The Right Final Aim of Life

Author(s): G. von Gizycki

Source: International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Apr., 1891), pp. 311-330
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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TheRightFinal Aimof Life.

3II

God. This is an attitudewhich,experience seems to me to

show, promises the greatest moral strength and happiness.
To some it may seem to cut away the foundationsof moral
life; but thereare manyto whom it will appear to furnishthe
truestmoral stabilityin restingon the divineself-manifestation
in human experience.
C. H. Toy.
HARVARD

UNIVERSITY.

THE

RIGHT

FINAL

AIM

OF LIFE.

WHAT is the rightfinalaim of life? To answer a question

correctly,we must understandit completely. But the meaning of this question does not seem to be immediatelyclear.
We must thereforeanalyze it. We have to ask, (i) " What
is meant by 'final aim'?" (2) "What is meant by 'final aim
of life'?" and (3) "What is meant by 'the rightfinalaim of
life'??"
We will begin by consideringthe firstquestion.
I. The whole of those consequences of an actionwhich are
foreseenand willed by the agent are togethercalled the " intention"of that action. As a rule,not all these consequences
are directly desired, but only a portion of them; and this
portionof the intended consequences is called the "aim" of
the action. The causes which have to be put in operationin
order to the attainmentof this aim are called the " means."
They too are willed (but not directly),because the aim is attainable only throughthem; and thus, if an aim can only be
realized through a long chain of causes and effects,every
memberof this chain may itself,in its turn,become a relative
aim, in so faras it is conceived and willed and realized by
means of causes otherthan itself; whereas the ultimateaim,
which is not subservientas a means to anything further,is
called the final aim. An action which achieves its finalaim
is successful; one which misses it is unsuccessful. The certaintyof attainingthe finalaim would be enough by itselfto

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Internationaljournal of Ethics.

determinethe agent to the action; while the latterwould not

be attempted if failure in the final aim were foreseen. The
idea of the consequences aimed at in an action is called the
reason or motiveof that action,while the feeling excited by
this idea is known as the motiveimpulse.
Let us take an example. A man once sent-onboard a ship
a box which he had insuredfora large sum. In the box he
had placed a machine with a clock-work movement,so arrangedas aftera certainintervalto produce a violentexplosion
and -therebyto sink the ship. He intended,afterthe catastropheshould have taken place, to claim the considerablesum
forwhich the box, thus lost with the ship, had been insured.
All these anticipated consequences-the conveyance of the
box on board the ship, the movementof the clock-work,the
explosion, the founderingof the ship,the receiptof the insurance money-together formedthe man's intention
; but it was
only the last memberin this series of consequences that he
directly desired; only this, in other words,was his aim, or
his final aim, while all the rest were only means. His action
would have been successful
, if he had received the insurance
money.
In this case it was not difficultto say what was the final
aim of the action. But let us take another example. An
author prepares and publishes a work on political economy.
The consequences which he anticipates are these: his work
contributesto the instructionof mankind; it co-operateswith
social arrangethe forceswhich are making fora reform\of
ments; it bringsto the author the respectand recognitionof
many minds, while it makes him the object of hatred and
persecutionon the part of certain influentialcircles; and he
acquires the consciousness of having done his duty,and having proved himselfa usefulmemberof human society. Now
in such a case is it always possible, even forthe man himself,
to say what was, strictlyspeaking,his final aim or his ruling
motiveimpulse? The ordinarycase is that several motive
impulses act in combination; and the person is often not in a
positionto know which was the strongest,or whetherthis or
that motivewould by itselfhave been strong enough to de-

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TheRigktFinal Aimof Life.

313

termine him to the act in question. In the example before

us, the publication of a work of reformingtendency,there
may perhaps have been a joint operation of the feeling of
duty,the love of man, ambition,and the wish to be blameless
beforethe tribunalof conscience; these motives in combination were strongerthan the fearof having to sufferpersecution,and so the personresolved to performthe action. Would
he have done it none the less supposing he had foreseenthat
it would bringhim no honor or reputation? This may often
appear to him verydoubtful. The feelingswhich menexperience afterthe performanceof an action oftenaffordthem revelations as to the motiveswhich in realityimpelled them to
such action; and these discoveries are sometimes far from
flattering. One imagined that benevolence and the feeling of
dutyinspiredone's act; but the overpoweringvexationwhich
follows it when all external recognitionis denied, reveals to
one subsequentlythat ambitionwas the rulingmotive.
The question, what is the final aim of an action, cannot,
therefore,be answered by direct self-observation,but the
answer is a- matterof judgment,on which one maybe mistaken. For the most part,people do not reflectupon their
finalaims; and if they do, it is often impossible forthem to
reach an assured conclusion.
We have considered what is meant by a final aim, and
have seen that the determinationof the final aim is oftena
matterof uncertainsupposition,and that in many cases several aims are pursued together.
2. We have now to answer the second question. What is
the finalaim of life?
By many persons this question is taken to mean: What
was the aim of God in the creationof mankind? In thatcase,
the question startsfromthe unprovableassumptionthat mankind was the creationof a Being that thinksand wills. And
if we choose to ask what aim Nature has in producing mankind, thenwe should be creatingNature herselfinto a being
that thinksand wills, and so startingonce more froman unprovable assumption. We cannot speak of aims unless we
have in mind an intelligentBeing that sets aims beforeit;

