Islamophobia Negative - DDI 2015 SWS

ISLAMOPHOBIA CASE NEG
*America PIK
1nc
Equating the term "America" with United States is
imperialist appropriation of the word
Malavet 2002 [Pedro A., Associate Professor of Law, The University of Florida Fredric G. Levin
College of Law; J.D., LL.M., Georgetown. La Raza Law Journal Fall, 2002
13 La Raza L.J. 387 LATCRIT
VII: COALITIONAL THEORY AND PRAXIS: SOCIAL JUSTICE MOVEMENTS AND LATCRIT COMMUNITY: The Past,
Present and Future of the Puerto Rico-U.S. Colonial Relationship: Vieques, Transculturation, and
Reparations: Reparations Theory and Postcolonial Puerto Rico: Some Preliminary Thoughts, lexis, AX]
n18. See also the discussion of Balzac supra note 6 (the U.S. Supreme Court distinguishes between Puerto
refer
to the United States of America as such or as "United States" or simply
"U.S." and to its citizens as United States/U.S. citizens or estadounidenses, thus
purposefully avoiding the imperialistic appropriation of the terms
"America" and "American" to describe only one nation and its
citizens. Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol explains the irony of using the term "American" to refer
Rican U.S. citizens and "Americans"). Except on this one occasion, in this article, I will generally
only to citizens of the United States of America: I use the designation United States for the United States of
America. Many, if not most or all of the other authors use the terms United States and America
interchangeably. I decided not to alter the authors' choice of language in that regard. I do find it necessary
the
imperialistic practice of denominating the United States as
"America" remains normative. Indeed, America is much larger than the
U.S. alone; there is also Canada [and Mexico] in North America, and all of
Latin America and the Caribbean (some locations commonly referred to as Central
to comment thereon, however, because I find it ironic that in a book on imperialism
America, some as South America).
Using the term America when referring to the United

States of America creates cultural assimilation and
perpetuates colonial and hegemonic thought
Velazquez 2007 [Edyael, M.A. in Latin American Studies, Influence of Trajectory and Agency
on Strategies of Incorporation and Identity of Immigrant Youth: A Case Study of New Life High School,
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1187742144, Accessed 11/26/2014, pg. 12-13, AX]
my definition of immigrant includes all people of European descent,

who have immigrated and settled on this land since the discovery
of the New World, but through genocide and the institutions of
colonialism, slavery, racism, capitalism and hegemony have
constructed, defined, and controlled immigration discourse in order
to establish themselves as the original citizens and American as the
native identity. A component of the hegemonic attitude at the foundation
of the United States is establishing the national identity as
American. America is a continent (or three to some) not a country.
The United States is not America, but one of the countries on the
American continent. Therefore, referring to the United States as America
and its citizens as American is a strategy of hegemony. Because I wish
to deconstruct the hegemonic practice of referring to the United
States as America and its citizens as American, I refer to U.S.
citizens as UnitedStatesian. Re-defining who is considered
immigrant also challenges how someone is considered immigrant.
In contrast,
Research conducted on the so-called second generation, referencing the children of immigrants, (Portes,
1993, Portes et. al, 1994, 1996, 2001; Rumbaut, 1999; Zhou, 1997) indicates that immigrants are defined
by generational position. Therefore, anybody who is a descendant of someone who immigrated at any
point is an immigrant of X generation. However, the hegemonic establishment of United Statesian identity
as a native identity instead of an immigrant identity, places the descendants of European immigrants
outside of immigrant identity and immigration discourse. And it also introduces my third objective: to
challenge and re-frame the discourse on immigration. I challenge immigration discourse by considering
UnitedStatesian an immigrant identity constructed by European immigrants. By placing UnitedStatesian
inside the immigration discourse, I re-frame the U.S.-centric, assimilationist understanding of immigrant
incorporation and identity to an understanding centered on the experience of the immigrant.2 Thus,
instead of asking how UnitedSatesian are you? and using assimilation into UnitedStatesian identity to
measure the identity and successful incorporation of immigrants, I explore diverse identities and
strategies of incorporation that immigrants negotiate influenced by their particular experience. The
The
current frame of immigrant incorporation discourse centers
American as the native identity to which all immigrants aspire to
assimilate to. The idea of the American dream is the hallmark of a
successful American life that can only be attained by being
American and living in America. I have present two criticisms: 1)
America does not equate the United States, and 2) American does
not equate success. First, America is not a country, but a continent (or three
South, Central, and North). The fact that citizens of the United States of
America are recognized as American demonstrates the colonialist,
hegemonic mentality that created this country and continues to
shape its relations with other nations and peoples. Secondly, another
objectives I have outlined shape the arguments I present in this thesis and how I construct them. 2
symptom of this hegemonic mentality is equating being American with being successful. In immigrant
American is placed as the native identity immigrants

assimilate to. The ultimate goal for the immigrant is to become American and stop being immigrant
in order to receive all the glory of being American. For example, researchers often
understand the success of immigrants by measuring their level of
Americaness. This understanding of immigrant incorporation
establishes other immigrant identities as unsuccessful and
undesired.
incorporation research,
Extensions- "AMERICA" PERPETUATES

HEGEMONIC MENTALITY
"America" centric discouse affects perspective and
understanding
Bauer 10 [Ralph Bauer, Associate Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the
University of Maryland, American Literary History Volume 22, Number 2, Summer 2010 Early American
Literature and American Literary History at the Hemispheric Turn
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/american_literary_history/v022/22.2.bauer.html#back, Accessed 7/24/15, AX]
Colonial American texts outside the Anglo-American tradition are of interest in this paradigm primarily as
Cabeza de Vaca's
narrative is seen (implausibly) as a "mestizo voice speaking for the first
time from what is now the U.S. literary tradition" of contemporary Latino
writers because his text "both narrates and incarnates the process of becoming something
new we now call American" (Bruce-Novoa 129).12 In its attempt to
appropriate the Spanish-American texts of the discovery and conquest for the
literary history of the US, this metanarrative also tends to eclipse colonial
Spanish-American literatures during the seventeenth and especially the eighteenth
centuries, except insofar as they pertain to territories that would later be
annexed by the US,13 thereby running the risk of reinforcing US
American [End Page 254] ideas of exceptionalism and manifest destiny,
according to which the history of the entire colonial North America
culminates in the foundation of the US. The literary history of the
Ibero-American colonies and nation-states (as well as much contemporary Latin
American criticism),14 by contrast, vanishes into thin air after the initial phase of
the European discoveries and conquests has been completed as though
touched by Hegel's nineteenth-century "spirit" of history.15 In this time-honored narrative
of successive periods of American history, Native Americans "inhabited" America,
Italian explorers (such as Columbus, Vespucci, Verrazano, or Cabot) "discovered"
America, Spaniards (such as Corts or Daz del Castillo) "conquered" America,
Englishmen (such as Smith or Bradford) "settled" America, and (US) Americans
(such as Franklin or Jefferson) "founded" the American nation-state.
an original "first" in a national or ethnic literary tradition that came later. Thus,
FRONTLINE - RACE / ETHNICITY

UNDERSTANDING IS LIMITED
The US as "America" discourse demonstrates a
perspective that hurts a holistic understanding of racism
and imperialism
By contrast, much of the recent hemispheric studies of nineteenth- and twentieth-century American
literature has originated from within (US) American studies, particularly the "new" or "transnational"
American studies of the 1990s and 2000s.9 Methodologically, much of this recent hemispheric scholarship
has been informed by an Anglo-American postcolonialist and US [End Page 252] American
multiculturalist/minority discourse studies paradigm, particularly in the critique of US empire and racism,
investigating the connections between US domestic racial politics, ethnic nationalisms, and US imperialism
in the hemisphere during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.10 Thus, despite the frequent critique of
the traditionally narrow conception of "America" in American studies

as denoting the US (rather than the hemisphere) and despite the emphatically
transnational framework embraced by these works, the US nation-state (or empire) has often
remained at the center of critical analysis in the recent "hemispheric
turn" of American studies. To be sure, some of the most innovative and pathbreaking recent
scholarship in hemispheric American studies has been done precisely in the attempt to reconceptualize
subdisciplines of US American literary scholarship by placing their particular archives in a hemispheric
context and by bringing them into conversation with archives and critical traditions written in languages
other than English and in places outside the US.11 However, while the US multiculturalist approach, with
its interest in ethnic or racial categories as they have emerged in the modern US, has made for a powerful
paradigm in recent attempts in nineteenth- and twentieth-century American studies to cross national
borders, the nation-state never made much historical sense for the study of early American literatures,
whether they be written in English, Spanish, French, or Portuguese (except insofar as they have been
Until the early nineteenth

century, "America" did indeed denote the hemisphere, not one
particular nation-state. From this point of view, early American studies has been
"transnational" (or prenational) by the very nature of its archive. One of the ways in which
hemispheric scholarship on the colonial period might inform hemispheric
scholarship on later periods, then, is to dislodge further the US as a central or
normative paradigm for transnational historical development and to
practice what Roland Greene has called a "polycentric historicism" (27) a historicism that
resists unilinear national (or ethnic) teleologies of literary history and that
is respectful to the historical context and the critical traditions of
multiple places and parallel literary histories. Let me illustrate this point by
considered as part of the national literatures of Europe).
briefly considering how the "hemispheric turn" has been reflected in two recent literary anthologies.
EXTENSIONS - RACE / ETHNICITY

UNDERSTANDING IS LIMITED
US-centric "America" terminology inhibits discussions of
race
Bost 10 Suzanne, (Associate Professor of English @ Loyola University Chicago), American Literary
History; Summer2010, Vol. 22 Issue 2, p266-270, 5p Doing the Hemisphere Differently: A Response to
Ralph Bauer, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/american_literary_history/v022/22.2.bost.html, Accessed
7/24/15, AX]
the US is a recent minority in the hemisphere, and I

we need to rethink the
orientation of American studies, which, even in its hemispheric modes, is still [End
Page 266] US-centric in its terminology, its questions, and its
periodicity. It is hard work for those of us educated in the US to unlearn the
narratives and definitions that govern US academic studies, and it is
hard work to understand (and sometimes even to locate) scholarship from and
about other nations in the hemisphere, but if we want to move past US
exceptionalism, we must. We must expand our sense of history, we must
encourage more multilingual education, and we must be willing to
surrender our own narrow perspectives to wider and longer views.
It is good to be reminded that
find Bauer's argument to be vitally important. I totally agree that
Let's do it. Let's declare our shared independence from the nation-state. Bauer's transnational approach to
the hemisphere establishes a framework for needed dialogue between early Americanists and "later"
Americanists. In terms of space, Bauer and I share the same terrain and the same commitment to viewing
the Americas in hemispheric dialogue. In terms of method, though, our approaches differ in subtle ways,
and I will focus on two of them in this response. The first is temporal. In critiquing the ahistoricity of the
"proto-nationalist 'origins' model," Bauer seems to be restoring a more (politically and historically)
In response to the inverted logic

that assumes contemporary national formations as the governing
principles for early American studies, Bauer returns us to a more properly
chronological order in which the prenational period provides the source of
polycentric hemispheric dialogue and in which Spanish norms preceded the British in the
hemisphere. This is a helpful genealogy for contemporary American studies (if I might make
so presentist a claim), providing a history of transnational intercourse
without the US at its center. (Bauer might think more about how "transnationalism" among
"correct" temporality with the prenational at the origin.
indigenous cultures would undermine the colonial temporality of his history, but that might go beyond the
"American" narrative.) I find Bauer's critique of the Heath Anthology's US-centrism helpful not because the
Heath "foreclosed on an understanding of these texts within their proper intellectual, historical, literary
contexts" but because this critique suits my contemporary political and theoretical concerns. I would argue
the "context" for texts is relative, and I do not think the past is
more "proper" than the present. Recent historiography has unmasked the historian in the
that
history, the ways in which narratives of the past are constructed for the use of the present. Rather than
seeking out an elusive objectivity, historians influenced by postmodernism have recast history as situated,
contested, and multidirectional. My own work on race and gender in the Americas keeps backing up. In my
first book, Mulattas and Mestizas: Representing Mixed Identities in the Americas, 1850-2000 (2003), I
turned to Mexican and Caribbean history for different ways of understanding [End Page 267] identity in
order to decenter the essentialism that underlies conceptions of race in the US. I made this move not to
to counter the
US-centrism that inhibits contemporary discussions of race. My
motivation for "dislodg[ing] the US as a central or normative paradigm"
was a political gesture more than a recovery of right historical sensibility. My most recent
replicate the "real" transnational context in which racial formations developed, but
book, Encarnacin: Illness and Body Politics in Chicana Feminist Literature (2009), focuses on the ways in
which Chicana writers identify with preconquest indigenous cultures in their resistance to contemporary
Euro-American norms. To understand this transhistorical imaginary, one must be able to move fluidly
between contemporary borderlands, pre-Columbian body rituals, and centuries of indigenous, Mexican,
and Chicana/o anticolonial resistance.
"America as US" discourse affects understanding of race

and ethnicity -- for example, how history is periodized
For the literary historian adopting a hemispheric, comparative, and

polycentric perspective envisioned by Greene and Caizares-Esguerra, one of the
consequences of dislodging the US from a position of centrality and
normativity in the hemisphere would be the necessity of reconsidering the way in
which literary history is periodized. (In fact, the very division at issue
here between "early" Americanists and those Americanists specializing in
later periods of the literary history of the US would be significantly blurred.) For example,
"colonial" literary studies would overlap chronologically with national literary studies in the hemisphere until at least the
1820s (until which decade some 95% of the Western hemisphere remained at least nominally under European imperial
control), if not the 1860s (which saw Canada's unification), or the early twentieth century (which saw the independence of
Cuba and Canada), or even the present day, when Native American nations, tribes, or peoples throughout the hemisphere
still regard themselves to be under European occupation and the European conquest as ongoing.
THE UNITED STATES IS DIFFERENT FROM

"AMERICA"
The US is only a part of America
USAisNotAmerica.com 2013 [Indeed, U.S.A. is not
America!
http://www.usaisnotamerica.com/index.php, AX]
America is the name of a whole continent. United States of America
means that the United States belongs to America and NOT that
America belongs to the United States. So, next time you want to refer to The
United States of America, you can do it as U.S. or the States or whatever you
want but not as only America. Gotcha?
"America" is the entire Western Hemisphere

Linarelli 96 [John Linarelli, Partner, Braverman & Linarelli; Adjunct Professor, Georgetown
University Law Center and the Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law; Project Director,
International Law Institute. Duquesne University Fordham International Law Journal November, 1996 20
Fordham Int'l L.J. 50 ARTICLE: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE AND LATIN AMERICA lexis, AX]
avoid using the term "American" or

"America" to refer to "United States" because the first two words may
be construed as referring to the entire Western Hemisphere . See Paul B.
n11. In this Article I have attempted to
Stephan III et al., International Business and Economics: Law and Policy vii (1993) (providing guidance on
this approach).
"America" includes Canada, Mexico, South America

Wald 9 [Eli Wald, Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
University
of Colorado Law Review Summer, 2009 80 U. Colo. L. Rev. 605 ARTICLE: THE OTHER LEGAL
PROFESSION AND THE ORTHODOX VIEW OF THE BAR: THE RISE OF COLORADO'S ELITE LAW FIRMS lexis,
AX]
one should refer to United States of America lawyers as

opposed to American lawyers: a term that may include Canadian,
Mexican, and South American attorneys. Nonetheless, to avoid confusion, the Article
More accurately,
follows the loose yet common reference to American lawyers. See, e.g., Maxwell Bloomfield, American
Lawyers in a Changing Society, 1776-1876 (1976); Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers (1989).
Mexico and Canada are also part of America

Scharf 99 [Irene Scharf, Associate Professor, Southern New England School of Law
University
of Hawai'i Law Review Summer, 1999 21 Hawaii L. Rev. 131 ARTICLE: Tired of Your Masses: A History
of and Judicial Responses to Early 20th Century Anti-Immigrant Legislation lexis, AX]
it is often considered offensive to use the word

"American" to refer to United States citizens, as America encompasses
the continent that is home to Mexico and Canada as well, in this paper I will be as specific as is
See id. Aware that
possible in referring to the various groups being discussed.
Using the term "America" causes ambiguity

Burrow 6 [Heiko E. Burow, with Baker & McKenzie LLP in Dallas, Texas. He is a member of the
Texas and Oklahoma bars and is also qualified to practice law in Germany; and Raymond C. Kolls, Vice
President, General Counsel & Corporate Secretary of Orthofix International Journal of Health Law Spring,
2006 ol. 39, No. 2, HOSPLW Pg. 165 TITLE: Basic Concepts and Issues: A Primer on Distribution and Sales
Representative Agreements in the Medical Device and Durable Medical Equipment Industries
lexis, AX]
The agreement should specifically identify the geographic territory in which the intermediary will market
beware ambiguous definitions of the

territory. Some agreements describe a territory as "America" or "North America" or "Europe." While
the medical devices. The manufacturer should
such descriptions may be perfectly clear to the negotiating parties at the time they enter into the
the ambiguity can create subsequent interpretative

difficulties. For example, it is unclear whether "America" means only the
United States or also Canada and Latin and South American
countries. Likewise, "North America" is commonly understood to refer to
the United States and Canada, but arguments could possibly be
made that parts of Mexico were intended to be included. Europe is not a
agreement,
country and can be interpreted to mean the European continent (including parts of Russia and Turkey), the
twenty-five member countries of the European Union (EU), or the member countries of the European Free
it is almost always preferable to define the territory

by specific national boundaries, or subdivisions thereof, such as
states, provinces, counties, or cities.
Trade Association. Thus,
UNITED STATES IS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NOT MEXICO
United State of America is US; United Mexican States is
Mexico
Stenzel 12 [Paulette L. Stenzel, Professor of International Business Law and Sustainability, The
Eli Broad College of Business, Michigan State University.American Business Law Journal Fall, 2012
Am. Bus. L.J. 557 ARTICLE: The Pursuit of Equilibrium as the Eagle Meets the Condor: Supporting
Sustainable Development Through Fair Trade lexis, AX]
49
"United States" refers to "The United States of

America" and "Mexico" is used in place of the country's official title, Los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos ("The United Mexican States").
In the remainder of this article,
AFF AT: America PIK

Use of the term America has near universal acceptance
King 11 [Shani King, Associate Professor, University of Florida Levin College of Law; Co- Director,
Center on Children and Families. J.D., Harvard Law School
Ohio State Law Journal
St. L.J. 575
ARTICLE: The Family Law Canon in a (Post?) Racial Era, lexis, AX]
2011
72 Ohio
American is used in this Article to refer to the United States of

America. It is used because this term has achieved almost universal
acceptance as a reference to the United States of America. The
author pauses to acknowledge that its use is inaccurate because it ignores the
The term
fact that there are many other countries in North and South America.
Use of the term is acceptable to avoid awkward grammar

Smolin 2K [David M. Smolin, Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford University; Fellow,
Southern Center for Law and Ethics Cumberland Law Review 2000 / 2001 31 Cumb. L. Rev. 685 RAY
RUSHTON DISTINGUISHED LECTURER SERIES: Exporting the First Amendment?: Evangelism, Proselytism,
and the International Religious Freedom Act, lexis, AX]
"American" refers to the United States

of America. It is sometimes stated that this use is insensitive to the other
nations, which inhabit the continents of North, Central, and South America. Without debating the point, it
is my hope that its use herein will be clearly understood and will avoid
awkward grammatical constructions.
Within the context of this article, the adjective
America is acceptable for language economy

Gould 10 [William B. Gould IV, Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law, Emeritus, at Stanford Law
School; Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, 1994-98 Stanford Law & Policy Review
2010
21 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev 401 SYMPOSIUM: INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: Labor Law Beyond U.S.
Borders: Does What Happens Outside of America Stay Outside of America?
Lexis, AX]
the word "America" to refer to the United

States of America even though there are, of course, many American
countries. This shorthand is used for brevity only. It will not, I hope, be
taken for arrogance, but rather for simple economy of language.
Here and throughout this paper, I have used
The term can be used despite problems

Gassama 99 [Ibrahim J. Gassama, Associate Professor, University of Oregon School of Law; J.D.
Harvard Law School; B.A. Virginia Tech
Fall 1999 Michigan Journal of Race & Law
5 Mich. J. Race & L.
133 ARTICLE: TRANSNATIONAL CRITICAL RACE SCHOLARSHIP: TRANSCENDING ETHNIC AND NATIONAL
CHAUVINISM IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION lexis, AX]
I consciously use the terms "America" and "American" in this article to

refer to the United States and to its citizens, residents and
representatives. I recognize that this is sometimes offensive to other
inhabitants of the Americas and admire the irony of succumbing to
this usage given my criticism of the new imperial global order being
propagated from the United States. See David Kennedy, The Disciplines of
International Law and Policy, 12 Leiden J. Int'l L. 9, 10 & n. 1 (1999) (adopting the adjective "United
Statesean" from Spanish to "avoid imprecision and offense").
*Islamophobia PIC
Note
The 2NC Language First card goes with all word pics obviously
1NC
We advocate the entirety of the 1AC, replacing the term
Islamophobia with Anti-Muslimism
Using the term Islamophobia reinscribes discriminationit labels racism as an irrational fear rather than a
conscious individual choice and dehistoricizes Anti-Muslim
discrimination
Richardson 2012 [Robin (director of Runnymede Trust, pioneer in Muslim
Studies),Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism or what? concepts and terms revisited,
http://www.insted.co.uk/anti-muslim-racism.pdf, Accessed 7/24/15, AX]
The disadvantages of the term Islamophobia are significant . Some of

them are primarily about the echoes implicit in the concept of phobia. Others are about the implications
ofthe term Islam. For convenience, they can be itemised as follows. 1. Medically,
phobia
implies a severe mental illness of a kind that affects only a tiny minority
of people. Whatever else anxiety about Muslims may be, it is not merely a mental
illness and does not merely involve a small number of people. 2.To
accuse someone of being insane or irrational is to be abusive and, not surprisingly, to
make them defensive and defiant. Reflective dialogue with them is then all
but impossible. 3.To label someone with whom you disagree as irrational or insane
is to absolve yourself of the responsibility of trying to understand ,
both intellectually and with empathy, why they think and act as they do, and of
seeking through engagement and argument to modify their perceptions and
understandings.4.The concept of anxiety is arguably more useful in this context than the concept of
phobia. It is widely recognised that anxiety may not be (though certainly may be)warranted by objective
facts, for human beings can on occasions perceivedangers that do not objectively exist, or anyway do not
exist to the extent that is imagined. Also it can sometimes be difficult to identify, and therefore to name
accurately, the real sources of an anxiety. 5. The
use of the word Islamophobia on its

own implies that hostility towards Muslims is unrelated to, and
basically dissimilar from, forms of hostility such as racism,
xenophobia, sectarianism, and such as hostility to so-called fundamentalism
(Samuels 2006).Further, it may imply there is no connection with issues of
class, power, status and territory; or with issues of military, political
or economic competition and conflict. 6.The term implies there is no
important difference between prejudice towards Muslim
communities within ones own country and prejudice towards cultures and
regimes elsewhere in the world where Muslims are in the majority, and with which the
West is in military conflict or economic competition. 7.The term is inappropriate for describing opinions
that are basically anti-religion as distinct from anti-Islam. I am an Islamophobe, wrote the journalist Polly
Toynbee in reaction to the Runnymede 1997 report, adding ... I am also a Christophobe. If Christianity
were not such a spent force in this country, if it were powerful and dominant as it once was, it would still
be every bit as damaging as Islam is in those theocratic states in its thrall... If I lived in Israel, I'd feel the
The key phenomenon to be addressed is arguably

anti-Muslim hostility, namely hostility towards an ethno-religious identity
within western countries (including Russia), rather than hostility towards
the tenets or practices of a worldwide religion. The 1997 Runnymede definition
same way about Judaism. 8.
of Islamophobia was a shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam and, therefore, to fear or
dislike of all or most Muslims. In retrospect, it would have been as accurate, or arguably indeed more
accurate, to say a shorthand way of referring to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims and, therefore,
dread or hatred of Islam.
2NC
Anti-Muslimism is the most appropriate term to describe
the oppression depicted in the 1AC- it recognizes all
aspects of Anti-Muslim violence
Lopez 2011 [Fernando Bravo (Workshop on International Mediterranean Studies (TEIM),
Universidad Autnoma de Madrid), Towards a definition of Islamophobia, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Taylor
& Francis (Routledge), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01419870.2010.528440, Accessed
7/23/15, Pg. 2-3, AX]
the pertinence of the term Islamophobia for referring to

rejection of and discrimination against Muslims was conditioned by the
nature of this phenomenon. Towards the end of the 1990s, some authors began to discuss
the suitability of the term Islamophobia for designating rejection
based on what they considered not so much a phobia of the Islamic religion,
but rejection on an ethno-cultural basis. If, then, rejection of Islam was
not the main source of this discrimination against Muslims, why
speak of Islamophobia? In 1997, for example, Tariq Modood, qualified the term
Islamophobia as somewhat misleading because, according to him, the
rejection and discrimination against Muslims is more a form of
racism than a form of religious intolerance, though it may perhaps be best
described as a form of cultural racism, in recognition of the fact that the target group, the
Muslims, are identified in terms of their non-European descent, in
terms of their not being white, and in terms of their perceived
culture (Modood 1997b). Along these same lines, Fred Halliday argued that anti-Muslimism
was a more appropriate term because the attack now is against not
Islam as a faith but Muslims as a people, the latter grouping together all, especially
At the same time,
immigrants, who might be covered by the term (Halliday 1999, emphasis in original).
The word Islamophobia papers over other forms of

prejudice- the continued use of the term only fractures
and weakens collective movements
Allen 07 [Chris (Lecturer in Social Policy), ISLAMOPHOBIA AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES, Centre for European Policy Studies CEPS, AX]
However both the report and its model have failed to stand the test of time and a detailed analysis
highlights a number of serious flaws.20
The most obvious disadvantage of the
term is that it is understood to be a phobia. As phobias are

irrational, such an accusation makes people defensive and defiant,
in turn making reflective dialogue all but impossible. Likewise,
Islamophobia as a separate and stand-alone concept implies that
prejudice against Muslims is unrelated to other forms of prejudice,
for example prejudice based around physical appearance and skin
colour; prejudice against immigrants; prejudice against military,
religious or economic rivals; and prejudices around class, power and
status. The separateness of the concept can also imply that Muslims
themselves want to be separate or different even, thereby failing
to recognise or accept the similarities and overlaps that also exist .
Relevant to the contemporary climate in particular is that the continued use or over-use
of the term prevents either inadvertently or deliberately,

depending upon the sources in question, legitimate criticisms of
Muslims being voiced, let alone attended to. Elsewhere it has been used far too
indiscriminately and inappropriately, failing to differentiate between opinions that are antireligion per se
from those that are specifically anti-Islam. For example, I am an Islamophobe, yes, said Polly Toynbee in
the
key phenomenon to be addressed is an anti-Muslim hostility directed
at an ethno-religious identity rather than the tenets of a religion .22 In
the Guardian newspaper, But I am a Christophobe and Judeophobe too.21 As Halliday has argued,
terms of the Runnymede model and Rokeachs Dogmatism Scale upon which it was based therefore, the
instrument does not measure up to the theory.23 As regards Islamophobia per se, the same is blatantly
true: the instruments we have to define, identify and explain it neither measure up to the theory nor are
they entirely bias-free. Despite being able to identify incidents, events and expressions of what we might
simplistically suggest as being Islamophobia, as the EUMC 9/11 report noted, these were not necessarily
in themselves the reason for any attacks. Islamophobia seemed to be the stimulant underpinning
them.24 Consequently, what was thought to be known about Islamophobia failed to provide any insight or
explanation as to why Islamophobic retaliatory acts ensued or why such a phenomenon exists.
Consequently, we are trying to locate something that we maybe do not adequately understand, hence
Maussens comments. Nonetheless, the EUMCs 9/11 report does offer some respite from this lack of
clarity. As it stated: [N]either exhaustive nor conclusive[it did] clarify some of the common trends and
themes that were apparent in the wake of September 11. No single explanation can completely account for
the events that followed those in the US, but this does allow an insight into a certain identifiable
phenomenon25 Most important therefore is the reports categorical and justifiable conclusion that
certain identifiable phenomenon was evident.26 In doing so , and in

contrast to the Runnymede model, the report differentiated the manifestations
the common trends and themes from what it saw as the phenomenon of
Islamophobia itself, neither concluding nor making the assumption
that the manifestations or forms of that certain identifiable
phenomenon were either that which constituted it or defined it.
2nc Language First

Your first question should be the way that language is
used its the most concrete, immediate way to target
and challenge oppression
Collins and Glover 2 (John Collins, Ass. Prof. of Global Studies at St.
Lawrence, and Ross Glover, Visiting Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence
University, 2002, Collateral Language, p. 6-7, The Real Effects of Language)
As any university student knows, theories about the social construction and social effects of language
Conservative critics often

argue that those who use these theories of language (e.g., deconstruction) are
just talking about language, as opposed to talking about the real
world. The essays in this book, by contrast, begin from the premise that language matters
in the most concrete , immediate way possible: its use, by political
and military leaders, leads directly to violence in the form of war,
mass murder (including genocide), the physical destruction of
human communities, and the devastation of the natural
environment. Indeed, if the world ever witnesses a nuclear holocaust, it
will probably be because leaders in more than one country have succeeded in
convincing their people, through the use of political language, that
the use of nuclear weapons and, if necessary, the destruction of the
earth itself, is justifiable. From our perspective, then, every act of political
violencefrom the horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents
in the Soviet Union to the destruction of the World Trade Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistan is
intimately linked with the use of language. Partly what we are talking
about here, of course, are the processes of manufacturing consent and
shaping peoples perception of the world around them; people are
have become a common feature of academic scholarship.
more likely to support acts of violence committed in their name if

the recipients of the violence have been defined as terrorists , or
if the violence is presented as a defense of freedom.
Media analysts such
as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently about the corrosive effects that this kind of process has on the
political culture of supposedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however, the most
the
language that shapes public opinion is the same language that burns
villages, besieges entire populations, kills and maims human bodies,
and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with
land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of violence can
easily be made more palatable through the use of euphemisms such
as pacification or, to use an example discussed in this book, targets. It is important to point
out, however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact
that the violence itself is abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of
vital interests and surgical strikes and the flattering language of civilization and just
wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental gaze from the
physical effects of violence.
fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects of violence;
*STATE PIC
1nc shell
We affirm the entirety of the 1ac except for the plan text.
Its net beneficial solves better because it doesnt start
at the place of the state or include the pretended fiated
action we will get links to.
The assumption of 1AC solvency papers over reality with
normative legal talk, emotionally disconnecting them
from the implications of the speech act- this strengthens
bureaucratic institutions and destroys individual
autonomy by buying into a system that prevents us from
addressing the root causes of our problems
Delgado 1991 [Richard (Professor of civil rights and critical race theory @ University of
Alabama Law School), Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought, U
Penn Law Review, Vol. 139: 933, http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3742&context=penn_law_review, Accessed 7/21/15, pg. 957-958, AX]
Normativity not only anesthetizes powerful actors, making it easier

for them to do their work, it can paralyze the rest of us, leading us to
cooperate passively in our own mistreatment. The principal danger to
human autonomy and worth today is large bureaucracies -- corporations,
Health Maintenance Organizations, mega-universities, and the like. Because of their own internal structures and needs,
these organizations function best if they can treat the rest of us like
numbers, according to routine. 99 Yet this must not appear to be so -we would revolt, would demand more personalized treatment, which would disrupt the routine. Bureaucracies
thus adopt the discourse of normativity to make us think we are
being treated with care and consideration when we are not . And they
employ a host of smiling agents -- publicists, insurance adjusters, account clerks, claims agents,
and other "front" persons to talk soothing normatives with us. "We want, of course, to
do what is fair. You must, however, acknowledge your responsibility in
this situation. Surely you don't think our HMO should grant every claim -- we must think of our other patients."
Yet the script always ends up having been written by the Home Office . The insurance adjuster, it
turns out, does not really care for us as persons. 100 If we enter into
this numbing, but vaguely reassuring formal discourse, we will cause
little trouble. But we will, from time to time, get a small jolt -- end up blind-sided by the inexorable weight of the
bureaucracy behind the adjuster. We are like the doe in the headlights, transfixed
at the approaching automobile. Like the doe, we sometimes think we
have been spared. The automobile swerves, the kind driver slows. The adjuster turns out to have a little
discretion, which he or she exercises in our favor: The doctor will see us next month, after all. But the doe's
problem is not the car -- it is the road. Another car will come along.
Staring at the headlights prevents the doe from seeing that
problem, just as entering into platitudinous, scripted discourse with
the various insurance [*958] adjusters of the world prevents us from
appreciating our own dilemma.
The preoccupation with pretending to be policymakers

traps them in a spectator position and bars them from
recognizing the bureaucratic violence of the legal praxis
Schlag 90 (Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law
review, november, page lexis)
All of this can seem very funny. That's because it is very funny. It is also deadly serious. It is deadly serious,
normative legal thought, as Robert Cover explained, takes place in a

field of pain and death. n56 And in a very real sense Cover was right. Yet as it takes place,
normative legal thought is playing language games -- utterly
oblivious to the character of the language games it plays, and thus,
utterly uninterested in considering its own rhetorical and political
contributions (or lack thereof) to the field of pain and death. To be
sure, normative legal thinkers are often genuinely concerned with
reducing the pain and the death. However, the problem is not what normative legal
because all this
thinkers do with normative legal thought, but what normative legal thought does with normative legal
What is missing in normative legal thought is any serious

questioning, let alone tracing, of the relations that the practice, the
rhetoric, the routine of normative legal thought have (or do not have) to
the field of pain and death. And there is a reason for that: Normative legal thought
thinkers.
misunderstands its own situation. Typically, normative legal thought understands itself to be outside the
field of pain and death and in charge of organizing and policing that field. It is as if the action of normative
legal thought could be separated from the background field of pain and death. This theatrical distinction is
what allows normative legal thought its own self-important, self-righteous, self-image -- its congratulatory
sense of its own accomplishments and effectiveness. All this self-congratulation works very nicely so long
as normative legal [*188] thought continues to imagine itself as outside the field of pain and death and as
having effects within that field. n57 Yet it is doubtful this image can be maintained. It is not so much the
case that normative legal thought has effects on the field of pain and death -- at least not in the direct,
normative legal thought is the

pattern, is the operation of the bureaucratic distribution and the
institutional allocation of the pain and the death. n58 And apart from the
originary way it imagines. Rather, it is more the case that
leftover ego-centered rationalist rhetoric of the eighteenth century (and our routine), there is nothing at
this point to suggest that we, as legal thinkers, are in control of normative legal thought. The problem for
the normative appeal of normative legal thought

systematically turns us away from recognizing that normative legal
thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of
the field it claims to describe and regulate. The problem for us is
that normative legal thought, rather than assisting in the
understanding of present political and moral situations, stands in
the way. It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic -- its own
fantastic understanding of the political and moral scene. n59Until
normative legal thought begins to deal with its own paradoxical postmodern rhetorical situation, it will
remain something of an irresponsible enterprise. In its rhetorical
structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with
individual humanist subjects who think themselves empowered
Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions
of bureaucratic practices -- academic and otherwise.
us, as legal thinkers, is that
Our impact is especially true in context of racialized lawone step reforms are trumpeted as complete wins and
used to ignore systemic problems

The ability of normative assertion to change the way we perceive

reality was demonstrated by Stanley Milgram in an experiment now considered a
classic.40 Milgram, a psychologist at Yale University, told volunteers that they would be participating in an
the purpose of the experiment was to see whether the

subjects could be induced to violate their ethical norms and
inhibitions. Each subject -was seated in front of a console with acalibrated dial, and told that by
experiment on learning. In fact,
turning the dial they would administer electric shocks to a "learner" seated in another room. The subjects
were told in no circumstances to turn this dial beyond a point marked with red-doing so could administer a
fatal dose of electricity to the other subject. After the rules were explained, a second investigator, wearing
a white coat and an authoritative demeanor, entered the room and directed the subjects to turn the dials
to particular settings. Each time, a trained actor in the other room emitted a realistic groan or exclamation
of pain. The investigator directed the subjects to turn the dial to higher and higher settings and eventually
to exceed the point marked in red. A high percentage of the subjects cooperated
with the experiment, even administering what they thought might be a lethal dose ofelectricity. Afterward,
they went along with the

because, "If he (meaning the high-authority doctor in charge) said it was
all right, then it must be so." Apparently, the investigator's assurances
that administering pain was permissible and part of theexperiment actually
changed the way they saw their behavior.41Ordinary life is full of similar examples
in which the mere pronouncement of something as normatively good or
bad changes our perception of it. The decision in Brown v. Board of
Education changed the way we thought about minorities. Reagan
and Reaganomics changed things back again.43 During war, we
demonize our enemies, and thereafter actually see them as grotesque, evil
and crafty monsters deserving of their fate on the battlefield .44 Later,
many subjects confessed to doubts aboutwhat they were doing, but said
experiment
during peacetime, they may become our staunch allies once again. Derrick Bell and other Critical Race
theorists have been pointing out the way in which
standard, liberal-coined civil rights
law injures the chances of people of color and solidifies racism. 45

Accordingto these writers, one function of our broad system of race-remedies
law is to free society of guilt. Although the remedies are ineffective,
they enable members of the majority group to point to the array of
civil rights statutes and case law which ostensibly assure fair and
equal treatment in schools, housing, jobs, and many other areas of
life. With all these elaborate anti discrimination laws on the books, if
black people are still poor and unhappy-well, what can be done? The law's
condemnation of racism thus enables us to blame the victim, praise
ourselves for our liberality, and thereby deepen the dilemma of
people of color.
Its legit they get 100% of the plan to generate offense

versus the cp, this is a necessary test against critical
affirmatives.
Framework
Our focus on individual responsibility and rejection of
disconnected simulation is the only way to truly change
the world- individual reflexivity precedes the agencies we
join
Chandler 2013 [David (Professor of International Relations @ the University of Westminster),
The World of Attachment? The Post-humanist Challenge to Freedom and Necessity, Millennium: Journal of
International Studies 41(3) 516534, DOI: 10.1177/0305829813481840, Sage Pub, Accessed 7/21/15, AX]
I wish to argue that the rule of blind necessity removes the liberal political content of government
practices in effect, reducing the problematic of rule to the generic or eve-ryday problems of individual
behaviour and practices and the institutional milieu (cul-tural and social values, identities, power
asymmetries and information flows) which shapes these. As Foucault indicated,
this shift away
from sovereign and disciplinary power constituted the population as a political

problem and, within this, focused on the real lives or the everyday of individuals
and communities and their environment, the milieu in which they live ... to the
extent that it is not a natural environment, that it has been created by the population and therefore has
It is this milieu which accounts for action at a

distance of one body on another and thereby appears as a field of intervention.76
In this framework, governance operates indirectly, through work on
the informal level of societal life itself, rather than through the
formal framework of public law in relation to individuals as citizens: action is brought to
effects on that population.75
bear on the rules of the game rather than on the players, as Foucault states in The Birth of
Biopolitics.77The world of becoming thereby is an ontologically flat world without the traditional
hierarchies of existence and a more shared conception of agency. For Bennett, therefore, to begin to
experience the relationship between persons and other materialities more horizontally, is to take a step
toward a more ecological sensibility.78 Here there is room for human agency but this agency involves a
Rather than
the hubristic focus on transforming the external world, the ethicopolitical tasks are those of work on the self to erase hubris-tic liberal traces of
subject-centric understandings, understood to merely create the dangers of existential
resentment.79 Work on the self is the only route to changing the
deeper understanding of and receptivity to the world of objects and object relations.
world. As Connolly states: To embrace without deep resentment a world of becoming is

to work to become who you are, so that the word become now modifies are more
than the other way around.80 Becoming who you are involves the microtactics of the self, and work
on the self can then extend into micropolitics of more conscious
and reflective choices and decisions and lifestyle choices leading to
potentially higher levels of ethical self-reflectivity and responsibility .
Bennett argues that against the narcissism of anthropomorphic understandings of
domination of the external world, we need some tactics for cultivating
the experience of our selves as vibrant matter.82 Rather than hubristically
imagining that we can shape the world we live in, Bennett argues that: Perhaps
the ethical responsibility of an individual human now resides in
ones response to the assemblages in which one finds oneself participating.83 Such ethical tactics include reflecting more on our relationship to what we eat and
considering the agentic powers of what we consume and enter into an assemblage with. In doing so, if an
image of inert matter helps animate our current practice of aggressively wasteful and planet-endangering
consumption, then a materiality experi-enced as a lively force with agentic capacity could animate a more
the object to be changed or

transformed is the human the human mindset. By changing the
way we think about the world and the way we relate to it by including
ecologically sustain-able public.84 For new materialists,
we will have overcome

attachment disorders and have more ethically aware
approaches to our planet.85 In cultivating these new ethical
sensibilities, the human can be remade with a new self and a new
self-interest.
broader, more non-human or inorganic matter in our consid-erations,
our modernist
Focusing on larger structures of power obscures our own

responsibility
Kappeler, 95 [Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11]
We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the
notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the
conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is
precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash
a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective
action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective
our habit of focusing on the stage where the major

dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own
sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to
the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness and its accompanying
phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens - even more so those of
other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for
such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that
àssumption' of responsibility. Yet
indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into
thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating
it seems to absolve us from

having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events,
or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our
own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls òrganized irresponsibility',
the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular,
upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with
For we tend to think that we cannot `do'

anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we
are not where the major decisions are made . Which is why many of those not
yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental
deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister,
the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their
mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and
since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I
were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative
insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities':
what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a
the thinking of the major powermongers:
general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like Ì
'We
are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in
so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension: our willed
refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own
understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of
prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we
want to stop this war', Ì want military intervention', Ì want to stop this backlash', or Ì want a moral revolution."
àre' the war in our ùnconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees
and I don't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and
We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in

the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape òur
one for the òthers'.
feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the
values of war and violence.
Chow
The aff is engaged in a war of words when in reality they
do nothing for the Muslims being surveilled by the NSAthe starting point for advocacy should be to confront our
own privilege
Chow 93. Rey Chow, Professor of English and Comp Lit, Writing Diaspora:
tactics of intervention in contemporary cultural studies, pg. 17
While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons
especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek privilege I remain
skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is hegemony
formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how
intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an
oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that
power through literacy, through the culture of words), but how they can
resist, as Michel Foucault said, the forms of power that transform them
into its objects and instrument in the sphere of knowledge, truth,

consciousness and discourse. Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against a
hegemony which already includes them and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society
in Gramscis terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational space? Because borders
have so clearly meandered into so many intellectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation
between borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought as the creation of
new fields. Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders of borders, that is, as para-sites
that never take over a field in its entirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau
is a helpful for the formulation of this parasitical intervention.De
Certeau distinguished
between strategy and another practice tactic in the following terms. A
strategy has the ability to transform the uncertainties of history into
readable spaces. . Strategy therefore belongs to an economy of the proper
place and to those who are committed to the building, growth,, and
fortification of a field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy ?a
cultural weapon, a private hunting preserve,? or ?a means of social
stratification? in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A
tactic, by contrast, is a calculated action determined by the absence of

a proper locus (de Certeau, p. 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic
concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the
age-old rules of fishes and insects that disguise or transform
themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case ben concealed by the form of
rationality currently dominant in Western culture (de Certeau. P. xi). Why are tactics useful at this moment?
As discussions about multiculturalism, interdisiplinarity, the third world intellectual, and other companion
issue develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and
difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us.
Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of

territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness ensuring from them;
unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely
to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual
and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of
righteousness all these forces creates new solidarities whose
ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities
are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to
overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again
is immense. We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we
fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint
are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most
certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who
seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan space alike.
What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization
by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarity-with-the-oppressed),
but the power, wealth, and privilege that ironically accumulate
from their oppositional viewpoint,and the widening gap between the

professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain
from such words. (When Foucault saidintellectuals need to struggle against
becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind
of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where intellectual
freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, is that if a professor
wishes to denounce aspects of big business,. . . he will be wise to locate in a
school whose trustees are big businessmen.28 Why should we believe in
those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their

salaries and honoraria keep rising?How do we resist the turning-intopropriety of oppositional discourses, when the intention of such
discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How
do we prevent what begin as tactics that which is without any base
where it could stockpile its winnings? (deCerteau, p.37)from turning into
a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?
Displacement DA- Schlag

Prescriptions for action fail unless they come from
someone in a position to create actual change- theres no
connection between the aff and material agency
Schlag 1990 [Pierre (Professor of Law @ Colorado State), Normative and Nowhere to Go,
Stanford Law Review, November 1990, http://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/pubpdfs/schlag/SchlagSLR.pdf,
Accessed 7/21/15, AX]
You'll notice that here (as elsewhere)
normative legal thought has a very pressing and urgent
tone. It wants to know right away what should be done. Right away. And true to
its name, normative legal thought wants to engage right away in the enterprise of norm-selection.
Normative legal thought wants to decide as quickly as possible

which norm (which doctrine, which rule, which theory) should govern a
particular activity. Now as intellectually stifling and politically narrow as the enterprise of normselection may be, [FN30] it still offers legal thinkers some residual possibility of posing interesting
normative legal
thought can't wait to shut down these intellectual and political
openings as well. It cannot wait to envelop these inquiries in its own highly stylized ethical-moral
form of norm-justification. Normative legal thought cannot wait to enlist
epistemology, semiotics, social theory or any other enterprise in its
own ethical-moral argument structures about the right, the good,
the useful, the efficient (or any of their doctrinally crystallized derivatives). It cannot
wait to reduce world views, attitudes, demonstrations, provocations,
and thought itself, to norms. In short, it cannot wait to tell you (or
somebody else) what to do. In fact, normative legal thought is so much in a
philosophical, social, psychological, economic, or semiotic inquiries about law. Yet
hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not the
slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it . For
instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the
difference principle [FN31] into effect, or to restructure *179 the
doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future, we should . . . . " When
was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges
should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans,
or Hercules surrogates? Normative legal thought doesn't seem
overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character
and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and
proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite
its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative
legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical
purposes, its only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a few law
students--persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its
wonderful normative advice into effect.
2
Stigmatization DA
Premature legal engagement strengthens inequalityreformist laws legitimize critics who deny rights to those
who have already been addressed and normativity
conditions us to stigmatize marginalized populations for
being unlike the ethical majority
Normativity thus enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough

edges of our world, to tune out or redefine what would otherwise make a
claim on us. In the legal system, the clearest examples of this are
found in cases where the Supreme Court has been faced with
subsistence claims. For example, in Lindsey v. Normet, the Supreme Court considered a claim
that housing is such a basic necessity that it could only be denied or subordinated when a state is able to
The Court summarily upheld Oregon's streamlined

eviction procedure, rejecting in emphatic tones the idea that there is a
constitutional right to shelter or that "the Constitution ...provide[s] judicial remedies for
show a "compel-ling interest."
every social and economic ill."88In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,89 the Court
followed Lindsey in holding that Texas's unequal school finance scheme did not deny children in tax-poor
the Court responded by shaming the

attorneys and litigants who had brought the novel claim. It declined to
apply strict scrutiny, ridiculed the idea that money can be equated with a good education and held
that the plaintiffs were complaining, at most, of a relative deprivation.90
In Dandridge v. Williams,91 the Court also rejected, even more emphatically than it had before,
the idea that subsistence-here, welfare-is a constitutional right. In
districts the right to an education. Again,
Dandridge, a number of families challenged a state rule that provided a decreasing schedule of welfare
support for each person beyond the initial beneficiary and a fixed increment for families larger than ten.
The welfare recipients challenged these provisions as a violation of equal protection. A district court agreed
with them, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state's fee schedule, although it
discriminated against large families, was a legitimate exercise of economic/social legislation and had to be
These cases are telling because they forced the

judiciary to confront the harsh reality that our competitive freemarket system creates losers as well as winners. What obligation do
the winners have to the losers? The answer, so far has been "none." We owe the
poor no legal obligation because the legislature did not think so; the
poor are unreasonable; they are not poor enough; and money might
not solve their problem anyway (you know how they are). Not only does
normativity help us justify indifference to others' needs, but we
sometimes use it to rationalize treatment of others that would
sustained if it had any reasonable basis.92
otherwise be seen as injurious , if not downright cruel. As I pointed out earlier,

those in a position to dictate norms rarely, if ever, see their own favorite
forms of behavior as immoral. Rather, we stigmatize the conduct of
our enemies, people who are unlike us or do things we do not like, for example, drugtaking or congregating on street corners. Then, when we punish offenders from the
other ("criminal") (sub-)culture, we are able to tell ourselves that imposing
punishment is not only good for society, but good for the offender .4
Judges write with blood,95 but normativity is the filter that prevents us
from seeing this. It focuses our attention on abstraction, when it is

particularity and real-world detail that alone move us. 96Even when we do
not pronounce out groups' behavior positively vicious, we may declare it lazy and indolent, so as to justify
Warfaring nations, for example, often gain ascendancy

over more peace loving nations (e.g., Native Americans). The conquerors then
decide it was their own spiritual, aesthetic, and ethical superiority that enabled
them to prevail, not their superior weapons, numbers, or
bloodthirst.97 Often, they declare the conquered guilty of waste, of failure to use
their own resources to the best advantage (e.g., by not clear-cutting the land), so that the
takeover was a moral duty.9
our own aggressive behavior.
Simulation DA
Simulation is the worst form of advocacy- it creates
disconnected activists with little care for external social
problems
Antonio 95 (Professor Antonio (PhD Notre Dame) specializes in social theory, macroscopic
sociology, and economy and society. His writings have focused on Marx, the Frankfurt School, Weber,
Dewey, Habermas, and others in the classical and continental tradition. Nietzsche's Antisociology:
Subjectified Culture and the End of History http://www.jstor.org/stable/2782505?
seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) modified for ableist language)
The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the

longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or
"foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification
with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw
differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that
persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify

with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain
advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel
about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective
role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-" The
role has actually become the character ." This highly subjectified social self
or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity . The powerful authority given the
social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity,
decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing
overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of
acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think,
expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17).
Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to
hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts
"many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of
a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor?
A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than
an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to
tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the
copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259;
1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts
foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan
for the long term or participate in enduring networks of
interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a
"stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94).
Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a
watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock
market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this
principle, too, is merely astring to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels
people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and
Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an

inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the
fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or
ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position,
anticipating others."
even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of

genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect
ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared
the new simulated versions . Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these
impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are
"violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing,
arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder
for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to
command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands,
who commands severelya god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience.
The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching

and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of
tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).
Epistemology first
Epistemology key- challenges Islamophobia specifically
Grosfoguel 2010 [Ramon, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies @ UC Berkeley, Epistemic
Islamophobia and Colonial Social Sciences, http://www.okcir.com/Articles%20VIII%202/Grosfoguel-FM.pdf,
Against this hegemonic identity poli-tics that always privileged

Christian and Western beauty, knowledge, traditions, spiritualities, and cosmologies while
deem-ing as inferior and subaltern the non-Chris-tian and non-Western beauty,
knowledge, traditions, spiritualities, and cosmologies,those subjects rendered inferior and subal-tern
by these hegemonic discourses devel-oped their own identity politics as a reac-tion to the racism of the
former. This pro-cess is necessary as part of a process of self-valorization in a racist world that renders
them inferior and disqualifies their human-ity. However, this process of identitarian affirmation has its
limits if it leads to funda-mentalist proposals that invert the binary terms of the hegemonic Western
Males Eurocentric racist and sexist philosophical tradition of thought. For example, if it is assumed that
subaltern non-Western eth-nic/racial groups are superior and that the dominant Western racial/ethnic
groups are inferior, they are merely inverting the terms of hegemonic Western racism without overcoming
its fundamental problem, that is, the racism that renders some human beings inferior and the elevation of
others to the category of superior on cultural or biological grounds (Grosfoguel 2003). Another
example is that of acceptingas do some Islamic and Afrocentric

funda-mentaliststhe hegemonic Eurocentric fundamentalist
discourses that the Euro-pean tradition is the only one that is naturally and inherently democratic, whereas the non-European others
are presumed to be naturally and inherently authoritar-ian, denying
democratic discourses and forms of institutional democracy to the
non-Western world (which are, of course, distinct from Western liberal democracy),and as a
result, supporting political author-itarianism. This is what all Third World
fundamentalists do when they accept the Eurocentric fundamentalist false premise that the only
democratic tradition is the Western one, and, therefore, assume that democracy does not apply to their
cul-ture and their societies, defending monarchical, authoritarian and/or dictato-rial forms of political
The idea that

democracy is inherently Western and that non-demo-cratic
forms are inherently non-Westernis shared both by Eurocentric
fundamental-ist discourses and its varieties such asThird Worldist
fundamentalisms. The divisions that results from theseidentity
politics ends up reproducing in aninverted form the same
essentialism and fundamentalism of the hegemonic Euro-centric
discourse. If we define fundamen-talism as those perspectives that assumestheir own cosmology and
authority. This merely reproduces an inverted form of Eurocentric essentialism.
epistemology to be superior and as the only source of truth,inferiorizing and denying equality to other
epistemologies and cosmologies, then Eurocentrism is not merely a form of fun-damentalism but the
hegemonic funda-mentalism in the world today. Those ThirdWorldist fundamentalisms (Afrocentric,Islamist,
Indigenist, etc.) that emerge in response to the hegemonic Eurocentric fun-damentalism and that the
Western press put in the front pages of newspapers every-day are subordinated forms of Eurocentric
fundamentalism insofar as they reproduce and leave intact the binary, essentialist, racial hierarchies of
political consequence of this

epistemological discussion is that a founda-tional basis on
contemporary discussions on political Islam, on democracy and on
the so-called War on Terrorism is epistemic racism. Western epistemic
racism by inferiorizing non-Western epistemolo-gies and
cosmologies and by privileging Western epistemology as the
superior form of knowledge and as the only source to define human
rights, democracy, citizen-ship, etc. ends up disqualifying the nonWest as unable to produce democracy, jus-tice, human rights , scientific
knowledge,etc. This is grounded in the essentialist idea that reason and
Eurocentric fundamen-talism (Grosfoguel 2009). In sum, a
philosophy lies in the West while non-rational thinking lies in the

rest.
Grosfoguel 2010 [Ramon, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies @ UC Berkeley, Epistemic

Islamophobia and Colonial Social Sciences, http://www.okcir.com/Articles%20VIII%202/Grosfoguel-FM.pdf,
Epistemic racism and epistemic sexism are the most hidden forms of
racism and sexism in the global system we all inhabit, the
Westernized/Christianized modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal
world-system (see Grosfoguel 2008a). Social, political, and economic
racisms and sexisms are much more visible and recognized today
than epistemological racism/sexism. How-ever, epistemic racism is the
foundational form and older version of racism in that the inferiority of
non-Western people as below the human (non-humans or sub-humans) is defined on their
closeness to animality and the latter is defined on the basis of their inferior intelligence
and, thus, lack of rationality. Epistemic racism operates through the
privileging of an essentialist (identity) politics of Western male
elites, that is, the hegemonic tradition of thought of Western philosophy and social theory that almost
never includes Western Women and never includes non-Western philosophers/philosophies and social
the West is considered to be the only legiti-mate

tradition of thought able to produce knowledge and the only one
with access to universality, rationality and truth. Epistemic
racism considers non-Western knowledge to be inferior to
Western knowledge. Since epistemic racism is entangled with epistemic sexism, Western
scientists. In this tradition,
centric social science is a form of epistemic racism/sexism that privilege Western males knowledge as
the superior knowledge in the world today. If we take the canon of thinkers privi-leged within Western
academic disciplines,we can observe that without exception theyprivilege Western male thinkers and
This hegemonic
essentialist identity politics is so powerful and so normalized
through the discourse of objectivity and neutrality of the Cartesian
ego-politics of knowl-edge in the social sciencesthat it hides who speaks and from
which power location they speak from, such that when we think of identity politics
we immediately assume, as if by common sense, that we are talking about
racialized minorities. In fact, without denying the existence of essentialist identity politics
among racialized minorities, the hegemonic identity politicsthat of
Eurocentric male dis-courseuses this identitarian, racist, sexist
discourse to discard all critical interven-tions rooted in
epistemologies and cosmol-ogies coming from oppressed groups and non-Western
traditions of thought (Mal-donado-Torres 2008). The underlying myth of the
Westernized academy is still the sci-entificist discourse of
objectivity and neutrality which hides the locus ofenunciation
of the speaker, that is, who speaks and from what epistemic body-politics of knowledge and
the-ories, above all those of European andEuro-North-American males.
geopolitics of knowledge they speak from in the existing power relations at a world-scale. Through the
myth of the ego-politics of knowledge (which in reality always speaks through a Western male body
critical voices coming from individuals

and groups inferiorized and subalternized by this hegemonic
epistemic racism and epistemic sexism are denied and discarded as
particularistic. If epistemology has coloras African philosopher Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (1997)
and a Eurocentric geopolitics of knowledge)
points out so welland has gender/coloras African-American Sociologist Patricia Hills Collins (1991)has
arguedthen the Eurocentric epistemology that dominates the social sciences has both color and gender.
The construction of the epistemology of Western males as

superior and the rest of the world as inferior forms an inherent part
of the epistemological racism/sexism which has prevailed in the worldsystem for more than 500 years.
-*Law Fails- Islamophobia specific

