alternative like two ends of a curved
mirror, the "vicious" curvature of a political space henceforth magnetized, circularized,

reversibilized from right to lek a torsion that is like the evil demon of commutation, the
whole system, the infinity of capital folded back over its own sur&ce: transfinite? And
isn't it the same with desire and libidinal space? The conjunction of desire and value, of
desire and capital. The conjunction of desire and the law; the ultimate joy and
metamorphosis of the law (which is why it is so well received at the moment): only
capital takes pleasure, Lyotard said, before coming to think that we take pleasure in
capital. Overwhelming versatility of desire in Deleuze: an enigmatic reversal which
brings this desire that is "revolutionary by itself, and as if involuntarily, in wanting what
it wants," to want its own repression and to invest paranoid and fascist systems? A
malign torsion which reduces this revolution of desire to the same fundamental
ambiguity as the other, historical revolution. All the referentials intermingle their
discourses in a circular, Moebian compulsion. Not so long ago sex and work were
savagely opposed terms: today both are dissolved into the same type of demand.
Formerly the discourse on history took its force from opposing itself to the one on
nature, the discourse on desire to the one on power: today they exchange their signifiers
and their scenarios. It would take too long to run through the whole range of operational
negativity, of all those scenarios of deterrence which, like Watergate, try to revive a
moribund principle by simulated scandal, phantasm, murder - a sort of hormonal
treatment by negativity and crisis. It is always a question of proving the real by the
imaginary; proving truth by scandal; proving the law by transgression; proving work by
the strike; proving the system by crisis and capital by revolution; and for that matter
proving ethnology by the dispossession of its object (the Tasaday). Without counting:
proving theater by anti-theater; proving art by anti-art; proving pedagogy by antipedagogy; proving psychiatry by anti-psychiatry, etc., etc. Everything is metamorphosed
into its inverse in order to be perpetuated in its purged form. Every form of power, every
situation speaks of itself by denial, in order to attempt to escape, by simulation of death,
its real agony. Power can stage its own murder to rediscover a glimmer of existence and
legitimacy. Thus with the American presidents: the Kennedys are murdered because
they still have a political dimension. Others - Johnson, Nixon, Ford - only had a right to
puppet attempts, to simulated murders. But they nevertheless needed that aura of an
artificial menace to conceal that they were nothing other than mannequins of power. In
olden days the king (also the god) had to die - that was his strength. Today he does his
miserable utmost to pretend to die, so as to preserve the blessing of power. But even this
is gone. To seek new blood in its own death, to renew the cycle by the mirror of crisis,
negativity and anti-power: this is the only alibi of every power, of every institution
attempting to break the vicious circle of its irresponsibility and its fundamental
nonexistence, of its deja-vu and its deja-mort.

Translating misery into capital is a perverse system of neoimperial

academia---vote negative to reject their cherry-picking of misery and refuse
to engage in the trauma economy
Tomsky 11 (Terri, Ph.D in English from U-British Columbia, postdoctoral fellow in
cultural memory at the University of Alberta From Sarajevo to 9/11: Travelling
Memory and the Trauma Economy, Parallax Volume 17, Issue 4, 2011)
In contrast to the cosmopolitization of a Holocaust cultural memory,1 there exist
experiences of trauma that fail to evoke recognition and subsequently, compassion
and aid. What is it exactly that confers legitimacy onto some traumatic claims and
anonymity onto others? This is not merely a question of competing victimizations,
what geographer Derek Gregory has criticized as the process of cherry-picking
among [ . . . ] extremes of horror, but one that engages issues of the international
travel, perception and valuation of traumatic memory.2 This seemingly arbitrary
determination engrosses the emigre protagonist of Dubravka Ugresics 2004 novel,
The Ministry of Pain, who from her new home in Amsterdam contemplates an
uneven response to the influx of claims by refugees fleeing the Yugoslav wars: The
Dutch authorities were particularly generous about granting asylum to those who
claimed they had been discriminated against in their home countries for sexual
differences, more generous than to the wars rape victims. As soon as word got
round, people climbed on the bandwagon in droves. The war [ . . . ] was
something like the national lottery: while many tried their luck out of genuine
misfortune, others did it simply because the opportunity presented itself.3
Traumatic experiences are described here in terms analogous to social and
economic capital. What the protagonist finds troubling is that some genuine
refugee claimants must invent an alternative trauma to qualify for help: the problem
was that nobodys story was personal enough or shattering enough. Because death
itself had lost its power to shatter. There had been too many deaths.4 In other
words, the mass arrival of Yugoslav refugees into the European Union means that war
trauma risks becoming a surfeit commodity and so decreases in value. I bring up
Ugresics wry observations about traumas marketability because they enable us to
conceive of a trauma economy, a circuit of movement and exchange where
traumatic memories travel and are valued and revalued along the way. Rather than
focusing on the end-result, the winners and losers of a trauma lottery, this article
argues that there is, in a trauma economy, no end at all, no fixed value to any given
traumatic experience. In what follows I will attempt to outline the system of a trauma
economy, including its intersection with other capitalist power structures, in a
way that shows how representations of trauma continually circulate and, in that
circulation enable or disable awareness of particular traumatic experience across
space and time. To do this, I draw extensively on the comic nonfiction of MalteseAmerican writer Joe Sacco and, especially, his retrospective account of newsgathering
during the 19921995 Bosnian war in his 2003 comic book, The Fixer: A Story From
Sarajevo.5 Sacco is the author of a series of comics that represent social life in a

number of the worlds conflict zones, including the Palestinian territories and the
former Yugoslavia. A comic artist, Sacco is also a journalist by profession who has
first-hand experience of the way that war and trauma are reported in the
international media. As a result, his comics blend actual reportage with his
ruminations on the media industry. The Fixer explores the siege of Sarajevo (1992
1995) as part of a larger transnational network of disaster journalism, which also
critically, if briefly, references the September eleventh, 2001 attacks in New York
City. Saccos emphasis on the transcultural coverage of these traumas, with his comic
avatar as the international journalist relaying information on the Bosnian war,
emphasizes how trauma must be understood in relation to international circuits of
mediation and commodification. My purpose therefore is not only to critique
the aesthetic of a travelling traumatic memory, but also to call attention to the
material conditions and networks that propel its travels. Travelling Trauma
Theorists and scholars have already noted the emergence, circulation and effects of
traumatic memories, but little attention has been paid to the travelling itself. This is a
concern since the movement of any memory must always occur within a material
framework. The movement of memories is enabled by infrastructures of power,
and consequently mediated and consecrated through institutions. So, while some
existing theories of traumatic memory have made those determining politics and
policies visible, we still dont fully comprehend the travel of memory in a global age
of media, information networks and communicative capitalism.6 As
postcolonial geographers frequently note, to travel today is to travel in a world
striated by late capitalism. The same must hold for memory; its circulation in this
global media intensive age will always be reconfigured, transvalued and even
commodified by the logic of late capital. While we have yet to understand the
relation between the travels of memory (traumatic or otherwise) and capitalism,
there are nevertheless models for the circulation of other putatively immaterial things
that may prove instructive. One of the best, I think, is the critical insight of Edward
W. Said on what he called travelling theory.7 In 1984 and again in 1994, Said wrote
essays that described the reception and reformulation of ideas as they are
uprooted from an original historical and geographical context and propelled across
place and time. While Saids contribution focuses on theory rather than memory, his
reflections on the travel and transformation of ideas provide a comparison which
helpfully illuminates the similar movements of what we might call travelling trauma.
Ever attendant to the historical specificities that prompt transcultural
transformations, the Travelling Theory essays offers a Vichian humanist reading of
cultural production; in them, Said argues that theory is not given but made. In the
first instance, it emanates out of and registers the sometimes urgent historical
circumstances of its theorist. Subsequently, he maintains, when other scholars take
up the theory, they necessarily interpret it, additionally integrating their own social
and historical experiences into it, so changing the theory and, often, authorizing it in
the process. I want to suggest that Saids birds eye view of the intellectual circuit
through which theory travels, is received and modified can help us appreciate the
movement of cultural memory. As with theory, cultural memories of trauma are lifted

and separated from their individual source as they travel; they are mediated,
transmitted and institutionalized in particular ways, depending on the structure
of communication and communities in which they travel. Said invites his
readers to contemplate how the movement of theory transforms its meanings to such
an extent that its significance to sociohistorical critique can be drastically
curtailed. Using Luka css writings on reification as an example, Said shows how a
theory can lose the power of its original formulation as later scholars take it up
and adapt it to their own historical circumstances. In Saids estimation, Luka
css insurrectionary vision became subdued, even domesticated, the wider it
circulated. Said is especially concerned to describe what happens when such theories
come into contact with academic institutions, which impose through their own
mode of producing cultural capital, a new value upon then. Said suggests
that this authoritative status, which imbues the theory with prestige and the
authority of age, further dulls the theorys originally insurgent message.8
When Said returned to and revised his essay some ten years later, he changed the
emphasis by highlighting the possibilities, rather than the limits, of travelling
theory. Travelling Theory Reconsidered, while brief and speculative, offers a look at
the way Luka css theory, transplanted into yet a different context, can flame [ . . . ]
out in a radical way.9 In particular, Said is interested in exploring what happens
when intellectuals like Theodor Adorno and Franz Fanon take up Luka cs: they
reignite the fiery core of his theory in their critiques of capitalist alienation and
French colonialism. Said is interested here in the idea that theory matters and that as
it travels, it creates an intellectual [ . . . ] community of a remarkable [ . . . ] affiliative
kind.10 In contrast to his first essay and its emphasis on the degradation of
theoretical ideas, Said emphasizes the way a travelling theory produces new
understandings as well as new political tools to deal with violent conditions and
disenfranchized subjects. Travelling theory becomes an intransigent practice that
goes beyond borrowing and adaption.11 As Said sees it, both Adorno and Fanon
refuse the emoluments offered by the Hegelian dialectic as stabilized into resolution
by Luka cs.12 Instead they transform Luka cs into their respective locales as the
theorist of permanent dissonance as understood by Adorno, [and] the critic of
reactive nationalism as partially adopted by Fanon in colonial Algeria.13 Saids set
of reflections on travelling theory, especially his later recuperative work, are
important to any account of travelling trauma, since it is not only the problems of
institutional subjugation that matter; additionally, we need to affirm the occurrence
of transgressive possibilities, whether in the form of fleeting transcultural affinities or
in the effort to locate the inherent tensions within a system where such travel occurs.
What Said implicitly critiques in his 1984 essay is the negative effects of exchange,
institutionalization and the increasing use-value of critical theory as it travels within
the academic knowledge economy; in its travels, the theory becomes practically
autonomous, uncoupled from the theorist who created it and the historical context
from which it was produced. This seems to perfectly illustrate the international circuit
of exchange and valuation that occurs in the trauma economy. In Saccos The Fixer,
for example, it is not theory, but memory, which travels from Bosnia to the West, as

local traumas are turned into mainstream news and then circulated for consumption.
By highlighting this mediation, The Fixer explicitly challenges the politics that make
invisible the maneuvers of capitalist and neoimperial practices. Like Said, Sacco
displays a concern with the dissemination and reproduction of information and its
consequent effects in relation to what Said described as the broader political
world.14 Saids anxiety relates to the academic normativization of theory (a
tame academic substitution for the real thing15), a transformation which, he
claimed, would hamper its uses for society. A direct line can be drawn from
Saids discussion of the circulation of discourse and its (non)political effects, and the
international representation of the 19921995 Bosnian war. The Bosnian war existed
as a guerre du jour, the successor to the first Gulf War, receiving saturation coverage
and represented daily in the Western media. The sustained presence of the media had
much to do with the proximity of the war to European cities and also with the
spectacular visibility of the conflict, particularly as it intensified. The bloodiest
conflict to have taken place in Europe since the Second World War, it displaced two
million people and was responsible for over 150,000 civilian casualties.16 Yet despite
global media coverage, no decisive international military or political action took place
to suspend fighting or prevent ethnic cleansing in East Bosnia, until after the
massacre of Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995. According to Gregory Kent,
western perceptions about the war until then directed the lack of political will within
the international community, since the event was interpreted, codified and dismissed
as an ethnic, civil war and humanitarian crisis, rather than an act of (Serbian)
aggression against (Bosnian) civilians.17 The rather bizarre presence of a large
international press corps, hungry for drama and yet comfortably ensconced
in Sarajevos Holiday Inn amid the catastrophic siege of that city,
prompted Jean Baudrillard to formulate his theory of the hyperreal. In an article for
the Paris newspaper Liberation in 1993, Baudrillard writes of his anger at the
international apathy towards the Bosnian crisis, denouncing it as a spectral war.18
He describes it as a hyperreal hell not because the violence was in a not-so-distant
space, but because of the way the Bosnians were harassed by the [international]
media and humanitarian agencies.19 Given this extensive media coverage, it is
important to evaluate the role of representative discourses in relation to
violence and its after effects. To begin with, we are still unsure of the consequences of
this saturation coverage, though scholars have since elaborated on the racism framing
much of the media discourses on the Yugoslav wars.20 More especially, it is the
celebrity of the Bosnian war that makes a critical evaluation of its current status in
todays media cycle all the more imperative. Bosnias current invisibility is
fundamentally related to a point Baudrillard makes towards the end of his essay:
distress, misery and suffering have become the raw goods circulating in a global age
of commiseration.21 The demand created by a market of a sympathetic, yet
selfindulgent spectators propels the global travel of trauma (or rather, the
memory of that trauma) precisely because Bosnian suffering has a resale value
on the futures markets.22 To treat traumatic memory as currency not only
acknowledges the fact that travelling memory is overdetermined by capitalism;

more pertinently, it recognizes the global system through which traumatic memory
travels and becomes subject to exchange and flux. To draw upon Marx: we can
comprehend trauma in terms of its fungible properties, part of a social relation [that
is] constantly changing with time and place.23 This is what I call the trauma
economy. By trauma economy, I am thinking of economic, cultural, discursive and
political structures that guide, enable and ultimately institutionalize the
representation, travel and attention to certain traumas. The Trauma Economy in Joe
Saccos The Fixer Having introduced the idea of a trauma economy and how it might
operate, I want to turn to Sacco because he is acutely conscious of the way
representations of trauma circulate in an international system. His work exposes the
infrastructure and logic of a trauma economy in war-torn Bosnia and so echoes some
of the points made by Said about the movement of theory. As I examine Saccos
critical assessment of the Bosnian war, I want to bear in mind Saids discussion about
the effects of travel on theory and, in particular, his two contrasting observations:
first, that theory can become commodified and second, that theory enables
unexpected if transient solidarities across cultures. The Fixer takes up the notion of
trauma as transcultural capital and commodity, something Sacco has confronted in
his earlier work on Bosnia.24 The Fixer focuses on the story of Neven, a Sarajevan
local and the fixer of the comics title, who sells his services to international
journalists, including Saccos avatar. The comic is set in 2001, in postwar Sarajevo
and an ethnically partitioned and economically devastated Bosnia, but its narrative
frequently flashes back to the conflict in the mid- 1990s, and to what has been
described as the siege within the siege.25 This refers not just to Sarajevos three and
a half year siege by Serb forces but also to its backstage: the concurrent
criminalization of Sarajevo through the rise of a wartime black market economy from
which Bosniak paramilitary groups profited and through which they consolidated
their power over Sarajevan civilians. In these flashbacks, The Fixer addresses Nevens
experience of the war, first, as a sniper for one of the Bosniak paramilitary units and,
subsequently, as a professional fixer for foreign visitors, setting them up with
anything they need, from war stories and tours of local battle sites to tape recorders
and prostitutes. The contemporary, postwar scenes detail the ambivalent friendship
between Neven and Saccos comic avatar. In doing so, The Fixer spares little detail
about the economic value of trauma: Nevens career as a fixer after all is reliant
on what Sacco terms the flashy brutality of Sarajevos war.26 Even Neven admits
as much to his interlocutor, without irony, let alone compassion: When massacres
happened, Neven once told me, those were the best times. Journalists from
all over the world were coming here.27 The Fixer never allows readers to
forget that Neven provides his services in exchange for hard cash. So while Neven
provides vital indeed for Saccos avatar often the only access to the stories and
traumas of the war, we can never be sure whether he is a reliable witness or merely
an opportunistic salesman. His anecdotes have the whiff of bravura about them.
He expresses pride in his military exploits, especially his role in a sortie that
destroyed several Serb tanks (the actual number varies increasingly each time the tale
is told). He tells Sacco that with more acquaintances like himself, he could have

broken the siege of Sarajevo.28 Nevens heroic selfpresentation is consistently

undercut by other characters, including Saccos avatar, who ironically renames him a
Master in the School of Front-line Truth and even calls upon the reader to assess the
situation. One Sarajevan local remembers Neven as having a big imagination29;
others castigate him as unstable30; and those who have also fought in the war reject
his claims outright, telling Sacco, it didnt happen.31 For Saccos avatar though,
Neven is a godsend.32 Unable to procure information from the other denizens of
Sarajevo, he is delighted to accept Nevens version of events: Finally someone is
telling me how it was or how it almost was, or how it could have been but finally
someone in this town is telling me something.33 This discloses the true value of the
Bosnian war to the Western media: getting the story right factually is less important
than getting it right affectively. The purpose is to extract a narrative that evokes an
emotional (whether voyeuristic or empathetic) response from its audience. Here we
see a good example of the way a traumatic memory circulates in the trauma economy,
as it travels from its site of origin and into a fantasy of a reality. Nevens mythmaking
whether motivated by economic opportunism, or as a symptom of his own
traumatized psyche reflects back to the international community a counter-version
of mediated events and spectacular traumas that appear daily in the Western media.
It is worth adding that his mythmaking only has value so long as it occurs within
preauthorized media circuits. When Neven attempts to bypass the international
journalists and sell his story instead directly to a British magazine, the account of his
wartime action against the 43 tanks is rejected on the basis that they dont print
fiction.34 The privilege of revaluing and re-narrating the trauma is reserved for
people like Saccos avatar, who has no trouble adopting a mythic and hyperbolic
tone in his storytelling: it is he, Neven, who has walked through the valley of the
shadow of death and blown things up along the way.35 Yet Nevens urge to
narrate, while indeed part of his job, is a striking contrast to the silence of
other locals. When Sacco arrives in Sarajevo in 2001 for his follow-up story, he finds
widespread, deliberate resistance to his efforts to gather first-hand testimonies.
Wishing to uncover the citys terrible secrets, Sacco finds his research has stalled,
as locals either refuse to meet with him or cancel their appointments.36 The
suspiciousness and hostility Sacco encounters in Sarajevo is a response precisely to
the international demand for trauma of the 1990s. The mass media presence during
the war did little to help the citys besieged residents; furthermore, international
journalists left once the drama of war subsided to the last offensives
grinding up the last of the last soldiers and civilians who will die in this
war.37 The media fascination with Sarajevos humanitarian crisis was as intense as
it was fleeting and has since been described as central to the ensuing compassion
fatigue of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the
casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of
Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war
and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the
appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords
defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other

ethnic loyalty. For not only is Sacco ignorant about the muddled ethnic realities of the
war, its moral ambiguities and its key players but he also wants to hear Nevens
shamelessly daring and dirty account of the war, however unreliable. As Sacco
explains, hes a little enthralled, a little infatuated, maybe a little in love and what is
love but a transaction.39 Neven a hardened war veteran provides the goods, the
first-hand experience of war and, for Saccos avatar, that is worth every
Deutschemark, coffee and cigarette. He explains in a parenthetical remark to his
implied reader: I would be remiss if I let you think that my relationship with Neven is
simply a matter of his shaking me down. Because Neven was the first friend I made in
Sarajevo . . . [hes] travelled one of the wars dark roads and Im not going to drop him
till he tells me all about it.40 Saccos assertion here suggests something more than a
mutual exploitation. The word friend describing Saccos relationship to Neven is
quickly replaced by the word drop. Having sold his raw goods, Neven finds that the
trauma economy in the postwar period has already devalued his experience by
disengaging with Bosnias local traumas. As Sacco suggests, the war moved on and
left him behind [ . . . ] The truth is, the war quit Neven.41 The Neven of 2001 is not
the brash Neven of old, but a pasty-looking unemployed forty-year old and recovering
alcoholic, who takes pills to prevent his anxiety attacks.42 His wartime actions lay
heavily on his conscience, despite his efforts to stash [ . . . ] deep his bad
memories.43 The Fixer leaves us with an ironic fact: Neven, who has capitalized on
trauma during the war, is now left traumatized and without capital in the postwar
situation. Juxtaposing Traumas in a Global Age Saccos depiction of the
trauma economy certainly highlights the question of power and exploitation, since so
many of the interactions between locals and international visitors are shaped by the
commodity market of traumatic memories. And while The Fixer provides a new
perspective of the Bosnian war, excoriating the profit-seeking objectives of both the
media and the Bosnian middle-men amid life-altering events, its general point about
the capitalistic vicissitudes of the trauma economy is not significantly different from
that sustained in the narratives of Aleksandar Hemon, Rajiv Chandrasekaran or Art
Spiegelman.44What distinguishes Saccos work is the way it also picks up the
possibility described in Edward Saids optimistic re-reading of travel: the potential
for affiliation. As I see it, Saccos criticism isnt leveled merely at the moral grey zone
created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of
representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate
trauma in different ways. been described as central to the ensuing compassion
fatigue of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the
casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of
Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war
and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the
appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords
defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other
ethnic loyalty. For not only is Sacco ignorant about the muddled ethnic realities of the
war, its moral ambiguities and its key players but he also wants to hear Nevens
shamelessly daring and dirty account of the war, however unreliable. As Sacco