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International.7ournacof Ethics.

foran aim is an effectpreviouslyconceived and willed. If we

disregardthis intellectualaspect of an aim there remains to
us only the simple causal connectionwith referenceto which
we may speak of causes and effectsand a co-operationof differentcauses in the productionof a particulareffect,but not
of means and aims. But to make unjustifiedassumptionis
not in accordance with the ethic of belief. The question as
thus stated must thereforebe dismissed.
What then can be the import of the question about the
final aim of life,if it is not to have a transcendentalmeaning? If it is to mean "What final aim predominatesin the
life of mankind," in other words, "'What motive-impulse
rules in the lifeof mankind?" this question would start from
the erroneouspresuppositionthat one definitemotive-impulse
does rule in the life of mankind. There are very many differentimpulses in everyhuman mind,and action is determined now by one, and now by another. Moreover it is by
no means the case that a single definitemotive-impulseis
active through a whole lifetimewith especial intensity,so
that all others are dwarfedby it. This does occur in some
cases; there are people whose ruling impulse from early
youth to extremeold age is the love of science, and others in
whom ambitionplays the same leading part; while in many
cases it is only froma certain epoch, fromearly manhood or
frommiddle life,and in consequence of personal experiences
benevolence or the
that a single motive,such as the reformer's
business man's love of gain, attainsa peculiar intensity. But
there are many people in whom one simplycannotperceive
that any one motivein particularis farsuperiorin forceto all
othersthrougha lengthenedperiod of time.
It appears that the question about the final aim of life,
whatevermeaningwe put upon it, always contains unjustifiable assumptions. How are we then to judge of our third
and principalquestion?
3. What is the rightfinalaim of life?
Many persons understandthis question in the same transcendental sense as the former; they understandby the right
final aim of life that which God or Nature intended by the

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The RightFinal Ain of Life.

3I5

creationof mankind,and they assume as self-evidentthat to

pursue this aim is the rightcourse formankind. But even if
we could make theassumptionof a transcendentalaim,itwould
not followthat we are to regard the advancementof it as a
moral command. Let us suppose that the complete realization of that aim was antagonisticto our moral ideas; in that
case we should assent to the very opposite moral command,
namely,so faras lay in our power to frustratethe realization
of such an aim; and we could only erect into an Imperative
the idea of making that aim our own, if it appears to us to be
good, if,that is to say, we should have esteemed a corresponding course of action to be right even though we had not
regardedit as the advancementof the transcendentalaim.
What do we understandby "right"? From an ethical
point of view we may distinguishbetween two meaningsof
this word,one which it has in thought below the scientific
level, the other which it has in scientificthought. If any one
has not arrivedat the point of bringinghis moral convictions
into systematicconnection,he calls everythingrightwhich he
instinctively
approves, and everythingwrong which he instinctivelydisapproves. But when one's reflectionupon the
provinceof good and evil has led him to the recognitionof a
supreme standard,then he will accept as rightonlywhat conformsto this standard. He now offersand demands justification forethicaljudgments,while the othersabide by merefeeling. The standard furnishesthe ultimatemajor premise of
all ethical ratiocinationand the ultimate basis of all ethical
demonstration.
The standardwhich appears at the present day to be obtainingever wider recognitionis that of the greatest possible
happiness of all mankind,and it is this that we shall take as
a point of departure forour furtherconsiderations. We do
not attemptto set forththe experiencesand reflectionswhich
may be expected to determinemankindto its acceptance; all
that is necessaryhas been said on this point by Hume, Bain,
Sidgwick, H6fding, and others. At best, therefore,
the explanations on which we are entering can have the forceof
proof only forthose who admit that it is more desirable than

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3 i6

International7ournai of Ethics.