Individual interrogation should be the starting pointliberal reformism is a smokescreen tactic that normalizes
Islamophobic violence
Yassin-Kassab 2014 [Robin, author of The Road from Damascus, The Muslims Are
Coming!: Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror review, The Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/apr/03/muslims-are-coming-islamophobia-extremism-domesticwar-on-terror-review, Accessed 7/22/15, AX]
Muslims were
categorised as "extremists" or "moderates", although no link has
been proved between extremist ideas and terrorist violence. The clumsy
This focus on doctrine meant the state intervened to promote correct belief.
binarism sometimes went further Salafis were extremist, Sufis were moderate although most Salafis are
Those labelled moderate were

quickly reclassified if they spoke out on foreign policy. The emphasis
on ideology led to the criminalisation of certain ideologies , and to the new
crime of "glorifying terrorism" (as opposed to inciting violence). Increasingly , young Muslims
were imprisoned for their reading matter. Thus the more liberal approach ended by
assaulting liberal freedoms, and culture was transformed into a battlefield. By turning
comparatively new (and by no means universal) values such as gender and
sexual equality into icons of superior westernism, "liberalism
became a form of identity politics". (Reformism is heavy with bleakly
absurd contradiction. For the sake of cultural sensitivity in Ramadan, hunger-striking
quietists and some Sufis fight jihad against America.
Guantnamo prisoners are force-fed only at night.) In one of several illuminating character sketches,
Kundnani shows that the radicalisation of Yemeni-American Anwar al-Awlaki, killed by a US drone in 2011,
involved no psychological crisis or theological shift (as the reformist literature would have it), but only
experience of the war on terror, domestic and external, including his American-inspired arrest and abuse
by Yemeni police. The preacher's newly violent language mirrored not the Qur'an so much as war on terror
This failure to engage with the real roots of violent

alienation has ramifications going far beyond security. Both
culturalism and reformism neglect what Kundnani calls "the basic political
question thrown up by multiculturalism: how can a common way of
life, together with full participation from all parts of society, be
created?" Those British Muslims who "ghettoised" didn't do so by choice but as a result of industrial
discourse itself.
collapse, discriminatory housing policies and the fear of racist violence. Identity politics was promoted and
funded by local government in response to a 1970s radicalism (for instance the Asian Youth Movements,
modelled on the Black Panthers), which linked anti-racism to anti-capitalism. Home secretary Willie
Whitelaw supported "ethnic" TV programming on the grounds that "if they don't get some outlet for their
Multiculturalism, then, was

not a leftist plot but a conservative move bringing together the
state and community "uncles" against a much more subversive
alternative. And in the last decade, while "anti-terror" resources have flowed
into Muslim communities, benefiting the usual gatekeepers and provoking the envy of
equally deprived non-Muslim communities, young, alienated Muslims, as likely obsessed by
the Illuminati as the caliphate, are deterred from speaking and being
challenged in public. Kundnani provides detailed, well-contextualised accounts of the entrapment of
activities you are going to run yourself into much more trouble".
vulnerable African-American Muslims as well as the criminalisation of the (already traumatised) Minnesota
Somali community (for its opposition to the US-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia). Arab-Americans,
who had either identified as white or as a "model minority" (patriotic, bourgeois, less troublesome than
black people or Latinos), suddenly found those options closing. In comedian Dean Obeidallah's words, "I go
Anti-Muslim hysteria
was whipped up by the media, the entertainment industry, and a
state vocabulary that considered pipe bombs "weapons of mass
to bed September 10th white, wake up September 11th, I am an Arab."
destruction" when used by Muslims. Anti-Muslim violence in America

increased by 50% in 2010. The book closes with discussion of the new European far-right's
embrace of Zionism it is now Islamphobic rather than antisemitic. In "creeping-shari'a" scaremongering,
Rightists "ascribe to Islam magical

powers to secretly control western governments while at the same time
[seeing it as] a backward seventh-century ideology whose followers constitute a
dangerous underclass". In Britain the English Defence League was born; in the US a mediabased Islamophobic campaign fed existent conservative movements.
Both peddle varieties of the "Eurabia" conspiracy theory, whereby a corrupt European
political class has signed the continent over to Muslim domination
through immigration, birth rates and multiculturalism . At one extreme, this
the tropes of classical antisemitism are clear.
brand of "anti-terror" politics soon arrives at its own, Anders Breivik-style terrorism. Arun Kundnani is one
of Britain's best political writers, neither hectoring nor drily academic but compelling and sharply
intelligent. The Muslims Are Coming should be widely read, particularly by liberals who consider their own
positions unassailable. "Neoconservatism
invented the terror war," Kundnani writes,

"but Obama liberalism normalised it, at which point, mainstream
journalists stopped asking questions."
One step reforms such as curtailing bulk data collection

are just drops in the bucket- Islamophobia is a persistent
ideology infecting American politics, which requires
changes that predate any policies
Kundnani 2014 [Arun, (Professor of Terror Studies and Media @ NYU), "No NSA reform can fix
the American Islamophobic surveillance complex," The Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/28/nsa-reform-american-islamophobic-surveillancecomplex, Accessed 7/13/15, AX]
Better oversight of the sprawling American national security apparatus

may finally be coming: President Obama and the House Intelligence Committee unveiled plans this
week to reduce bulk collection of telephone records. The debate opened up by
Edward Snowden's whistle-blowing is about to get even more legalistic than all the parsing of hops and
These reforms may be reassuring, if sketchy. But for those

living in so-called "suspect communities" Muslim Americans, left-wing
campaigners, "radical" journalists the days of living on the receiving end of
excessive spying wont end there. How come when we talk about spying we don't talk about
the lives of ordinary people being spied upon? While we have been rightly outraged at
the government's warehousing of troves of data, we have been less
interested in the consequences of mass surveillance for those most
affected by it such as Muslim Americans. In writing my book on Islamophobia and the
War on Terror, I spoke to dozens of Muslims, from Michigan to Texas and Minnesota to Virginia.
Some told me about becoming aware their mosque was under
surveillance only after discovering an FBI informant had joined the
congregation. Others spoke about federal agents turning up at
colleges to question every student who happened to be Muslim. All of
them said they felt unsure whether their telephone calls to relatives
abroad were wiretapped or whether their emails were being read by
government officials. There were the young Somali Americans in Minnesota who
described how they and their friends were questioned by FBI agents
for no reason other than their ethnic background. Some had been
placed under surveillance by a local police department, which disguised
its spying as a youth mentoring program and then passed the FBI intelligence on
Somali-American political opinions. There were the Muslim students
at the City University of New York who discovered that fellow students they had
stores and metadata.
befriended had been informants all along, working for the New York Police Department's
Intelligence Division and tasked with surveilling them. There was no
reasonable suspicion of any crime ; it was enough that the targeted
students were active in the Muslim Students Association. And then
there was Luqman Abdullah, a Detroit-based African-American imam,
whose mosque was infiltrated by the FBI, leading to a 2009 raid in
which he was shot and killed by federal agents. The government
had no evidence of any terrorist plot ; the sole pretext was that
Abdullah had strongly critical views of the US government. These are
the types of people whom the National Security Agency can suspect of being
two "hops" away from targets. These are the types of "bad guys" referred to
by outgoing NSA director Keith Alexander. Ten years ago, around 100,000
Arabs and Muslims in America had some sort of national security file
compiled on them. Today, that number is likely to be even higher. A study published last year by
the Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition documented the effects
of this kind of mass surveillance. In targeted communities, a culture
of enforced self-censorship takes hold and relationships of trust
start to break down. As one interviewee said: "You look at your closest friends
and ask: are they informants?" This is what real fear of surveillance
looks like: not knowing whom to trust, choosing your words with
care when talking politics in public, the unpredictability of state
power. Snowden has rightly drawn our attention to the power of what intelligence
agencies call "signals intelligence" the surveillance of our digital
communications but equally important is "human intelligence", the
result of informants and undercover agents operating within
communities. Underpinning all the surveillance of Muslim Americans
is an assumption that Islamic ideology is linked to terrorism. Yet, over
the last 20 years, far more people have been killed in acts of violence by
right-wing extremists than by Muslim American citizens or
permanent residents. The huge numbers being spied upon are not
would-be terrorists but law-abiding people , some of whom have "radical" political
opinions that still ought to be protected by the First Amendment to the constitution. Just the same, there
are plenty of other minority Americans who are not would-be "home-grown" terrorists but they still live in
let's reform the NSA and its countless

collections. But let's not forget the FBI's reported 10,000
intelligence analysts working on counter-terrorism and the 15,000
paid informants helping them do it. Let's not forget the New York
Police Department's intelligence and counter-terrorism division with
its 1,000 officers, $100m budget and vast program of surveillance.
Let's not forget the especially subtle psychological terror of being
Muslim in America, where, sure, maybe your phone calls won't be stored for
much longer, but there's a multitude of other ways you're always
being watched.
fear that they might be mistaken as one. So
Attempts to combat islamophobia through law inevitably

fails
Schriefer 10 (Paula Schriefer, Deputy Assistant Secretary at the BUREAU
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, The Wrong Way to Combat
'Islamophobia', November 9 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/opinion/10iht-edschriefer.html) //mL
Such a campaign is deeply flawed from a human rights perspective,
both in its equation of religious discrimination (a legitimate human rights
violation) with the vague concept of defamation, as well as in the
proposed remedy of imposing legal limits on freedom of expression . A
recent Freedom House report looking at blasphemy laws in seven countries documents the negative
how such laws

actually contribute to greater interfaith strife and conflict. Because
no one can agree on what constitutes blasphemy, laws that attempt
to ban it are themselves vague, highly prone to arbitrary
enforcement and are used to stifle everything from political
opposition to religious inquiry. Particularly when applied in countries with weak
impact of such laws on a range of fundamental human rights, while noting
democratic safeguards e.g., strong executives, subservient judiciaries, corrupt law enforcement
laws do nothing to achieve their supposed goals of

promoting religious tolerance and harmony and instead are
disproportionally used to suppress the freedom of religious
minorities or members of the majority religion that hold views
considered unorthodox. In Pakistan, for example, Christians and Ahmadiyya (Muslims who do
blasphemy
not believe Muhammad was the final prophet) make up only 2 percent of the population, but have been
the target of nearly half of the more than 900 prosecutions for blasphemy in the past two decades. The
remaining prosecutions have been made against Muslims themselves, often simply as an easy way to
settle personal scores that have nothing to do with religion. Mere accusations of blasphemy have led to
mob violence in which people have been maimed or killed and whole communities devastated. The
governments of countries that already have such problematic laws on the books are precisely those
countries leading the charge to create an international blasphemy law through the United Nations. The
motivations of states like Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia countries with appalling records on religious
freedom and broader human rights are unquestionably hypocritical and have more to do with their
desire to score points with unhappy domestic populations and religious extremists than the desire to foster
religious tolerance. Support for blasphemy laws is high among the general public in the Islamic world. Even
the staunchest advocates of human rights in the Middle East, individuals who are openly critical of their
corrupt and authoritarian leaders, balk at the idea that the publication of the Danish cartoons or the
burning of a Koran should be protected forms of freedom of expression. In a part of the world where ones
religion is as key to ones identity as nationality and race, most people simply view such forms of
expression as a bigoted attack on their very existence. Such views are bolstered by the need to better
address the real issues of discrimination and violence against individuals because of their religious beliefs,
even in established democracies. It is a fact that political parties espousing xenophobic and anti-Islamic
views in Europe have gained in both popularity and representation, and that legal policies have been
enacted that most human rights organizations rightly see as restricting the fundamental rights of Muslims
to practice their religious beliefs. It is also a fact that many of the same people who defended the Danish
cartoons as an important form of free expression somehow feel perfectly justified in criticizing the plans to
Yet
hypocrisy in Europe and the United States does not justify attempts
to bring governmental oversight into what constitutes offensive
expression. Even with the best intentions, which are often lacking,
governments should never be in the business of policing speech. The
tools of defeating intolerance, including religious intolerance, start
with a legislative environment that protects peoples fundamental
political rights and civil liberties, including freedom of expression .
build an Islamic Center near the site of the World Trade Center because it offends them.
Blasphemy laws dont work in any context and U.N. member states should reject them unconditionally.
-State Bad Impacts

This card lose you the reformism debate- legal avenues
lead to disinvestment from real solutions
Kandaswamy 12 [Priya, Women's, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Mills College, THE
OBLIGATIONS OF FREEDOM AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL EQUALITY, SOUTHWESTERN LAW REVIEW, vol 41,
AX]
Despite a vast array of critiques that have elucidated the ways in which the U.S. state is deeply invested in maintaining social relations of racism, capitalism, and
The pursuit of legal

equality is frequently understood as the most pragmatic approach
and a necessary first step to any kind of broad scale social change.
In practice, however, legal equality struggles have failed to deliver
substantive social justice for many groups. Frequently written off as a sign of the incompleteness of legal
change, these failures are often invoked as evidence of the need for
further legal reform rather than prompting the serious consideration of
the law's actual capacity to effect change that perhaps they should. Even those critical of
legal strategies frequently fall back on them, citing legal reform as a
necessary evil, the best that can be achieved in the current political context, or the first step toward broader changes. In this way, the law
maintains a fierce hold on the political imagination. In this essay, I argue for the importance of
severing that hold. The assumptions that legal reform is a pragmatic and
necessary first step to social justice is a reflection of the boundaries
that circumscribe what is imagined as politically possible within
dominant discourse rather than the essential truths they are often taken to be. To the extent that legal
interventions will always simultaneously reinforce the legal
authority of the U.S. state, legal reform is bound to reiterate rather
than transform unequal distributions of power. Pinning political
possibilities to the law circumscribes the boundaries of change in very narrow
ways. Instead, movements for social justice must seek to open up
possibilities for transformation and evaluate their engagements with
the law in terms of the future possibilities those engagements might
open or foreclose. In other words, rather than presume legal equality is the answer, it is necessary to engage with the more complex questions
heteropatriarchy, it is still quite commonplace to assume that to remedy social injustices one must turn first to the law.
about what freedom should and could look like and locate legal interventions in relation to this broader vision. In order to illustrate these points, I turn first to the historical
example of emancipation and the consequent conferral of citizenship to formerly enslaved people, a quintessential moment in the expansion of legal rights in U.S. history. I
look to Reconstruction Era struggles over the meaning of citizenship specifically because they mark a particularly defining moment in the reconfiguration of racial violence
through the construct of the liberal subject. Given the ways that U.S. citizenship had been defined against blackness, the Fourteenth Amendment's extension of citizenship
rights to freed people forced the nation to grapple with what racially inclusive citizenship in a nation forged through racial violence would look like. Therefore, considering
the legacies of this historical period raises crucial issues for contemporary struggles for inclusion, equality and the extension of legal rights, particularly given the role
emancipation has played as an important historical reference point for these struggles. Emancipation marked a moment of great possibility, and freed people held broad
and diverse visions of freedom that included reparations, land ownership, freedom of mobility, and other self-defined mechanisms of individual and collective self-
as Saidiya Hartman shows, legal recognition as citizens worked to

constrain and curtail these more expansive possibilities of freedom by
locking freedom for black people into an idiom defined by obligation,
indebtedness, and responsibility.2 Rather than mitigate the significance of racial difference in the national imagination,
the conferral of citizenship rights collaborated in "the persistent
production of blackness as abject, threatening, servile, dangerous, dependent, irrational, and infectious"3 and
obliged freed people to shoulder the responsibilities and burdens of
perpetually having to demonstrate their preparedness for and
deservingness of citizenship in a context where their blackness
marked them as otherwise.4 This was evident in the ways that state institutions prioritized enforcing labor and sexual discipline
determination.1 However,
amongst freed people.5 As the Virginia Freedmen's Bureau's Assistant Commissioner Orlando Brown wrote, if freed people were to be citizens, it was necessary "to make
the Freedmen into a self-supporting class of free laborers, who shall understand the necessity of steady employment and the responsibility of providing for themselves and
anti-black racism fundamentally shaped recognition

as a liberal subject. 7 While for white male citizens liberal individualism had afforded a kind of entitlement and self-determination, for freed
[their] families."6 As Hartman shows,
people, recognition as a liberal subject rendered one responsible and therefore lameworthy. This was particularly evident in the workings of contract. A key distinction
between the free person and the slave was self-ownership signified primarily through the capacity to enter into contract.9 The understanding of legal freedom as selfpossession meant that there was no inherent contradiction between subordination and freedom as long as subordination was secured through a freely entered into
contract, a phenomenon most clearly illustrated by the labor and marriage contracts.10 For freed people who had both been structurally denied access to other material
resources through slavery and who were subject to vagrancy laws that criminalized the refusal to enter into long-term labor contracts, contracts were very much coerced."
However, despite the fact that they functioned to limit black people's mobility, secure the hyper-exploitation of black labor, and provided the ground for the development
of carceral institutions directed at the punishment of black people,12 entering into the labor contract became discursively understood as the quintessential sign of
freedom.13 In fact, freed people were called upon to demonstrate their independence and deservingness of freedom by fulfilling the terms of the labor contract.'*4 In this
way, contract provided a rubric for reinventing relations of subordination by obscuring national responsibility for the injustices of slavery and instead displacing this
responsibility onto the shoulders of the formerly enslaved.15 Freedom was rewritten as obligation and independence manifested as a burden.16 Liberal concepts of
freedom also functioned as a mechanism of regulating gender and sexuality through the marriage contract. While marriages and other kinship ties were not legally
recognized under slavery, one of the first rights freed people gained was marriage recognition.1' However, as Katherine Franke points out, the extension of marriage rights
was grounded in the belief that marriage as an institution would help civilize freed people by instilling heteropatriarchal gender norms. 18 Ak^y element of the
rationalization of slavery was the construction of black inferiority as marked by a lack of the gender differentiation that was seen as characteristic of civilization.19 As Matt
Richardson describes, "early attempts to congeal racist taxonomies of difference through anatomical investigation and ethnographic observation produced the Black body
as always already variant and Black people as the essence of gender aberrance, thereby defining the norm by making the Black its opposite."20 While marriage
recognition did provide some tangible protections to married freed people, the belief in marriage as a civilizing institution simultaneously reiterated and valorized white
supremacist beliefs that black people's inferiority was evidenced in their lack of appropriate gender and sexuality.21 Additionally, the extension of marriage rights provided
the ground upon which alternative sexual arrangements were criminalized and rationalized state austerity toward black people by constructing the self-sufficient household
as the means to economic security." As a result of the legal recognition of black marriages, many freed people faced convictions for adultery, fornication, cohabitation, and
the failure to provide for their legal dependents. In this way, much like the labor contract, the extension of rights in fact created new obligations and new grounds upon
which black people might be punished. Michel Foucault argues that one of the distinguishing features of the modern state is the emergence of biopower.24 Unlike
sovereign power that is expressed in the capacity to take life, biopower is invested in the production of knowledge about and regulation of populations, processes of
sovereign
power does not simply disappear but rather that the state continues
to exercise sovereign power alongside biopower.26 This process is
delimited by state racism, which "introduces] a break into the
domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what
must live and what must die." 7 As biopower becomes concerned
with regulating the life of the population, racism marks the bodies
upon which sovereign power must still be exercised. Killing the
internal or external racial threat becomes understood as a necessary
element to making the population stronger.29 Scholars such as Ann Stoler and Scott Morgensen have
normalization and regularization, and ultimately the capacity to "make live" in particular ways.25 However, Foucault also notes that
elaborated on Foucault's rather scant discussion of racism showing the ways in which biopower in fact emerges in relation to and as a function of colonial violence.30
Hartman's analysis of anti-black racism and the constitution of the liberal subject complicates Foucault's analysis and adds to scholarship that highlights the central role of
racial violence in the elaboration of state power.31 As Hartman shows, during Reconstruction, black people were simultaneously subject to the normalizing and violent
freed people
were subject to constant surveillance as their moral capacity for
citizenship was always in question, and any failure to comply with
labor or marriage contracts was read as evidence of this incapacity. 33
On the other hand, contractual freedom provided a basis for the state's total
disinvestment in black life, thereby making it more or less
impossible to live up to the ideals of citizenship .34 In this way, the seeming contradictions between
racial inclusion and racial violence were effectively displaced by locating responsibility for state violence in those who suffered from its effects. The black
subject was thus brought into the fold of citizenship but as a subject
always in need of reform or punishment. This historical example powerfully illustrates
the ways in which inclusion into citizenship rights can operate as a
technique of domination and the role the construct of the liberal
subject plays in maintaining state racism.35 Certainly, laws have changed a great deal since Reconstruction.
However, the differentiated structure of citizenship grounded in anti-black
racism that Hartman describes still operates.36 For example, contemporary political struggles over
powers of the state, or perhaps more accurately normalizing processes became yet another vehicle for state violence.32 On the one hand,
marriage reflect the processes by which marriage can secure entitlements for one social group while exacting social obligations from another. On the one hand, a
mainstream, predominantly white gay and lesbian movement seeks access to a wide array of property and social rights through same-sex marriage recognition.37 On the
other hand, marriage incentive programs and increasingly punitive welfare regulations cast marriage and the economic self-sufficiency that supposedly comes with it as an
obligation for welfare recipients who are most frequently represented as black women.38 Another terrain upon which racially stratified constructions of citizenship are
evident is in struggles for state protection from violence. Legislation that has increasingly criminalized violence against women and hate crimes against LGBT people holds
out the promise of greater equality and freedom for some by expanding a system of mass incarceration that targets women of color and queer and transgender people of
color.39 In fact, the increasingly punitive and austere orientation of the U.S. welfare state and the expansion of the prison industrial complex can be understood as the
the state disinvests in black

life.41 On the other hand, processes of criminalization hold individuals
responsible for the effects of that disinvestment, displacing
responsibility for state violence onto those who feel its effects most
and punishing those bodies for their structural location. 42 The
assumption that legal equality strategies are the most pragmatic
pathways through which resistance movement might effect change
presumes that recognition as a free and equal liberal subject by the
state is universally desirable, possible, and emancipatory . A
historical view, however, demonstrates that the abstract
construction of the liberal subject has functioned in particular ways
to secure continued anti-black violence and that, for many, liberal
logical extension of the processes of liberal subjection that Hartman outlines.40 On the one hand,
subjecthood itself rationalizes and begets state violence. It is essential that the utility
of the law for social change be assessed from the vantage point of people who live at this conjuncture. My point then is to insist on the necessity of vociferously
challenging hegemonic understanding of how the law works and what the law offers movements for social change by centering the experiences of those for whom legal
Legal change is often

construed as the benchmark of success for social movements.
However, the case of Reconstruction clearly demonstrates how legal recognition can in practice
produce a narrowing of political possibilities and a fixing of
responsibility for social injustice onto the black bodies. While Reconstruction is frequently
narrated as the transition from slavery to freedom, it is more accurate to recognize the ways in which the state reduced the
multiple possible meanings of freedom to the rubrics of liberal
individualism and contract. These rubrics produced black people as
both formally free and structurally subordinated thereby reconciling
state racism with the extension of citizenship.
citizenship and the extension of rights have undermined rather than advanced struggles for freedom.
-Individual Pedagogy Key

Islamophobia takes root at a level deeper than politicsthe systemic notion of Western superiority and Muslim
irrationality is generated by culture and media, dictates
policy, and creates broader militant sentiments that
violently oppresses those who dont fit the normalized
notion of an American- surveillance in the context of
counter-terrorism efforts is a mechanism influenced by
right wing fear mongering
Kumar 2013 [Deepa, (Associate Professor of Middle Eastern Studies @ Rutgers), "Twelve Years
Post 9/11, Islamophobia Still Runs High ," Truthout, http://www.truth-out.org/video/item/18759-twelveyears-post-9-11-islamophobia-still-runs-high#, Accessed 7/13/15, AX]
Islamophobia is basically the term, the name given to anti-Muslim

racism. It is a form of prejudice. And it involves making generalizations about an
entire group based on the actions of a few through this mythical
understanding of what Islam is supposed to be. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And we
KUMAR:
should mention that there was a poll that was conducted by the Arab American Institute that found that
American attitudes towards Arab and Muslims, specifically for Republicans and Romney voters in this last
presidential election, were rated to be strongly negative. Does this mean that Islamophobia is only a
problem of right-wingers or conservative voters? KUMAR: Absolutely not. I think it is true that larger
numbers of conservative voters are racist. They are racist not just in terms of their attitude towards Arabs
and South Asians, but also to a whole host of other groups. So it's true that this idea sort of concentrated
But in fact Islamophobia is far more systemic than that. That is to

say, the idea of a Muslim enemy, the idea of a terrorist enemy is one that
actually goes back a couple of decades but was brought to light after 9/11 by the
political elite, by our political leaders. So in fact it is built into the system of U.S.
foreign policy in this country. And to simply look at the far right and to ignore the fact that
it has larger implications in terms of justifying U.S. foreign policy would
within those ranks.
be really to have only an incomplete picture of what is at work in this form of racism. DESVARIEUX: Okay.
Let's talk about the mass media and how they depict Islam since 9/11. Can you describe for us how the
the trauma of 9/11, the fact that, you

know, 3,000 Americans died meant that it enabled the U.S. media to actually draw on
stereotypes that have been, you know, propped up by Hollywood, by the
news media, and so on for a few decades before that. And that was the idea that
these are crazy, irrational people. They are all apparently driven by
Islam to violence. And so we should lock them up, we should be
suspicious of them, we should detain them at airports, and so on and
so forth. And so that's what you saw in the immediate aftermath of
9/11. And this show called 24, which your viewers may know, is--it's about a lot of things [incompr.] that
it's about justifying the building of a national security state and
justifying practices like torture and so on and so forth. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And also
mass media has depicted Islam? KUMAR: Well, basically,
the story of the day, of course, is Syria, and everyone's attention is drawn to Syria. Can you describe for us
just how does Islamophobia play a role in any of the arguments for intervention in Syria, really? KUMAR:
Okay. It doesn't play a direct role in that. It is--the
idea of humanitarianism has a long

history in the United States. The idea that there are victims all over
the world, that the U.S. government has then got to make war in
order to, you know, somehow defend them, this goes back all the way to the Spanish-American
war of 1898, which was supposed to be about rescuing Cubans. And similarly, you see these sorts of
justifications given. You know, Vietnamese need to be defended. In Iraq, it was babies, apparently, who
were being bayoneted in Kuwait, and therefore the U.S. needed to intervene and defeat Iraq in 1991. So
what
makes it particularly potent in this case is that after 9/11 what you see is
the Bush administration projecting this idea of clash of civilizations,
which is basically the notion that we in the West are democratic, we are rational,
we are civilized, we are, you know, all things wonderful, and they in the East are
barbaric, they're misogynistic, and so on and so forth, and therefore we
have an obligation, what used to be called the white man's burden, to go off
and rescue them. And so you see some of that language, which is the idea that
Arabs cannot bring democracy by themselves, they cannot make change, and so
we need to intervene. So it's a combination both of the victim narrative,
which has a long history, combined with this language of clash of civilizations.
DESVARIEUX: Okay. And how does this fit into domestic policy? How do they work
Islamophobia into domestic policy? KUMAR: Right. I mean, the comparison I make in
the book and that I'm actually working on in the next book is that the U.S. government, and
U.S. imperialism in particular, always needs an enemy. That is, when there is no humanitarian
cause, an enemy is an extremely useful way to justify wars abroad, as
well as the policing of dissent at home. So, for instance, during the Cold
War we had been menacing enemy of the Soviet Union, against whom both a hot and a Cold War had to
be waged. And, of course, this justified, then, McCarthyism, because there's
always a reflection of the external enemy inside, and these people
have to be rounded up, blacklisted, and so on and so forth. So that's the
logic back then, and, of course, it was entirely about a politics of fear. Today we have
the same sort of thing. After 9/11, the war on terror comes into being
precisely about fighting endless wars. Remember, back in 9/11 the Bush
this idea of humanitarianism has a long history within the foreign policy establishment. But
administration was going to start with Afghanistan, go to Iraq, and then Iran, Syria, and so on and so forth.
the idea was to drum up this fear of this

menacing terrorist enemy, which justified wars all over the world in
order to gain the U.S.'s interest in [incompr.] particularly in the oil-rich region
in the Middle East. You asked me about domestic politics. Always there was a
reflection of the domestic in terms of the international threat. And so
what you've seen is innocent Muslims--and often actually not even
Muslims, people from the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, some of them Sikhs, some some of
them Hindus, some of them Christians, and so on, being racially profiled because that
is the logic that comes out of this. I have a whole chapter in the book about how the
legal system has been reworked so as to justify things like indefinite
detention, things like torture, things like deportation. And, frankly, the
infiltration of agents into our schools, into my school, into colleges, and so
forth. So, you know, it's truly horrific the extent to which Muslim
Americans and people who look Muslim have been demonized since
It didn't work out that way. But
9/11 .
DESVARIEUX: How do you sort of categorize or interpret these votes by different states to ban
This is actually the work of a far right

wing Islamophobic network. These people have been active for the
last two decades, and they get, you know, funding to the tune of $45-$50
billion over the last seven, eight years. These people hold the view that there
are no moderate Muslims, all Muslims are somehow connected to
Islamist organizations--Hamas or the Muslim brotherhood and so on. And even though they
sharia law? What's your take on that? KUMAR: Yes.
pretend to be moderate, right--this is the language some of these people use--in fact they are involved in a
conspiracy to take over the United States and to replace the Constitution with sharia law. Of course, this is
nonsense, this is complete conspiracy theory. But these are the people.
They are lawyers, they are academics, they are people in the military, they are people in the security
establishment. They are
responsible for this campaign where, you know, about half a
the U.S. have adopted these laws. It's a process

of fearmongering, and it enables the right wing to actually grow in
their ranks and promote this kind of hate.
dozen to a dozen states across
Individual epistemological interrogation is keyinternalized racist stereotypes and implicit biases require
active challenging
Feingold and Lorang 2012 [Jonathon (J.D. graduate of UCLA School of Law) and Karen
(J.D. graduate of UCLA School of Law), Defusing Implicit Bias, UCLA Law Review Discourse 2012,
LexisNexis, AX]
accusations of racial profiling often require or rely

on evidence of conscious intent. Though presumptively unconstitutional, racial [*220]
Like allegations of racism,
profiling is often justified on policy grounds as a rational form of racial discrimination. Racial profiling is
rational in the sense that it relies on perceived statistical correlations between a particular racial group and
For instance, when New York officials conduct

covert surveillance on Muslim communities, the decision is based on
a conscious belief that the targeted individuals are more likely to
engage in terrorism than the general population. Understood in this way, a
a corresponding trait or behavior.
successful claim of racial profiling requires proof of a conscious decision to discriminate against the
These examples of racism defenses and

racism allegations illustrate the central role that evidence of
conscious intent plays in our public dialogue. Even within the disparate treatment
theory of racial discrimination, however, such an approach fails to take into
targeted group because of their race.
account recent findings from the fields of psychology and social

cognition that complicate the way we may think about racially
motivated acts. These findings reveal that implicit biases, often undetectable
through introspection [*221] and self-reporting, cause us to treat others
differently because of their race. To gain a more accurate sense of the role played by
implicit biases, we begin by disaggregating the concepts of explicit and implicit biases. Both explicit
and implicit biases are the result of social cognitions. n73 Cognitions
are thoughts or feelings, and "[a] social cognition is a thought or
feeling about a person or a social group, such as a racial group. " n74
Explicit biases are thoughts or feelings that we are aware of and are able
to identify through introspection. n75 We commonly, though not always, "agree with and
endorse our explicit [biases]." n76 Racism allegations, and the corresponding racism
defenses, often reflect our familiarity with explicit biases. Racism defenses regularly rely on the type of
evidence offered by Zimmerman's father, while those alleging racism correspondingly search for the
smoking-gun quote or document that will reveal racist intent. n77 The national focus on Zimmerman's
possible use of the pejorative term "coon" provides one such example of evidence common to a racism
allegation. n78
Implicit bias research shows that traditional
understandings of conscious intent fail to tell the whole story .

Implicit biases "pop[] into mind quickly and automatically without
conscious volition." n79 Unlike explicit biases, implicit biases are difficult to
identify because of introspective limitations and our own selfmonitoring. n80 In fact, we are usually unaware of, or mistaken about, the sources of
our implicit biases and the influence they have on our judgment and
behavior. n81 Implicit biases may actually include "thought[s] or
feeling[s] that we would reject as inaccurate or inappropriate upon
self-reflection." n82 This disassociation between implicit and explicit biases means that we
may honestly believe we hold positive [*222] attitudes about a
particular racial group, yet we simultaneously hold negative
attitudes toward that same group at an implicit level . n83 This explains why
being Hispanic, growing up in a multiracial household, having Black friends, and honestly professing
antiracist ideals does not preclude the possibility that an individual might hold implicit negative attitudes
about Blacks. To circumvent challenges posed by our inability to access implicit biases, psy-chological tests
have been designed to measure our unconscious cognitions. These tests have relied on various linguistic
cues, physiological responses, microfacial movements, neurological activity, and "reaction times when
completing various tasks." n84 Perhaps the most well-known test is the Implicit Association Test (IAT),
which measures reaction times for sorting stimuli into categories. n85 The IAT consistently reveals "implicit
attitudes in favor of one social group over another." n86 For many Americans, implicit biases manifest "in
the form of negative beliefs (stereotypes) and attitudes (prejudice) against racial minorities." n87 Because
many people hold implicit biases, the real question becomes whether these biases influence or predict
behavior. Jerry Kang summarizes the prevailing wisdom on this point: There is now persuasive evidence
implicit bias against a social category, as measured by instruments such as the

predicts disparate behavior toward individuals mapped to that
category. This occurs notwithstanding contrary explicit commitments in
favor of racial equality. In other words, even if our sincere self-reports of
that
IAT,
bias score zero, we would still engage in disparate treatment of

individuals on the basis of race, consistent with our racial schemas.
Controlled, deliberative, rational processes are not the only forces
guiding our behavior.
That we are not even aware of, much less intending, such race-
contingent behavior does not magically erase the harm. n88 [*223] In fact, studies have shown that
"[a]utomatic associations influence behavior by both professionals and laypeople in employment, medical,
most troubling, and

police officers and private
citizens unconsciously rely on race when making decisions about whether
voting, law enforcement, and countless other contexts." n89 Perhaps
especially relevant to Trayvon's death, evidence suggests that
or not to shoot. n90 Part III proceeds by detailing the potentially deadly combination of implicit bias and
guns.
-AT: State Good

Roleplaying a state policymaker colludes with an
imperialist agenda that maintains status quo power,
privilege, and oppression by distancing debaters from
real world participation in the political contexts we
debate about.
Reid-Brinkley 2008 (Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley, University of Pittsburgh Department of
Communications, THE HARSH REALITIES OF ACTING BLACK: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS
NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE 2008)
the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a sense

of detachment associated with the spectator posture .115 In other words, its
participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance
themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates . Debaters can
throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without
blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real
world participation in the political contexts they debate about . As William Shanahan
Mitchell observes that
remarks: the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the
particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and
When we blithely call for United States Federal

Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that
establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific
atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to
acknowledge these implications (emphasis in original).116 118 The objective
stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona . The
policymaker relies upon acceptable forms of evidence, engaging in logical
discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters note,
such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and
contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying
networks of oppression. In other words, the discursive practices of policy-oriented
debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and
privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of
hegemony. So, rather than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose
needed to be debated as such.
to perform themselves in debate, violating the more objective stance of the policymaker and require
their opponents to do the same.
-AT: Perm
Choosing between the plan and the alt should be a
competing methodology debate- the point of our PIK is
that the affirmative should have to prove their strategy is
the best- the affirmative chose their starting point for a
reason and its necessary to ensure that the affirmative
cant permute away superior mechanisms for fighting
oppression--- political energy is limited and requires a
strict focus
Young 6 [Iris Marion, Professor of Political Science @ University of Chicago, Responsibility and
Global Justice, sites.coloradocollege.edu/engaging-the-global/files/2013/01/Young_2006.pdf, Accessed
7/21/15, AX]
So far, I have offered only a way of thinking about responsibility in general. One might well object that the social
all who
participate by their actions in processes that produce injustice share
responsibility for its remedy. Does this mean that all participants bear responsibility in the same
way and to the same degree? If not, then what are the grounds for differentiating
kinds and degrees of responsibility? Most of us participate in many structural processes,
connection model of responsibility raises as many questions as it answers. For example, the model says that
moreover, that arguably have disadvantaging, harmful, or unjust consequences for others. It is asking too much to
expect most of us to work actively to restructure each and every one of the structural injustices for which we arguably
How, then, should we reason about the best ways to use our
limited time, resources, and creative energy to respond to structural
injustice? Adequately responding to questions like these would take at least another full essay. Thus, I will only
share responsibility.
sketch answers here, and illustrate the responses once again through the example of the anti-sweatshop movement.
Some moral theorists argue that responsibility names a form of
obligationdistinctfromduty.JoelFeinberg,forexample,distinguishesbetween an ethic that focuses on obligation or duty and
an ethic that focuses on responsibility. On the one hand, a duty specifies a rule of action or delin- eates the substance of
A responsibility, on the other hand, while no less obligatory, is

more open with regard to what counts as carrying it out. 49 A person with
responsibilities is obliged to attend to outcomes that the
responsibilities call for, and to orient her actions in ways
demonstrably intended to contribute to bringing about those
outcomes. Because a person may face many moral demands on her actions, and because changes in
what actions count as performing the duty.
circumstances are often unpredictable, just how a person goes about discharging her responsibilities is a matter subject to
Given that a combination of responsibilities may be

overly demanding, and given that agents have discretion in how
they choose to discharge their responsibilities, it is reasonable to
say that it is up to each agent to decide what she can and should do
under the circumstances, and how she should order her moral
priorities. Others have the right to question and criticize our decisions and actions, however, especially when we
depend on one another to perform effective collective action. Part of what it means to be
responsible on the social connection model is to be accountable to others with
whom one shares responsibilityaccountable for what one has decided to do and
for which structural injustices one has chosen to address. When an
agent is able to give an account of what she has done, and why, in terms of
shared responsibilities for structural injustice, then others usually ought to accept her
decision and the way she sets priorities for her actions. These considerations
considerable discretion.5
begin to provide an answer to the question I stated above, namel how should one reason about the best way to use ones
limited time and resources to respond to structural injustices? In a world with many and deep structural injustices ,
most of us, in principle, share more responsibility than we can
reasonably be expected to discharge. 5 Thus, we must make choices

about where our action can be most useful or which injustices we
regard as most urgent. While a social connection model of responsibility will not give us a list of maxims
or imperatives, it should offer some parameters for reasoning to guide our decisions and actions. These parameters, in
turn, address the other ques tion I raised earlierthe question about kinds and degrees of responsi bility. Different agents
plausibly have different kinds of responsibilities in relation to particular issues of justice, and some arguably have a
greater degree of responsibility than others.
-Theory
*Global/Local
Notes
Along the same lines of thought as the State PIC- hence
why Kappeler is in the 2NC
1NC
The 1AC is an act of world ordering images of
disempowering structures produce a vision of the world
that negates activism at the level of the self. The I-InRelationship is a necessary starting point for changing
larger structures
Jayan Nayar, LawUniversity of Warwick, 1999 SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity , 9
Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599
Despite the fixation of the beneficiaries of ordered worlds, even the ordered "critic," with the prescribed
languages, visions and possibilities of human socialities, other realities of humanity nevertheless persist.
Notwithstanding the globalization of social concern and the transnationalization of professionalized critique
and reformatory action, struggles against violence remain energized, persistent and located. They are
waged through the bodies of lives lived in experiential locations against real instruments of terror,
functioning within embodied sites of violence. Non-information and non-representation of the existence of
such struggles, and non-learning of the wisdoms thus generated do not negate their truths or the vibrancy
"We" are participants in ordered worlds, not merely

observers. The choice is whether we wish to recognize our own
locations of ordered violence and participate in the struggle to resist
their orderings, or whether we wish merely to observe violence in
far-off worlds in order that our interventionary participation "out
there" never destabilizes the ground upon which we stand. I suggest
that we betray the spirit of transformatory struggle, despite all our
expressions of support and even actions of professionalized
expertise, if our own locations, within which are ordered and from
which we ourselves order, remain unscrutinized. And so, what might
I contribute to the present collective exercise toward a futuristic
imaging of human possibilities? I am unsure. It is only from my view
of the "world," after all, that I can project my visions. These visions
do not go so far as to visualize any "world" in its totality; they are
uncertain even with regard to worlds closer to home, worlds
requiring transformatory actions all the same. Instead of fulfilling
this task of imagining future therefore I simply submit the following
two "poems." [*629] Changing the "I" of the World: The Essential
Message of Mahatmas?" We are today bombarded by images of our
"one world." We speak of the world as "shrinking" into a "global
village." We are not all fooled by the implicit benign-ness of this
image of "time-space" contracted--so we also speak of "global
pillage." This astuteness of our perceptions, however, does not
prevent us from our delusion of the "global;" the image of the
"global" world persists even for many activists amongst us who
struggle to "change" the world. This is recent delusion. It is a
delusion which anesthetizes us from the only world which we can
ever locate ourselves in and know--the worlds of "I"-in relationships.
The "I" is seldom present in "emancipatory" projects to change the
world. This is because the "relational I"-world and the "global"-world
are negations of one another; the former negates the concept of the
latter whilst the latter negates the life of the former. And concepts
are more amenable to scrutiny than life. The advance in
of their socialities. 51
technologies of image-ing enables a distanciation of scrutiny, from

the "I"-world of relationships to the "global"-world of abstractions.
As we become fixated with the distant, as we consume the images of
"world" as other than here and now, as we project ourselves through
technological time-space into worlds apart from our here and now,
as we become "global," we are relieved of the gravity of our present.
We, thus, cease the activism of self (being) and take on the mantle
of the "activist" (doing). This is a significant displacement. 1NC That
there is suffering all over the world has indeed been made more
visible by the technologies of image-ing. Yet for all its consequent
fostering of "networks," images of "global" suffering have also
served to disempower. By this, we mean not merely that we are filled
with the sense that the forces against which the struggle for
emancipations from injustice and exploitation are waged are
pervasive and, therefore, often impenetrable, but, more importantly,
that it diverts our gaze away from the only true power that is in our
disposal--the power of self-change in relationships of solidarities.
The "world," as we perceive it today, did not exist in times past. It
does not exist today. There is no such thing as the global "one
world." The world can only exist in the locations and experiences
revealed through and in human relationships. It is often that we
think that to change the world it is necessary to change the way
power is exercised in the world; so we go about the business of
exposing and denouncing the many power configurations that
dominate. Power indeed does lie at the core of human misery, yet we
blind ourselves if we regard this power as the power out there.
Power, when all the complex networks of its reach are untangled, is
personal; power does not exist out there, [*630] it only exists in relationship. To say
the word, power, is to describe relationship, to acknowledge power, is to acknowledge our subservience in
that relationship. There can exist no power if the subservient relationship is refused--then power can only
Changing the world therefore

is a misnomer for in truth it is relationships that are to be changed.
And the only relationships that we can change for sure are our own.
And the constant in our relationships is ourselves--the "I" of all of
us. And so, to change our relationships, we must change the "I" that
is each of us. Transformations of "structures" will soon follow. This
is, perhaps, the beginning of all emancipations. This is, perhaps, the
essential message of Mahatmas.
achieve its ambitions through its naked form, as violence.
World-ordering is the ordering of worlds a civilizing

mission that subdues assimilates and eradicates the other
Jayan Nayar, LawUniversity of Warwick, 1999 SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING
[*606] Distinguishing these two meanings of "order" provides us with radically opposed directions of
Although the rhetoric of

world-order would focus on visions of some projected "world" that
provides the aspiration for collective endeavors, "order" does not
come to be without necessary "ordering;" the "world" of "worldorder" has not come to be without the necessary ordering of many
worlds. The ordering and the ordered, the world of order and the ordered world, all
analysis and orientations for future imagings of social relations.
are inextricable parts of the past and the present of "civilization." Despite the
vision of world-order founded on a notion of a universal society of
humankind aspiring toward a universal common good, (first given meaning
within a conceptual political-legal framework through the birth of the so-called "Westphalian" state system
the materialities of "ordering" were of a different complexion

altogether. Contrary to the disembodied rhetoric of world-order as
bloodless evolution, the new images of the world and languages of
"globality" did not evolve out of a sense of "hospitality" n15 to the
"other," the "stranger." Rather, the history of the creation of the postWestphalian "world" as one world, can be seen to be most intimately
connected with the rise of an expansionist and colonizing world-view
and practice. Voyages of "discovery" provided the necessary reconnaissance to image this "new
world." Bit by bit, piece by piece, the jigsaw of the globe was completed.
With the advance of the "discoverer," the "colonizer," the "invader,"
the "new" territories were given meaning within the hermeneutic
construct that was the new "world." [*607] The significance of this evolution of the
n14 ),
world does not, however, lie merely in its acquiring meaning. It is not simply the "idea" of the world that
was brought to prominence through acts of colonization. The construction of the "stage" of the world has
The idea of a single

world in need of order was followed by a succession of chained and
brutalized bodies of the "other." The embodied world that has been
in creation from the "colonial" times to the present could not, and
does not, accommodate plurality. The very idea of "one world"
contains the necessary impetus for the absorption, assimilation, if
not destruction, of existing worlds and the genocide of existing
socialities. This violence of "order-ing" within the historical epoch of
colonialism is now plainly visible. Through "colonialism" was reshaped the material basis
of exchange that determined human relationships. Put differently, the very idea of what is
"human" was recast by the imposed value-systems of the "civilizing"
process that was colonialism. To be human, to live, and to relate to others, thus, both lost
and gained meaning. Lost were many pre-colonial and indigenous
conceptions of human dignity, of subsistence, production,
consumption, wealth and poverty. Gained was the advent of the
human "self" as an objective "economic" agent and, with it, the
universals of commodification as the basis for human relations.
Following this transformation of the material political-economy of
the colonized, or "ordered," colonialism entrenched the "state" as
the symbolic "political" institution of "public" social relations. The
effect of this "colonization of the mind" was that the "politicaleconomic" form of social organization--the state--was universalized
as common, if not "natural," resulting in a homogenization of
"political" imagination and language. Thus, diversity was unified,
while at the same time, unity was diversified. The particularities and
inconveniences of human diversity--culture and tradition--were
subordinated to the "civilized" discourse of secular myths (to which
the "rule of law" is central), n16 while concurrently, humanity was formally segregated into
also occurred, albeit amid the performance of a violent drama upon it.
artificial "states," enclosures of mythic solidarities and common destinies. This brief remembering of
colonialism as an historic process, provides us with the most explicit lessons on the violence of the
The
world of those who "order" is the destruction of the "worlds" of
those ordered. So many ideologies of negation and (re)creation
"ordering" of "worlds." From its history we see that an important feature of ordering prevails.
served to justify this "beginning"--terra nullius, the "savage" native,

the "civilizing mission." n17 The [*608] "world," after all, had to be created out of all this
"unworldly" miasma, all for the common good of the universal society of humankind. Although
historical colonialism as a formal structure of politico-legal ordering
of humanity has come and gone, the violence of colonization is very
much a persistent reality. A striking feature of historical world-orderings was the confidence
with which the "new world" was projected upon human imagination. Colonialism was not a tentative
process. The "right" of colonization, both as a right of the colonizer and as a right thing to do by the
colonizer, was passionately believed and confidently asserted. Thus, for the most part, this "right" was
uncontested, this confidence unchallenged. "World-order" today is similarly asserted with confidence and
Contemporary world-orderings, consistent with those of the

past, are implemented using a range of civilizational legitimization.
rectitude.
With the advent of an ideology of "humanity," a "post-colonial" concession to human dignity demanded by
the previously colonized, new languages of the civilizational project had to be conceived of and projected.
"Freed" from the brutalities of the order of historical colonialism, the

"ordered" now are subjected to the colonizing force of the "postcolonial," and increasingly, globalization-inspired ideologies of
development and security. Visible, still, is the legitimization of "order" as coercive command
through the rhetoric of "order" as evolutionary structure.
Reject the 1AC in order to politicize our own relationships

with structures this is the first step towards liberation
Nayar, LawUniversity of Warwick, 1999 SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING
So, back to the question: to what extent, for this, "our world," do we contemplate change when "we"
In addition to the familiar culprits of violent

orderings, such as government, financial institutions, transnational
corporations, the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO (as significant culprits they indeed are), do we, in
our contemplations of violent orders, vision our locations within
corporate "educational" institutions as "professional academics" and
"researchers," our locations within corporate NGOs as "professional activists," our locations within
"think-tanks" and "research organizations" as "professional policy-formulators," and whatever
other locations of elite "expertise" we have been "trained" to
possess, as ordered sites, complicit and parasitic, within a violent
"world-order"? Do we see in our critiques of world-orderings, out
there, the orderings we find, right here, in our bodies, minds,
relationships, expectations, fears and hopes? Would we be willing to see "our
imagine transformed "world-orders?"
(ordered) world" dismantled in order that other worlds, wherein our "privileges" become extinguished, may
These concerns are, then, I believe, the real complexities of

judgment and action. Consideration should be given, not only to
those of the political-structural, so often honed in on, but also to the [*628] issue
of the political-personal, which ultimately is the "unit" of "worlds" and
of "orders." If "globalization," as a recent obsession of intellectual minds, has contributed anything
flourish?
to an understanding of the ways of the "world," I suggest, it is that we cannot escape "our" implication
within the violence of "world (mis)orders." IV. A WORLD FOR TRANSFORMATION: TWO POEMS Despite the
fixation of the beneficiaries of ordered worlds, even the ordered "critic," with the prescribed
languages, visions and possibilities of human socialities, other realities of humanity nevertheless persist.
Notwithstanding the globalization of social concern and the transnationalization of professionalized critique
and reformatory action, struggles against violence remain energized, persistent and located. They are
waged through the bodies of lives lived in experiential locations against real instruments of terror,
functioning within embodied sites of violence. Non-information and non-representation of the existence of
such struggles, and non-learning of the wisdoms thus generated do not negate their truths or the vibrancy
of their socialities. n51
"We" are participants in ordered worlds, not merely
observers. The choice is whether we wish to recognize our own

locations of ordered violence and participate in the struggle to resist
their orderings, or whether we wish merely to observe violence in
far-off worlds in order that our interventionary participation "out
there" never destabilizes the ground upon which we stand. I suggest that
we betray the spirit of transformatory struggle, despite all our
expressions of support and even actions of professionalized expertise, if our own
locations, within which are ordered and from which we ourselves order, remain
unscrutinized.
2NC
The alt solves the aff- Islamophobia needs to be
challenged in every instance and thats our point- by
starting movements from the position of large institutions
we displace our individual complicity in the system of
oppression- thats net worse
Focusing on larger structures of power obscures our own
responsibility
Kappeler, 95 [Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11]
We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the
notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the
conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is
precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash
a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective
action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any colle
ctive àssumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the
major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to
our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness and its
accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens - even
more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious nonresponsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and
Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia - since the decisions for such events are always made
elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian
president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own
it
seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own
actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those
political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in
judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular,
what Beck calls òrganized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically,
institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and
For we tend to
think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to
be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made .
Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to
engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of ` What would I do if
I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since
we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and
truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of
what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the
comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no
possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire
unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers:
the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more
prevalent formulations like Ì want to stop this war', Ì want military intervention', Ì want to stop this backlash', or Ì want
'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or
participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension: our
willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our
own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of
prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we
a moral revolution."
àre' the war in our ùnconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees
and I don't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and
We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in

the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape òur
feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the
values of war and violence.
one for the òthers'.
*Model Minority K
1nc shell
The root cause of surveillance and securitized politics lies
in the model minority myth and the subsequent
construction of racialized categories of good and bad
Asian- this isnt just Anti-Muslim violence but manifests
itself in the way in which other South Asians are
indiscriminately attacked for looking Asian- the affs focus
displaces focus on other Asian groups facing
disproportionate violence
Kannan 2014 [Vani,Model Minority or Potential Terrorist? Affective Economies, Rhetorics of
Silence & the Murder of Sunando Sen, Studies on Asia Series IV, Volume 4, No. 1, March 2014
http://studiesonasia.illinoisstate.edu/seriesiv/documents/kannan_studies_march14.pdf, Accessed 7/25/15,
AX]
Immigration policyand with it, immigration waveshave shifted since 1965, but the
myth of the model minority endures. In Unruly Immigrants, Monisha das Gupta writes
that the demographic and class differences arising from post-1965 immigration policy have led to the
emergence of distinct, often conflicting, needs and interests on the part of immigrants from South Asia
varying socioeconomic needs are obscured by the

model minority trope, which has constructed the false sense that the
Indian diaspora is an evenly successful, self-reliant, and almostwhite immigrant group.18 The historical construction of this trope
sits in direct contrast to the history of institutional and
interpersonal violence targeting Indian-Americans, beginning with the Chinese
Exclusion Act and continuing today.19 The National Security Entry Exit Registration
(2006, p. 56). These
System (NSEERS), for example, led to the fingerprinting and interrogation of 83,000 South Asian males
over the age of 16 immediately following 9/11; out of these men, 13,000 were placed in deportation
The Patriot Act and voluntary interview program

similarly profiled people based on nationality. 21 Ahmad argues that there is
a mutually reinforcing relationship between this type of governmental
racial profiling and individual hate crimes (2004, 1262). Wing draws a similar
conclusion, linking profiling to nationality as well as race : Todays war on
terrorism is, among other things, also a war on racialized immigrants as the
Patriot Act and other new laws treat them as suspected enemy
combatants simply because of their race and nationality (2005). Other
institutional influences on the post-9/11 racial climate include police
spying on Muslim student associations and mosques, FBI
entrapment, and drone attacks, all of which have established Islam
as the enemy, leading to more everyday forms of Islamophobia
stereotypes, racist comments, and other overt and covert abuse that
have been a regular feature of life post-9/11. This combination of structural
and interpersonal violence has constructed a racialized ethnic
category that has been referred to as the ArabMuslimSouthAsian
body.23 Post-9/11 stereotyping of the ArabMuslimSouthAsian body has become a
transnational phenomenon, where [f]ew desis (a person of Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi,
proceedings.20
Afghani, Sri Lankan, or Nepalese descent) are able to deny the existence of a heightened fear of our
the first three people killed as part of 9/11 backlash

were of South Asian descent.25 According to a report by National Asian Pacific American
Legal Consortium (NAPALC), 96% of the victims of post-9/11 vigilante violence
in the three months immediately following the attacks were South Asian. 26
bodies.24 Indeed,
Attacks have disproportionately affected Sikh-American men, who are profiled because they wear turbans
and grow long facial hair, leading to what Volpp describes a conflate[ion] with Osama Bin Laden (2002,
a Sikh-American, was
murdered outside his gas station in Mesa, Arizona by a man who said he wanted to
kill a Muslim in retaliation for the terrorist attacks.27 Twelve years later, these attacks
continuearound the time of the Oak Creek Sikh temple shooting,28 there were also 10 separate
anti-Muslim attacks.29 In September 2013, Dr. Prabhjot Singh, a Columbia
University professor, was attacked in Manhattan by a group of 20
young men shouting get Osama and terrorist.30 In New York, within a month of
Sunando Sens murder, police arrested a man accused of murdering MiddleEastern Brooklyn shopkeepers;31 a 72-year-old man named Ali Akmal was nearly beaten
1590). In one of the earliest such attacks, Balbir Singh Sodhi,
to death while going on his early morning walk; and a 57-year-old man named Bashir Ahmad was beaten
and stabbed repeatedly as he entered a mosque in Flushing, Queens.32Considering vigilante violence in
it is hard to deny the racial motivations for the attacks. The

Arab-MuslimSouthAsian body, a transnational figure that
constitutes a major shift in American racial conceptualization, is
both produced by and enacted via institutional and vigilante
violence.33 It marks a major shift in Indian-American history by folding South
Asian and Middle Eastern diasporas into the orientalist category of
Muslim-looking or potential terrorist,34 obscuring the social and
political salience of the various identity groups consolidated under
it.35 The concept of the ArabMuslimSouthAsian body, understood within the
context of Indian-American deracialization, serves as a framework within which we
can consider popular media covering Sens murder. We will see in the analysis that follows
that the articles are marked by the absence of acknowledgment of the
racially-motivated nature of the attackan absent presence36 or rhetoric of
silence that is both meaningful and invisible.37 Although scholarship in the fields of rhetoric
and composition and discourse analysis offer both taxonomies of silence and methodologies
for locating ideological silences in popular media (see, for example, Huckin
2002, Ratcliffe 2005, and Sweeney 2012), this work has not been applied to the
this context,
model minority trope post-9/11 .
Though I do not argue for a causal relationship between
the Indian-American racial history set forth here and media treatment of Sens murder, I do argue that
the deracialized model minority trope is at play in the rhetorics of

silence surrounding Sens skin color, and that through this silence,
deracialized discourses are produced that obscure the context of
post-9/11 violence and racial profiling.
Hypervisible bodies are simultaneously marginalized and

rendered invisible through specular abstraction by the
privileged observer
Traise Yamamoto, 2000, "In/Visible Difference: Asian American Women
and the Politics of Spectacle on JSTOR," Race, Gender & Class Journal,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41675310?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
You will find, this season, signs of yourself everywhere, but while Asian fashion accessories can be worn "as accents or
top-to-toe" ( Marie Claire , 134) in order to achieve that eponymous "China Girl" look, not a single Asian American model is
to be found in these pages. Inclusion of "Asianness" expands style horizons, extends the fashion frontier, but Asian bodies
Such magazines perfectly

emblematize the function of difference in this age of spectacle and
multi cultural display, and the ways in which the appearance of
inclusion (as well as the inclusion of appearance) substitutes
remain firmly on the other side of the geo-sartorial border.
specular, commodified representations for structural visibility as

national subjects. The insidiousness of difference as spectacle is
that it is just as often used to lay claim to a supposed ideology of
inclusion, as it is to demarcate the boundaries beyond which
colored bodies may not go . This was made all too clear by the now infamous cover of the March
24th, 1997, issue of National Review magazine, which depicts Al Gore and Bill and Hilary Clinton as a Chinese monk,
peasant and Maoist, respectively. Outfitted with cues, slanted eyes, and the requisite buck teeth, the three Manchurian
Candidates" (the lead article's title) are a stark figuration of what it means to be hyper visible as a racialized object - the
the
Asian American body, like all bodies of color in the United States, is
primarily useful as ideological cultural capital . French political theorist Guy DeBord
parsed, exaggerated and fetishized signs of which circulate in a discursive and representational arena in which
asserts that "The Spectacle is capital accumulated to the point where it becomes image " (1 965/1 997), and these
magazines collectively display that the ideological work of demarcating and delimiting national subjects is enacted
through infinitely manipulable images of Asianness, which run the gamut from politically-charged yellowface to
fashionable chinoiserie. In both cases, signs of Asianness, orientaba, mark the cutting edge of or transgression beyond the
national identity is
formulated through the ways in which historical or "everyday"
persons are abstracted and "reconstituted as a collective subject, or
citizen" (1991). That is, the individual person "acquires a new body by
participation in the political public sphere. The American subject is
privileged to suppress the fact of his historical situation in the
abstract 'person': but then, in return, the nation provides a kind of
prophylaxis for the person, as it promises to protect his privileges,"
one effect of which "is to appear to be disembodied or abstract while
retaining cultural authority" ( 1 99 1 a). Yet, this process of privileged
abstraction implicitly assumes a subject whose particularities of
race, gender, class and sexuality are coded as normative and
therefore invisible. The male, white, heterosexual and propertied
subject is structurally visible in direct proportion to that subject's
invisibility as a site of marked embodiment. But what obtains for those
border of normative whiteness. Lauren Beriant, among others, has argued that
whose marked particularity remains, in a sense, uncollectible, unabstractable, who

are marked "as precisely not abstract, but as imprisoned in the surplus embodiment
of a culture that values abstraction" (1991a). Women, people of color, the
poor, the queer are subject to an enforced embodiment wherein the

particularity of their hyper-visible bodies defines their status as the
obverse of American ideality, or more accurately as the obverse
upon which the idea of American national identity depends.
The myth of model minority demonizes and makes other