explains, hes a little enthralled, a little infatuated, maybe a little in love and what is
love but a transaction.39 Neven a hardened war veteran provides the goods, the
first-hand experience of war and, for Saccos avatar, that is worth every
Deutschemark, coffee and cigarette. He explains in a parenthetical remark to his
implied reader: I would be remiss if I let you think that my relationship with Neven is
simply a matter of his shaking me down. Because Neven was the first friend I made in
Sarajevo . . . [hes] travelled one of the wars dark roads and Im not going to drop him
till he tells me all about it.40 Saccos assertion here suggests something more than a
mutual exploitation. The word friend describing Saccos relationship to Neven is
quickly replaced by the word drop. Having sold his raw goods, Neven finds that the
trauma economy in the postwar period has already devalued his experience by
disengaging with Bosnias local traumas. As Sacco suggests, the war moved on and
left him behind [ . . . ] The truth is, the war quit Neven.41 The Neven of 2001 is not
the brash Neven of old, but a pasty-looking unemployed forty-year old and recovering
alcoholic, who takes pills to prevent his anxiety attacks.42 His wartime actions lay
heavily on his conscience, despite his efforts to stash [ . . . ] deep his bad
memories.43 The Fixer leaves us with an ironic fact: Neven, who has capitalized on
trauma during the war, is now left traumatized and without capital in the postwar
situation. Juxtaposing Traumas in a Global Age Saccos depiction of the trauma
economy certainly highlights the question of power and exploitation, since so many of
the interactions between locals and international visitors are shaped by the
commodity market of traumatic memories. And while The Fixer provides a new
perspective of the Bosnian war, excoriating the profit-seeking objectives of both the
media and the Bosnian middle-men amid life-altering events, its general point about
the capitalistic vicissitudes of the trauma economy is not significantly different from
that sustained in the narratives of Aleksandar Hemon, Rajiv Chandrasekaran or Art
Spiegelman.44What distinguishes Saccos work is the way it also picks up the
possibility described in Edward Saids optimistic re-reading of travel: the potential
for affiliation. As I see it, Saccos criticism isnt leveled merely at the moral grey zone
created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of
representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate
trauma in different ways. suffering.48 Instead, the panel places Saccos
(Anglophone) audience within the familiar, emotional context of the September 11,
2001 attacks, with their attendant anxieties, shock and grief and so contributes to a
blurring of the hierarchical lines set up between different horrors across different
spaces. Consequently, I do not see Saccos juxtaposition of traumas as an instance of
what Michael Rothberg calls, competitive memory, the victim wars that pit winners
against losers.49 Sacco gestures towards a far more complex idea that takes into
account the highly mediated presentations of both traumas, which nonetheless
evokes Rothbergs notion of multidirectional memory by affirming the solidarities of
trauma alongside their differences. In drawing together these two disparate events,
Saccos drawings echo the critical consciousness in Saids Travelling Theory essay.
Rather than suggesting one trauma is, or should be, more morally legitimate than the
other, Sacco is sharply attentive to the way trauma is disseminated and recognized in

the political world. The attacks on theWorld Trade Centre, like the siege of Sarajevo,
transformed into discursive form epitomize what might be called victim narratives. In
this way, the United States utilized international sympathy (much of which was
galvanized by the stunning footage of the airliners crashing into the towers) to launch
a retaliatory campaign against Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. In contrast, Bosnia in
1992 faced a precarious future, having just proclaimed its independence. As we
discover in The Fixer, prior to Yugoslavias break-up, Bosnia had been ordered to
return its armaments to the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which were then placed
into the hands of the rebel Serbs, leaving the Bosnian government to build an army
almost from scratch.50 The analogy between 9/11 and 1992 Sarajevo is stark:
Sarajevos empty landscape in the panel emphasizes its defencelessness and isolation.
The Fixer constantly reminds the reader about the difficulties of living under a
prolonged siege in a city that is cut off and being starved into submission.51 In
contrast, September 11, 2001 has attained immense cultural capital because of its
status as a significant U.S. trauma. This fact is confirmed by its profound visuality,
which crystallized the spectacle and site of trauma. Complicit in this process, the
international press consolidated and legitimated the events symbolic power, by
representing, mediating and dramatizing the trauma so that, as SlavojZ izek
writes, the U.S. was elevated into the sublime victim of Absolute Evil.52 September
11 was constructed as an exceptional event, in terms of its irregular circumstances
and the symbolic enormity both in the destruction of iconic buildings and in the
attack on U.S. soil. Such a construction seeks to overshadow perhaps all recent
international traumas and certainly all other U.S. traumas and sites of shock. Saccos
portrayal, which locates September eleven in Sarajevo 1992, calls into question
precisely this claim towards the singularity of any trauma. The implicit doubling and
prefiguring of the 9/11 undercuts the exceptionalist rhetoric associated with the
event. Saccos strategy encourages us to think outside of hegemonic
epistemologies, where one trauma dominates and becomes more
meaningful than others. Crucially, Sacco reminds his audience of the cultural
imperialism that frames the spectacle of news and the designation of
traumatic narratives in particular. Postwar Bosnia and Beyond 2001 remains,
then, both an accidental and a significant date in The Fixer. While the (Anglophone)
world is preoccupied with a new narrative of trauma and a sense of historical rupture
in a post 9/11 world, Bosnia continues to linger in a postwar limbo. Six years have
passed since the war ended, but much of Bosnias day-to-day economy remains coded
by international perceptions of the war. No longer a haven for aspiring journalists,
Bosnia is now a thriving economy for international scholars of trauma and political
theory, purveyors of thanotourism,53 UN peacekeepers and post-conflict nation
builders (the ensemble of NGOs, charity and aid workers, entrepreneurs, contractors,
development experts, and EU government advisors to the Office of the High
Representative, the foreign overseer of the protectorate state that is Bosnia). On the
other hand, many of Bosnias locals face a grim future, with a massive and
everincreasing unemployment rate (ranging between 35 and 40%), brain-drain
outmigration, and ethnic cantonments. I contrast these realities of 2001 because

these circumstances a flourishing economy at the expense of the traumatized

population ought to be seen as part of a trauma economy. The trauma economy, in
other words, extends far beyond the purview of the Western media networks. In
discussing the way traumatic memories travel along the circuits of the global media, I
have described only a few of the many processes that transform traumatic events into
fungible traumatic memories; each stage of that process represents an exchange that
progressively reinterprets the memory, giving it a new value. Media outlets seek to
frame the trauma of the Bosnian wars in ways that are consistent with the aims of
pre-existing political or economic agendas; we see this in Sacco just as easily
as in Ugresics assessment of how even a putatively liberal state like the Netherlands
will necessarily inflect the value of one trauma over another. The point is that in this
circulation, trauma is placed in a marketplace; the siege of Sarajevo, where an
unscrupulous fixer can supply western reporters with the story they want to hear is
only a concentrated example of a more general phenomenon. Traumatic memories
are always in circulation, being revalued in each transaction according to the logic of
supply and demand. Victim and witness; witness and reporter; reporter and
audience; producer and consumer: all these parties bargain to suit their different
interests. The sooner we acknowledge the influence of these interests, the closer we
will come to an understanding of how trauma travels.

1nc
Inherency no cards

1nc
Interpretation increase means to make greater
Buckley 06 (Jeremiah, Attorney, Amicus Curiae Brief, Safeco Ins. Co. of America et al
v. Charles Burr et al, http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/06-84/0684.mer.ami.mica.pdf)
First, the court said that the ordinary meaning of the word increase is to make
something greater, which it believed should not be limited to cases in which a
company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged. 435 F.3d at
1091. Yet the definition offered by the Ninth Circuit compels the opposite conclusion.
Because increase means to make something greater, there must necessarily
have been an existing premium, to which Edos actual premium may be compared, to
determine whether an increase occurred. Congress could have provided that ad-verse
action in the insurance context means charging an amount greater than the optimal
premium, but instead chose to define adverse action in terms of an increase. That definitional choice must be respected, not ignored. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,
392-93 n.10 (1979) ([a] defin-ition which declares what a term means . . . excludes any
meaning that is not stated). Next, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the
Insurance Prong includes the words existing or applied for, Congress intended that an
increase in any charge for insurance must apply to all insurance transactions from
an initial policy of insurance to a renewal of a long-held policy. 435 F.3d at 1091. This
interpretation reads the words exist-ing or applied for in isolation. Other types of
adverse action described in the Insurance Prong apply only to situations where a
consumer had an existing policy of insurance, such as a cancellation, reduction, or
change in insurance. Each of these forms of adverse action presupposes an alreadyexisting policy, and under usual canons of statutory construction the term
increase also should be construed to apply to increases of an already-existing
policy. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (a phrase gathers meaning from
the words around it) (citation omitted).
Violation the aff doesnt increase status quo development just leads to
coordination between agencies
Cosgrove 13 THEIR AUTHOR BS in Environmental Science, Western
Washington University and Director of Campaigns, Conservation Law Foundation
(Sean, Congress Can Let New England States Plan for Future Storms, or Not,
Conservation Law Foundation, 12/3, http://www.clf.org/blog/oceanconservation/congress-can-let-new-england-states-plan-future-storms/)
The House of Representatives has recently passed the Water Resources Reform and
Development Act, also known as WRRDA. The House bill contains a harmful additional
provision, known as a rider, which would prohibit the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
from coordinating with coastal states to implement any ecosystem-based management
or regional ocean planning program. This provision, led by a Congressman from landlocked Waco, Texas, seeks to prohibit the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, a key coastal
and ocean management agency, from coordinating with coastal states. This means
that even though many states are conducting planning efforts to help protect

their ocean resources and support their states ocean economy, they would not be
able to coordinate with the U.S. Army Corps on any projects under the National
Ocean Policy. While driven by an anti-federal sentiment, the Flores rider actually
weakens the ability of states to carry out ocean planning and coastal management for
the welfare and health of its own citizens. On the bright side, the Senate passed a
version of the WRRDA bill containing the National Endowment for the Oceans (NEO),
which would establish a beneficial fund for improving coastal management and
resilience. Championed by energetic Rhode Island Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, NEO
will help set up an endowment supporting work by state, regional, tribal
and federal entities, as well as nonprofit organizations and academic
institutions to fund the baseline science, monitoring, and observation data
needed to improve ocean use management, including economic development that will
create jobs and support coastal economies. We need ocean planning and we need all
federal agencies including the US Army Corps of Engineers to be closely engaged
with states and other federal agencies. We cant be held hostage to the whims of a
nonsensical political agenda when we have real work to get done; the difference could be
destroyed communities and lost lives. Thankfully, large numbers of Senators and
Representatives from New England and other states have spoken out in support of the
National Ocean Policy and a National Endowment for the Oceans. Now the Congress
needs to let states prepare for their own future by rejecting the irresponsible Flores
Rider and enacting the National Endowment for the Oceans.
Standards
1 Limits the topic is already massive managing exploration and
development mean the Aff can do anything without actually changing ocean
policy
2 Ground increasing development is key to all DA and CP ground
management allows the aff to spike out of core neg generics
Vote neg for education and fairness

case
The environment cannot be controlled or regulated their attempt to do so
breeds ressentiment
Baudrillard, 94 (Jean, The Illusion of the End, 1994, LB)
Such a very American hallucination this ocean, this savannah, this desert, this virgin
forest reconstituted in miniature, vitrified beneath their experimental bubble. In the
true spirit of Disneyland's attractions, Biosphere 2 is not an experiment, but an
experimental attraction. The most amazing thing is that they have reconstituted a
fragment of artificial desert right in the middle of the natural desert (a bit like
reconstituting Hollywood in Disneyworld). Only in this artificial desert there are neither
scorpions nor Indians to be exterminated; there are only extraterrestrials trained to
survive in the very place where they destroyed another, far better adapted race, leaving
it no chance. The whole humanist ideology - ecological, climatic, micro-cosmic and
biogenetic - is summed up here, but this is of no importance. Only the sidereal,
transparent form of the edifice means anything - but what? Difficult to say. As ever,
absolute space inspires engineers, gives meaning to a project which has none, except the
mad desire for a miniaturization of the human species, with a view perhaps to a future
race and its emergence, of which we still dream. . . The artificial promiscuity of climates
has its counterpart in the artificial immunity of the space: the elimination of all
spontaneous generation (of germs, viruses, microbes), the automatic purification of the
water, the air, the physical atmosphere (and the mental atmosphere too, purified by
science). The elimination of all sexual reproduction: it is forbidden to reproduce in
Biosphere 2; even contamination from life [Ie vivant] is dangerous; sexuality may spoil
the experiment. Sexual difference functions only as a formal, statistical variable (the
same number of women as men; if anyone drops out, a person of the same sex is
substituted). Everything here is designed with a brain-like abstraction. Biosphere 2 is to
Biosphere 1 (the whole of our planet and the cosmos) what the brain is to the human
being in general: the synthesis in miniature of all its possible functions and operations:
the desert lobe, the virgin forest lobe, the nourishing agriculture lobe, the residential
lobe, all carefully distinct and placed side by side, according to the analytical imperative .
All of this in reality entirely outdated with respect to what we now know about the brain
- its plasticity, its elasticity, the reversible sequencing of all its operations. There is, then,
behind this archaic model, beneath its futuristic exterior, a gigantic hypothetical error, a
fierce idealization doomed to failure. In fact, the 'truth' of the operation lies elsewhere,
and you sense this when you return from Biosphere 2 to 'real' America, as you do when
you emerge from Disneyland into real life: the fact is that the imaginary, or
experimental, model is in no way different from the real functioning of this society. Just
as the whole of America is built in the image of Disneyland, so the whole of American
society is carrying on - in real time and out in the open - the same experiment as
Biosphere 2 which is therefore only falsely experimental, just as Disneyland is only
falsely imaginary. The recycling of all substances, the integration of flows and circuits,
non-pollution, artificial immunity, ecological balancing, controlled abstinence,

restrained jouissance but, also, the right of all species to survival and conservation - and
not just plant and animal species, but also social ones. All categories formally brought
under the one umbrella of the law - this latter setting its seal on the ending of natural
selection. It is generally thought that the obsession with survival is a logical consequence
of life and the right to life. But, most of the time, the two things are contradictory. Life is
not a question of rights, and what follows on from life is not survival, which is artificial,
but death. It is only by paying the price of a failure to live, a failure to take pleasure, a
failure to die that man is assured of survival. At least in present conditions, which the
Biosphere principle perpetuates. This micro-universe seeks to exorcize catastrophe by
making an artificial synthesis of all the elements of catastrophe. From the perspective of
survival, of recycling and feedback, of stabilization and metastabilization, the elements
of life are sacrificed to those of survival (elimination of germs, of evil, of sex). Real life,
which surely, after all, has the right to disappear (or might there be a paradoxical limit
to human rights?), is sacrificed to artificial survival. The real planet, presumed
condemned, is sacrificed in advance to its miniaturized, air-conditioned clone (have no
fear, all the earth's climates are air-conditioned here) which is designed to vanquish
death by total simulation. In days gone by it was the dead who were embalmed for
eternity; today, it is the living we embalm alive in a state of survival. Must this be our
hope? Having lost our metaphysical utopias, do we have to build this prophylactic one?
What, then, is this species endowed with the insane pretension to survive - not to
transcend itself by virtue of its natural intelligence, but to survive physically,
biologically, by virtue of its artificial intelligence? Is there a species destined to escape
natural selection, natural disappearance - in a word, death? What cosmic cussedness
might give rise to such a turnabout? What vital reaction might produce the idea of
survival at any cost? What metaphysical anomaly might grant the right not to disappear
- logical counterpart of the remarkable good fortune of having appeared? There is a kind
of aberration in the attempt to eternalize the species - not to immortalize it in its
actions, but to eternalize it in this face-lifted coma, in the glass coffin of Biosphere 2.We
may, nonetheless, take the view that this experiment, like any attempt to achieve
artificial survival or artificial paradise, is illusory, not from any technical shortcomings,
but in its very principle. In spite of itself, it is threatened by the same accidents as real
life. Fortunately. Let us hope that the random universe outside smashes this glass coffin.
Any accident will do if it rescues us
from a scientific euphoria sustained by drip-feed.
The entirety of Western politics rests on the state of exception any action
that begins with the State maintains the ability to determine life
Agamben 98 professor of philosophy at the University of Verona (Giorgio, Homo
Sacer, pg. 8-9)
The protagonist of this book is bare life, that is, the life of homo sacer (sacred man), who
may be killed and yet not sacrificed, and whose essential function in modern politics we
intend to assert. An obscure figure of archaic Roman law, in which human life is
included in the juridical order || ordinamento || solely in the form of its exclusion (that

is, of its capacity to be killed), has thus offered the key by which not only the sacred texts
of sovereignty but also the very codes of political power will unveil their mysteries. At
the same time, however, this ancient meaning of the term sacer presents us with the
enigma of a figure of the sacred that, before or beyond the religious, constitutes the first
paradigm of the political realm of the West. The Foucauldian thesis will then have to be
corrected or, at least, completed, in the sense that what characterizes modern politics is
not so much the inclusion of zo~in rhepo/iswhich is, in itself, absolutely ancientnor
simply the fact that life as such becomes a principal object of the projections and
calculations of State power. Instead the decisive fact is that, together with the process by
which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare lifewhich is
originally situated at the margins of the political ordergradually begins to coincide
with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoe
right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction. At once excluding bare life
from and capturing it within the political order, the state of exception actually
constituted, in its very separateness, the hidden foundation on which the entire political
system rested. When its borders begin to be blurred, the bare life that dwelt there frees
itself in the city and becomes both subject and object of the conflicts of the political
order, the one place for both the organization of State power and emancipation from it.
Everything happens as if, along with the disciplinary process by which State power
makes man as a living being into its own specific object, another process is set in motion
that in large measure corresponds to the birth of modern democracy, in which man as a
living being presents himself no longer as an object but as the subject of political power.
These processeswhich in many ways oppose and (at least apparently) bitterly conflict
with each othernevertheless converge insofar as both concern the bare life of the
citizen, the new biopolitical body of humanity.
It is only the attempt to know the other from the self that creates a dualism
and the condition for oppression.
Baudrillard 1993 (Jean, Transparency of Evil, pg. 127-129)
These days everything is described in terms of difference, but otherness is not the
AND
confined to reservations. These are the vicissitudes of a logic of difference.
Alt causes
Crist, 7 (Eileen Crist, 2007, Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change
Discourse,
http://journal.telospress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/2007/141/29.full.pdf+html)
While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers
in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a
manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of
proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed
approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from

the planets ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the
one issue that trumps all others. Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to
civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has
bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The
race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve the
problem. Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of
wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of
fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space
to deflect the suns rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the
problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding
them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for
example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by changing our
whole style of living.16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers
come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in
his words, the one lifeline we can use immediately.17 In the policy realm, the first step
toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing
the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need
for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the
ozone-depleting CFCs. The Montreal protocol, he submits, marks a signal moment in
human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a
global pollution problem.18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change
problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the
wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems
treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planets predicament. Just as the risks of
unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long
underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be nave not to anticipate another (perhaps
even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the
above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of
technological shifts and innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole
would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction,
land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would
go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of
the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits
virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire
planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change
discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of
confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisisamong
numerous other catastrophesclimate-change literature often focuses on how global
warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can
save it from impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels
cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while
muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge ever 1964
work, an entire socio-cultural-economic lifefrom (actual or aspired to) ways of eating
and lodging, transportation, entertainment, or emoting and thinkingbinds the

consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers and, through the latter, to the
whole. Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced
Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon, 1991), p. 12. Horkheimer and Adorno traced the
origins of the collectives participation in its own domination to the historical moment
that magical control over nature (and over the deities of nature) was relinquished to a
specific elite or clique in exchange for self and social preservation. Max Horkheimer and
Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York:
Continuum, 1972), pp. 2122. After the decisive turn when the social body became
implicated in its own domination, what is done to all by the few, always occurs as the
subjection of individuals by the many: social repression always exhibits the masks of
repression by a collective (ibid.). And elsewhere: The misplaced love of the common
people for the wrong which is done them is a greater force than the cunning of the
authorities (ibid., p. 134). In light of such astute observations offered by critical
theorists, neo-Marxist and anarchist analyses that indict corporate and/or state power
for the troubled natural and social worlds are, at best, only partially true. 20. More than
thirty years ago, environmental philosopher Arne Naess articulated the influential
distinction between shallow and deep ecology, characterized by the focus on
symptoms of the environmental crisis, on the one hand, versus critical attention to
underlying causes of problems, on the other. Notwithstanding its unfortunate elitist
overtonesimplying that some environmental thinkers are capable of reflecting deeply,
while others flounder with superficialitiesthe shallow-deep distinction has been
significant for two compelling reasons. One, it clarified how symptomology leads
merely to technical piecemeal solutions; and two, it showed how underlying causes, left
unaddressed, eventually generate more nasty symptoms. In other words, shallow
ecological thinking is technical and narrow: when we think about climate change as the
problemas opposed to confronting the limitless expansionism of the capitalist
enterprise as the problemwe arguably become shallow in our thinking. Arne Naess,
The Shallow and the Deep, Long- Range Ecology Movements, in George Sessions, ed.,
Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First Century (1973; Boston: Shambhala, 1995), pp. 151
55. on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to
downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the
devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation,
topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so
on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus
specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization
of the biodiversity crisisa crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and
which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual nontopic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several
works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the
consequences of global warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that
biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or
longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate
change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem lossesindeed, is doing so

already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may
temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will
not put an end towill barely addressthe ongoing destruction of life on Earth.