anythingelse that the happiness of all should be increasedso

faras may be possible.
Let us now returnto our question. " What is the rightfinal
aim of life?" It is clear fromwhat has been said that the
transcendentalmeaningwhich may be put upon this question
in no way concerns us, we are occupied solely with its empirical import. It contains the assumption that in the lifeof
everyperson a final aim ought to rule,and it asks what this
is. But we have seen that if we take the words in theirstrict
meaning,it is not the case that in the lifeof any person a
single final aim has sole supremacy. If we start fromour
standard of right,our question implies the judgment that it
would be in accordance withthe happiness of all, if one and
the same final aim were always pursued. As every final
and as every particular
aim presupposes a motive-imnpulse
motive-impulse has the power of erecting a final aim,
the latterjudgment amounts to this: "It is in accordance
with the happiness of mankind that all action should
be determinedby one and the same motive-impulseand
never by any other." But this assumption is in the
sharpest contradictionwith our experience. Researches into
the importanceof the appetitesin the animal worldhave shown
us that theyare a part of the organizationno less necessary
to life than the sense, the muscles,or the bones; they are
properties which have been developed in consequence of
their utilityin the struggle for existence. To attempt to
eradicate any one of these impulses would be to attemptto
eradicate one of the factorswhich preserve the life of the
race.
But certain as this is, it is no less certainthat it is not in
harmonywith the happiness of the world to let all our impulses have a freecourse. Since thinkingbeings have existed
at all, theyhave recognized that a certaincontroland regulation of the desires is necessary.
Now impulse can be restrictedand subdued only by impulse. Some thinkershave recommended that they should
be subjected to reasonable self-love,others to conscience,
others again to universal benevolence. By this subjection

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The RightFinal Aim of Lfre.

317

of impulsesto a controllingimpulse it is not understoodthat

the rest should be eradicated and never realize themselvesat
all, but only that they should neverbe permittedto lead to
their correspondingaction, except when this is consistent
with the impulse which is by rightsthe ruling one. Thus
for example, those who think the guidance should be. intrustedto conscience have generallysaid, " One need not do
everythingfrom conscience, but one should do nothing
against conscience." So it appears as if this inquiryinto the
rightfinalaim of life had simply meant,as a rule,what motive-impulseought to play the leading part in the lifeof mankind. This is then a question of soul-culture. It presupposes-what of course would stillhave to be proved-that it is
in accordance withthe ethical standard to develop one and
the same motive-impulsein all individualsin a particularly
high degree,and it asks the question what impulse this is.
We therefore
ask, what motive-impulseis it most in accordance withthe happiness of mankindto develop into predominant force? So faras we are aware, only two impulses have
been suggested to the cultureof which this favorableinfluence is ascribed; one is universal benevolence,and the other
the desire of obtainingthe rewardof an approvingconscience.
Those who representedself-loveas the supreme controlling
motivestartedin everycase, we believe, fromthe assumption
-long since proved to be erroneous-that in fact all human
action was- egoistic; and they did not teach that this ought
to be so, or that it would be desirable to begin developing
egoism into a ruling power. Moreover,it has been proved
by Sidgwick, Stephen,and others,that there is not a complete harmonybetween private and general happiness, and
one who should continuallyendeavor afterhis
that,therefore,
own greatestpossible happiness would sometimes injure the
general happiness. And those who recommendedthe love of
rightforits own sake as the rulingmotivedid not allege that
with the general happiness.
this would be most in conformity
confineourselves to a comparisonof the value
We, therefore,
of the two first-natnedimpulses,and we ask, " Would it be
with the greatestpossible happiness of all,
most in conformity

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Inter-national
Yournal of Ethics.

if the supreme motivein human lifewere benevolence,or, in

otherwords,the desire forthe greatest possible happiness of
with the greatest
all? Or would it be most in conformity
possible happiness of all if the wish to attainthe joys of conscience and to avoid itspains were the regulatorof humanlife?
It will probablybe the general opinion that the happiness
of mankindwould be most effectuallyadvanced if it were directlydesired; and the assertionthat more might be contributed to its realizationby the endeavor afteranotherend,will
be thought paradoxical. If you want to hit a target,it is
said, you should aim directlyat it. When we contemplate
the lives of the greatest benefactorsof humanity,we seem
to find in each particular case that their controlling aim,
the object of theirenthusiasm,was something that extended
beyond theirown personality; it was the welfare of theirfellow-men,or some great cause which was a principal condition of that welfare. The consciousness of servingthe cause
of good in the world sustained and gladdened them on their
frequentlyarduous path; but it is not probable that the
desire of obtaining such gladness was theirprincipalmotive.
"Life," cries the great abolitionist,Wendell Phillips," what a
weariness it is, with its drudgeryof education,its littlecares
of to-day,all to be lived over again to-morrow; its rising,
eating,and lying down,-only to continue the monotonous
routine! Let us thank God that He has inspiredany one to
awaken us frombeing these dull and rottingweeds, revealed
to us the joy of self-devotion,taught us how we intensify
this life by laying it a willing offeringon the altar of some
great cause!" The following incident is told of Abraham
Lincoln: " One day Lincoln was ridingalong a countryroad,
but in
when he noticed near by a pig making great efforts,
vain, to get out of the mud into which it had sunk. Lincoln
rode on a mile or two, then turned round,rode back, took
planks and boards, and lifted the unfortunateanimal out.
The exploit becoming known in the neighborhood,a friend
remarked to Lincoln the next day, 'You must be a veryunselfishman, Mr. Lincoln, to have helped that pig out of the
mud.' 'Unselfish,' replied Lincoln; 'why, I did it for my