POCs hyper visible by reinforcing existing racial
prejudicescountering this stereotype is a prerequisite to
any aff solvency
Noy Thrupkaew, 3-25-2002 "The Myth of the Model Minority," American
Prospect, http://prospect.org/article/myth-model-minority AC
The Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (SEARAC), an advocacy group in
Washington, estimates that more than 2.2 million Southeast Asians now
live in the United States. They are the largest group of refugees in
the country and the fastest-growing minority. Yet for most policy
makers, the plight of the many Mali Keos has been overshadowed by the
well-known success of the Asian immigrants who came before and

engendered the myth of the "model minority." Indeed, conservatives
have exploited this racial stereotype -- arguing that Asians fare well
in the United States because of their strong "family values" and
work ethic. These values, they say, and not government assistance, are
what all minorities need in order to get ahead. Paradoxically, Southeast
Asians -- supposedly part of the model minority -- may be suffering
most from the resulting public policies . They have been left in the hands
of underfunded community-assistance programs and government agencies
that, in one example of well-intentioned incompetence, churn out forms in
Khmer and Lao for often illiterate populations. But fueled by outrage over bad
services and a fraying social safety-net, Southeast Asian immigrants have
started to embrace that most American of activities, political protest -- by
pushing for research on their communities, advocating for their rights, and
harnessing their political power. The model-minority myth has persisted in
large part because political conservatives are so attached to it. "Asian
Americans have become the darlings of the right," said Frank Wu, a law
professor at Howard University and the author of Yellow: Race beyond Black
and White. "The model-minority myth and its depiction of AsianAmerican success tells a reassuring story about our society
working." The flip side is also appealing to the right. Because Asian
Americans' success stems from their strong families and their
dedication to education and hard work, conservatives say, then the
poverty of Latinos and African Americans must be explained by their
own "values": They are poor because of their nonmarrying, schoolskipping, and generally lazy and irresponsible behavior, which
government handouts only encourage.
Specifically, model minority obscures the identity of

Southeast Asians and increase their vulnerability to
poverty and similar problems faced by black and Latino
communities
Noy Thrupkaew, 3-25-2002 "The Myth of the Model Minority," American
Prospect, http://prospect.org/article/myth-model-minority AC
What most dramatically skews the data, though, is the fact that about half the population of Asian (or,
more precisely, Asian-Pacific Islander) Americans is made up of the highly educated immigrants who began
The plight of refugees from Cambodia,

Laos, and Vietnam, who make up less than 14 percent of Asian
Americans, gets lost in the averaging. Yet these refugees, who started arriving in the
arriving with their families in the 1960s.
United States after 1975, differ markedly from the professional-class Chinese and Indian immigrants who
The Southeast Asians were fleeing wartime

persecution and had few resources. And those disadvantages have
had devastating effects on their lives in the United States. The most recent
started coming 10 years earlier.
census data available show that 47 percent of Cambodians, 66 percent of Hmong (an ethnic group that
lived in the mountains of Laos), 67 percent of Laotians, and 34 percent of Vietnamese were impoverished
in 1990 -- compared with 10 percent of all Americans and 14 percent of all Asian Americans. Significantly
poverty rates among Southeast Asian Americans were muchhigher

than those of even the "nonmodel" minorities : 21 percent of African
Americans and 23 percent of Latinos were poor. Yet despite the clear inaccuracies created by
lumping populations together, the federal government still groups Southeast Asian refugees under the
overbroad category of "Asian" for research and funding purposes. "We've labored under the shadow of this
model myth for so long," said KaYing Yang, SEARAC's executive director. "There's so little research on us, or
we're lumped in with all other Asians, so people don't know the specific needs and contributions of our
communities." To get a sense of those needs, one has to go back to the beginning of the Southeast Asian
refugees' story and the circumstances that forced their migration. In 1975, the fall of Saigon sent shock
waves throughout Southeast Asia, as communist insurgents toppled U.S.-supported governments in
Vietnam and Cambodia. In Laos, where the CIA had trained and funded the Hmong to fight Laotian and
Vietnamese communists as U.S. proxies, the communists who took over vowed to purge the country of
ethnic Hmong and punish all others who had workedwith the U.S. government. The first refugees to leave
Southeast Asia tended to be the most educated and urban, English-speakers with close connections to the
U.S. government. One of them was a man who wishes to be identified by the pseudonym John Askulraskul.
He spent two years in a Laotian re-education camp -- punishment for his ability to speak English, his
having been educated, and, most of all, his status as a former employee of the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID). "They tried to brainwash you, to subdue you psychologically, to work
you to death on two bowls of rice a day," Askulraskul told me recently. After being released, he decided to
flee the country. He, his sister, and his eldest daughter, five and a half years old, slipped into the Mekong
River with a few others. Clinging to an inflated garbage bag, Askulraskul swam alongside their boat out of
fear that his weight would sink it. After they arrived on the shores of Thailand, Askulraskul and his daughter
were placed in a refugee camp, where they waited to be reunited with his wife and his two other
daughters. It was not to be. "My wife tried to escape with two small children. But my daughters couldn't
make it" -- he paused, drawing a ragged breath -- "because the boat sank." Askulraskul's wife was swept
back to Laos, where she was arrested and placed in jail for a month. She succeeded in her next escape
attempt, rejoining her suddenly diminished family. Eventually, with the help of his former boss at USAID,
they moved to Connecticut, where Askulraskul found work helping to resettle other refugees. His wife, who
had been an elementary-school teacher, took up teaching English as a second language (ESL) to Laotian
refugee children. His daughter adjusted quickly and went to school without incident. Askulraskul now
manages a project that provides services for at-risk Southeast Asian children and their families. "The job I
am doing now is not only a job," he said. "It is part of my life and my sacrifice. My daughter is 29 now, and
I know raising kids in America is not easy. I cannot save everybody, but there is still something I can do."
Like others among the first wave of refugees, Askulraskul considers himself one of the lucky ones. His
education, U.S. ties, and English-language ability --everything that set off the tragic chain of events that
culminated in his daughters' deaths -- proved enormously helpful once he was in the United States. But the
majority of refugees from Southeast Asia had no such advantages. Subsequent waves frequently hailed
from rural areas and lacked both financial resources and formal schooling. Their psychological scars were
even deeper than the first group's, from their longer years in squalid refugee camps or the killing fields.
The ethnic Chinese who began arriving from Vietnam had faced harsh discrimination as well, and the
Amerasians -- the children of Vietnamese women and U.S. soldiers -- had lived for years as pariahs. Once
here, these refugees often found themselves trapped in poverty, providing low-cost labor, and receiving no
health or other benefits, while their lack of schooling made decent jobs almost impossible to come by. In
1990, two-thirds of Cambodian, Laotian, and Hmong adults in America had less than a high-school
education -- compared with 14 percent of whites, 25 percent of African Americans, 45 percent of Latinos,
and 15 percent of the general Asian-American population. Before the welfare-reform law cut many of them
off, nearly 30 percent of Southeast Asian Americans were on welfare -- the highest participation rate of any
ethnic group. And having such meager incomes, they usually lived in the worst neighborhoods, with the
attendant crime, gang problems, and poor schools. But shouldn't the touted Asian dedication to schooling
have overcome these disadvantages, lifting the refugees' children out of poverty and keeping them off the
streets? Unfortunately, it didn't. "There is still a high number of dropouts for Southeast Asians," Yang said.
"And if they do graduate, there is a low number going on to higher education." Their parents' difficulty in
navigating American school systems may contribute to the problem. "The parents' lack of education leads
to a lack of role models and guidance. Without those things, youth can turn to delinquent behavior and in
some very extreme cases, gangs, instead of devoting themselves to education," said Narin Sihavong,
director of SEARAC's Successful New Americans Project, which interviewed Mali Keo. "This underscores the
need for Southeast Asian school administrators or counselors who can be role models, ease the cultural
barrier, and serve as a bridge to their parents." "Sometimes families have to choose between education
and employment, especially when money is tight," said Porthira Chimm, a former SEARAC project director.
The picture that emerges -of high welfare participation and dropout rates, low levels of
education and income -- is startlingly similar to the situation of the
poorest members of "nonmodel" minority groups. Southeast Asians,
Latinos, and African Americans also have in common significant
numbers of single-parent families. Largely as a result of the killing fields, nearly a
"And unfortunately, immediate money concerns often win out."
quarter of Cambodian households are headed by single women. Other Southeast Asian families have
similar stories. Sihavong's mother, for example, raised him and his five siblings on her own while his father
Southeast Asians
they share the fate of other people of color when they are
was imprisoned in a Laotian re-education camp. No matter how "traditional"

may be,
denied access to good education, safe neighborhoods, and jobs that

provide a living wage and benefits. But for the sake of preserving the
model-minority myth, conservative policy makers have largely
ignored the needs of Southeast Asian communities. One such need is for
psychological care. Wartime trauma and "lack of English proficiency, acculturative stress, prejudice,
discrimination, and racial hate crimes" place Southeast Asians "at risk for emotional and behavioral
problems," according to the U.S. surgeon general's 2001 report on race and mental health. One random
sample of Cambodian adults found that 45 percent had post-traumatic stress disorder and 51 percent
suffered from depression. John Askulraskul's past reflects trauma as well, but his education, Englishlanguage ability, and U.S. connections helped level the playing field. Less fortunate refugees need literacy
training and language assistance. They also need social supports like welfare and strong communityassistance groups. But misled by the model-minority myth, many government agencies seem to be
unaware that Southeast Asians require their services, and officials have done little to find these needy
refugees or accommodate them. Considering that nearly two-thirds of Southeast Asians say they do not
speak English very well and more than 50 percent live in linguistically isolated ethnic enclaves, the lack of
outreach and translators effectively denies them many public services. The problem extends beyond
antipoverty programs, as Mali Keo's story illustrates. After her husband left her, she formed a relationship
with another man and had two more children. But he beat the family for years, until she asked an
organization that served Cambodian refugees to help her file a restraining order. If she had known that a
shelter was available, she told her interviewer, even one without Khmer-speaking counselors, she would
have escaped much earlier. Where the government hasn't turned a blind eye, it has often wielded an iron
fist. The welfare-reform law of 1996, which cut off welfare, SSI, and food-stamp benefits for most
noncitizens -- even those who are legal permanent residents -- sent Southeast Asian communities into an
uproar. Several elderly Hmong in California committed suicide, fearing that they would become burdens to
the lack of literacy programs prevented (and still

does prevent) many refugees from passing the written test that
would gain them citizenship and the right to public assistance.
their families. Meanwhile,
Thus we advocate a counterhegemonic storytelling of the

myth of the model minority. Challenging this racism is key
to solving for the institutional discrimination of POC and
creating real social change.
Caroline Hargreaves, 2010, "How Important is Discourse to Social
Change? Case: Micro-blogging Community Tumblr," London School of
Economics and Political Science
https://www.academia.edu/1635691/How_Important_is_Discourse_to_Social_C
hange_Case_Micro-blogging_Community_Tumblr
Discourse can be described as a set of values and beliefs that informs our social
responses and actions, More importantly, a thorough understanding of the
discursive forces that shape our social fabric presents a valuable

opportunity and instrument for resistance groups to challenge
dominant discourses. Foucault's famous work on the relationship between power
and knowledge brings the debate to another level, where discourses serve as the
meeting place of these two forces. This conception opens up possibilities to bring
about change, as power in a Foucauldian perspective is ubiquitous and operates
without agency, beyond traditional notions of the state and through culturally
embedded factors. Foucault rejects the liberal notion that knowledge can flourish
only in the absence of power (see Evans, 2005), which allows alternative discursive
methods onto the scene. These can challenge the way in which relations
and structures of power are embedded in everyday life by providing

alternative values and norms as well as morally validating the
identities and perspectives of those oppressed by the existing
relations and structures of powe r (Stammers, 1999). This is why much
attention should be paid (by actors seeking to challenge the status quo)
towards discourse in particular in terms of locating both

opportunities and constraints for social change. As argued by Hacking
(1999:58) "Politics, ideology and power matter more than metaphysics to most
advocates of construction. Talk of construction tends to undermine the authority of
knowledge and categorization. It challenges complacent ways of doing things not by
refuting or proposing better, but by unmasking." This will reveal how
categories of knowledge are used in power relationships and

towards moulding the global society in a particular way . With reference to the
discourse of human rights, Hunt (1990) argues that the Gramscian concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony make it
possible to advance a positive evaluation certain strategies within progressive politics. The 'discursive war of position' is
here seen as taking practical measurements to bring about shifts and modifications in popular consciousness. In discourse
specifically, Mouffe (2005:18) explains that "[e]very
hegemonic order is susceptible of

being challenged by counter-hegemonic practices, i.e. practices
which will attempt to disarticulate the existing order so as to install
other forms of hegemony." Hegemony then becomes a process that
generates a question of culturally altering social consciousness,
reworking what already exists and introducing elements that
transcend dominant narratives of issues and movements. Without
going too far into the reasons behind resisting the mainstream media logic,
the main concerns are to what extent this logic can be seen as representative
of the larger voice of society, locally and globally. Mass culture has been
perceived to be an instrument of ideological dominance over social
consciousness (see Gramsci, 1971), or what Hirst (1976:386) later labeled
the imaginary, shaping social subjects. Discourses are therefore not
deliberately created narratives, but rather ideological extensions of
the hegemonic forces in play on both macro- and micro levels of
society. The democratic deficits inherent in a media system dominated by
corporate and commercial structures are apparent alongside inequalities of access,
representation and ideological power (Carroll and Hackett, 2006 ). At every point
in history when a larger minority has felt oppressed by a smaller

majority, revolutions have taken place, often manifested in large
social movements. Melucci (1996:84) also takes the constructivist approach and writes that at the core of
social movements is the construction of collective identity, an interactive process that addresses the question of how a
Since our identities and cultures are ultimately

shaped through cognitive perceptions and flows of information, its
democratization is integral to the collective welfare and progression.
collective becomes a collective.
Collective action therefore becomes a way of communicating a message to the rest of society. As argued
discourse is constitutive both in the sense

that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in
the sense that it contributes to transforming it. From the mere conception of
by Faiclough and Wodak (1997: 258),
ideas to the distribution of messages through e.g. self-mediation, policy-makers, marketing-companies,

social movements and NGOs, the
change is clear.
significance of discourse to progressive social
2NC Link ext.

The foundation of Islamophobia is the construction of
racial dichotomies- the model minority identifies
distinctions between Good Muslims and Bad Muslims
in order to demonize particular racial bodies
Hilal 2014 [Maha (Doctorate in Philosophy), Too Damn Muslim to be Trusted: The War on Terror
and the Muslim American Response,
http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/16817/Hilal_american_0008E_10652display.pdf?
sequence=1, Accessed 7/23/15, AX]
Neil Gotunda (2011) adds to the discussion of the racialization of Muslims in his article titled The
Racialization of Islam in American Law. Gotunda (2011) speaks about Muslims as a new racial category.
Gotunda (2011) argues the
use of acceptance of the Muslim category as a

racial category presents enormous challenges to the assertion of
Islam as a religious faith. Respect for religious beliefs and practices remains an important
strand in our social fabric. By contrast, racism has been one of our most contested and disputed practices
racializing Muslims is a way of

situating them in the racial hierarchy as a way of diminishing claims
to religious freedom. As he states further to this effect, racialized Islam in the
form of the Muslim terrorist is not susceptible to the traditional
analyses of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses (p.186). The
process of racialization, according to Gotunda (2011), involves three
dimensions: the raced body, the racial category, and the ascribed
subordination (p.187). The dimension of raced body, involves the positioning of a group into the
commonsense idea of color-races. The racial category, in the case of Muslims,
refers to linking this group to regions of the world that are
predominantly Muslim, while the third dimension in the process of
racialization is ascribed subordination, which Gotunda (2011) refers to as the
active process of hierarchy and subordination (p.188). Providing a basis for
(p.186). Thus, Gotundas argument here is that
comparison, Gotunda (2011) compares the racialization process of Asian Americans to that of Muslims.
One particularly salient aspect in this comparison is ascribed foreignness, where he argues that the
Muslim terrorists have essentially taken the place of the Asian

traitor, spy, and saboteur (p.190). Gotunda (2011) also considers the construction of the
model minority as a function of the racialization process. He argues that similar to Asian
Americans, a model minority image has emerged to distinguish
good Muslims from bad Muslims. He suggests that the Muslim terrorist
is a defined image of the bad Muslim, while the construction of the
good Muslim has not yet crystallized. However, Gotunda (2011) uses the
example of Zuhdi Jasser as an example of the construction of the
good Muslim. Jasser, for example, was a witness at the congressional
hearings on Islamic Radicalization and embraced the problem of radicalization
as a Muslim problem, consistent with conservative discourses.
Jassers work in this realm is serving to create the model minority for
the racial category of Muslims (p. 192). Later in his article, Gotunda (2011) illustrates
how the process of racializing Muslims serves to exclude White
Muslims from condemnation when/if they perpetrate acts of violence .
For example, John Walker Lindh was referred to as the American
Taliban, which according to Gotunda (2011) distinguishes white Americans
from minorities by emphasizing his identity as American. In
emphasizing this American identity as a function of Whiteness, the
foreignness of the raced non-White is simultaneously highlighted (p.

193). In a similar vein, Colleen LaRose, a white woman known as Jihad Jane, stimulated controversy
because her race defied the image of the typical Muslim terrorist.
The USs categorization of Muslims as either good or

bad is a particular formation of the model minority
stereotype. The Affirmatives redemption of bad
Muslims into the category of good Muslims perpetuates
the dichotomy, making hyper-visible those who do not
conform to the ideal societal position ascribed to them
Jackson and Kim 11 (John L. Jackson is Dean of the University of Pennsylvania's School of
Social Policy and Practice. He also is the Richard Perry University Professor of Communication, Africana
Studies, and Anthropology in the Standing Faculty of the Annenberg School for Communication and the
Standing Faculty of the School of Arts and Sciences. David K. Kim is a Professor of Religious Studies , Chair
of the Religious Studies Department , and Associate Professor in American Studies at Connecticut College.
Race, Religion, and Late Democracy https://books.google.com/books?
id=f0dcGarZj0AC&pg=PA192&lpg=PA192&dq=model+minority+islam&source=bl&ots=pbOVG4ECMU&sig
=9zhvyJBJAVBhK9WBJQnAdzJBr3U&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAmoVChMItd_zq6jixgIVgZeACh3IeABK#
v=onepage&q=model%20minority%20islam&f=false)
Asian Americans as model minorities operated to discipline African

Americans as an example of racial success, yet the emphasis on
minority status reaffirmed the super position of whites. Unlike the use of
the foreignness trope to serve foreign policy, the model minority trope is domestic and serves to discipline
African Americans. The model minority is also a pan-Asian category: it is applied to most Asian Americans,
not limited to a particular national origin. Together, the two tropes offer a more complete racial landscape
for Asian Americans. The good Asian performs racially as a model minority, assimilated and successful.
But if there is resistance to racial subordination organized through ethnic or group identity, those ethnic
Labeling a racial performance as foreign is an

invitation to discrimination and disciplinary actions against the bad
Asian. Furthermore, in the case of conflict with an Asian nation, the
raced bodies of Asian Americans are available through the trope of
foreignness as a mobilization point for Americans. Good Muslim
Corresponding to the Asian American model minority, we can see the
emergence of the good Muslim and bad Muslim stereotypes. While
excesses can be labeled as foreign.
the Muslim terrorist is now well established, the scripting of the good Muslim is a work in progress. The
new republican majority in Congress is holding congressional hearings on the threat of Islamic
radicalization. The first noncongressional witness to testify was Zuhdi Jasser, A Republican and selfidentified Muslim; founder of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy, he is politically active and
appears often in conservative media. He is reported as calling on Muslim leaders to aggressively oppose a
culture of separatism and urges Islamic clerics to disavow scripture that belittles non-Muslims and
women and to renounce a role for Islam in the government (Boorstein 2011). Jassers appearances on
controversial television commentator Glen Becks show suggest that this is not a doctrinal or sectarian
dispute among Islamic faithful. This is an example of the crafting of the model minority for the racial
category of Muslims. We should expect continued efforts to create a script for the proper racial
The emergence of the possibility of the good

Muslim suggests that the Muslim racial category will follow the dual
track of Asian American racialization with two different ascribed
racial sterotypes: the Muslim terrorist and the good Muslim. The
Muslim terrorist is an extreme example of the foreignness trope,
providing a domestic body in the service of our foreign military
operations in Iraw and Afghanistan. For those Americans who are
collected in then Muslim category, the disciplinary function of the
good Muslim corresponding to the model minority is available
for use against Muslims or those with Asiatic brown bodies who
protest or disagree with American domestic or foreign policy. The loose
performance of the good Muslim.
framework for the Muslim racial category and its racial trope, the Muslim terrorist, makes organizing
difficult. Mosques offer important centers for faith and community. But it is unclear how a faith-based
community can organize to include non-Muslims against a racial trope. One promising development was
the support given by Asian Americans to the victims of hate crimes after 9/11. The racial category of Asian
Americans as a panethnic group could, over time, encompass faith-based communities. The implications of
the racialization of Islam for American foreign policy considerations are less ambiguous but more
discouraging. The racialization of Islam through the Muslim racial category seems to be following the
model of Asian American racialization. There is a simplistic duality. One side is the bad
Muslim, the Muslim terrorist, useful to further American foreign policy goals. On the other side is the
good Muslim, assimilating to conventional American secular ideals. While that awkward binary may be
adequate for domestic racial politics, it is clearly inadequate to address Islam and democracy in the world
today. The democratic upheavals in North Africa and the Arab world are far more complex and subtle than
the gross categories offered by American racialization.
*Undercommons K
Notes
I would read on case
1NC (long)
The 1ACs praxis reinscribes the ideology of Islamophobiaspeaking for others destroys Islamic agency and
homogenizes the Muslim body
ISJ 2014 [Bi-annual publication that focuses on the critical analysis of Islamophobia,
Islamophobia Studies Journal Volume 2 Issue 2 Fall 2014,
http://crg.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/ISJ_2014-15_Fall_Issue_-Final_Volume.pdf, Accessed 7/24/15, pg.
32-33, AX]
The war on terror discourse reinforces the basic premise of

Orientalism, the absolute difference between Islam and the west. Islam and Muslims are
associated with an inherent, uncivilized propensity for violence,
which is connected to the Orient as something to be both feared and
controlled for this reason. This fear of the violent potential of the Muslim Other takes its contemporary
form through the trope of dangerous Muslim man who evokes fear through terrorism, anchored by the
civilized, white, good, heroic American on the other side.19This American is part of the construction of
the western family of white nations, a civilization, obliged to use force and terror to defend itself against a
the war on terror discourse

extends Orientalist constructs is through the idea of an unchanging
and uniform Muslim Other who cannot speak for her/himself . This is
about two issues: first, the idea that all Muslims everywhere are the
same, and second, the agency of Muslims to define themselves.
They can only be seen and heard if they are interpreted and
mediated by the west through its privilege to both set the terms of
the discourse of the war on terror and to define them as particular
types of Muslims through it. The subject positions available to
Muslims in this hegemonic discourse are linked to the way in which
terrorism is defined as an Islamic problem because Muslims carried out the 9/11
menacing cultural Other.20 A second way in which
attacks. Terrorism is explained as a religious problem, rather than as a political issue, by linking it to the
By association then, all Muslims have this inherent

tendency to be potential terrorists because they are Muslims. Their
religion of the attackers.
actions can be explained solely and exclusively through reference to their religion, which is also perceived
as inherently violent. Quranic verses are often presented as literal evidence of this Muslim propensity for
Islamic terrorism.
The AFFs politics of recognition ties reinscribes

oppression by tying subjecthood to suffering
Tuck and Yang 14 [Eve, & K.W., 2014, R-Words: Refusing Research. In
n D. Paris & M. T. Winn (Eds.) Humanizing research: Decolonizing qualitative
inquiry with youth and communities (pp. 223-248). Thousand Oakes, CA:
Sage Publications. Pp. 228]
The costs of a politics of recognition that is rooted in naming pain
have been critiqued by recent decolonizing and feminist scholars
(Hartman, 1997, 2007; Tuck, 2009). In Scenes of Subjection, Sadiya Hartman
(1997) discusses how recognizing the personhood of slaves enhanced the
power of the Southern slaveowning class. Supplicating narratives of
former slaves were deployed effectively by abolitionists, mainly White,
well-to-do, Northern women, to generate portraits of abuse that ergo
recognize slaves as human (Hartman, 2007). In response, new laws
afforded minimal standards of existence, making personhood
coterminous with injury (Hartman, 1997, p. 93), while simultaneously

authorizing necessary violence to suppress slave agency. The slave
emerges as a legal person only when seen as criminal or a violated
body in need of limited forms of protection (p. 55). Recognition
humanizes the slave, but is predicated upon her or his abjection.
You are in pain, therefore you are. [T]he recognition of humanity
require[s] the event of excessive violence, cruelty beyond the limits
of the socially tolerable, in order to acknowledge and protect the
slaves person (p. 55). Furthermore, Hartman describes how slave-asvictim as human accordingly establishes slave-as-agent as criminal.
Applying Hartmans analysis, we note how the agency of Margaret Garner
or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider violence that humane
society must reject while simultaneously upholding the legitimated
violence of the state to punish such outsider violence. Hartman asks,
Is it possible that such recognition effectively forecloses agency as
the object of punishment . . . Or is this limited conferral of humanity
merely a reinscription of subjugation and pained existence? (p. 55).
Research is used to commodify pain

narratives and damage representations to reproduce
oppression with the justification of the academy
inquiry with youth and communities
https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-RWords_Refusing-Research.pdf]
Urban communities, and other disenfranchised communities . Damage-centered
researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of
change in which harm must be recorded or proven in order to
convince an outside adjudicator that reparations are deserved. These
reparations presumably take the form of additional resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other
this theory of change as

both colonial and flawed, because it relies upon Western notions of
power as scarce and concentrated, and because it requires
disenfranchised communities to posi-tion themselves as both
singularly defective and powerless to make chang e (2010). Finally, Eve has
observed that won reparations rarely become reality, and that in many
cases, communities are left with a narrative that tells them that they
are broken.Similarly, at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the fixation social
material, political, and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described
science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from com-munities that are not White, not wealthy,
and not straight.
Academes demon-strated fascination with telling and

retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and
for its consumptive implacability. Imagining itself to be a voice, and
in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised (Simpson, 2007,
p. 67, emphasis in the original) is not just a rare historical occurrence in anthropology and related
We observe that much of the work of the academy is to

reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice. At first, this may read as an
fields.
intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things
have changed in recent decades. However, it is our view that while many individual scholars have cho-sen
to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their disciplines, novice researchers
emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that
such approaches embody what it means to do social science. The collection of pain narratives and the
theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent in the social sciences that
one might surmise that they are indeed what the academy is about. In her examination of the symbolic
violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990) portrays the core message from the academy to those on the
No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you

better than you can speak about yourself. No need to hear your
voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And
then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such
a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you I write
myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still colonizer the
speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk. ( p. 343)
margins as thus:
Hookss words resonate with our observation of how much of social science research is concerned with
providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a recognition that is enamored with knowing through
pain. Further, this passage describes the ways in which the researchers voice is constituted by,
legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by telling back
the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to untangle the almost imperceptible
differences between forces that silence and forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins
to speak, to tell their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, Do not
speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that is a sign of deprivation, a
wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain (hooks, 1990, p. 343).
Your politics of inclusion gets coopted

Brown 1996 [Wendy Brown, Prof. Political Science, Prof. Rhetoric, Prof.
Critical Theory @ UC-Berkeley, 96, In the folds of our own discourse: The
Pleasures and Freedoms of Silence, 3 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable, 189-91]
In her lecture at the Swedish Academy on the occasion of receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature, Toni
certain
kinds of language are themselves silencing, capable of violence and
killing, as well as "susceptible to death, erasure." A dead language is not
Morrison also displaces the conventional antinomy between silence and language, arguing that
only one no longer spoken or written, it is unyielding language content to admire its own paralysis. Like
statist language, censored and censoring. Ruthless in its policing duties, it

has no desire or purpose other than to maintain the free range of its
own narcotic narcissism, its own exclusivity and dominance. However moribund, it is not
without effect, for it actively thwarts the intellect, stalls conscience,
suppresses human potential. Unreceptive to interrogation, it cannot
form or tolerate new ideas, shape other thoughts, tell another story,
fill baffling silences. Official language smitheried to sanction ignorance and
preserve privilege is a suit of armor, polished to shocking glitter, a husk from which the knight
departed long ago. 4 While Morrison is concerned in this passage primarily with
state languages, with bureaucratic and 'official' languages, any language of
regulation, including those originally designed on behalf of our
emancipation, has the potential to become "official" in the sense she
describes. If silence can function as speech in discourse, can be a function of
discourse, and can also function as a resistance to regulatory discourse,
such practices of silence are hardly unfettered. The complexities of silence and speech in relation to
freedom brings us to the second passage of Foucault's that I want to consider. It is from his "Two Lectures"
on power,"5 and occurs in the context of his discussion of discovering or "disinterring" subjugated
is it not perhaps the case that these fragments of

genealogies are no sooner brought to light, that the particular elements of the
knowledge that one seeks to disinter are no sooner accredited and put into circulation, than they
run the risk of re-codification, recolonisation? In fact, those unitary
discourses, which first disqualified and then ignored them when they
made their appearance, are, it seems, quite ready now to annex
them, to take them back within the fold of their own discourse and to
knowledges: .. .
invest them with everything this implies in terms of their effects of knowledge and power." Here,
Foucault's concern is less with disrupting the conventional

modernist equation of power with speech on one side, and
oppression with silence on the other, than with the ways in which
insurrectionary discourse borne of exclusion and marginalization can
be colonized by that which produced it much as counter-cultural
fashion is routinely commodified by the corporate textile industry.
While "disqualified" discourses are an effect of domination, they nevertheless potentially function as
oppositional when they are deployed by those who inhabit them. However, when "annexed" by those
they become a particularly potent

source of regulation, carrying as they do intimate and detailed
knowledge of their subjects. Thus, Foucault's worry would appear to adhere not simply to
the study of but to the overt political mobilization, of oppositional discourses. Consider the way
in which the discourse of multiculturalism has been annexed by
mainstream institutions to generate new modalities of essentialized
racial discourse; how "pre-menstrual syndrome" has been rendered a debilitating disease in
"unitary" discourses which they ostensibly oppose,
medical and legal discourses;'7 how "battered women's syndrome" has been deployed in the courtroom to
defend women who strike back at their assailants by casting them as sub-rational, egoless victims of male
violence; 8 or how some women's response to some pornography was generalized by the Meese
Commission on pornography as the violence done to all women by all pornography. 9
Orienting politics around the university space creates

social death
Occupied UC Berkeley 09 [The Necrosocial: Civic Life, Social Death,
and the UC. http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/thenecrosocial/]
In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the
conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within
prescribed identity categoriesour force will be dependent on the
limited spaces of recognition built between us. Here we are at odds
with one another socially, each of us: students, faculty , staff, homebums,
activists, police, chancellors, administrators, bureaucrats, investors, politicians, faculty/
staff/ homebums/ activists/ police/ chancellors/ administrators/ bureaucrats/ investors/ politicians-to-be.
That is, we are students, or students of color, or queer students of color, or faculty, or
Philosophy Faculty, or Gender and Women Studies faculty, or we are custodians, or we are shift leaders
We form teams, clubs,

fraternities, majors, departments, schools, unions, ideologies,
identities, and subculturesand thankfully each group gets its own
designated burial plot. Who doesnt participate in this graveyard? In the university
we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality
translates to a value of domination. We spend money and energy
trying to convince ourselves were brighter than everyone else.
each with our own office, place, time, and given meaning.
Somehow, we think, we possess some trait that means we deserve more than everyone else. We have
measured ourselves and we have measured others. It should never feel terrible ordering others around,
right? It should never feel terrible to diagnose people as an expert, manage them as a bureaucrat, test
them as a professor, extract value from their capital as a businessman. It should feel good, gratifying,
It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in

everyone this same dream of domination. After all, we are
intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve
this. We are convinced, owned, broken. We know their values better than they
do: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. This triumvirate of sacred values are ours of course, and in this
completing.
moment of practiced theaterthe fight between the university and its own studentswe have used their
When those values are violated by the

institutions which are created to protect them, the veneer fades, the tired set collapses: and
words on their stages: Save public education!

very
we call it injustice, we get indignant. We demand justice from them, for them to adhere
to their values. What many have learned again and again is that these institutions dont
care for those values, not at all, not for all. And we are only beginning to
understand that those values are not even our own. The values create popular
images and ideals (healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness, individuality, pulling yourself up by your
mean in practice the selling of

commodified identities, the states monopoly on violence , the expansion of
markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on
race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general. They sell the
practice through the image. Were taught well live the images once we accept the practice.
bootstraps, public education) while they
In this crisis the Chancellors and Presidents, the Regents and the British Petroleums, the politicians and the
managers, they all intend to be true to their values and capitalize on the university economically and
Their most
recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so
that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what
was always dead in the university, to see just how dead we are
willing to play, how non-existent, how compliant, how desirous.
sociallywhich is to say, nothing has changed, it is only an escalation, a provocation.
1NC (short)
The 1ACs praxis reinscribes the ideology of Islamophobiaspeaking for others destroys Islamic agency and
homogenizes the Muslim body
32-33, AX]
The war on terror discourse reinforces the basic premise of

Orientalism, the absolute difference between Islam and the west. Islam and Muslims are
associated with an inherent, uncivilized propensity for violence,
which is connected to the Orient as something to be both feared and
controlled for this reason. This fear of the violent potential of the Muslim Other takes its contemporary
form through the trope of dangerous Muslim man who evokes fear through terrorism, anchored by the
civilized, white, good, heroic American on the other side.19This American is part of the construction of
the western family of white nations, a civilization, obliged to use force and terror to defend itself against a
the war on terror discourse

extends Orientalist constructs is through the idea of an unchanging
and uniform Muslim Other who cannot speak for her/himself . This is
about two issues: first, the idea that all Muslims everywhere are the
same, and second, the agency of Muslims to define themselves.
They can only be seen and heard if they are interpreted and
mediated by the west through its privilege to both set the terms of
the discourse of the war on terror and to define them as particular
types of Muslims through it. The subject positions available to
Muslims in this hegemonic discourse are linked to the way in which
terrorism is defined as an Islamic problem because Muslims carried out the 9/11
menacing cultural Other.20 A second way in which
attacks. Terrorism is explained as a religious problem, rather than as a political issue, by linking it to the
By association then, all Muslims have this inherent

tendency to be potential terrorists because they are Muslims. Their
religion of the attackers.
actions can be explained solely and exclusively through reference to their religion, which is also perceived
as inherently violent. Quranic verses are often presented as literal evidence of this Muslim propensity for
Islamic terrorism.
Research is used to commodify pain

narratives and damage representations to reproduce
oppression with the justification of the academy
Urban communities, and other disenfranchised communities . Damage-centered
researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of
change in which harm must be recorded or proven in order to
convince an outside adjudicator that reparations are deserved. These
reparations presumably take the form of additional resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other
this theory of change as

both colonial and flawed, because it relies upon Western notions of
material, political, and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described
power as scarce and concentrated, and because it requires

disenfranchised communities to posi-tion themselves as both
singularly defective and powerless to make chang e (2010). Finally, Eve has
observed that won reparations rarely become reality, and that in many
cases, communities are left with a narrative that tells them that they
are broken.Similarly, at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the fixation social
science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from com-munities that are not White, not wealthy,
and not straight.
Academes demon-strated fascination with telling and

retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and
for its consumptive implacability. Imagining itself to be a voice, and
in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised (Simpson, 2007,
p. 67, emphasis in the original) is not just a rare historical occurrence in anthropology and related
We observe that much of the work of the academy is to

reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice. At first, this may read as an
fields.
intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things
have changed in recent decades. However, it is our view that while many individual scholars have cho-sen
to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their disciplines, novice researchers
emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that
such approaches embody what it means to do social science. The collection of pain narratives and the
theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent in the social sciences that
one might surmise that they are indeed what the academy is about. In her examination of the symbolic
violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990) portrays the core message from the academy to those on the
No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you

better than you can speak about yourself. No need to hear your
voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And
then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such
a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you I write
myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still colonizer the
speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk. ( p. 343)
margins as thus:
Hookss words resonate with our observation of how much of social science research is concerned with
providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a recognition that is enamored with knowing through
pain. Further, this passage describes the ways in which the researchers voice is constituted by,
legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by telling back
the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to untangle the almost imperceptible
differences between forces that silence and forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins
to speak, to tell their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, Do not
speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that is a sign of deprivation, a
wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain (hooks, 1990, p. 343).
Orienting politics around the university space creates

social death
Occupied UC Berkeley 09 [The Necrosocial: Civic Life, Social Death,
and the UC. http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/thenecrosocial/]

In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the
conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within
prescribed identity categoriesour force will be dependent on the
limited spaces of recognition built between us. Here we are at odds
with one another socially, each of us: students, faculty , staff, homebums,
activists, police, chancellors, administrators, bureaucrats, investors, politicians, faculty/
staff/ homebums/ activists/ police/ chancellors/ administrators/ bureaucrats/ investors/ politicians-to-be.
That is, we are students, or students of color, or queer students of color, or faculty, or
Philosophy Faculty, or Gender and Women Studies faculty, or we are custodians, or we are shift leaders
We form teams, clubs,

fraternities, majors, departments, schools, unions, ideologies,
each with our own office, place, time, and given meaning.
identities, and subculturesand thankfully each group gets its own

designated burial plot. Who doesnt participate in this graveyard? In the university
we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality
translates to a value of domination. We spend money and energy
trying to convince ourselves were brighter than everyone else.
Somehow, we think, we possess some trait that means we deserve more than everyone else. We have
measured ourselves and we have measured others. It should never feel terrible ordering others around,
right? It should never feel terrible to diagnose people as an expert, manage them as a bureaucrat, test
them as a professor, extract value from their capital as a businessman. It should feel good, gratifying,
It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in

everyone this same dream of domination. After all, we are
intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve
this. We are convinced, owned, broken. We know their values better than they
do: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. This triumvirate of sacred values are ours of course, and in this
completing.
moment of practiced theaterthe fight between the university and its own studentswe have used their
When those values are violated by the

institutions which are created to protect them, the veneer fades, the tired set collapses: and
we call it injustice, we get indignant. We demand justice from them, for them to adhere
to their values. What many have learned again and again is that these institutions dont
care for those values, not at all, not for all. And we are only beginning to
understand that those values are not even our own. The values create popular
words on their stages: Save public education!
very
images and ideals (healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness, individuality, pulling yourself up by your
mean in practice the selling of

commodified identities, the states monopoly on violence , the expansion of
markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on
race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general. They sell the
practice through the image. Were taught well live the images once we accept the practice.
bootstraps, public education) while they
In this crisis the Chancellors and Presidents, the Regents and the British Petroleums, the politicians and the
managers, they all intend to be true to their values and capitalize on the university economically and
Their most
recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so
that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what
was always dead in the university, to see just how dead we are
willing to play, how non-existent, how compliant, how desirous.
sociallywhich is to say, nothing has changed, it is only an escalation, a provocation.
2nc turns case

The affs victimization of Arab Americans creates a white
knight complex that leads to an increase in surveillance
on the bad Muslims
Spivak and Barlow 2004 [Gayatri (Avalon Foundation Professor @Columbia University),
Tani E. (Professor of History @ Rice University),Not Really a Properly Intellectual Response: An Interview
with Gayatri Spivak, Positions: east asia cultures critique, Volume 12, Number 1, Spring 2004, pg. 140,
It is a pity in
all of this postnational talk that this cruel nationalismtaking
pleasure in the death of othersbegins with the shock of the death
of ones own. It is a cause for great sorrow that this event brings out the worst
kind of herd mentalityto quote Nietzschein human beings, and it falls
under nationalism. Bushs spin doctors have told him to say that
Islam is a wonderful religion and the hijackers hijacked it. There- fore one
must now endlessly be nice to Arab Americans even as there is
relentless racial profiling and undercover incarceration. Feminism is
showing its problems too. Why are members of the Revolutionary
Association of Women of Afghanistan suddenly taken to be
prophets? We dont know much about their values. They are a good group.
They havent appeared all of a sudden, but they have only now been
picked up because the Taliban hate their women. But people know
little about their specific problems. They also cannot give them real
informed sympathy because they are taken as a kind of fetish that
will justify support for the war, although they themselves oppose it.
GayatriChakravortySpivak: My problem is that I am unable to give a general response.
On the other side, you have the picture that CNN showed of U.S. women on aircraft carriers who are
actually chief programmers, wielding sextants and so on. And the guy even said that there can be no more
sexist jokes about women drivers. There is this wonderful blond girl. Midwestern-looking, freckled cheeks,
saying, If I can drive an aircraft carrier, I can drive a truck. These are issues I wrote about in Can the
Who could question that these are terrible

things? You would be foolish to say there was any justification for
burning widows or stoning adulter- esses. On the other hand, this sudden
exposure of visible violence by people, justifying war, killing
Afghans, does nothing to guarantee that the subaltern womens
epistemic production will be one iota altered. I am interested not only in the fact
that men do harm to women, but the fact that when it comes to the subaltern
woman, nobody is interested in the patience that is required, in
order to make her not acquiesce when they arrive at the point of
visible violence.
Subaltern Speak? twenty years ago.
2nc link ext.

The affirmative attempts to historicize the action of the
subaltern by rendering it into a recognizable people. This
project of academic integration obliterates the subaltern.
Spivak 5 [Gayatri, Prof. Comparative Literature and Society @ Columbia,
2005, Scattered speculations on the subaltern and the popular, Postcolonial
Studies Vol 8 No 4, p. 476]
Subaltern is to popular as gender is to sex, class to poverty, state to nation. One
word inclines to reasonableness, the other to cathexis / occupation
through desire. Popular divides between descriptive (as in presidential or TV ratings),
evaluative (not high, both a positive and a negative value, dependent on your politics), and
contains people, a word with immense range, from just anyone, to the masses (both a
positive and a negative political value, depending on your politics). The reasonable and rarefied definition
subaltern that interests me is: to be removed from all lines of social

mobility. The disciplinary interest of literary criticism is in the singular and the unverifiable. In Can the
of the word
Subaltern Speak? it was the peculiar and singular subalternity of the young Bhubaneswari Bhaduri that
The question of
veridicality / of the evidentiary status of testimony, sometimes taken for
granted in unexamined oral history / has to be thought of here. Gilles
seemed of interest.1 Her story was my mother Sivani Chakravortys testimony.
Deleuzes notion of singularity is both complex and simple. In its simplest form, the singular is not the
particular because it is an unrepeatable difference that is, on the other hand, repeated / not as an example
of a universal but as an instance of a collection of repetitions. Singularity is life as pure immanence, what
will be, of this life, as life. As the name Bhubaneswari Bhaduri became a teaching text, it took on this
If the thinking of subalternity is

taken in the general sense, its lack of access to mobility may be a
version of singularity. Subalternity cannot be generalised according
to hegemonic logic. That is what makes it subaltern. Yet it is a category
and therefore repeatable. Since the general sense is always mired in narrow
senses, any differentiations between subalternity and the popular must thus
concern itself with singular cases and thus contravene the philosophical purity of Deleuzes thought.3
imperative / repeat as singular /, as does literature.2
The starting point of a singular itinerary of the word subaltern can be Antonio Gramscis Southern
Question rather than his more general discussions of the subaltern. I believe that was the basic starting
point of the South Asian Subaltern Studies collective / Gramsci, a Communist, thinking beyond capital logic
in terms of unequal development. Subsequently, Partha Chatterjee developed a nuanced reading of both
Gramsci and Foucault.4 It is from Some Aspects of the Southern Question, then, that we can move into
Ranajit Guhas On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India.5 Subaltern in the early Guha
was the name of a space of difference. And the word was indistinguishable from people. Although Guha
seems to be saying that the words people and subaltern are interchangeable, I think this is not a
in their early work, the members of the

Subaltern Studies collective would not quarrel with the notion that
the word subaltern and the idea of the popular do not inhabit a
continuous space. Yet their failure to make this distinction has led to
a certain relaxing of the word subaltern that has undermined its
usefulness. The slide into the popular may be part of this.
Subalternity is a position without identity. It is somewhat like the strict
substantive point for him. At least
understanding of class. Class is not a cultural origin, it is a sense of economic collectivity, of social
relations of formation as the basis of action. Gender is not lived sexual difference. It is a sense of the
collective social negotiation of sexual differences as the basis of action. Race is not originary; it assumes
where social lines of mobility, being elsewhere, do not

permit the formation of a recognisable basis of action. The early
racism. Subalternity is
subalternists looked at examples where subalternity was brought to crisis, as a basis for militancy was
formed. Even then
colonial and nationalist historiography did not recognise
it as such. Could the subaltern speak, then? Could it have its insurgency
recognised by the official historians? Even when, strictly speaking, they had burst the
outlines of subalternity? This last is important. Neither the groups celebrated by the early
subalternists nor Bhubaneswari Bhaduri, in so far as they had burst their bonds
into resistance, were in the position of subalternity. No one can say
I am a subaltern in whatever language.
And
subaltern studies will
not reduce itself to the historical recounting of the details of the

practice of disenfranchised groups and remain a study of the
subaltern.
Research is used to commodify pain narratives- a refusal

to enagage in research is necessary
Research is a dirty word among many Native communities (Tuhiwai Smith,1999), and
arguably, also among ghettoized (Kelley, 1997), Orientalized(Said, 1978), and other communities
of overstudied Others. The ethicalstandards of the academic industrial complex are a recent
development, and likeso many postcivil rights reforms, do not always do enough to ensure that
socialscience research is deeply ethical, meaningful, or useful for the individual or com-munity being
Social science often works to collect stories of pain

andhumiliation in the lives of those being researched for
commodification. However,these same stories of pain and humiliation are
part of the collective wisdom thatoften informs the writings of
researchers who attempt to position their intellectualwork as
decolonization. Indeed, to refute the crime, we may need to name it. Howdo we learn
from and respect the wisdom and desires in the stories that we
(over)hear, while refusing to portray/betray them to the spectacle of
the settler colonialgaze? How do we develop an ethics for research
that differentiates between powerwhich deserves a denuding,
indeed petrifying scrutinyand people? Atthe same time, as fraught as research is in
researched.
its complicity with power, it is one ofthe last places for legitimated inquiry. It is at least still a space that
proclaims tocare about curiosity. In this essay, we theorize refusal not just as a no, but as atype of
investigation into what you need to know and what I refuse to write in(Simpson, 2007, p. 72).
Therefore, we present a refusal to do research, or a refusalwithin research, as a way of

thinking about humanizing researchers. We have organized this chapter into four portions. In the first three
sections,we lay out three axioms of social science research. Following the work of EveKosofsky Sedgwick
(1990), we use the exposition of these axioms to articulateotherwise implicit, methodological, definitional,
self-evident groundings (p. 12)of our arguments and observations of refusal. The axioms are: (I) The
subalterncan speak, but is only invited to speak her/our pain; (II) there are some forms of knowledge that
the academy doesnt deserve; and (III) research may not be theintervention that is needed. We realize that
these axioms may not appear self-evident to everyone, yet asserting them as apparent allows us to
proceed towardthe often unquestioned limits of research. Indeed, in dealing with an open-secret
structure, its only by being shameless about risking the obvious that wehappen into the vicinity of the
transformative (Sedgwick, 1990, p. 22). In thefourth section of the chapter, we theorize refusal in earnest,
exploring ideas thatare still forming.Our thinking and writing in this essay is informed by our readings of
postco-lonial literatures and critical literatures on settler colonialism. We locate much ofour analysis
inside/in relation to the discourse of settler colonialism, the particu-lar shape of colonial domination in the
United States and elsewhere, includingCanada, New Zealand, and Australia. Settler colonialism can be
differentiatedfrom what one might call exogenous colonialism in that the colonizers arrive at a place
(discovering it) and make it a permanent home (claiming it). The perma-nence of settler colonialism
makes it a structure, not just an event (Wolfe, 1999).The settler colonial nation-state is dependent on
destroying and erasingIndigenous inhabitants in order to clear them from valuable land. The settlercolonial
structure also requires the enslavement and labor of bodies that have been stolen from their homelands
and transported in order to labor the land stolenfrom Indigenous people. Settler colonialism refers to a
triad relationship, betweenthe White settler (who is valued for his leadership and innovative mind), the disappeared Indigenous peoples (whose land is valued, so they and their claims to itmust be extinguished),
and the chattel slaves (whose bodies are valuable butownable, abusable, and murderable). We believe that
this triad is the basis of theformation of Whiteness in settler colonial nation-states, and that the interplay
oferasure, bodies, land, and violence is characteristic of the permanence of settlercolonial structures.Under
coloniality, Descartes formulation, cognito ergo sum (I think, thereforeI am) transforms into ego
conquiro (I conquer, therefore I am; Dussel, 1985;Maldonado-Torres, 2007; Ndlvou-Gatsheni, 2011).
Nelson Maldonado-Torres(2009) expounds on this relationship of the conquerors sense-of-self to
Knowledge of self/Others
became the philosophical justification for the acquisition of bodies
and territo-ries, and the rule over them. Thus the right to conquer is
intimately connected tothe right to know (I know, therefore I
conquer, therefore I am). Maldonado-Torres (2009) explains that for Levi Strauss, the
hisknowledge-of-others (I know her, therefore I am me).
self/Other knowledge paradigmis the methodological rule for the birth of ethnology as a science (pp. 34).
Settler colonial knowledge is premised on frontiers; conquest, then, is an exerciseof the felt entitlement to
transgress these limits. Refusal, and stances of refusal inresearch, are attempts to place limits on conquest
and the colonization of knowl-edge by marking what is off limits, what is not up for grabs or discussion,
what issacred, and what cant be known. To speak of limits in such a way makes some liberal thinkers
When access to information, to

knowledge, to theintellectual commons is controlled by the people
who generate that information[participants in a research study], it
can be seen as a violation of shared standards of justice and truth.
(Simpson, 2007, p. 74) By forwarding a framework of refusal within
(and to) research in this chapter, weare not simply prescribing limits
to social science research. We are making visibleinvisibilized limits,
containments, and seizures that research already stakes out.
uncomfortable, andmay, to them, seem dangerous.
*Politics DA
1NC
Obama will fight the plan- Recent meeting proves he
supports surveillance of Muslims
Blumenthal 14 (Max Blumenthal: Writer for AlternetSyndication service and online community of the alternative
press, featuring news stories from alternative newsweeklies,
magazines and web publications, Obama Humiliates Muslim
Guests at White House Ramadan Event, Endorses Israels Gaza
Assault and NSA Surveillance, 7/17/14,
http://www.alternet.org/world/obama-humiliates-muslim-white-house-guestsendorsing-israels-gaza-assault-defending-nsa , Accessed: 7/17/15, RRR)
At the annual White House Iftar dinner commemorating the Muslim holiday of Ramadan, President Barack Obama
endorsed Israels ongoing assault on the Gaza Strip and defended government spying on
Muslim-Americans. Alongside dozens of Muslim-American community activists and Muslim diplomats, the
White House welcomed Israeli Ambassador to the US Ron Dermer, an
outspoken advocate of Israel's settlement enterprise who has
claimed Muslim and Arab culture is endemically violent . In the past, the
annual Iftar dinner passed without much notice. Last year, President Barack Obama delivered a boilerplate speech to the
assembled crowd of Muslim-American community activists and Middle Eastern ambassadors about his efforts to spur
entrepreneurship. But this time, amidst a one-sided Israeli assault on the Gaza Strip that was about to claim its 200th
death in just a week, and which the US had backed to the hilt, the heat was on. While Obama prepared his remarks, calls
rang out with unprecedented intensity for invitees to boycott the July 14 ceremony. Among those who urged a boycott in
protest of the Gaza assault and ongoing government spying on Muslim-Americans was the Arab-American AntiDiscrimination Committee (ADC), an established presence in Washington representing the countrys largest Arab-American
advocacy group. Joining the boycott call was Mariam Abu-Ali, the sister of Ahmed Abu Ali, a US citizen renditioned to
Saudi Arabia for torture before being sentenced to life in prison on dubious charges of threatening to kill George W. Bush.
The White House Iftar is a slap in the face to those in the Muslim
community who have been victims of U.S. civil-rights and humanrights abuses, Abu Ali wrote. It is an attempt by administration after
administration to whitewash the crimes of the U.S. government
against Muslims by painting a less-than-accurate picture of their
relationship with the American Muslim community. As established MuslimAmerican leaders like Laila Al-Marayati lined up to boycott (Al-Marayati rejected an invitation to the State Departments
Iftar), others defended their presence at the ceremony. Most vocal among them was Rep. Keith Ellison (D-MN), one of the
two Muslim members of Congress. I disagree with the tactic, Ellison remarked in a statement released by his office. It
will not close Guantanamo Bay, guarantee a cease-fire between Israel and Palestine or undo the NSAs targeting of
Muslims. The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) echoed Ellison, insisting that the event would allow [them] to
engage with senior White House officials for a decent amount of time on substantive issues. While Muslim-American civil
rights groups like the Council on American Islamic Relations have assumed a more confrontational posture towards the
White House and boycotted a prayer breakfast with former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg in protest of his
support for NYPD surveillance of Muslims, MPAC has taken an altogether different tack. Its role as a paid consultant on the
cable TV series, Tyrant, was perhaps the best example of its accommodationist stance. Produced by Howard Gordon,
the creator of 24 and Homeland, the show starred a white actor playing a pathological Arab dictator who ruled over
the deeply dysfunctional fictional nation of Abuddin. Even mainstream TV critics derided the series as unbearably
Orientalist, with the Washington Posts Hank Stuever describing it as a stultifyingly acted TV drama stocked with tired
and terribly broad notions of Muslim culture in a make-believe nation on the brink. Leading up to the White House Iftar, a
leader of a major Muslim advocacy organization told me on background that MPAC was bleeding support, especially from
younger activists. At the Iftar dinner, Obama launched into a defense of Israels assault on the Gaza Strip, declaring, I
will say very clearly, no country can accept rockets fired indiscriminately at citizens. And so, weve been very clear that
Israel has the right to defend itself against what I consider to be inexcusable attacks from Hamas. He went on to claim
against all evidence that his administration had worked long and hard to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and
that it had emphasized the need to protect civilians, regardless of who they are or where they live. Ali Kurnaz, the
Obamas
remarks provoked deep discomfort, with attendees exchanging
disturbed looks and rolling their eyes in astonishment . No one walked out in
central regional director for the Florida-based Emerge USA, was in the audience. He told me that
protest, however. After the dinner, I overheard at least three different exchanges attendees pointing out that
Palestinians should have a right to defend themselves too, Kurnaz recalled. Like many others who joined the dinner,
Kurnaz was not aware that Israeli Ambassador Ron Dermer had been invited. Dermer was a longtime confidant of Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the son of the Republican former Mayor of Miami Beach. This year, Dermer broke
diplomatic protocol by appearing at a fundraiser for the Republican Jewish Committee, helping to raise money for a
Perhaps the most startling

aspect of Dermers presence at the Iftar dinner was his stated belief
that a cultural tendency towards belligerency is deeply
embedded in the culture of the Arab world and its foremost
religion. According to Kurnaz, Dermer spent the evening isolated in the White Houses Green Room adjacent to
partisan organization dedicated to undermining Obamas agenda.
the main reception area, where he milled around mostly without company. None of the activists invited to the dinner
They
confronted him on the issue of domestic spying, an issue that took
on renewed immediacy after revelations by the Intercept that the
NSA and FBI has spied on leading Muslim-American civil rights
activists. Obama attempted to remind them that the spying had
begun under his predecessor, Bush, but defended the practice
approached him. When dinner began, Kurnaz said Obama was unusually candid with those seated at his table.
nonetheless , denying that the NSA had violated any laws.
2NC Link cards

Obama will fight the plan- It undermines administrations
counterterrorism efforts
Ackerman 14 (Spencer Ackerman: National security editor for Guardian,
White House Iftar dinner guests press Obama on surveillance of Muslims,

The Guardian, 7/16/2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/16/white-house-iftar-obamasurveillance-muslims, Accessed: 7/17/14, RRR)
Attendees of a White House dinner this week celebrating a Muslim holiday attempted to
leverage their direct interaction with Barack Obama into a presidential
commitment to discuss widespread and controversial surveillance of
their communities. They left feeling they had Obama's interest, but not much more. Less than a week after the
Intercept, based on documents leaked by Edward Snowden, showed US Muslim activists and attorneys had been targeted for surveillance,
Obama gathered legislators, diplomats and US Muslim community leaders to the White House on Monday night for an Iftar dinner, the sunset
Obama stressed the value of

pluralism, sidestepping the surveillance controversy . Not everyone
was satisfied with the omission. Some of the people who attended were signatories of a letter sent to the
meal during Ramadan. In remarks released by the White House,
White House in the wake of the Intercept story urgently requesting a meeting with Obama. Without that commitment yet in hand, took the
opportunity to raise the issue with Obama personally at the Monday dinner. "I specifically asked the president if he would meet with us to
discuss NSA spying on the American Muslim community. The president seemed to perk up and proceeded to discuss the issue, saying that he
takes it very seriously," said Junaid Sulahry, the outreach manager for Muslim Advocates, a legal and civil rights group. Obama was noncommittal, Sulahry said, but displayed "a clear willingness to discuss the issue." Hoda Elshishtawy, the national policy analyst for the Muslim
Public Affairs Council, said that she brought it up as part of a "table-wide discussion" on post-9/11 surveillance of US Muslims. "Our
That tension has

plagued the Obama administration's domestic counterterrorism or,
as it prefers, "countering violent extremism" for its entire tenure. The
communities can't be seen as suspects and partners at the same time," Elshishtawy said.
departments of justice and homeland security lead outreach efforts in Muslim and other local communities, stressing vigilance against
radicalizing influences and dialogue with law enforcement. Yet Muslim communities labor under widespread suspicion of incubating terrorism.
Surveillance from law enforcement and US intelligence is robust, from the harvesting of digital communications to the recruitment of
The Federal Bureau of Investigation compiles maps of