Impact framing
May votes neg and probably hates the aff he advocates creating change at
the individual level
May 13 (Todd, THEIR AUTHOR, email between Jon Langel and Todd May posted to
cross-ex debate forum, 3/30/13, http://www.cross-x.com/topic/54943-may-05-as-aresponse-to-nietzsche/?hl=todd+may#entry871009 //stransky)
Todd: Hi Jon (and Rob), Actually, the issue is a bit complicated. I think you're right to
say that there's nothing in the article that seeks to challenge Nietzsche's notion of
ressentiment. Moreover, Nietzsche himself was certainly into change; recall his disdain
for the ass in Zarathustra who can only say yea. On the other hand, the kind of change
he went in for would not be the kind I outlined in my article. Nietzsche was averse to any
kind of egalitarianism. His models of accomplishment were individual artists and
conquerors. That is a side of Nietzsche that often gets played past in contemporary
appropriations of his work, ex. Foucault and Deleuze (although Deleuze had his own
streak of elitism). But it is certainly there. So, while I would say that progressive political
change should studiously avoid ressentiment, it would not adopt Nietzsche's own
political pronouncements and formulations. That's my view of the relation of the article
to his thought. Is that at all helpful?
He votes neg and also you breed hella ressentiment
May 05
(Todd May. "To Change the World, to Celebrate Life: Merleau-Ponty and Foucault on
the Body." Philosophy and Social Criticism 31:5-6. September 2005, LB)
And what happens from there? From the meetings, from the rallies, from the petitions
and the teach-ins? What happens next? There is, after all, always a next. If you win this
time - end aid to the contras, divest from apartheid South Africa, force debt-forgiveness
by technologically advanced countries -there is always more to do. There is the deunionization of workers, there are gay rights, there is Burma, there are the Palestinians,
the Tibetans. There will always be Tibetans, even if they aren't in Tibet, even if they
aren't Asian. But is that the only question: Next? Or is that just the question we focus
on? What's the next move in this campaign, what's the next campaign? Isn't there more
going on than that? After all, engaging in political organizing is a practice, or a group of
practices. It contributes to making you who you are. It's where the power is, and where
your life is, and where the intersection of your life and those of others (many of whom
you will never meet, even if it's for their sake that you're involved) and the buildings and
streets of your town is. This moment when you are seeking to change the world, whether
by making a suggestion in a meeting or singing at a rally or marching in silence or
asking for a signature on a petition, is not a moment in which you don't exist. It's not a
moment of yours that you sacrifice for others so that it no longer belongs to you. It
remains a moment of your life, sedimenting in you to make you what you will become,
emerging out of a past that is yours as well. What will you make of it, this moment? How

will you be with others, those others around you who also do not cease to exist when
they begin to organize or to protest or to resist? The illusion is to think that this has
nothing to do with you. You've made a decision to participate in world-changing. Will
that be all there is to it? Will it seem to you a simple sacrifice, for this small period of
time, of who you are for the sake of others? Are you, for this moment, a political ascetic?
Asceticism like that is dangerous.
framing issue all of these people will die anyway were accessing a
terminal uniqueness route that indicates that the life they experience
should be valuable were also winning reasons why you make their lives
disposable which overextends your own will to power which is life negating

It absolves us of our personal responsibilities because we rely on the state

to solve problems link turns the aff
Kappeler, 95- (Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)
We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and
diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and
politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective
irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and
where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal
acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential
responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are
indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to
command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their
decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of
responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power
take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our
own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our
apparent `powerlessness and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political
disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel
secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say,
the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such
events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for
the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into
thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own
judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own
sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any
relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections
between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that
we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent
lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also

individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and

unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major
powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war,
because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the
major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned
with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of ` What
would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister
or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the
only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell
there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter
out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no
possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously
desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the
UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war',
`I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral
revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or
participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `noncomprehension: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for
working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological
current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the
advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you',
our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' our
readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one
of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its
violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our
feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war
and violence. destining of revealing insofar as it pushes us in a certain direction.
Heidegger does not regard destining as determination (he says it is not a fate which
compels), but rather as the implicit project within the field of modern practices to
subject all aspects of reality to the principles of order and efficiency, and to pursue
reality down to the finest detail. Thus, insofar as modern technology aims to order and
render calculable, the objectification of reality tends to take the form of an increasing
classification, differentiation, and fragmentation of reality. The possibilities for how
things appear are increasingly reduced to those that enhance calculative activities.
Heidegger perceives the real danger in the modern age to be that human beings will
continue to regard technology as a mere instrument and fail to inquire into its essence.
He fears that all revealing will become calculative and all relations technical, that the
unthought horizon of revealing, namely the concealed background practices that make
technological thinking possible, will be forgotten. He remarks: The coming to presence
of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will
be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the
unconcealedness of standing-reserve. (QT, 33) 10 Therefore, it is not technology, or
science, but rather the essence of technology as a way of revealing that constitutes the
danger; for the essence of technology is existential, not technological. 11 It is a matter

of how human beings are fundamentally oriented toward their world vis a vis
their practices, skills, habits, customs, and so forth. Humanism contributes to this
danger insofar as it fosters the illusion that technology is the result of a collective human
choice and therefore subject to human control. 12
Demonizing the Right is what gives it power. Instead we should realize that
the ideological divide between the left and the right is meaningless
Baudrillard, 97 (Jean, A Conjuration of Imbeciles, 1997)
But today the left is deprived of its political energy. It has become a purely moralistic
law-making structure, a representative of universal values, a sacred holder of the reign
of Virtue, and an incarnation of antiquated values such as Good or Truth. It now acts as
a jurisdiction which asks everyone to act responsibly while still granting itself the right
to remain irresponsible. The political illusion of the left (which had remained frozen
during twenty years of opposition) turned into a platform of historical morality (and not
of historical direction) once it came to power. It then became the holder of a morality of
truthfulness, basic rights, and good conscience, having thus reached a zero degree on
the political scale and, undoubtedly, the lowest point of the genealogy of morals. Its
moralization of all values marked its historical failure (and the failure of thinking in
general). Since then, even reality, the principle of reality, has become an act of faith. Try
to question the reality of war, for example, and you immediately become a betrayer of
moral law. With the left and the traditional right both deprived of political substance,
where has the political gone to? Well, simply, it has moved to the far right. As Bruno
Latour so accurately noted the other day in Le Monde, the only political discourse today
in France is that of Le Pen's Front National. All the rest is moral and pedagogic
discourse, teachers' lessons and lecturers' tirades, managers' rhetoric and programmers'
jargon. By contrast, having given himself to evil and immorality, Le Pen has been able to
take over all of the political, the remnant of what has been abandoned or voluntarily
rejected by a political ideology of Good deeds and Enlightenment values. The more he is
antagonized by a moral coalition (a sign of political impotence), the more he enjoys the
benefits of political immorality, the benefits which come with being the only one on the
side of evil. In the past, whenever the traditional right decided to implement an ideology
of morality and order, you could always count on the left, always attempting to
antagonize those so-called moral values in the name of political claims. But today, the
left is experiencing the same condition that once characterized the traditional right.
Suddenly responsible for the defense of moral order, the left has no choice but to
witness the slippage of abandoned political energies toward political forces which do not
hesitate to antagonize its newly created order. Conversely, the left keeps on reactivating
the source of evil by continuing to embody the rule of virtue, which of course is nothing
more than the rule of supreme hypocrisy. If Le Pen did not exist, we would have to
invent him! Indeed, it is thanks to him that we can get rid of our evil share, of what is
the worst part of us. It is as such that we can curse Le Pen. If he were to disappear,
however, we would be left begging for pity! We would be left struggling with our own
racist, sexist, and nationalist (everyone's fate) viruses. Simply, we would be abandoned

to the murderous negativity of society. As such, Le Pen is the perfect mirror of the
political class which uses him to conjure up its own evils, just as every individual uses
the political class to cast away any form of corruption inherent to society (both are
similar types of corrupt and cathartic functions). Trying to put an end to this, trying to
purify society and moralize public life, trying to eradicate what claims to embody evil is
a complete misunderstanding of the way evil operates, of the way politics itself operates.
Opting for a mode of unilateral denunciation, and ignoring the very principle of
reversibility of evil, anti-Le Pen supporters have left him with a monopolistic control
over the evil share. Having thus been cast away, Le Pen can no longer be dislodged. By
demonizing him in the name of virtue, the political class simply offers him a most
comfortable situation. Le Pen simply has to pick up and recycle the discourse of
ambivalence, of denial of evil, and of hypocrisy that his opponents constantly throw at
him in the course of their battle for the defense of law or the defense of a good cause. Le
Pen's enemies provide him with the energy he needs. Too eager to discredit him, they
simply transform his mistakes into (his own) victories. They do not see that good never
comes from a purification of evil (evil always retaliates in a forceful way), but rather
from a subtle treatment which turns evil against itself. All this shows us that Le Pen
may be the embodiment of worthlessness and idiocy. No doubt! But he is above all the
symptom of his opponents' stupidity. The imbeciles are those who, by denouncing him,
blatantly reveal their own impotence and idiocy and glaringly demonstrate how absurd
it is to antagonize him face to face. They simply have not understood the rules of evil
that his game of musical chairs follow. By continuing to antagonize him, the imbeciles
give life to their own ghosts, their negative doubles. This shows, indeed, a terrifying lack
of lucidity on their part. But what drives such a perverse effect, the fact that the left
remains trapped in a discourse of denunciation whereas Le Pen maintains a privilege of
enunciation? What pushes one to gain all the profits from the crime while the other
suffers the negative effects of recrimination? What causes one to "get off" [s'eclatant]
with evil when the other gets lost with the victim? Well, it's quite simple. By
incarcerating Le Pen in a ghetto, it is in fact the democratic left which becomes
incarcerated and which affirms itself as a discriminatory power. It becomes exiled
within its own obsession and automatically grants a privilege of justice to what it
demonizes. And, of course, Le Pen never misses an opportunity to claim republican
legality and fairness on his behalf. But it is above all on the imaginary but very pregnant
figure of the rebel and persecuted soul that he establishes his prestige. Thus, he can
enjoy the consequences of both legality and illegality. A victim of ostracism, Le Pen has
an incredible freedom of language and can deploy an unmatched arrogance of
judgement, something that the left has deprived itself of. Let's give an example of such a
magical thought that today stands in for political thought. Le Pen is blamed for the
sentiment of rejection and exclusion of immigrants in France. But this is just a drop in
an ocean of social exclusion that has overwhelmed all of society (recently, exclusion
itself, as well as the "social breakdown" that politicians like to mention, were all
excluded by the decree signed by the President of the Republic to dissolve the National
Assembly). We are all both responsible and victim at the same time of this inextricable
and complex process of exclusion. There is something typically magical in the need to

conjure up this virus, which is everywhere to be found (it is a direct function of our
social and technical "progress"), and in the desire to exorcise the curse of exclusion (and
our impotence by the same token) through the figure of a hated man, institution, or
organization, no matter who or what they are. It is as if we were faced with a tumor in
need of extraction whereas, in fact, the metastases have already expanded everywhere.
The Front National simply follows the course of the social metastases, and is all the
more virulent since people think that they have eradicated the disease when, in fact, it
has already infected the entire body. Not to mention that this process of magical
projection of the Front National takes place along the same lines as this party's own
process of demonization of immigrants. One must always be suspicious of the ruse of
contamination, a ruse which, by means of the transparency of evil, mutates positivity
into negativity, and a demand for liberty into "democratic despotism." As usual, it is a
question of reversibility, of a subtle encirclement of evil whose rational intelligence is
never suspected. While modern pathology tells us a lot about the physical body, we do
not pay attention to this mode of analysis when it comes to the social body. To remain
within the political, we must step away from ideology and look at things through the
lens of social physics. Our democratic society is a stasis. Le Pen is a metastasis. Global
society is dying of inertia and immune deficiency. Le Pen is simply the visible
transcription of such a viral condition; he is the spectacular projection of the virus. This
happens in dreams too. Le Pen is a burlesque, hallucinatory figuration of a latent state,
of a silent inertia caused by forced integration and systematic exclusion. Since the hope
of finally curing social inequalities has truly disappeared (by and large), it is no surprise
if resentment has moved to the level of racial inequality. The failure of the social
explains the success of the racial (and of all the other fatal strategies). As such, Le Pen is
the only savage analyst in today's society. The fact that he is placed on the far right is
merely the sad result of the fact that analysts are no longer to be found on the left or the
far left. Judges, intellectuals no longer analyze. Only the immigrants perhaps, as polar
opposites, could become analysts too. But they already have been recycled by a good and
responsible humanitarian thought. Le Pen is the only one who operates a radical erasure
of the so-called distinction between right and left. This is, no doubt, an erasure by
default. But the harsh criticism of this conventional distinction which was unleashed in
the 1960s (and culminated in 1968) has unfortunately disappeared from the political
scene today. Le Pen simply recuperates a de facto situation that the political class
refuses to confront (it even uses elections to deny it), but whose extreme consequences
will be felt some day. If, one day, political imagination, political will, and political
demand hope to rebound, they will have to take into account the radical abolition of the
antiquated and artificial distinction between right and left, which, in fact, has been
largely damaged and compromised over the past decades, and which only holds today
through some sort of complicit corruption on both sides. This distinction is dead in
practice but, by means of an incurable revisionism, is constantly reaffirmed.

2nc

Case
tag
Zizek, 02
(Slavoj, Senior Researcher dept. of philosophy @ Univ. of Ljubljana, 2002 (Welcome To
the Desert of the Real, p. 60-2, LB)
In a strict Lacanian sense of the term, we should thus posit that 'happiness' relies on the
subject's inability or unreadiness fully to confront the consequences of its desire: the
price of happiness is that the subject remains stuck in the inconsistency of its desire. In
our daily lives, we (pretend to) desire things which we do not really desire, so that,
ultimately, the worst thing that can happen is for us to get what we 'officially' desire.
Happiness is thus inherently hypocritical: it is the happiness of dreaming about things
we do not really want. When today's Left bombards the capitalist system with demands
that it obviously cannot fulfil (Full employment! Retain the welfare state! Full rights for
immigrants!), it is basically playing a game of hysterical provocation, of addressing the
Master with a demand which will be impossible for him to meet, and will thus expose his
impotence. The problem with this strategy, however, is not only that the system cannot
meet these demands, but that, in addition, those who voice them do not really want
them to be realized. For example, when 'radical' academics demand full rights for
immigrants and opening of the borders, are they aware that the direct implementation
of this demand would, for obvious reasons, inundate developed Western countries with
millions of newcomers, thus provoking a violent working-class racist backlash which
would then endanger the privileged position of these very academics? Of course they
are, but they count on the fact that their demand will not be met- in this way, they can
hypocritically retain their clear radical conscience while continuing to enjoy their
privileged position. In 1994-, when a new wave of emigration from Cuba to the USA was
on the cards, Fidel Castro warned the USA that if they did not stop inciting Cubans to
emigrate, Cuba would no longer prevent them from doing it- which the Cuban
authorities in effect did a couple of days later, embarrassing the USA with thousands of
unwanted newcomers .... Is this not like the proverbial woman who snapped back at a
man who was making macho advances to her: 'Shut up, or you'll have to do what you're
boasting about!' In both cases, the gesture is that of calling the other's bluff, counting on
the fact that what the other really fears is that one will fully comply with his or her
demand. And would not the same gesture also throw our radical academics into a panic?
Here the old '68 motto 'Sayans realistes, demandons /'impossible!' acquires a new
cynical and sinister meaning which, perhaps, reveals its truth: 'Let's be realists: we, the
academic Left, want to appear critical, while fully enjoying the privileges the system
offers us. So let's bombard the system with impossible demands: we all know that these
demands won't be met, so we can be sure that nothing will actually change, and we'll
maintain our privileged status!' If someone accuses a big corporation of particular
financial crimes, he or she is exposed to risks which can go right up to murder attempts;
if he or she asks the same corporation to finance a research project into the link between
global capitalism and the emergence of hybrid postcolonial identities, he or she stands a
good chance of getting hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Framing
No cards

Suffering
The affirmative regurgitates past suffering and uses it to justify action
which reinforces the military industrial complex and leads to massive
imperialism which turns the case
Baudrillard 2006 (Jean, No Reprieve for Sarajevo, 2006, LB)
The problem lies indeed in the nature of our reality. We have got only one, and it must
be preserved. Even if it is by the use of the most heinous of all paroles: "One must do
something. One cannot remain idle." Yet, to do something for the sole reason that one
cannot do nothing never has been a valid principle for action, nor for liberty. At the
most it is an excuse for one's own powerlessness and a token of self-pity. The people of
Sarajevo are not bothered by such questions. Being where they are, they are in the
absolute need to do what they do, to do the right thing. They harbour no illusion about
the outcome and do not indulge in self-pity. This is what it means to be really existing, to
exist within reality. And this reality has nothing to do with the so-called objective reality
of their plight, which should not exist, and which we do so much deplore. This reality
exists as such - it is the stark reality of action and destiny. This is why they are alive,
while we are dead. This is why we feel the need to salvage the reality of war in our own
eyes and to impose this reality (to be pitiable) upon those who suffer from it, but do not
really believe in it, despite the fact they are in the midst of war and utter distress. Susan
Sontag herself confesses in her diaries that the Bosnians do not really believe in the
suffering which surrounds them. They end up finding the whole situation unreal,
senseless, and unexplainable. It is hell, but hell of what may be termed a hyperreal kind,
made even more hyperreal by the harassment of the media and the humanitarian
agencies, because it renders the attitude of the world towards them even less
unfathomable. Thus, they live in a kind of ghost-like war - which is fortunate, because
otherwise, they would never have been able to stand up to it. These are not my words, by
the way: they say it so. But then Susan Sontag, hailing herself from New York, must
know better than them what reality is, since she has chosen them to incarnate it. Or
maybe it is simply because reality is what she, and with her all the Western world, is
lacking the most. To reconstitute reality, one needs to head to where blood flows. All
these "corridors", opened by us to funnel our foodstuffs and our "culture" are in fact our
lifelines along which we suck their moral strength and the energy of their distress. Yet
another unequal exchange. And to those who have found in a radical delusion of reality
(and this includes the belief in political rationality, which supposedly rules us, and
which very much constitutes the principle of European reality) a kind of alternative
courage, that is to survive a senseless situation, to these people Susan Sontag comes to
convince them of the "reality" of their suffering, by making something cultural and
something theatrical out of it, so that it can be useful as a referent within the theatre of
western values, including "solidarity". But Susan Sontag herself is not the issue. She is
merely a societal instance of what has become the general situation whereby toothless
intellectuals swap their distress with the misery of the poor, both of them sustaining
each other, both of them locked in a perverse agreement. This parallels the way the

political class and civil society are swapping their respective misery: one throwing up
corruption and scandals, the other its purposeless convulsions and its inertia. Thus, not
so long ago, one could witness Bourdieu and Abbe Pierre offering themselves as
televisual slaughtering lambs trading with each other pathetic language and sociological
garble about poverty. Our whole society is thus on its way towards "commiseration" in
the most literal sense of the word (under the cloak of ecumenical bathos). It looks like as
if we are in the midst of an immense feeling of guilt, shared by intellectuals and
politicians alike, and which is linked to the end of history and the downfall of values.
Then, it has become necessary to replenish the pond of values, the pond of references,
and to do so by using that smallest common denominator which is the suffering of the
world, and in doing so, replenishing our game reserves with artificial fowls. "At the
moment, it has become impossible to show anything else than suffering in the news
broadcasts on television", reports David Schneidermann. Ours is a victim-society. I
gather that society is merely expressing its own disappointment and longing for an
impossible violence against itself. Everywhere, a New Intellectual Order is following on
the heels of the New World Order. Everywhere, we see distress, misery and suffering
becoming the basic stuff of the primitive scene. The status of victimhood, paired with
human rights is the sole funeral ideology. Those who do not directly exploit it do it by
proxy - there is no dearth of mediators who take some surplus value of financial or
symbolic nature along the way. Loss and suffering, just like the global debt, are
negotiable and for sale on the speculative market, that is, the intellectual-political
market - which is in no way undermining the military-industrial complex of old &
sinister days. Every commiseration is grounded within the logic of suffering. To refer to
suffering, even if it is to fight it, lends it an unending base of objective reproduction. It is
clear that in order to fight whatever, one must start from the evil, not from the suffering.
It is absolutely obvious that in Sarajevo we may witness the scene of the transparency of
Evil. The concealed cancer-cell which causes everything else to rot, the virus whose
blatant symptom the Europeans' paralysis has become. One seems to salvage the
European inventory in the GATT negotiations, but in the meanwhile it is thrown in the
flames at Sarajevo. In a certain sense, it is a good thing. Bogus Europe, vanishing
Europe, Europe that has been squandered in the most hypocritical of dealings, this
Europe is exposed in Sarajevo. In that sense, the Serbs could almost be hailed as the
demystifying instrument, the savage analyst of that ghostly Europe, creature of those
techno-democratic politicians who are as triumphant in their discourses as they are
ineffective in their deeds. One sees how Europe is disintegrating just as the discourse of
united Europe flowers (exactly as the situation of human rights is worsening just as the
discourse on human rights is proliferating). But this is not even the fine point of the
story. The fine point is that the Serbs, as carriers of the ethnic cleansing, are at the apex
of the kind of Europe in the making; because the "real" Europe that is being made, is a
white Europe, a Europe 'made' white, integrated and cleansed, in the moral sense, in the
economic sense, and in the ethnic sense. This Europe is being made victoriously in, and
in that sense, what happens there is not an untimely occurrence on the way towards a
pious and democratic Europe, which does not exist, but a logical and ascending step
towards the New European Order, itself a branch of the New World Order, whose