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319

own sake, not the pig's!"' Perhaps we may doubt whether

Lincoln did not rescue the pig partlyforthe pig's own sake,
for good men generally have sympathywith sufferinganimals, and even good children help a caught bird out of the
snare withoutthinkingof themselvesin doing it. But in any
case, thismuch seems to be certain,that in respectof his interferenceon behalf of an oppressed and ill-treatedclass of his
fellow-men,Lincoln would not have said, " I did it formy own
sake, not forthe slave's."
If the greatestpossible happinessof mankindis the standard
of value of all things,if it is desirable that all our actions
withthe general happiness,then we
should be in conformity
must continuallybear in mind the consequences which our
action will have forthe lifeand happiness of others,and the
general happinessmust thus become the centreof our interest.
But psychologicallyspeaking,it is hardlypossible that it can
obtain this positionin our consciousness without at once becoming our principalaim,-in otherwords,without the love
of man being developed into our ruling motive-impulse.
But it has been asserted that a more accurate consideration
of moral action shows that the general welfareis not its final
aim. It has been said, " Benevolence and the moral impulse
are not the same, and the moral appeal proper is to the moral
feelings. The moral feelingexhorts us to act rightly,to do
deeds, the expected consequences of which would be forthe
general good; but benevolence would fainrealize schemes for
the public good, and it failsof its object when the resultis not
forthcoming. When I, to my own danger, do something
the general interest,but the actual
whichI thinkwould further
my benevounforeseenconsequences of which are different,
lence gives me pain, my conscience gives me joy." "Conscience is directed on somethingwithin me, benevolence on
something without me." * This can hardly be a correct
* " A Student'sManual of Ethical Philosophy. Adapted fromthe Germanof
G. von Gizycki," by StantonCoit,London, i889, p. 82. "Moralphilosophie,
dargestelltvon Georgvon Gizycki,"Leipzig, I888, p. I i8.
gemeinverstgtndlich
The authorof this book has, as the presentpaper shows,alteredhis view upon
questionof moralphilosophy.
an important

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InternationalYournal of Ethics.

account of the matter. Might we not just as well say, " If

some one enters upon an undertaking,after maturedeliberation,withthe view of procuringforhimselfa legitimatepecuniaryprofit,and in consequence of circumstancesthat could
not be foreseenthe enterprisemiscarriesto his pecuniaryloss,
in this case he will not be angrywith himselfbut will be satisfiedwithhis own conduct,because he has done all that lay in
his powerand has no errorto reproachhimselfwith; and from
this it followsthatthe true aim of his actionwas not to improve
his financialposition,but to obtain his own self-approval1" If
it is untrueto say thatin thiscase the agent's desirewas directed,
not to something outside him (pecuniaryprofit)but to somethingwithinhim (self-approval),
it is no less untrueto make the
correspondingassertionin the formercase of whichwe spoke.
"Conscience" before the action and "conscience" after the
action are not identical states of mind. The conscience of a
benevolentperson urges him to help his neighbor,to do him
good, and thereforeto attainan objective goal,-and thus he
does all in his power to assist him. Now let us suppose that
the service which he rendered to the other person turns out
to the latter'sdetrimentin consequence of unforeseencircumstances, what will be the agent's state of mind? In the
degree in which he had a personal interestin the other's prosperityhe will feelpain. But if,in lookingback upon his own
conduct,he is unable to perceive that he committedany culpable error,or that he could have foreseenthe mischiefwhich
has resulted; and if,on the contrary,he is conscious of having
acted aftermaturedeliberationand to the best of his knowledge and conscience,then the contemplationof his own moral
conditionat the time in question will affordhim,in so faras
he is rational,no ground of pain; ratherhe will recognize it
to have been good, and this recognitionwill be attended by a
certainsatisfaction. In this case, as in the case of the person
who has failedin a business enterprisethroughno faultof his
own, the agent,in so faras his mindhas been educated in the
way which we should approve,will find comfortin the consciousness that he has nothing to reproach himselfwith.
But thisdesirable conditionof mind is by no means invariably