Muslim businesses and religious institutions, without suspicion of
specific crimes. The mixed message comes amidst the freight of a foreign policy featuring drone strikes in Muslim countries,
informants inside mosques.
a reluctance to foreclose on indefinite detention that functionally is only aimed at Muslims, and difficulty concluding the war in Afghanistan
all of which have strained relations with American-Muslim communities. Some of those community leaders have already come under fire for
attending the White House dinner. The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee urged a boycott over the surveillance and administration
support for Israel during the current Gaza offensive, rejecting what it called "normalization of the continuous breach of our fundamental
rights." Representatives of organizations that rejected the boycott argued that they can exercise greater influence through access than
through rejection. "Our strategy is to worth through the system," said Farhana Khera, Muslim Advocates' executive director.
The
White House declined comment on what it called "private

conversations at a closed press event."
Plan links to politics- Islamophobic lobbyists means plan

causes huge fight
CAIR 2013 [Council on American Islamic Relations Chicago; March 19, 2013; THE INFLUENCE OF
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS; http://www.cairchicago.org/blog/2013/03/the-influence-ofislamophobic-propagandists-in-congressional-politics/, Accessed 7/22/15, AX]
A select group of expert propagandists wield considerable influence

in congressional politics. These so-called scholars and activists compile
misinformation that is widely discredited and peddle it to
sympathetic right-leaning politicians who regurgitate its resulting
hateful rhetoric on the national stage. The most odious of these misinformation
experts include Brigette Gabriel, Frank Gaffney, Daniel Pipes, Walid Phares, Zuhdi Jasser and David
Their rhetoric is bigoted and incorrect, yet

insidiously shapes our national discourse through their political
Yerushalmi, just to name a few.
allies who hold influential positions in House Committees. The most

influential political allies include: Rep. Peter King, Rep. Allen West,
Rep. Sue Myrick, Rep. Michele Bauchman, and Rep. Paul Broun
among others. Through their various think tanks and advocacy organizations,
misinformation experts fear-monger and propagate baseless and inflammatory
rhetoric that shapes state and national discourse and policy. Brigette Gabriel characterizes Islam
as bent on the destruction and domination of American freedom and
values and says Islam keeps countries backwards, teaches hate and oppresses women and children.
She and her contemporaries employ gross generalizations equating
Muslims with radical Islamists, arguing that the difference between
Islam and the West is the difference between civilization and
barbarism and goodness and evil. She is quoted saying they have no soul, they
are dead-set on barbarism. To cast such a shadow of 1.5 billion Muslims as barbaric, hateful and soulless
is dangerously reductionist and insidious. Her books, Because They Hate and They Must Be Stopped, detail
her extremist mindset. Her organization ACT! For America, which boasts over 250 chapters nationwide,
mobilizes people at the grassroots level to make a difference in their communities by essentially
this organization, she endeavors to lay the

legislative groundwork for discriminatory policies against Muslims.
propagating their hateful message nationwide. Through
Curtailing surveillance unpopular Congressional and

popular backlash
Sethi 14 [Arjun Sethi, legislative counsel for national security and privacy related affairs at the
American Civil Liberties Union, February 26, 2014, Spying on Muslims is legal?,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/26/opinion/sethi-spying-on-muslims-legal/] //dickies
a federal judge in New Jersey

ruled that blanket, suspicion-less surveillance of Muslims is
permissible under the U.S. Constitution. Since September 11, 2001, the New York Police Department
Muslims in America just lost their right to privacy. Last week,
has used community mapping, video surveillance, photography and confidential informants to map Muslim
life in and around New York. No detail has proved too remote for the prying eyes of the NYPD. Mosques,
student groups, restaurants, even grade schools, have all been surveilled. In 2012, a group of New Jersey
plaintiffs sued the NYPD, alleging that the spying program chills religious expression and stigmatizes Islam.
The plaintiffs include an Iraq war veteran, a prominent mosque and a math teacher. Each was monitored
by the NYPD absent any evidence of wrongdoing. The judge, however, ruled the plaintiffs failed to prove
discrimination, and found that monitoring Muslims was the only way to stop terrorism arising from the
Muslim community. The court also dealt a damaging blow to whistle-blowers, ruling that The Associated
Press revelations about the program caused the plaintiffs' injury, not the NYPD. According to the judge, the
harm to Muslim communities was caused by overzealous journalists, not snooping cops. The most
immediate effect of the decision is that it will deepen the isolation of Muslims in America. A report by The
Creating Law Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility Project at CUNY Law School illustrates this
sharply. Many Muslims in New York live under an umbrella of fear. Not because they have anything to hide,
but because they want to be left alone, what Justice Louis Brandeis once called the right most valued by
civilized men. They hesitate before speaking Arabic or Urdu in public, dither before attending religious
services or joining faith based groups, and shy away from embracing emblems of faith, like hijabs and
beards. Not even students are immune from this incessant second-guessing. Many vacillate before joining
Muslim groups on campus or speaking on controversial issues like religious profiling in the classroom. Nor
is the problem confined to Muslims in and around New York. Indeed, the court's decision raises the specter
of something far more ominous. What stops the federal government from mapping and monitoring Muslims
nationwide? Permitting dragnet religious surveillance of Muslim communities will also exacerbate anti-
The NYPD spying program comes on the heels of a

nationwide maelstrom against Islam. More than a dozen state
legislatures have considered legislation criminalizing sharia law .
Mosques have been burned and vandalized, and Muslims have been
the target of countless hate crimes. Congress has joined the chorus
as well, with some members repeatedly overblowing the threat posed
by home-grown Muslim extremism. This widespread animus has led to a disturbing
paradox: More Americans fear Islam today than just after the 9-11
attacks.
Muslim sentiment.
Curtailing religious surveillance creates Congressional

backlash
Mint Press News 13 [Mint Press News, an independent watchdog journalism organization
that provides issue-based original reporting, in-depth investigations, and thoughtful analysis of the most
pressing topics facing our nation, April 23, 2013, Ellison Fights Back Against Calls For Police Surveillance
Of Muslim American Communities, http://www.mintpressnews.com/ellison-fights-back-against-calls-forpolice-surveillance-of-muslim-american-communities/61575/]//dickies
Ellison was speaking about the recent arrest of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the sole surviving Boston bombing
suspect who is being held in police custody and charged with crimes that could carry the death penalty if
Ellison, one of only two Muslims elected to the U.S. Congress, has tried to
stave off the onslaught of accusations against Muslims living in the
U.S., pitting himself against other elected officials calling for broad FBI
he is convicted.
surveillance of Muslim communities. Ninety-nine percent of the Muslims are outstanding Americans, said
Rep. Peter King (R-N.Y.) on Fox News Sunday. The fact is, thats where the threat is coming from. When
the FBI was after the Westies, they went to the Irish community. When they were after the mafia, they
went to the Italian community. If you know a certain threat is coming from a certain community, thats
where you have to look. The FBI and U.S. police departments began broad surveillance of mosques and
Muslim communities in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, a method some believe has unfairly
targeted a group of people for their religious affiliation and physical appearance. All Americans should be
concerned, said New York City Democratic Councilmember Daniel Dromm after the release of Mapping
Muslims, a report issued by the Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition, the Asian American Legal
Defense and Education Fund and the Creating Law Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility (CLEAR)
project last month. The policing thats going on now encourages mistrust or distrust within the Muslim
community. It is not good policing. These rights groups claim that the NYPD has targeted Muslim
communities around the city. The report alleges that since 2001, the NYPD has mapped, monitored and
analyzed American Muslim daily life throughout New York City, and even its surrounding states. In the
some elected officials are calling for similar surveillance

techniques for Muslim communities in the wake of the bombings and
shootings that killed four and injured 170. Ellison has led the
pushback in Congress against expanding surveillance based upon
religion or physical appearance, saying, In all these cases, where you see acts of radicalized
present case,
individuals using violence, they may have a religious affiliation, but oftentimes, when they give reasons for
why they did what they did, it is politics. He added, The FBI did not go after all Italians or all Irish people.
No one ever said lets surveil a whole ethnic community. They went after people who were criminals and
who were exhibiting criminal behavior To say that because of the Westies that every Irish person was
under suspect; Everyone in America knows that is ridiculous. But still, [King] wants to cast a wide net with
regard to Muslims.
Plan creates backlash current political climate proves

Harris 10 [David, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburg, 2010, Law Enforcement and
Intelligence Gathering in Muslim and Immigrant Communities After 9/11,
https://socialchangenyu.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/law-enforcement-and-intelligence-gathering-inmuslim-and-immigrant-communities-after-911-harris.pdf] //dickies
While legislation at either the federal or state level could impose judicial supervision requirements and
the enactment of such legislation seems as

unlikely in the current political climate as a reversal of the Hoffa and White cases by
the Supreme Court. In 2006, Congress reauthorized the expiring provisions of
the Patriot Act219 with few changes, despite strong opposition.220 In the fall of
2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act ,221 which, among other
things, withdrew the possibility of using the writ of habeas corpus in
cases arising from detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.222 In addition, the
summer of 2007 saw the enactment of legislation that provided
additional procedures for the National Security Agency to acquire
foreign intelligence through a warrantless wiretapping program .223
legal standards on the use of informants,
The state laws regulating the use of informants, discussed above, were passed many years ago,224 and, in
states have leaned in the other direction, passing their

own Patriot Acts.225 In all, statutory restraints on the use of
informants seem unlikely in todays political climate because a
more recent years,
political opponent could easily accuse a legislator advocating such

restraints as being soft on terrorism or handcuffing our police and
national security forces.
SPOT Specific
Obama continually supports and fights for the TSA
Pavlich 6/2 (Katie, Editor at Townhall, New York Times Best Selling author, author of Fast
and Furious: Barack Obama's Bloodiest Scandal and Its Shameless Cover-Up, National Review
Washington Fellow, After TSA Fails 96 Percent of Tests, Obama Continues to Have Confidence
in Security Agency, http://townhall.com/tipsheet/katiepavlich/2015/06/02/after-tsa-fails-96percent-of-tests-white-house-says-americans-can-be-confident-in-airport-security-n2007107
//rck)
Speaking from the White House Tuesday, Press Secretary Josh Earnest told
reporters Americans can be confident airports around the country
are secure and that President Obama still has confidence in the TSA .
"The President does believe the American people should feel
confident in traveling airports all across the country because there are
security measures in place to protect the traveling public," Earnest said. "The
President does continue to have confidence that the officers of the
TSA do very important work that continues to protect the American
people and continue to protect the American aviation system."
Obama will hate the planhe wont give up on the SPOT

program
Carter 3/6 (Tom, worker for the International Committee of the Fourth
International, Obama administration seeks to conceal records of discredited airport
screening program, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/03/24/aclu-m24.html,
//rck)
The TSA, backed by the Obama administration, has obstinately refused to

make any concessions with respect to the billion-dollar program. When the ACLU made its
initial Freedom of Information Act request in October 2014, the Obama administration
refused to turn over the requested records, responding in boilerplate language that the
ACLU had failed to demonstrate a particular urgency to inform the
public about the government activity involved in the request. The
Obama presidencywhich campaigned on promises of greater transparencyhas set a record
for censoring and withholding documents requested under the Freedom of Information Act, a 1966 reform
that ostensibly permits anyone to request and access government documents for a fee (see: Obama
administration sets record for denying access to government documents).As is often the case with the
political-military-intelligence establishment, what

appears on the surface to be laughable incompetence reveals itself upon closer examination to be
something more sinister. While the ACLU criticizes the SPOT program for being ineffective,
unscientific, and wasteful, the program is more likely arbitrary by design.
projects of Americas
*Negotiated Agreements CP
Counterplan text: Local law enforcement in the United
States should engage in informal negotiated agreements
with Muslim communities on the use of informants.
Negotiated agreements solve and avoids links to politics
If change with respect to the use of informants seems unlikely to happen via
either judicial or legislative action, there is still another way in which
change in how law enforcement uses informants in mosques might yet occur. This solution
depends not on raw political power or legal reasoning but on something else: the recognition
of how the interests of law enforcement and the community
overlap.234 Viewed correctly, these mutual interests can serve as the
springboard for the negotiation of a set of agreed-upon local
practices for using informants. Such negotiation could get law
enforcement what it most needs: good (or at least workable) relations with Muslim
communities, a continued flow of information from these same
communities, and an ability to use informants when a real need
exists for them. This process could also get Muslim communities at least some
of what they need: a formal recognition of their opposition to the use of
informants, as well as protection from some of the most egregious (as they may see
it) uses of informants against them. Law enforcement would give up the right to use
informants with total freedom, and the community would find itself protected , to a
degree, from the possibility that police would place informants into
mosques or other religious settings without a solid, fact-based
reason.235 The path would be difficult, fraught with obstacles, and, in certain respects, downright
unsatisfactory. But it represents the most promisingand perhaps the only
way forward for both law enforcement and Muslim communities . 1.
What the Negotiated Approach Is and What It Might Strive to Attain a) Description of the Process What
arrangements would be both

local and informal. Any given mosque or Muslim organization would
work toward agreement on the use of informants with its local FBI
field office, local agents of the Department of Homeland Security,
and the local police department (if the local department involves itself in this type of
informant-based investigation).236 A negotiation between locals on both sides of
the issue stands the best chance of succeeding, because those
involved in the negotiations may know each other from efforts
already made to build bridges and connections. The negotiations
themselves can serve as trust-building measures, enhancing and
strengthening relationships that already exist, or helping to create new
relationships. These efforts would be informal in the sense that they would strive not for
the imposition of a strict set of legal standards for example, a free-standing
system for procuring informant warrants but rather for a set of agreed-upon
might such a negotiated approach look like? To start, such
practices that the parties would then follow. If one of the parties came to feel that the agreed-upon
practices no longer work, the parties could, together, agree to adjust them. Best and
most importantly, these practices could be tailored to fit local facts and
circumstancesthe specific realities that both the community and law enforcement agencies face
daily. Why would any law enforcement agency agree to negotiate away any of its power to use informants
as part of an arrangement with precisely the people whom it may want to spy on? The fact that some
police agencies already use internal guidelines toor at least attempt tolimit some of the ways in which
they use informants, highlights the idea that limiting agency power to something less than what the Fourth
Amendment would allow can in fact represent the best available practice.237 Given that the FBI, NYPD,
and other law enforcement groups want something from the Muslim communitiescontinued and
increased cooperation, especially intelligence on suspicious activitiesand given that use of informants in
an unregulated fashion puts those very benefits in jeopardy by undermining connections with the
community, law enforcement may prove more willing than one might initially assume to engage in such a
negotiation.
2NC solvency
Counterplan solves limits use of active informants
i) Passive Versus Active Informants and the Standards for Using Them First, we must examine the methods
by which, and the circumstances within which, law enforcement might use informants. For the sake of
simplicity, let us break the methods of using informantsthat is, the types of informantsinto two
In passive informant activity, the

informant attends or participates in any activitygoes to a political rally, takes
part in a worship service, listens to a speech or a sermon, or the like to the same extent that
any private citizen might. The passive informant observes and reports to the police what she
sees and hears. In other words, the passive informant acts as a walking camera
and audio recorder,238 absorbing everything around her and reporting what she sees. The
categories: passive informants and active informants.
passive informant cannot target any particular individual, and she cannot do anything more than observe.
She might interact with other individuals who are present at the scene of the observation, but only in ways
An active informant, on the other hand,

would target a particular person or specific group for observation
and interaction. She would seek to actively connect with these individuals in an effort to gather
evidence of wrongdoing, plotting, or other behavior. An active informant might work
a targeted individual closely, perhaps befriending the target and her
family, as long as the informant did not in any way press the target
toward illegal conduct.239The critical distinction between passive
and active informants could serve as the basis for negotiating the
circumstances under which law enforcement could use informants.
The parties could pledge to have informants work only in a strictly
passive way, unless and until some proof of activity indicating possible terrorist or criminal behavior
that prove necessary to deflect suspicion.
emerged during passive observationexactly as the FBIs rules used to dictate under the Levi
The idea would be an informant who would blend in

completely and act no differently from any other person present . Given
Guidelines.240
that we cannot exclude the possibility that religious groups might (knowingly or unknowingly) harbor small
law enforcement should retain the ability

to use informants in these settings, but only passively, as a way to
check leads or find out if any activity exists which deserves some
greater degree of attention. A negotiated agreement would allow
law enforcement to have the presence it sometimes needs, and to
have it without any proof of wrongdoing; in other words, they could use passive
groups or individuals bent on terrorism,
informants at their discretion, as they may now under existing law. At the same time, law enforcement
This
arrangement seems like a good idea from both the point of view of
law enforcement success, because it allows police and security
agencies to look and listen for any indicators of real trouble, and
from the point of view of the communities, because they would have
assurance that the worship and fellowship that form the core of
activities at religious institutions would not encounter government
interference or disruption, unless absolutely necessary.241Something more would be
would agree to exercise this power only passively, so as to minimize intrusion and interference.
required for law enforcement to make use of active informants under a negotiated agreement. In
particular, the use of active informants would require some evidence. Law enforcement could use active
informants only if some reasonable, fact-based suspicion existed to link a particular suspect or suspects to
engagement in terrorist activity or other criminal conduct. That is, the police would agree not to use an
active informant just to make sure nothing is happening. Rather,
the use of active
informants would require some minimal evidence something more than a

hunch, feeling, or intuitionindicating that illegal activity has been, is, or will
be taking place. Police officers involved in any investigation should have little difficulty
understanding this reasonable, fact-based suspicion rule because it comes from Terry v. Ohio, under which
courts have used the same standard to test police officers decisions to stop and frisk suspects for almost
forty years.242 A system regulating informant use according to whether the facts would support a passive
or active informant operation would allow the government to use relatively unintrusive passive informants
without seeking permission; more intrusive (i.e., active) informant activity would require fact-based
This bifurcation would give

the government the flexibility it needs to gather information or
investigate leads, but it would also require some evidence to
conduct active informant investigations and limit these
investigations to situations potentially posing danger.
suspicion that terrorist or other criminal activity might be afoot.
Solves mutual education increases productivity of law

enforcement and relations
parties might agree on a process of

mutual education. For its part, law enforcement might educate Muslim
groups and congregations so that they could recognize actual
suspicious behavior, as opposed to simply relying on hunches about
people who have unusual opinions. It has become common for police departments and
iv) Education Across the Divide Fourth, the
the FBI to appeal to Muslim communities to report anything suspicious, much as FBI Director Mueller did in
the speech quoted at the beginning of this article.250 While there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of
Muellers exhortation, it was also quite general. It is all very well to ask community members to report their
suspicions, and even such a general request may produce leads for law enforcement. It is true that not all
leads may actually help law enforcement; this is true even when all the leads in an investigation originate
an untrained member of the

public, if asked to provide information to the police about something
as unusual as possible terrorist activity, would, in good faith, inevitably
produce mostly (if not wholly) useless leads, which officers and agents
must then spend their valuable time pursuing. Without some concrete indication
from law enforcement professionals. It seems likely that
of what suspicious action means, most lay people would stand little chance of spotting the real thing.
Training communities regarding the types of information that law

enforcement agencies want is one way to improve the amount of
useful information law enforcement receives. Moreover, the FBI, the Department
of Homeland Security, and even local police are in a good position to provide such training. For their part ,
Muslim communities could educate law enforcement about social
and religious customs, particularly habits of language . Considerable amounts
of such cultural and religious training regarding the customs and mores of Islam, by Muslims for police and
FBI agents, already takes place.251 Many police chiefs and law enforcement administrators at all levels
these efforts and stated that this type of training has

greatly enhanced their agencies capabilities, as well as
relationships with the Muslim communities.252 Language is a special area of
concern that these trainings should specifically address. Arabic speakers may sometimes
express opinions in Arabic in stronger, more vehement ways than
one might hear in English; these kinds of comments can hit Western
ears as angry, radical, or extremisteven when speakers intend
nothing of the sort.253 While it is true that law enforcement must react vigorously to any words
have expressed enthusiastic support for
expressing an intention to take some illegal or dangerous action, they must also exercise caution, because
linguistic, stylistic, and idiomatic differences can give a listener a misleading impression.
Aff cards
Negotiated approach fails police circumvent and
coordination fails
To be sure, the negotiated approach has flaws. It is not a perfect system for
accomplishing the twin goals of winning help and intelligence for law enforcement on the one hand, and
winning respect for the Muslim community on the other. As things stand, no existing solution can put these
two objectives perfectly in balance. But while some degree of tension between them seems inevitable, the
negotiated approach comes closest to a reasonable balance. Nevertheless, any proponent of this approach
the negotiated approach would

carry with it substantial questions concerning enforceability . What if
police agree to an arrangement with their Muslim partners , perhaps
including the four points described above, but in some particular case decide that they will
not abide by it, for what they believe to be good and sufficient reasons? For example, suppose that
must reckon with at least three specific problems. First,
law enforcement were to hear rumors of suspicion surrounding a very religious foreigner, new to the
Muslim community. Besides the religious nature of the persons appearance and practices, no known
The police may simply decide that they do not

want to take a chance that someone harmful will slip through their
fingers, so they decide, without any reasonable suspicion, that the
case calls for the use of an active informant. Should this become known, no
oneno institution, no court, no judge, no inspector, no arbiter
could do anything to enforce the rules that the police had agreed to
with the Muslim community; neither the community nor anyone else
would have standing to litigate the matter or any enforceable right
to take action. Without any kind of enforcement mechanism, negotiated agreements
of the type proposed here would bind the police only in the loosest
sense. Second, it is impossible to ignore the unbalanced power inherent
in such a negotiation. Law enforcement does not have to agree to
anything; it now has all the power it needs to use informants in any way and at any time it wants, and
it need not seek permission from anyone to use this power, least of
all from the (Muslim) community under scrutiny. While this unilateral approach
factual basis for suspicion exists.
clearly has costs,264 law enforcement may freely ignore them under the status quo if it wishes. Muslim
communities, for their parts, have no power to force the police to the bargaining table, and they cannot
force any change in police policy. They can only caution the police that, if they perceive informants being
used and overused in their religious institutions, many Muslims will become more fearful and less trusting
of law enforcement, as well as less likely to approach police with vital information.265Surely, both of these
ideas constitute fair criticism. Still, both merely redirect us to the underlying premise of the whole
negotiated approach. The police both want and need the cooperation of the community and the crucial
intelligence that a cooperative relationship facilitates. If and when law enforcement recognizes this fact,
the desire of the police to further the building of such relationships will serve as the enforcement
mechanism. This will not always be enough to restrain law enforcement and force it to consistently honor
its obligations under a negotiated agreement, but it is preferable to the alternative. It is better than the
current we make the rules approach, and certainly preferable from the perspective of the community, for
Third,
the local aspect of the negotiated approach proposed here , explained as
one of its strengths, may also constitute a weakness. Because of the
stratified nature of law enforcement in the United States, there
would be multiple law enforcement entities with which any Muslim
community wishing to negotiate an agreement would have to deal.
There are local departments for cities and counties, often with
which a negotiated arrangement limiting the use of informants can only be an improvement.
overlapping jurisdiction. A local police departmenteven a large one, like the

NYPDcould adopt its own policies on these matters. There are also
federal agencies, such as the FBI, that play primary anti-terrorism roles. To make matters
even more complex, the federal level is itself stratified. The FBI has fifty -six
field offices around the country, as well as more than 400 regional agencies
in smaller towns and cities.266 Each one of these field offices reports to FBI headquarters in Washington,
the FBI itself is only one part of

U.S. Department of Justice, which has the final say over FBI policy . As
a result, even if a local FBI office wishes to negotiate and agree to a set
of limits and rules for the use of informants, it remains less than
clear whether it would have the power to do so, or whether FBI
headquarters or the Department of Justice would allow it.
D.C., and must follow national FBI policy.267 Moreover,
*Neolib K
Notes
Integrate with the neolib vs K affs file our lab is working
on!
Link
The war on terror and fear of Islam are rhetorical
strategies to preclude critique of neoliberalism their
representations shut down movements while ensuring
error replication
Fasenfest 11
(David Fasenfest, American sociologist and an Associate Professor at Wayne

State University, Terrorism, Neo-Liberalism and Political Rhetoric, Critical
Sociology 37 (4) 2011)
The second observation is over the ambivalence shown by Western governments and political parties in
Democracy is good, the mantra goes, but we also desire stability and
so we are concerned about succession and chaos that may accompany the deposition of
Mubarak in Egypt. Conservatives, long the champions of freedom and
democracy around the world (but perhaps not in Florida!), find themselves critical of
Obamas stance calling for change and respect for the wishes of the people
of Egypt. Even these calls for change by the Administration are tempered by concerns over the
transition. After all, Mubarak was a valued ally (translate: a willing instrument of our foreign
the USA.
policy) and Egypt a recipient of our foreign aid (translate: we fund their military) they should not be
abandoned so quickly. Other absolute rulers in the region are watching us to see how we respond to this
democratic threat. Similar themes emerge: what is this movement for change and who will assume the
mantle of leadership. After all, we cannot just legitimize the aspirations of the dispossessed and the claims
against tyrants we have put into place and propped up for many years, even decades that would
We only
wish to demonize and overthrow our enemies, not our allies. How best to do
that if not to invoke images of Taliban-like governments in waiting eager to seize control,
describe so many countries around the world and potentially herald a Jacobin moment in each.
thereby worrying about
the rising role of what we call Islamists
in the region. Images
of another Iran are offered us to caution for calm and patience regarding Egypt. Nationalist forces and
national liberation movements during the period from the end of World War II through the Vietnam War era
and beyond were either supported by the USA if that movement called for deposing a government
unfriendly to US interests for example, funding the Contra war against Sandinista Nicaragua, or were
vilified as communist or worse if they opposed dictators friendly towards the USA fostering rebellion in
the Congo and the overthrow and assassination of Lumumba, and the overthrow of Mosaddeq in Iran
followed by the installation of Mohammad Reza Shah come to mind (see Berberoglu, 2000 on the politics of
national liberation struggles). The case of the successful coup in Iran in 1953, which served as a blueprint
for a successful coup in Guatemala in 1954 and the failed Bay of Pigs intervention in Cuba in 1961, is
instructive in the current situation for two reasons. First, the harsh rule of the USA-supported Shah left an
animosity among the Iranian people that culminated in an Islamic revolution in 1979 steeped in the hatred
of the USA. So long as we were pre-occupied by our Cold War against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact countries, and so long as Iran was kept in check by our ally Saddam Hussein in Iraq, that country was
not a primary concern of the USA. Second, our memory of the Iranian situation and hostage taking after
the overthrow of the Shah informs our political response and assessment of any post-Mubarak Egypt. Our
government fails to see how this popular anti- American rhetoric is born out of an association with a hated
regime propped up by American guns and money. The image of a group like the Moslem Brotherhood
taking part in discussions of a post-Mubarak Egypt and visions of the Ayatollah led revolution in Iran and
the unenlightened rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan (Langman, 2005) fuel our fears. Since the events of
9/11 the West in general and the USA in particular have used the specter
of Islam as our excuse and justification for our foreign (and domestic)
policies. That cataclysmic event vaulted a neo-conservative world view
front and center ,
which lead to a willingness to use military power unilaterally and without
regard to international norms in order to rectify and restore American and European interests as the US
Government has defined them. Our official understanding of anti-western terrorism is that it is a direct
result of Islams rejection of western liberalism and a rejection of the freedom and conspicuous
consumption of non-Islamic nations.
By framing the response as a war on terrorism
the US Government obscures the anti-communal nature of its position .

By anti-communal, I mean that neo-liberalism rejects the rights of
those who embody difference even as it purports to defend a system of
democracy rooted in difference. Clearly, there is no uniform definition of Arab (David, 2007)
but it is clear that there has been an attempt to both create a singular Muslim
identity and then strip it of its symbols (Byng, 2010) in the creation and
embodiment of this external threat. Only by raising the specter of an Islamic regime, with all
its implied hostility to the West, can our current political leaders rationalize a measured and hesitant
response to the opposition movement in Egypt, and in so doing urge that the transition from Mubarak does
not leave a power vacuum. Once again we fail to recognize or choose to ignore the fact that legitimate
grievances against despotic regimes will lead, in turn, to legitimate grievances against states and
governments that support and maintain those regimes in power. The anger of the Iranian people amid the
memory of US involvement in installing and supporting the Shah is ignored, and in its place we identify the
We now seem
to ignore the poverty and repression sustained by US aid for a leader whose
main value was to be a powerful instrument of our foreign policy and a proxy in an
Islamic nature of the revolution as the root cause of the animosity against this country.
important region (not to mention a willing partner through rendition and the application of torture illegal in
The signals are clear. The overthrow of the government in Tunisia, the
responses to popular protest in Jordan and Yemen, and current events in
Egypt all point to a growing willingness by citizens to challenge the
the USA).
existing order that ensures widespread poverty,
aggregates wealth and power
among a very few, and in this way to resist the forces of social control in demonstrating and demanding
real change.
By labeling this opposition as Islamist and demonizing its
goals western governments can ignore legitimate claims and dismiss

popular protest . And so we return to the situation in the USA. We face persistent unemployment
that promises to be devastating for a generation of workers too old to retrain and too young to partake of
years of retirement especially as the conservatives in Congress mean to strip bear the underpinning of
the willingness and

eagerness of these same conservative forces to advocate for the continuation
of the Mubarak regime reveals the true nature of their domestic social
the social supports making that retirement possible. On some level
political agenda . There are no appeals to poverty alleviation, no sense that

there is a social responsibility of society to all citizens, and no compassion for those
dealt a harsh blow by the policies of its government and the working of its economy. This is true in
their response to events in Egypt, and apparently true as these politicians
contemplate policies and budget cuts to social spending in the USA.
Link
The perpetuation of neoliberalism relies on the
construction of the dangerous Muslim other in order to
justify external atrocities such as the War on Terrorviolence against Muslims is just another extension of right
wing neoliberal politics
Ali 2014 [Hussein (student @ Berkeley), Islamophobia Stoked by
Neoliberal Ideology, The Emory Wheel,
http://emorywheel.com/islamophobia-stoked-by-neoliberal-ideology/,
And in Europe, it does not get better. With the rise of the Stop the Islamization of
Europe (SIOE) and other far-right organizations and political parties the
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the UK and the National Front (FN) in France the
Muslim diaspora in Europe is threatened and at great risk for losing their
own ground. Common to all these events is this acute crisis of
neoliberalism that is becoming evident in the discourse of Western
society, a crisis that foreshadows a looming disaster. On one hand, it is
defined by its ideological framework, which is constituted by
Western ideals such as the right to freedom of speech and
expression or anti-censorship. However, what is critical here is how the
neoliberal state handles those who operate from the outside of this
ideological framework. This way of dealing with marginalized
minorities is prevalent in France, for example, where, in 2003, the National
Assembly under the presidency of Jacques Chirac passed a law that prohibits
wearing a niqab or hijab in schools, yet allows Christian students to practice
their freedom of choice by letting them wear small crosses to school. Later in 2010 with
President Nicolas Sarkozy in office, the Senate of France legislated the full ban on face covering. Such
gestures of power, which are always supported by the legal and moral
order of the state, are another characteristic of the neoliberal crisis.
These signs of power become an opening for supremacy, an
authoritarian mechanism that seeks to marginalize and criminalize
the different identities found in Western society. The identity of the
Muslim today, especially after the atrocious 9/11, is constructed upon an
opposition to the negative, meaning that for the Muslim to be a
Muslim he/she must oppose himself/herself to the identity of the
terrorist or the primitive, creating a space for identity politics.
Nevertheless, one must not forget that the ideological framework of the neoliberal
state predefines the process of the construction of such a
marginalized identity. Terrorism, for example, is a neologism, a notion
created by the neoliberal governments to excuse an already-failed
war to gain control of territories and fight the enemies of Western
democracy, yet Muslims cannot escape this accusation of enmity or
of being a terrorist or a Jihadist, leaving them in a long-run resistance
against the negative, false consciousness of the government that
criminalizes their existence. This reasoning by the forces of neoliberalism is
lethally dangerous for grouping a diverse religion under the perception that
Islam itself breeds terrorism. And now that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
is crawling to Iraq after a bloodthirsty conflict with the Syrian government, the Muslim
situation worsens and regresses to the same model that was applied to all Muslims
during 9/11 or the 2006 Ontario terrorism case. It is a model of exclusion that
generalizes and applies the image of the terrorist to all Muslims and
universalizes a false and negative identity that targets the worshippers of Allah.
This is the popular form of Islamophobia that the neoliberal state employs
in its process of marginalizing and, let us say it frankly, Westernizing
Muslims who must choose their allies carefully and proceed cautiously in
accordance to what Western society predetermines as a positive
image of Islam. This mode of generalization and exclusionary power
is a new process of policing the peoples of the neoliberal society and
is certainly not limited to Muslims the criminalization of
immigrants, the rejection of queer minorities, the targeting of races
or religions and, of course, the oppression of women operate from the
same, repetitive mechanism that alienates marginalized identities.
The problem of Islamophobia, however, becomes a graver issue when the prejudice towards Muslims is not
considered a form of oppression but a form of freedom of speech and expression. Criticism of Islam,
especially in the 21st century, is a liberal one, by which I mean that the voiced critics of the religion do not
take into consideration the socioeconomic, the historical and the differential conditions of the religion and
it is an act of absurdity to claim that the

ideology of al-Qaeda or any militant Salafi organization is the same as that of the
Sufis in North Africa or that of the Shias in Lebanon and Iraq . When
its followers. To voice this candidly,
Maher, for example, criticizes Islam, he seeks to consider origins, ideals or common values that Muslims
share, as the starting point of his critique. But our objection to this way of criticizing is that Maher regards
the text as a static, immutable object that rejects interpretations. Militant rationalism, as the Marxist
Its
utmost priority is to destroy the Other by indulging in an alreadyestablished medium of debate in which sciences and reason reign
supreme, and to establish their understanding of things and appoint
it as the universal. What is left to say here is that the militant rationalism or the New Atheist clan
literary theorist Terry Eagleton describes it, is the governing body of the New Atheist movement.
faces this irony or a paradox in its own system of reasoning, which is the claim that the sciences and
reason have an access to the truth so these four horsemen of atheism are nothing but prophets of their
militant rationalism has a double existence: one that

is, according to Eagleton, an apparatus used by the neoliberal states in their
War on Terror, by which ideology supplies a moral justification to
their latters atrocious acts; and the other mode of existence, as Noam Chomsky argues, is
a religion that amasses the peoples and feeds them a false ideology that
is paradoxical by its own terms. To the vigilant, it is not a surprise that
there is a war against Muslims all over the world, but it is shocking
that we do not know who is really being fought. The images of ISIS,
al-Qaeda and Boko Haram lurk in the shadows of the neoliberal
mentality whenever one confronts the topic of Islam and Muslims. One can
say, however, that todays war against Muslims is a war that universalizes
the image of the primitive terrorist whose priority is to destroy and
fight Western democracy. Today, the neoliberal world is dominated and
haunted by the fantasy of these images; the production of false
realities is what keeps capitalism well and alive.
own following. It is thus safe to say that
Link
The 1ac frames educational spaces as the site for
epistemological transformation but fails to recognize its
complicity in neoliberal ideology- political and educational
Anti-Muslim projects have always been framed around the
rhetoric of choosing free markets above radicalized
violence and spreads the neoliberal agenda
32-33, AX]
In the post-cold war era, as argued, these global designs coalesced around
the imperial project of capitalist democracy. In the age of terror,
neoliberalism has occupied center stage in the neo-imperial
discourses and projects targeting the Muslim world. The
Islamophobic/neoliberal program is multifaceted and encapsulates a
huge array of social, cultural, political and economic schemes. One
significant field of operation in this global Islamophobic/neoliberal crusade is
education, forming what I call the Islamophobic-Neoliberal-Educational
Complex.ISLAMOPHOBIC-NEOLIBERAL-EDUCATIONAL COMPLEX The Islamophobic-NeoliberalEducational Complex epitomizes the ideological site in which American
neo-imperial designs in the Muslim world are enacted. It rests on the
Islamophobic instrumentalization of education and reform to
institute a wide-ranging cultural and conceptual reconfiguration of
the Muslim world for global hegemony. This Complex operates at the
intersection of American educational imperialism, Islamophobic
securitization and neoliberalization. One of the very early instances of this project was
the White Revolution devised by the Kennedy administration for the Shah of Iran to counteract the threat
of a red revolution in the country. The Revolution was meant to strengthen secularism, garner support
for the Pahlavi regime and also importantly weaken the clerical class. This benevolent educational aid
was conditioned on economic modernization and the privatization of national assets (Dorn and Ghodsee
schemes of liberal-capitalist-oriented education were

integral to the global scheme of the production of liberal-capitalist
Last Man in the third world. This cultural reconversion has
transmuted into the more gigantic project of producing the
Neoliberal Man, to which we shall now turn. The Islamophobic-NeoliberalEducational Complex is hinged on two broad packages of
neoliberalization as antidotes to the Muslim Threat:
neoliberalization from above and neoliberalization from below. The
nexus of the war on terror and neoliberalization from above is
epitomized in Bush Is National Security Strategy. One fundamental
fulcrum of the war on terror is to ignite a new era of global
economic growth through free markets and free trade (White House 2002).
A necessary prelude to such free market ignition is a global
conflagration of violence, as Afghanistan and Iraq amply show in
addition to the numerous invisible small wars around the globe (Scahill 2013). Embracing free
trade and free markets holds magnificent things in store for humanity, so we
are promised. They generate prosperity and growth, a necessary endeavor for imprinting the
habits of liberty (White House 2002, 17). Shrouding imperial ambitions in the thick
2012, 387-388). These
veil of high-sounding moral ideals is not an entirely novel colonial ploy. In

tandem with global neoliberal restructuring, neoliberalization from below forms the
centerpiece of the ideological war for hearts and minds (and
pockets) to de-radicalize young Muslims. Neoliberalization in this context takes on a
vast social and cultural dimension. It is not simply an economic dogma concerned
with the reshuffling of economic structures. It is a full-blown social
program predicated on a set of values and predispositions
congruent with the broader neoliberal project. The discourses and
policy packages imposing free trade, privatization, deregulation,
the slashing of public spending, free market legal infrastructures at
the top dovetail with the grassroots social programs foisting a slew
of values smacking of a neoliberal ideology. These mainly concern
individual choice, individual responsibility, initiative,
entrepreneurship, skills and freedom. ISLAMOPHOBIA AS COMMODIFICATION
Education then becomes the site where these laboratory experiments
in neoliberal engineering are carried out. The aim of education in the neoliberal
age is to improve the skills of the labor force and the population as
a whole and enhance the propagation of ideas that boost
productivity and opportunity (National Endowment for Democracy 2012, 17). In the
same vein, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), launched in the same spirit as the NSS, subsumes
among its goals the development of skills that lead to job and opportunity and promote
entrepreneurship (US Department of State 2008, 2). This should not be taken lightly as economic
populism, so admonishes the National Endowment for Democracy. This necessitates fundamental
institutional reforms that will ... foster entrepreneurship, and promote changes in the educational system
to raise labor productivity and provide young people with the skills needed to compete in a global
The strategic significance of these neoliberal professions is

not limited to the economic transformation they are meant to effect.
Their centrality lies precisely in the capacity to instigate a wider and
long-term ideological revolution against Islamic terrorism. In this regard,
neoliberal Education is the best hope of turning young people away
from violence and extremism (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2007, 37).
Neoliberal education thus functions as a bulwark against the Islamic
threat, domesticating the minds of young Muslims and inoculating
their propensity for extremism. Neoliberalism meets education
meets Islamophobia.
economy.
*Courts CP
Notes:
The counterplan text should probably change and be specific on the grounds
for each aff.
Also, especially against the SPOT Aff, ACLU is their main solvency advocate &
the first 1NC card says that ACLU promotes bringing their cases to the Courts
because its more effective.
1nc
Text: The Unites States federal judiciary should
Court rulings are necessary for governmental surveillance
reformACLU v. Clapper proves
Toomey & Yachot 4/17 (Patrick & Noa, staff attorney in the ACLUs National
Security Project, where he works on issues related to electronic surveillance, national security
prosecutions, whistle-blowing, and racial profiling, United States circuit judge for the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, communications strategist for the ACLU's Center for Democracy,
which houses the National Security Project; the Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project; and
the Human Rights Program, Why Todays Landmark Court Victory Against Mass Surveillance
Matters, https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/why-todays-landmark-court-victory-againstmass-surveillance-matters, //rck)
court ruled unanimously today that

the mass phone-records program exposed two years ago by NSA whistleblower Edward
Snowden is illegal because it goes far beyond what Congress ever
intended to permit when it passed Section 215 of the Patriot Act. The ruling in ACLU
v. Clapper is enormously significant, and not only because the program in question the first to be
revealed by Edward Snowden is at the heart of a legislative reform effort
playing out right now, or because it sparked the most significant
debate about government surveillance in decades. The decision could also
In a landmark victory for privacy, a federal appeals
affect many other laws the government has stretched to the breaking point in order to justify dragnet
collection of Americans sensitive information. Under the program, revealed in the Guardian on June 5,
2013, telecommunications companies hand over to the NSA, on a daily basis, records relating to the calls
of all of their customers. Those records include information about who called whom, when, and for how
ACLU sued the NSA over the program just days after it was revealed, and we took the
case to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals after it was dismissed by a district court. A few points
long. The
on what makes the decision so important. 1. It recognizes that Section 215 of the Patriot Act does not
authorize the government to collect information on such a massive scale. Section 215 allows the
government to demand from third parties any tangible thing relevant to foreign intelligence or terrorism
investigations. Relevant is a pretty abstract term, but the government employed a pretty fantastical
interpretation to argue that every single call record in America is relevant because some of those records
might come in handy in a future investigation. The decision says: Excerpt from 2nd Circuit ruling on NSA
call records program. 2.
The decisions significance extends far beyond the

phone records program alone. It implicates other mass spying
programs that we have learned about in the past two years and
almost certainly others that the government continues to conceal
from the public. For example, we know that the Drug Enforcement Administration, for decades,
employed a similar definition of relevance to amass logs of every call made from the United States to as
many as 116 different countries. The same theory was also used to justify the collection of email
metadata. Both those programs have been discontinued, but the legal reasoning hasnt, and it could very
well be the basis for programs the government has never acknowledged to the public, including the CIAs
bulk collection of Americans financial records. Excerpt from 2nd Circuit decision on NSA call records
program. 3. Metadata is incredibly sensitive and revealing. The government has long argued that the
phone records program doesnt reveal the contents of calls, and as such, it is not an invasion of privacy.
But metadata, especially in aggregate, can be just as revealing as content, painting a detailed picture of a
persons life. The decision reads: Excerpt from 2nd Circuit Court decision in NSA call records program
The court recognized that public, adversarial

the lawfulness of this spying program was vitally
important to its decision and it drew a direct contrast to the secret,
one-sided proceedings that occur in the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court. The FISC operates in near-total secrecy, in which it almost always hears
case. 4. The importance of adversarial review.
litigation concerning
only from the government. It oversees a wide variety of broad surveillance programs without any public
participation or input, approving a body of secret law that has no place in a democracy.
This
decision affirms the role that federal courts and the public have
in overseeing practices with such sweeping constitutional
implications. 5. The congressional reforms under consideration just dont cut it.
Ahead of Section 215s sunset on June 1, Sen. Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) is trying to push
through a straight reauthorization of the provision, extending its life by another five years. After todays
decision came down, he took to the floor to defend
the
program a position altogether at odds with the
court decision, with the conclusions of multiple executive-branch

review groups who found the program hasnt been effective in stopping terrorism, and with
the clear consensus that supports far-reaching surveillance reform.
appeals
2NC Solvency
Only the courts ensure US surveillance is necessary and
proportionateUN recommendation proves
Stepanovich & Mitnick 14 (Amie & Drew, junior policy counsel working on
cybersecurity, digital due process, and privacy, Senior Research Associate for the Public
International Law and Policy Group and served as the Managing Online Editor of the Human
Rights Brief, U.S. Policy Manager at Access, expert in domestic surveillance, cybersecurity, and
privacy law, leads projects on digital due process and responds to threats at the intersection of
human rights and communications surveillance, Director of the Domestic Surveillance Project
at the Electronic Privacy Information Center, Principles 6 and 7: Competent Judicial Authority
& Due Process, //rck)
As noted above, the Principles require that all decisions relating to

Communications Surveillance be made by a competent judicial authority acting
independently of the government and in accordance with due process of law. This
reflects the core requirement of international human rights law that the
use of lawful surveillance powers by public officials must not only be
necessary and proportionate but also be attended by independently monitored strict
safeguards against abuse.87 As the European Court of Human Rights held in its 1979 decision in Klass
v. Germany:88 The rule of law implies, inter alia, that an interference by the
executive authorities with an individuals rights should be subject to
an effective control which should normally be assured by the judiciary, at least in the
last resort, judicial control offering the best guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper
procedure. Although the Court in Klass agreed that it
is in principle desirable to
entrust supervisory control to a judge, it did not go so far as to hold that prior judicial
authorisation was required in every case so long as the relevant authorising body was sufficiently
independent of the authorities carrying out the surveillance to give an objective ruling and was also
vested with sufficient powers and competence to exercise an effective and continuous control."89 In
subsequent cases, however,
the Court has made clear the desirability of
judicial authorisation for the use of lawful surveillance.
In a case in 1999,
for instance, the Court stated that: It is, to say the least, astonishing that [the] task [of authorising
interceptions] should be assigned to an official of the Post Offices legal department, who is a member of
the executive, without supervision by an independent judge, especially in this sensitive area of the
confidential relations between a lawyer and his clients, which directly concern the rights of the defence.90
The Principles, however, reflect the view that prior
judicial authorisation of
surveillance powers is not merely desirable but essential.
This is because
neither of the other two branches of government is capable of providing the necessary degree of
independence and objectivity to prevent the abuse of surveillance powers. The Court's view in Klassthat
oversight by a parliamentary body might be sufficiently independentno longer seems tenable,
particularly in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in which legislators have shown themselves all too willing to
sacrifice individual rights in the name of promoting security. In the case of the executive branch, the
dangers are even more acute. In the UK, for instance, the same government ministers who are responsible
for the activities of the intelligence services are also responsible for authorising interception warrants, and
do so on the advice of those agencieshardly a credible safeguard against abuse. In addition, in August
the South Korean Constitutional Court rejected the collection of

individuals subscriber data in the absence of prior judicial
authorization on the basis that this amounted to treating them as
potential criminals.91 This was followed by the Korean National Human Rights Commission,
2012,
which decided in April 2014 that the lack of any requirement for prior judicial authorization for access to
among its recent

recommendations relating to NSA surveillance, the UN Human Rights
Committee recommended that the US government should provide
for judicial involvement in [the] authorization or monitoring of
the collected data by police violates international human rights.92 Also notable,
surveillance measures.93 For these reasons, the Principles endorse the view that only a
judge offers the sufficient guarantees of independence and
impartiality to ensure that surveillance powers are exercised in a manner, which is both necessary
and proportionate.
Specifically, the Courts are key to curtail TSA unreasonable searches
Schneier 9
(Bruce, internationally renowned security technologist, called a

"security guru" by The Economist, author of 13 books -- including Data and Goliath:
The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World -- as well as hundreds
of articles, essays, and academic papers, Court Limits on TSA Searches,
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/07/court_limits_on.html //rck)
A federal judge in June threw out seizure of three fake passports from a traveler,
saying that TSA screeners violated his Fourth Amendment rights
against unreasonable search and seizure. Congress authorizes TSA to
search travelers for weapons and explosives; beyond that, the agency is overstepping its
bounds, U.S. District Court Judge Algenon L. Marbley said. "The extent of the search went
beyond the permissible purpose of detecting weapons and explosives and was instead motivated by a
desire to uncover contraband evidencing ordinary criminal wrongdoing," Judge Marbley wrote. In the
second case, Steven Bierfeldt, treasurer for the Campaign for Liberty, a political organization launched
from Ron Paul's presidential run, was detained at the St. Louis airport because he was carrying $4,700 in a
lock box from the sale of tickets, T-shirts, bumper stickers and campaign paraphernalia. TSA screeners
quizzed him about the cash, his employment and the purpose of his trip to St. Louis, then summoned local
police and threatened him with arrest because he responded to their questions with a question of his own:
What were his rights and could TSA legally require him to answer? Mr.
Bierfeldt's suit, filed in U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia, seeks to bar TSA
from "conducting suspicion-less pre-flight searches of passengers or
their belongings for items other than weapons or explosives. " I wrote
about this a couple of weeks ago: ...Obama should mandate that airport security be solely about terrorism,
and not a general-purpose security checkpoint to catch everyone from pot smokers to deadbeat dads.
The Constitution provides us, both Americans and visitors to America, with strong
protections against invasive police searches. Two exceptions come into play at
airport security checkpoints. The first is "implied consent," which means that you cannot refuse to be
searched; your consent is implied when you purchased your ticket. And the second is "plain view," which
means that if the TSA officer happens to see something unrelated to airport security while screening you,
their
combination that turns airport security checkpoints into police-statelike checkpoints. The TSA should limit its searches to bombs and weapons and
leave general policing to the police -- where we know courts and the Constitution still
he is allowed to act on that. Both of these principles are well established and make sense, but it's
apply.
Politics NB
Avoids the link to politicsCourts are insulated
Shinar 14 (Adam, Assistant Professor, Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary
Center, Herzliya.
S.J.D. & LL.M. Harvard Law School, LL.B. Hebrew University, ENABLING RESISTANCE:
HOW COURTS
FACILITATE DEPARTURES FROM THE LAW, AND WHY THIS MAY NOT BE A BAD
THING //rck)
What, then, should we make of the political question doctrine and its relationship to resistance and
when the political question doctrine is merely a label

for ordinary constitutional interpretation it is difficult to claim that
the Court enables resistance. The more accurate description is that potential room for
resistance is entailed in the enforcement of the Constitution. It is the Constitution that
assumes that the political branches will either abide by its
commands or that they have discretion whether to obey. For example, when
illegality? On the one hand,
the Constitution provides that the Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments,121 then
whether the Senate decides to conduct a full trial or whether it delegates the matter to a committee is an
Therefore, even if having a trial by

committee somehow violates the defendants constitutional rights,
the Constitution seems to say that the Court cannot intervene. 122 By
contrast, when courts decide whether an issue is committed to other
branches, or whether they should, as a prudential matter, avoid
deciding the issue, two additional observations come into play. First, the court is able
to portray itself as standing outside the vicissitudes of politics. In this
way, the unlawfulness is happening elsewhere, and the court will not be perceived as
complicit, despite its facilitation. For example, when the constitutionality of keeping
troops in Libya came before a district court, the court refused to intervene.123 Criticism of
President Obamas movemaintaining troops without congressional
authorization in violation of the War Powers Actstuck with him. No one thought
that the court was somehow at fault. Second, courts often choose to punt particular
issue that the Senate gets to determine.
issues to the political branches, not necessarily because they lack the judicial tools to resolve them, but
because there is a concern that if the court rules in favor of the plaintiffs, the decision will not be obeyed
and consequently the courts status will be jeopardized. Thus, the best way to safeguard the courts
legitimacy would be by picking its fights.124 In this way,
alleged illegality can continue.
the court saves face and the
*Baudrillard
Notes
Please {dont} read
1NC
The visibility of the affirmative recreates virulence
through the hyper-signification of the 1ac. The medium
has become the message. The 1acs politics of
transparency internalizes control through the
panendoptikon, where individuals become transparent to
themselves. Reality only exists through hyper-expression
and over-representation; the modern subject no longer
exists, rather an empty screen projecting a fake sociality.
Baudrillard 2 ~ The violence of the image, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/the-violence-of-the-image/
This is the typical violence of information, of media, of images, of

the spectacular. Connected to a total visibility , a total elimination of
secrecy.
Be it of a psychological or mental, or of a neurological, biolo-gical or genetic order - soon we shall discover the gene of
revolt, the center of violence in the brain, perhaps even the gene of resistance against genetic manipulation - biological brainwashing,
brainstorming, brainlifting, with nothing left but recycled, whitewashed lobotomized people as in Clockwork Orange. At this point
we
should not speak of violence anymore, but rather of virulence . Inasmuch that
it does not work frontally, mechanically, but by contiguity, by contamination, along chain reactions, breaking our secret immunities. And
operating not just by a negative effect like the classical violence, but on the contrary by an excess of the positive, just as a cancerous cell
proliferates by metastasis, by restless reproduction and an excess of vitality.
That is the point in the controversy about the violence on the

screens and the impact of images on people's mind. The fact is that the
medium itself has a neutralizing power , counterbalancing the direct
effect of the violence on the imagination. I would say : the violence of the third type annihilates the
violence of the first and second type - but at the price of a more virulent intrusion in the deep cells of our mental world. The same as for antibiotics : they eradicate the agents of disease by reducing the general level of vitality.
When the medium becomes the message (MACLUHAN), then violence as a

medium becomes its own message , a messenger of itself. So the
violence of the message cannot be compared with the violence of
the medium as such, with the violence-emanating from the confusion
between medium and message . It is the same with viruses the virus also is information, but of a very special
kind - it is medium, and message, agent and action at the same time . That the
very origine of its "virulence", of its uncontrollable proliferation. In fact , in all actual biological, social or
mental processes, virulence has substituated violence . The
traditional violence of alienation , power and oppression has been
superated by something more violent than violence itself : the
virality , the virulence. And while it was an historical or individual subject of violence, there is no subject , no
personal agent of virulence (of contamination, of chain reaction), and then no possibility
to confront it efficiently. The classical violence was still haunted by
the specter of the Evil, it was still visible. Virulence only transappears, it is of the
order of transparency
and its logic is that of the transparency of the Evil.
The image (and more generally the s re of information) is violent because what happens
there is the murder of the Real , the vanishing point of Reality. Everything must be
seen, must be visible , and the image is the site par excellence of this
visibility . But at the same time it is the site of its disappearance. And that something in it has
disappeared, has returned to nowhere, makes the very fascination of the image.
Particularly in the case of all professional of press-images which

testify of the real events . In making reality , even the most violent, emerge to
the visible , it makes the real substance disappear. I t is like the Myth of Eurydice :
when Orpheus turns around to look at her, she vanishes and returns to hell. That is why, the more exponential the
marketing of images is growing the more fantastically grows the
indifference towards the real world . Finally, the real world becomes a
useless function , a collection of phantom shapes and ghost events .
We are not far from the silhouettes on the walls of the cave of Plato.
A wonderful model of this forced visibility is Big Brother and all similar programs,
reality shows, docusoaps etc.
Just there; where everything is given to be seen there
is nothing left to be seen . It is the mirror of platitude, of banality, of

the zero degree of everyday life. There is the place of a fake sociality , a virtual sociality
where the Other is desperately out of reach - this very fact illuminating perhaps the fundamental truth
that the human being is not a social being . Move over in all these scenarii the televisual public is
mobilized as spectator and judged as become itself Big Brother. The power of control and
transvisuality has shifted to the silent majorities themselves.
We are far beyond the panoptikon, where there was still a source of
power and visibility
it was so to say a panexoptikon -
things were made visible to an
external eye, whereas here they are made transparent to themselves - a

panendoptikon - thus erasing the traces of control and making the
operator himself transparent. The power of control is internalized , and
people are no more Lt victims of the image : they transform themselves into images they only exist as screens, ;or in a superficial dimension.
All that is visualized there, in the operation Big Brother, is pure virtual reality, a synthetic
image of the banality, producted : as in a computer. The equivalent of a ready-made - a given
transcrition of everyday life - which is itself already recycled by all current
patterns.
people dont want that, what they
secretly want to see is the spectacle of the banality ,which is from now our real
pornography, own true obscenity - that of the nullity,of insignificance and platitude (i.e.
Is there any sexual voyeurism ? Not at all. Almost no sexual scenery. But
the extreme reverse of the "There of the Cruelty"). But maybe in that scene lies a certain form of cruelty, at least of a virtual one. At the time
when media and television are more and more unable to give an image of the events of the world, then they discover the everyday life, the
existential banality as the most criminal event, as the most violent (in)actua-lity, as the very place of the Perfect Crime. And that it is, really.
people are fascinated, terrified and fascinated by this indifference

of the Nothing-to-see, of the Nothing-to-say, by the indifference of
their own life, as of the zero degree of living. The banality and the consumption of banality
And
have now become an olympic discipline of our time - the last form of the experiences of the limits.
In fact, this deals with the naive impulsion to be nothing, and to comfort oneself in this nothingness - sanctioned by the right to be nothing and
to be considered and respected as such. Something like a struggle for Nothing and for Virtual death - the perfect opposite to the basic
anthropological postulat of the struggle for life. At least it seems that we are all about to change our basic humanistic goals.
There are two ways of disappearing, of being nothing , (in the Integral Reality,
everything must logically want to disappear - automatic abreaction to the overdose of reality). Either to be
hidden,and to insist on the right not-to-be-seen (the actual defense of private life).Or
one shifts to a delirious exhibitionism of his own platitude and insignificance - ultimate protection against the servitude of being,and of being
himself.
Hence the absolute obligation to be seen,to make oneself visible at any price.
Everyone deals on both levels at the same time. Then we are in the
double bind - no t to be seen,and to be continously visible . No
ethics,no legislation can solve this dilemma,and the whole current
polemic about the right to information,all this polemic is useless .
Maximal information, maximal visibility are now part of the human rights (and of human duties all
the same) and the destiny of the image is trapped between the
unconditional right to see and that, unconditional as well, not to be
seen.
This means that people are deciferable at every moment . Overexposed to the
information , and addicted to their own image. Driven to express themselves at
any time - self-expression as the ultimate form of confession, as Faucauld said. To become an image, one has to give a visual object
of his whole everyday life, of his possibilities, of his feelings and desires. He-has to keep no secrets and to
interact permanently. Just here is the deepest violence, a violence done to the deepest
core, to the hard core of the individual. And at the same-time to the language ,
light of
because it also loses its symbolic originality - being nothing more

than the operator of visibility .. It loses its ironic dimersion, its
conceptual distance, its autonomous dimension - where language is more important than
what it signifies. The image too is more important than what it sneaks of . That we
forget usually, again and again and that is a source of the violence done to the image.
Today everything takes the look of the image - then all pretend that
the real has disappeared under the pression and the profusion of
images.. What is totally neglected is that the image also disappears under the blow
and the impact of reality . The image is usually spoiled of its own
existence as image, deyoted to a shameful complicity with the real .
The violence exercised by the image is largely balanced by the violence done to the image - its exploitation as a
pure vector of documen-tation, of testimony, of message (including the message
of misery and violence), its allegeance to morale, to pedagogy, to politics, to publicity . Then
the magic of the image, both as fatal and as vital illusion, is fading
away. The Byzantine Iconoclasts wanted to destroy images in order to abolish meaning and the representation of God. Today we are still
iconoclasts, but in an opposite way : we kill the images by an overdose of meaning .
Borgs'fable on " The People of the Mirror :he gives the hypothesis that
behind each figure of
resemblance and representation there is a vanquished enemy , a defeated

singularity, a dead object. And the Iconoclasts clearly understood how icons were the best way of letting God disappear. (but perhaps God
himself had chosen to disappear behind the images ? Nobody knows). Anyway,today is no more the matter of God :
We
disappear behind our images . No chance anymore that our images are stolen from us, that we must give up
our secrets - because we no longer have any. That is at the same time the sign of our ultimate morality and of our total obscenity.
There is a deep misunderstanding of the process of meaning . Most

images and photographs today reflect the misery and the violence of human
condition . But all this affects us less and less, just because it is over
signified . In order for the meaning, for the message to affect us,
the image has to exist on its own , to impose its original language . In
order for the real to be transferred to our imagination, or our imagination transferred to the real,
it must be a counter-transference upon the image, and this countertransference has to
be resoluted, worked through (in terms of psychoanalysis). Today we see misery and violence
becoming a leitmotiv of publicity just by the way of images . Toscani for example
is reintegrating sex and Aids, war and death into fashion. And why not ? Jubilating ad-images are no less obscene than the pessimistic ones)
But at one condition to show the violence of publicity itself, the

violence of fashion, the violence of the medium. What actually publishers are not able even
to try to do. However, fashion and high society are themselves a kind of
spectacle of death . The world's misery is quite so visible , quite so transparent
in the line and the face of any top-model as on the skeletal body of an african boy. The same cruelty is to be perceived everywhere, if one only
knows how to look at it.
The 1AC is nothing more than the production and

assimilation of otherness. This creates a violent form of
identification whereby the other becomes an object of
manipulation, another commodity in the economy of
symbolic exchange.
Baudrillard 02
/Jean, Screened Out, 51 56/