distinctive features everywhere are white fundamentalism, protectionism,

discrimination and control. Some say: if we let this happen in Sarajevo, it will happen to
us later on. What nonsense! It has befallen us already. All European countries are on the
road to ethnic cleansing. This is the real Europe that is being slowly put together in the
shadow of national parliaments. And Serbia is in forward position. There is no need to
invoke some kind of passivity, some inability to react, since we are dealing with a
programme being logically implemented, of which Bosnia is merely the actual frontier.
Why do you think that Le Pen has all but vanished from the (French) political scene? He
has vanished because the essence of his ideas has completely infiltrated the political
class, taking the garb of "the French particularity", the holy union, the euronationalist
impulse, or plain protectionism. No use any longer for Le Pen. He won, not as a political
person, but as a virus, having taken over the minds. Why would you believe that things
will remain limited in Sarajevo. It is the same thing that is at stake everywhere. No
display of solidarity is going to change anything about that. It will stop only the day that
the killing will end, that is when the borders of "white" Europe will have been redrawn.
It is as if Europe, all nationalities, all political movements, no matter which, had "taken
a contract", a killer's contract with the Serbs, who have become the agents of the dirty
jobs for the West. Just as the West had taken a contract with Saddam Hussein against
Iran. The problem is that if the killer overdoes it, he must be eliminated too. But if the
operations against Iraq and in Somalia look like failures within the establishment of the
New World Order, then the Bosnian case looks promising within the New European one.
They feed off images and will continual to replicate them so longer as they
are deemed profitable
Baudrillard, 94 (Jean, The Illusion of the End, 1994, LB)
In the case of the Romanian revolution, it was the faking of the dead in Timisoara which
aroused a kind of moral indignation and raised the problem of the scandal of
'disinformation' or, rather, of information itself as scandal. It was not the dead that were
the scandal, but the corpses being pressed into appearing before the television cameras,
as in the past dead souls were pressed into appearance in the register of deaths . It was
their being taken hostage, as it were, and our being held hostage too, as mystified TV
viewers. Being blackmailed by violence and death, especially in a noble and
revolutionary cause, was felt to be worse than the violence itself, was felt to be a parody
of history. All the media live off the presumption of catastrophe and of the succulent
imminence of death. A photo in Liberation, for example, shows us a convoy of refugees
'which, some time after this shot was taken, was to be attacked by the Iraqi army'.
Anticipation of effects, morbid simulation, emotional blackmail. It was the same on
CNN with the arrival of the Scuds. Nothing is news if it does not pass through that
horizon of the virtual, that hysteria of the virtual - not in the psychological sense, but in
the sense of a compulsion for what is presented, in all bad faith, as real to be consumed
as unreal. In the past, to show something up as a fake, we said: 'It's just play-acting', 'It's
all romance!', 'It's put on for the cameras!'. This time, with Romania and the Gulf War,
we were able to say, 'It's just TV!' Photographic or cinema images still pass through the
negative stage (and that of projection), whereas the TV image, the video image, digital

and synthetic, are images without a negative, and hence without negativity and without
reference. They are virtual and the virtual is what puts an end to all negativity, and thus
to all reference to the real or to events. At a stroke, the contagion of images, engendering
themselves without reference to a real or an imaginary, itself becomes virtually without
limits, and this limitless engendering produces information as catastrophe. Is an image
which refers only to itself still an image? However this may be, that image raises the
problem of its indifference to the world, and thus of our indifference to it - which is a
political problem. When television becomes the strategic space of the event, it sets itself
up as a deadly self-reference, it becomes a bachelor machine. The real object is wiped
out by news not merely alienated, but abolished. All that remains of it are traces on a
monitoring screen. Many Romanian eyewitness accounts speak of being dispossessed of
the event in this way, deprived of the lived experience they have of it by being
submerged in the media network, by being placed under house arrest in front of their
television screens. Spectators then become exoterics of the screen, living their revolution
as an exoticism of images, themselves exogenous, touristic spectators of a virtual
history. From the moment the studio becomes the strategic centre, and the screen the
only site of appearance, everyone wants to be on it at all costs, or else gathers in the
street in the glare of the cameras, and these, indeed, actually film one another. The
street becomes an extension of the studio, that is, of the non-site of the event, of the
virtual site of the event. The street itself becomes a virtual space. Site of the definitive
confusion of masses and medium, of the real-time confusion of act and sign. There is no
will to communicate in all this. The only irresistible drive is to occupy this non-site, this
empty space of representation which is the screen. Representation (political
representation too) is currently a trough of depression - meteorological depression which the media fill up with their turbulences, with the same consequences as occur
when any kind of space is suddenly depressurized. The highest pressure of news
corresponds to the lowest pressure of events and reality [Ie reel].The same unrealism in
the Ceausescu trial. It is not the judicial procedure itself which is scandalous but the
video tape, unacceptable as the only, bloodless trace of a bloody event. In the eyes of the
whole world, this will remain an event forever suspect, for the sole reason of its strangely obscene - scenic abduction. This hidden jury, its voice striking out against the
accused, these defendants we are forced to see even though they are virtually dead, these
dead prisoners shot a second time to meet the needs of news. One might even wonder
whether the actors in this staged event were not deliberately trying to make themselves
seem suspect in the eyes of world opinion, as though playing at sabotaging their image.
At the same time, the Ceausescu trial was pulled off perfectly as a video production,
betraying a sharp sense of the image function, the blackmail-function, the deterrencefunction. Deep down, the intuitive grasp of these things has grown more sophisticated
over there, in the shadow of dictatorship, than it has with us. We have nothing to teach
them. For, if the Romanians themselves got high on this media speculation which served
them as a revolutionary aphrodisiac, they also dragged all the Western media into the
same news demagogy. By manipulating themselves, they caused us spontaneously to
swallow their fiction. We bear the same responsibility as they do. Or, rather, there is no
responsibility anywhere. The question of responsibility cannot even be raised. It is the

evil genius of news which promotes such staging. When information gets mixed in with
its source, then, as with sound waves, you get a feedback effect - an effect of interference
and uncertainty. When demand is maximal (and everywhere today the demand for
events is maximal), it short-circuits the initial situation and produces an uncontrollable
response effect. That is, ultimately, why we do the Romanians an injustice when we
accuse them of manipulation and bad faith. No one is responsible. It is all an effect of
the infernal cycle of credibility. The actors and the media sensed obscurely that the
events in Eastern Europe had to be given credibility, that that revolution had to be lent
credibility by an extra dose of dead bodies. And the media themselves had to be lent
credibility by the reference to the people. Leading to a vicious circle of credibility, the
result of which is the decredibilizing of the revolution and the events themselves. The
logical sequence of news and history turns back against itself, bringing, in its cyclical
movement, a kind of deflation of historical consciousness. The Americans did just the
same in the Gulf War. By the excessive nature of their deployment and stagecraft, by
putting their power and news control so extravagantly to the test, they decredibilized
both war and news. They were the Ubus of their wn power, just as the Romanians were
the Ubus of their own mpotence. Excess itself engenders the parody which invalidates
the facts. And, just as the principle of economics is wrecked by financial speculation, so
the principle of politics [Ie politique] and history is wrecked by media speculation.

1nr

K
Their interpretation of fiat misunderstands policy makingthis turns their
predictability and education arguments and also links to our critique
CLAUDE 1988
(Inis, Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, States and
the Global System, pages 18-20)
This view of the state as an institutional monolith is fostered by the notion of
sovereignty, which calls up the image of the monarch, presiding over his kingdom.
Sovereignty emphasizes the singularity of the state, its monopoly of authority, its unity of
command and its capacity to speak with one voice. Thus, France wills, Iran demands, China
intends, New Zealand promises and the Soviet Union insists. One all too easily conjures up
the picture of a single-minded and purposeful state that decides exactly what it wants to achieve,
adopts coherent policies intelligently adapted to its objectives, knows what it is doing, does what
it intends and always has its act together. This view of the state is reinforced by political
scientists emphasis upon the concept of policy and upon the thesis that governments derive
policy from calculations of national interest. We thus take it for granted that states act
internationally in accordance with rationally conceived and consciously constructed
schemes of action, and we implicitly refuse to consider the possibility that alternatives to
policy-directed behaviour may have importancealternatives such as random, reactive,
instinctual, habitual and conformist behaviour. Our rationalistic assumption that states
do what they have planned to do tends to inhibit the discovery that states sometimes do
what they feel compelled to do, or what they have the opportunity to do, or what they
have usually done, or what other states are doing, or whatever the line of least resistance
would seem to suggest. Academic preoccupation with the making of policy is accompanied by
academic neglect of the execution of policy. We seem to assume that once the state has
calculated its interest and contrived a policy to further that interest, the carrying out of
policy is the virtually automatic result of the routine functioning of the bureaucratic
mechanism of the state. I am inclined to call this the Genesis theory of public
administration, taking as my text the passage: And God said, Let there be light: and
there was light. I suspect that, in the realm of government, policy execution rarely follows
so promptly and inexorably from policy statement. Alternatively, one may dub it the PoohBah/Ko-Ko theory, honouring those denizens of William S. Gilberts Japan who took the
position that when the Mikado ordered that something e done it was as good as done and might
as well be declared to have been done. In the real world, that which a state decides to do is not as
good as done; it may, in fact, never be done. And what states do, they may never have
decided to do. Governments are not automatic machines, grinding out decisions and converting
decisions into actions. They are agglomerations of human beings, like the rest of us inclined to
be fallible, lazy, forgetful, indecisive, resistant to discipline and authority, and likely to fail to get
the word or to heed it. As in other large organizations, left and right governmental hands are
frequently ignorant of each others activities, official spokesmen contradict each other, ministries
work at cross purposes, and the creaking machinery of government often gives the impression
that no one is really in charge. I hope that no one will attribute my jaundiced view of
government merely to the fact that I am an Americanone, that is, whose personal

experience is limited to a governmental system that is notoriously complex, disjointed,

erratic, cumbersome and unpredictable. The United States does not, I suspect, have the
least effective government or the most bumbling and incompetent bureaucracy in all the
world. Here and there, now and then, governments do, of course perform prodigious
feats of organization and administration: an extraordinary war effort, a flight to the
moon, a successful hostage-rescue operation. More often, states have to make do with
governments that are not notably clear about their purposes or coordinated and
disciplined in their operations. This means that, in international relations, states are
sometimes less dangerous, and sometimes less reliable, than one might think. Neither
their threats nor their promises are to be taken with absolute seriousness. Above all, it
means that we students of international politics must be cautious in attributing purposefulness
and responsibility to governments. To say the that the United States was informed about
an event is not to establish that the president acted in the light of that knowledge; he
may never have heard about it. To say that a Soviet pilot shot down an airliner is not to
prove that the Kremlin has adopted the policy of destroying all intruders into Soviet
airspace; one wants to know how and by whom the decision to fire was made. To
observe that the representative of Zimbabwe voted in favour of a particular resolution in
the United Nations General Assembly is not necessarily to discover the nature of
Zimbabwes policy on the affected matter; Zimbabwe may have no policy on that matter,
and it may be that no one in the national capital has ever heard of the issue. We can
hardly dispense with the convenient notion that Pakistan claims, Cuba promises, and
Italy insists, and we cannot well abandon the formal position that governments speak
for and act on behalf of their states, but it is essential that we bear constantly in mind the
reality that governments are never fully in charge and never achieve the unity, purposefulness
and discipline that theory attributes to themand that they sometimes claim.
Their framework of pretend is damaginga policy-focused framework
makes us believe that the only agents of change are state or governmental
actionthis makes us forget about our individual responsibility. This
effects the round in two waysacts as another link, and turns the
framework.
Jayan Nayar, School of Law, University of Warwick, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs.
599, Fall, 1999.
The "world," as we perceive it today, did not exist in times past. It does not exist today.
There is no such thing as the global "one world." The world can only exist in the
locations and experiences revealed through and in human relationships. It is
often that we think that to change the world it is necessary to change the way power is
exercised in the world; so we go about the business of exposing and denouncing the
many power configurations that dominate. Power indeed does lie at the core of
human misery, yet we blind ourselves if we regard this power as the power
out there. Power, when all the complex networks of its reach are untangled,
is personal; power does not exist out there, [*630] it only exists in
relationship. To say the word, power, is to describe relationship, to acknowledge

power, is to acknowledge our subservience in that relationship. There can exist no

power if the subservient relationship is refused--then power can only achieve its
ambitions through its naked form, as violence. Changing the world therefore is a
misnomer for in truth it is relationships that are to be changed. And the only
relationships that we can change for sure are our own. And the constant in our
relationships is ourselves--the "I" of all of us. And so, to change our relationships, we
must change the "I" that is each of us. Transformations of "structures" will
soon follow. This is, perhaps, the beginning of all emancipations. This is, perhaps, the
essential message of Mahatmas.
Roleplaying causes nihilism and ressentiment
Antonio 1995 [Robert; Professor of Sociology at the University of Kansas; Nietzsches
Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History; American Journal of
Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995]
While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of
autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in
specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross
fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking
themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in
simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The
role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator
suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly
amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness,
spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes,
meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others
might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp.
302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to
hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing
them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked,
"Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . .
[Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to
tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals"
(Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300,
302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine
attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in
enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a
"stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94).
Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated,
"One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while
reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on
something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to
throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend
their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and

anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense
of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to
role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill
any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine
ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively
and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions.
Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations
of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing,
arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of
the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more
urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince,
class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination
of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the
way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89,
303-4).LB
Our critique comes first rhetorical analysis precedes policymaking
because the affirmative's discourse shapes policy implementation
Dauber, 01 (Cori, communication studies professor, The Shots Seen Round the World,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v004/4.4dauber.html)
Rhetoric, whether discursive or visual, has real power in the way events play out. What this
article makes clear is that rhetoric (and therefore rhetorical analysis) also has power in the way
policy is shaped and defined. In a recent book on the conflict in Kosovo, the authors note
that when the president spoke to the nation on the night the air war began, he immediately ruled
out the use of ground forces. This was done, they argue, due to fears that leaving open the
possibility of ground force participation would sacrifice domestic public and congressional (and
allied) support for the air war. But "publicly ruling out their use only helped to reduce Milosevic'
s uncertainty regarding the likely scope of NATO's military actions," 109 and possibly to
lengthen the air war as a result. Yet, they report, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger,
'who authored the critical passage in the president's speech, maintains that 'we would not
have won the war without this sentence.''' 110 It would be difficult to find more direct evidence
for the profound impact and influence public rhetoric and debate have--and are understood to
have--on policy, policymaking, and policy makers at the highest level. That means that rhetorical
analysis can have a role to play and a voice at the table before policies are determined.
Academic rhetoricians, through their choice of projects and the formats in which they
publish, can stake a claim to having an important voice at the table-and they should do
so.
The universal ethics posed by the 1ac establishes a discourse that justifies
wars and annihilation and causes Otherness by trying to erase distinctions
Odysseos, 8-

Dr. Louiza Odysseos, University of Sussex Department of International Relations,

Against Ethics? Iconographies of Enmity and Acts of Obligation in Carl Schmitts
Theory of the Partisan, Practices of Ethics: Relating/Responding to Difference in
International Politics Annual Convention, International Studies Association, 2008)
In The Concept of the Political Schmitt had already indicted the increased
usage of the terminology of humanity by both theorists and institutional
actors such as the League of Nations (1996a). His initial critique allows us to
illuminate four distinct criticisms against contemporary world politics ethical
recourse to the discourse of humanity (cf. Odysseos 2007b). The first
objection arises from the location of this discourse in the liberal universe of
values. By using the discourse of humanity, the project of a universal ethics
reverberates with the nineteenth century ringing proclamations of
disinterested liberal principle (Gowan 2003: 53) through which liberalism
quite successfully conceals its politics, which is the politics of getting rid of
politics (Dyzenhaus 1998: 14). For Schmitt, the focus of liberal modernity on
moral questions aims to ignore or surpass questions of conflict altogether: it
is therefore the battle against the political - as Schmitt defines the political,
in terms of the permanency of social antagonism in politics (Sax 2002: 501).
The second criticism argues that humanity is not a political concept, and no
political entity corresponds to it. The eighteenth century humanitarian
concept of humanity was a polemical denial of the then existing aristocratic
feudal system and the privileges accompanying it (Schmitt 1996a: 55).
Outside of this historical location, where does it find concrete expression but
in the politics of a politically neutral international community which acts, we
are assured, in the interest of humanity? (cf. Blair 1999). The international
community is coextensive with humanity[it]possesses the inherent right to
impose its willand to punish its violation, not because of a treaty, or a pact
or a covenant, but because of an international need, a need which it can
only determine as the secularized church of common humanity (Rasch
2003: 137, citing James Brown Scott).2 A third objection, still, has to do with
the imposition of particular kind of monism: despite the lip-service to
plurality, taken from the market (Kalyvas 1999), liberal pluralism is in fact
not in the least pluralist but reveals itself to be an overriding monism, the
monism of humanity (Rasch 2003: 136). Similarly, current universalist
perspectives, while praising customary or cultural differences, think of them
but asethical or aesthetic material for a unified polychromatic culture a
new singularity born of a blending and merging of multiple local constituents
(Brennan 2003: 41).One oft-discussed disciplining effect is that, politically,
the ethics of a universal humanity shows little tolerance for what is regarded
as intolerant politics, which is any politics that moves in opposition to its
ideals, rendering political opposition to it illegitimate (Rasch 2003: 136). This
is compounded by the fact that liberal ethical discourses are also defined by
a claim to their own exception and superiority. They naturalise the historical
origins of liberal societies, which are no longer regarded as contingently

established and historically conditioned forms of organization; rather, they

become the universal standard against which other societies are judged.
Those found wanting are banished, as outlaws, from the civilized world.
Ironically, one of the signs of their outlaw status is their insistence on
autonomy, on sovereignty (ibid.:141; cf. Donnelly 1998). Most importantly,
and related to this concern, there is the relation of the concept of humanity
to the other, and to war and violence. In its historical location, the humanity
concept had critical purchase against aristocratic prerogatives; yet its
utilisation by liberal ethical discourses within a philosophy of an absolute
humanity, Schmitt feared, could bring about new and unimaginable modes
of exclusion (1996a,2003,2004/2007): By virtue of its universality and
abstract normativity, it has no localizable polis, no clear distinction between
what is inside and what is outside. Does humanity embrace all humans? Are
there no gates to the city and thus no barbarians outside? If not, against
whom or what does it wage its wars? (Rasch2003: 135). Humanity as such,
Schmitt noted, cannot wage war because it has no enemy,(1996a: 54),
indicating that humanity is a polemical word that negates its opposite
(Kennedy 1998: 94; emphasis added). In The Concept of the Political Schmitt
argued that humanity excludes the concept of the enemy, because the
enemy does not cease to be a human being (1996a: 54). However, in his
1950 book with an international focus, The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt
noted how only when man appeared to be the embodiment of absolute
humanity, did the other side of this concept appear in the form of a new
enemy: the inhuman (2003a: 104). It becomes apparent that, historically
examined, the concept of humanity engenders a return to a discriminatory
concept of war, by which Schmitt meant that it reintroduces the legitimacy
and need for substantive causes of justice in war (Schmitt 2003b: 37-52).
This in turn disallows the notion of justus hostis, of a just enemy explored
in section three associated with the notion of non-discriminatory interstate
war which took the shape of guerreen for me (Schmitt 2003a: 142-144). The
concept of humanity, therefore, shatters the formal concept of justus hostis,
allowing the enemy to now be designated substantively as an enemy of
humanity as such. This leaves the enemy of humanity with no value and
open to dehumanisation and political and physical annihilation (Schmitt
2004: 67). In discussing the League of Nations, Schmitt highlights that,
compared to the kinds of wars that can be waged on behalf of humanity, the
interstate European wars from 1815 to 1914 in reality were regulated; they
were bracketed by the neutral Great Powers and were completely legal
procedures in comparison with the modern and gratuitous police actions
against violators of peace, which can be dreadful acts of annihilation
(Schmitt2003a: 186). Enemies of humanity cannot be considered just and
equal. Moreover, they cannot claim neutrality: one cannot remain neutral in
the call to be for or against humanity or its freedom; one cannot, similarly,
claim a right to resist or defend oneself, in the sense we understand this
right to have existed in the international law of Europe (the jus publicum
Europeaum). Such a denial of self-defence and resistance can presage a