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present. Those who have not trained themselvesto regulate

theirfeelingsin accordance withthe precept," Only be vexed
so faras is of use," oftenfeel a predominance of pain at the
thoughtof an action on account of which theydo not deserve
to feelpain at all.
It has been said, "If men were to take for their final aim
the advancementof the general welfare,theiraction would be
a moral failure in each particular case in which it does not
reach this aim." A failureit would undoubtedlybe; but it is
still a moral action (in the sense of a good action) in so far
as the agent in acting was in a morallygood condition,that
is, if he desired to do right,and had done all in his power to
ascertain what was right. An action is moral (good) or not
moral accordingto its own nature,not according to what happens afterit; and it would be irrationalto regretit if it was
moral.
But then we are reminded to how many failureswe are liable if we take for our aim the advancement of the general
happiness,how uncertainis the issue of our enterprises,how
oftenthe best intentionsare thwartedby accident,or by the
hostile intentionsof others,how oftena man's lifeis brought
to a close beforehe has been able to realize his plans.
run
"Our wills and fatesdo so contrary
That our devicesstillare overthrown;
Our thoughtsare ours,theirends none of our own."

The choice of that aim is not wise, it has been said, for its
attainmentcan be frustrated
by externalcircumstances. We
need, if we are to be preservedfromdespondencyand despair,
an aim, the attainmentof which depends on ourselves alone.
Not externalachievements,but the attainmentof the peace of
conscience ought to be our finalaim.
To this we answer as follows: "External achievements"is
an ambiguous phrase. What is its meaning here? The happiness or misery,the life or death of our brothers! It is not
wise, we are told, to take their welfarefor our aim. But the
ambiguous word "wise" is not the true ethical term. Is it
to set our desires upon the
right,is it for thecommoninterest,

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welfareof mankind? That is the question withwhichwe are

concerned. Doubtless we are exposed to many failuresin our
endeavor after the general welfareas in all our endeavors.
But surely it does not followfromthis that we ought to abandon that endeavor? Rather we should seek to educate ourselves by all our failures,that so faras possible we may avoid
them in future. What failures have been experienced in
the endeavor aftera knowledge of the laws of nature! And
we must not exaggerate the uncertaintyof the issue of our
benevolentefforts;we must not make the exception into the
rule. Have not centuries of the experience of mankind bequeathed a rich store of knowledge withrespectto the consequences of action havingreferenceto thewelfareof humanity?
If these consequences really remained forevera subject of
doubt,then thegreatestpossiblehappinessof mankindcould no
more be the ethical standardthan it could be the ethical aim;
and we have startedfrom the assumptionthat it is the standard. It is said, "How oftenis man's lifebroughtto a close
before he has been able to realize his plans." But this only
leads up to the poet's exhortation:
"Zwischen haut und morgen
Liegt eine lange Frist;
Lerne schnellbesorgen,
Da du noch munterbist."
"Long is the space that severs
To-morrowfromto-day;
Learn to labor quickly,
Waking while you may."

And to say thatany one who is to be preservedfromdespondencyand despairneeds an aim,theattainmentof whichdepends

on himselfalone, is to say what is not true. Let us recall the
innumerablepatriots who have fought for the freedomand
welfareof their people, let us thinkof their steadfastnessin
battle,in prison,on the scaffold. We could hardly say of
themthattheiraim was not to help theirpeople, but to obtain
the joys of conscience. The glad consciousness of devoting
theirlives to a great cause sustained them underall the blows

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323

of fate; but they dedicated theirlives to that cause, and not

to an anticipatedjoy.
It has been said that the happiness of mankindis no fitting
aim forthe poor. " Will not the poor and weak, the ill and
neglected say, It is very well foryou who are rich and powerful,foryou who are princes and statesmen; but we, how little
can we do, how poor and weak we are in thismattercompared
withyou. Such an aim cannot make us enthusiasticto do
right. Is not the moral teacherable to offermen something
which we as well as the richestand mostpowerfulcan attain?"
But in reality,everyone, whateverhis position,can act in the
way which,according to his best convictions,conduces in the
given circumstancesto the welfareof mankind. This is what
the moral teacher commends to the poor as well as to the
rich. And the poor man knows as well as the rich that in
our moraljudgment of a personeverythingturnson his character,not on the consequences of his action,and thatthe poor
man may have a bettercharacterthanthe rich; he knows that
even the rich man-just like himself-can do for the general
welfareno more than his best. Whoever observes withattention the struggles of the working-classtowardsthe introduction ofjustersocial arrangementswill recognizehow powerfully
the idea of advancing the welfareof theirbrothersis capable of
inspiringeven " the poor." Auguste Comte seemed to believe
that therewas no class of men among whom so great a sense
of comradeship is to be foundas among the working-class.
It is furtherobjected: " We find that certain psychological
laws of the emotionsand will would make universalhappiness
an impracticableaim. The notion of it, on account of its abstractness,would require a high degree of rationalizationin a
man in order to take hold of his imaginationand stirhis enthusiasm. To obtain the vaguest sort of a conceptionof it is
difficult
even forminds specially trained to abstractthinking.
And perhaps still more difficultto grasp is the truthof the
ethical generalizationthat the essence of virtueis thepurpose,
and the essence of duty the obligation,to increase universal
happiness as faras it is in one's power." *
* StantonCoit, " Final Aim of Moral Action." Mind, July,i886, p. 330.