With modernity, we enter the age of the production of the Other.
The aim is no longer to kill the Other, devour it, seduce it, vie with
it, love it or hate it, but, in the first instance, to produce it . The
Other is no longer an object of passion, but an object of production.
Perhaps, in its radical otherness or its irreducible singularity, the Other has become
dangerous or unbearable, and its seductive power has to be
exorcized? Or perhaps, quite simply, otherness and the dual relation progressively
disappear with the rise of individual values and the destruction of
symbolic ones? The fact remains that otherness does come to be in short supply and, ifwe are not to live otherness as destiny, the other
has to be produced imperatively as difference. This goes for the world as much as for the body, sex
and social relations. It is to escape the world as destiny, the body as destiny, sex (and the opposite sex) as destiny, that the production of the other as difference will be
invented. For example, sexual difference: each sex with its anatomical and psychological characteristics, with its own desire and all the irresolvable consequences that
ensue, including the ideology ofsex and the Utopia of a difference based both in right and in nature. None of this has any meaning in seduction, where it is a question not
of desire but of a game with desire, and where it is a question not of the equality of the sexes or the alienation ofthe one by the other, since game-playing involves a
perfect reciprocity ofpart- ners (not difference and alienation, but otherness and complicity). Seduction is as far from hysteria as can be. Neither of the sexes projects its
sexuality on to the other; the distances are given; otherness is intact - it is the very condition of that higher illusion that is play with desire.
However, with the coming of the nineteenth century and Romanticism, a masculine hysteria comes into play and with it
a change in the sexual paradigm, which we must once again situate within the more general, universal framework of the
change in the paradigm of otherness.
In this hysterical phase, it was, so to speak, the femininity of man which projected itself on to woman and shaped her as an ideal figure in his
image. In Romantic love, the aim was not now to conquer the woman, to
seduce her, but to create her from the inside, to invent her , in some cases as
achieved Utopian vision, as idealized woman, in others as jemme jatale, as star - another hysterical, supernat- ural metaphor. The
Romantic Eros can be credited with having invented this ideal of harmony, of loving fusion, this
ideal of an almost incestuous form of twin beings the woman as projective resurrection ofthe same, who assumes her super- natural form only as ideal of the same, an
artefact doomed henceforth to Vamour ox, in other words, to a pathos ofthe ideal resemblance ofbeings and sexes - a pathetic confusion which substitutes for the dual
The whole mechanics ofthe erotic changes meaning, for the

erotic attraction which previously arose out of otherness, out of the strangeness of the Other, now finds its
stimulus in sameness - in similarity and resemblance. Auto-eroticism, incest? No. Rather a hypostasis of the Same. Of the same eyeing up
otherness of seduction.
the other, investing itself in the other, alienating itselfin the other - but the other is only ever the ephemeral form ofa difference which brings me closer to me. This indeed
sexuality becomes connected with death: it is

because it becomes connected with incest and its destiny - even in banalized form (for
is why, with Romantic love and all its current spin-offs,
we are no longer speaking ofmythic, tragic incest here; with modern eroticism we are dealing with a secondary incestuous form - of the protection of the same in the
image of the other - which amounts to a confusion and corruption of all images).
We have here then, in the end, the invention of a femininity which renders woman superfluous.
The invention of a difference
which is merely a roundabout copulation with its double. And

which, at bottom, renders any encounter with otherness impossible
(it would be interesting to know whether there was not any hysterical quid pro quo from the feminine in the construction of a virile, phallic mythology; feminism being one
such example of the hystericization of the masculine in woman, of the hysterical projection of her masculinity in the exact image ofthe hysterical projection by man ofhis
femininity into a mythical image of woman).
However, there still remains a dissymmetry in this enforced assignment to difference.
This is why I have contended, paradoxically, that man is more different from woman than woman is from
man. I mean that, within the framework ofsexual difference, man is merely different, whereas in woman
there remains something ofthe radical otherness which precedes the debased status ofdifference.
in this process of extrapolation of the Same into the production

of the Other, of hysterical invention of the sexual other as twin
sister or brother (if the twin theme is so prominent today, that is because it reflects this mode oflibidinal cloning), the sexes
become progressively assimilated to each other. This develops from difference
to lesser difference through to the point of role-reversal and the virtual non-differentiation of the sexes. And it ends up making sexuality a useless function. In cloning, for example,
In short,
pointlessly sexed beings are going to be repro- duced, since sexuality is no longer needed for their reproduction.
If the real woman seems to disappear in this hysterical invention

ofthe feminine (though she has other means ofresisting this), in this invention ofsexual
difference, in which the masculine occupies the privileged pole from the outset, and in which all the feminist struggles will
merely reassert that insoluble privilege or difference , we must recognize too that masculine
desire also becomes entirely problematical since it is able only to project itselfinto another in its image and, in this way, render itselfpurely speculative. So all the nonsense
There is a kind of transcendent justice

which means that, in this process ofsexual differentiation which culminates inexorably in non- differentiation, the two sexes
each lose as much of their singularity and their otherness. This is
the era ofthe Transsexual, in which all the conflicts connected with
this sexual difference carry on long after any real sexuality, any real alterity of the sexes, has disappeared.
Each individual repeats on his or her own body this (successful?) takeover ofthe feminine by masculine projection hysteria. The body is
identified and appropriated as a self-projection, and no longer as
otherness and destiny. In the facial features, in sex, in sickness and death, identity is constantly
being altered. You can do nothing about that. It is destiny. But this is precisely what has to be warded off at all costs in the identification of the body,
the individual appropriation of the body, of your desire, your
appearance, your image: plastic surgery on all fronts. For if the body is no longer a
about the phallus and male sexual privilege, etc. needs revising.
site of otherness, of a dual relation, if it is a site of identification,

then you have urgently to reconcile yourselfwith it, to repair it,
perfect it, turn it into an ideal object . Everyone treats his/her body as man treats woman in the projective
identification we have described: he invests it as a fetish in a desperate attempt at selfidentification . The body becomes an object of autistic worship, of
an almost incestuous manipulation . And it is the body's resemblance to its model which becomes a source oferoticism
and unconsummated self-seduction, insofar as it virtually excludes the Other and is the best means of excluding any seduction from elsewhere.
Many other things relate also to this production of the Other - a hysterical, speculative production. Racism is one example, in its development throughout the modern era
But the more we learn

how unfounded the genetic theory of race is, the more racism
intensifies. This is because we are dealing with an artificial
construction of the Other, on the basis of an erosion of the
singularity of cultures (of their otherness one to another) and entry into the fetish- istic
system of difference. So long as there is otherness, alienness and a (possibly violent) dual relation, there is no racism properly so called. That
is to say, roughly, up to the eighteenth century, as anthropological accounts attest. Once this 'natural' relation is lost,
we enter upon an exponential relation with an artificial Other . And
there is nothing in our culture with which we can stamp out racism,
since the entire movement of that culture is towards a fanatical
differential construction of the Other, and a perpetual extrapolation
ofthe Same through the Other. Autistic culture posing as altruism.
We talk of alienation. But the worst alienation is not being
dispossessed by the other, but being dispossessed of the other: it is
and its current recrudescence. Logically, it ought to have declined with progress and the spread ofEnlightenment.
having to produce the other in the absence of the other, and so
continually to be thrown back on oneself and one's own image . If, today, we
are condemned to our image (to cultivate our bodies, our 'looks', our identities, our desires), this is not because ofalienation, but because ofthe end ofalienation and the
virtual disappearance ofthe other, which is a much worse fate. In fact, the definition ofalienation is to take oneselfas one's focus, as one's object of care, desire, suffering
This definitive short-circuiting of the

other ushers in the era of transparency. Plastic surgery becomes
universal. And the surgery performed on the face and the body is
merely the symptom ofa more radical surgery: that performed on
otherness and destiny.
and communication.
What is the solution? There is no solution to this erotic trend within an entire culture; to this fascination, this whirl of denial of otherness, of all that is alien and negative; to
All we can do is
remind ourselves that seduction lies in non-reconciliation with the
other, in preserving the alien status of the Other. One must not be
this foreclosing of evil and this reconciliation around the Same and its multiple figures: incest, autism, twinship, cloning.
reconciled with oneself or with one's body. One must not be

reconciled with the other, one must not be reconciled with nature,
one must not be reconciled with the feminine
(that goes for women
2NC link- Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism is the formation of the viral Other, the
final amassing of difference into one huge melting pot.
This inevitably recreates racism in a more viral form.
*could also be answer to permutation (see proper use of otherness section)

Grace 2000Senior Lecturer in Feminist Studies @ University of
Canterbury at Christchurch (Victoria, 2000, Routledge, Baudrillards
Challenge: A Feminist Reading,
http://sociology.sunimc.net/htmledit/uploadfile/system/20100724/201007241
51252877.pdf, rmf)
As the biological bases of racism are exposed as pure fallacy in
theoretical and genetic terms, and as the principles of democracy
have advanced since the Enlightenment, racism should have
declined. Logically, as Baudrillard claims in his book The Perfect Crime
(PC), this should have been the case, yet he observes that as
cultures become increasingly hybrid, racism actually grows stronger
(PC: 131 2). He analyses this contra-indication in terms of the increasing
fetishisation of difference and the loss of the encounter with the
Other , and in the erosion of the singularity of cultures qua
increasing simulation of differentiation. The relation within the
order of cultural difference is phobic, according to Baudrillard: a
kind of reflex that is fundamentally irrational in terms of the logic of
the system. The other is idealised, and: because it is an ideal other,
this relationship is an exponential one: nothing can stop it, since the
whole trend of our culture is towards a fanatically pursued
differential construction, a perpetual extrapolation of the same from
the other. (PC: 132) Autistic culture by dint of fake altruism, he adds,
recapturing the cultural imperative of the western hyperreal
culture to recognise, value, liberate, and understand difference. On
the other hand, racism can equally result from the opposite sentiment; that of
a desperate attempt to manifest the other as an evil to be overwhelmed.
Either way, both the benevolence of the humanitarian and the hatred
of the racist seek out the other for reasons symptomatic of the
fetishisation of difference. As the increasingly cult-like dedication to
differences escalates with its concurrent impulse to increasing
homogeneity,4 another other emerges. Baudrillard comments on
the figure of the alien as a monstrous metaphor for the viral
Other, which is, in his words, the compound form of all the varieties
of otherness done to death by our system (TE: 130). I remember
thinking recently how there must be some significance to the outpouring of
alien movies (on television especially) and wondered if this was the final
frontier of otherness to be done to death (what else is left?). I recall also
being disturbed, as I watched one such movie, to reflect on my accepting
without question the imperative of exterminating the aliens who (that?) were
going to invade and transform human society in evil ways. Baudrillard
emphasises that this metaphor of alien Other seizes on what he
describes as a viral and automatic form of racism that perpetuates
itself in a way that cannot be countered by a humanism of
difference . Viral in the sense of self-generating and invisibly
infecting, reconstructing: a virus of difference, played out through
minute variations in the order of signs. Such a form of monstrous
otherness is also the product of what Baudrillard calls an
obsessional differentiation (TE: 130), emanating from the
compulsion of the self (same) to manifest signs of difference in the
form of the other . The problematic structure of this self( same )
other( different) dynamic , Baudrillard argues, demonstrates the
weakness of those dialectical theories of otherness which aspire
to promote the proper use of otherness (TE: 130). Racism, especially
in its current viral and immanent form, makes it clear that there is no
such thing as the proper use of difference. This point links again
with my concerns about the emptiness of feminist claims for the
importance of irreducible differences in the absence of a structural
critique.
2NC link- University

The university is dead. The affirmatives attempt to use
educational spaces as a means of politics reproduces
power and regenerates the fiction of knowledge. Only by
allowing the university to rot can we inject death into the
system.
Baudrillard 81 ~Jean, Simulacra and Simulation 1981, p. 143 - 146
The university is in ruins: nonfunctional in the social arenas of the
market and employment, lacking cultural substance or an end
purpose of knowledge . 143 Strictly speaking, there is no longer even any
power: it is also in ruins. Whence the impossibility of the return of the fires of 1968: of the
return of putting in question knowledge versus power itself - the explosive contradiction of
knowledge and power (or the revelation of their collusion, which
comes to the same thing) in the university, and, at the same time,
through symbolic (rather than political) contagion in the whole
institutional and social order. Why sociologists? marked this shift: the impasse of
knowledge, the vertigo of nonknowledge (that is to say at once the absurdity and the impossibility of
accumulating value in the order of knowledge) turns like an absolute weapon against power itself, in order
to dismantle it according to the same vertiginous scenario of dispossession. This is the May 1968 effect.
Today it cannot be achieved since power itself, after knowledge, has

taken off, has become ungraspable - has dispossessed itself . In a
now uncertain institution, without knowledge content, without a
power structure (except for an archaic feudalism that turns a
simulacrum of a machine whose destiny escapes it and whose
survival is as artificial as that of barracks and theaters), offensive
irruption is impossible . Only what precipitates rotting, by
accentuating the parodic, simulacral side of dying games of
knowledge and power, has meaning. A strike has exactly the
opposite effect. It regenerates the ideal of a possible university:
the fiction of an ascension on everyone's part to a culture that is
unlocatable, and that no longer has meaning . This ideal is
substituted for the operation of the university as its critical
alternative, as its therapy. This fiction still dreams of a permanency
and democracy of knowledge. Besides, everywhere today the Left
plays this role: it is the justice of the Left that reinjects an idea of
justice, the necessity of logic and social morals into a rotten
apparatus that is coming undone, which is losing all conscience of its
legitimacy and renounces functioning almost of its own volition. It is
the Left that secrets and desperately reproduces power, because it
wants power, and therefore the Left believes in it and revives it
precisely where the system puts an end to it. The system puts an end one by one
to all its axioms, to all its institutions, and realizes one by one all the objectives of the historical and
revolutionary Left that sees itself constrained to revive the wheels of capital 144 in order to lay seige to
them one day: from private property to the small business, from the army to national grandeur, from
puritan morality to petit bourgeois culture, justice at the university -
everything that is
disappearing, that the system itself, in its atrocity, certainly, but

also in its irreversible impulse, has liquidated, must be conserved.
Whence the paradoxical but necessary inversion of all the terms of
political analysis . Power (or what takes its place) no longer believes
in the university. It knows fundamentally that it is only a zone for the shelter and surveillance of
a whole class of a certain age, it therefore has only to select - it will find its elite elsewhere, or by other
Diplomas are worthless: why would it refuse to award them, in

any case it is ready to award them to everybody; why this
provocative politics, if not in order to crystallize energies on a fictive
stake (selection, work, diplomas, etc.), on an already dead and rotting
referential? By rotting, the university can still do a lot of damage
(rotting is a symbolic mechanism - not political but symbolic, therefore subversive for us). But for
means.
this to be the case it is necessary to start with this very rotting, and
not to dream of resurrection . It is necessary to transform this
rotting into a violent process, into violent death, through mockery
and defiance, through a multiplied simulation that would offer the
ritual of the death of the university as a model of decomposition to
the whole of society, a contagious model of the disaffection of a
whole social structure, where death would finally make its ravages,
which the strike tries desperately to avert, in complicity with the
system, but succeeds, on top of it all, only in transforming the
university into a slow death, a delay that is not even the possible
site of a subversion, of an offensive reversion. That is what the events of May
1968 produced. At a less advanced point in the process of the liquefaction of the university and of culture,
the students, far from wishing to save the furniture (revive the lost
object, in an ideal mode), retorted by confronting power with the
challenge of the total, immediate death of the institution , the challenge of
a 145 deterritorialization even more intense than the one that came from the system, and by summoning
power to respond to this total derailment of the institution of knowledge, to this total lack of a need to
gather in a given place, this death desired in the end - not the crisis of the university, that is not a
challenge, on the contrary, it is the game of the system, but the death of the university - to that challenge,
power has not been able to respond, except by its own dissolution in return (only for a moment maybe, but
we saw it).
*Anti blackness
1NC Link
The 1ac start from positioning an analogy to the position
of blackness that erases its historical specificity and
undermines coalitions around challenging anti blackness.
Their coalitional politics posits a chain of equivalencies
that gets coopted by alliances with civil society.
Sexton 2010
[Jared, associate professor of African American studies and film and media studies at the University of
California, Irvine, People-of-Color-Blindness, Social Text 2010 Volume 28, Number 2 103: 31-56, AX]
*we dont endorse ableist language
If the oppression of nonblack people of color in, and perhaps beyond,

the United States seems conditional to the historic instance and
functions at a more restricted empirical scope, antiblackness seems
invariant and limitless (which does not mean that the former is somehow negligible and short-lived or
that the latter is exhaustive and unchanging). If pursued with some consistency, the sort of
comparative analysis outlined above would likely impact the formulation of

political strategy and modify the demeanor of our political culture. In
fact, it might denature the comparative instinct altogether in favor of
a relational analysis more adequate to the task. Yet all of this is
obviated by the silencing mechanism par excellence in Left political and
intellectual circles today: Dont play Oppression Olympics! The
Oppression Olympics dogma levels a charge amounting to little more than a leftist
version of playing the race card. To fuss with details of comparative (or relational) analysis
is to play into the hands of divide-and-conquer tactics and to promote a callous immorality. 72
However, as in its conservative complement, one notes in this catchphrase the

unwarranted translation of an inquiring position of comparison into
an insidious posture of competition, the translation of ethical
critique into unethical attack. This point allows us to understand better
the intimate relationship between the censure of black inquiry and
the recurrent analogizing to black suffering mentioned above: they bear a
common refusal to admit to significant differences of structural
position born of discrepant histories between blacks and their
political allies, actual or potential. We might, finally, name this refusal
people-of-color-blindness, a form of colorblindness inherent to the
concept of people of color to the precise extent that it
misunderstands the specificity of antiblackness and presumes or
insists upon the monolithic character of victimization under white
supremacy 73 thinking (the afterlife of) slavery as a form of
exploitation or colonization or a species of racial oppression among
others. 74 The upshot of this predicament is that obscuring the
structural position of the category of blackness will inevitably
undermine multiracial coalition building as a politics of radical
opposition and, to that extent, force the question of black liberation back
to the center of discussion. Every analysis that attempts to
understand the complexities of racial rule and the machinations of
the racial state without accounting for black existence within its
frameworkwhich does not mean simply listing it among a chain of
equivalents or returning to it as an afterthoughtis doomed to

miss what is essential about the situation. Black existence does not
represent the total reality of the racial formation it is not the
beginning and the end of the storybut it does relate to the totality ;
it indicates the (repressed) truth of the political and economic
system. That is to say, the whole range of positions within the racial
formation is most fully understood from this vantage point , not unlike the
way in which the range of gender and sexual variance under patriarchal and heteronormative regimes is
What is lost for the

study of black existence in the proposal for a decentered,
postblack paradigm is a proper analysis of the true scale and
nature of black suffering and of the strugglespolitical, aesthetic,
intellectual, and so onthat have sought to transform and undo it.
What is lost for the study of nonblack nonwhite existence is a proper
analysis of the true scale and nature of its material and symbolic
power relative to the category of blackness. 76 This is why every attempt
most fully understood through lenses that are feminist and queer. 75
to defend the rights and liberties of the latest victims of state

repression will fail to make substantial gains insofar as it forfeits or
sidelines the fate of blacks, the prototypical targets of the panoply of police
practices and the juridical infrastructure built up around them .
Without blacks on board, the only viable political option and the only
effective defense against the intensifying cross fire will involve
greater alliance with an antiblack civil society and further
capitulation to the magnification of state power. At the apex of the midcentury
social movements, Kwame Ture and Charles Hamilton wrote in their 1968 classic, Black Power: The Politics
black freedom entails the necessarily total revamping

of the society. 77 For Hartman, thinking of the entanglements of the African diaspora in this
context, the necessarily total revamping of the society is more
appropriately envisioned as the creation of an entirely new world: I
of Liberation, that
knew that no matter how far from home I traveled, I would never be able to leave my past behind. I would
never be able to imagine being the kind of person who had not been made and marked by slavery. I was
Terror was captivity without the

possibility of flight, inescapable violence, precarious life. There was
no going back to a time or place before slavery, and going beyond it
no doubt would entail nothing less momentous than yet another
revolution.
black and a history of terror had produced that identity.
2nc link: No History

Racial profiling cannot be understood free from its
historical context on the plantation. Other approaches fail
because they render this concrete situation metaphorical.
Sexton 07 (Jared, Racial Profiling and the Societies of Control from
Warfare in the American Homeland: Policing and Prison in a Penal
Democracy edited by Joy James, Duke University Press, p. 200-02. Sexton is
an associate professor of African American Studies and an associate professor
of Film and Media Studies at the University of California, Irvine. They have a
Ph.D from the University of California, Berkeley in Ethnic Studies // EMS).
In theory, everyone in the United States (and many outside its boundaries) is subject to these rules of
engagement. Yet, as Ira Glasser, former director of the America Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), recently
while the police could, say, randomly raid apartment buildings

on the Upper West Side of Manhattan and yield fruitful results, they
clearly do not. As he puts it, "They don't do it because most of the folks who live
in those apartment buildings are white. They don't do it because if
they tried to do it, the outrage would become so big, so fast that it
would become politically impossible to sustain."12 We might wonder who would
noted,
be outraged at such operations and whose outrage would make a difference? At any rate, the verdict of his
analysis is clear: On our highways, on our streets, in our airports, and at our customs checkpoints, skin
color once again, irrespective of class, and without distinctions based on education or economic status,
skin color once again is being used as a cause for USDIClOn, and a sufficient reason to violate people's
rights. For blacks in particular the situation is acute. The most recent attack on Fourth Amendment
protections followed immediately the Warren Court's "due process revolution," as inaugurated by its
decisions in the Mapp (1961) and Miranda (1966) cases. This shift in judicial opinion in favor of criminal
suspects and defendants, disproportionately black and characteristically depicted as such, was supposed
by some to be the criminal-law equivalent to or extension of then recent civil law reforms.
The
motion toward constitutional protections for blacks was, then, taken to be a

byproduct of the limited success of the Civil Rights Movement, but its broader implications were rapidly
conflated with the perceived threat of the radicalization of struggle
dubbed "Black Power," which for the mainstream presented ominous
criminal tendencies, among other things. The idea that blacks could or should have both civil
and criminal rights thus entered the furor of an emergent "law and order" political culture whose executive'
The legal history

from Richard Nixon to Ronald Reagan to George W Bushfrom "war on
crime" to "war on drugs" to "war on terror" -is alarmingly short . The
liberal civil-rights legislation and judiciary review enjoyed a very
brief and largely ineffective life. But the "revolution" in criminal
rights never even got off the ground; it never actually happened except in the
legislative, and judicial wings all feverishly and collaboratively retrenched.
collective paranoid fantasy of "white America." There is, finally, no golden age for blacks before the
criminal law. Therefore, in our discussions of a so-called creeping fascism or nascent authoritarianism or
we might
do better than trace its genealogy to the general warrant (or even
the Executive Order), whose specter forever haunts the democratic
experiment of postrevolutionary civil society. Instead, the proper
rise of the police state, particularly in the wake of the Homeland Security and PATRIOT acts,
object of investigation is the antebellum slave code and its

antecedents in colonial statute, not because the trajectory of this
legal history threatens to undo the rights of all, but precisely
because the prevailing libertarian impulse in the United States has
so resourcefully and rendered the concrete situation in metaphoric

terms. Under the force of this blacks, who were clearly in the but definitively not of it, were not only
available to arbitrary search and seizure-the bane of the general warrant-but were, in the main, always
already searched and seized. More to the point, they had, in the famous phrase, "no rights that a white
The ethos of slavery- in other words, the

no legitimate
black self-defense, recognizes no legitimate assertions of black selfpossession, privacy, or autonomy. A permanent state of theft, seizure, and abduction
orders the affairs of the captive community and its progeny. Structural vulnerability to
appropriation, perpetual and involuntary openness, including all the
wanton uses of the body so finely detailed by scholars like Saidiya Hartman and Hortense
Spillers, should be understood as the paradigmatic conditions of black
existence in the Americas, the defining characteristics of New World
antiblackness.14 In short, the black, whether slave or "free," lives under
the commandment of whites.Is Policing blacks in the colonial and antebellum periods was,
man bound to respect," including the right to life.
lasting ideological and affective matrix of the white supremacist project- admits
we recall, the prerogative of every white (they could assume the role or not) and was only later
professionalized as the modern prison system emerged out of the ashes of Reconstruction.I6 Without
glossing the interceding history, suffice it to say that such policing was organized across the twentieth
century at higher orders of magnitude by the political, economic, and social shifts attending the transition
from welfare to warfare state. "Racial
profiling," then, is a young term, but the

practice is centuries-old. In other words, the policing of blacks-whose
repression has always been state sanctioned, even as it was
rendered a private affair of "property management" _ remains a
central issue today; it has not recently emerged. Amnesty International's public
hearings on racial profiling, the stalled federal legislation termed "HR 1443," the ACLU'S "Driving while
Black" campaign, and the problematic reworking of the issue of racial profiling after September 11 all
The effects of crude

political pragmatism, legalistic single-mindedness, or historical
myopia enable us to identify the unleashing of the police with the
advent of the war on drugs or the xenophobic panic around the New
Immigration or the emergence of Homeland Security against the
threat of terrorism.
unfold against the backdrop of this long history of "policing black people."
A2 Coalitions
Islamophobia is only a manifestation of racializationthe
fact that Middle Easterners are deemed white by law
means they could never include other minorities in their
struggle against law
Love 09 (Erik Love, an ISPU Fellow and an Assistant Professor of Sociology
at Dickinson College in Pennsylvania, received his MA and Ph.D. in sociology

from the University of California at Santa Barbara.) (Confronting Islamophobia
in the United States: framing civil rights activism among Middle Eastern
Americans, 23 Sep 2009. Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 43, Nos 3- 4, 401-425, DOI:
10.1080/00313220903109367)
Approaching Islamophobia as a product of racial dynamics in the
United States brings certain analytical advantages. First, this
approach draws on a wealth of knowledge about race and ethnicity
to explain how Islamophobia does not always target Islam and
Muslims per se, but instead takes on the familiar pattern of racial
scapegoating: fear and hatred, prejudice and discrimination directed
towards groups crudely demarcated primarily by physical
appearance.5 Race clearly plays a role when Sikh American and
African American Muslim children are harassed in similar ways in
classrooms, when Syrian Americans along with Pakistani Americans
have to present themselves to immigration authorities for special
registration, when Lebanese American and Iranian American
workers lose their jobs for the same discriminatory reasons, and
when Chaldean churches and Sunni mosques alike are vandalized
and receive the same kinds of hate mail. These kinds of incidents, which
impact on a large range of communities in spite of their diversity, occur
primarily as a result of the racial lens through which Americans
-
understand the world. The ideology of race is understood as a flexible

social construct, subject to modification through the work of actors who
target the state as they seek recognition and redress.6 The process of
racialization profoundly affects all individuals in the United States,
because each person is perceived to belong to socially constructed
racial categories. The categories themselves change over time, as do
the criteria for membership in any particular category; people
recognized as belonging to the Irish race, for example, later became
white due to changes in the predominant racial ideology. These
identity categories take on meaning and have material consequences via
state policy and resource provision, through representations in cultural space
and through the organization of institutions in civil society. The prevailing
racial order at any point in history indicates the schema or hierarchy of
recognized racial identity categories, created through a compromise
between racial movements and the state.7 From the latter part of the
twentieth century to the present day (the so-called post-civil rights
era), the racial pentagon of black, white, Latino, Asian and Native
American has been described as the prevailing list of recognized
racial identity categories in the United States.8 Where do individuals

and groups affected by racialized Islamophobia fit? According to the United
States Census, people from the broadly defined Middle Eastern region legally
count as racially white. This creates a paradox, as described by John
Tehranian: On one hand, [Middle Eastern Americans] suffer from the types of
discrimination that face minority groups. On the other hand, formally
speaking, Middle Easterners are deemed white by law. This dualistic
and contested ontology of the Middle Eastern racial condition
creates an unusual paradox. Reified as the other, Americans of Middle
Eastern descent do not enjoy the benefits of white privilege. Yet, as
white under the law, they are denied the fruits of remedial action.9
The unclear position caused by this racial paradox*/in terms of
citizenship, rights and identity*/of migrants and their descendants
who came to the United States from North Africa and western and
southern Asia, a large region now vaguely defined as the Middle
East, dates back to the eighteenth century if not earlier. The groups
under the Middle Eastern racial umbrella often have little in common with one
another except that, in the United States, Islamophobia lumps them together
and makes them targets of discrimination and racism. In other words,
Islamophobia is the latest term for a centuries-long history of
American state policy, cultural discourses and discriminatory
practices that enforce racial boundaries around Middle Easterners in
America.
*Cede the Political K
1nc
Individual interrogation is always the wrong starting point
for politics- governments obey institutional logics that
exist independently of individuals and constrain
decisionmaking the only way to concretely change
society is by engaging institutional politics
Wight Professor of IR @ University of Sydney 6
(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology,
pgs. 48-50
relations constitute our
identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is
what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded .
One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these
A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. Our social
At any particular
moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of
relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This latticework of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and
endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them . Thus, the
relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals
who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct,
being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.
although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and
structures: people
are not relations, societies are not conscious agents.

If there is an ontological
difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the
relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts,
Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected.
encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce
a system of concepts designating the point of contact

between human agency and social structures. This is known as a
positioned practice system. In many respects, the idea of positioned practice is very
similar to Pierre Bourdieus notion of habitus. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do
in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be
understood solely in terms of individual decision-making , or as determined
it: that is,
by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieus notion of the habitus can be viewed as a bridge-
the notion of a
habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a social
field. According to Bourdieu, a social field is a network, or a configuration, of
objective relations between positions objectively defined . A social
field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied
by individuals and/or institutions the nature of which defines the
situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the
building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly,
relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A habitus (positioned practices) is a mediating link
between individuals subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which
The power of the habitus derives from the

thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned
rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that
commences during early childhood. It is inculcated more by
experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent
they share with others.
performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit

reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily
knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As
such, the habitus can be seen as the site of internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.
Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between:
(1) the habitus and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the sociocultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the
dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the habitus. When
placed within Bhaskars stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1.
Society, as field of relations, exists prior

to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings
at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action.
Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered,
institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there
must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to
individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent
upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the
existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, their explanation
The explanation of practices will require all three levels.
cannot be reduced to consciousness
or to the attributes
of individuals . These
emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society
Society, as opposed to the individuals that

constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, a complex and independent reality that has
its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its
possibility of disturbance. This new reality is societyIt becomes necessary to reflect upon
based on a causal criterion.
it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables.
The distinction between pragmatism and radicalism is falsely

constructed and the affirmative holds the two in creative tension
legalization strategies enable us to take advantage of current
conditions without sacrificing political vision
Berger 13 [2013, Dan Berger is an Assistant Professor at the University of
Washington Bothell, Social Movements and Mass Incarceration: What is To
Be Done?, Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society,
Volume 15, Issue 1-2, 2013, pages 3-18]
The strategy of decarceration combines radical critique, direct action,

and tangible goals for reducing the reach of the carceral state . It is a
coalitional strategy that works to shrink the prison system through a
combination of pragmatic demands and far-reaching, open-ended
critique. It is reform in pursuit of abolition. Indeed, decarceration allows a
strategic launch pad for the politics of abolition, providing what has
been an exciting but abstract framework with a course of actio n. 32
Rather than juxtapose pragmatism and radicalism , as has so often happened in the
realm of radical activism, the strategy of decarceration seeks to hold them in
creative tension. It is a strategy in the best tradition of the black
freedom struggle. It is a strategy that seeks to take advantage of
political conditions without sacrificing its political vision . Today we are in
a moment where it is possible, in the words of an organizer whose work successfully closed
Illinois's infamous supermax prison Tamms in January 2013, to confront prisons as both an
economic and a moral necessity. 33 Prisons bring together diverse forms of oppression across
race, class, gender, sexuality, citizenship status, HIV status and beyond. The movements against
them, therefore, will need to bring together diverse communities of
resistance.
They will need to unite people across a range of issues, identities, and sectors. That is
the coalition underlying groups such as Californians United for a Responsible Budget (CURB), the Nation
The fight against prisons is both a targeted

campaign and a broad-based struggle for social justice. These movements
Inside initiative, and Decarcerate PA.
must include the leadership by those directly affected while at the same work to understand that prisons
affect us all. This message is the legacy of prison rebellions from Attica in 1971 to Pelican Bay in 2012.
The challenge is to maintain the aspirational elements of that message

while at the same time translating it into a political program .
Decarceration, therefore, works not only to shrink the prison system but
to expand community cohesion and maximize what can only be
called freedom. Political repression and mass incarceration are joined at the
hip. The struggles against austerity, carcerality, and social oppression, the
struggles for restorative and transformative justice, for grassroots
empowerment and social justice must be equally interconnected. For it is
only when the movement against prisons is as interwoven in the social fabric
of popular resistance as the expansion of prisons has been stitched into the
wider framework of society that we might hope to supplant the carceral state .
There are many obstacles on the path toward decarceration; the existence of a strategy hardly guarantees
its success. Until now, I have focused largely on the challenges internal to the movement, but there are
even taller hurdles to jump in encountering (much less transforming) the deeply entrenched carceral state.
Perhaps the biggest challenge, paradoxically, comes from the growing consensus, rooted in the collective
fiscal troubles of individual states, that there is a need for prison reform. In that context, a range of
politicians, think tanks, and nonprofit organizationsfrom Right on Crime to the Council on State
Governments and the Pew Charitable Trustshave offered a spate of neoliberal reforms that trumpet free
market solutions, privatization, or shifting the emphasis away from prisons but still within the power of the
carceral state. Examples include the Justice Reinvestment processes utilized by states such as Texas and
Pennsylvania that have called for greater funding to police and conservative victim's rights advocates
neoliberal
reforms can also be found in the sudden burst of attention paid to reentry
services that are not community-led and may be operated by private,
conservative entities. 34 Perhaps the grandest example can be found in California, where a
while leaving untouched some of the worst elements of excessive punishment. These
Supreme Court ruling that overcrowding in the state's prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment
has been met with a proposal for realignment, that shifts the burden from state prisons to county jails.
35 A combination of institutional intransigence and ideological commitment to punish makes the road
Even as many states move to shrink their prison populations, they

have done so in ways that have left in place the deepest markings of the
carceral state, such as the use of life sentences and solitary confinement, and
the criminalization of immigrants. Social movements will need to confront
the underlying ideologies that hold that there is an acceptable
level of widespread imprisonment, that there is a specter of villainy out therebe they
illegal immigrants, cop killers, sex criminals waiting in the wings to destroy the
American way of life. 36 There is a risk, inherent in the sordid history of
prison reform, that the current reform impulse will be bifurcated along poorly
defined notions of deservingness that will continue to uphold the carceral
logic that separates good people from bad people and which decides that
no fate is too harsh for those deemed unworthy of social inclusion. This, then, is
a movement that needs to make nuanced yet straightforward
arguments that take seriously questions of accountability while
showing that more cops and more (whether bigger or smaller) cages only takes
us further from that goal. 37 At stake is the kind of world we want to live
in, and the terms could not be more clear: the choice , to paraphrase Martin Luther
King, is either carceral chaos or liberatory community . The framework of communityas
ahead steep.
expressed Decarcerate PA slogan build communities not prisons and the CURB budget for humanity
campaignallows for a robust imagination of the institutions and mechanisms that foster community
versus those that weaken it. It focuses our attention on activities, slogans, programs, and demands that
If the state wants to crush dissent

through isolation, our movements must rely on togetherness to win. Solidarity
is the difference between life and death. State repression expands in
the absence of solidarity. Solidarity is a lifeline against the logic of
criminalization and its devastating consequences. For the most successful
challenges to imprisonment come from intergenerational movements:
movements where people raise each other's consciousness and raise each
other's children, movements that fight for the future because they know their
history. Here, in this pragmatic but militant radicalism, is a chance to
end mass incarceration and begin the process of shrinking the
carceral state out of existence.
maximize communities. In short, it allows for unity.
Legal strategies are comparatively the best we can build

long term movements
Spade 11 (lawyer, prominent trans activist, and Associate Professor of Law
at Seattle University School of Law. He founded the Sylvia Rivera Law Project
which provides free legal services to transgender individuals who are lowincome and/or people of color)
(Dean, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics and the
Limits of Law, pg. 186-7)
Developing law and policy reform rargers as campaign issues. Because administrative systems cause
enormous harm [Q transpeople every day, issues related to how these systems operate tend to be deeply
law and policy reform targets

can sometimes be a good place to direct our organizing . This organizing can
provide opportunities ro reframe an issue, bring directly impacted people who have not
previously been part of political organizing into leadership, build shared political analysis about
important forms of systemic harm, and establish and advance relationships within and
berween constituencies. When these law/policy reform campaigns are chosen, they can build
momentum and membership in a movement organization. Winning certain reforms may
even provide some relief to members experiencing harm . The limited effect of
law and policy reform victories can also often huild shared analysis among organizers about
how empty legal equality can be, and can generate enhanced demands for
transformation as organizing continues . Taking up law and policy targets can
make sense when deployed as a tactic in service of a larger strategy of mass
mobilization. If law and policy changes are won solely through the work of a few white lawyers
felt and broadly applicable to our constituencies. For that reason,
meeting with bureaucrats or elected officials behind closed doors, this does not achieve the mobilization
goals that require building a demand (and momentum behind that demand) across a broad spectrum of
directly impacted people and winning it through collective efforts of a large group. The goals of this work
should not be merely about changing what laws and policies say. Instead, the work should build the
capacity of directly impacted people to work together and push for change that will significantly improve
their lives. Ideally, those who are propelled into political action by involvement in a campaign stay with the
work, continue to develop skills and analysis, and bting others to organizing. Together, people can
construct increasingly broad imaginations of transformative change. Even after small victories enormous
harms must still be addressed as newly won policies are often nor followed or implemented, and important
lessons are learned about sustained struggle and the effectiveness of collective action.
Radical politics must engage the state the alt is right wing take over
Mouffe 10
(What is Radical Politics Today?, Edited by Jonathan Pugh, pg. 235)
It is clear that, once we envisage social reality in terms of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic
practices, radical politics is not about withdrawing completely from existing
institutions. Rather, we have no other choice but to engage with hegemonic
practices, in order to challenge them. This is crucial otherwise we will be faced with a
chaotic situation. Moreover, if we do not engage with and challenge the existing
order, if we instead choose to simply escape the state completely, we leave the
door open for others to take control of systems of authority and regulation. Indeed
there are many historical (and not so historical) examples of this. When the Left
shows little interest, Right-wing and authoritarian groups are only too happy to
take over the state.
The alternative is to ENGAGE institutional politics- we

must move beyond their abstraction in favor of
discussing the tough choices and trade-offs that a
non-institutional analysis wishes away institutions
are inevitable and learning to pragmatically engage
them best facilitates change
Themba-Nixon 2K [Makani Themba-Nixon, Changing the Rules: What
Public Policy Means for Organizing, Colorlines. Oakland: Jul 31, 2000. Vol. 3,
Iss. 2; pg. 12, AX]
In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource
allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the
world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the
rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from
policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop
corporate abuses , or win racial justice without contesting the rules
and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and
double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly
every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding
priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and
disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the
public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it
isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed
around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty
was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars
in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to
other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune
into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up
right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare
policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting
by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies.
Policy doesn't get more relevant than this . And so we got involved in
policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches .
We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own . Those who do
are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage
ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and
alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public
agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages

power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies
have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions
have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local
problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun
control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since
1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have
passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than
minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a
family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that
demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made
inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by
conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and
where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are
usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include
front groups, economic pressure, and the tried and true: cold, hard cash.
Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at
the smaller scale of local politics. At the local level, we have greater access to
elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for
reelection. For example, getting 400 people to show up at city hall in
just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand,
400 people at the state house or the Congress would have a less significant
impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually
constituents, and the impact is even greater. Recent trends in government
underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of
measures devolving significant power to state and local government.
Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water
safety are among the areas where states and localities now have
greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure.
History has taught us that, for social services and civil rights in particular, the
lack of clear federal standards and mechanisms for accountability
lead to uneven enforcement and even discriminatory implementation
of policies. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing
progressive initiatives in this more localized environment. Greater
local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement
important social policies that were heretofore out of reach. To do so will
require careful attention to the mechanics of local policymaking and
a clear blueprint of what we stand for. Getting It in Writing Much of the
work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By
getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our
demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real
consequences if the agreement is broken . After all the organizing, press
work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a
handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain
amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the
bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance
by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writingwhether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent
control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their
power into written policies that are making a real difference in their
communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing
arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore . Making policy
work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of
retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information,
data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public
conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond
fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to
our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to
making it so.
2NC Link ext.

Individual focus trades off with collective action frames.
This makes debates competitions of dueling oratories
rather than political strategies that include Mobilizing
Ideas that explain a plan of action for collectivity,
organization, and continuity.
Oakes et al 2k6 [Jeannie Oakes, John Rogers, Gary Blasi, & Martin
Lipton .UCLA Law Students. Grassroots Organizing, Social Movements, and
the Right to High-Quality Education paper prepared for the Rethinking
Rodriguez Symposium. The Warren Institute UC Berkeley, School of Law April
27-28, 2006 https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/oakes-rogers-blasi_paper.pdf,
social movements challenge societys collective
sense making in ways that conventional reform strategies do not. This comes about through a
struggle over beliefs and ideas as well as over concrete conditions
Framing As we discussed earlier,
i.e., disrupting the cultural logics of scarcity, merit and deficit with countervailing logics. Instead of these
logics, Americans could presume that the nations gr eat wealth can make opportunities abundant, not
scarce. They could adopt as common sense that high quality and equitable education is a right for all
students, not something that students should have to compete for. They could take as given that social
priorities and not social wealth determine whether society can afford to educate all children well and
provide them with decent housing, healthcare, and economic stability. They could believe that schools are
absolutely capable of providing high-quality education to low-income children and children of color if there
is enough public will to provide the necessary opportunities to schools in all communities.
Under what conditions can the current networks of grassroots organizations,

coalitions, and interest groupsand those that might join themactually
become a social movement? For insights, we again turn to the social science scholarship on
social movements. Scholars in the field define social movements as
collectivities acting with some degree of organization and
continuity outside of institutional and organizational channels for
the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority... 36 They
identify three requisites to a social movement: "collectivity," "organization," and "continuity.
Most scholars agree that acting together to sustain a coherent challenge to

existing authority requires (a) a processes through which sufficient numbers of people
come to see their grievances and their possible re mediation in shared and compelling terms (commonly
organizational and leadership resources sufficient

to move from shared understanding to concerted action ; and (c)
sufficient allies and resources to sustain concerted action over time
and in the face of significant resistance . In this section we examine these three
referred to as framing); (b)
conditions, generally, and as they may exist at the present time in California.
alternative logics must take the

form of mobilizing ideas that, not only change thinking , but
In the language of many social movement scholars, such
compel action by a variety of audiences and participantsfrom

grassroots actors to middle class and elite observers and reactors .
The phenomenon whereby these mobilizing ideas take shape is commonly known as framing.
Framing is not simply finding the right turn of phrase to motivate

individuals; rather it poses a new conception of an existing social
problem that moves it from being seen as regrettable and inevitable
to being considered an injustice that can and should be remedied .

Scholars of framing see this process as being a deliberate effort of
social movement actors to assign meanings to events and conditions
that will mobilize supporters and allies. Such meanings are generally
referred to as collective action frames. 37
David Snow and his colleagues argue d, for example, in 1986 that "frame alignment processes" were
crucial to social movement organizations. 38 Fourteen years later two of the authors wrote of the "almos t
the essential
collective action frame reflects a shared understanding of some
problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change ,
make attributions regarding w ho or what is to blame, articulate an
meteoric increase" in research on "the framing/movement link." 39 In this literature,
alternative set of arrangements , and urge others to act in concert

to affect change. 40 Snow and others also argue that fram es are linked with the development
and maintenance of collective id entitythe strong sense of being a member of a group particularly as
collective identity is
thought to be a primary motivation for individuals in movements
such as feminism, environmentalism, and civil rightsfrom which they dont expect
social movement coalitions become heterogeneous. 41 In turn,
benefit to ones own class or material interests. 42

However, not all frames are alike. Theorists differentiate (a) diagnostic framing, which defines important
causes of the problem ; (b) prognostic framing, the articulation of possible solutions or a plan of attack;
and (c) motivationa l framing, which helps construct the vocabularies of motive and a rationale for action.
43
In the case of educational justice, there are contending and to some

extent incompatible frames , some more likely than others to define problems
and solutions in ways that develop a sense of injustice and a
collective identity among a wide array of activists required to generate broad-based publ ic
support. None of the frames is wholly satisfactory, and much framing work rema ins. Two of the prevailing
frames, inequality (lack of fundamental fairness or justice) and quality (lack of adequacy or excellence)
An inequality frame, shaped in the more general struggles for

diagnoses the problem as one of unequal access
to educational opportunity, and calls for redistribution and leveling ,
have both strengths and deficits.
civil rights and social equa lity,
accepted in Serrano 44 but rejected in Rodriguez. 45 The inequality frame draws motivational force from
the inequality
frame is self-limiting in its reach. Appealing to those who have the least, along
with their allies driven by justice concerns, it has the potential to
frame potential allies as competitors . To the degree that it fails to challenge the logic
the still powerful images and themes of the civil rights movement. At the same time,
it seems to call for redistribution within a zero sum arena

of high-quality education.
of scarcity,
The affirmative must identity a coherent connection

between their advocacy and its potential for tangible
political change---absent a metric to test its efficacy, it
replicates idealist theoretical approaches they critique
Catherine Lu 13, Associate Professor of Political Science, McGill University,
July 2013, Activist political theory and the challenge of global justice, Ethics
& Global Politics, Vol. 6, No. 2,
http://www.ethicsandglobalpolitics.net/index.php/egp/article/view/21627/2858
7
Which of these various international, state, corporate and civil society responses
and proposals should we support? What political institutional changes are
required to halt these repeated scenes of human wreckage produced by grave
injustices such as the Rana Plaza building collapse? Is progress in breaking the vicious pattern of
workplace catastrophes in the global apparel industry possible? What can political theorists
contribute to these ongoing debates about global justice and responsibility?
The main objective of Lea Ypis first book, Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency, is precisely to
provide an account of the role of political theory and political theorists in the struggles of contemporary
the purpose of normative political theory in its

activist mode is to identify and assist contemporary avant-garde political
agents to realise progressive political change by formulating coherent and
plausible normative views about the function and purpose of our social
practices and institutions . This is accomplished by employing a historically
informed and forward-looking dialectical method of learning from the trials,
failures, and successes of past political struggles with a view to evaluating
the adequacy of different interpretations of the function and purposes of social
institutions and practices, and distinguishing between more regressive or
status quo, and more progressive interpretations of the relevant normative
principles.20
The criteria for adjudicating between different normative interpretations of
the function and purpose of political institutions involve meeting three tasks .
First, an interpretation (or family of interpretations) is better than its rivals if it is able
to diagnose the causes of persistent and profound patterns of social conflict
political agents for global justice. For Ypi,
at an appropriate level of analysis, accounting for the empirical evidence

better than its competitors. Second, an interpretation is superior if it is able,
after identifying inadequacies in old normative categories, to innovate from them
and formulate principles that preserve all the normative benefits of its
predecessors whilst avoiding their failures. Third, a normative interpretation
can outperform its rivals if it displays heuristic potential, providing new ways
to conceive of the purposes or functions of social institutions and practices, in light
of theoretical innovations that anticipate new, unforeseen questions and challenges. A dialectical
approach thus helps to make progress under contemporary conditions possible
by providing a way to judge which theories (or families of theories) spawned by social and
political conflicts and crises are better able to combine principles and agency in a
fundamentally appropriate but also politically effective and motivationally sustainable
way . In light of the novel political and moral challenges wrought by new agents and circumstances of
politics, normative political theory should aim to revise or refine interpretations of
the normative principles underlying our social practices and institutions, in ways
that improve their functionality and responsiveness to the concerns and
commitments of the agents subjected to them.21
The normative theorist who is engaged in this activist mode works in tandem with
the avant-garde political agents who struggle for progressive political
transformations: both are likened to creative scientists or artists who put existing knowledge and
techniques at the service of fresh experiments, developing new perspectives, asking unprecedented
Drawing on the
history of the womens movement, the anti-slavery movement, workers movements,
anti-colonial movements, and human rights movements, Ypi observes that the most
effectual avant-garde political agents were those who tried to subvert
specific interpretive patterns from within, while continuing to act as their
questions, and paving the way for the development of alternative paradigms.22
critical voice .23 In terms of theories of global justice, Ypi finds Kants own political theory
exemplary for combining a cosmopolitan account of normative principles with a
statist conception of political agency , and she interprets Kants moral politician to
be similar to a cosmopolitan avant-garde political agent who makes it her duty to act within
the state in conformity with cosmopolitan principles of justice .24
An adequate activist political theory should be able to give an account of the
moral desirability of principles, as well their political feasibility and
motivational sustainability . Doing so requires confronting issues of principle and
issues of political agency, and combining them in ways that make possible
progressive political change. Ypi observes, however, that normative political theorists
have tended to ignore the normative relevance of political agency to the task
of formulating normative principles for politics.
This ignorance or disconnect between normative principles and political agency is
apparent in the two dominant approachesideal and non-idealto normative
political theory. Ideal theory approaches are truth-seeking enterprises that try to identify
and establish a fundamentally appropriate analysis of first-order normative
principles, regardless of whether these principles can meaningfully guide
action in the real world .25 While constructing principles based on idealised
agents, structures, and conditions may have some critical force in that they provide a
basis for evaluating the justness of existing principles, practices, and social conditions, Ypi argues that
ideal theoretical approaches tend to generate principles that are indeterminate,

irrelevant, or distorting , given their disconnection from issues of political
agency.26 Non-ideal approaches, in contrast, aim to develop principles able to guide agency in
empirically contingent circumstances, and typically take the current circumstances conditioning social and
political agency to play a constitutive role in formulating the relevant normative principles.27 Ypi is
non-ideal theoretical approaches are vulnerable to a status

quo bias, compromising the critical task of normative theory by taking too much of existing
agents, practices, institutions, and conditions as they are .
concerned, however, that
Ypi admits that these are stylised reconstructions, and that most contemporary political theories of global
justice exhibit elements of both ideal and non-ideal theoretical approaches so understood. Indeed, it
should be noted that Ypis interpretation of the function of ideal and non-ideal theories reveals a certain
dissatisfaction with a standard way of thinking about their distinction.28 In the seminal account by John
Rawls, ideal theories are the primary task of the political theorist, and have as their aim the identification
of the correct first-order normative principles to guide the major social and political institutions of a society.
Ideal theory accomplishes this task by abstracting from historically contingent circumstances, and
idealising agents, structures or conditions in certain counterfactual and favourable ways.29 Non-ideal
theory is distinguished by its aim to identify transitional normative principles in response to unfavourable
contexts where agents are either wilfully acting against the normative principles identified in ideal theory,
or are involuntarily incapable of acting according to those principles. For example, in Rawlss Law of
Peoples, the duty of assistance is a principle of non-ideal theory to deal with the problematic existence of
burdened societies that lack the capacity to develop domestically decent or just political and social
institutions.30 Non-ideal principles thus serve a transitional aim of helping agents to progress towards an
ideal account of justice.
the distinction between ideal and non-ideal approaches to

political theory serves a different purpose than this Rawlsian account. Her interpretation of the
distinction operates to highlight the relationship between normative principles
and political agency, and how problematic relationships between these too
distant and too closecan undermine either the critical value or the efficacy of
any normative theory . From an activist theoretical perspective, ideal
theoretical approaches may avoid a status quo bias, but they typically fail to contribute to
solving problems confronted by agents currently suffering from inadequate
political and social institutions and arrangements , whereas non-ideal theoretical
Ypis formulation of
approaches tend to generate myopic views of problem solving that typically lack critical force or
emanicipatory potential.
With her account of activist political theory and the dialectical approach, Ypi is able to expose
unconstructive aspects of the contemporary global justice debate among the two main rivals,
cosmopolitans and statists. Ypi is not against cosmopolitanism, but she criticises a tendency of
cosmopolitan theorists to dismiss the normative relevance of the state and

state-based associations for realising cosmopolitan egalitarian conceptions of
global justice. This dismissal, most salient in cosmopolitan arguments about the moral arbitrariness
and insignificance of polit ical associations or relational ties, is unconstructive and
detrimental to the cause of advancing cosmopolitan normative principles
because it fails to recognise the importance of political agency for the
realisation of cosmopolitan aims . According to Ypi, the cosmopolitan disavowal of
political membership and associative relations is both unnecessary and unwarranted
Rejecting the normative standing of political communities hardly supports
the defence of global distributive principles ; it merely draws attention away
from some relevant conceptual tools necessary to analyse global political
transformation. Being disconnected from how political agency takes shape in
the world , and failing to provide principled guidance on how agents
committed to cosmopolitan normative principles should aim to reform
particular institutions and practices, deprives cosmopolitan theories of their
transformative potential and relevance to contemporary political struggles for
global justice.31 A critical and constructive theory of global justice should not only
provide normative principles that are fundamentally appropriate, but also
address issues of political agency that render such principles politically
effective and motivationally sustainable .
2NC Solves Race