dreadful nihilistic destruction of all law (ibid.: 187). When the enemy is not
accorded a procedural justice and formal equality, the notion that peace can
be made with him is unacceptable, as Schmitt detailed through his study of
the League of Nations, which had declared the abolition of war, but in
rescinding the concept of neutrality only succeeded in the dissolution of
peace (ibid.: 246). It is with the dissolution of peace that total wars of
annihilation become possible, where the other cannot be assimilated, or
accommodated, let alone tolerated: the friend/enemy distinction is not
longer taking place with a justus hostis but rather between good and evil,
human and in human, where the negative pole of the distinction is to be
fully and finally consumed without remainder (Rasch 2003: 137). Finally, the
ethical discourse of a universal humanity can be discerned in the tendency
to normalise diverse peoples through legalisation and individualisation. The
paramount emphasis placed on legal instruments and entitlements such as
human rights transforms diverse subjectivities into rights-holders. [T]he
other is stripped of his otherness and made to conform to the universal ideal
of what it means to be human, meaning that the term human is not
descriptive, but evaluative. To be truly human, one needs to be corrected
(Rasch 2003: 140 and 137; cf. Young 2002;Hopgood 2000). What does this
correction in its multiform tactics, which include Michel Foucaults proper
terms of discipline and training, aim to produce? The answer may well be the
proper, free (masterful), equal and rational (in its self-interest)subject of
rights, of capitalism and the governmentalised state (Foucault 2001a). As Gil
Anidjar notes, the operation of the traditional binary sovereign/enemy is
transformed in the disciplinary society (which signals, according to Foucault,
the dissolution of sovereign power) into disciplinary regime/criminality (or,
for that second term, legal subject, subject of the law, and, of course,
man) (Anidjar 2004:42; emphasis added). Of equally great importance is
transformation that follows in the transition from a disciplinary to a
governmental economy of power: this is what we are at the moment
confronting and must analyse: what are the paths towards which the other as
enemy is directed by (a global) governmentality and, moreover, what forms,
subjectivities, etc., is the enemy encouraged to take in the form of an
unavoidable freedom, along the lines articulated by Foucault under the
heading of self government(2007b).
Prioritzation of ethics and the need to help others perpetuates solidaritist
approach that causes war and violence
Chandler, 1David ( Research Fellow at the Policy Research Institute) The Road to Military
Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped A New Humanitarian Agenda Human
Rights Quarterly 23.3 muse
During the 1990s, humanitarian aid organizations have come under fire if they have
followed a universalist approach of providing emergency aid solely on the basis of need

rather than policy ends. It is now commonplace to read of humanitarian aid prolonging wars,
feeding killers, legitimizing corrupt regimes, creating war economies, and perpetuating
genocidal policies. Humanitarians have gone from being angels of mercy who can do no
wrong to being seen as part of the problem. The British Secretary of State for International
Development, Claire Short, has expressed concerns that aid agencies have prolonged the
conflict in Sudan and has said that she is "haunted by the risk of relief maintaining conflict."
86 Similarly, the European Community's Humanitarian Office (ECHO) has decided to shift
to a new human rights-based approach to humanitarian aid, as a result of sustained criticism:
"[b]usiness as usual for the Commission as humanitarian aid donor would mean courting the
risk of growing criticism and isolation from the donor community, and a loss of credibility
generally." 87 The trend was highlighted by the controversy over the delivery of aid to [End
Page 696] the nearly two million Rwandan refugees in camps in Ngara, District of Tanzania;
Goma, Zaire; and Bukava, Zaire in 1996. From the very beginning, agencies were
condemned by human rights groups for saving the lives of "genocidaires" who would
survive to reorganize and reinvade Rwanda to finish off the genocide. 88 As James Orbinski
stated on receiving the Nobel Peace Prize for MSF: [t]he moral intention of the humanitarian
act must be confronted with its actual result. And it is here where any form of moral
neutrality about what is good must be rejected. The result can be the use of the humanitarian
in 1985 to support forced migration in Ethiopia, or the use in 1996 of the humanitarian to
support a genocidal regime in the refugee camps of Goma. Abstention is sometimes
necessary so that the humanitarian is not used against a population in crisis. 89 This
perspective is often termed the "Do No Harm" approach in which not providing aid to those
in need is ethically defensible through the human rights discourse. 90 Short-term assistance
is criticized for the potential long-term harm, either in fueling conflict or legitimizing and
strengthening political factions. 91 This approach resulted in the deaths of up to 200,000
people in Zaire, including fleeing troops clearly intent on revenge for the genocide of 1994.
92 Acting Policy Director at Oxfam Britain, Philip Bloomer, has attempted to challenge the
"trend to start blaming the humanitarian assistance for the conflicts." 93 He has warned that:
"[w]e've seen a concerted political attack on the fundamental humanitarian principles and
assistance for perpetuating wars." 94 By no means were all refugees guilty of genocide. As
Nicholas Stockton notes, "some 750,000 of those forcibly repatriated or 'lost in Zaire' were
children under five. Over 1.5 million were under 16 years of age." 95 He concludes that:
"[t]he application of 'do no harm' policies is tantamount to playing God--a deadly, perhaps
totalitarian business to indulge in without the benefit of 20:20 future vision." 96
AND the belief that our activism must respond to political conditions
through political institutions appeals is what nullifies our ethical potential
and makes ethical transformation impossible --- turns case and solvency
Hershock, 99[Scholar at the East-West Center. Changing the Way Society Changes The Journal of Buddhist Ethics,
Vol 6. 1999. MUSE)
I have argued at some length (Hershock, 1999) that evaluating technologies on the basis of the tools they
generate commits us to taking individual users and not the dramatic patterns of our lived interdependence
as the primary locus of evaluation. In doing so, we effectively exclude from consideration precisely that
domain in which the values informing our technological bias have the most direct bearing on the quality of

our personal and communal conduct -- the movement of our shared narration. This has led to a stubborn
and at times even righteous blindness regarding our slippage into a new era of colonization -- a
colonization, not of lands or cultural spheres, but of consciousness as such. Indeed, the disposition to
ignore the critical space of interdependence has been so thoroughly prevalent that the conditions of
possibility for this new form of colonialism are widely championed -- in both the "developed" and the
"developing" world -- as essential to establishing and safeguarding our individual and collective dignity, a
crucial component of our growing equality and autonomy. By using the same information technologies
employed by those individuals and institutions perpetrating and perpetuating the inequitable distribution of
power and wealth, social activists may have enjoyed the opportunity to "beat them at their own game ."
However, they have also insured that everyone remains on the same playing field, playing the same game.
Social activist successes have in this way blinded us to our deepening submission to technologies of
control and the consequent depletion of precisely those attentive resources needed to meaningfully accord
with our changing circumstances and contribute to them as needed. The costs of such blindness are
practically limitless. The more "successful" a technology is, the more indispensable it become s. That is, all
technologies are liable to crossing thresholds beyond which they generate more new problems than they
solve
. Because technologies arise as patterns of value-driven conduct, they function as ambient amplifiers of our
individual and cultural karma -- our experience-conditioning, intentional activity. In crossing the threshold of
their utility, technologies create the karmic equivalent of a gravitational black hole, funneling all available
attention-energy into themselves. For the dominant technological lineage correlated with the rise of liberal
democracy and the imperative for social activism, this has meant an intensification of our karma for both
controlling and being controlled. The more successfully we extend the limits of control, the more we extend
the range of what can and must be controlled. In capsule form: the better we get at getting what we want,
the better we get at wanting; but the better we get at wanting, the better we get at getting what we want,
though we won't want what we get. This karmic circularity is pernicious, and the attention-energy invested
in it to date has already brought about an epidemic depletion of precisely those resources needed for
realizing dramatically satisfying -- and not merely factually sufficient -- solutions to our troubles, both
personal and communal. The methodological irony of social activism is that it does not free us from
dependence, but rather sustains its very possibility. This is not as paradoxical as it might sound. Insuring
our independence by means of restructuring the institutions that mediate our contact with one another
renders us dependent on those institutions -- on the structure, and hence the technologies, of our
mediation. In consequence, our freedom comes to be increasingly dependent on the rationalization and
regulation of our relationships with one another -- the realization of secure and yet generic co-existence.
Just as the technology-driven transformation of societies in the industrial and post-industrial eras has
involved an ever more detailed refinement of class divisions and labor categories, social activism advances
through an ever more varied identification of populations in need of guaranteed freedoms. In valorizing
both autonomy and equality, social activism denies our dramatic interdependence and tacitly endorses notseeing (avidy) or not-attending to the full set of conditions sponsoring our present situation. Although
unique and deeply local patterns of injustice may be important in building a legal case, the work of social
activism is not to encourage our liberating intimacy with such patterns. Rather, it consists of constructing
legal mechanisms for exerting reformative control over institutional structures and the processes by means
of which (generically) given individuals play or are forced to play particular roles therein. Unfortunately, as

generic 'women', 'children', 'workers', or 'minorities', the beneficiaries of social activism are effectively cut off
from precisely those aspects of their circumstances, relationships, and self-understanding which provide
them with the resources necessary for locally realizing meaningful -- and not merely factual -- alternatives
to the patterns of injustice in which they find themselves embedded. Among the products of social activism
are thus virtual communities of individuals having no immediate and dramatically responsive relationship
with one another -- individuals who have relinquished or been deprived of intimate connection with the
causes and conditions of both their troubles and those troubles' meaningful resolution. With no intended
disregard of the passion many activists bring to their work, social activism has aimed at globally reengineering our political, economic and societal environments in much the same way that our dominant
technological lineage has been committed to re-making our world -- progressively "humanizing" and
"rationalizing" the abundantly capricious natural circumstances into which we human beings have found
ourselves "thrown." This shared strategic genealogy is particularly disturbing, suggesting that -- like all
technologies oriented toward control -- social activism is liable to rendering itself indispensable. If the
history of social activism is inseparable from the rise and spread of influential technologies and subject to
similar accelerating and retarding conditions, so is its future. Social Activist Strategy: Legally Leveraging
Institutional Change While it has become common practice to decry the excessive legalism of
contemporary societies, the ramifications of strategic collusion between social activism and the way we
have technically and legally tooled our factual co-existence have remained largely unattended. In part, this
is because the legal bias of social activism has appeared so incontestably "practical." Legislation allows for
directly restructuring power relations and negotiating justice at the "highest" possible levels. The legislative
process has also become the dominant technology for mediating divergent claim s about the facts of our
(often troubled) co-existence and for preserving "fair" definitions of 'being right' and 'being wronged'.
Only distancing the alt completely from ethics solves
Louiza Odysseus (PhD International Relations) March 2003 Against Ethics? Iconographies of
Enmity and Acts of Obligation in Carl Schmitts Theory of the Partisan
http://www.louizaodysseos.org.uk/resources/Odysseos+ISA+2008+Against+Ethics.pdf
The paper ends with a discussion of obligation. Outlining the contours of a notion of
political, rather, than ethical obligation, however, may require some explicit distancing
from the now-familiar accounts that have oriented critical ethical endeavours for some
time. So we ask again the ethical question which has haunted us: from whence does
obligation originate? Were we to be still enthralled by a Levinasian or generally any
other-beholden thought of being hostage to the other, we might say that the face to
face encounter installs obligation before representation, knowledge and other Greek
relationalities (Levinas 1989: 7677; Odysseos 2007a: 132-151). Caputo, however,
warns us off this kind of commitment to a notion of perfectible or total obligation. He
asks that we recognise that one is always inside/outside obligation, on its margins. On
the threshold of foolishness. Almost a perfect fool for the Other. But not quite; nothing
is perfect (1993: 126). The laudable but impossible perfectibility of ethics and ethical
obligation to the other must be rethought. This is because one is hostage of the Other,
but one also keeps an army, just in case (ibid.). Caputo is not speaking as a political
realist in this apparently funny comment. He is pointing, I suggest, to the centrality of
politics and enmity. Obligation is not to the other alone; it is also to the radical
possibility of openness of political order, which allows self and other to be determined
otherwise (Prozorov 2007a). Analytically, we also want to know the tactics and

subjective effects of being directed towards enforced freedom. In this way, we might
articulate a political and concrete act obligation that is inextricably tied to freedom that
is not enforced, that is not produced for us, or as us.

Round Semis vs Niles North OW

1nc

1nc
Permitting and licensing isnt a federal action for development
DOE, 14 - Office of Health, Safety, and Security at the Department of Energy (Coastal
Zone Management Act and Related Legislation 2/27,
http://homer.ornl.gov/sesa/environment/policy/czma.html
Provisions for Federal Agency Actions Congress ensured the representation of federal
agency interests when implementing the CZMA by providing administrative grants only
to those states that allowed full participation of relevant federal agencies in the
development of their management programs (Section 306[d][1]). After such
participation in the development of its state management program, Section 307(c)(1)(A)
mandates that: Each federal agency activity within or outside the coastal zone that
affects any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone shall be carried out
in a manner which is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable
policies of approved state management programs. An extensive review and evaluation
process (implemented by regulations at 15 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] part 930)
ensures such "federal consistency." The process includes preliminary measures, project
review guidelines, and notification and consultation. DOE must comply with federal
consistency requirements when construction or other activities potentially affect the
coastal zone. Federal consistency is required for federal agency actions that include:
federal agency activities, including development projects (15 CFR part 930, subpart C)
(see definitions below); actions requiring a federal license or permit (15 CFR part 930,
subpart D); outer continental shelf (OCS) exploration, development, and production
activities (15 CFR part 930, subpart E); and, federal assistance to state and local
governments (15 CFR part 930, subpart F). "The term 'federal agency activity' means
any function performed by or on behalf of a federal agency in the exercise of its statutory
responsibilities." (15 CFR 930.31[a]) The term encompasses a wide range of federal
agency activities that initiate an event or series of events where coastal effects are
reasonably foreseeable (e.g., a proposal to physically alter coastal resources, a proposed
plan that would direct future agency actions, a proposed rulemaking that would alter
uses of the coastal zone). The term does not include issuing a federal license or permit to
an applicant or person or granting federal assistance to an applicant agency. "The term
federal 'development project' means a federal agency activity involving the planning,
construction, modification, or removal of public works, facilities, or other structures and
includes the acquisition, use, or disposal of any coastal use or resource." (15 CFR
930.31[b])
Its is a possessive pronoun showing ownership
Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005
(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a
noun and to show possession or ownership. EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine
substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)
Violation the aff incentives private sector development or exploration it
doesnt mandate federal development or exploration these are
contextually distinct
McNutt, 13 - chair of the Ocean Exploration 2020 group (Marcia, The Report of
Ocean Exploration 2020
http://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/oceanexploration2020/oe2020_report.pdf)
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT By 2020, private sector investments in exploration
technology development specifically for the dedicated national program of exploration
exceed the federal investment, but federal partners play a key role in testing and refining
new technologies. Forum participants agreed that a top priority for a national ocean
exploration program of distinction is the development of mechanisms to fund emerging
and creatively disruptive technologies to enhance and expand exploration capabilities.
In addition to the significant federal government investment in ocean
exploration technology developmentwhether by the U.S. Navy, NASA, NOAA, or other
civilian agenciesmany felt strongly that increased investment would come from the
private sector to achieve the kind of program they envisioned. Participants also felt that
national program partners should continue to play a key role in testing and refining
these technologies as well as working to adapt existing and proven technologies for
exploration.

1nc
Global climate modeling does not allow ambiguity or duality into global
warming debates it splits certainty and reason apart from excess and
nonknowledge in order to create a restricted economy and then banish its
excess this accumulation and aggregation is an epistemology that
attempts to know the world only as more and more data to be fit into
models for energy scenarios voting Aff propels us further towards
catastrophe ecological collapse already outpaces our models and if we
continue to banish the unknown excess of our models then we also ensure
the victory of things like climate denial-ism and political corruption of
science voting neg is a pre-requisite to any kind of solvency or having a
sound ethics, politics, or epistemology
Yusoff 9 (Kathryn Yusoff, School of Geography, University of Exeter, Excess,
catastrophe, and climate change, 24 August 2007; in revised form 19 March 2008;
published online 26 October 2009, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space
2009, volume 27, pages 1010-1012) [M Leap]
The catastrophe of climate change is excessive and will inscribe all earthly space. It is
earth writing writ large. The limits of this ``immense industrial network'' which
expresses ``a circuit of cosmic energy'' expenditure is predominantly articulated in the
scientific modelling of catastrophic futures, such as in the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change's Fourth Assessment Report (2007a).(1) The report, although [this is]
seriously flawed in its exclusion of the more excessive, unknowable dimensions of
environmental change, implicitly points towards catastrophic abrupt climate change. Its
vision of futurity is one that threatens life itself. But before we rush to configure and cost
the parameters of these disasters to come, we might pause to ask, `How do we ``know''
and inhabit this global overflowing of atmospheric effect?' and `What knowledge
becomes useful in light of this excess?' For the IPCC (and the political/economic
implications that are implicit in its findings), the basis of their knowing rests on the
collaborative work done with climate prediction models or global coupled general
circulation models (GCMs).(2) Climate change is predominantly articulated in, and as
an effect of, GCMs, which are an amalgam of GIS data and the historical epistemes of
climate science. How GCMs shape and predict the futurity of earth, in collaboration with
and in ignorance of dynamic earth processes, is less clear. In particular, because in this
`knowing' it is presupposed that our ability to `know' is reliant on our ability to
represent and articulate this futurity solely through the accumulation of data. As energy
vaults from the biosphere through those scientific sensing machines to be rendered into
data, we might ask about the forms of representation and silence that articulate this
futurity? How do climate models figure the world and how do we perceive that
knowledge? in the ``circuit of cosmic energy'' on which life depends, what escapes and
is in excess of the machine vision of GCMs? Is this a restricted model for accounting for
the economies of energy exchange? There is a range of debates circulating that are

working around the knowledge networks of climate change, in science studies,

geography, and, not least, in science itself. This climate work connects to broader
debates about relational ethics in the constitution of being worldly, the role of GIS and
digitalisation in configuring the world, and the politics of organising a response to this
knowledge. The discussion of climate change has revolved around the questions of what
do we know, how do we know it (is it a valid form of knowledge production?), and what
should be done about it. Yet, what this knowledge of climate change has revealed
alongside its certainties (the role of anthropogenic induced climate change) is
uncertainties (of how much cannot be known or is difficult to know) and the ambiguities
inherent in recognising a complex energy system that cannot, in Georges Bataille's
words, be regulated by a mechanic. The ambiguities inherent in unknowing have had a
negative political dimension, in the form of climate sceptics and the nonratification
of treaties to limit CO2 emissions, and consequently led to a splitting of that
ambivalence of knowledge, where certainty and reason have been cleaved apart
from unknowing and excess. This splitting of knowledge into what Bataille has
called a restricted economy and its excess has had a dramatic effect on the
forms of response that have been imagined to understand this knowledge of climate.
The costs of this splitting of ambivalence is not just theoretical, but bears on the practice
of modelling itself, in the form of producing models that fulfill political rather
than scientific objectives. Moreover, in many of the models, such as the predictions
of sea ice loss in the Arctic (figure 1), the reality of events has already exceeded
the standard deviation of models, confirming Char's assertion that we are closer to the
catastrophe than to the alarm itself. Furthermore, this suggests that the `standard
deviation' of models is insufficient to adequately model the world. In the Arctic,
experience now precedes science. As Neil Adger commented recently in The Guardian:
``At 4 degrees we are basically into a different climate regime ... . There is no science on
how we are going to adapt to 4 degrees warming. It is actually pretty alarming'' (quoted
in Randerson, 2008). This is also instructional because the catastrophic failure of the ice
was seen by the IPCC as an excessive, unpredictable event (the problem of rising sea
levels was not entirely understood), which was consequently left out of the IPCC's
calculations for the Fourth Assessment Report. Rather than risk uncertainty and
disagreement over how sea level would rise, the IPCC omitted the failure of the ice
sheets and relegated it to a footnote. In order to achieve a 90% (instead of a 66%)
certainty in the Fourth Assessment, scientists had to relegate a large potential
uncertainty to the footnotes. Dr James Hansen, Director of NASA Goddard Institute for
Space Studies and a notable climate scientist, said: ``I would have preferred an even
clearer statement about the dangers of future sea level rise if the ice sheets begin to
disintegrate. And I think that a business as usual scenario will guarantee future
disintegration of West Antarctica and parts of Greenland.'' (3) Hansen's comments
highlight the dual
process by which ice is eradicated from the equation, the removal of this unknown
instability or nonknowledge promotes further instability. This is the cost of
splitting the ambiguity of knowledge.