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To this we must replythat to make the general welfarethe

finalaim of actiondemands no higherdegreeof developmentof
the understandingthan to make it the standardof action; and
we startfromthe presuppositionthatitis the standard. If the
abstractidea of "universalhappiness" has power to stimulate
but a few,yetinnumerablemindsare inspiredwithenthusiasm
by the detailed idea of the concrete things which that conception represents. Undoubtedly the reading of Bellamy's
" Looking Backward" has made an epoch in the lives of
many thousands; the image of a happier order of society
whichthis writerhas depictedas possible,has firedtheirsouls
and incited them to be active to the best of their powers in
bringingabout its realization.
At times,but happily not often,we hear the assertion that
determinesus to adthere is no motive-impulsewhichdirectly
vance the general welfare. He who is completelydestituteof
such an impulsecan obviously not be determinedto actionfor
the common interestby an appeal to his benevolence; but in a
civilized society there will be but fewmen and women who
are really devoid of all love of man. The lecturer of the
South Place Ethical Society in London says: "But if any one
asks, 'Why should I love my fellow-men?'we must answer,
' Stop! that is blasphemyagainst humanity,and we will not
tolerateit withoutprotestingagainst such degenerate scepticism.' The love of man, as we see and feel in our own experience, is something ultimate,something inviolable. Love
knows no motivebeyond itself,and permits no doubt that it
is its own justification." And he says furtherthat a good
man will choose the path of duty, "not because it will
be his own greatest happiness, but because it will contribute to the happiness and virtue of mankind,which he
loves directly more than himself,and to devote himselfto
which he thereforedoes not esteem a sacrifice. The self
makes no claims when it loses itselfin surrenderto the universal welfare,any more than when it loses itselfin devotion
to one person." *
* " Die EthischeBewegungin der Religion."

StantonCoit, Leipzig, i890.

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TheRightFinal Aimof Life.

325

One oftenhears the objection that benevolence is too weak

a motive. But is thereany emotionalforcewhich guarantees
the pursuitof the general welfare,and which is strongerone
the average than benevolence? In manypersons benevolence
is not weak, and it may in all cases be strengthenedby nurture,education,and social arrangements. The love of man
is a motive which has continuouslyincreased in strength
throughout the progress of civilization,and we may hope
that it will always develop itself with increasing power.
"The love of all men, simplyas human beings," it has been
said, " is psychologicallythe latestdeveloped of all the motives
of right action." But "right action" is, in so far as our
standardis accepted,that action which is conformableto the
happiness of all men; and it has not been shown that any
motive except "the love of all men" leads to such action as
this.
It is further
objected: " The general welfareis ill adapted to
become the finalaim of conduct,because its fullrealizationis
so farremovedin time. An immediateincrease of happiness
cannot be made the moral aim; since the immediateeffectof
rightaction is oftena general increaseof pain. Restraintimplies pain, and duty demands of us oftena discipline and restraintof othersas well as of ourselves. 'Universal Happiness' can mean only the happiness which will pervade society
whenperfectrighteousnesshas triumphed,togetherwithwhatever happiness the advance towards moral victorymay admit
of. Nothing else can properlybe understoodunderuniversal
happiness. Certainlythe mere fragmentof desirable consciousness which the advance towards moral victory may
admit of could not deserve that name. Therefore to aim at
universalhappinesswould be the same as aiming at the final
triumphof justice and joy on earth. Now in proportionas
the realization of an object is seen to be distant,its power
over the imaginationand emotions is weakened. But so far
as merelyhuman calculationsare to be relied upon, the kingdom of heaven is not near at hand."
This objection starts fromthe wholly groundless assumption that any one whose ruling motiveis the general love of
VOL.