Racial progress has occurred though legal change and
more is still possible---reject nonstate action because it
ignores specific reforms that achieved lasting reductions
in racial inequality
Michael Omi 13, and Howard Winant, Resistance is futile?: a response to
Feagin and Elias, Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 36, Issue 6, p. 961-973,
2013 Special Issue: Symposium - Rethinking Racial Formation Theory, AX
In Feagin and Elias's account, white racist rule in the USA appears unalterable
and permanent. There is little sense that the white racial frame evoked by systemic racism theory changes in
significant ways over historical time. They dismiss important rearrangements and
reforms as merely a distraction from more ingrained structural
oppressions and deep lying inequalities that continue to define US society
(Feagin and Elias
2012, p. 21). Feagin and Elias use a concept they call surface flexibility to argue that white elites frame racial realities in
ways that suggest change, but are merely engineered to reinforce the underlying structure of racial oppression. Feagin
and Elias say the phrase racial democracy is an oxymoron a word defined in the dictionary as a figure of speech that
combines contradictory terms. If they mean the USA is a contradictory and incomplete democracy in respect to race and
racism issues, we agree. If they mean that people of colour have no democratic rights or political power in the USA,
we
disagree . The USA is a racially despotic country in many ways, but in our view it is also in many
respects a racial democracy, capable of being influenced towards
more or less inclusive
and redistributive economic
policies , social policies, or for that matter,
imperial policies. What is distinctive about our own epoch in the USA (post-Second World War to the present) with respect
to race and racism? Over the past decades there has been a steady drumbeat of efforts to contain and neutralize civil
rights, to restrict racial democracy, and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities in different
institutional sites employment, health, education persist and in many cases have increased. Indeed, the post-2008
period has seen a dramatic increase in racial inequality. The subprime home mortgage crisis, for example, was a major
racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected by predatory lending practices; many lost their
It would be easy to
conclude, as Feagin and Elias do, that white racial dominance has been
homes as a result; race-based wealth disparities widened tremendously.
continuous and unchanging throughout US history . But such a

perspective misses the dramatic twists and turns in racial politics
that have occurred since the Second World War and the civil rights
era. Feagin and Elias claim that we overly inflate the significance of the
changes wrought by the civil rights movement, and that we overlook the
serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of huge racial
inequalities (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its wake. We do not . In Racial Formation we
wrote about racial reaction in a chapter of that name, and elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias devote little
While we argue that

the right wing was able to rearticulate race and racism issues to
roll back some of the gains of the civil rights movement, we also believe that
there are limits to what the right could achieve in the post-civil
rights political landscape. So we agree that the present prospects for racial
justice are demoralizing at best. But we do not think that is the whole
story. US racial conditions have changed over the post-Second World War period, in ways
that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. Some of the major reforms of the 1960s
have proved irreversible ; they have set powerful democratic forces
attention to our arguments there; perhaps because they are in substantial agreement with us.
in motion . These racial (trans)formations were the results of unprecedented political mobilizations, led by the
desegregation of the armed
forces, as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the Voting Rights Act, the
Immigration and Naturalization Act (Hart- Celler), as well as important court decisions like
Loving v. Virginia that declared anti-miscegenation laws
unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his
black movement, but not confined to blacks alone. Consider the
interest convergence hypothesis effectively explains all these developments. How does Lyndon Johnson's famous (and
possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964 We have lost the South for a generation
count as convergence?
The US racial regime has been transformed in
significant ways . As Antonio Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorporation of opposition
(Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial
regime under movement pressure was exercising its hegemony. But Gramsci insists that such reforms which he calls
passive revolutions cannot be merely symbolic if they are to be effective: oppositions must win real gains in the
process. Once again, we are in the realm of politics, not absolute rule. So yes, we think there were
important if
partial victories that shifted the racial state and transformed the
significance of race in everyday life. And yes, we think that further victories
can take place both on the broad terrain of the state and on the more
across civil society .
Indeed we have argued that in many ways the most important accomplishment of the
anti-racist movement of the 1960s in the USA was the politicization of the social. In the USA
and indeed around the globe, race-based movements demanded not only the
inclusion of racially defined others and the democratization of
structurally racist societies, but also the recognition and validation
immediate level of social interaction: in daily interaction, in the human psyche and
by both the state and civil society of racially-defined experience and

identity. These demands broadened and deepened democracy itself.
They facilitated not only the democratic gains made in the USA by the black
movement and its allies, but also the political advances towards equality, social justice and inclusion
accomplished by other new social movements: second-wave feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-
By no means do we think that the post-war

movement upsurge was an unmitigated success. Far from it: all the new social
war movements among others.
movements were subject to the same rearticulation (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. xii) that produced the racial ideology of
colourblindness and its variants; indeed all these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that
arose from the political right to counter them. Yet even their incorporation and containment, even their confrontations
even the need to develop the

highly contradictory ideology of colourblindness, reveal the
with the various backlash phenomena of the past few decades,
transformative character
of the politicization of the social. While it is not possible here to explore so
extensive a subject, it is worth noting that it was the long-delayed eruption of racial subjectivity and self-awareness into
the mainstream political arena that set off this transformation, shaping both the democratic and anti-democratic social
movements that are evident in US politics today. What are the political implications of contemporary racial trends?
use of racial categories can be imprecise. This is not their

problem alone; anyone writing about race and racism needs to frame
terms with care and precision, and we undoubtedly get fuzzy too
from time to time. The absence of a careful approach leads to racial
Feagin and Elias's
lumping and essentialisms of various kinds. This imprecision is heightened

in polemic . In the Feagin and Elias essay the term whites at times refers to all
whites, white elites, dominant white actors and very exceptionally,
anti-racist whites, a category in which we presume they would place themselves. Although the terms black,
African American and Latino appear, the term people of colour is emphasized, often in direct substitution for black
reference points. In the USA today
it is important not to frame race in a bipolar
manner . The black/white paradigm made more sense in the past

than it does in the twenty-first century. The racial make-up of the
nation has now changed dramatically. Since the passage of the Immigration Reform Act of
1965, the USA has become more coloured. A majorityminority national demographic shift is well underway. Predicted
to arrive by the mid-twenty-first century, the numerical eclipse of the white population is already in evidence locally and
regionally. In California, for example, non-Hispanic whites constitute only 39.7 per cent of the state's population. While the
decline in the white population cannot be correlated with any decline of white racial dominance, the dawning and
deepening of racial multipolarity calls into question a sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit black/white racial
framework that is evident in Feagin and Elias's essay. Shifting racial demographics and identities also raise general
questions of race and racism in new ways that the systemic racism approach is not prepared to explain.3 Class
questions and issues of panethnicizing trends, for example, call into question what we mean by race, racial identity and
race consciousness. No racially defined group is even remotely uniform; groups that we so glibly refer to as Asian
American or Latino are particularly heterogeneous. Some have achieved or exceeded socio-economic parity with whites,
while others are subject to what we might call engineered poverty in sweatshops, dirty and dangerous labour settings, or
prisons. Tensions within panethnicized racial groups are notably present, and conflicts between racially defined groups
(black/brown conflict, for example) are evident in both urban and rural settings. A substantial current of social scientific
analysis now argues that Asians and Latinos are the new white ethnics, able to work toward whiteness4 at least in part,
and that the black/white bipolarity retains its distinct and foundational qualities as the mainstay of US racism (Alba and
Nee 2005; Perlmann 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Waters, Ueda and Marrow 2007). We question that argument in
light of the massive demographic shifts taking place in the USA. Globalization, climate change and above all neoliberalism
on a global scale, all drive migration. The country's economic capacity to absorb enormous numbers of immigrants, lowwage workers and their families (including a new, globally based and very female, servant class) without generating the
sort of established subaltern groups we associate with the terms race and racism, may be more limited than it was when
the whitening of Europeans took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In other words this argument's key
precedent, the absorption of white immigrants of a different color (Jacobson 1998), may no longer apply. Indeed, we
might think of the assimilationist model itself as a general theory of immigrant incorporation that was based on a
historically specific case study one that might not hold for, or be replicated by, subsequent big waves of immigration.
Feagin and Elias's systemic racism model, while offering numerous important insights, does not inform concrete analysis
of these issues. It is important going forward to understand how groups are differentially racialized and relatively
positioned in the US racial hierarchy: once again racism must be seen as a shifting racial project. This has important
consequences, not only with respect to emerging patterns of inequality, but also in regard to the degree of power
available to different racial actors to define, shape or contest the existing racial landscape. Attention to such matters is
largely absent in Feagin and Elias's account. In their view racially identified groups are located in strict reference to the
dominant white racial frame, hammered into place, so to speak. As a consequence, they fail to examine how racially
subordinate groups interact and influence each others boundaries, conditions and practices. Because they offer so little
specific analysis of Asian American, Latino or Native American racial issues, the reader finds her/himself once again in the
land (real or imaginary, depending on your racial politics) of bipolar US racial dynamics, in which whites and blacks play
the leading roles, and other racially identified groups as well as those ambiguously identified, such as Middle Eastern
and South Asian Americans (MEASA) play at best supporting roles, and are sometimes cast as extras or left out of the
We still want to acknowledge that blacks have been

catching hell and have borne the brunt of the racist reaction of the
past several decades. For example, we agree with Feagin and Elias's critique
of the reactionary politics of incarceration in the USA. The new Jim Crow (Alexander
picture entirely.
2012) or even the new slavery that the present system practises is something that was just in its beginning stages when
we were writing Racial Formation. It is now recognized as a national and indeed global scandal.
understood?
How is it to be
Of course there are substantial debates on this topic, notably about the nature of the prison-
industrial complex (Davis 2003, p. 3) and the social and cultural effects of mass incarceration along racial lines. But
beyond Feagin and Elias's denunciation of the ferocious white racism that is
operating here, deeper political implications are worth considering.
As Alexander (2012), Mauer (2006), Manza and Uggen (2008) and movement groups like Critical Resistance and the Ella
Baker Center argue, the upsurge over recent decades in incarceration rates for
black (and brown) men expresses the fear-based, law-and-order appeals that have shaped US racial politics since the rise
aims at
restricting the increasing impact of voters of colour in a
demographically shifting electorate. There is a lot more to say about this, but for the present
of Nixonland (Perlstein 2008) and the Southern strategy. Perhaps even more central, racial repression
two key points stand out: first, it is not an area where Feagin and Elias and we have any sharp disagreement, and second,
for all the horrors and injustices that the new Jim Crow represents,
incarceration, profiling and similar practices remain political issues .
These practices and policies are not ineluctable and unalterable
dimensions of the US racial regime . There have been previous
waves of reform in these areas. They can be transformed again by
mass mobilization, electoral shifts and so on. In other words,

resistance is not futile . Speaking of electoral shifts and the formal political arena, how should
President Barack Obama be politically situated in this discussion? How do Feagin and Elias explain Obama? Quite
amazingly, his name does not appear in their essay. Is he a mere token, an oreo, a shill for Wall Street? Or does Obama
represent a new development in US politics, a black leader of a mass, multiracial party that for sheer demographic
reasons alone might eventually triumph over the white people's party, the Republicans? If the President is neither the
white man's token nor Neo, the One,5 then once again we are in the world of politics: neither the near-total white
despotism depicted by Feagin and Elias, nor a racially inclusive democracy. President Obama continues to enjoy
widespread black support, although it is clear that he has not protected blacks against their greatest cumulative loss of
wealth in history. He has not explicitly criticized the glaring racial bias in the US carceral system. He has not intervened in
conflicts over workers rights particularly in the public sector where many blacks and other people of colour are
concentrated. He has not intervened to halt or slow foreclosures, except in ways that were largely symbolic. Workers and
lower-middle-class people were the hardest hit by the great recession and the subprime home mortgage crisis, with black
families faring worst, and Latinos close behind (Rugh and Massey 2010); Obama has not defended them. Many writers
have explained Obama's centrism and unwillingness to raise the issue of race as functions of white racism (Sugrue
2010). The black community and other communities of colour as well remains politically divided. While black folk have
taken the hardest blows from the reactionary and racist regime that has mostly dominated US politics since Reagan (if not
since Nixon), no united black movement has succeeded the deaths of Malcolm and Martin. Although there is always
important political activity underway, a relatively large and fairly conservative black middle class, a black bourgeoisie in
Frazier's (1957) terms, has generally maintained its position since the end of the civil rights era. Largely based in the
public sector, and including a generally centrist business class as well, this stratum has continued to play the role that
Frazier and before him, Charles S. Johnson. William Lloyd Warner, Alison Davis and other scholars identified: vacillation
between the white elite and the black masses. Roughly similar patterns operate in Latino communities as well, where the
working towards whiteness framework coexists with a substantial amount of exclusion and super-exploitation. Alongside
class issues in communities of colour, there are significant gender issues. The disappearance of blue-collar work,
combined with the assault by the criminal justice system chiefly profiling by the police (stop and frisk) and
imprisonment, have both unduly targeted and victimized black and brown men, especially youth. Women of colour are
also targeted, especially by violence, discrimination and assaults on their reproductive rights (Harris-Perry 2011); profiling
is everywhere (Glover 2009). Here again we are in the realm of racial politics. Debate proceeds in the black community
on Obama's credibilty, with Cornel West and Tavis Smiley leading the critics. But it seems safe to say that in North Philly,
Inglewood or Atlanta's Lakewood section, the president remains highly popular. Latino support for Obama remains high as
well. Feagin and Elias need to clarify their views on black and brown political judgement. Is it attuned to political realities
or has it been captured by the white racial frame? Is Obama's election of no importance? *** In conclusion, do Feagin
and Elias really believe that white power is so complete, so extensive, so sutured (as Laclau and Mouffe might say) as
they suggest here? Do they mean to suggest, in Borg-fashion, that resistance is futile? This seems to be the underlying
political logic of the systemic racism approach, perhaps unintentionally so. Is white racism so ubiquitous that no
meaningful political challenge can be mounted against it? Are black and brown folk (yellow and red people, and also
others unclassifiable under the always- absurd colour categories) utterly supine, duped, abject, unable to exert any
political pressure? Is such a view of race and racism even recognizable in the USA of 2012? And is that a responsible
political position to be advocating? Is this what we want to teach our students of colour? Or our white students for that
racial conflict,
both within (and against) the state and in everyday life, is a
fundamentally political process. We think that they would also accept our claim that the
matter? We suspect that if pressed, Feagin and Elias would concur with our judgement that
ongoing political realities of race provide extensive evidence that

people of colour in the USA are not so powerless , and that whites
are not so omnipotent, as Feagin and Elias's analysis suggests them to be. Racial formation theory
allows us to see that there are contradictions in racial oppression. The racial formation approach reveals that white racism
is unstable and constantly challenged, from the national and indeed global level down to the personal and intra-psychic
conflicts that we all experience, no matter what our racial identity might be. While racism largely white continues to
there have been enormous increases in racial

inequality in recent years. But movement-based anti-racist
opposition continues, and sometimes scores victories. Challenges to
flourish, it is not monolithic. Yes,
white racism continue both within the state and in civil society .
Although largely and properly led by people of colour, anti-racist movements also incorporate whites such as Feagin and
Movements may experience setbacks, the reforms for

which they fought may be revealed as inadequate, and indeed their leaders may be
co-opted or even eliminated, but racial subjectivity and self-awareness, unresolved and conflictual
Elias themselves.
both within the individual psyche and the body politic, abides .
Resistance is not futile.
2NC impact- political crisis

We need sites of public contestation and solidarity in
order to solve political crises- otherwise we risk
catastrophic impacts and never create concrete change
Milstein 2014 [Brian, College detudes mondiales, Thinking politically about crisis: A
pragmatist perspective, European Journal of Political Theory, 0(0) 1-20, Accessed at Sage Journals
12/12/2014, pg. 1-3, AX]
Crisis is a prominent feature of our social and political reality. However,
the term crisis, pervasive as it is in discussions about politics, society, and history, is rarely defined or
grappled with explicitly. As the conceptual historian Reinhart Koselleck once observed, From the
nineteenth century on, there has been an enormous quantitative expansion in the variety of meanings
attached to the concept of crisis, but few corresponding gains in either clarity or precision.1 Nearly a halfcentury after Koselleck made this statement, very little has changed. We talk of particular crises; we talk of
things that are alleged to be in crisis, but there is comparatively little discussion about crisis as such.
This is especially the case in political theory, where the bulk of normative energies tend to be expended on
however else we might

characterize crisisbe it as a time of radical disruption, a moment of
epochal transition, the detonation of systemic societal contradictions,
or a state of emergency, and be it of the state, the economy, the environment, or the
international sphere a crisis is always in the last instance a political
questions relating to ideal conditions in an otherwise stable society. Yet
think to
phenomenon. My purpose here is to rethink the concept of crisis as a

concept of political theory. More specifically, I am interested in how the grammar
of crisis might inform the way we think about political action and social
change. In doing so, I seek to broach a number of foundational questions about the nature of the
concept of crisis and the place it occupies in our political repertoire: What are
we doing when we say there is a crisis? What function does the concept serve? What
assumptions are we putting into play when we use the term crisis? Since the beginning of the modern age,
crisis experiences have played a key role in calibrating the aims of

politics and the central questions of political theory . The primary point of
reference for modern political thoughtthe sovereign statewas forged
out of the manifold political crises of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Jon
Elster observes that new constitutions almost always are written in the wake of a crisis or exceptional
Many of our social welfare institutions came into

being in the wake of recurrent economic crises, and it is also out of
these same experiences that the idea of socioeconomic justice has
found its way into the mainstream of contemporary political
thought. Many of our most important international institutions, as well
as the bulk of international humanitarian law, were forged out of
experiences of international and humanitarian crisis, and so, too,
have our current debates about human rights and international or
global justice. At the same time, crises are not exactly phenomena we welcome. They wreak
havoc on society, destroying lives and livelihoods, and they are just
as likely to leave society in a worse state instead of a better one.
Moreover, crises harbor political dangers as well as opportunities, and the opportunities
circumstance of some sort.2
they do present may just as well be opportunities for exploitation by elites as for emancipatory movement
by the masses. It is no surprise that much of the recent literature dealing with crises, particularly in the
realm of legal and constitutional scholarship after 9/11, has put its emphasis on precisely this potential for
exploitation.3 But, as I will argue in what follows, even this potential for elites or rulers to manipulate crises
is parasitic on a more fundamental set of functions that the concept of crisis fulfills in the modern social
imaginary. Philosophies of history, especially those influenced by the Hegelian and Marxist traditions, often
identify crisis not only with disruption and cataclysm but with opportunities for transformation or even
transcendence:
crises can be indicative of deeper pathologies in the
structure of society, and they can bring into the open power
relations or conflicts that remained otherwise hidden. 4 To be sure, oversimplified associations of crisis with revolutionary praxis have been rightly criticized on both philosophical
the
possibility of a more subtle, methodical, and pragmatic investigation
into the relation of crisis experiences to the creation of historical meaning,
transformations of solidarity, and consciousness of justice and
injustice. Even if we can no longer abide a simple identification of crisis with emancipation, this does
not negate the possibility that crises can be occasions for contesting social
structures, transforming solidarities, and pursuing political change .
and empirical grounds as flawed, naive, and even dangerous.5 But this need not rule out
In this article I will offer a pragmatist approach to thinking about crisis. My argument is, if we want to
think about crisis as a political concept, we need to think through how the concept is used in modern
societiesthat is, by thinking and speaking actors who experience and act upon crises. Pragmatists from
C.S. Peirce to Wittgenstein to Jurgen Habermas and Robert Brandom have argued that, in order to grasp a
concept, we need first to examine how it serves the practice of reasoning, how it helps us make inferences
about the world, what prior understandings and judgments it presupposes, how it fits in with other related
concepts, and how it informs our repertoires of action. In what follows, I will show that the concept of crisis
Crisis belies the traditional distinctions between empirical

is an objective event, but it is one whose
urgency demands a normative commitment on the part of those
involved in it. It is an inherently reflexive concept, one that blurs the usual dichotomies between
fact and value, observer and participant, and theory and practice, and it presupposes our
ability to critically observe and take responsibility for our social
world. As such, the modern concept of crisis is an essentially
participatory concept, whose very invocation calls not just for
observation and critical judgment but action . I will begin with a look back at how
indeed rests on some powerful assumptions.
science and normative philosophy: it
the concept of crisis has emerged and developed as a central concept in modernity, a reflexive concept
participants use to make sense of their increasingly complex relationship to their social world. In the
the modern concept of crisis rests on certain

pragmatic assumptions, which will allow us to see how crises can be understood as a
function of the publicly discursive production of crisis consciousness. As we will see in
the The politics of the crisis community section, it is the public way in which actors
speak about, act upon, and contest each others consciousness of
crisis that makes crisis into a thoroughly political phenomenon,
susceptible to contestation, struggle, and even resistance. I will conclude
following section, I will show how
by arguing that it is precisely this discursive and contested aspect of the crisis concept that can make it
appear fuzzy, diluted, or subject to abuse, but this is all the more reason to strive to make the concept
explicit in political theory.
2NC impact- warming

Their politics of resistance to institutions and protest
weakens institutional and collective change because
those decentralized actions cant bring together diverse
communities and abandons institutions-particularly that
prevents solutions to global climate change.
Heath and Potter 2005 [Joseph Heath and Andrew Potter. Joseph Heath is an associate
professor in the department of philosophy at the University of Toronto. Andrew Potter is an assistant
professor in the department of philosophy at Trent University. Nation of Rebels: Why Counterculture
Became Consumer Culture. Spaceship Earth. HarperCollins Publishers. Pg. 329-330, AX]
The fact of the matter is that the antiglobaiisation movement has a

conception of democratic politics that is fundamentally hostile
toward national and international representative institutions. It is
convenient to attribute this hostility to a healthy scepticism (Governments sold us out!), but really it is
as old as the counterculture from which the antiglobalisation
movement sprang. Klein claims that her goal is to help build a form of deep and
decentralised democracy. Yet the polities that she has in mind is essentially the
60s ideal of participatory democracy or grassroots democracy. Its
countercultural pedigree can be seen in the profound dislike of
hierarchy, bureaucracy and expertise that this model of democracy
entails. The main goal of this sort of politics is to eliminate the
institutional barriers and vested interests that stand between
citizens and action. lt looks to shift from representation to
deliberation, by inverting the basic political struc ture from the topdown structure of representative democracy to a grassroots,
bottom-up process for decision-making. This requires a radically
decentralised politics, with power downloaded to local communities
or municipalities. This is just the political form of the
environmentalist Think globally, act locally agenda , with a similar faith in its
virtues. Underlying it all is a faith in the powers of spontaneous
harmony, an assumption that as long as each local community looks
after its own interests, the interests of the whole will automatically
be met. Furthermore, in shrinking the scope of citizens political responsibility and concern,
participatory democracy hopes to achieve a substantial reduction in conflict and complexity, and thereby
to evade the problems that arise from living in a pluralistic society. The more local the politics, the smaller
the population one needs to take into consideration, and thus the less the chances are of having to
compromise or accommodate those with different values. Supporters of participatory democracy have
even started advocating something called local foreign policy. Small organisations, from universities to
churches to municipalities, pass regulations that the governments at the provincial, state and fed eral
levels are unwilling to consider. Berkeley, California, was (naturally) one of the first to ban companies with
investments in Burma from selling their goods or services to municipal agencies. Others have followed suit,
targeting companies with investments in places like Indonesia and Nigeria, while still others have enacted
living wage laws, so that in order to win a municipal contract, a company must pay its employees a
suitably high wage and offer a certain package of benefits. Fundamentally, this is the same form of
If this sort of deep, decentralised

democracy were able to solve our problems, then we wouldnt need
governments at: all. But the most serious political challenges we
face are essentially collective action problems, and decentralised
local democracy cant be the solution to these problems, since more
often than not it is the cause. Global, warming is a good example. No
individual corporation has any interest in reducing its output of
greenhouse gases, because the costs of global warming arc spread
utopianism that one finds in Callenbachs Rcolopia.
across every person on the planet. At the same time, no individual

country has any incentive to regulate its own energy industries in
the absence of any guarantee that other countries will do likewise.
Global warming can be solved only by a general agreement that is
binding on every producer of greenhouse gases on earth. What we
need is not a local foreign policy, but a global domestic policy on
greenhouse gas emissions. At some point, the stance of the antiglobalisation movement
begins to generate a vicious circle. The whole problem with globalisation, say its opponents, is that it has
weakened governments to the point where they are now irrelevant. We cannot possibly expect our national
governments to bring peace, order and justice to the planet, since it is the very impotence of these
governments that makes the retreat into local politics necessary in the first place. But then these activists
turn around and refuse to participate in national politics, and deny the legitimacy of their own elected
'This retreat from democratic politics weakens these

governments further and robs them of legitimacy with certain crucial
segments of the population. In so doing, the antiglobalisation
movement weakens the only instrument that can be used to correct
the very problems that it diagnoses. We can break the circle only by
putting to bed the myth of pow erless governments. Governments,
especially those in the West, are not shrinking, they are not the
stooges of multinational corporations and there has not been a race
to the bottom in taxation, corporate regulation and environmental
protection. In fact, just the opposite is true. Average government tax
revenues as a percentage of GDP are higher than they have ever
been, and the trend is upward, not down. In the wake of the Enron,
WorldCom and Parmalat corporate scandals, there is a movement
toward significant tightening of international regulations on
corporate governance. Finally, there is no evidence that
environmental regulations are being weakened by pressures
emanating from global competition.
officials.
A2: Reformism Bad

Progressive change is possible and effective the alt fails and leads to
authoritarianism
Connolly 11
(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)
Is it not obligatory to expose and resist the system as such rather than taking
cumulative actions to move it? Don't such actions necessarily fold back in on
themselves, feeding the dosed system they seek to move? Some theorists on the
Left say such things, but they themselves have too dosed a view of the systems
they criticize. No system in a world of becoming composed of multiple,
interacting systems of different types, with different capacities of self-organization, is
entirely dosed. It is both more vulnerable to the outside than the carriers of hubris imagine
and periodically susceptible to creative movement from within and without simultaneously.
Moreover, pure negativity on the Left does not sustain either critique or militancy
for long, but rather, it tends eventually to lapse into resignation or to slide toward
the authoritarian practices of the Right that already express with glee the moods
of negativity, hubris, or existential revenge. We have witnessed numerous examples of
such disappointing transitions in the last several decades, when a negative or authoritarian mood
is retained while the creed in which it was set is changed dramatically. We must therefore
work on mood, belief; desire, and action together. As we do so we also amplify

positive attachment to existence itself amidst the specific political resentments
that help to spur us on. To ignore the existential dimension of politics is to
increase the risks of converting a noble movement into an authoritarian one and
to amplify the power of bellicose movements that mobilize destructive potential.
To focus on the negative dimension alone is to abjure the responsibilities of political action
during a dangerous time.
To review, none of the role interventions listed above nor all in concert could suffice to break
such a global resonance machine. Luck and pregnant points of contact with salutary changes in
state actions, other cross-state citizen movements, the policies of international
organizations, creative market innovations, and religious organization are

needed. But those larger constellations may not themselves move far in a positive direction
unless they meet multiple constituencies primed to join them and geared to press them whenever
they lapse into inertia, if a world resonance machine of revenge and counter-revenge stretches,
twists, and constrains the classical image of sovereign units, regionally anchored creeds, uneven
capitalist exchange, and international organizations, while drawing selective sustenance from all
of them, a new counter-machine must do so too.
Reform is key crucial to the movement and refusing short term work
ignores the real bodies in the system now
Meiners 7 (Ph.D. in Education, Simon Fraser University, Canada; teaches,
writes and organizes in Chicago. Erica R., Right to BeHostile: SCHOOLS.
PRISONS, AND THE MAKING OF PUBLIC ENEMIES, pg. 169-70)
Working toward a horizon of abolition forces me to continue learning and considering the depth of how
prison
abolition does not mean not doing reform work . The horizon of abolition does
not preclude working for reforms and changes . Reform work and service
prisons and incarceration are natural- ized in our communities. However, this multifaceted goal of
providing are required because there are real bodies who need immediate
assistance. As longtime feminist prison activist and scholar Karlene Faith writes: Every reform
raises the question of whether, in Gramsci's tenus, it is a revolutionary reform, one
that has liberatory potential to challenge the status quo, or a reform reform ,
which may ease the problem temporarily or superficially, but reinforces the status quo by validating the
We do liberal reform work because real

women in real crises occupy the prisons, and they can't be ignored .
Revolutionary reform work is educative: it raises questions of human rights (and thereby
validates prisoners as human beings) and demonstrates that the state apparatus , which is
mandated to uphold human rights, is one of the worst rights abusers . (Faith, 2000,164-165)
Faith reminds me of the necessity of doing the " both/and" where everyday local
work may involve service providing or working for reforms, but it is also
useful to place, understand, and connect this labor to a larger movement . For
system through the process of improving it.
example, I cofacilitated domestic violence workshops at the Cook County Jail because there are real
women in prisons and jails with real needs. We distributed information about the resources available to
women including housing and advocacy services. Yet, despite offering information to women who generally
were not informed about these resources, this service-providing was also problematic if analyzed through a
wider framework. Our work was free and removed responsibility fron; the jail to provide these services. Our
program made the jail "look good because a group of university academics volunteered their time and provided services and did nothing to challenge the existence of the jail, in fact our work potentially
strengthened the jail's legitimacy. This creates a clear contradiction, as how do we challenge the
legitimacy of the jail, yet recognize that there are women who require immediate resources ?
There are
significant tensions between these frameworks, reform or service-providing
and abolition, and I don't think that these tensions are necessarily a negative .
For me, these tensions about how and where to work, and the conflicts
surrounding short- and long-term strategies for change, can make both the
"direct service" and "abolition" work stronger. I specifically use the term the
horizon of prison abolition because this is a goal that shifts yet simultaneously frames all of my work.
Abolition is also a concept that is grounded in histories of successful struggles for racial and economic (and
gender) justice, and invoking these histories is useful.
Must consider each use of sovereignty as unique cannot universalize

our opposition to the state or we will create the same problems of
universal sovereignty and give ourselves over to multiple other forms
of oppression
Derrida 3
(Jacques, THE "WORLD" OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT TO COME (EXCEPTION, CALCULATION,
SOVEREIGNTY), Research in Phenomenology. Pittsburgh: 2003. Vol. 33 pg. 9, 44 pgs)
And yet, in the second place, it would be imprudent and hasty, in truth hardly reasonable, to
oppose unconditionally, that is, head on, a sovereignty that is itself unconditional and
indivisible. One cannot combat, head on, all sovereignty, sovereignty in general,
without threatening at the same time, beyond the nation-state figure of sovereignty, the
classical principles of freedom and self-determination. Like the classical tradition of law
(and the force that it presupposes), these classical principles remain inseparable from a sovereignty at
once indivisible and yet able to be shared. Nation-state sovereignty can even itself, in certain
conditions, become an indispensable bulwark against certain international powers,
certain ideological, religious, or capitalist, indeed linguistic, hegemonies, which,

under the cover of liberalism or universalism, would still represent, in a world that
would be little more than a market, a rationalization in the service of particular
interests. Yet again, in a context that is each time singular, where the respectful attention paid to
singularity is not relativist but universalizable and rational, responsibility would
consist in
orienting ourselves without any determinative knowledge of the rule. To be
responsible, to keep within reason [garder raison], would be to invent maxims of
transaction for deciding between two just as rational and universal but contradictory
exigencies of reason as well as its enlightenment.
2NC Right Takeover DA

The left is failing because of a suspicion of the nation state we might
fight the right at all levels in order to be effective
Grayson and Little 11
(Deborah Grayson and Ben Little 4 August 2011, The far right are the masters of network politics, not the
'internationalist' left, http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/deborah-grayson-and-ben-little/far-rightare-masters-of-network-politics-not-internationa)
While Norway mourns and attends to matters of justice, across Europe the left would be wise to
pause and reflect upon the mixed responses to the worst case of child murder in northern Europe
since the Second World War. We can only hope that Anders Breivik is a lone operator and that
we will not see this kind of politically motivated mass murder repeated in the UK or anywhere
else, but in showing how right wing ideology is formed and disseminated through increasingly
international networks, the Utoya massacre has lessons for us all.
Although globally oriented lefties may like to think this is a contradiction in

terms, it is the far right who are pioneering the way towards a new form of
internationalism. This is not to say that they have lost their attachment to the
nation for all that vigilantes like Breivik may think in civilisational or European terms, small
state nationalism remains the bedrock of their politics. Those that see the blurring of
boundaries between European and national perspectives as a sign of incoherence
which will diminish the power of these ideological beliefs are mistaken. In an age
of network politics it's a strength, and one that the left needs to understand if we
are to reverse the electoral successes of the centre-right and the populist rise of the farright across Europe. So far, the left has struggled to match the way far-right
networks have learned to scale seamlessly from the local to the civilisational
through the conceptual space of the national. The English Defence League, for example,
explain local opposition to their marches as stemming from the malign influence of the SWPs
campaign, Unite Against Fascism; cite the welfare state as evidence of leftist domination in
national politics; and see in the European Court of Human Rights the imposition of socialist,
multicultural values across the entire continent. This sense of multiple scales allows the
EDL to create a language that reflects their politics at every level, and to
communicate their message across local and national boundaries. They create a
unified rhetoric that the left, with their suspicion of the national, cannot
replicate.
The strategy of the 1AC results in Anti-politics that makes

political corruption and right wing dominance inevitable
Boggs 97 CARL BOGGS ,National University, Los Angeles, The Great
Retreat: Decline Of The Public Sphere In Late Twentieth-Century America
1997 Theory and Society 26., AX
Both mall culture and mass media symbolize the prevailing mood of antipolitics: they reproduce to a deeply-atomized, commodified social life-world which corresponds to the
mode of consciousness described by Richard Sennett in The Fall of Public Man, where citizen
involvement in a republic is effaced ``by the belief that social meanings
are generated by the feelings of individual human beings,'' so that the

common terrain of power relations and social space is obliterated .15
Sheldon Wolin refers to this development as a ``crisis of citizenship,'' reected in the carving up of the
The point has been reached where

most Americans can no longer imagine a system truly open to citizen
participation, where the ordinary person might have influence . Viewed in this
public sphere by local, privatized interests.16
way, modernity is two-sided: it coincides with the spread of technology, knowledge, and expertise but also
Individuals feel engulfed

by forces beyond their control ^ bureaucracy, government, huge corporations, the global
economy. Under these conditions psychological retreat from the public sphere
may seem normal enough. The problem, however, is that such firmly
entrenched bastions of power will not vanish simply because they
reinforces widespread feelings of alienation and powerlessness.
are denigrated or ignored; on the contrary, their hegemony will

simply go unchallenged.
After California anti-tax crusaders launched the Proposition 13
campaign in 1978, an upsurge of movements on the right fed into a rapidly-growing anti-statist current
that transformed the whole terrain of American electoral politics. Winning millions of adherents, these
movements took many forms: libertarians, Christian fundamentalists, anti-abortion campaigns, groups, the
National Rie Association, local militias, and so forth. While usually ambivalent toward the public sphere,
popular hostility toward

government was never just a right-wing phenomenon; it had already
resonated within the new left, the counter-culture, some progressive
movements, and a nascent neo-liberalism. As a general mood, anti-politics
they nonetheless entered it and often used it to great advantage. Yet
can be seen as a response to the mounting crisis of the public sector at a time when competitive pressures
can also be understood as a growing

reaction against bureaucracy in any form. Anti-statism was further reinforced by
within the global market began to intensify. It
the crisis and then eclipse of Communism around the world ^ a development interpreted by many as
validation of free-market capitalism and privatized consumption styles fetishized in the leading industrial
nations. When the decline of European social democracy is taken into account, the waning of the entire
socialist tradition becomes a watershed event for justifying the most extreme (and utopian) forms of anti-
the discrediting of any

government planning or regulation of the economy ^ is widely interpreted as a
sign that state power is fundamentally corrupt and inefficient at all
times and all places. American society in the 1990s has seen the resurgence of a ercely antistatism. In this milieu the ``death of socialism'' ^ and with it
government right-wing populism comprising not only free-marketeers and anti-tax partisans but also a
bizarre variety of cults, militias, and enclave groups, mostly but not entirely drawn from the ranks of the
familiar `àngry white male.'' Many see themselves caught up in an all- out war against an evil and
oppressive federal government that taxes and regulates citizens beyond reason. Others see the national
state apparatus as some kind of agency of international conspiracies, sometimes involving the United
Nations. Inevitably, violent confrontations of one sort or another have taken place ^ the Waco stando and
conagration at the Branch Davidian compound, the Oklahoma City bombing, the protracted holdout of the
Montana Freeman, the Amtrak train derailment, and numerous others. In hundreds of lesser episodes,
federal agents and employees around the country have been victims of threats, intimidation, and various
hostile acts. A Gallop Poll taken in May 1995 revealed that no less than 39 percent of Americans believe
the federal government constitutes an enemy of human rights. In the rst ten days following the Oklahoma
City events a number of federal agencies received a total of 140 bomb threats. Twice in 1994 and 1995
disgruntled citizens took employees hostage, in San Francisco and Puerto Rico, to protest shoddy
treatment at the hands of government agents. Public ocials at all levels are frequently the target of verbal
assaults. Such manifestations of popular outrage cannot be dismissed as the irrational acts of marginals
and crazies, though this element does enter the picture; far more common is the lashing out of working
people who feel powerless and believe, quite rightly, that most government ocials and politicians care
little about their problems. Whether this revolt against politics can have any strategic value in a period of
global interdependence and worsening social crisis raises yet another set of issues. In fact, the historical
meaning of contemporary anti-statism is far from clear. Here it is necessary to mention that the 752
neo-conservative and right-wing attack on big government has been, and

continues to be, highly selective insofar as these groups would actually
hope to strengthen the most oppressive and authoritarian fea-
tures of the state (the military , police , prison system , controls

over personal life ) while tearing down
those
social programs
that account
for no more than three percent of the total federal budget. Nor is there the slightest inclination to disturb
the most gargantuan and powerful institutions of all ^ the multinational corporations, huge nancial networks, and their global extensions in theWorld Bank and IMF. Some- how these huge fortresses of power
and wealth escape the conservative attack on ``bigness,'' waste, and lack of accountability. The reality is
that the modern state and corporations are thoroughly interwoven, and both are integrated into the
permanent war economy. InTheodore Roszak's words: ``When we talk about `big government' in America,
this ought to be the meat of the discussion. It is big war that created and sanctioned the big corporations.
It is the big corporations that undergird big government. Big government is quite simply the Ameri- can
Anti-politics thus represents an

abstract, ultimately duplicitous rejection of state power; retreat
from the public sphere does not suggest popular mobilization
against big government as such but rather an assault on just the
economy as our local extension of global industrialism.''17
redistributive and welfare functions of the state . Put more simply: the
idea of dismantling the welfare state is really a code for lowered taxes,
deep cuts in social programs, deregulation, and freeing of more
resources for private consumption. The values associated with
citizen participation, much less a recovery of the public sphere, have no place on
this agenda. Thus the Reagan presidency, galvanized and legitimated by its strong opposition to
entrenched governmental power, actually contributed to the expansion of that power year by year.
Resources were poured into the military; the space program, intelligence, and law enforcement rose to
record levels; taxes were increased; administrative corruption spread; and bureaucracy showed no signs of
dissolving. Reagan also concocted his famous Star Wars scheme, which, if enacted, would have been the
most expensive government program in history. Still, Republicans persisted in their libertarian blather
about the evils of state power, always invoking ``free-market'' values that, in fact, have no relevance to
the United States or any capitalist economy. The reality is that the much-celebrated shift back to an
autonomous market, family values, local neighbor- hood, and individual consumption could never occur
without eroding the very foundations of state-integrated corporate capitalism.
A2: Cooption/State Link

And despite threats of cooption, being able to forge ties with those in
power is necessary to the success of movements
Yeo (Assistant Professor of Politics at the Catholic University of America) 11
(Andrew, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests , Cambridge University Press, pg 196-7)
In the previous section, 1 covered several policy implications and prescriptions for U.S. overseas basing strategy.
What insights and lessons can be drawn for anti-base movements? I offer four sets of
recommendations for activists regarding anti-base movement strategy and advocacy. The first suggestion stems directly
from the security consensus framework: when
possible, activists should form ties with

political elites. As discussed in the introductory chapter, U.S. base policies are ultimately
decided by government officials. Therefore, anti-base movements gain greater
leverage and influence on basing policy outcomes when they form ties with key
elites. This was certainly the case with successful anti-base movements such as the
Anti-Treaty Movement in the Philippines and No Bases Coalition in Ecuador. Although
not included in this volume, ties qeen Puerto Rican anti-base activists and several U.S. congressional repre utatives
helped activists shut down Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in Vieques it, Loo-i. The support of several prominent U.S.
political figures such as Hillary Clinton and Jesse Jackson, and the direct involvement of U.S. representatives 11ch as
Nydia M. Velasquez and Luis V. Gutierrez, increased publicity and political leverage for the Vieques movement.57
Encouraging anti-base movements to form ties with sympathetic elites seems u'f-evident. Yet, one might find surprising
the level of resistance to this suggestion by some activists. Ties
to political elites raise the specter of

co-optation. The lack of trust in politicians, the political establishment, or more generally formal politics often
stems from activists' own experience and interaction with government officials over the course of several movement
episodes. This attitude was expressed by several anti-base activists in South Korea, Japan, and even the Philippines.
Activists in \ticeura also faced heated discussions over strategy: Should they maintain support for radical
left parties? At the local level, should movement leaders move from informal to more formal
avenues of politics? Although the wariness of movements in engaging formal political actors is
understandable, research across several anti-base movement episodes suggests that
movements that form alliances with political elites and engage base politics
through both formal and informal channels tend to have a greater impact on basing policy
outcomes.
*Framework
Notes
You can take literally any of the 8 islamophobia affs and
read as the t version
Take shell from the generic file- also a ton of the state
good and institutions key stuff are found above in the
Cede the Political K portion of the file
Topical Versions of the aff
Strict Scrutiny
Strict scrutiny standards are historically tough for
governments to meet- extending the standards to include
religion solves extensive Islamophobic actions.
Parvaresh 2014 [ROMTIN, J.D., University of Southern California; B.A., B.S., University of
California, Berkeley, PRAYER FOR RELIEF: ANTI-MUSLIM DISCRIMINATION AS RACIAL DISCRIMINATION,
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, 2014, http://lawreview.usc.edu/wp-content/uploads/Parvaresh-FinalPDF.pdf, Accessed 7/16/15, AX]
the New York City Police Department (NYPD) made national

and international headlines when its secret surveillance of Muslims
across the New York City area was discovered. 2 Under the guise of
counterterrorism, the NYPD monitored the daily lives of thousands
of Muslims for about a decade, 3 using techniques such as taking photographs,
collecting license plate numbers at mosques, and utilizing informants
known as mosque crawlers to infiltrate Muslim organizations. 4 From
recording sermons to monitoring businesses and grade schools, the NYPD targeted individuals not
because of a reasonable suspicion that they specifically were linked
to terrorism, but rather because of one common characteristic: they
were or were believed to be Muslim. As one might expect, the police surveillance
program has come under fire, as it chills religious participation and casts innocent Muslims as
potential terror suspects. 5 In mid-2012, a group of Muslim plaintiffs filed
suit in federal court challenging the NYPDs program. 6 Though their
complaint alleged First Amendment violations, including violations
of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, their likelihood for
success may be hampered: Recent findings indicate that Muslim plaintiffs as a
class are less likely to succeed on First Amendment challenges
relative to other religious groups. 7 Indeed, in early 2014, the case was dismissed on standing
In late 2011,
and pleading grounds,8 and it was under appeal in the Third Circuit as of August 2014. Of greater interest, however, is the
plaintiffs additional claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This claim, too, faces
a doctrinal obstaclereligion
is not a suspect classification and is thus not

subject to strict scrutiny. Only classifications based on race and
national origin are suspect and thus warrant strict scrutiny; 9 by
contrast, religion, more so than race or national origin, appears to be
the primary, if not sole, basis for the NYPDs surveillance . This Note,
however, does not look to resolve the constitutionality of the NYPD surveillance program. Rather, it explores an idea
the
NYPD lawsuit plaintiffs might have bolstered their case would have been to
frame the alleged equal protection violations in the context of race, and thus have the NYPDs actions
analyzed under strict scrutiny a historically tough burden for the
government to meet. 10 The question then becomes whether anti-Muslim discrimination could be
impliedly raised by the case: the intersection of race and religion in post-9/11 America. For instance, one way
interpreted as a form of racial discrimination. This Note therefore seeks to place anti-Muslim discrimination into current
anti-Muslim discrimination
should be treated as racial discrimination.11 In short, because Muslims, along with
Middle Easterners and South Asians, have increasingly become racialized in both the
immediate and prolonged aftermath of 9/11, they now warrant
additional legal protection given the various forms of discrimination
they experience in both private and public contexts. Opening racial
legal understandings of race. It argues that, in some instances,
discrimination claims to them would be one way to provide such relief.
The strict scrutiny standard solves-it requires the

government to demonstrate a legitimate, non-targeted
justification for surveillance- policies restricting the
expression of Islamic ideas fail to meet
Figueroa 12 [Tiffani, (associate @ Morrison Foersters Litigation Department), "ALL MUSLIMS
ARE LIKE THAT": HOW ISLAMOPHOBIA IS DIMINISHING AMERICANS' RIGHT TO RECEIVE INFORMATION,
Hofstra Law Review, Winter 2012, http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2699&context=hlr, Accessed 7/16/15, AX]
in the case of Islamophobia, it is easy to target a specific group

because some Americans automatically associated the 9/11 hijackers
with all Muslims and those perceived as Muslim. 3 1 Similarly, in the
interest of national security, the government at times partook in
practices that people may view as discriminatory. The government
failed to protect the free speech rights of Muslims as a targeted
group, and these actions subsequently harmed the right to receive
information for Americans. Although the government's purpose in
enforcing the laws discussed in this Note was not to close off Muslim
ideas, the effects may show otherwise.352 Justice Antonin Scalia stated, "[t]he vice of
content based legislation- what renders it deserving of the high standard of
As
strict scrutiny-is not that it is always used for invidious, thoughtcontrol purposes, but that it lends itself to use for those purposes.
353 "Unavoidable targeting" stemming from a government regulation
is included within this "vice of content-based legislation." This phenomenon may shine light on what has
occurred following the 9/11 attacks. By employing an effects test in the First
Amendment analysis, courts will more efficiently investigate whether
there is viewpoint discrimination affecting the right to receive
information since the courts must first establish if a government
action falls disproportionately on a specific group.354
The strict scrutiny standard would immediately declare

the most invasive and abusive Islamophobic policies unConstitutional and reduce the executional ability of these
agencies
Love 2012 [Erik, (Assistant Professor of Sociology @ Dickinson College), "NYPD: Whose side are
you on?", Institute for Social Policy and Understanding,
http://www.ispu.org/GetArticles/48/2461/Publications.aspx, Accessed 7/16/15, AX]
a federal
investigation of the NYPD's practices is sorely needed. It's likely that if the
NYPD's crudely constructed policies of religious and racial profiling were
brought into the courts, the judicial principle of strict scrutiny
would definitively show that the NYPD had grossly violated the
constitutional right to equal protection under the law. Strict scrutiny
is the standard applied by the courts to determine whether the
government can move beyond constitutional limits due to
extraordinary circumstances. It's called "strict" because the government must
rise to a tripartite standard: first, it must prove that it has a compelling interest ;
second, that the policy is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest ; and, finally,
Despite the recent outpouring of support of these discriminatory programmes,
the policy must use the least restrictive means

Preventing terrorism is, undoubtedly, a compelling state interest. But
to achieve that interest.
spying on anyone who
happens to be in a mosque or restaurant cannot possibly be

"narrowly tailored ". Similarly, a programme so paranoid that it spied on
its own anti-terrorism partners and kept track of any Muslim who
changed their name clearly isn't the "least restrictive means"
towards achieving the goal of anti-terrorism. The case for proving
that the NYPD has violated the constitution appears easy to prove in
a court. The inability of Muslim American and civil liberties
advocates to get these programmes into the courts, so far, is
another sign of political oppression. What might be even worse than the flagrant
violation of civil rights, however, is that the NYPD programme is likely to make New
York and the rest of the country less safe from terrorism . The best
scholarship on terrorism suggests that devout Muslims are very unlikely to join up with terrorists. A
February 2012 report from the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security concluded that
terrorism from Muslim Americans was a "miniscule threat to public

safety". An earlier report from the same centre found that Muslim American "practices" effectively
"prevent radicalisation".
SPOT
The questioning of Muslim people creates a prevailing
atmosphere of Islamophobia
Bilici 10 (Mucahit Bilici, Assistant Sociology Professor at John Jay College; Islamophobia /
Islamophilia, Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend, Muslim Ethnic Comedy: Inversions of
Islamophobia, 2010, pg. 198-199)
This routine provides a perfect illustration of the Muslim airport experience, where the negative charisma of being Muslim
At the airport, those who have so far (in the city, at

the ticket counter, and so on) been treated equally suddenly become
suspect. At the internal borders of the nation, they suddenly feel their protected
status begin to evaporate. Even those Muslims who do not consider
themselves particularly profiled or discriminated against in everyday
life suddenly begin to feel uneasy. Strip search and other security
rites of passage through the border show them the hard edge of the
nation. Here Muslim otherness is revealed in the most conspicuous way.
assumes full transparency.
Despite official efforts to present searches at the airports as random, comedians like Dean Obeidallah skeptically ask their
The
fear a Muslim inspires is associated with the unpredictability of his
behavior. What if he is a terrorist? What if he hijacks the plane? What if he is only pretending to be normal? All
these questions that airport authorities ask citizens to consider
transform the Muslim passenger in the eyes of his fellow travelers
into a source of unpredictability and danger. When a Muslim like Azhar Usman gets
onto the plane, faces fall. Danger is imminent. The anxiety ends only when the plane lands. People are
almost thankful to the Muslim passenger for not doing what they
feared he might. Flying-while-Muslim thus becomes an extremely
public event. A crucial point here is that the airport is where Muslim
experience and American mainstream experience meet. Jokes about aviation
Muslim audiences: "Are you selected for random search even when you are dropping a friend at the airport?"
thus have a remarkable degree of transparency and universality. Muslims and non-Muslims alike can understand and
laugh at airport and airplane jokes. They are at once ethnic and national, particular and universal. These jokes represent
the comic surface where Muslim and American perspectives intersect most "dangerously" and with full intelligibility. Jokes
about the airport experience thus constitute a significant portion of the repertoire of Muslim comedians today.
This surveillance creates conditions for psychological and

physical violence against brown people
Huus 11 (Kari Huus, Fulbright Scholar Taiwan, "Muslim Travelers Say
They're Still Saddled with 9/11 Baggage",
www.today.com/id/44334738/ns/today-today_news/t/muslim-travelers-saytheyre-still-saddled-baggage/#.VafqhnTWKF4, 9/13/2011, sr)
Imagine it is 5 a.m. and youve landed in New York after a 12-hour
overseas flight. Standing in the line for U.S. citizens, you wait as a
border agent asks passengers ahead a few cursory questions, then
waves them through. Your family is instead ushered into a separate
room for more than an hour of searching and questioning. This was
the welcome that Hassan Shibly, traveling with his wife and infant
son, said they received in August 2010, when they returned to the United
States from Jordan, after traveling to Mecca. Are you part of any Islamic
tribe? Have you ever studied Islam full time? How many gods do you
believe in? How many prophets do you believe in? the agent at
New Yorks JFK Airport asked, according to Shibly, 24, a Syrian-born
Muslim American. He said the agent searched his luggage, pulling
out his Quran and a hand-held digital prayer counter. At the end
I guess (the agent) was trying to be nice he said, Sorry, I hope
you understand we just have to make sure nothing gets blown up ,
said Shibly, a law school graduate who grew up in Buffalo. A decade after
Islamic extremists used airplanes to attack the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, Muslim American travelers say they are still paying the
price for terror attacks carried out in the name of their religion. At
airports, ports and land crossings, many contend, they are
repeatedly singled out for special screening and intrusive
questioning about their religious beliefs. Others say they have been
marooned overseas, barred from flights to the United States.
Stories come pouring out' Whenever a group of Muslims sit
together stories come pouring out, said real estate agent Jeff
Siddique, a Pakistan-born U.S. citizen who has lived in Seattle for 35 years.
Its story after story after story. That is supported by a survey released in
August by the Pew Research Center, in which 36 percent of Muslim Americans
who traveled by air in the last year said they had been singled out for special
screening. According to a spokesman for the TSA, some people are chosen
randomly for secondary search, while others merit secondary screening if
their luggage contains things that raise questions. The TSA is now adding
a program called SPOT Screening Passengers by Observation
Technique. We have behavior detection officers who are all over the
airport, looking for people exhibiting behaviors that are considered
anomalous doing things that suggest they're trying to hide
something, said TSA spokesman Nick Kimball. They are observing
the queue. When that person gets up to the front, they would be
referred to the side. The TSA website calls the program a positive
step that does not require ethnic profiling but looks to the pattern of
behavior. These are tools that would allow us to be more precise, but
without getting into racial profiling, which is a bad thing.One of the most
chilling cases surrounding the no-fly list is that of Gulet Mohamed, a 19year-old American citizen of Somali heritage. Mohamed had been
visiting family in Yemen and Somalia two countries with active
Islamist terrorist groups. When he went to the Kuwait airport to
extend his visa in December, he was arrested and taken to a
detention facility, where he was blindfolded, questioned and beaten
by unknown agents, according to his lawyer, Gadeir Abbas. The
questioners were especially interested in information about Anwar
al-Awlaki, a dual U.S. and Yemeni citizen turned Islamic extremist in
Yemen, Abbas said. Mohamed insisted he had no information and, after a
week, Kuwait ordered his deportation. But when he tried to board a flight
to the United States, he was told he was on the no-fly list. Only after
Abbas filed a lawsuit on his behalf in January was Mohamed allowed
to return home to Virginia. Mohamed is pursuing a claim for
damages and to be removed from the list. The federal government
wants the case thrown out on the grounds that it is irrelevant now
that he is back in the U.S. Meantime, it will not confirm if he is on
the no-fly list. The lawsuit is pending, after a judge moved it to a circuit
court on jurisdictional grounds. Its this very Kafkaesque world where no one
has charged (people on the list) with any crime but they can see its
effects, said Abbas, an attorney with CAIR. His case is the most heinous
example of what the no-fly list can do. Other pending court cases allege that
Muslim American travelers have encountered similar violations of their rights,
including some who were forced to take thousand-mile circuitous land routes
to get back into the U.S. or were stuck overseas for weeks or months until
lawyers here took up their cases. The ACLU, which argues that the watch
list system is unconstitutional, has filed a lawsuit against the Justice
Department, the FBI and the Terrorist Screening Center naming 20
people 18 U.S. citizens and two permanent residents who
allegedly have been prevented from boarding airline flights to or
from the U.S. The plaintiffs say they were told by security or airline staff
that their names were on the no-fly list. Thousands of people have been
barred altogether from commercial air travel without any opportunity to
confront or rebut the basis for their inclusion, or apparent inclusion on the
no-fly list," the lawsuits says. "The result is a vast and growing list of
individuals whom, on the basis of error or innuendo, the government deems
too dangerous to fly, but too harmless to arrest. In response, the
government objected on jurisdictional grounds and argued that the
policy does not violate the constitutional rights of the travelers
because they have not been denied the right to re-enter and reside
in the United States, nor have they been denied the ability to
travel. But critics of the list note that in cases like that of the lead
plaintiff, Ayman Latif, a 33-year-old U.S. citizen and disabled Marine
Corps veteran, that would have meant weeks of travel from the
Middle East to the United States by sea and land, at considerable
additional expense. The U.S. District Court in Portland, Ore., dismissed the
case on jurisdictional grounds, ruling that it should go instead to an appeals
court. The ACLU is appealing that decision.
SPOTs ambiguous nature is what allows racial profilingonly removing the program solves
AAI 2013 (AAI Arab American Institute (AAI) TSA SPOT PROGRAM; Arab
American Institute; AAI ISSUE BRIEF - TSA SPOT PROGRAM;
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/aai/pages/7665/attachments/original/
1431630938/SPOT%2525202015.pdf?1431630938- No date in article but last
date cited in past tense is November 2013)
In 2007, TSA introduced a program called Screening Passengers by
Observation Techniques (SPOT) based on the subjective,
discriminatory screening process first used by the Israeli
government. The program uses Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) to
identify passengers who behave suspiciously in some manner,
then ask them more questions or subject them to increased physical
security checks. In 2012, more than 3,000 BDOs were deployed to 176 U.S. airports to look for preselected
facial expressions, body language, and appearances that the program lists as suspicious. The Problem Any
program that increases the scrutiny of American citizens runs the
risk of selecting individuals discriminatorily, especially in a program

like SPOT, where the officer who makes the initial inspection also
decides who will be inspected. This problem is exacerbated when the
class singled out is not designated by any real objective criteria.
There is no closed list of sensitive behaviors that officers can look
for without using their personal prejudices. Furthermore, there have
been a number of reports of profiling or discrimination by BDOs and
other TSA officers. Regardless of exactly how often this happens, its easy to understand
how a program like SPOT could encourage arbitrary enforcement and
ethnic and/or religious profiling against Arab or Muslim travelers, or
other groups deemed suspicious. Whether or not these problems
would be tolerable in a program that actually made Americans safer
is a difficult question, but that difficulty disappears if the program
isnt actually effective. And here, the facts leave no room for doubt:
SPOT, which has cost American taxpayers about $1 billion dollars
over the last few years, has not been shown to be an effective tool in
fighting terrorism. Over and over again, independent reports from the DHS Inspector General and the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) have come to the same conclusion. In a strongly critical
November 2013 report, the GAO bluntly said that available
evidence does not support whether behavioral indicators [like those
used in SPOT] can be used to identify persons who may pose a risk
to aviation security. The report indicated that the techniques
officers use to identify suspicious passengers werent scientifically
sound in any real way. At a Congressional hearing in the aftermath of the report, TSA Administrator John
Pistole defended SPOT, but even its supporters on the Transportation Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Perhaps most
obviously, there has not been a single instance of a traveler flagged
by a BDO who actually turned out to be a threat to aviation security.
Homeland Security seemed to acknowledge that there were no real results TSA could point to.
Rep. Mark Sanford (R-SC) made the point that however helpful behavioral detection might be in other law enforcement
fields, it simply hasnt translated into success in aviation security. Rep. Sanford also agreed with Reps. Sheila Jackson-Lee
suspicious
behavior were too vague to prevent discriminatory enforcement.
(D-TX), Steven Horsford (D-NV), and Donald Payne (D-NJ) that SPOTs guidelines defining
State/Reformism Key
We should engage policy institutions to change the
counter-terrorism paradigm.
Jackson 9 (Richard Jackson, Deputy Director at the National Centre for Peace
and Conflict Studies, PhD from the University of Canterbury, Critical
Terrorism Studies: An Explanation, a Defence and a Way Forward, p.8-9, 1215-2009,
If a critically-informed research praxis is distinguished by its explicit
commitment to human emancipation, an important component of
CTS research is to try to influence policy; not being concerned with
policy relevance is not an option for scholars committed to human
emancipation (Gunning, 2007b; Toros and Gunning, 2009). However, this
does not mean that one should limit oneself to being relevant to state elites.
Critical scholars should engage both policy-makers and policytakers, if their primary commitment is to humanity rather than the
state. Engaging policy-takers furthermore, serves to lessen the risk
of co-option by the status quo, particularly if those thus engaged include
members of communities labelled suspect by the state, those designated
terrorists, and so on. However, to be effective, and to work towards
realising the potential for immanent change within the status quo,
critical scholars must simultaneously strive to engage those who are
embedded in the state, members of the counter-terrorist forces,
the political elite, and so on. This is an area where critical scholars
have arguably been weak in the past. I would argue that a
commitment to emancipation in turn implies, among other things: a
commitment to praxis as organic intellectuals to help bring about
concrete utopias out of the fissures and contradictions of existing
structures (see Herring, 2008; Toros and Gunning, 2009); a continuous
process of immanent critique of existing power structures and
practices in society; the moral and intellectual questioning of the
instrumental rationality paradigm of political violence, whether it be
terrorist or counter-terrorist violence, state or non-state violence (see Burke,
2008); the prioritising of human security over national security and
working towards minimising all forms of physical, structural, and
cultural violence (Toros and Gunning, 2009); and the serious scholarly and
practical exploration of non-violence, conflict transformation, and
reconciliation as practical alternatives to terrorist and counter-terrorist
violence. From this perspective, I believe that CTS is at heart an antihegemonic project, a kind of outsider theorising which seeks to go beyond
problem-solving within the status quo and instead to help engage through
critical theory with the problem of the status quo (Booth, 2007). Of course,
the adoption of an anti-hegemonic, critical standpoint requires a certain
amount of intellectual and moral courage because it invariably engenders
vigorous opposition from interests vested in the status quo as a number of
CTS scholars, including ourselves, have experienced (see Breen Smyth, 2009;
Herring, 2008). CTS scholars must therefore adopt a prior commitment to
refusing to give in to intimidation, abandoning research that is controversial,
or to self-censorship. In the current political environment engendered
by the war on terrorism, CTS scholars must be prepared to say the

unsayable, whether it is to governments, the wider society,
particular communities, or terrorists; in a very real sense, we must
accept that blasphemy is our business (Booth, 2008: 68).
Case- Impact Framing
Extinction 1st
Extinction 1st pre-requisite to formation of value
Wapner 2003
Paul, Associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University,
DISSENT, Winter, http://www.dissentmgazine.org/menutest/artiles/wi03/wapner.htm
The third response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves
Postmodernism
prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that
characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what
postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within
its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist
urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else
could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have
silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world.
already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" does
deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, hut how would we know what such self-expression
means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and
whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are
Even the most radical postmodernist must

acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the
social constructions-except one.
phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment
We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't

appear What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the
of physical existence is crucial.
postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of
we need
not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is
existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman
world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a
fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of
environmental preservation.
those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But
Elevating Human extinction to a real possibility

encourages a new social ethic to solve conflicts and
create meaning to life.
Epstein and Zhao 9 [Richard J. Epstein and Y. Zhao, Laboratory of
Computational Oncology,Department of Medicine,University of Hong Kong,