THE AFFs GLOBAL WARMING DISCOURSE RELIES UPON FALSE

DICHOTOMIES BETWEEN (1) HUMANITY AND NATURE, (2) SELF AND
NONSELF, AND (3) SUBJECT AND OBJECT. The attempt to posit and then
reconcile these dichotomies is the very foundation that produces the
anthropocentric, capitalist subjectivity that replicates the case harms.
Deleuze and Guattari '72 (Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 1972, pp.
2-5) [m leap]
There is no such thing as either [human] man or nature now, only a process that
produces the one within the other and couples the machines together . Producingmachines, desiring-machines everywhere, schizophrenic machines, all of species life: the
self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever. Now
that we have had a look at this stroll of a schizo, let us compare what happens when
Samuel Beckett's characters decide to venture outdoors. Their various gaits and
methods of self-locomotion constitute, in and of themselves, a finely tuned machine.
And then there is the function of the bicycle in Beckett's works: what relationship does
the bicycle-horn machine have with the mother-anus machine? "What a rest to speak of
bicycles and horns. Unfortunately it is not of them I have to speak, but of her who
brought me into the world, through the hole in her arse if my memory is correct."2 It is
often thought that Oedipus is an easy subject to deal with, something perfectly obvious,
a "given" that is there from the very beginning. But that is not so at all: Oedipus
presupposes a fantastic repression of desiring-machines. And why are they repressed?
To what end? Is it really necessary or desirable to submit to such repression? And what
means are to be used to accomplish this? What ought to go inside the Oedipal triangle,
what sort of thing is required to construct it? Are a bicycle horn and my mother's arse
sufficient to do the job? Aren't there more important questions than these, however?
Given a certain effect, what machine is capable of producing it? And given a certain
machine, what can it be used for? Can we possibly guess, for instance, what a knife rest
is used for if all we are given is a geometrical description of it? Or yet another example:
on being confronted with a complete machine made up of six stones in the right-hand
pocket of my coat (the pocket that serves as the source of the stones), five stones in the
right-hand pocket of my trousers, and five in the left-hand pocket (transmission
pockets), with the remaining pocket of my coat receiving the stones that have already
been handled, as each of the stones moves forward one pocket, how can we determine
the effect of this circuit of distribution in which the mouth, too, plays a role as a stonesucking machine? Where in this entire circuit do we find the production of sexual
pleasure? At the end of Malone Dies, Lady Petal takes the schizophrenics out for a ride
in a van and a rowboat, and on a picnic in the midst of nature: an infernal machine is
being assembled. "Under the skin the body is an over-heated factory,/ and outside,/ the
invalid shines,/ glows,/ from every burst pore."3 This does not mean that we are
attempting to make nature one of the poles of schizophrenia. What the schizophrenic

experiences, both as an individual and as a member of the human species, is not at all
any one specific aspect of nature, but nature as a process of production. What do we
mean here by process? It is probable that at a certain level nature and industry are two
separate and distinct things: from one point of view, industry is the opposite of nature;
from another, industry extracts its raw materials from nature; from yet another, it
returns its refuse to nature; and so on. Even within society, this characteristic
man[human]-nature, industry-nature, society-nature relationship is responsible for the
distinction of relatively autonomous spheres that are called production, distribution,
consumption. But in general this entire level of distinctions, examined from the point of
view of its formal developed structures, presupposes (as Marx has demonstrated) not
only the existence of capital and the division of labor, but also the false
consciousness that the capitalist being necessarily acquires, both of itself and
of the supposedly fixed elements within an over-all process. For the real truth of the
matter the glaring, sober truth that resides in delirium is that there is no such thing
as relatively independent spheres or circuits: production is immediately consumption
and a recording process (enregistrement), without any sort of mediation, and the
recording process and consumption directly determine production, though they do so
within the production process itself. Hence everything is production: production of
productions, of actions and of passions; productions of recording processes, of
distributions and of co-ordinates that serve as points of reference; productions of
consumptions, of sensual pleasures, of anxieties, and of pain. Everything is production
since the recording processes are immediately consumed, immediately consummated,
and these consumptions directly reproduced. This is the first meaning of process as we
use the term: incorporating recording and consumption within production itself, thus
making them the productions of one and the same process. Second, we make no
distinction between [human] man and nature: the essence of nature and the natural
human essence of man become one within nature in the form of production or industry,
just as they do within the life of man as a species. Industry is no longer considered from
the extrinsic point of view of utility, but rather from the point of view of its fundamental
identity with nature as and by [humanity] man.4 Not [human] man as the king of
creation production of man but rather as the being who is in intimate contact with the
profound life of all forms or all types of beings, who is responsible for even the stars and
animal life, and who ceaselessly plugs an organ-machine into an energy-machine, a tree
into his body, a breast into his mouth, the sun into his asshole: the eternal custodian of
the machines of the universe. This is the second meaning of process as we use the term:
man [human] and nature are not like two opposite terms confronting each other not
even in the sense of bipolar opposites within a relationship of causation, ideation, or
expression (cause and effect, subject and object, etc.); rather, they are one
and the same essential reality, the producer-product.

The alternative is non knowledge to know anything beyond yourself

requires a negation of the place you currently reside that makes
ressentiment inevitable
Bataille 45 (Georges, On Nietzsche, 1945, LB)
"Life," I said, "is bound to be lost in death, as a river loses itself in the sea, the known in
the unknown" ( Inner Experience). And death is the end life easily reaches (as water
does sea level). So why would I wish to turn my desire to be persuasive into a worry? I
dissolve into myself like the sea--and I know the roaring waters of the
torrent head straight at me! Whatever a judicious understanding sometimes seems
to hide, an immense folly connected with it (understanding is only an infinitesimal part
of that folly), doesn't hesitate to give back. The certainty of incoherence in reading, the
inevitable crumbling of the soundest constructions, is the deep truth of books. Since
appearance constitutes a limit, what truly exists is a dissolution into common opacity
rather than a development of lucid thinking. The apparent unchangingness of books is
deceptive: each book is also the sum of the misunderstandings it occasions. So why
exhaust myself with efforts toward consciousness? I can only make fun of myself as I
write. (Why write even a phrase if laughter doesn't immediately join me?) It goes
without saying that, for the task, I bring to bear whatever rigor I have within me. But the
crumbling nature of thinking's awareness of itself and especially the certainty of
thinking reaching its end only in failing, hinder any repose and prevent the relaxed state
that facilitates a rigorous disposition of things. Committed to the casual stance--I think
and express myself in the free play of hazard. Obviously, everyone in some way admits
the importance of hazard. But this recognition is as minimal and unconscious as
possible. Going my way unconstrained, unhampered, I develop my thoughts,
make choices with regard to expression--but I don't have the control over myself
that I want. And the actual dynamic of my intelligence is equally uncontrollable. So that
I owe to other dynamics--to lucky chance and to fleeting moments of relaxation--the
minimal order and relative learning that I do have. And the rest of the time . . . Thus, as
I see it my thought proceeds in harmony with its object, an object that it attains more
and perfectly the greater the state of its own ruin. Though it isn't necessarily conscious
of this. At one and the same time my thinking must reach plenary illumination and
dissolution . . . In the same individual, thought must construct and destroy itself. And
even that isn't quite right. Even the most rigorous thinkers yield to chance. In addition,
the demands inherent in the exercise of thought often take me far from where I started.
One of the great difficulties encountered by understanding is to put order into thought's
interrelations in time. In a given moment, my thought reaches considerable rigor. But
how to link it with yesterday's thinking? Yesterday, in a sense, I was another person,
responding to other worries. Adapting one to the other remains possible, but . . . This
insufficiency bothers me no more than the insufficiency relating to the many woes of the
human condition generally. Humanness is related in us to nonsatisfaction, a
nonsatisfaction to which we yield without accepting it, though; we distance ourselves
from humanness when we regard ourselves as satisfied or when we give up searching for
satisfaction. Sartre is right in relation to me to recall the myth of Sisyphus, though "in
relation to me" here equates to "in relation to humanity," I suppose. What can be

expected of us is to go as far as possible and not to stop. What by contrast, humanly

speaking, can be criticized are endeavors whose only meaning is some relation to
moments of completion. Is it possible for me to go further? I won't wait to coordinate
my efforts in that case--I'll go further. I'll take the risk. And the reader, free not to
venture after me, will often take advantage of that same freedom! The critics are right to
scent danger here! But let me in turn point out a greater danger, one that comes from
methods that, adequate only to an outcome of knowledge, confer on individuals whom
they limit a sheerly fragmentary existence--an existence that is mutilated with respect to
the whole that remains inaccessible. Having recognized this, I'll defend my position. I've
spoken of inner experience: my intention was to make known an object. But by
proposing this vague title, I didn't want to confine myself sheerly to inner facts of that
experience. It's an arbitrary procedure to reduce knowledge to what we get from our
intuitions as subjects. This is something only a newborn can do. And we ourselves (who
write) can only know something about this newborn by observing it from outside (the
child is only our object). A separation experience, related to a vital continuum (our
conception and our birth) and to a return to that continuum (in our first sexual feelings
and our first laughter), leaves us without any clear recollections, and only in objective
operations do we reach the core of the being we are. A phenomenology of the developed
mind assumes a coincidence of subjective and objective aspects and at the same time a
fusion of subject and object. * [This is the fundamental requirement of Hegel's
phenomenology. Clearly, instead of responding to it, modern phenomenology, while
replying to changing human thought, is only one moment among others: a sandcastle, a
mirage of sorts.] This means an isolated operation is admissible only because of fatigue
(so, the explanation I gave of laughter, because I was unable to develop a whole
movement in tandem with a conjugation of the modalities of laughter would be left
suspended--since every theory of laughter is integrally a philosophy and, similarly, every
integral philosophy is a theory of laughter . . .). But that is the point--though I set forth
these principles, at the same time I must renounce following them. Thought is produced
in me as uncoordinated flashes, withdrawing endlessly from a term to which its
movement pushes it. I can't tell if I'm expressing human helplessness this way, or my
own . . . I don't know, though I'm not hopeful of even some outwardly satisfying
outcome. Isn't there an advantage in creating philosophy as I do? A flash in the night--a
language belonging to a brief moment . . . Perhaps in this respect this latest moment
contains a simple truth. In order to will knowledge, by an indirect expedient I tend to
become the whole universe. But in this movement I can't be a whole human being, since
I submit to a particular goal, becoming the whole. Granted, if I could become it, I would
thus be a whole human being. But in my effort, don't I distance myself from exactly
that? And how can I become the whole without becoming a whole human being? I can't
be this whole human being except when I let go. I can't be this through
willpower: my will necessarily has to will outcomes! But if misfortune (or chance) wills
me to let go, then I know I am an integral, whole humanness, subordinate to nothing. In
other words. the moment of revolt inherent in willing a knowledge beyond practical
ends can't be indefinitely continued. And in order to be the whole universe, humankind
has to let go and abandon its principle, accepting as the sole criterion of what it is the

tendency to go beyond what it is. This existence that I am is a revolt against existence
and is indefinite desire. For this existence God was simply a stage-and now here he is,
looming large, grown from unfathomable experience. comically perched on the stake
used for impalement.

Warming
No impact consensus
Taylor 12 (James, Forbes energy and environment writer, 3/14/2012, "Shock Poll:
Meteorologists Are Global Warming Skeptics",
www.forbes.com/sites/jamestaylor/2012/03/14/shock-poll-meteorologists-are-globalwarming-skeptics/)
A recent survey of American Meteorological Society members shows meteorologists
are skeptical that humans are causing a global warming crisis. The survey confirms
what many scientists have been reporting for years; the politically focused
bureaucratic leadership of many science organizations is severely out of touch
with the scientists themselves regarding global warming issues. According to
American Meteorological Society (AMS) data, 89% of AMS meteorologists believe global
warming is happening, but only a minority (30%) is very worried about global
warming. This sharp contrast between the large majority of meteorologists who believe
global warming is happening and the modest minority who are nevertheless very
worried about it is consistent with other scientist surveys. This contrast
exposes global warming alarmists who assert that 97% of the worlds scientists
agree humans are causing a global warming crisis simply because these
scientists believe global warming is occurring. However, as this and other scientist
surveys show, believing that some warming is occurring is not the same as
believing humans are causing a worrisome crisis. Other questions solidified the
meteorologists skepticism about humans creating a global warming crisis. For example,
among those meteorologists who believe global warming is happening, only a modest
majority (59%) believe humans are the primary cause. More importantly, only 38%
of respondents who believe global warming is occurring say it will be very harmful
during the next 100 years. With substantially fewer than half of meteorologists very
worried about global warming or expecting substantial harm during the next 100 years,
one has to wonder why environmental activist groups are sowing the seeds of global
warming panic. Does anyone really expect our economy to be powered 100 years from
now by the same energy sources we use today? Why immediately, severely, and
permanently punish our economy with costly global warming restrictions when
technological advances and the free market will likely address any such global warming
concerns much more efficiently, economically and effectively? In another line of survey
questions, 53% of respondents believe there is conflict among AMS members regarding
the topic of global warming. Only 33% believe there is no conflict. Another 15% were not
sure. These results provide strong refutation to the assertion that the debate
is over. Interestingly, only 26% of respondents said the conflict among AMS members
is unproductive. Overall, the survey of AMS scientists paints a very different picture
than the official AMS Information Statement on Climate Change. Drafted by the AMS
bureaucracy, the Information Statement leaves readers with the impression that AMS
meteorologists have few doubts about humans creating a global warming crisis. The
Information Statement indicates quite strongly that humans are the primary driver of

global temperatures and the consequences are and will continue to be quite severe.
Compare the bureaucracys Information Statement with the survey results of the AMS
scientists themselves. Scientists who have attended the Heartland Institutes annual
International Conference on Climate Change report the same disconnect throughout
their various science organizations; only a minority of scientists believes humans are
causing a global warming crisis, yet the non-scientist bureaucracies publish position
statements that contradict what the scientists themselves believe. Few, if any, of
these organizations actually poll their members before publishing a position statement.
Within this context of few actual scientist surveys, the AMS survey results are very
powerful.
Nature is inherently chaotic the impact is nihilism and ressentiment
Baudrillard, 94 (Jean, The Illusion of the End, 1994, LB)
Such a very American hallucination this ocean, this savannah, this desert, this virgin
forest reconstituted in miniature, vitrified beneath their experimental bubble. In the
true spirit of Disneyland's attractions, Biosphere 2 is not an experiment, but an
experimental attraction. The most amazing thing is that they have reconstituted a
fragment of artificial desert right in the middle of the natural desert (a bit like
reconstituting Hollywood in Disneyworld). Only in this artificial desert there are neither
scorpions nor Indians to be exterminated; there are only extraterrestrials trained to
survive in the very place where they destroyed another, far better adapted race, leaving
it no chance. The whole humanist ideology - ecological, climatic, micro-cosmic and
biogenetic - is summed up here, but this is of no importance. Only the sidereal,
transparent form of the edifice means anything - but what? Difficult to say. As ever,
absolute space inspires engineers, gives meaning to a project which has none, except the
mad desire for a miniaturization of the human species, with a view perhaps to a future
race and its emergence, of which we still dream. . . The artificial promiscuity of climates
has its counterpart in the artificial immunity of the space: the elimination of all
spontaneous generation (of germs, viruses, microbes), the automatic purification of the
water, the air, the physical atmosphere (and the mental atmosphere too, purified by
science). The elimination of all sexual reproduction: it is forbidden to reproduce in
Biosphere 2; even contamination from life [Ie vivant] is dangerous; sexuality may spoil
the experiment. Sexual difference functions only as a formal, statistical variable (the
same number of women as men; if anyone drops out, a person of the same sex is
substituted). Everything here is designed with a brain-like abstraction. Biosphere 2 is to
Biosphere 1 (the whole of our planet and the cosmos) what the brain is to the human
being in general: the synthesis in miniature of all its possible functions and operations:
the desert lobe, the virgin forest lobe, the nourishing agriculture lobe, the residential
lobe, all carefully distinct and placed side by side, according to the analytical imperative .
All of this in reality entirely outdated with respect to what we now know about the brain
- its plasticity, its elasticity, the reversible sequencing of all its operations. There is, then,
behind this archaic model, beneath its futuristic exterior, a gigantic hypothetical error, a
fierce idealization doomed to failure. In fact, the 'truth' of the operation lies elsewhere,

and you sense this when you return from Biosphere 2 to 'real' America, as you do when
you emerge from Disneyland into real life: the fact is that the imaginary, or
experimental, model is in no way different from the real functioning of this society. Just
as the whole of America is built in the image of Disneyland, so the whole of American
society is carrying on - in real time and out in the open - the same experiment as
Biosphere 2 which is therefore only falsely experimental, just as Disneyland is only
falsely imaginary. The recycling of all substances, the integration of flows and circuits,
non-pollution, artificial immunity, ecological balancing, controlled abstinence,
restrained jouissance but, also, the right of all species to survival and conservation - and
not just plant and animal species, but also social ones. All categories formally brought
under the one umbrella of the law - this latter setting its seal on the ending of natural
selection. It is generally thought that the obsession with survival is a logical consequence
of life and the right to life. But, most of the time, the two things are contradictory. Life is
not a question of rights, and what follows on from life is not survival, which is artificial,
but death. It is only by paying the price of a failure to live, a failure to take pleasure, a
failure to die that man is assured of survival. At least in present conditions, which the
Biosphere principle perpetuates. This micro-universe seeks to exorcize catastrophe by
making an artificial synthesis of all the elements of catastrophe. From the perspective of
survival, of recycling and feedback, of stabilization and metastabilization, the elements
of life are sacrificed to those of survival (elimination of germs, of evil, of sex). Real life,
which surely, after all, has the right to disappear (or might there be a paradoxical limit
to human rights?), is sacrificed to artificial survival. The real planet, presumed
condemned, is sacrificed in advance to its miniaturized, air-conditioned clone (have no
fear, all the earth's climates are air-conditioned here) which is designed to vanquish
death by total simulation. In days gone by it was the dead who were embalmed for
eternity; today, it is the living we embalm alive in a state of survival. Must this be our
hope? Having lost our metaphysical utopias, do we have to build this prophylactic one?
What, then, is this species endowed with the insane pretension to survive - not to
transcend itself by virtue of its natural intelligence, but to survive physically,
biologically, by virtue of its artificial intelligence? Is there a species destined to escape
natural selection, natural disappearance - in a word, death? What cosmic cussedness
might give rise to such a turnabout? What vital reaction might produce the idea of
survival at any cost? What metaphysical anomaly might grant the right not to disappear
- logical counterpart of the remarkable good fortune of having appeared? There is a kind
of aberration in the attempt to eternalize the species - not to immortalize it in its
actions, but to eternalize it in this face-lifted coma, in the glass coffin of Biosphere 2.We
may, nonetheless, take the view that this experiment, like any attempt to achieve
artificial survival or artificial paradise, is illusory, not from any technical shortcomings,
but in its very principle. In spite of itself, it is threatened by the same accidents as real
life. Fortunately. Let us hope that the random universe outside smashes this glass coffin.
Any accident will do if it rescues us from a scientific euphoria sustained by drip-feed.

Independently, the demand to return nature to balance inscribes a selfhatred that culminates in auto-annihilation makes their impacts
inevitable
Jean Baudrillard, Professor of Sociology and Philosophy @ Multiple universities,
2007, Darwins Artificial Ancestors and the Terroristic Dream of the Transparency of
the Good International Journal of Baudrillard Studies Volume 4, number 2
All this has been brought about by the highly dubious way in which the concept of
nature has evolved. What was initially matter became energy. The modern discovery of
nature consists in its liberation as energy and in a mechanical transformation of the
world. After having first been matter, and then energy, nature is today becoming an
interactive subject. It is ceasing to be an object, but this is bringing it all the more surely
into the circuit of subjection. A dramatic paradox, and one which also affects human
beings: we are much more compromised when we cease to be objects and become
subjects. This is a trick that was pulled on us long ago in the name of absolute liberation.
Let's not pull the same one on nature. For the ultimate danger is that, in an interactivity
built up into a total system of communication, there is no other; there are only subjects
and, very soon, only subjects without objects. All our problems today as civilized
beings originate here: not in an excess of alienation, but a disappearance of alienation in
favour of a maximum transparency between subjects. An unbearable situation, all the
more so for the fact that, in foisting on nature the status of a subject in law, we are also
foisting on it all the vices of subjectivity, decking it out, in our own image, with a bad
conscience, with nostalgia (for a lost object which, in this case, can only be us), with a
range of drives in particular, an impulse for revenge. The balance we hear so much of
in ecology (out of balance) is not so much that of planetary resources and their
exploitation as the metaphysical one between subject and object. Now, that
metaphysical subject/object balance is being upset and the subject, armed as he is with
all the technologies of advanced communication (technologies on whose horizon the
object has disappeared), is the beneficiary. Once that balance is disrupted, it inevitably
sparks violent reactions on the part of the object. Just as individuals counter the
transparency and virtual responsibility inflicted on them as subjects with unexplainable
acts, acts of resistance, failure, delinquency and collective disorder, so nature counters
this enforced promotion, this consensual, communicational black mail, with various
forms of behaviour that are radically other, such as catastrophes, upheavals,
earthquakes and chaos. It would seem that nature does not really feel a sense of
responsibility for itself, nor does it react to our efforts to give it one. We are, admittedly,
indulging in a (bad) ecological conscience and attempting, by this moral violence, to
stave off possible violence on nature's part. But if, by offering it the status of subject, we
are handing it the same poisoned chalice as we gave to the decolonized nations , we
ought not to be surprised if it behaves irrationally merely so as to assert itself as such.
Contrary to the underlying Rousseauist ideology, which argues that the profound nature
of the liberated subject can only be good and that nature itself, once emancipated,
cannot but be endowed with natural equilibrium and all the ecological virtues, there is
nothing more ambiguous or perverse than a subject. Now, nature is also germs, viruses,
chaos, bacteria and scorpions, significantly eliminated from Biosphere 2 as though they

were not meant to exist. Where are the deadly little scorpions, so beautiful and so
translucent, which one sees in the Desert Museum not far away, scorpions whose
magical sting certainly performs a higher, invisible but necessary function within
our Biosphere 1: the incarnation of evil, of the venomous evil of chance, the mortal
innocence of desire (the desire for death) in the equilibrium of living beings? What they
have forgotten is that what binds living beings together is something other than an
ecological, biospherical solidarity, something other-than the homeostatic equilibrium of
a system: it is the cycle of metamorphoses. Man is also a scorpion, just as the Bororo are
araras and, left to himself in an expurgated universe, he becomes, himself, a scorpion.5
In short, it is not by expurgating evil that we liberate good. Worse, by liberating good,
we also liberate evil. And this is only right: it is the rule of the symbolic game. It is the
inseparability of good and evil which constitutes our true equilibrium, our true balance.
We ought not to entertain the illusion that we might separate the two, that we might
cultivate good and happiness in a pure state and expel evil and sorrow as wastes. That is
the terroristic dream of the transparency of good, which very quickly ends in its
opposite, the transparency of evil. We must not reconcile ourselves with nature. It seems
that the more the human race reconciles itself with nature, the less it is reconciled with
itself. Above and beyond the violence it inflicts on others, there is a violence specific to
the human race in general, a violence of the species against itself in which it treats itself
as a residue, as a survivor even in the present of a coming catastrophe. As if it too
were ready to repent of an evolution which has brought it such privileges and carried it
to such extremes. This is the same conjuncture as the one to which Canetti refers, in
which we stepped out of history, except that here we have not stepped out of history, but
have passed a point beyond which nothing is either human or inhuman any longer and
what is at stake, which is even more immense, is the tottering of the species into the
void. It is quite possible that, in this process, the species itself is commencing its
own disappearance, either by disenchantment with or ressentiment towards
itself, or out of a deliberate inclination which leads it here and now to manage that
disappearance as its destiny. Surreptitiously, in spite of our superiority (or perhaps
because of it), we are carrying over on to our own species the treatment we mete out to
the others, all of which are virtually dying out. In an animal milieu which has reached
saturation point, species are spontaneously dissuaded from living. The effects produced
by the finite nature of the earth, for the first time contrasting violently with the infinity
of our development, are such that our species is automatically switching over to
collective suicide. Whether by external (nuclear) violence or internal (biological)
virulence. We are subjecting ourselves as a human species to the same experimental
pressure as the animal species in our laboratories. Man is without prejudice: he is using
himself as a guinea-pig, just as he is using the rest of the world, animate or inanimate.
He is cheerfully gambling with the destiny of his own species as he is with that of all the
others. In his blind desire to know more, he is programming his own destruction with
the same ease and ferocity as the destruction of the others. He cannot be accused of a
superior egoism. He is sacrificing himself, as a species, to an unknown experimental
fate, unknown at least as yet to other species, who have experienced only natural fates.