1.-No. 3

22

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326

International-ournal of Ethics.

man, and who, therefore,desires to promote the general welfare, must necessarily anticipate a "full realization" of it.
But just as the ethical standard is not " universal happiness"
but thegreatestpossibleuniversalhappiness,that is, the greatest possible excess of pleasure over pain in the world,so the
finalaim correspondingto this standardis not the realization
of universal happiness but the greatestpossiblepromotionof
happiness in the world. The case in which universal happiof present pain is
ness can be promoted by an intensification
only an exceptional case; the rule is that it is promoted by a
diminutionof pain. No one doubts that whoever discovers
and applies successfulmeans of annihilatingsources of great
pain, such for example as infectiousdiseases, is therebypromotingthe general welfarein a higher degree. No abolitionist doubted that the welfareof mankindwould be increased
by the destructionof slavery. And even if the social reformeracknowledges that the new order of things forwhich
he is fightingis not imminentin the near future,yet as long
as he is certainthat his activityis accelerating.its approach,
the idea of the futurewill exercise a great power on his " imagination and emotions."
The same unfoundedassumption is at the root of the following objection: "If the attainmentof universal happiness
be the ultimate aim of conduct,three hypotheses must be
assumed which have no other foundationthan the need of
having an aim which is unconditionallyattainable. First, it
must be assumed that somehow or other universal happiness
will triumphin the world,and, secondly, that the human race
is immortal; and, thirdly,as a ground of justificationforthese
two hypotheses,it must be assumed that historyand human
existence are underthe controlof an intelligentmoral author
of nature." But as the true ethical final aim is not the realization of something impossible-unmixed happiness in the
world-but only the greatest possible amount of happiness,
faith."
we do not requirethis " extra-experimental
None of the argumentswhich we have examined, in oppo-sitionto our proposed final aim, appeared to constitutea
decisive case against it. Let us now considerthe final aim

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The Right Final Aim of Life.

327

which appears as its rival,and let us ask, Would it be in

conformity
withthe greatestpossible happiness of mankindif
the desire to obtain the joy of conscience and to escape its
pain were our rulingmotive-impulse?
we
If we are to answer this question in the affirmative,
must,it would seem, start in the firstinstance from the presupposition that peace of conscience can only follow upon
withthe greatestpossible hapsuch action as is in conformity
piness of mankind; forif in any one case the sanction of conscience wereto rewardan action of generalinjurioustendency,
then it would be incumbenton the man to choose this action,
supposing that he desired to obtain the sanctionof conscience.
Now in what cases does the approval of conscience reallytake
place ? In all in which the agent believes that he has acted
rightly. But his opinionsabout what is rightusually depend
in great part upon his education and his social environment.
A Fuegian has differentmoral opinions froman Englishman.
It is rarelythe case that a precise inductionfroma man's particular moral judgment would give the result that theirunderlying principlewas the greatest possible welfare of mankind; in most cases the basis of the greater part of them
would be seen to be the supposed welfareof a limitedcircle,for example, of a man's own race or of his own class or of
his own nation.
he who would determinean agent to act in
And, therefore,
with the welfareof mankind will not be able to
conformity
say to him," Endeavor to secure the sanction of conscience,"
but he will seek to cultivate his conscience so as in future
only to approve what conformsto the universalwelfare; and
he will only be able to attain this resultwhen he succeeds in
determininghim to acknowledge the general well-being as
the supreme standardof right,and to make its advancement
his ruling aim. "Strive after the general well-being," not
" Strive afterthe peace of your own conscience,"will therefore be his advice. We almost all stand in great need of a
generalizationof our conscience,-of an elevationabove class
prejudicesby the express reminderthatwhatwe are concerned
with is the well-beingof all mankind,not merelythat of the

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328

International
-7ournalof Ethics.