Professorial Block, Queen Mary Hospital, Hong Kong. The Threat That Dare
Not Speak Its Name: Human Extinction. Perspectives in Biology and
Medicine, volume 52, number 1 (winter 2009):11625. Project Muse.Final ends for all species are the same, but the journeys will be different. If we cannot influence the end of
our species, can we influence the journey? To do soeven in a small waywould be a crowning
Only by
elevating the topic of human extinction to the level of serious
professional discourse can we begin to prepare ourselves for the
challenges that lie ahead. The difficulty of the required transition should not be
achievement for human evolution and give new meaning to the term civilization.
underestimated. This is depicted in Table 3 as a painful multistep progression from the 20th-century
philosophical norm of Ego-Thinkdefined therein as a short-term state of mind valuing individual material
self-interest above all other considerationsto Eco-Think, in which humans come to adopt a broader Gaia-
Making this change

must involve communicating the non-sensationalist message to all
global citizens that things are serious and we are in this
like outlook on themselves as but one part of an infinitely larger reality.
togetheror, in blunter language, that the road to extinction and its related
agonies does indeed lie ahead. Consistent with this prospect, the risks of human
extinctionand the cost-benefit of attempting to reduce these riskshave been quantified in a recent
Once complacency has been shaken off and a

sense of collective purpose created, the battle against self-seeking anthropocentric
sobering analysis (Matheny 2007).
human instincts will have only just begun. It is often said that human beings suffer from the ability to
appreciate their own mortalityan existential agony that has given rise to the great religions but in the
we must begin to bear the added burden of

anticipating the demise of our species. Indeed, as argued here, there are compelling
reasons for encouraging this collective mind-shift. For in the best of all possible worlds, the
realization that our species has long-term survival criteria distinct
from our short-term tribal priorities could spark a new social ethic to
upgrade what we now all too often dismiss as human nature (Tudge 1989).
present age of religious decline,
Case- CTS Answers
1NC
Critical terrorist approaches are never contextual- even if
terror studies in flawed in most instances the contextual
situation requires political action.
Michel and Richards 9 (Torsten Michel and Anthony Richards, May 19 2009, False dawns
th
or new horizons? Further issues and challenges for Critical Terrorism Studies, Critical Studies on Terrorism
Vol. 2, No. 3, December 2009, pp. 404-405, accessed 7/17/15) CH
what it means to engage in critical scholarship

is hardly present in CTS publications so far. This is not to say that CTS scholars must develop
an elaborate account of the critique of reason, but what is unsatisfactory is that thus
far it seems that this dimension is not even implicitly assumed . First,
CTS scholarship right now focuses on one core problem that should be subjected to
critique the predominance of a specific orthodox take on terrorism.
What is, however, actually critiqued is a social reality that has emerged
out of a specific application of reason (instrumental reason to be precise). An account
This background conception as to
of this social reality needs to feature in CTS as Critical scholarship is never particular but is in its
The critique is never simply projected against this or

that situation or discourse but always aims for a wider questioning
of the prescriptions of reason that underlie these discursive
structures. The second main example where so far only rudimentary reflection can be witnessed
concerns the notions of relativism and truth. As we have seen, CTS commits itself to a
historicist notion of truth which recognizes the contextual and
historically contingent nature of our knowledge. Such a position, if not
substantiated, leaves itself open to a relativistic reading that could
basically end up in arguing that knowledge claims essentially cannot
be evaluated against a common basis. With respect to the study of terrorism then
this could easily lead to the exoneration and legitimization of
specific violent practices by claiming their rootedness in a specific
historical environment that cannot be judged by standards outside
itself. Critical Theory in general (and CTS as well, we presume), however, is eager to avoid such a
conception holistic.
plunge into relativism which would also threaten the potential for a truly emancipatory agenda. If this is
the case, it seems necessary to elaborate more substantially on the nature of knowledge and the
possibility of truth in such accounts. Again, we find quite an extensive treatment of these matters among
Critical Theorists but hardly anything in CTS publications so far. Admittedly, Toros and Gunning try to
circumvent the complete plunge into an epistemological relativism by maintaining, much in line with
Critical Theory in general, a commitment to a minimalist foundationalism which self-critically allows for
the emergence of contextually contingent concepts or evidence: rather than collapsing the ontological
distinction between object and subject, it maintains it, while acknowledging that the two shape each other
commitment to an
ontological dualism between subject and object (albeit in a minimalistic fashion),
however, creates its own problems. Do these concepts that they admit can
only be delineated within a specific historical and social context
refer to real states of affairs in the world? Is the Welsh School committed to a form
in a dialectical, never-ceasing dynamic (Toros and Gunning 2009, p. 92). Such
of critical realism that maintains that we can find what has been called intransitive mind-independent
objects that vary in their social meaning according to hegemonic epistemological discourses (Wight 2006,
p. 12)? If so, is it committed to a philosophical realism and how would it conceptualize the bridging of the
subject-object gap? It can hardly maintain that human beings can grasp these objects for what they
really are, as this would be tantamount to maintaining a standard beyond historical and social
contingencies. But if it, on the other hand, maintains a nominalism that places these concepts at the
mercy of intersubjective, and therefore eventually, mind-dependent processes, how does it escape from
relativist commitment?
All these issues appear to be unresolved and yet
they are by no means trivial as they pertain to the conditions of the

possibility of FSCT in general .
Critical terror studies are garbage- most counterterror policies are
necessary- criticisms rely on utopian thinking
Jones and Smith 9 * University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia
AND ** King's College, University of London, London, UK (David and
M.L.R.,We're All Terrorists Now: Criticalor HypocriticalStudies on
Terrorism?, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 32, Issue 4 April 2009 ,
pages 292 302, Taylor and Francis)
The journal, in other words, is not intended, as one might assume, to evaluate critically those state or non-
the journal's ambition is

to deconstruct what it views as the ambiguity of the word terror, its
manipulation by ostensibly liberal democratic state actors, and the complicity
of orthodox terrorism studies in this authoritarian enterprise. Exposing the
state actors that might have recourse to terrorism as a strategy. Instead,
deficiencies in any field of study is, of course, a legitimate scholarly exercise, but what the symposium
introducing the new volume announces questions both the research agenda and academic integrity of
journals like Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and those who contribute to them. Do these claims, one
might wonder, have any substance? Significantly, the original proposal circulated by the publisher
Routledge and one of the editors, Richard
Jackson , suggested some uncertainty concerning the
preferred title of the journal. Critical Studies on Terrorism appeared last on a list where the first choice was
Review of Terror Studies. Evidently, the concision of a review fails to capture the critical perspective the
journal promotes. Criticism, then, is central to the new journal's philosophy and the adjective connotes a
distinct ideological and, as shall be seen, far from pluralist and inclusive purpose. So, one might ask, what
exactly does a critical approach to terrorism involve? What it Means to be Critical The editors and
contributors explore what it means to be critical in detail, repetition, and opacity, along with an
excessive fondness for italics, in the editorial symposium that introduces the first issue, and in a number of
subsequent articles. The editors inform us that the study of terrorism is a growth industry, observing with
a mixture of envy and disapproval that literally thousands of new books and articles on terrorism are
published every year (pp. l-2). In adding to this literature the editors premise the need for yet another
journal on their resistance to what currently constitutes scholarship in the field of terrorism study and its
allegedly uncritical acceptance of the Western democratic state's security perspective. Indeed, to be
critical requires a radical reversal of what the journal assumes to be the typical perception of terrorism and
the methodology of terrorism research. To focus on the strategies practiced by non-state actors that
feature under the conventional denotation terror is, for the critical theorist, misplaced. As the
symposium explains,
acts of clandestine non-state terrorism are committed by a

tiny number of individuals and result in between a few hundred and a few
thousand casualties per year over the entire world (original italics) (p. 1). The United
States's and its allies' preoccupation with terrorism is, therefore, out of proportion to its effects. 1 At the
same time, the more pervasive and repressive terror practiced by the state has been silenced from public
The complicity of terrorism studies with the

increasingly authoritarian demands of Western, liberal state and media
practice, together with the moral and political blindness of established
terrorism analysts to this relationship forms the journal's overriding
assumption and one that its core contributors repeat ad nauseam. Thus, Michael Stohl, in his
and academic discourse (p. 1).
contribution Old Myths, New Fantasies and the Enduring Realities of Terrorism (pp. 5-16), not only
discovers ten myths informing the understanding of terrorism, but also finds that these myths reflect a
state centric security focus, where analysts rarely consider the violence perpetrated by the state (p.
5). He complains that the press have become too close to government over the matter. Somewhat
contradictorily Stohl subsequently asserts that media reporting is central to terrorism and counterterrorism as political action, that media reportage provides the oxygen of terrorism, and that politicians
consider journalists to be the terrorist's best friend (p. 7). Stohl further compounds this incoherence,
claiming that the media are far more likely to focus on the destructive actions, rather than on
grievances or the social conditions that breed [terrorism]to present episodic rather than thematic
stories (p. 7). He argues that terror attacks between 1968 and 1980 were scarcely reported in the United
States, and that reporters do not delve deeply into the sources of conflict (p. 8). All of this is quite
contentious, with no direct evidence produced to support such statements. The media is after all a very
broad term, and to assume that it is monolithic is to replace criticism with conspiracy theory. Moreover,
even if it were true that the media always serves as a government propaganda agency, then by Stohl's
own logic, terrorism as a method of political communication is clearly futile as no rational actor would
the notion that an

inherent pro-state bias vitiates terrorism studies pervades the critical
position. Anthony Burke, in The End of Terrorism Studies (pp. 37-49), asserts that established analysts
engage in a campaign doomed to be endlessly misreported. Nevertheless,
like Bruce Hoffman specifically exclude states as possible perpetrators of terror. Consequently, the
emergence of critical terrorism studies may signal the end of a particular kind of traditionally statefocused and directed 'problem-solving' terrorism studiesat least in terms of its ability to assume that its
categories and commitments are immune from challenge and correspond to a stable picture of reality (p.
42). Elsewhere, Adrian Guelke, in Great Whites, Paedophiles and Terrorists: The Need for Critical Thinking
in a New Era of Terror (pp. 17-25), considers British government-induced media scare-mongering to
have legitimated an authoritarian approach to the purported new era of terror (pp. 22-23). Meanwhile,
Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass, in The Terrorist Subject: Terrorist Studies and the Absent
Subjectivity (pp. 27-36), find the War on Terror constitutes the single, all embracing paradigm of
analysis where the critical voice is not allowed to ask: what is the reality itself? (original italics) (pp. 2829). The construction of this condition, they further reveal, if somewhat abstrusely, reflects an abstract
desire that demands terror as an ever-present threat (p. 31). In order to sustain this fabrication:
Terrorism experts and commentators function as realist policemen; and not very smart ones at that,
who while gazing at the evidence are unable to read the paradoxical logic of the desire that fuels it,
Booth, in The Human Faces of Terror:

reiterates Richard Jackson's contention
that state terrorism is a much more serious problem than non-state
terrorism (p. 76). Yet, one searches in vain in these articles for evidence
whereby lack turns toexcess (original italics) (p. 32). Finally, Ken
Reflections in a Cracked Looking Glass (pp. 65-79),
to support the ubiquitous assertion of state bias : assuming this bias in

conventional terrorism analysis as a fact seemingly does not require a
corresponding concern with evidence of this fact, merely its continual
reiteration by conceptual fiat. A critical perspective dispenses not only
with terrorism studies but also with the norms of accepted scholarship.
Asserting what needs to be demonstrated commits, of course, the elementary logical fallacy petitio
critical theory apparently emancipates (to use its favorite verb) its
practitioners from the confines of logic, reason, and the usual standards of
academic inquiry. Alleging a constitutive weakness in established scholarship without the necessity
of providing proof to support it, therefore, appears to define the critical posture. The unproved
state centricity of terrorism studies serves as a platform for further
unsubstantiated accusations about the state of the discipline. Jackson
and his fellow editors, along with later claims by Zulaika and Douglass, and Booth, again assert
that orthodox analysts rarely bother to interview or engage with those
involved in 'terrorist' activity (p. 2) or spend any time on the ground in the areas most
principii. But
affected by conflict (p. 74). Given that Booth and Jackson spend most of their time on the ground in
Aberystwyth, Ceredigion, not a notably terror rich environment if we discount the operations of Meibion
Glyndwr who would as a matter of principle avoid pob sais like Jackson and Booth, this seems a bit like the
pot calling the kettle black. It also overlooks the fact that Studies in Conflict and Terrorism first advertised
the problem of talking to terrorists in 2001 and has gone to great lengths to rectify this lacuna, if it is
one, regularly publishing articles by analysts with first-hand experience of groups like the Taliban, Al Qaeda
and Jemaah Islamiyah. A consequence of avoiding primary research, it is further alleged, leads
conventional analysts uncritically to apply psychological and problem-solving approaches to their object of
study. This propensity, Booth maintains, occasions another unrecognized weakness in traditional terrorism
research, namely, an inability to engage with the particular dynamics of the political world (p. 70).
Analogously, Stohl claims that the US and English [sic] media exhibit a tendency to psychologize terrorist
acts, which reduces structural and political problems into issues of individual pathology (p. 7).
Preoccupied with this problem-solving, psychopathologizing methodology, terrorism analysts have lost the
capacity to reflect on both their practice and their research ethics. By contrast, the critical approach is not
only self-reflective, but also and, for good measure, self-reflexive. In fact, the editors and a number of the
journal's contributors use these terms interchangeably, treating a reflection and a reflex as synonyms (p.
2). A cursory encounter with the Shorter Oxford Dictionary would reveal that they are not. Despite this
linguistically challenged misidentification, reflexivity is made to do a lot of work in the critical idiom.
Reflexivity, the editors inform us, requires a capacity to challenge dominant knowledge and
understandings, is sensitive to the politics of labelling is transparent about its own values and political
standpoints, adheres to a set of responsible research ethics, and is committed to a broadly defined notion
of emancipation (p. 2). This covers a range of not very obviously related but critically approved virtues.
Let us examine what reflexivity involves as Stohl, Guelke, Zulaika and Douglass, Burke, and Booth explore,
Firstly, to challenge dominant
knowledge and understanding and retain sensitivity to labels leads inevitably
to a fixation with language, discourse , the ambiguity of the noun, terror,
and its political use and abuse. Terrorism, Booth enlightens the reader unremarkably, is a
somewhat repetitively, its implications. Reflexive or Defective?
politically loaded term (p. 72). Meanwhile, Zulaika and Douglass consider terror the dominant tropic [sic]
space in contemporary political and journalistic discourse (p. 30). Faced with the serious challenge
(Booth p. 72) and pejorative connotation that the noun conveys, critical terrorologists turn to
deconstruction and bring the full force of postmodern obscurantism to bear on its use. Thus the editors
proclaim that terrorism is one of the most powerful signifiers in contemporary discourse. There is,
moreover, a yawning gap between the 'terrorism' signifier and the actual acts signified (p. 1). [V]irtually
all of this activity, the editors pronounce ex cathedra, refers to the response to acts of political violence
not the violence itself (original italics) (p. 1). Here again they offer no evidence for this curious assertion
and assume, it would seem, all conventional terrorism studies address issues of homeland security. In
keeping with this critical orthodoxy that he has done much to define, Anthony Burke also asserts the
instability (and thoroughly politicized nature) of the unifying master-terms of our field: 'terror' and
'terrorism' (p. 38). To address this he contends that a critical stance requires us to keep this radical
instability and inherent politicization of the concept of terrorism at the forefront of its analysis. Indeed,
without a conscious reflexivity about the most basic definition of the object, our discourse will not be
critical at all (p. 38). More particularly, drawing on a jargon-infused amalgam of Michel Foucault's
identification of a relationship between power and knowledge, the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School's critique
of democratic false consciousness, mixed with the existentialism of the Third Reich's favorite philosopher,
Martin Heidegger, Burke questions the question. This intellectual potpourri apparently enables the
critical theorist to question the ontological status of a 'problem' before any attempt to map out, study or
resolve it (p. 38). Interestingly, Burke, Booth, and the symposistahood deny that there might be objective
data about violence or that a properly focused strategic study of terrorism would not include any
prescriptive goodness or rightness of action. While a strategic theorist or a skeptical social scientist might
claim to consider only the complex relational situation that involves as well as the actions, the attitude of
The
critical approach to language and its deconstruction of an otherwise useful, if
imperfect, political vocabulary has been the source of much confusion and
human beings to them, the critical theorist's radical questioning of language denies this possibility.
inconsequentiality in the practice of the social sciences. It dates from the

relativist pall that French radical post structural philosophers like Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari,
Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, cast over the social and historical sciences in order to demonstrate that
social and political knowledge depended on and underpinned power relations that permeated the
This radical assault on the

possibility of either neutral fact or value ultimately functions unfalsifiably, and
as a substitute for philosophy, social science, and a real theory of
language. The problem with the critical approach is that, as the Australian philosopher John Anderson
landscape of the social and reinforced the liberal democratic state.
demonstrated, to achieve a genuine study one must either investigate the facts that are talked about or
the fact that they are talked about in a certain way. More precisely, as J.L. Mackie explains, if we
concentrate on the uses of language we fall between these two stools, and we are in danger of taking our
in so far
as an account of the use of language spills over into ontology it is liable to be
a confused mixture of what should be two distinct investigations: the study of
the facts about which the language is used, and the study of the linguistic
phenomena themselves. It is precisely, however, this confused mixture of fact
and discourse that critical thinking seeks to impose on the study of terrorism
and infuses the practice of critical theory more generally. From this confused
seed no coherent method grows. What is To Be Done? This ontological confusion
notwithstanding, Ken Booth sees critical theory not only exposing the dubious links
between power and knowledge in established terrorism studies, but also
offering an ideological agenda that transforms the face of global politics .
discoveries about manners of speaking as answers to questions about what is there. 2 Indeed,
[C]ritical knowledge, Booth declares, involves understandings of the social world that attempt to stand
outside prevailing structures, processes, ideologies and orthodoxies while recognizing that all
conceptualizations within the ambit of sociality derive from particular social/historical conditions (original
italics) (p. 78). Helpfully, Booth, assuming the manner of an Old Testament prophet, provides his critical
disciples with big-picture navigation aids (original italics) (p. 66) to achieve this higher knowledge. Booth
promulgates fifteen commandments (as Clemenceau remarked of Woodrow Wilson's nineteen points, in a
somewhat different context, God Almighty only gave us ten). When not stating the staggeringly obvious,
Critical theorists thus should avoid

exceptionalizing the study of terrorism,3 recognize that states can be agents
of terrorism, and keep the long term in sight. Unexceptional advice to be
sure and long recognized by more traditional students of terrorism. The
critical student, if not fully conversant with critical doublethink, however,
might find the fact that she or he lives within Powerful theories that are
constitutive of political, social, and economic life (6th Commandment, p. 71), sits
uneasily with Booth's concluding injunction to stand outside prevailing
ideologies (p. 78). In his preferred imperative idiom, Booth further contends that terrorism is best
the Ken Commandments are hopelessly contradictory.
studied in the context of an academic international relations whose role is not only to interpret the
world but to change it (pp. 67-68). Significantly, academicor more precisely, criticalinternational
relations, holds no place for a realist appreciation of the status quo but approves instead a Marxist ideology
of praxis. It is within this transformative praxis that critical theory situates terrorism and terrorists. The
political goals of those non-state entities that choose to practice the tactics of terrorism invariably seek a
similar transformative praxis and this leads critical global theorizing into a curiously confused empathy
with the motives of those engaged in such acts, as well as a disturbing relativism. Thus, Booth again
decrees that the gap between those who hate terrorism and those who carry it out, those who seek to
delegitimize the acts of terrorists and those who incite them, and those who abjure terror and those who
glorify itis not as great as is implied or asserted by orthodox terrorism experts, the discourse of
governments, or the popular press (p. 66). The gap between us/them is a slippery slope, not an
unbridgeable political and ethical chasm (p. 66). So, while terrorist actions are alwayswithout
exceptionwrong, they nevertheless might be contingently excusable (p. 66). From this ultimately
relativist perspective gang raping a defenseless woman, an act of terror on any critical or uncritical scale
of evaluation, is, it would seem, wrong but potentially excusable. On the basis of this worrying relativism a
further Ken Commandment requires the abolition of the discourse of evil on the somewhat questionable
grounds that evil releases agents from responsibility (pp. 74-75). This not only reveals a profound
ignorance of theology, it also underestimates what Eric Voeglin identified as a central feature of the appeal
of modern political religions from the Third Reich to Al Qaeda. As Voeglin observed in 1938, the Nazis
represented an attractive force. To understand that force requires not the abolition of evil [so necessary
to the relativist] but comprehending its attractiveness. Significantly, as Barry Cooper argues, its
attractiveness, [like that of al Qaeda] cannot fully be understood apart from its evilness. 4 The line of
relativist inquiry that critical theorists like Booth evince toward terrorism leads in fact not to moral clarity
but an inspissated moral confusion. This is paradoxical given that the editors make much in the journal's
introductory symposium of their responsible research ethics. The paradox is resolved when one realizes
that critical moralizing demands the ethics of responsibility to the terrorist other. For Ken Booth it
involves, it appears, empathizing with the ethic of responsibility faced by those who, in extremis have
some explosives (p. 76). Anthony Burke contends that a critically self-conscious normativism requires the
analyst, not only to critique the strategic languages of the West, but also to take in the side of the
Other or more particularly engage with the highly developed forms of thinking that provides groups
like Al Qaeda with legitimizing foundations and a world view of some profundity (p. 44). This additionally
demands a capacity not only to empathize with the other, but also to recognize that both Osama bin
Laden in his Messages to the West and Sayyid Qutb in his Muslim Brotherhood manifesto Milestones not
only offer well observed criticisms of Western decadence, but also converges with elements of critical
theory (p. 45). This is not surprising given that both Islamist and critical theorists share an analogous
contempt for Western democracy, the market, and the international order these structures inhabit and
have done much to shape. Histrionically Speaking Critical theory, then, embraces relativism not only
toward language but also toward social action. Relativism and the bizarre ethicism it engenders in its
attempt to empathize with the terrorist other are, moreover, histrionic. As Leo Strauss classically inquired
of this relativist tendency in the social sciences, is such an understanding dependent upon our own
commitment or independent of it? Strauss explains, if it is independent, I am committed as an actor and I
am uncommitted in another compartment of myself in my capacity as a social scientist. In that latter
capacity I am completely empty and therefore completely open to the perception and appreciation of all
commitments or value systems. I go through the process of empathetic understanding in order to reach
clarity about my commitment for only a part of me is engaged in my empathetic understanding. This
means, however, that such understanding is not serious or genuine but histrionic. 5 It is also profoundly
dependent on Western liberalism. For it is only in an open society that questions the values it promotes
that the issue of empathy with the non-Western other could arise. The critical theorist's explicit loathing of
the openness that affords her histrionic posturing obscures this constituting fact. On the basis of this
histrionic empathy with the other, critical theory concludes that democratic states do not always abjure
acts of terror whether to advance their foreign policy objectives or to buttress order at home (p. 73).
Consequently, Ken Booth asserts: If terror can be part of the menu of choice for the relatively strong, it is
hardly surprising it becomes a weapon of the relatively weak (p. 73). Zulaika and Douglass similarly
At the core of this critical,

ethicist, relativism therefore lies a syllogism that holds all violence is terror:
Western states use violence, therefore, Western states are terrorist. Further,
the greater terrorist uses the greater violence: Western governments exercise
the greater violence. Therefore, it is the liberal democracies rather than Al
Qaeda that are the greater terrorists. In its desire to empathize with the transformative
assert that terrorism is always a weapon of the weak (p. 33).
ends, if not the means of terrorism generally and Islamist terror in particular, critical theory reveals itself
as a form of Marxist unmasking. Thus, for Booth terror has multiple forms (original italics) and the real
terror is economic, the product it would seem of global capitalism (p. 75). Only the engagee intellectual
academic finding in deconstructive criticism the philosophical weapons that reveal the illiberal neoconservative purpose informing the conventional study of terrorism and the democratic state's prosecution
of counterterrorism can identify the real terror lurking behind the manipulation of the politics of fear (p.
75). Moreover, the resolution of this condition of escalating violence requires not any strategic solution
Booth, Burke,
and the editors contend that the only solution to the world-historical crisis
that is facing human society globally (p. 76) is universal human
emancipation. This, according to Burke, is the normative end that critical theory pursues.
that creates security as the basis for development whether in London or Kabul. Instead,
Following Jurgen Habermas, the godfather of critical theory, terrorism is really a form of distorted
communication. The solution to this problem of failed communication resides not only in the improvement
of living conditions, and the political taming of unbounded capitalism, but also in the telos of mutual
understanding. Only through this telos with its strong normative bias towards non violence (p. 43) can a
In other words, the only ethical

solution to terrorism is conversation: sitting around an un-coerced table
presided over by Kofi Annan, along with Ken Booth, Osama bin Laden,
President Obama, and some European Union pacifist sandalista, a
transcendental communicative reason will emerge to promulgate norms of
transformative justice. As Burke enunciates, the panacea of un-coerced communication would
universal condition of peace and justice transform the globe.
establish a secularism that might create an enduring architecture of basic shared values (p. 46). In the
un-coerced norm projection is not concerned with the world as it is, but
how it ought to be. This not only compounds the logical errors that
end,
permeate critical theory, it advances an ultimately utopian agenda under

the guise of soi-disant cosmopolitanism where one somewhat vaguely
recognizes the human interconnection and mutual vulnerability to nature,
the cosmos and each other (p. 47) and no doubt bursts into spontaneous
chanting of Kumbaya . In analogous visionary terms, Booth defines real security as
emancipation in a way that denies any definitional rigor to either term. The struggle against terrorism is,
then, a struggle for emancipation from the oppression of political violence everywhere. Consequently, in
Booth
further maintains that universities have a crucial role to play. This also is
something of a concern for those who do not share the critical vision, as
university international relations departments are not now, it would seem, in
business to pursue dispassionate analysis but instead are to serve as
cheerleaders for this critically inspired vision. Overall, the journal's fallacious
commitment to emancipation undermines any ostensible claim to pluralism and diversity. Over
determined by this transformative approach to world politics, it necessarily
denies the possibility of a realist or prudential appreciation of politics and the
promotion not of universal solutions but pragmatic ones that accept the
best that may be achieved in the circumstances . Ultimately, to present the world
how it ought to be rather than as it is conceals a deep intolerance notable in
the contempt with which many of the contributors to the journal appear to
hold Western politicians and the Western media.6 It is the exploitation of this
this Manichean struggle for global emancipation against the real terror of Western democracy,
oughtistic style of thinking that leads the critic into a Humpty Dumpty
world where words mean exactly what the critical theorist chooses them to
meanneither more nor less. However, in order to justify their disciplinary
niche they have to insist on the failure of established modes of terrorism
study. Having identified a source of government grants and academic perquisites, critical studies in fact
does not deal with the notion of terrorism as such, but instead the manner in which the Western liberal
democratic state has supposedly manipulated the use of violence by non-state actors in order to other
minority communities and create a politics of fear. Critical Studies and Strategic TheoryA Missed
Opportunity Of course, the doubtful contribution of critical theory by no means implies that all is well with
what one might call conventional terrorism studies. The subject area has in the past produced superficial
assessments that have done little to contribute to an informed understanding of conflict. This is a point
readily conceded by John Horgan and Michael Boyle who put A Case Against 'Critical Terrorism Studies'
(pp. 51-74). Although they do not seek to challenge the agenda, assumptions, and contradictions inherent
in the critical approach, their contribution to the new journal distinguishes itself by actually having a wellorganized and well-supported argument. The authors' willingness to acknowledge deficiencies in some
terrorism research shows that
critical self-reflection is already present in
existing terrorism studies . It is ironic, in fact, that the most clearly reflective, original, and
critical contribution in the first edition should come from established terrorism researchers who critique the
critical position. Interestingly, the specter haunting both conventional and critical terrorism studies is that
both assume that terrorism is an existential phenomenon, and thus has causes and solutions. Burke makes
this explicit: The inauguration of this journal, he declares, indeed suggests broad agreement that there
is a phenomenon called terrorism (p. 39). Yet this is not the only way of looking at terrorism. For a
strategic theorist the notion of terrorism does not exist as an independent phenomenon. It is an abstract
noun. More precisely, it is merely a tacticthe creation of fear for political endsthat can be employed by
any social actor, be it state or non-state, in any context, without any necessary moral value being
strategic theory offers a far more critical perspective on

terrorism than do the perspectives advanced in this journal. Guelke, for example,
involved. Ironically, then,
propounds a curiously orthodox standpoint when he asserts: to describe an act as one of terrorism,
without the qualification of quotation marks to indicate the author's distance from such a judgement, is to
condemn it as absolutely illegitimate (p. 19). If you are a strategic theorist this is an invalid claim.
Terrorism is simply a method to achieve an end. Any moral judgment on the

act is entirely separate. To fuse the two is a category mistake . In strategic theory,
which Guelke ignores, terrorism does not, ipso facto, denote absolutely illegitimate violence.
Intriguingly, Stohl, Booth, and Burke also imply that a strategic understanding forms part of their critical
viewpoint. Booth, for instance, argues in one of his commandments that terrorism should be seen as a
conscious human choice. Few strategic theorists would disagree. Similarly, Burke feels that there does
appear to be a consensus that terrorism is a form of instrumental political violence (p. 38). The
problem for the contributors to this volume is that they cannot emancipate themselves from the very
orthodox assumption that the word terrorism is pejorative. That may be the popular understanding of the
term, but inherently terrorism conveys no necessary connotation of moral condemnation. Is terrorism a
form of warfare, insurgency, struggle, resistance, coercion, atrocity, or great political crime, Burke asks
All violence is instrumental. Grading it

according to whether it is insurgency, resistance, or atrocity is irrelevant. Any
strategic actor may practice forms of warfare. For this reason Burke's further
claim that existing definitions of terrorism have specifically excluded states
as possible perpetrators and privilege them as targets, is wholly inaccurate
rhetorically. But once more he misses the point.
(p. 38). Strategic theory has never excluded state-directed terrorism as an object of study, and neither for
that matter, as Horgan and Boyle point out, have more conventional studies of terrorism. Yet, Burke offers
as a critical revelationthat the strategic intent behind the US bombing of North Vietnam and
Cambodia, Israel's bombing of Lebanon, or the sanctions against Iraq is also terrorist. He continues: My
point is not to remind us that states practise terror, but to show how mainstream strategic doctrines are
terrorist in these terms and undermine any prospect of achieving the normative consensus if such
terrorism is to be reduced and eventually eliminated (original italics) (p. 41). This is not merely confused,
it displays remarkable nescience on the part of one engaged in teaching the next generation of graduates
from the Australian Defence Force Academy. Strategic theory conventionally recognizes that actions on the
part of state or non-state actors that aim to create fear (such as the allied aerial bombing of Germany in
World War II or the nuclear deterrent posture of Mutually Assured Destruction) can be terroristic in nature. 7
The problem for critical analysts like Burke is that they impute their own moral valuations to the term
terror. Strategic theorists do not. Moreover, the statement that this undermines any prospect that terrorism
can be eliminated is illogical: you can never eliminate an abstract noun. Consequently,
those
interested in a truly critical approach to the subject should perhaps turn to

strategic theory for some relief from the strictures that have traditionally
governed the study of terrorism, not to self-proclaimed critical theorists who
only replicate the flawed understandings of those whom they criticize.
Horgan and Boyle conclude their thoughtful article by claiming that critical terrorism studies has more in
common with traditional terrorism research than critical theorists would possibly like to admit. These
reviewers agree: they are two sides of the same coin. Conclusion In the looking glass world of critical
terror studies the conventional analysis of terrorism is ontologically challenged, lacks self-reflexivity, and is
policy oriented. By contrast, critical theory's ethicist, yet relativist, and deconstructive gaze reveals that
we are all terrorists now and must empathize with those sub-state actors who have recourse to violence for
whatever motive. Despite their intolerable othering by media and governments, terrorists are really no
different from us. In fact, there is terror as the weapon of the weak and the far worse economic and
coercive terror of the liberal state. Terrorists therefore deserve empathy and they must be discursively
At the core of this understanding sits a radical pacifism and an

idealism that requires not the status quo but communication and human
emancipation. Until this radical post-national utopia arrives both force and
the discourse of evil must be abandoned and instead therapy and un-coerced
conversation must be practiced. In the popular ABC drama Boston Legal Judge
Brown perennially referred to the vague, irrelevant , jargon-ridden
engaged.
statements of lawyers as jibber jabber . The Aberystwyth-based school of

critical internationalist utopianism that increasingly dominates the study of
international relations in Britain and Australia has refined a higher order
incoherence that may be termed Aber jabber. The pages of the journal of
Critical Studies on Terrorism are its natural home.
AT: Alternatives
Alternatives to counterterror measures are utopian we
cant emancipate ourselves from the problem of terrorism
Michel and Richards 9 (Torsten Michel and Anthony Richards, May 19th
2009, False dawns or new horizons? Further issues and challenges for Critical
Terrorism Studies, Critical Studies on Terrorism Vol. 2, No. 3, December 2009,
pp. 406-407, accessed 7/17/15) CH
The following will raise some concerns as to how the role of emancipation is conceptualized in current
examples of Frankfurt School-inspired approaches to CTS. To begin with, in addition to the critique of
positivism which is inherent in various critical projects within and outside the field of International
CTS clearly articulates that one of its main aims and certainly its
is to provide a space for emancipatory rationality
(Blakeley 2007, p. 234; also Jackson 2007, pp. 249250). Emancipation is directed at all
those groups and individuals, mainly located in the global South, that suffer from
the so far rigid and hegemonic discourse that characterises
terrorism research. The close intertwinement with state interests has, in their view, a purely
Relations,
main normative aim
instrumental dimension that aims at reifying and cementing the dominance of Western political and
institutional structures on a global and regional scale (Blakeley 2007, p. 231). From these initial
observations certain problematic issues follow for the conception of emancipation so far exhibited in CTS.
CTS makes the premature and optimistic

assumption not only that universalising a specific set of values (i.e.
Western) is a good thing but that every community will ultimately , when
it comes to its senses, pursue a path of emancipation which will lead
to a universalistic conception of a just society and a harmonization
of norms and values (McDonald 2009, p. 121). The assumption is made that
everybody wants to be emancipated or that if they do not want to
they should want to. One is left with the impression that, rather than reflecting the
heterogeneity of human existence, CTS represents an elite body of thought derived
in the West that is underpinned by the utopian aspiration that everybody
wants to, or should want to, to live by a specific set of values which are seen as universally valid as
To begin with, on a more practical level,
they are derived from an allegedly universal application of reason. And so, rather than being liberating or
CTS risks being narrow and

itself engaged in a hegemonic project. In order to realise emancipation in this sense it
emancipatory, for the vast bulk of the global population,
is therefore necessary, presumably, to universalise a specific set of values through a continuous
How emancipatory, however, is it to

quash all other forms of ideology and governance that do not
conform to our own? It is argued that the politics of emancipation aims to transcend
application of self-reflexive emancipatory reason.
oppressive social divisions. What about those cultures (and indeed peoples securities) that revolve
around social divisions? Here again we encounter a strange lack of self-reflexivity in FSCT-inspired
approaches to terrorism. Although scholars engaged in promoting this normative agenda stress the need
for a continuous critical engagement, it remains unclear from where their own normative agenda comes
A simple statement of conviction along the

lines of we aim to free people from oppression is certainly not
enough to legitimise desired practices. Empirically, it may be abhorrent to us to see
and what exactly makes it legitimate.
that the role of women in many environments apparently renders them insecure from a CTS perspective,
but what if this is a cultural imperative? Are we also to attempt to address the insecurity of lower caste
Do women in developing countries and

members of lower castes feel insecure or is that a state of mind that
has been bestowed upon them by relativist observers who deem that
they must be insecure according to the latters own conceptions as
to what must define security? As Ayoob argues, such a definition of
tribes and groups in relation to higher castes?
emancipation refuses to acknowledge that a society or group can be

emancipated without being secure and vice versa. . . . Such semantic
acrobatics tend to impose a model of contemporary Western
polities . . . that are far removed from Third World realities (Ayoob 1997,
pp. 126127)
Responding to terrorism cant be reduced to discursive

choices. Problematizing conventional approaches isnt
sufficient.
th
CTS tends to overstate the case for its novelty

relates to the perpetual problem of defining terrorism . Ruth Blakeley
One example as to where
maintains that one of the main problems with orthodox terrorism studies is that in its conceptions the
terrorist label is used as a political tool to de-legitimize certain groups, rather than as an analytical
category (Blakeley 2007, p. 230). This politicization of the term terrorism leads to a specific narrative, she
argues, in which the Northern democratic states are continuously portrayed as victims under constant
Blakeley
suggests that critically oriented scholars need to reclaim the term
terrorism and use it as an analytical tool, rather than political tool
in the service of the elite power (p. 233). The critical edge in this new take on terrorism
threat from extremist non-state actors mostly originating in the global South. Therefore,
studies should thereby bring deliverance from the dominant discourse in which terrorism studies serves as
There are, however, some

flaws in this argument. Firstly, Blakeley seems to suggest a bifurcation between a political use
a legitimizing tool for oppressive actions conducted by hegemonic states.
embedded in a specific set of structures that empower few, silence many and blame specific non-state
actors, and an analytical view that would allow a fairer approach to the analysis of terrorism. She says for
instance: This means that rather than taking a literal approach to the study of terrorism and then seek
instances of the phenomenon to try and determine causes and remedies (p. 230), we end up with utilizing
the terrorism label to further specific state-centric interests and shape security discourses in an
advantageous way for the powerful. An analytical rather than political use, she argues, promises a more
even one might even say neutral basis from which all instances that fit into a reasonable definition of
how
such an analytical use based on a reasonable definition is
achievable, it will certainly not fit well into a critical approach, even
when broadly conceptualized. This is because Critical Theory has generally
understood itself as a counter-movement to the abstract
systematizations of German idealism in its various forms and has
objected most strongly against a practical (political, social) and
theoretical (abstract analytical) split of human existence. Intuitively, then,
terrorism can be equally addressed (p. 229). Apart from the obvious question of whether and
Blakeleys call for an analytical use of the term terrorism seems hard to combine with the overall critical
outlook that CTS is proposing. Apart from these potential compatibility problems ,
Blakeley
contradicts herself in her pursuit of this analytical use. Only one paragraph
after proposing the necessity for critical scholars to reclaim terrorism and use it as an analytical tool within
she states that such an endeavour should be

pursued with the specific, normative aim of offering suggestions for
the emancipation of people in the South from the oppressive
practices of Northern powers (p. 234). Emancipating oppressed people
in the South, as laudable as it sounds, is of course a political aim in itself. If CTS
a Critical Theory oriented approach,
takes this as a central concern, however, and the emphasis on emancipation in almost all instances of T.
then we encounter
here a politicization of the terrorism label yet again, this time
projected against the global hegemonic North, but nevertheless
political. So, we are left somewhat puzzled as to how reclaiming terrorism analytically and thereby
Michel and A. Richards scholarship in this young field suggests it does,
overcoming its political abuse can be meaningfully combined with a clear and overt political agenda
It seems fair to suggest that given the way

that terrorism is used in various language-games in the international
arena, a political use is unavoidable in one form or another (Jackson 2007,
p. 247). But why then veil this political proclivity in a scholarly jargon
that suggests a de-politicization and analytical revival of the term
terrorism? On the definition itself, terrorism is surely a method that has been used by a wide
exhibited in CTS scholarship itself.
variety of actors. There is nothing new in Jacksons (2007, p. 248) proclamation that we need an actor-free
definition of terrorism. Such definitions have been put forward by so-called orthodox terrorism scholars
for many years (Schmid and Longman 1998). Of course, the terrorism perpetrated by states should not be
excluded from any definition (nor should terrorism carried out by any actor) but this is not a new or
A perpetrator based definition is indeed not only

unhelpful but it is also misses the key point that terrorism is first
and foremost a method and as such no perpetrator is excluded, be
they states, social movements, guerrilla groups, terrorist groups and
so on. As Weinberg rightly observed the notion of one mans terrorist is another mans freedom fighter
is confusing the goal with the activity (Weinberg 2005, p. 2). An actor-free definition that
strives for neutrality might look something like the following:
terrorism is a particular method of force or violence and/or the
threat of force or violence that has been carried out by a wide range
of actors (both state and non-state), that often targets civilians, is
usually for a political purpose and is usually designed to have a
psychological impact beyond the immediate victims. Such a
definition is not the product of some new-found momentum towards
bringing the state back into terrorism studies but reflects what has
always been the case (at least in modern times): that terrorism is a
method that has been used by a variety of actors.
contemporary revelation.
They have no criteria for making epistemological and

ontological choices about terrorism.
th
Smith suggests that emancipation seems to be particularly helpful in thinking about September 11
because it forces us to think through the reasons for those undertaking the attacks as well as the complex
question of how to respond (Smith 2005, p. 43). A clear link is made between 9/11, emancipation and
human insecurity (which entails the lack of the provision of food, shelter, education, health care etc.)
anyone could reasonably argue that there is a link

between economic underdevelopment and human insecurity, to take this
further and suggest a link between human insecurity and terrorism is
certainly more contentious. The literature on this issue has failed to establish such a link
(Smith 2005, p. 54). While
(and indeed, in general, argues against it) (Schmid 2004, pp. 6566; also Krueger and Maleckova 2003).
Terrorism has not, in the main, been the weapon of those in poverty (for
example) but of those who aim to fulfil particular political and religious
ideologies. Smith therefore makes something of a quantum leap: the apparent degree
of support from those in less developed countries who suffer from
human insecurity is suddenly and speculatively propelled as a
possible cause of terrorism (Smith 2005, pp. 5455). While the lack of
empirical research in terrorism studies has rightly been criticised,
critical security studies and CTS are arguably even more culpable in
this regard when such claims are made based upon little empirical
evidence. On a more abstract level it also seems unclear what the commitment to emancipation in
CTS actually signifies. The term is used without any substantial clarification as to its conceptual and
Critical Theory itself is

characterised by a variety of conceptualisations regarding not only
the content of emancipation but also the differing views as to the
possibility of achieving and pursuing in a practical way an
emancipatory agenda. In CTS such reflections, however, seem not to
be of any particular concern. Rather, the emancipatory potential of
human reflection and action is silently assumed to be not only
possible but realisable. This is connected to an underlying commitment to a specific form of
practical content. This seems especially troubling as
rationality (Rengger 1998, pp. 8283) that allows for deducing the problem-laden structure of
contemporary academic discourse in the area of terrorism studies and a subsequent prescription for a
normative-practical agenda in which the emancipation of mainly the global Downloaded by [University of
California, Berkeley] at 08:23 15 July 2015 408 T. Michel and A. Richards South takes a prime spot. Even a
quick glance over the main contributions to Critical Theory over the last decades will reveal, however, that
both the actual content of emancipation as well as the potential for its realisation are hotly debated. The
range of propositions we can find in this respect span from an engaged withdrawal in Adorno and
Horkheimer, through to the pragmatist infused communicative action within existing liberal institutionalist
structures in Habermas, to the emphasis on recognition as a precondition for healthy citizenship in Axel
Honneth (Chambers 2004, pp. 220239).2 Each of these (and to be clear these are only three specific,
through prominent, examples of Critical scholarship) presents a completely distinct representation of the
content, aim and potential for the pursuit of emancipation. CTS scholars, for better or worse, cannot simply
take emancipation out of these contestations and either claim a deceptive transparency of meaning
manifested in liberating people from all kinds of violence or retreat into an anti-foundationalist stand in
which the concrete content of emancipation cannot and need not be determined in the beginning. With
the questions of the supremacy of their critical

ontology as well as the authority of their epistemology remain
unresolved, and with respect to the second option, the question arises as to how an
emancipatory agenda can be argued for and pursued without any
preconception of its substance thus, how do the self appointed
emancipators know that they are in fact emancipating ? It turns out that a
normative aim (in this case liberating or emancipating or simply
helping the oppressed of the world) is not a viable ground on which
scholarship or action for that matter can be based. As we can learn from the
large trajectory of Critical Theory, such a commitment comes with its
shortcomings and flaws and any possibility of following Marxs
dictum to change the world must first and foremost start with a selfreflective and critical stand towards ones own theoretical and
practical commitments. A simple desire to better the world and to
unmask the abuse of power (as implicitly portrayed in current instances of
terrorism scholarship) is not just an external exercise of speaking truth to power but relies in
respect to the first option
its very possibility on a constant commitment to internal critique and a continuous perpetuation of the
hermeneutics of suspicion, all of which right now seem dangerously absent in CTS scholarship. In this
respect, we can recall Nick Renggers recent citation of T. S. Elliot: The last temptation is the greatest
treason: to do the right deed for the wrong reason (Rengger 2008, p. 961; originally in Eliot 1938, p. 44.1)
Terror policy key

We shouldnt discard problem-solving approaches to
terrorism.
Horgan &. Boyle 2008 [John & Michael J, A case against Critical Terrorism Studies,
Critical Studies on Terrorism, 1:1, 52-53, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539150701848225]
Another critique of terrorism studies derives from the general

critique of the influence of problem-solving theory in terrorism
studies (Gunning 2007b). The argument here, and deriving from Cox, is that terrorism studies tends to take the
world as it is, rather than challenging its foundations of social and political order, and forsakes efforts to find ways of
applying scholarly knowledge to relieving the burdens of those oppressed by unjust social and political structures (Cox
1981, p. 129). In other words, the charge is that the study of terrorism has a predominant status quo bias, which leads it
to focus on how to solve problems for those in power, at the expense of emancipation. The mode of thinking of
terrorism studies is thus dominated by instrumental rationality, to the detriment of reflective approaches and
We believe this is overstating the case. Like much of

political science, the study of terrorism has been influenced by the
logic of problem-solving theory and includes a strong dose of
instrumental rationality. But to imply that all those working within
an empirical tradition of research in terrorism studies do not
challenge the status quo, or suggest uncomfortable truths to those
in power, is misleading. Many of the serious scholars who work in
this field are sympathetic to the normative goals that CTS scholars
espouse, and are unafraid to speak truth to power when needed. For
example, many terrorism scholars do not hesitate to tell
governments bluntly that unpopular certain foreign policy choices
(such as the US invasion of Iraq or the Israeli occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza) generate terrorism, and that addressing pervasive
economic and social inequalities is an essential part of counterterrorism. In fact, in a 2004 Open Letter to the American People, over 700 security studies scholars in the USA
interdisciplinary research.
and elsewhere signed their names to a case which included the following: We judge that the current American policy
centered around the war in Iraq is the most misguided one since the Vietnam period, one which harms the cause of the
struggle against extreme Islamist terrorists. One result has been a great distortion in the terms of public debate on foreign
and national security policy-an emphasis on speculation instead of facts. (Security Scholars for a Sensible Foreign Policy
5
(2004) The list included such well-known terrorism experts as Jessica Stern, David Rapoport (Co-editor of Terrorism and
Political Violence), and Mia Bloom. If terrorism scholars, including these, were solely interested in telling comforting lies to
those in power, they would shy away from these uncomfortable facts and would certainly not publicly identify themselves
with such an openly critical stance.
Case- Alt causes

Other programs result in racial profiling
Leadership Conference 11
The Leadership Conference, coalition charged by its diverse membership of more

than 200 national organizations to promote and protect the civil and human rights of
all persons in the United States, The Reality of Racial Profiling,
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/racial-profiling2011/the-reality-ofracial.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/, 2011//SRawal
- Operation front line
- Lower standard from probable cause to reasonable suspicion
- Terrorists screening center
Another example of a federal program that involves racial profiling is

Operation Front Line (OFL). The stated purpose of OFL,47 which was instituted just prior to the
November 2004 presidential election, is to "detect, deter, and disrupt terror operations."48 OFL is a covert
program, the existence of which was discovered through a Freedom
of Information Act lawsuit filed by the American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee and the Yale Law School National Litigation Project.49 According to the 2009
ACLU/Rights Working Group report, data regarding OFL obtained from the Department of Homeland Security show that :
an astounding seventy-nine percent of the targets investigated were
immigrants from Muslim majority countries . Moreover, foreign nationals from Muslimmajority countries were 1,280 times more likely to be targeted than similarly situated individuals from other countries.
Incredibly, not even one terrorism-related conviction resulted from the interviews conducted under this program. What did
result, however, was an intense chilling effect on the free speech and association rights of the Muslim, Arab and South
Asian communities targeted in advance of an already contentious presidential election.50 Lists of individuals who
Inasmuch as
the overwhelming majority of those selected were Muslims, OFL is a
clear example of a federal program that involves racial profiling .
registered under NSEERS were apparently used to select candidates for investigation in OFL.51
Moreover, because OFL has resulted in no terror-related convictions, the program is also a clear example of how racial
profiling uses up valuable law enforcement resources yet fails to make our nation safer.52 Although Arabs and Muslims,
those presumed to be Arabs or Muslims based on their

appearance, have since 9/11 been targeted by law enforcement
authorities in their homes, at work, and while driving or walking,53
airports and border crossings have become especially daunting . One
and
reason for this is a wide-ranging and intrusive Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) guidance issued in July 2008 that states,
"in
the course of a border search, and absent individualized

suspicion, officers can review and analyze the information
transported by any individual attempting to enter . the United
States."(Emphasis added)54 In addition, the standard to copy documents belonging to a person seeking to enter
the U.S. was lowered from a "probable cause" to a "reasonable
suspicion" standard.55 Operating under such a broad and subjective
guidance, border agents frequently stop Muslims, Arabs, and South
Asians for extensive questioning about their families, faith, political
opinions, and other private matters, and subject them to intrusive
searches. Often, their cell phones, laptops, personal papers and books are taken and reviewed. The FBI's
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a list of every person
who, according to the U.S. government, has "any nexus" to
terrorism.56 Because of misidentification (i.e., mistaking non-listed persons for listed persons) and overclassification (i.e., assigning listed persons a classification that makes them appear dangerous when they are not), this
defective "watch-list" causes many problems for Muslims, Arabs, and

South Asians seeking to enter the United States, including those
who are U.S. citizens.
Alt cause local policies enforce racist surveillance, plan

cant reform these
AP 12 Samantha Henry, Matt Appuzzo, Wayne Perry, reporters for the
Associated Press, American multinational nonprofit news agency, 2012 (New
Jersey Muslims Angry Over NYPD Surveillance Findings, The Huffington Post,
May 25, Available online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/25/newjersey-muslims-cangry-nypd-surveillance_n_1545319.html, Accessed on
6/14/15)
TRENTON, N.J. -- Muslim leaders in New Jersey say they are angry but uncertain
what their next step will be after the state's attorney general found that New York City police did not
violate any laws in its surveillance of Muslim businesses, mosques and student groups in New Jersey.
Several mosque leaders who attended a meeting Thursday with Attorney General Jeffrey S. Chiesa said
they were shocked he found no violation of state criminal or civil

laws by the NYPD in operations that many Muslims considered
unjustified surveillance based solely on religion. "This is a big
violation of our civil rights , and we need to go to our communities and explain it?" Imam
Mohammad Qatanani, the spiritual leader of the Islamic Center of Passaic County said Thursday as he left
the meeting. Qatanani said he would not tell his congregants to stop collaborating with law enforcement,
"We need from them to show us the same seriousness and

honesty in building bridges with the Muslim community." Chiesa had been
but added,
asked by Gov. Chris Christie, who appointed him, to look into operations in New Jersey that were part of a
widespread NYPD program to collect intelligence on Muslim communities both inside New York and beyond.
Undercover officers and informants eavesdropped in Muslim cafes

and monitored sermons, even when there was no evidence of a
crime. They infiltrated Muslim student groups, videotaped mosquegoers or collected their license plate numbers as they prayed. The
result was that many innocent business owners, students and
others were cataloged in police files. The interstate surveillance
efforts, revealed by The Associated Press earlier this year, angered many Muslims and
New Jersey officials. Some, like Newark Mayor Cory Booker and the state's top FBI official,
criticized the tactics. Others, like Christie, focused more on the fact that the NYPD didn't tell New Jersey
exactly what it was up to. In response, Chiesa launched what he described as a fact-finding review. Further,
authorities found that New Jersey has no laws barring outside law enforcement agencies from secretly
conducting operations in the state, representatives of the attorney general's office told the AP. However,
New York police have agreed to meet with New Jersey law enforcement regularly to discuss
counterterrorism intelligence and operations, the attorney general said.
Alt causeFBIs terror list

Bilici, 1AC Author, 10 (Mucahit Bilici, Assistant Sociology Professor at John
Jay College; Islamophobia / Islamophilia, Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend,
Muslim Ethnic Comedy: Inversions of Islamophobia, 2010, pg. 198-199//rck)
Ahmed Ahmed is an Egyptian American who also had an acting career in

Hollywood. Dissatisfied with the parts available to Middle Eastern actors,
he decided to become a stand-up comedian after 9/11. Ahmeds routine
typically revolves around the absurdities of the security check at the
airport. He claims that his name matches one of the FBIs most wanted
terrorists. So each time he goes to the airport, he has to go through
extra security checks.
SPOT doesnt do anythingthere are only officers at 0.8%

of US Airports
Forbes 14 (Steve, Chairman and Editor-in-Chief of Forbes Media, editorials for
each issue of Forbes under the heading of Fact and Comment, January 6, Spot-on
Mistake at TSA; Duped by Obama,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/othercomments/2014/01/06/spot-on-mistake-at-tsaduped-by-obama/, //rck)
Consider SPOTs results last year: Behavior detection officers chose nearly 36,000
travelers for extra screening, then referred about 2,100 of them to law enforcement. Of those,
183 were arrested on a range of charges, from

suspected drugs. None for terrorism. The agency points to
the arrests as proof of SPOTs success. But consider that the TSA had to pick out 196
a tiny fraction were denied boarding, and
fraudulent documents to
travelers, on average, for each one who ultimately merited arrest. Not exactly a big payoff for
the effort and expense of keeping 3,131 officers at 122 airports. Nor is the TSA
supposed to be in the business of detaining drunks or catching common criminals, unless they
mean to blow up a plane. Airport security and airline personnel can handle the routine stuff.
Government Accountability Office reported that flagging travelers

based on behavior is only slightly better than picking them out by
random chance. Although a 2011 study by TSAs parent agency concluded the program is
The
effective, the GAO found that the studys data were unreliable and its method flawed.
Case- Circumvention
1NC
The FBI will circumvent whistleblowers are punished
ACLU 13 [American Civil Liberties Union, September 2013, UNLEASHED AND UNACCOUNTABLE; The
FBIs Unchecked Abuse of Authority, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/unleashed-andunaccountable-fbi-report.pdf]//dickies
The FBI has a notorious record of retaliating against FBI employees

who report misconduct or abuse in the FBI and has used aggressive leak
investigations to suppress other government whistleblowers. Congress
exempted the FBI from the requirements of the Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989 and instead required the Justice Department to
establish an internal system to protect FBI employees who report
waste, fraud, abuse, and illegality. Still, FBI Director Robert Mueller repeatedly vowed to protect
Bureau whistleblowers: I issued a memorandum on November 7th [2001] reaffirming the protections that
are afforded to whistleblowers in which I indicated I will not tolerate reprisals or intimidation by any Bureau
employee against those who make protected disclosures, nor will I tolerate attempts to prevent employees
court cases and investigations by the

Justice Department Office of Professional Responsibility and Inspector General have
repeatedly found that FBI officials continue to retaliate against FBI
employees who publicly report internal misconduct, including Michael German,181 Sibel
Edmonds,182 Jane Turner,183 Robert Wright,184 John Roberts,185 and Bassem Youssef.186 Other FBI
whistleblowers choose to suffer retaliation in silence. Special Agent Chad Joy
from making such disclosures.180 Yet
courageously blew the whistle on a senior FBI agents serious misconduct during the investigation and
prosecution of Alaska Sen. Ted Stevens, which resulted in the trial judge overturning the conviction against
him, but only after the senator had lost re-election.187 Special Agent Joy was publicly criticized by his
then-retired supervisor, subjected to a retaliatory investigation, and then taken off criminal cases.188 Joy
resigned and no longer works at the FBI, while the FBI agent responsible for the misconduct in the Stevens
case continues to be assigned high-profile investigationsa clear sign that the FBI culture continues to
These high-profile
cases of whistleblower retaliation discourage other FBI personnel
from coming forward. A 2009 Inspector General report found that 28 percent of nonsupervisory FBI employees and 22 percent of FBI supervisors at the GS14 and GS-15 levels never report misconduct they see or hear about on the job.190 That
protect agents involved in misconduct more than those who report it.189
such a high percentage of officials in the governments premiere law enforcement agency refuse to report
internal misconduct is shocking and dangerous and perpetuates the risk that Americans like Sen. Stevens
will continue to be victimized by overzealous investigations and prosecutions. The FBI has also been
involved in suppressing other government whistleblowers through inappropriately aggressive leak
when the U.S. media reported in 2005 that the National

(NSA) was spying on Americans communications without
warrants in violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the FBI didnt launch an
investigation to enforce the laws criminal provisions. It instead
went after the whistleblowers, treating leaks to the American public
about government malfeasance as espionage.191 After more than a year of
investigations. For example,
Security Agency
aggressive investigation and interviews, armed FBI agents conducted coordinated raids on the homes of
four former NSA and Justice Department officials and a House Intelligence Committee staffer, treating
them as if they were dangerous Mafiosi instead of dedicated federal employees who held the
governments highest security clearances. William Binney, who served more than 30 years in the NSA,
described an FBI agent pointing a gun at his head as he stepped naked from the shower.192
Curtailing surveillance in specific areas will just cause

agencies to literally surveil areas outside/around itmosque surveillance tactics prove
Goldman et. al, 12
(Adam and Matt are editors for the Associated Press. NYPD Defends Tactics
Over Mosque Spying; Records Reveal New Details On Muslim Surveillance.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/24/nypd-defends-tacticsover_n_1298997.html. Date Accessed- 7/13/15. Anshul Nanda)
NEW YORK -- The New York Police Department targeted Muslim mosques
with tactics normally reserved for criminal organizations, according to
newly obtained police documents that showed police collecting the license plates of
worshippers, monitoring them on surveillance cameras and cataloging
sermons through a network of informants. The documents, obtained by The Associated Press, have
come to light as the NYPD fends off criticism of its monitoring of Muslim
student groups and its cataloging of mosques and Muslim businesses
in nearby Newark, N.J.The NYPD's spokesman, Paul Browne, forcefully defended the legality of
those efforts Thursday, telling reporters that its officers may go wherever the public goes and collect
intelligence, even outside city limits. The new documents, prepared for Police Commissioner Raymond
paid informants monitored conversations

and sermons inside mosques. The records offer the first glimpse of
what those informants, known informally as "mosque crawlers,"
gleaned from inside the houses of worship. For instance, when a Danish newspaper
published inflammatory cartoons of Prophet Muhammad in September 2005, Muslim
communities around the world erupted in outrage. Violent mobs
took to the streets in the Middle East. A Somali man even broke into the cartoonist's
Kelly, show how the NYPD's roster of
house in Denmark with an ax. In New York, thousands of miles away, it was a different story. Muslim
leaders preached peace and urged people to protest lawfully. Write letters to politicians, they said. Some
advocated
boycotting Danish products, burning flags and holding

rallies. All of that was permissible under law and protected by the First Amendment to the
Constitution. All was reported to the NYPD by its mosque crawlers and made its
way into police files for Kelly. "Imam Shamsi Ali brought up the topic of
the cartoon, condemning them. He announced a rally that was to take place on Sunday
(02/05/06) near the United Nations. He asked that everyone to attend if possible and reminded everyone
to keep their poise if they can make it," one report read. At the Muslim Center of New York in Queens, the
report said, "Mohammad Tariq Sherwani led the prayer service and urged those in attendance to
When one Muslim leader

suggested planning a demonstration, one of the people involved in the discussion
about how to get a permit was, in fact, working for the NYPD. "It seems horrible to me that
the NYPD is treating an entire religious community as potential
terrorists," said civil rights lawyer Jethro Eisenstein, who reviewed some of the documents and is
participate in a demonstration at the United Nations on Sunday."
involved in a decades-old class-action lawsuit against the police department for spying on protesters and
lawsuit is known as the Handschu case, and a court

order in that case governs how the NYPD may collect intelligence .
political dissidents. The
Eisenstein said the documents prove the NYPD has violated those rules. "This is a flat-out violation,"
Eisenstein said. "This is a smoking gun." Browne, the NYPD spokesman, did not discuss specific
investigations Thursday but told reporters that, because of the Handschu case, the NYPD operates under
stricter rules than any other department in the country. He said police do not violate those rules. His
statements were intended to calm a controversy over a 2007 operation in which the NYPD mapped and
photographed all of Newark's mosques and eavesdropped on Muslim businesses. Newark Mayor Cory
Booker said he was never told about the surveillance, which he said offended him. Booker and his police
director accused the NYPD of misleading them by not revealing exactly what they were doing. Had they
known, they said it never would have been permitted. But Browne said Newark police were told before and
the police commissioner, and