And, whereas it seemed that, linked to that natural fate, there was something like an
instinct of self-preservation long the mainstay of a natural philosophy of individuals
and groups this experimental fate to which the human species is condemning itself by
unprecedented, artificial means, this scientific prefiguring of its own disappearance,
sweeps away all ideas of a self-preservation instinct. The idea is, indeed, no longer
discussed in the human sciences (where the focus of attention would seem, rather, to be
on the death drive) and this disappearance from the field of thought signals that,
beneath a frenzy for ecological conservation which is really more to do with nostalgia
and remorse, a wholly different tendency has already won out, the sacrificing of the
species to boundless experimentation.
Aff doesnt come close to solving
McMartin 13 (Peter, Vancouver Sun Columnist, 3/9/2013, "Global warmings new
frightening deadline",
www.vancouversun.com/opinion/columnists/Global+warming+frightening+deadline/8
071552/story.html)
In April 2009, the science journal Nature published a paper entitled Greenhouse-Gas
Emission Targets for Limiting Global Warming to 2 C. Its subject was the end of the
modern world. At the time, it attracted little notice. It was a half-dozen pages long. For
laymen, its technical content was impenetrable. The purpose of the paper researched
and written by a team of European scientists headed by Malte Meinshausen, a
climatologist with Germanys Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact was to determine
just how much time mankind had left before our burning of fossil fuels would cause
catastrophic global warming. The marker for what would be considered catastrophic
warming was generally agreed to be anything above a rise of two degrees Celsius in
global temperature. More than 100 countries, the paper noted, (the actual number was
167 countries) have adopted a global warming limit of 2C or below (relative to preindustrial levels) as a guiding principle for mitigation efforts to reduce climate change
risks, impacts and damages. The problem was, no one was exactly sure how much
fossil-fuel consumption had already contributed to global warming, or how much fossil
fuel mankind could consume without going over the two degrees Celsius marker. Those
phenomena needed to be quantified. Meinshausens team did just that. It constructed a
rigorous model by incorporating hundreds of factors that had never been grouped
together before, and then ran them through a thousand different scenarios. The teams
conclusion? Time was perilously short. It found that if we continued at present levels
of fossil fuel consumption (and, in fact, consumption has been rising annually), we have
somewhere between an 11- to 15-year window to prevent global temperatures from
surpassing the two degree Celsius threshold in this century. And the longer we waited,
the worse the odds got. To quote from a story on the Meinshausen paper by reporter
Katherine Bagley of the non-profit news agency, InsideClimate News: To have a 50-50
chance of keeping temperature rise below two degrees, humans would have to stick to a
carbon budget that allowed the release of no more than 1,437 gigatons of carbon dioxide
from 2000 to 2050. To have an 80-per-cent chance of avoiding that threshold, they

would have to follow a stricter budget and emit just 886 gigatons. To put that in
perspective, Meinshausens team calculated that the worlds nations had already
produced 234 gigatons by 2006. At our present rate, the paper predicted, the world
will surpass that 886-gigaton figure by 2024 or sooner, if annual consumption
rates continue to rise as they have. Since the Meinshausen paper was published,
several other studies have corroborated its findings. The math in them comes to
basically the same conclusion. Yes, I use Meinshausens study, wrote Prof. Mark
Jaccard, environmental economist at Simon Fraser University, in an email. But I also
use about five others that basically say the same thing. The reason they all say the same
thing is because the math is trivial no independent analysts dispute it. This is not
groupthink, Jaccard wrote. Even when we bring in vice-presidents from oil and coal
companies to be parts of the study groups, they quietly agree. When you are sitting in a
meeting at Stanford (University) with top researchers and away from your marketing
department it is pretty hard to sustain the myths that business-as-usual is OK. Prof.
Thomas Pederson, executive director of the Pacific Institute for Climate Solutions, and
former dean of science at the University of Victoria, noted in an email that the study
was conducted by one of the best teams of climate scientists in the world. Given
continuing acceleration of emissions globally, Pederson wrote, were on or near the
worst-case track that Meinshausen et al. modelled, and that puts us on a probable
course for several degrees of planetary warming by the end of this century. In a word,
that will be disastrous. An even more alarming assessment comes from University of
B.C. Prof. William Rees, originator of the ecological footprint concept. I havent read
this particular study, Rees wrote, but it sounds about right. If I recall, the United
Kingdoms Tyndall Centre (for Climate Change Research) suggests that a 90-per-cent
reduction in carbon emissions from high income countries may be necessary. In any
event, various authors dont believe we have any hope of cutting greenhouse gases
sufficiently in time to avoid a two Celsius degree increase in mean global
temperature since to date, no serious steps have been taken to wean the world off
fossil fuels. What would serious steps entail? According to the Meinshausen paper, up
to 80 per cent of our known reserve of fossil fuels will have to stay in the ground. The
carbon budget implied by the 2 C limit, Jaccard wrote, means that we cannot be
making new investments that expand the carbon polluting infrastructure. This
means no expansion of oilsands, no new pipelines (like Keystone and Northern
Gateway) and no expansion of coal mines and coal ports. This does not mean shutting
down the oilsands. It does not mean shutting coal mines. These will continue to operate
for decades. But you cannot be expanding carbon polluting production and also
prevent 2 C or even 4 C temperature increase. The industry knows this, but prefers
its ads telling us about the jobs and revenue from expanding the polluting
infrastructure. But the remedies needed, Rees suggested, might have to be even more
draconian than that. Even the International Energy Agency and the World Bank have
recently conceded that even if present agreed-upon policies were implemented, the
world is likely headed to four Celsius degrees warming by the end of the century.
This would render much of the most heavily populated parts of the earth
uninhabitable ...

Framing
Death becomes a commodity turns the aff
Baudrillard 76 (Jean, certified badass, Symbolic Exchange and Death, pp. 177-180,
Sage Publications, LB)
Security is another form of social control, in the form of life blackmailed with the
afterlife. It is universally present for us today, and 'security forces' range from life
assurance and social security to the car seatbelt by way of the state security police force.
'Belt up' says an advertising slogan for seatbelts. Of course, security, like ecology, is an
industrial business extending its cover up to the level of the species: a convertibility of
accident, disease and pollution into capitalist surplus profit is operative everywhere . But
this is above all a question of the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you
of your own death, which everybody dreams of, as the darkness beneath their instinct of
conservation. It is necessary to rob everyone of the last possibility of giving themselves
their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system. Again, in
this symbolic short-circuit, the gift-exchange is the challenge to oneself and one's own
life, and is carried out through death. Not because it expresses the individual's asocial
rebellion (the defection of one or millions of individuals does not infringe the law of the
system at all), but because it carries in it a principle of sociality that is radically
antagonistic to our own social repressive principle. To bury death beneath the contrary
myth of security, it is necessary to exhaust the gift-exchange. Is it so that men might live
that the demand for death must be exhausted? No, but in order that they die the only
death the system authorises: the living are separated from their dead, who no longer
exchange anything but the form of their afterlife, under the sign of comprehensive
insurance. Thus car safety mummified in his helmet, his seatbelt, all the paraphernalia
of security , wrapped up in the security myth, the driver is nothing but a corpse, closed
up in another, non-mythic, death , as neutral and objective a s technology, noiseless and
expertly crafted. Riveted to his machine, glued to the spot in it, he no longer runs the
risk of dying, since he is already dead. This is the secret of security, like a steak under
cellophane : to surround you with a sarcophagus in order to prevent you from dying Our
whole technical culture creates an artificial milieu of death . It is not only armaments
that remain the general archetype of material production , but the simplest machine
around us constitutes a horizon of death, a death that will never be resolved because it
has crystallised beyond reach . fixed capital of death, where the living labour of death
has frozen over, as the labour force is frozen in fixed capital and dead labour. In other
words, all material production is merely a gigantic 'character armour' by means of which
the species means to keep death at a respectful distance . Of course, death itself
overshadows the species and seals it into the armour the species thought to protect itself
with . Here again , commensurate with an entire civilisation , we find the image of the
automobile-sarcophagus: the protective armour is just death miniaturised and become a
technical extension of your own body The biologisation of the body and the
technicisation of the environment go hand in hand in the same obsessional neurosis.
The technical environment is our over-production of pollutant, fragile and obsolescent

objects. For production lives, its entire logic and strategy are articulated on fragility and
obsolescence . An economy of stable products and good objects is indispensable: the
economy develops only by exuding danger, pollution, usury, deception and haunting.
The economy lives only on the suspension of death that it maintains throughout
material production , and through renewing the available death stocks , even if it means
conjuring it up by a security build up: blackmail and repression . Death is definitively
secularised in material production, where it is reproduced on a large scale as capital.
Even our bodies, which have become biological machinery, are modelled on this
inorganic body, and therefore become, at the same time , a bad object, condemned to
disease , accident and death. Living by the production of death, capital has an easy time
producing security' it's the same thing. Security is the industrial prolongation of death,
just as ecology is the industrial prolongation of pollution . A few more bandages on the
sarcophagus. This is also true of the great institutions that are the glory of our
democracy' Social Security is the social prosthesis of a dead society (,Social Security is
death ! ' - May '68) , that is to say, a society already exterminated in all its symbolic
wheels, in its deep system of reciprocities and obligations, which means that neither the
concept of security nor that of the 'social' ever had any meaning. The 'social' begins by
taking charge of death . It's the same story as regards cultures that have been destroyed
then revived and protected as folklore (d. M. de Certeau, ' La beaute du mort' [in La
culture au pluriel, Paris: UGE, 1 974]) . The same goes for life assurance, which is the
domestic variant of a system which everywhere presupposes death as an axiom . The
social translation of the death of the group - each materialising for the other only as
social capital indexed on death. Death is dissuaded at the price of a continual
mortification : such is the paradoxical logic of security In a Christian context, ascesis
played the same role. The accumulation of suffering and penitence was able to play the
same role as character armour, as a protective sarcophagus against hell. And our
obsessional compulsion for security can be interpreted as a gigantic collective ascesis, an
anticipation of death in life itself: from protection into protection, from defence to
defence, crossing all jurisdictions, institutions and modern material apparatuses, life is
no longer anything but a doleful, defensive book-keeping, locking every risk into its
sarcophagus. Keeping the accounts on survival, instead of the radical compatibility of
life and death. Our system lives off the production of death and pretends to manufacture
security. An about-face? Not at all, just a simple twist in the cycle whose two ends meet.
That an automobile firm remodels itself on the basis of security (like industry on antipollution measures) without altering its range, objectives or products shows that
security is only a question of exchanging terms. Security is only an internal condition of
the reproduction of the system when it reaches a certain level of expansion, just as
feedback is only an internal regulating procedure for systems that have reached a certain
point of complexity.
We cant create better tech to solve for things like using fossil fuels. It is not
us that controls technology, but technology that controls us.
Baudrillard, 96 (Jean, The Perfect Crime, 1996, CP)

At the peak of our technological performance, the irresistible impression remains that
something eludes
AND
each of them there is a hidden someone thumbing his nose at us.
Environmental policy creates scapegoats while ignoring underlying causes
of warming collapse thus legitimating the status quo while appearing to
reform it
Bobertz 95
(Bradley, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law,
Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating
Theory, Texas Law Review Volume 73 Number 4 March 1995,
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?
handle=hein.journals/tlr73&div=29&g_sent=1&collection=journals)
To date, explanations for the intellectual bedlam of environmental law have included
analyses of the byzantine organizational and jurisdictional structures of congressional
subcommittees, models of public choice and game theory, lessons from evolutionary
biology, and visions of impersonal institutionalized corruption. This Article offers an
alternative theory for understanding both the convolutions and the failures of environmental
law. Drawing on insights from the fields of anthropology, psychology, and media studies, I
examine the phenomenon of societal scapegoating as a means for developing collective
solutions to complex, poorly understand problems. My thesis is straightforward:
Environmental lawmaking provides an important avenue for alleviating what we
individually and collectively experience at some level as guilt or shame for the
environmental degradation we witness through a world view shaped, in large measure, by
the media. By offering this scapegoating or guilt-redemption theory, I do not attempt to
provide a full explanation of environmental law and its genesis, and I certainly do not
purport to diagnose the American psyche. However, I do attempt to explore some of the
most basic, yet least understood, questions of the field: Why have we chosen to control
pollution through the particular means we have, and why do we create legal responses to
some environmental problems but not to others? The theory advanced in this Article
relocates federal environmental law, a relative newcomer to the legal scene, to a more
traditional place in the geography of social reform legislation. Rather than manifesting an
unprecedented legal experiment, environmental law simply reflects a recent iteration of an
old problem the attempt to influence mass behavior through the instruments of the legal
system. In environmental law, one witnesses the same issues that for decades have provided
grist for reform-minded lawmakers: struggles to define desirable and undesirable behavior;
debates over incentives, deterrence, and punishment; and questions about who makes the
rules and when these rules might violate other aims and values of society. As with other
areas of the law, these issues all emerge in the context of a complex, multitiered system of
delegated collective power and individual liberty. In contrast to other areas of social reform,
however, environmental law presents some unique problems. While the causes of crime,
poverty, and other social problems can, without too much intellectual turmoil, be attributed
to individual behavior, environmental degradation appears to implicate all of us.

Pollution can strike observers as the integral by-product of the relatively comfortable
lifestyle enjoyed by a majority of Americans in the late twentieth century. Yet, with images
of smokestacks, dying lakes, and oil-drenched otters constantly intruding on the public
consciousness, we are forced to live out Pogos dilemma: We have met the enemy, and he is
us. Because the deep-seated causes of pollution tend to implicate us all, we feel the desire
for psychological guilt release or redemption with special force. Thus, laws that
externalize blame to outside forces allow us to preserve a way of life to which we have
grown accustomed and one that we are reluctant to change the very way of life that
generates pollution in the first place. Environmental laws help us escape this psychological
dilemma. They establish clear lines between the perpetrators and the victims, maintaining
our position safely on the side of the innocent by treating pollution not as a natural, expected
outcome of industrialization, but instead as an aberration from a norm of cleanliness.
Environmental laws and the social patterns they reflect raise troubling questions. If we
reduce the purpose of environmental law to merely stopping end-point pollution, we
inevitably discourage scrutiny of our basic habits and ways of life. With pollution being
taken care of by the government, only the most guilt-sensitive will take action to change
their own behavior, and only the most fervently committed will press for deeper changes in
our systems of production and waste disposal. Unfortunately, these ardent few occupy a
marginalized position in mainstream America, and as the process of environmental
lawmaking marches onward identifying and punishing its scapegoats the underlying
causes of pollution are rarely mentioned, let alone acted upon. Thus, environmental
legislation presents a striking example of how the law can legitimize an existing state of
affairs while simultaneously creating the appearance of reforming it.

2nc

K
Double bind either the aff's impacts have too short a timeframe for the
round to spillover or they're not true and FIAT is an independent reason
to vote negative overstretches the will and causes limitless nihilism
Antonio 1995 [Robert; Professor of Sociology at the University of Kansas;
Nietzsches Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History; American
Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995]
While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of
autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals)
in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross
fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others,
asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed
in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but
actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social
self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the
social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness."
Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing
overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and
unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do
(Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous
rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows,"
"abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and
superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you
genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no
more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell
the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals"
(Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268,
300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine
attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate
in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to
be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94).
Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259)
stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal
while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might
miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is
merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain
compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense
and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and
faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the
fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity).
The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership.
Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and
praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick"

harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born
physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd;
they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all
according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the
masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more
urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god,
prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly
combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled
ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168;
1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).LB

Warming
Warming wont cause extinction
Barrett, professor of natural resource economics Columbia University, 7
(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)
First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If
unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being
depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also
happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as
the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. Catastrophic climate
change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large
changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to
unfold, giving societies time to adjust. Abrupt climate change is also possible,
and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate
change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very
serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment
of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse
case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the
Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we
were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would
be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but
we would have done much more about it by now.
Experts agree
Hsu 10 (Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg.
http://www.livescience.com/culture/can-humans-survive-extinction-doomsday100719.html)
His views deviate sharply from those of most experts, who don't view climate change
as the end for humans. Even the worst-case scenarios discussed by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't foresee human extinction. "The
scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end-ofhumanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the
University of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the technological tools to begin
tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve the problem, Pielke said. He
added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of
politics is that the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate
short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of fear and alarm that
some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One
technological solution to climate change already exists through carbon capture and
storage, according to Wallace Broecker, a geochemist and renowned climate

scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York

City. But Broecker remained skeptical that governments or industry would commit the
resources needed to slow the rise of carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that
more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. "The rise
in CO2 isn't going to kill many people, and it's not going to kill humanity,"
Broecker said. "But it's going to change the entire wild ecology of the planet, melt a lot of
ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're
essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain."

Framing
The entirety of Western politics rests on the state of exception any action
that begins with the State maintains the ability to determine life
Agamben 98 professor of philosophy at the University of Verona (Giorgio, Homo
Sacer, pg. 8-9)
The protagonist of this book is bare life, that is, the life of homo sacer (sacred man), who
may be killed and yet not sacrificed, and whose essential function in modern politics we
intend to assert. An obscure figure of archaic Roman law, in which human life is
included in the juridical order || ordinamento || solely in the form of its exclusion (that
is, of its capacity to be killed), has thus offered the key by which not only the sacred texts
of sovereignty but also the very codes of political power will unveil their mysteries. At
the same time, however, this ancient meaning of the term sacer presents us with the
enigma of a figure of the sacred that, before or beyond the religious, constitutes the first
paradigm of the political realm of the West. The Foucauldian thesis will then have to be
corrected or, at least, completed, in the sense that what characterizes modern politics is
not so much the inclusion of zo~in rhepo/iswhich is, in itself, absolutely ancientnor
simply the fact that life as such becomes a principal object of the projections and
calculations of State power. Instead the decisive fact is that, together with the process by
which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare lifewhich is
originally situated at the margins of the political ordergradually begins to coincide
with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoe
right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction. At once excluding bare life
from and capturing it within the political order, the state of exception actually
constituted, in its very separateness, the hidden foundation on which the entire political
system rested. When its borders begin to be blurred, the bare life that dwelt there frees
itself in the city and becomes both subject and object of the conflicts of the political
order, the one place for both the organization of State power and emancipation from it.
Everything happens as if, along with the disciplinary process by which State power
makes man as a living being into its own specific object, another process is set in motion
that in large measure corresponds to the birth of modern democracy, in which man as a
living being presents himself no longer as an object but as the subject of political power.
These processeswhich in many ways oppose and (at least apparently) bitterly conflict
with each othernevertheless converge insofar as both concern the bare life of the
citizen, the new biopolitical body of humanity.
Thats cause inevitable violence and prevents us from embracing ethics
Bauman, 95(Zygmunt, Professor of sociology at the University of Leeds, Life in fragments. Essays in
postmodern Moralities, 1995)
(Reject the gendered language)**
Such conditionsconditions without which there would be no camps and no genocide,
conditions which turned the unthinkable into realityare accomplishments of our

modern civilization, and in particular of three features which underlie, simultaneously,

its glory and its misery: the ability to act at a distance, the neutralization of the
moral constraints of action, and its gardening posturethe pursuit of
artificial, rationally designed order. That one can kill today without ever
looking the victim in the face, is a banal observation. Once sinking a knife into
the body, or strangling, or shooting at close distance have been replaced with
moving dots over a computer screenjust like one does in amusement
arcade games or on the screen of a portable Nintendothe killer does not need to
be pitiless; he does not have the occasion to feel pity. This is, however, the most
obvious and trivial, even if the most dramatic, aspect of action at a distance. The less
dramatic and spectacular manifestations of our new, modern, skills of distant action are
more consequential yetall the more so for not being so evident. They consist in
creating what may be called a social and psychological, rather than a merely physical
and oplical, distance between actors and the targets of their actions. Such social
psychological distance is produced an reproduced daily, and ubiquitously, and on a
massive scale, by the modern management of action, with its three different, yet
complementary aspects. First, in a modern organization every personally performed
action is a mediated action, and every actor is cast in what Stanley Milgram called the
magnetic state: almost no actor ever has a chance to develop the authorship attitude
towards the final outcome of the operation, since each actor is but an executor of a
command and giver of another; not a writer, but a translator of someone elses
intentions. Second, there is the horizontal, functional division of the overall task:
each actor has but a specific, self-contained job to perform and produces an
object with no written-in destination, no information on its future uses; no
contribution seems to determine the final outcome of the operation, and most retain
but a tenuous logical link with the ultimate effecta link which the
participants may be in good conscience claim to be visible only in retrospect.
Third, the targets of the operation, the people who by design or by default are
affected by it, hardly ever appear to the actors as total human beings, objects
of moral responsibility and ethical subjects themselves. As Michael Schluter and David
Lee wittily yet aptly observed, in order to be seen at the higher levels you have to be
broken up into bits and most of you thrown away. As a result, most actors in
organizations deal not with human beings, but with facets, features,
statistically represented traits; while only total human persons can be
bearers or moral significance. The global impact of all these aspects of
modern organization is what I have called borrowing the term from the vocabulary of
the medieval Churchthe moral adiaphorization of action: for all practical
purposes, the moral significance of the ultimate and combined effect of
individual actions is excluded from the criteria by which individual actions
any measure. And so the latter are perceived and experienced as morally
neutral. More exactly out with the same effect. The fragmentation of the objects of
action is replicated by the fragmentation of actors. The vertical and horizontal
division of the global operation into partial jobs makers every actor into a role-

performer. Unlike the person, the role-performer is an eminently replaceable and

exchangeable incumbent of a site in the complex network of tasksthere is always a
certain impersonality, a distance, a less-than-authorship relationship between the roleperformer and the role performed. In none of the roles is the role-performer a whole
person, as each roles performance engages but a selection of the actors skills and
personality features, and in principle should neither engage the remaining parts nor
spill over and affect the rest of the actors personality. This again makes the roleperformance ethically adiophoric: only total persons, only unique persons
(unique in the sense of being irreplaceable in the sense that the deed would remain
undone without them) can be moral subjects, bearers of moral responsibility
but modern organization derives its strength from its uncanny capacity for
splitting the fragmentation, while on the other hand providing occasions for the
fragments to come together again has never been modern organizations forte. Modern
organization is the rule of nobody. It is, we may say, a contraption to the float
responsibilitymost conspicuously, moral responsibility.