so-called cultivatedclass,or of the rich,or of men as contrastedwithwomen,or of those who belong to one's own
people,or of humanbeings now alive. It is onlywhenwe
make thatobjectiveaim oursupremepurposethatwe insure
to reason and wisdomand goodness the requisiteinfluence
uponouraction; it is onlythenthatwe can be sureof an advanceinourethicalviews. Especiallyinourowntime,inwhich
theinadequacyofmanytraina greater
degreethaneverbefore
is being acknowledgedthroughwide
ditionalarrangements
conscience
circles,and a neworderof thingsis in preparation,
requiresa compass; and if mankindare to pursuethe direcwelfare
tionwhichthecompassof theuniversal
then
indicates,
theymusttake thisaim fortheirown personalaim. Many
far too easily; the constant
men arriveat self-complacency
the
standard
to
of rightis essentialif theyare to
reference
of Thomas'a Kempis: " Do notbe joyful
obeytheinjunction
exceptwhenyouhave donea good action." If theytakefor
theirsupremepurposethesubjectiveaimwhichwe mentioned,
and regardtheinnerresultsofaction,thepeaceofconscience,
as thesole decisivematterand as whatstampsan actionas a
missuccess,then,supposingthattheirwell-aimed
enterprises
carry,theywill hardlydraw all the necessarylessons from
thisexperience:withmanyof themtheremighteasilyarise
a certaindisregardof externalsuccess,-of thereal influence
of theiractionson thewelfareof theirfellow-men,in other
to thewell-beingof humanity;
words,a certainindifference
they will easilyforgetthat it is theirdutyto bend all the
to ascertaintheactualexternal
powersof theirunderstanding
consequencesof theiractionas regardsthe generalwelfare.
Writerswho regardtheinwardmoralsanctionas theright
aim of lifehaveattemptedto anticipatethe objectionswhich
we have urgedby expressingthe" ultimateruleof right"in
" Let thyfinalaim in life be thineown peace of
theformula,
mindin doingwhatin thybest judgmenttendstowardsuni* or " Seek peace of consciencein devoting
versalhappiness,"
thyselfto thewelfareof mankind."
t But thisis nota single
* Coit. Mind, July,i886, p. 338.

t Gizycki,1. c., p. 84.

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The RightFinal Aim of Life.

329

but a double injunction; it implies an impracticablecombination of two distinctfinalaims. Either the one or the other
must abdicate the supremacyto its rival. If we are to insist
upon man's finding peace of conscience then he must do
whateverin fact affordshim the approval of his conscience,
however littleit may justifyitselfby the standardof the general well-being! And so they may torturetheirenemies,beat
theirchildrento death, shoot theirfriendsin a duel, "exploit"
their workmen and treat them like slaves! How can one
justifythe limitationthat only such gladness of conscience is
to be sought foras attends upon action conformableto the
general welfare? By saying that it is not everyjoy of conscience the aspirationafterwhich conformsto the general welfare? But this replycould only be assented to by one who
prefersto take forhis supremefinalaim, not the peace of his
own conscience but the general welfare. If every human
being possessed a normal conscience such as infalliblysanctioned action for the general interest, then the injunction
which we are criticisingwould really be no double injunction,
but a single one, the second clause of whichwould simplyindicate the means to the end prescribed by the first; but precisely in proportion as actual consciences fall short of that
ideal, the dethroningof the general happiness fromthe position of rulingaim would bring to pass an injuryto the general happiness.
to recall the sanction of conscience
It is right,frequently,
both to othersand to one's self; but it is hardlythe case that
one ought to make it one's ruling aim. In proportionas a
man has a benevolenthearthe will find happiness in the service of man. And so Garrisonsaid when he looked back on
fiveand twentyyears of his battle against slavery: " I have
been compensatedin this cause a million times over. In the
darkest hour, in the greatest peril,I have feltjust at that
momentthat it was everythingto be in such a cause." And
if we cannot findhappiness in the position to which the path
of duty has brought us, we shall at least find comfortin it.
Perhaps we all need thisreferenceto the inwardconsequences
of our action,by means of whichvirtueis its own rewardand

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330

Internationaljournal of Ethics.

vice its own punishment; for benevolence and the sense of

duty are often not strong enough to conquer powerfulimpulses of self-love; we must invokethe aid of ethicalself-love
in order to insure the victoryto the forceswhich make for
good. But our ruling aim ought to be the advancementof
the universalhappiness of mankind.
G. VON GIZYCKI.
BERLIN

THE

UNIVERSITY.

MORAL

PHILOSOPHER
LIFE.*

AND

THE

MORAL

THE main purpose of this paper is to show that there is no

such thing possible as an ethical philosophy dogmatically
made up in advance. We all help to determinethe content
of ethical philosophy so far as we contributeto the race's
moral life. In other words,there can be no final Truth in
Ethics any more than in Physics,until the last man has had
his experience and said his say. In the one case as in the
other,however, the hypotheses which we now make while
waiting,and the acts to which they promptus, are among the
indispensable conditions which determine what that "say"
shall be.
First of all, whafis the position of hini who seeks an ethical philosophy? To beginwith,he must be distinguishedfrom
all those who are satisfiedto be ethical sceptics. He will not
be a sceptic; thereforeso farfromethical scepticismbeing one
possible fruit of ethical philosophizing it can only be regarded as that residual alternativeto all philosophywhich,
fromthe outset,menaces everywould-be philosopherwho may
give up the quest discouraged,and renounce his original aim.
That aim is to find an account of the moral relations that
obtain among things,which will weave them into the unityof
a stable system,and make of the world what one may call a
* Addressread before the Philosophical Club of Yale University,
February
9, i89i.

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