1nr

K
The K turns and outweighs the case environmental security only increases the probability and
magnitude of catastrophe, violence, and destruction while trying to fend it off there is endless
destruction in the Affs accumulative archive the alternative is to accept the playful inner
experience of loss and make a cut in the fabric of utility voting negative allows you to solve the
case in a playful way instead of securitizing loss and uncertainty this also avoids the disad of
imprisoning our experience of the world within the restricted economy of labor that bars the
possibility of intimate inner experience thats Yusoff heres more evidence:
Kathryn Yusoff 10 (Professor of Geography at the University of Exeter, Biopolitical Economies and the Political Aesthetics of
Climate Change Theory Culture Society 2010 27: 73 http://history.ucsd.edu/_files/base-folder1/Biopolitical%20Economies
%20and%20the%20Political%20Aesthetics%20of%20Climate%20Change.pdf) [m leap]
At a time when so much is at stake, a thinking that does not shy away from the limits of an exchange with animality, both exuberant

desire to endlessly accumulate and fend off loss and

destruction ultimately inates the likelihood and magnitude of catastrophe and
loss. This is what is so paradoxical about strategies that exude care, but return to a ledger of accounting
so stultied that they imprison[s] loss in a restricted economy, endlessly suppressing the
force of that biopolitical exchange (be that with polar bears or the long-dead animal fossils that have fuelled
our carbon-climate experiment). The restricted economy, which Bataille articulates, shares everything with the
logic of industrial capitalist modernity that has been so destructive to other forms of life, and nothing with
the intimacy of experience that can open up possibility in a politics of biopolitical living. What is
and violent, is surely needed. This

crucial here in the constant bringing down in the world of accumulative categories is an attack on conservation itself as a practice
that ignores the limits of the biosphere (for Bataille these are the only real limits). How the biopolitical is ordered through archival
principles is key to the possibilities of intimacy and ethics. As Grosz asks: what would an ethics be like that did not rebound with

By conserving and accumulating our archives

of destruction, we continue ordering and spending destruction without ever
transgressing the limits (to transgress the limit is to become aware of the limit ) in ways that
bring catastrophic loss and wholesale destruction, violence and generosity are systematically repressed.
The blindspot in archives of extinction is that they use the very same machinations and forms of
thought to rank and discipline loss as those practices that are part of the destruction
the slow accumulated loss and encroachment of late capitalism that sees no limits to its
accumulative capacity. As Stoekl comments in his discussion of Bataille and energy politics: The qualied
mechanized destruction of the Earth becomes the quantied, mechanized preservation of the
Earth (2007a: 133). In colloquial terms: greenwash. If the political, then, is about the enunciation that
claims a place in the order of things, while simultaneously rupturing that order, then the
echoes of an exchange dictated by the past? (1999: 11).

political aesthetics of climate change would sound something like the torrent of animal noise unleashed on the polluting inhabitants
in Ted Hughess Iron Woman: the otter came twisting and tumbling towards them, up the ery tunnel, in a writing sort of dance,
as if it were trying to escape from itself. And as it came it was crying something . . . (1993: 28). We might never be able to hear, in
conventional terms, the otters dance, but we might heed a warning in that ery tunnel that the world is less playful in the absence of

As anthropogenic climate change commits us to mass extinction events, we

might spend a while in the embrace of such violence to hear its dark secret .
animality.

Remaining imprisoned within the restricted world of labor and utility turns and outweighs the
aff work and labor discipline society for the purpose of utility this spills throughout society
to cause nearly all misery and evil play is a good alternative to work and labor play does not
mean passivity or idleness, actually quite the opposite play is a creative and joyful exuberance
and it is carried out for the intrinsic good of its own experience
Black 85 (Bob Black, "The Abolition of Work and Other Essays," 1985) [m leap]

No one should ever work. Work is the source of nearly all the misery in the world. Almost
any evil you'd care to name comes from working or from living in a world designed for work. In order
to stop suffering, we have to stop working. That doesn't mean we have to stop doing
things. It does mean creating a new way of life based on play; in other words, a ludic conviviality,
commensality, and maybe even art. There is more to play than child's play, as worthy as that is. I call for a
collective adventure in generalized joy and freely interdependent exuberance. Play isn't
passive. Doubtless we all need a lot more time for sheer sloth and slack than we ever enjoy now, regardless of income or
occupation, but once recovered from employment-induced exhaustion nearly all of us want to act .
Oblomovism and Stakhanovism are two sides of the same debased coin. The ludic life is totally incompatible
with existing reality. So much the worse for "reality," the gravity hole that sucks the
vitality from the little in life that still distinguishes it from mere survival . Curiously -- or
maybe not -- all the old ideologies are conservative because they believe in work . Some of them, like
Marxism and most brands of anarchism, believe in work all the more fiercely because they believe in so little else. Liberals say
we should end employment discrimination. I say we should end employment.
Conservatives support right-to-work laws. Following Karl Marx's wayward son-in-law Paul Lafargue I support the right to be lazy.
Leftists favor full employment. Like the surrealists -- except that I'm not kidding -- I favor full unemployment. Trotskyists agitate for
permanent revolution. I

agitate for permanent revelry. But if all the ideologues (as they do) advocate work -on
endlessly about wages, hours, working conditions, exploitation, productivity, profitability.
They'll gladly talk about anything but work itself. These experts who offer to do our thinking for
us rarely share their conclusions about work, for all its saliency in the lives of all of us. Among themselves they
and not only because they plan to make other people do theirs -- they are strangely reluctant to say so. They will carry

quibble over the details. Unions and management agree that we ought to sell the time of our lives in exchange for survival, although
they haggle over the price. Marxists think we should be bossed by bureaucrats. Libertarians think we should be bossed by
businessmen. Feminists don't care which form bossing takes so long as the bosses are women. Clearly these

ideologymongers have serious differences over how to divvy up the spoils of power . Just as clearly, none of
them have any objection to power as such and all of them want to keep us working.
You may be wondering if I'm joking or serious. I'm joking and serious. To be ludic is not to be
ludicrous. Play doesn't have to be frivolous, although frivolity isn't triviality: very often we ought
to take frivolity seriously. I'd like life to be a game -- but a game with high stakes . I want to play for
keeps. The alternative to work isn't just idleness . To be ludic is not to be quaaludic. As much as I treasure
the pleasure of torpor, it's never more rewarding than when it punctuates other pleasures and pastimes. Nor am I promoting
the managed time-disciplined safety-valve called "leisure" ; far from it. Leisure is
nonwork for the sake of work. Leisure is the time spent recovering from work and in the
frenzied but hopeless attempt to forget about work. Many people return from vacation so beat that they look
forward to returning to work so they can rest up. The main difference between work and leisure is that work at least you get paid for
your alienation and enervation. I am not playing definitional games with anybody. When I say I want to abolish work, I mean just
what I say, but I want to say what I mean by defining my terms in non-idiosyncratic ways. My minimum definition of

work is

forced labor, that is, compulsory production. Both elements are essential. Work is
production enforced by economic or political means, by the carrot or the stick. (The carrot is just
the stick by other means.) But not all creation is work. Work is never done for its own sake,
it's done on account of some product or output that the worker (or, more often, somebody else) gets out
of it. This is what work necessarily is. To define it is to despise it. But work is usually even worse than its
definition decrees. The dynamic of domination intrinsic to work tends over time
toward elaboration. In advanced work-riddled societies, including all industrial societies
whether capitalist or "Communist," work invariably acquires other attributes which accentuate
its obnoxiousness. Usually -- and this is even more true in "Communist" than capitalist countries, where the state is almost
the only employer and everyone is an employee -- work is employment, i. e., wage-labor, which means selling yourself on the
installment plan. Thus 95% of Americans who work, work for somebody (or something) else. In the USSR or Cuba or Yugoslavia or
any other alternative model which might be adduced, the corresponding figure approaches 100%. Only the embattled Third World

peasant bastions -- Mexico, India, Brazil, Turkey -- temporarily shelter significant concentrations of agriculturists who perpetuate

the traditional arrangement of most laborers in the last several millenia, [is] the payment of taxes (=
ransom) to the state or rent to parasitic landlords in return for being otherwise left alone.
Even this raw deal is beginning to look good. All industrial (and office) workers are employees and under
the sort of surveillance which ensures servility. But modern work has worse implications . People don't
just work, they have "jobs." One person does one productive task all the time on an or-else basis.
Even if the task has a quantum of intrinsic interest (as increasingly many jobs don't) the monotony of its
obligatory exclusivity drains its ludic potential . A "job" that might engage the energies of some people,
for a reasonably limited time, for the fun of it, is just a burden on those who have to do it for forty hours a week with no say in how it
should be done, for the profit of owners who contribute nothing to the project, and with no opportunity for sharing tasks or
spreading the work among those who actually have to do it. This is the real world of work: a world of bureaucratic blundering, of
sexual harassment and discrimination, of bonehead bosses exploiting and scapegoating their subordinates who -- by any rationaltechnical criteria -- should be calling the shots. But capitalism in the real world subordinates the rational maximization of
productivity and profit to the exigencies of organizational control. The

degradation which most workers

experience on the job is the sum of assorted indignities which can be denominated as
"discipline." Foucault has complexified this phenomenon but it is simple enough. Discipline consists of the totality of
totalitarian controls at the workplace -- surveillance, rotework, imposed work tempos, production quotas, punching -in and -out, etc.

Discipline is what the factory and the office and the store share with the prison and the school
and the mental hospital. It is something historically original and horrible. It was beyond the
capacities of such demonic dictators of yore as Nero and Genghis Khan and Ivan the Terrible. For all their bad intentions they
just didn't have the machinery to control their subjects as thoroughly as modern despots do.
Discipline is the distinctively diabolical modern mode of control, it is an innovative
intrusion which must be interdicted at the earliest opportunity. Such is "work." Play is
just the opposite. Play is always voluntary. What might otherwise be play is work if it's
forced. This is axiomatic. Bernie de Koven has defined play as the "suspension of consequences." This is unacceptable
if it implies that play is inconsequential. The point is not that play is without consequences. This is to demean play. The point is that

the consequences, if any, are gratuitous. Playing and giving are closely related, they are the behavioral and
transactional facets of the same impulse, the play-instinct. They share an aristocratic disdain for results. The player gets something
out of playing; that's why he plays. But the

core reward [of play] is the experience of the activity

itself (whatever it is). Some otherwise attentive students of play, like Johan Huizinga (Homo Ludens), define it as gameplaying or following rules. I respect Huizinga's erudition but emphatically reject his constraints. There are many good games (chess,
baseball, Monopoly, bridge) which are rule-governed but there is much more to play than game-playing. Conversation, sex, dancing,
travel -- these practices aren't rule-governed but they are surely play if anything is. And rules can be played with at least as readily as

Work makes a mockery of freedom. The official line is that we all have rights
and live in a democracy. Other unfortunates who aren't free like we are have to live in police
states. These victims obey orders or-else, no matter how arbitrary. The authorities keep them
under regular surveillance. State bureaucrats control even the smaller details of everyday life . The
officials who push them around are answerable only to higher-ups, public or private. Either way, dissent and disobedience
are punished. Informers report regularly to the authorities. All this is supposed to be a very bad thing.
And so it is, although it is nothing but a description of the modern workplace . The
liberals and conservatives and libertarians who lament totalitarianism are phonies and
hypocrites. There is more freedom in any moderately deStalinized dictatorship than
there is in the ordinary American workplace . You find the same sort of hierarchy and
discipline in an office or factory as you do in a prison or monastery. In fact, as Foucault and others have shown,
prisons and factories came in at about the same time, and their operators consciously
borrowed from each other's control techniques. A worker is a part-time slave. The
boss says when to show up, when to leave, and what to do in the meantime . He tells you how much work
anything else.

to do and how fast. He is free to carry his [or her] control to humiliating extremes, regulating, if he feels like it, the clothes you wear
or how often you go to the bathroom. With a few exceptions he can fire you for any reason, or no reason. He has you spied on by
snitches and supervisors, he amasses a dossier on every employee. Talking back is called "insubordination," just as if a worker is a
naughty child, and it not only gets you fired, it disqualifies you for unemployment compensation. Without necessarily endorsing it
for them either, it is noteworthy that children at home and in school receive much the same treatment, justified in their case by their
supposed immaturity. What does this say about their parents and teachers who work? The demeaning system of domination I've

described rules over half the waking hours of a majority of women and the vast majority of men for decades, for most of their
lifespans. For certain purposes it's

not too misleading to call our system democracy or capitalism or -but its real names are factory fascism and office oligarchy.
Anybody who says these people are "free" is lying or stupid . You are what you do. If you do boring,
stupid monotonous work, chances are you'll end up boring, stupid and monotonous. Work is a much
better still -- industrialism,

better explanation for the creeping cretinization all around us than even such significant moronizing mechanisms as television and
education. People

who are regimented all their lives, handed off to work from school
and bracketed by the family in the beginning and the nursing home at the end, are habituated to heirarchy and
psychologically enslaved. Their aptitude for autonomy is so atrophied that their
fear of freedom is among their few rationally grounded phobias. Their obedience
training at work carries over into the families they start, thus reproducing the system in more
ways than one, and into politics, culture and everything else. Once you drain the vitality
from people at work, they'll likely submit to heirarchy and expertise in everything.
They're used to it.
Rejecting environmental security modeling is an absolute prior step to creating any successful
effectuation of the aff only the alternative can solve warming or lay the foundation for
producing good scientific knowledge about climate change we need to take the risk of
embracing intimacy with nonknowledge instead of splitting duality into an opposition between
the restricted economy and its barred excess the aff cant assimilate our mode of thinking into
their advocacy the alternative has a fundamentally different methodology for solving the case
than the Aff does excess is banished by the ethico-political assumptions of environmental
management and security that underlie the Aff project
Yusoff 9 (Kathryn Yusoff, School of Geography, University of Exeter, Excess, catastrophe, and climate change, 24 August
2007; in revised form 19 March 2008; published online 26 October 2009, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2009,
volume 27, pages 1012-1015) [M Leap]
This paper begins by addressing the dominance of scientific modelling in the scientific and political constructions of climate change
to demonstrate how GCMs have been a key diagnostic and predictive tool in rendering climate change. Further, I investigate how

the unit-based accumulation of earth data has actively secured the production of
political responses that have both emulated and reinstated a model of restricted
accounting [such as the Stern Review (Stern, 2007) and carbon trading]. I argue how this envisioning of climate
change in the form of `digital earth'(4) an amalgam of participative media that render a global model rests on an
unexamined conception of globality that has implications for the perception and knowledge of
climate change. The accumulation of GIS data, taken together as an assemblage of digital earth values, can be referred to as a
model of digital earth. Digital earth as a concept provides a suitable metaphor for the assemblage of GISs (geography, geosciences,
geolibraries) and forms of remote sensing that are assembled to provide global models of earth systems. It is through

these
models of digital earth that climate change is predicted, projected, managed, and conceptualised.
Considering the rendering of digital earth as a specific assemblage of globalisation produced through digitalisation, I want to think

forms of excess(5) (expressed in aesthetics and globalism) that are

subsumed in the models it makes of future climate change prediction scenarios. As the
machines of climate modelling account for the dynamic life forms of earth, by extrapolation, the model of digital earth
can be thought of as a participatory meta-organism in itself, receiving and responding to climate changes and the
bodily shifts of earth processes. Environmental feedback materialises as data fed into the
supercomputer to change the parameters of the climate model (figures 2 and 3). This everevolving model provides a continuous organism of change, adjustment, and reconfiguration (see
www.climateprediction.net). This assemblage of visualising technologies, sensors, processing power,
and material environments is continually being made and remade as an intermedia phenomenon (DeLanda,
1991). Yet, I suggest this excessive globality reveals its own fragmentation through an impossible
about how the digital realm is productive of its own

project of accumulation that fails to register and thus incorporate dynamic events. This is
not simply a theoretical critique of modelling the world . As many leading scientists
acknowledge, modelling uncertainty is one of the most difficult and urgent tasks that
climate science faces (see Lopez et al, 2006; Stainforth et al, 2005). While constructivist or sociological accounts of
scientific knowledge are essential to remaking the political terms of engagement with climate science (Demeritt, 1996; 2001a;
Demeritt and Rothman, 1998), they possess nothing of the shattering power of abrupt climate changes, which are currently forcing
the remaking of our environments. Written within the shadow of these tectonic-like movements of change, this paper takes seriously
the implications of irreversible loss and excess, and considers what this does to knowledge, both in terms of the practice of science
and in terms of its ethical implications. While

I acknowledge the importance of scientific practices in the

making of climate change as a political phenomenon, in this paper I concentrate on
acknowledging the role of that which is in excess in those practices , what Bataille calls the
`nonknowledge' that is part of the pact that we make with knowledge . This
nonknowledge is for Bataille a form of excess that challenges both our thinking and our ethics and it
is not simply a matter of admitting we do not know all the difficult answers to living on a dynamic
planet. For Bataille nonknowledge is that part of human experience that is excluded or expelled,
because it is seen not to contribute to knowledge, even though it is experienced and is thus the
most intimate form of knowledge.(6) For Bataille and Maurice Blanchot, who both wrote in the first age of
catastrophic globalism (that of the atomic bomb), the problem is how to respond to unknowing
within knowledge in a way that does not simply restate the limited terms of
engagement that continue to disregard this excess; that is, if we truly acknowledge
this knowledge (of abrupt climate change) our forms of knowing and acting on that
knowledge should be radically altered.(7) In light of nuclear annihilation, Blanchot asks the question, ``Why
does a question so serious since it holds the future of humanity in its sway a question such that to answer it would suppose a
radically new thinking, why does it not renew the language that conveys it'' (1997, page 103). He responds: ``If thinking falls back
into its traditional affirmations, it is because it wants to risk nothing of itself in the process of an ambiguous event'' (page 104). It is
easy to see why climate scientists have been reluctant to risk themselves in the process of publicly acknowledging the ambiguous
nature of some of the findings of climate science given the political and environmental risks of doing so. However,

not to
acknowledge the excess of our knowledge brings with it other kinds of risks: that we respond
within the narrow limits of a restricted economy and forgo the possibilities of being
attentive to that knowledge. Thus, I relocate some of the arguments away from the social or political construction of
science to the media in which scientific data participate with the world. Specifically, I focus on the negative presentation of

this
unknowing within models I want to think about the legibility of different kinds of knowledge, and how
breaking with a circuit of narrow accounting might allow us to consider other (im)possible
configurations of what Char called the ``well-being of misfortune'' (cited in Bataille, 1994, page 132). Referencing Bataille's
notion of expenditure through a general economy (Bataille, 1991), I suggest how this excess may be
recuperated as an emergent ethic within the disaster yet to come . Alongside this discussion,
Blanchot's (1995a) critical project to `write the disaster' as an alternative form of
inscription attempts to write into the space of an exorbitant globality and express something
of its ``circuit of cosmic energy''. Theoretically, Bataille's and Blanchot's writings suggest an alternative
approach to the catastrophe that cannot be reached solely by accounting for the
formation of scientific knowledge through unit-based modelling practices and
their attendant responses. Instead they insist that we must accept the experience of loss
as an implication of that knowledge in order to risk being changed by it .(8)
nonknowledge in envisioning climate change through GCMs, digital earth, and scientific visualisation. Through