Mayor Michael Bloomberg have been emphatic that police only
follow legitimate leads of criminal activity and do not conduct
preventive surveillance in ethnic communities. Former and current law
after the operation and knew exactly what it entailed. Kelly,
enforcement officials either involved in or with direct knowledge of these programs say they did not follow
leads. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the
secret programs. But the documents support their claims. The effort highlights one of the most difficult
aspects of policing in the age of terrorism. Solving crimes isn't enough; police are expected to identify
would-be terrorists and move in before they can attack. There are no universally agreed upon warning
signs for terrorism. Terrorists have used Internet cafes, stayed in hostels, worked out at gyms, visited
travel agencies, attended student groups and prayed at mosques. So the NYPD monitored those areas. In
doing so, they monitored many innocent people as they went about their daily lives. Using plainclothes
officers from the squad known as the Demographics Unit, police swept Muslim neighborhoods and
catalogued the location of mosques. The ethnic makeup of each congregation was logged as police fanned
out across the city and outside their jurisdiction, into suburban Long Island and areas of New Jersey.
"African American, Arab, Pakistani," police wrote beneath the photo of one mosque in Newark.
Investigators looked at mosques as the center of Muslim life. All their connections had to be known. David
NYPD's top intelligence officer, wanted a source inside every

mosque within a 250-mile radius of New York, current and former officials said.
Though the officials said they never managed to reach that goal,
documents show the NYPD successfully placed informants or
undercovers - sometimes both - into mosques from Westchester County,
N.Y., to New Jersey. The NYPD used these sources to get a sense of the sentiment of worshippers
whenever an event generated headlines. The goal, former officials said, was to alert police to
potential problems before they bubbled up. Even when it was clear there were no
links to terrorism, the mosque informants gave the NYPD the ability to
"take the pulse" of the community, as Cohen and other managers put it. When New
Cohen, the
York Yankees pitcher Cory Lidle and his flight instructor were killed on Oct. 11, 2006, when their small
plane crashed into a Manhattan high-rise apartment, fighter planes were scrambled. Within hours the FBI
and Homeland Security Department said it was an accident. Terrorism was ruled out. Yet for days after the
event, the NYPD's mosque crawlers reported to police about what they heard at sermons and among
worshippers. (View the PDF documents on Danish cartoons, mosque targeting and summaries of plane
crash.) At the Brooklyn Islamic Center, a confidential informant "noted chatter among the regulars
expressing relief and thanks to God that the crash was only an accident and not an act of terrorism," one
report reads. "The worshippers made remarks to the effect that ìt better be an accident; we don't need
any more heat,'" an undercover officer reported from the Al-Tawheed Islamic Center in Jersey City, N.J. In
NYPD put cameras on light poles and trained them on

mosques, documents show. Because the cameras were in public space,
police didn't need a warrant to conduct the surveillance . Police also
wrote down the license plates of cars in mosque parking lot s,
documents show. In some instances, police in unmarked cars outfitted with
electronic license plate readers would drive down the street and
record the plates of everyone parked near the mosque , former officials
some instances, the
recalled. "They're viewing Muslims like they're crazy.
New regulations only legitimize government surveillance

by creating an illusion of constraint
Glennon 14 [Michael, Professor of International Law at Tufts, 2014, National Security and Double
Government, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Glennon-Final.pdf] //dickies
National security policy in the United States has remained largely

constant from the Bush Administration to the Obama Administration. This continuity can be
explained by the double government theory of 19th-century scholar of the English Constitution Walter
U.S. national security

policy is defined by the network of executive officials who manage
the departments and agencies responsible for protecting U.S.
national security and who, responding to structural incentives embedded in the U.S. political
system, operate largely removed from public view and from
constitutional constraints. The public believes that the
constitutionally-established institutions control national security
policy, but that view is mistaken. Judicial review is negligible ;
congressional oversight is dysfunctional; and presidential control is
nominal. Absent a more informed and engaged electorate, little possibility exists for
Bagehot. As applied to the United States, Bagehots theory suggests that
restoring accountability in the formulation and execution of national security

policy.
The institution of national security agencies determines

policy new constraints create an illusion of control that
only legitimizes surveillance
U.S. national security policy has scarcely changed from the Bush to
the Obama Administration. The theory of Walter Bagehot explains why. Bagehot described the
emergence in 19th-century Britain of a disguised republic consisting of officials who actually
exercised governmental power but remained unnoticed by the
public, which continued to believe that visible, formal institutions
exercised legal authority.601 Dual institutions of governance, one
public and the other concealed, were referred to by Bagehot as double
government.602 A similar process of bifurcated institutional evolution has occurred in the United
States, but in reverse: a network has emerged within the federal
government that exercises predominant power with respect to
national security matters. It has evolved in response to structural incentives rather than
invidious intent, and it consists of the several hundred executive officials
who manage the military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law
enforcement agencies responsible for protecting the nations
security. These officials are as little disposed to stake out new
policies as they are to abandon old ones. They define security more in military and intelligence terms
rather than in political or diplomatic ones. Enough examples exist to persuade the
public that the network is subject to judicial, legislative, and
executive constraints. This appearance is important to its operation, for the network derives
legitimacy from the ostensible authority of the public, constitutional branches of the government. The
appearance of accountability is, however, largely an illusion fostered by
those institutions pedigree, ritual, intelligibility, mystery, and
superficial harmony with the networks ambitions. The courts,
Congress, and even the presidency in reality impose little constraint .
Judicial review is negligible; congressional oversight dysfunctional;
and presidential control nominal. Past efforts to revive these institutions have thus fallen
flat. Future reform efforts are no more likely to succeed, relying as
they must upon those same institutions to restore power to
themselves by exercising the very power that they lack. External
constraintspublic opinion and the pressare insufficient to check it. Both
are manipulable, and their vitality depends heavily upon the vigor of
constitutionally established institutions, which would not have
withered had those external constraints had real force. Nor is it
likely that any such constraints can be restored through
governmental efforts to inculcate greater civic virtue, which would
ultimately concentrate power even further. Institutional restoration can come only
from an energized body politic. The prevailing incentive structure, however,
encourages the public to become less, not more, informed and
engaged.
The national security team actually determines policy

court and the president create the illusion of curtailment
Bagehots theory may have overstated the naivet of Britains citizenry. When he wrote, probably few
Britons believed that Queen Victoria actually governed. Nor is it likely that Prime Minister Lord Palmerston,
let alone 658 members of the House of Commons, could or did consciously and intentionally conceal from
the British public that it was really they who governed. Big groups keep big secrets poorly. Nonetheless,
dual institutions of governance, one public and

the other concealed, evolve side-by-side to maximize both legitimacy and efficiency is worth
pondering as one possible explanation of why the Obama and Bush
national security policies have been essentially the same . There is no
Bagehots enduring insightthat
reason in principle why the institutions of Britains juridical offspring, the United States, ought to be
immune from the broader bifurcating forces that have driven British institutional evolution. As it did in the
power in the United States lay initially in one

set of institutionsthe President, Congress, and the courts. These are
Americas dignified institutions. Later, however, a second institution emerged to
safeguard the nations security. This, Americas efficient institution
(actually, as will be seen, more a network than an institution) consists of the several
hundred executive officials who sit atop the military, intelligence,
diplomatic, and law enforcement departments and agencies that have as their
mission the protection of Americas international and internal security. Large segments of the
public continue to believe that Americas constitutionally
established, dignified institutions are the locus of governmental
power; by promoting that impression, both sets of institutions
maintain public support. But when it comes to defining and protecting national security, the
publics impression is mistaken. Americas efficient institution makes most of
the key decisions concerning national security, removed from public
view and from the constitutional restrictions that check Americas dignified
institutions. The United States has, in short, moved beyond a mere imperial
presidency to a bifurcated systema structure of double governmentin which
even the President now exercises little substantive control over the
overall direction of U.S. national security policy. Whereas Britains dual
early days of Britains monarchy,
institutions evolved towards a concealed republic, Americas have evolved in the opposite direction,
toward greater centralization, less accountability, and emergent autocracy.
2NC
Secrecy and diffusion of blame means any curtailment will
be circumvented
What has held the Trumanites together during this era is what Bagehot believed held Britains efficient
institutions together: loyalty, collective responsibility, andmost importantlysecrecy.165 Secrecy, once
accepted, becomes an addiction, Edward Teller said.166 The Trumanite network is not alone in accepting
the need for secrecy in national security mattersthe Madisonian institutions do as wellbut in breadth
the Trumanites opaqueness is striking. Trumanites can have

no real discussions with family or friends about work because nearly all of
their work is classified. They hold multiple compartmented
clearances. Their offices are located in the buildings expensive real
estatethe Pentagons E-Ring, the CIAs Seventh Floor, the State Departments Seventh Floor. Key
and depth,
pads lock their doors. Next to their desks are a safe and two computers, one unclassified and the other
They speak in
acronyms and code words that the public has never heard and, God (and
the FBI) willing, never will hear. The experts they consult are their colleagues. Outside expertise,
when needed, is difficult to tap. The Trumanites sign non-disclosure
agreements under which they promise to submit for prepublication review anything they write on
classified. Down the hall is a SCIF167 where the most sensitive briefings take place.
the subject of their work. Outside experts have signed nothing; normally they do not even hold a security
Outside experts can thus provide insights but are not in the
flow of intelligence and have little sense of the internal,
organizational decisionmaking context in which issues arise. Nor have they any particular
loyalty to the group, not being a part of it. The Trumanites have additional
incentives to keep information to themselves. Knowing that
information in Washington is power, they are, in the words of Jack Balkin, both
information gluttons and information misers .168 They are information gluttons in
that they grab as much information as possible ; they are information misers in
that they try to keep it from the public. Potential critics, power competitors, and
clearance.
adversaries are starved for information concerning the Trumanite network while it feasts on information
concerning them. The secrecy of Trumanite activities thus grows as the privacy of the general public
diminishes and the Trumanites shared secret[s] of convenience169 bind them more tightly together.
The Trumanites ability to mask the identity of the decider is

another factor that accounts for the networks durability and
resilience. Efforts by the press and congressional oversight
committees to pinpoint exactly who is responsible for a given policy
are easily deflected by the shield of secrecy provided by the network
structure. Because everyonethe entire national security teamis
accountable, no one is accountable.170 The networks success in evading questions
concerning the continuation of military assistance to Egyptdespite a clear statutory prohibition against
the continuation of such aid following a military coup171is illustrative. Below is an excerpt from the State
Department spokeswoman, Jen Psaki, answering questions from the press on July 26, 2013: QUESTION:
And who ultimately made the decision not to make a determination? MS. PSAKI: Well, obviously, theres a
factor as it relates to the legal component, which our legal office here played a significant role in, and
certainly this was discussed and agreed to through the interagency process. QUESTION: But who decided?
I mean, the buck stops somewhere. As Harry Truman said, it stopped with him. Does the buck stop with the
President in this case, or with the Secretary, or with the acting legal advisor of the State Department, or
who? Who made the decision? MS. PSAKI: Well, Im not going to read out who was where on what and all
the players involved in this. QUESTION: Im not asking that. Im asking who made the decision. MS. PSAKI:
This was agreed to by the national security team. Beyond that, Im not going to I dont have anything.
QUESTION: Why are you afraid to say who made the decision? MS. PSAKI: Im not afraid of anything,
Arshad. Im just not Im not getting into more specifics than that for you.172 Its cohesion
the Trumanite network is curiously amorphous. It has no

leader. It is not monolithic. It has no formal structure.173 Its actual
notwithstanding,
membership blurs at the margins. Its ranks reflect the same organizational, philosophical, and personal
Blame avoidance ranks high among

its priorities.174 But while Trumanites view of the world differs at the margins, it does not differ at
rivalries and fissures common to all bureaucracies.
the core. It has been said that there is no such thing as a military mind,175 but this is not true. Mills
captured the military mindset; in the military, he wrote, there is an intensified desire, too deeply rooted to
examine, to conform to type, to be indistinguishable, not to reveal loss of composure to inferiors, and
above all, not to presume the right to upset the arrangements of the chain of command.176 Operating as
it does under the long shadow of the military, the range of internal disagreement within the Trumanite
network is tiny, like differences over appropriate necktie width. The conformist mentality percolates
upward. Bob Woodward reported on the response to President Obamas question as he sat down with
eighteen top advisers for the second meeting of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy review. Is there
anybody who thinks we ought to leave Afghanistan, the President asked? Everyone in the room was quiet.
They looked at him. No one said anything.177 The incident was unexceptional. The dirty little secret
the
United States government has enduring institutional interests that
carry over from administration to administration and almost always
dictate the position the government takes.178
here, a former associate counsel in the Bush White House, Brad Berenson, explained, is that
Plan fails national security experts have a personal

incentive to reinscribe the status quo
The Trumanite network is as little inclined to stake out new policies

as it is to abandon old ones. The Trumanites grundnorm is stability,
and their ultimate objective is preservation of the status quo . The
status quo embraces not only American power but the Trumanites
own careers, which are steadily elevated by the conveyer belt on which they sit. Preoccupied as
they are with cascading crises, swamped with memos and email and overwhelmed with meetings,
Trumanites have no time to re-examine the cosmological premises

on which policy is based.179 Their business is reacting, day and night. Working weekends
and evenings is routine; theirs are 24/7 jobs180 that leave no time for pondering big pictures. They are
caught up in tactics;181 larger ends are for memoirs. Reflecting on the fail[ure] to take an orderly,
rational approach to Vietnam decisionmaking, Robert McNamara wrote that we faced a blizzard of
problems, there were only twenty-four hours a day, and we often did not have time to think straight. 182
His successors encountered an equally frenetic environment.183 With the anger, frustration, emotion, and
a
pernicious but existing policy gradually comes to be seen as the
least bad choice. The status quo is preserved by minimizing risks,
which means no bold departure from the settled long-term policy
trajectory. Men who have participated in a decision, as James Thomson succinctly put it, develop a
the mental and physical exhaustion induced in working long hours under crisis conditions,
stake in that decision.184 Slow is therefore best. The risk of embarrassment is lower in continuing a policy
someone else initiated than in sponsoring ones own new one. If the policy fails, the embarrassment is
someone elses. Trumanites are therefore, above all, team players. They are disinclined to disagree openly.
The further up you go, one prominent organization theorist put it, the less you can afford to stick out in
any one place.185 As one seasoned adviser said, because there is a real team concept and where
money disputes are not usually the core, radically different views of the direction to be taken by an
administration can cause serious trouble.186 He advises that a new president should take care that his
key officials in foreign policy all have a roughly similar outlook on the world and Americas place in it.187
once a policy is final, Trumanites rally readily round it,

however much they might once have disagreed. Dissent shades into disloyalty
Accordingly,
and risks marginalization, particularly in a policy group with high esprit de corps. As Kissinger put it,
[s]erving the machine becomes a more absorbing occupation than

defining its purpose.188 Little credit is gained by advocating for an option that has earlier
been rejected. Likelier than not, ones superior, or his superior, was present at the creation of the policy
and takes pride in its authorship. In government it is always easier to go forward with a program that does
not work, David Halberstam wrote, than to stop it altogether and admit failure.189 Even those
immersed in the policy-making process are often bewildered by its outcome. The Army chief of staff,
Harold Johnson, could think of no logical rationale to explain the militarys continuing recommendations
for incremental escalation of the U.S. war effort in Vietnameven though the military had difficulty
devising any persuasive strategy to produce victory.190
Fusion Center Module No Regulations

Fusion centers monitor lawful religious activity
Patel and Price 12 Faiza Patel serves as co-director of the Brennan
Centers Liberty and National Security Program; Michael Price serves as
counsel for the Brennan Centers Liberty and National Security Program
(10/18/12, Faiza Patel, Michael Price, Brennan Center for Justice, Fusion
Centers Need More Rules, Oversight,
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/fusion-centers-need-more-rulesoversight)
Instead of looking for terrorist threats, fusion centers were monitoring
lawful political and religious activity. That year, the Virginia Fusion
Center described a Muslim get-outthe-vote campaign as
subversive. In 2009, the North Central Texas Fusion Center
identified lobbying by Muslim groups as a possible threat.
The DHS dismissed these as isolated episodes, but the two-year Senate
investigation found that such tactics were hardly rare. It concluded that
fusion centers routinely produce irrelevant, useless or
inappropriate intelligence that endangers civil liberties.
None of their information has disrupted a single terrorist plot. These
revelations call into question the value of fusion centers as currently
structured. At a minimum, they underscore the need for greater oversight
and clearer rules on what information fusion centers collect and disseminate.
Of course, effective information sharing is critical to national security. But as
the Senate investigation demonstrates, there is little value in distributing
information if it is shoddy, biased or simply irrelevant. When fusion centers
feed such information into the echo chamber of federal databases, they only
compound mistakes and clog the system.
The DHS has failed to create effective mechanisms or incentives for quality
control. Instead, fusion centers collect and share information
according to their individual standards, which vary considerably.
These rules often permit information to flow to federal agencies that
has no connection to criminal activity let alone terrorism. This creates
the risk that intelligence networks will become saturated with poor or
irrelevant information as well as lend undue credibility to inaccurate data.
The Senate report showed that these risks are not just theoretical.
Fusion centers need explicit and consistent rules. The DHS should
ensure that the information the centers collect and distribute is relevant,
useful and constitutional by requiring them to show some reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
This is not a particularly high bar to clear. The reasonable suspicion standard
is familiar to every police officer. The requirement would serve as an
important bulwark against privacy and civil rights violations, but it would also
keep meaningless information out of the system.
Without such well-defined and familiar standards, as the Senate report
demonstrates, fusion centers are left rudderless.
In addition, fusion centers must have active, independent oversight. While
Congressional inquiries are important for exposing problems, the Senate
should not have been the first governmental body to take a critical look at
fusion centers.
At the state and local level, there is often no mechanism to ensure that
fusion centers are generating useful information or complying with
the law. At the federal level, the DHS is responsible for verifying that the
data shared by fusion centers meet certain minimum standards. But the DHS
has delegated this responsibility to the centers themselves and has
not conducted independent audits.
DHS oversight has been so poor that the department could not even
say how much money it has spent on fusion centers, estimating the cost
at somewhere from $289 million to $1.4 billion.
Fusion centers guarantee profiling will continue post-plan

Constitution Project 12 The Constitution Project (8/15/12, The
Constitution Project, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUSION CENTERS,

http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/fusioncenterreport.pdf)
2. Reports of Political, Racial and Religious Profiling
Despite these constitutional principles, there have been numerous anecdotal
reports of incidents in which fusion centers have targeted individuals in the
United States for surveillance and investigation based solely on beliefs and
characteristics that are protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Although federal guidance to fusion centers cautions against profiling, these
incidents demonstrate that significant additional guidance, training and
oversight are crucial to ensure that fusion centers and other law enforcement
agencies do not engage in racial, religious and political profiling.41
Recent reports from across the country bear testament to the
potential for problematic profiling at fusion centers, particularly
regarding bulletins and intelligence reports circulated by fusion
centers. These are a few examples:
The February 2009 Prevention Awareness Bulletin, circulated by a
Texas fusion center, described Muslim lobbying groups as providing
an environment for terrorist organizations to flourish and warned that
the threats to Texas are significant.
The bulletin called on law enforcement officers to report activities such as
Muslim hip hop fashion boutiques, hip hop bands, use of online social
networks, video sharing networks, chat forums and blogs.42
A Missouri-based fusion center issued a February 2009 report describing
support for the presidential campaigns of Ron Paul or third party candidates,
possession of the iconic Dont Tread on Me flag and anti-abortion activism
as signs of membership in domestic terrorist groups.43
The Tennessee Fusion Center listed a letter from the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) to public schools on its online map of
Terrorism Events and Other Suspicious Activity. The letter had
advised schools that holiday celebrations focused exclusively on
Christmas were an unconstitutional government endorsement of
religion.44
The Virginia Fusion Centers 2009 Terrorism Risk Assessment
Report described student groups at Virginias historically black
colleges as potential breeding grounds for terrorism and
characterized the diversity surrounding a military base as a

possible threat.45
Fusion centers rely on racial profiling

Cyril 15 Staff writer for The Progressive (April 2015, Malkia Amala Cyril,
The Progressive, Black America's State of Surveillance,

http://www.progressive.org/news/2015/03/188074/black-americas-statesurveillance)
They will use fusion centers. Originally designed to increase interagency
collaboration for the purposes of counterterrorism, these have instead
become the local arm of the intelligence community. According to
Electronic Frontier Foundation, there are currently seventy-eight on record.
They are the clearinghouse for increasingly used suspicious activity
reportsdescribed as official documentation of observed behavior
reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other
criminal activity. These reports and other collected data are often stored in
massive databases like e-Verify and Prism. As anybody whos ever dealt with
gang databases knows, its almost impossible to get off a federal or
state database, even when the data collected is incorrect or no
longer true.
Predictive policing doesnt just lead to racial and religious profiling
it relies on it . Just as stop and frisk legitimized an initial, unwarranted
contact between police and people of color, almost 90 percent of whom turn
out to be innocent of any crime, suspicious activities reporting and the
dragnet approach of fusion centers target communities of color. One
review of such reports collected in Los Angeles shows approximately 75
percent were of people of color.
This is the future of policing in America, and it should terrify you as
much as it terrifies me. Unfortunately, it probably doesnt, because my life is
at far greater risk than the lives of white Americans, especially those
reporting on the issue in the media or advocating in the halls of power.
One of the most terrifying aspects of high-tech surveillance is the invisibility
of those it disproportionately impacts.
Fusion centers guarantee profiling will continue post-plan

Constitution Project 12 The Constitution Project (8/15/12, The
Constitution Project, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUSION CENTERS,

http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/fusioncenterreport.pdf)
2. Reports of Political, Racial and Religious Profiling
Despite these constitutional principles, there have been numerous anecdotal
reports of incidents in which fusion centers have targeted individuals in the
United States for surveillance and investigation based solely on beliefs and
characteristics that are protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Although federal guidance to fusion centers cautions against profiling, these
incidents demonstrate that significant additional guidance, training and
oversight are crucial to ensure that fusion centers and other law enforcement
agencies do not engage in racial, religious and political profiling.41
Recent reports from across the country bear testament to the

potential for problematic profiling at fusion centers, particularly
regarding bulletins and intelligence reports circulated by fusion
centers. These are a few examples:
The February 2009 Prevention Awareness Bulletin, circulated by a
Texas fusion center, described Muslim lobbying groups as providing
an environment for terrorist organizations to flourish and warned that
the threats to Texas are significant.
The bulletin called on law enforcement officers to report activities such as
Muslim hip hop fashion boutiques, hip hop bands, use of online social
networks, video sharing networks, chat forums and blogs.42
A Missouri-based fusion center issued a February 2009 report describing
support for the presidential campaigns of Ron Paul or third party candidates,
possession of the iconic Dont Tread on Me flag and anti-abortion activism
as signs of membership in domestic terrorist groups.43
The Tennessee Fusion Center listed a letter from the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) to public schools on its online map of
Terrorism Events and Other Suspicious Activity. The letter had
advised schools that holiday celebrations focused exclusively on
Christmas were an unconstitutional government endorsement of
religion.44
The Virginia Fusion Centers 2009 Terrorism Risk Assessment
Report described student groups at Virginias historically black
colleges as potential breeding grounds for terrorism and
characterized the diversity surrounding a military base as a
possible threat.45
Fusion centers do what they want

German and Stanley 7, German is on the Policy Counsel for National
Security, ACLU Washington Legislative Office; Stanley is the Public Education

Director, ACLU Technology and Liberty Program (December 2007, Michael
German and Jay Stanley, American Civil Liberties Union, WHATS WRONG
WITH FUSION CENTERS?,
https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf)
Ambiguous Lines of Authority. The participation of agencies from
multiple jurisdictions in fusion centers allows the authorities to
manipulate differences in federal, state and local laws to maximize
information collection while evading accountability and oversight
through the practice of policy shopping.
Private Sector Participation . Fusion centers are incorporating privatesector corporations into the intelligence process, breaking down the arms
length relationship that protects the privacy of innocent Americans who are
employees or customers of these companies, and increasing the risk of a
data breach.
Military Participation . Fusion centers are involving military personnel in
law enforcement activities in troubling ways.
Data Fusion = Data Mining . Federal fusion center guidelines encourage
whole sale data collection and manipulation processes that threaten privacy.
Excessive Secrecy . Fusion centers are hobbled by excessive secrecy,
which limits public oversight, impairs their ability to acquire essential
information and impedes their ability to fulfill their stated mission, bringing
their ultimate value into doubt.
Their inherently local nature makes regulation impossible

ONeil 8 political science graduate student at the University of California
Los Angeles (UCLA) Previously, iobhan served as the analyst for domestic
security and intelligence at the Congressional Research Service (CRS). She
spent five years working in homeland security serving as the deputy chief of
the Intelligence Bureau of the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and
Preparedness (OHSP) (April 2008, Siobhan, Homeland Security Affairs, The
Relationship between the Private Sector and Fusion Centers: Potential Causes
for Concern and Realities, https://www.hsaj.org/articles/134)
Given that fusion centers are entities established by states and
localities to serve their own law enforcement, emergency response, and
homeland security needs, and compounded by the sensitivities
associated with federalism, the federal government is in a difficult
position of balancing its interests and respecting the local nature of
fusion centers. As such, the federal government has been
understandably hesitant to place requirements on fusion centers.
Instead, federal agencies have produced guidelines, which have not
been compulsory, to include the National Strategy for Information
Sharing and Fusion Center Guidelines. 8 While these documents address
some of the tactical and operational concerns related to fusion centers, they
are often vague to a fault and fail to provide the comprehensive
vision for fusion centers as part of the nations homeland security
posture.
Failure to create a consensus on the role, structural requirements,
and responsibilities for fusion centers is apt to increase the
potential for ineffectiveness, which threatens the viability of fusion
centers. If fusion centers fail to demonstrate their worth and strengthen and
augment our nations homeland security efforts, political support and
external agency engagement with these centers is likely to decline.
Moreover, potential civil liberties abuses could damage fusion centers
credibility and undermine their public support. It has rightfully been warned
that even rumors of impropriety and civil liberties abuses associated with a
single fusion center can cause irreparable damage to the reputation of all
fusion centers nationwide. This would be unfortunate given the potential for
fusion centers to provide public safety and homeland security benefits to
both local communities and the nation.
Fusion centers arent under federal jurisdictionlocalities

wont enforce rules
Price 13, Michael Price serves as counsel for the Brennan Centers Liberty
and National Security Program (12/10/13, Michael Price, Brennan Center for
Justice, National Security and Local Police,
https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/national-security-local-police)
The Brennan Center has identified three major reasons the system is
ineffective:
Information sharing among agencies is governed by inconsistent rules and

procedures that encourage gathering useless or inaccurate information. This
poorly organized system wastes resources and also risks masking crucial
intelligence.
As an increasing number of agencies collect and share personal data on
federal networks, inaccurate or useless information travels more widely.
Independent oversight of fusion centers is virtually non-existent,
compounding these risks.
Oversight has not kept pace, increasing the likelihood that
intelligence operations violate civil liberties and harm critical policecommunity relations.
According to a report by the Government Accountability Office, 95 percent of
suspicious activity reports are not even investigated by FBI. This is
unsurprising. In the past, police departments shared information only when
there was reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. This time-tested
standard ensured that police were focused on real threats and not acting on
their own biases or preconceptions. But with this crucial filter removed after
the attacks of 9/11, almost any behavior from photographing a landmark,
to stretching in the park, to attending a mosque can be viewed as
potentially suspicious, reported, and shared with thousands of other
government agencies. It is impractical to sift through and follow up on every
report, so important information can easily fall through the cracks. In some
instances, the practice has also undermined community trust in the police,
which is an essential element of domestic counterterrorism.
Efforts by the federal government to address this oversight gap have
been half-hearted. The system is not under federal government
control. Federal funds simply flow to state legislatures, which then
allocate them as they see fit no questions asked. State and local
governments have rarely stepped into the breach, allowing
intelligence activities to go unchecked and unsupervised .
FBI NSLs Module

The FBI can circumvent via national security letters
Sanchez 15
(Julian Dont (Just) Let the Sun Go Down on Patriot Powers, May 29, 2015,
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/dont-just-let-the-sun-go-down-on-patriot-powers)
Also permanent are National Security Letters or NSLs, which allow the FBI to obtain a more
limited range of telecommunications and financial records without even needing to seek
judicial approval. Unsurprisingly, the government loves these streamlined tools, and used
them so promiscuously that the FBI didnt even bother using 215 for more than a
year after the passage of the Patriot Act. Inspector General reports have also made clear that
the FBI is happy to substitute NSLs for 215 orders when even the highly
accommodating FISC manages a rare display of backbone. In at least one case, when
the secret court refused an application for journalists records on First Amendment grounds,
the Bureau turned around and obtained the same data using National Security
Letters.
Case- Legal Reform Fails

One step reforms such as curtailing bulk data collection
are just drops in the bucket- Islamophobia is a persistent
ideology infecting American politics, which requires
changes that predate any policies
Kundnani 2014 [Arun, (Professor of Terror Studies and Media @ NYU), "No NSA reform can fix
the American Islamophobic surveillance complex," The Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/28/nsa-reform-american-islamophobic-surveillancecomplex, Accessed 7/13/15, AX]
Better oversight of the sprawling American national security apparatus

may finally be coming: President Obama and the House Intelligence Committee unveiled plans this
week to reduce bulk collection of telephone records. The debate opened up by
Edward Snowden's whistle-blowing is about to get even more legalistic than all the parsing of hops and
These reforms may be reassuring, if sketchy. But for those

living in so-called "suspect communities" Muslim Americans, left-wing
campaigners, "radical" journalists the days of living on the receiving end of
excessive spying wont end there. How come when we talk about spying we don't talk about
the lives of ordinary people being spied upon? While we have been rightly outraged at
the government's warehousing of troves of data, we have been less
interested in the consequences of mass surveillance for those most
affected by it such as Muslim Americans. In writing my book on Islamophobia and the
War on Terror, I spoke to dozens of Muslims, from Michigan to Texas and Minnesota to Virginia.
Some told me about becoming aware their mosque was under
surveillance only after discovering an FBI informant had joined the
congregation. Others spoke about federal agents turning up at
colleges to question every student who happened to be Muslim. All of
them said they felt unsure whether their telephone calls to relatives
abroad were wiretapped or whether their emails were being read by
government officials. There were the young Somali Americans in Minnesota who
described how they and their friends were questioned by FBI agents
for no reason other than their ethnic background. Some had been
placed under surveillance by a local police department, which disguised
its spying as a youth mentoring program and then passed the FBI intelligence on
Somali-American political opinions. There were the Muslim students
at the City University of New York who discovered that fellow students they had
befriended had been informants all along, working for the New York Police Department's
Intelligence Division and tasked with surveilling them. There was no
stores and metadata.
reasonable suspicion of any crime ; it was enough that the targeted

students were active in the Muslim Students Association. And then
there was Luqman Abdullah, a Detroit-based African-American imam,
whose mosque was infiltrated by the FBI, leading to a 2009 raid in
which he was shot and killed by federal agents. The government
had no evidence of any terrorist plot ; the sole pretext was that
Abdullah had strongly critical views of the US government. These are
the types of people whom the National Security Agency can suspect of being
two "hops" away from targets. These are the types of "bad guys" referred to
by outgoing NSA director Keith Alexander. Ten years ago, around 100,000
Arabs and Muslims in America had some sort of national security file
compiled on them. Today, that number is likely to be even higher. A study published last year by
the Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition documented the effects
of this kind of mass surveillance. In targeted communities, a culture
of enforced self-censorship takes hold and relationships of trust
start to break down. As one interviewee said: "You look at your closest friends
and ask: are they informants?" This is what real fear of surveillance
looks like: not knowing whom to trust, choosing your words with
care when talking politics in public, the unpredictability of state
power. Snowden has rightly drawn our attention to the power of what intelligence
agencies call "signals intelligence" the surveillance of our digital
communications but equally important is "human intelligence", the
result of informants and undercover agents operating within
communities. Underpinning all the surveillance of Muslim Americans
is an assumption that Islamic ideology is linked to terrorism. Yet, over
the last 20 years, far more people have been killed in acts of violence by
right-wing extremists than by Muslim American citizens or
permanent residents. The huge numbers being spied upon are not
would-be terrorists but law-abiding people , some of whom have "radical" political
opinions that still ought to be protected by the First Amendment to the constitution. Just the same, there
are plenty of other minority Americans who are not would-be "home-grown" terrorists but they still live in
let's reform the NSA and its countless

collections. But let's not forget the FBI's reported 10,000
intelligence analysts working on counter-terrorism and the 15,000
paid informants helping them do it. Let's not forget the New York
Police Department's intelligence and counter-terrorism division with
its 1,000 officers, $100m budget and vast program of surveillance.
Let's not forget the especially subtle psychological terror of being
Muslim in America, where, sure, maybe your phone calls won't be stored for
much longer, but there's a multitude of other ways you're always
being watched.
fear that they might be mistaken as one. So
Aff cant solve Anti-Arab sentiment is entrenched in

mainstream media and history which is why any legal
reform will fail
Salaita 6 Steven George Salaita, scholar, author and public speaker,
received his B.A. in political science from Radford University in 1997, his M.A.
in English from Radford in 1999, and completed his Ph.D. at the University of
Oklahoma in Native American studies with a literature emphasis, became an
assistant professor of English at University of Wisconsin in Whitewater, where
he taught American and ethnic American literature until 2006, associate
professor of English at Virginia Tech, won a 2007 Gustavus Myers Outstanding
Book Award for writing the book Anti-Arab Racism in the USA: Where It
Comes from and What it Means for Politics Today, 2006 (9/11, Anti-Arab
Racism, and the Mythos of National Pride, Beyond Orientalism and
Islamophobia, Fall, Available online at

https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new_centennial_review/v006/6.2salaita.pdf)
My second observation that anti-Arab racism is not confined to the political
right also is worth analysis. Racism, as writers from Elizabeth Cook-Lynn to bell hooks have
illustrated, is never limited to particular social or discursive movements,
nor is it ever rooted in consistent sites of cultural or linguistic
production. Any comprehensive survey of popular opinion in the
United States over the past decade (a time frame that purposely straddles 9/11) will
demonstrate that the blatant anti-Arab racism of the political right
is, using a vocabulary appropriate to specific political agendas, reinscribed continually in
the discourse , or at least the ethos, of mainstream and progressive
media . For instance, leftist liberal publications such as Dissent, Tikkun, and MoveOn.org
have been guilty of expressing racist attitudes either in the form of support for
Palestinian dispossession or by totalizing all Arabs and Muslims as potential terrorists; or the racism arrives
A similar guilt is shared by

mainstream (supposedly liberal) publications such as the New York Times,
Newsweek, Los Angeles Times, and Slate.com, which, given their corporate
obligations, cannot realistically be expected to attack anti-Arab
racism when it is so fundamental to the interests of American
capitalism (and to the survival of the publications). Of major concern to this essay is the recognition
that, in keeping with the seminal work of Louis Althusser and Terry Eagleton, we cannot
seriously interrogate racism by attributing it solely to one political
ideology without analyzing how the racism is interpolated through a
multitude of discourses at the benefit of various ideologies. Beyond this
intercultural observation, we can say that anti-Arab racism has specific historical
dimensions that render it unique even as it has been an inheritor of
countless tensions and anxieties. Some of those dimensionstravel narratology,
Orientalist scholarship, imperialismhave been discussed by others in some detail; the dimension
I invariably find most interesting is the relationship of anti-Arab
racism with settler colonization, both in the New World and Holy
Land. This relationship indicates that a centuries-old Holy Land
mania in the United States not only facilitated what Cook-Lynn
(2001) calls anti-Indianism, but has allowed the antiIndianism to
evolve into support for a new Messianic conquest that positions
todays Arabs in a fascinating theological continuum . If Natives were the first
victims of racism in North America, then Arabs, the new schematic evildoers, are
subtly by precluding Arabs from speaking on their own behalf.
merely the latest to be the first.
Case- Internal Link Defense
1NC
The aff is woefully inadequate to address the deep-rooted
anti-Muslim bias rooted in the US psyche, discourse, and
policyquestion the effectiveness of the affirmatives
method
Ali 12 [Yaser, Managing Attorney at Yaser Ali Law and J.D at University of California, Berkeley - School
of Law, Shariah and CitizenshipHow Islamophobia Is Creating a Second-Class Citizenry in America, 8-12012, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4176&context=californialawreview]
One would assume that anti-Muslim sentiment reached its high

water mark after 9/11. To the contrary, however, it has increased
dramatically in the third phase of Islamophobia, which began during
President Obamas 2008 campaign . If Volpps contentions about Muslims
being relegated to second-class citizenship were true in 2002, then
today that distinction has crystallized even further.136 Whereas a
vast majority of the incursions in the second phase occurred under
the umbrella of national security, Islamophobia has now evolved
beyond simply encouraging profiling and other surveillance
techniques aimed at Muslims under the professed interests of
national security. An institutionalized version of Islamophobia in this
third phase now focuses on the "creeping threat of Shariah" and, in
the process, more explicitly threatens the foundational conceptions
of citizenship described by Professor Bosniak. Further, while citizens enjoy some
fundamental level of respect for their individual beliefs and
practices, this is no longer the case with regard to Muslims, both in
journalism and politics today. Whereas it is widely recognized as socially
unacceptable to be openly disparaging toward minority groups, the
privilege reflected in that norm is increasingly denied to Muslims . In
third phase of Islamophobia , mainstream discourse now explicitly
challenges the notion that American Muslims deserve the same
liberal notions of rights that other citizens enjoy. One might surmise that since
the contours of this phase cannot easily be demarcated, the third
phase is in fact a difference in degree rather than in kind. It is true
that unlike the transition from the first to the second phase, there is
no single demonstrable event or tipping point that represents the
transition from the second to third period; however, there was a
this
gradual progression that increased in intensity since the

presidential campaign of 2008 when the term "Muslim" was actually
converted into a slur , as political opponents "accused" then-Senator Obama of secretly being
a Muslim. The suggestion that a Muslim citizen would be less suited for
office represents the deep-seated fear and mistrust of Muslims in
the American consciousness . President Obama's opponents recognized this fact and knew
that it would be a powerful tool for discrediting him. Yet what was perhaps most striking about the
"allegations" was not the partisan claims themselves, but the responses that President Obama and other
Obama felt compelled to reject the "accusations,"

doing his best to distance himself from the Muslim community and
choosing not to make any campaign stops in mosques or meet with
any Muslim organizations during the campaign (despite making numerous stops
government leaders offered.
at churches and synagogues). President Obama did not state, that although he was not a Muslim, there
was nothing wrong with Muslims per se. Instead,
he reiterated the bias by referring
to the accusations on his website as a "smear."
Further, during one campaign
rally, his aides asked two young Muslim women dressed in headscarves to exit the stage area where he
would be speaking. Arguably, the pervasiveness of such insidious discourse from the President helped
normalize the notion to the public that American Muslims are not
"citizens," but indeed "others ."
No federal modeling internal linklocal law enforcement

models regional agenciesour ev is comparative
Burruss et al 12 [George W. Burruss has a Ph.D. in Criminology & Criminal Justice at Southern
Illinois University Carbondale, Joseph A. Schafer has a Ph.D from Michigan State in Social Science (Criminal
Justice), Matthew J. Giblin, an associate professor and undergraduate program director in the Department
of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Melissa R. Haynes, Member
of the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Homeland Security in Small Law Enforcement
Jurisdictions: Preparedness, Efficacy, and Proximity to Big-City Peers, September 2012,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/239466.pdf]
Respondents were asked a range of questions designed to assess

the extent to which institutional pressures influenced their
approaches to homeland security. The measures address factors that
are independent of any one person in the organization; that is, they
focus on the influence of other agencies, professional associations,
and publications without addressing who within the organization
was specifically affected by these factors .10 Table 8 reports the results of
a number of questions measuring whether agency practices were
influenced by the actions of their peers. In evaluating their own
homeland security performance, 25.8 percent of respondents
indicated they paid significant attention to other agencies like their
own . An additional 59.8 percent of agencies paid some attention to similar agencies. Less than one
percent of responding agencies reported that they paid no attention to similar agencies in evaluating their
homeland security performance. Participating agencies were asked to what extent their agency modeled
homeland security policies and practices after other agencies that they viewed as successful. The majority
of agencies indicated they did engage in such modeling often (35.3 percent) or occasionally (54.9 percent).
Other sources of institutional pressure are professional associations and relevant publications. In
defining homeland security practices and approaches agencies might

be influenced by the resources offered by these other entities.
Respondents were asked to rate the influence of four sources of
influence on a three-point scale from not at all influential (0.0) to
very influential (2.0). Peer agencies were reported to be the most
influential . Strong influence was also indicated for professional associations and government
publications. Journal articles and books were the least influential, with an average rating between
somewhat influential and not at all influential. Grant programs and other funding opportunities were
generally less influential. In relative terms, federal and state grant funding for equipment and training were
most influential. Private or community funding sources were least influential in formulating homeland
security approaches and practices.
Case- Squo Solves

Squo solves, Federal govt already expanding rules, but
local law enforcement is not
Apuzzo 14, Matt Apuzzo(U.S. to Expand Rules Limiting Use of Profiling by
Federal Agents,January 16,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/16/us/politics/us-to-expand-rules-limitinguse-of-profiling-by-federal-agents.html?_r=0, Accessed 6/21/15)
The Justice Department will significantly expand its definition of
racial profiling to prohibit federal agents from considering religion ,
national origin, gender and sexual orientation in their investigations, a
government official said Wednesday. The move addresses a decade of criticism
from civil rights groups that say federal authorities have in
particular singled out Muslims in counterterrorism investigations
and Latinos for immigration investigations. The Bush administration
banned profiling in 2003, but with two caveats: It did not apply to
national security cases, and it covered only race, not religion,
ancestry or other factors. Since taking office, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. has been
under pressure from Democrats in Congress to eliminate those provisions. These exceptions
are a license to profile American Muslims and Hispanic-Americans,
Senator Richard J. Durbin, Democrat of Illinois, said in 2012. President George W. Bush said in 2001 that
racial profiling was wrong and promised to end it in America. But that was before the terrorist attacks of
Sept. 11. After those attacks, federal agents arrested and detained dozens of Muslim men who had no ties
to terrorism. The government also began a program known as special registration, which required tens of
thousands of Arab and Muslim men to register with the authorities because of their nationalities. Putting
an end to this practice not only comports with the Constitution, it would put real teeth to the F.B.I.s claims
that it wants better relationships with religious minorities, said Hina Shamsi, a national security lawyer
with the American Civil Liberties Union. It is not clear whether Mr. Holder also intends to make the rules
apply to national security investigations, which would further respond to complaints from Muslim groups.
Adding religion and national origin is huge, said Linda Sarsour, advocacy director for the National
Network for Arab American Communities. But if they dont close the national security loophole, then its
really irrelevant. Ms. Sarsour said she also hoped that Mr. Holder would declare that surveillance, not just
traffic stops and arrests, was prohibited based on religion. The Justice Department has been reviewing the
Mr. Holder
disclosed his plans in a meeting on Wednesday with Mayor Bill de
Blasio of New York, according to an official briefed on the meeting
who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the conversation
was private. Mr. de Blasio was elected in November after running a
campaign in which he heavily criticized the Police Departments
stop-and-frisk tactic, which overwhelmingly targets minorities and
which a federal judge declared unconstitutional. The mayor and
attorney general did not discuss when the rule change would be
announced, the official said. A senior Democratic congressional aide, however, said the Obama
administration had indicated an announcement was imminent. The Justice Department
would not confirm the new rules on Wednesday night but released a short statement
saying that the mayor and the attorney general discussed
preventing crime while protecting civil rights and civil liberties. In
the past, Mr. Holder has spoken out forcefully against profiling. Racial
rules for several years and has not publicly signaled how it might change them.
profiling is wrong, he said in a 2010 speech. It can leave a lasting scar on communities and individuals.
And it is, quite simply, bad policing whatever city, whatever state. Officials in the Bush administration
made similar statements, however, which is why civil rights groups have eagerly waited to hear not just
Mr. Holders opinion, but also the rules he plans to enact. As written ,
the Justice
Departments rules prohibit federal agents from using race as a
factor in their investigations unless there is specific, credible
information that makes race relevant to a case. For example, narcotics
investigators may not increase traffic stops in minority neighborhoods on the belief that some minorities
They can, however, rely on information from

witnesses who use race in their descriptions of suspects. The rules
cover federal law enforcement agencies such as the F.B.I. They do
not cover local or state police departments. That is significant
because Muslim groups have sued the New York Police Department
over surveillance programs that mapped Muslim neighborhoods ,
photographed their businesses and built files on where they eat,
shop and pray. Mr. Holders comments about the new racial profiling rules came up in a
are more likely to sell drugs.
conversation about that topic, the official said. William J. Bratton, the citys new police commissioner, has
While the rules directly control only federal

law enforcement activities, their indirect effect is much broade r, said
Fahd Ahmed, the legal director of the Queens-based South Asian
immigrant advocacy group Desis Rising Up and Moving. For instance,
he said, immigration bills in Congress have copied the Justice
Department profiling language. And civil rights groups can use the rules to pressure state
said he will review those practices.
and local agencies to change their policies. Federal guidelines definitely have an impact, Mr. Ahmed
said.
Local organizers can say, These policies are not in line with
whats coming from the federal level.
Case- State Good vs no plan
Notes
See also cede the political K
1NC Anti-Statism Bad

Results matters failure to have a course of action for mobilizing
populations dooms the alt. EVEN if they win their ethics claims, you
have to evaluate the question of alt solvency first.
Day 9
(Christopher, The Historical Failure of Anarchism: Implications for the Future
of the Revolutionary Project,
http://mikeely.files.wordpress.com/2009/07/historical_failure_of_aanarchism_c
hris_day_kasama.pdf)
The strength of anarchism is its moral insistence on the primacy of human freedom over
political expediency. But human freedom exists in a political context. It is not sufficient,
however, to simply take the most uncompromising position in defense of
freedom. It is neccesary to actually win freedom. Anti-capitalism doesnt do the
victims of capitalism any good if you dont actually destroy capitalism. Anti-statism
doesnt do the victims of the state any good if you dont actually smash the
state. Anarchism has been very good at putting forth visions of a free society and that is for the
good. But it is worthless if we dont develop an actual strategy for realizing those
visions. It is not enough to be right, we must also win.
Continues
Finally revolutionaries have a responsibility to have a plausible plan for making
revolution. Obviously there are not enough revolutionaries to make a revolution
at this moment. We can reasonably anticipate that the future will bring upsurges in popular
opposition to the existing system. Without being any more specific about where those
upsurges might occur it seems clear that it is from the ranks of such upsurges that the numbers
of the revolutionary movement will be increased, eventually leading to a revolutionary situation
(which is distinguished from the normal crises of the current order only by the existence of a
revolutionary movement ready to push things further). People who are fed up with the existing
system and who are willing to commit themselves to its overthrow will look around for
likeminded people who have an idea of what to do. If we dont have a plausible plan for
making revolution we can be sure that there will be somebody else there who
will. There is no guarantee that revolutionary-minded people will be
spontaneously drawn to anti-authoritarian politics. The plan doesnt have to be an
exact blueprint. It shouldnt be treated as something sacred. It should be subject to constant
revision in light of experience and debate. But at the very least it needs to be able to answer
questions that have been posed concretely in the past. We know that we will never confront the
exact same circumstances as previous revolutions. But we should also know that certain
problems are persistent ones and that if we cant say what we would have done in the past we
should not expect people to think much of our ability to face the future.
The 1ACs approach to criticizing Western governments

only re-creates the problem it attempts to solve
Berger 14 (Lars Berger, Associate Professor in International Security with a
PhD in Political Science from the Friedrich-Schiller University of Jena in
Germany, The Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism and the
Domestic War on Terror, by Arun Kundnani, March 27 2014,
https://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/books/the-muslims-are-comingislamophobia-extremism-and-the-domestic-war-on-terror-by-arunkundnani/2012227.article) //mL
One of the central themes in Arun Kundnanis critique of what he describes as the domestic war on terror
in the UK and the US is the apparent neglect of, or even taboo against, discussing the role played by the
foreign policies of Western governments in bringing about the horrific acts of violence witnessed on the
Kundnani, a US-based scholar of terrorism, is

adamant that what governments call extremism is to a large
degree a product of their own wars. However, there are a number
of theoretical and methodological problems with his account. Kundnani is
streets of London in July 2005 and May 2013.
right to highlight methodological concerns about existing studies of Islamist radicalisation, many of which
rely on a small number of cases and fail to include control groups of people who share radical ideologies
but nevertheless choose not to engage in political violence. But this is not a new insight. Indeed,
researchers across Europe have already published plenty of insightful critiques of the theoretical
Worse, Kundnani
commits the same mistakes when he presents no theoretical
justification for his choice of case studies, and fails to explain why
the vast majority of Muslims who disagree with the Western foreign
policies he sees as potential root causes have not become engaged
in political violence. If we look at public opinion polls from across the
Muslim world, including Muslim communities in the West, support for violence
against Western civilians stands, on average, at between 5 and 10
per cent. But if Kundnanis assertions are correct, this number should
be much higher, given that in some Muslim countries, overwhelming
majorities of up to 90 per cent criticise the policies of the US and the
West. In fact, it is not perceptions of US foreign policies with respect to Israel or
Middle Eastern petroleum resources that shape approval of terrorist violence
against US civilians, but the rejection of US culture and some of its
most prominent manifestations, such as freedom of expression. This
assumptions and methodological approaches of the radicalisation literature.
finding may go against the conventional wisdom that Kundnani seems to wish to repackage here as his
it is quite comprehensible in light of the groundbreaking

analysis of anti-Americanisms by scholars Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane,
in which they differentiate between a view that assesses US foreign
policies on their own terms and a view that regards those same
policies as reflecting the fundamentally evil nature of US society .
But there is a danger that Western governments, in an
attempt to address the cacophony of voices typical of the
decentralised, pluralistic religious discourses in many (Sunni) Muslim
communities around the world, can end up telling Muslims what the
correct interpretation of Islam is. But once again, these are issues that
have also already received considerable academic attention, with
plenty of excellent analysis ranging from peer-reviewed publications
to countless undergraduate essays. In short, Kundnanis critique of hostility towards
own insights, but
Muslims by some Western media and politicians and of Western governments interaction with their Muslim
communities is convincing, although not wholly original. His highly ideological insistence on the link
between Western foreign policies and Islamist terrorism is neither.
1NC Consequentialism
Moral absolutism creates tunnel vision and error
replication focus on consequences is a pre-requisite to
ethical decisionmaking
Isaac 2
(Jeffrey C. Isaac, professor of political science at Indiana-Bloomington,
director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from
Yale, Spring 2002, Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, Ends, Means, and
Politics, p. Proquest
As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an
unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political
responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a
kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see
that the purity of ones intention does not ensure the achievement
of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common
cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right
thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view
them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of
their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and
injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is
often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the
standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially
immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain
violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much
about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the
effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most
significant. Just as the alignment with good may engender impotence, it is often the
pursuit of good that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the
twentieth century: it is not enough that ones goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always,
to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically
contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers.
It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
*MECHANISM DEFENSE
SPECIFIC
Notes
Nothing on the embrace Terror version- its..
embracing terrorism
Mosques stuff is covered by the FBI circumvention module
Strict Scrutiny
1NC
1. Their Love evidence indicates Muslims do not have
the political power in the status quo to file suits no
reason why having a more strict standard will mean
they will be able to suddenly file lawsuits
2. Strict scrutiny wont solve courts will affirm
government actions in the name of national security
Meyler 08 (Bernadette Meyler, scholar of British and American constitutional law and of law
and the humanities, Leah Kaplan Visiting Professor in Human Rights, Religious Expression in
the Balance: A Response to Murad Hussain's Defending the Faithful, The Yale Law Journal,
3/21/08, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/religious-expression-in-the-balance-a-responseto-murad-hussains-defending-the-faithful, al)
Courts have, however, in the aftermath of September 11, been notoriously willing to affirm
government actions taken in the name of national security even when they deploy a strict scrutiny
standard. The district and circuit court opinions in Tabbaa v. Chertoffa case Hussain discusses that involved
American citizens re-entering the United States from a Muslim conference in Canadaprovide striking examples of this
tendency. The district court, in a move that the Second Circuit affirmed, did, in fact, apply strict scrutiny in evaluating the
plaintiffs claims under RFRAbut still ruled in favor of the government. Granting substantial deference to the
government with regard to its role in policing the countrys boundaries, the district court maintained that the IDSO
[Intelligence Driven Special Operation] inspections were the least restrictive means of furthering the governments
[compelling] interest in protecting its borders. Similarly, according to the Second Circuits opinion, given the intelligence
the government received, subjecting . . . [c]onference attendees to enhanced processing at the borderincluding
fingerprinting and photographingwas a narrowly tailored means of achieving the governments compelling interest in
protecting against terrorism. If strict scrutiny itself does not entail more rigorous examination of the explanations that
the government provides for its actions in this and similar situations , the prospect of outcomes favoring civil
liberties appears rather bleak. National security, guarding against terrorism, and the protection of
the borders may be construed as compelling state interests even if plaintiffs construct hybrid claims, and
tailoring that is narrow in name alone may be accepted by the courts. Let us not forget that one of the most reviled
results in Supreme Court jurisprudencethat in Korematsu v. United Statesemerged out of an
application of strict scrutiny.
3. Right wing judges means strict scrutiny will be

circumvented
Greenwald, 2014
(Glenn is a constitutional Lawyer and an author of a best selling book on politics and Law called No Place to
Hide. Congress is Irrelevant on Mass surveillance. Here is what matters instead..
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/11/19/irrelevance-u-s-congress-stopping-nsas-mass-surveillance/.
Date Accessed- 7/15/15. Anshul Nanda)
U.S. federal judge already ruled that the NSAs

domestic bulk collection program likely violates the 4th Amendment ,
and in doing so, obliterated many of the governments underlying
justifications. Multiple cases are now on appeal, almost certainly headed to the Supreme Court.
None of this was possible in the absence of Snowden disclosures. For a variety of reasons, when it
comes to placing real limits on the NSA, I place almost as little faith
in the judiciary as I do in the Congress and executive branch. To begin
with, the Supreme Court is dominated by five right-wing justices on
whom the Obama Justice Department has repeatedly relied to
endorse their most extreme civil-liberties-destroying theories. For
U.S. court proceedings. A
another, of all the U.S. institutions that have completely abdicated their role in the post-9/11 era, the
federal judiciary has probably been the worst, the most consistently
subservient to the National Security State. Courts have no power

over agencies
2NC
Their only solvency evidence specific to strict scrutiny
concludes that preventing terrorism is a compelling
state interest and thus still passes strict scrutiny only
the most overt forms of islamophobia will end but covert
islamophobia will continue because there is no proof of
intent that can be taken to court.
Extend that the courts will circumvent strict scrutiny
thats Meyler after 9/11 courts have been willing to
affirm actions in the name of security even with strict
scrutiny empirically proven with cases such as
Korematsu v. United States
Strict scrutiny fails racial profiling that has a compelling
state interest passes it
Johnson 4 [Kevin Johnson, is the Dean of the UC Davis School of Law. Before becoming a professor,
he was a student at Harvard Law School where he served as an editor of the Harvard Law Review, Spring
2004, Racial Profiling after September 11: the Department of Justice's 2003 Guidelines, Loyola Law
Review, http://academic.udayton.edu/race/06hrights/waronterrorism/racial06.htm] //dickies
The Justice Department guidelines are remarkably sparse about the proper consideration of race in the
case of national security and border integrity. They state that: [I]n investigating or preventing threats to
national security or other catastrophic events (including the performance of duties related to air
law
enforcement officers may not consider race or ethnicity except to
the extent permitted by the Constitution and laws of the United
States. The guidelines further suggest that airport screeners and other law
enforcement authorities may rely on race because a compelling state
interest (national security) justifies the racial classification and thus
survives strict scrutiny. The guidelines recognize that the Supreme
Court requires that all racial classifications be subject to strict
scrutiny.
transportation security), or in enforcing laws protecting the integrity of the Nation's borders, Federal
AT: Civil suits solve

Love indicates that Muslims dont have the polical power
to file suits no reason why setting a new standard solves
Civil suits are empirically ineffective against federal
officers
Mike Wagner, 2009 [Mike Wagner, AB, Villanova University; JD, The George Washington
University. Mike Wagner is an associate in the Washington office of Covington & Burling LLP, where he
counsels government contractors on issues arising at all phases of the public procurement process and
handles complex white collar investigations involving allegations of fraud and corruption. Prior to joining
Covington, he served as a law clerk on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland. A graduate of GW Law, he was an Articles Editor on the George
Washington Law Review and received the 2010 Scribes Law Review Writing Award for best student-written
article. November 2009, Warrantless Wiretapping, Retroactive Immunity, and the Fifth Amendment. The
George Washington Law Review, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 204. JC]
Carr v. United States, n103 another case rejecting a due process challenge to a
law immunizing a defendant from tort liability, is likewise unpersuasive
because it too involved a case in which the prospective elimination of a cause
of action. The plaintiff in Carr, a federal employee , was injured in a car
accident due to the driving of his colleague, also a federal employee, in 1965.
n104
The plaintiff initiated a civil suit against his co-worker, but the
Federal Drivers' Act of 1961 abrogated any civil suits against
federal employees acting within the scope of their employment and
substituted the United States in their place. n105 The plaintiff challenged
the abrogation of his cause of action as a violation of the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, but the Fourth Circuit rejected this argument: "The
accident occurred over four years after the enactment of the Drivers Act.
Therefore, ... [the plaintiff] had no interest entitled to constitutional
protection." n106 Just as in Ducharme, due process concerns were not
implicated because the plaintiff's cause of action, which accrued after the
adoption of the immunity provision, was abrogated prospectively by statute.
This distinction is crucial to understanding why the laws were upheld in
Ducharme and Carr but not in Ettor or Richmond Screw. In light of this
precedent, the importance of determining whether FISAA acts
retroactively or prospectively is plain. If the causes of action
eliminated by FISAA had accrued prior to its passage, then FISAA
would operate retroactively and the plaintiffs' property would be
eligible for due process protections . Because tort actions generally
accrue at the time of injury, n107 the cause of action in the suits abrogated by
FISAA accrued when the NSA, with the help of AT&T and other
telecommunications firms, began improperly monitoring the plaintiffs'
telephone and Internet lines soon after the September 11 [*220] attacks. n108
Thus, as Professor Anthony Sebok explains, by the time Congress passed
FISAA several years later, the plaintiffs' claims had already vested.
MORE CARDS
Doesnt solve- empirics prove 1/3 of the attempts fail
Winkler 2006 [Adam (Professor @ UCLA School of Law), "Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An
Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts," Vanderbilt Law Review,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/198950724/fulltextPDF/E2E5ED94185E4CE5PQ/1?accountid=10422,
ProQuest, AX]
This Article contributes to this debate by offering
a systematic empirical study of strict
scrutiny in the federal courts. Reporting the results of a census of every strict scrutiny
decision published by the district, circuit, and Supreme courts between
1990 and 2003, this study shows that strict scrutiny Is far from the
inevitably deadly test imagined by the Gunther myth and more closely resembles the contextsensitive tool described by OConnor. Courts routinely uphold laws when applying
strict scrutiny, and they do in every major arena of law in which they
use the test. Overall, 30 percent of all applications of strict scrutiny
nearly one in threeresult in the challenged law being upheld. Rather than fatal in
fact, strict scrutiny is survivable in fact.
End Racial Profiling
1NC
The End Racial Profiling Act is unnecessary and too
broad.
FOP nodate, world's largest organization of sworn law enforcement officers, S. 989/H.R. 2074,
the "End Racial Profiling Act", Fraternal Order of Police, http://www.fop.net/legislative/endrpact.shtml,
fwang
The legislation unnecessarily defines and bans so-called "racial

profiling." The United States Supreme Court has already made it very clear that "the Constitution prohibits
selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as
race," and that "the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
discriminatory application of the laws is the Equal Protection Clause ."
Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Further, as one Court of Appeals has explained, "citizens are
entitled to equal protection of the laws at all times. If law
enforcement adopts a policy, employs a practice, or in a given situation, takes steps to initiate an
investigation of a citizen based solely upon that citizen's race,
without more, then a violation of the Equal Protection Clause has
occurred ." United States v. Avery , 137 F.3d 343, 355 (6th Circuit 1997). The United States
Constitution itself prohibits "racial profiling," making Federal
legislation defining or prohibiting such activity unnecessary . The
legislation's definition of "racial profiling" is far too broad . The bill
prohibits the use of race "to any degree" in selecting individuals to
be subject to even the most routine investigatory action, excepting
only those situations in which race is used "in combination with
other identifying factors when the law enforcement agent is
seeking to apprehend a specific suspect whose race, ethnicity or national origin is part of the description of the
suspect." (emphasis added). This means that, absent an eyewitness or other description of a
specific suspect's race or ethnicity, law enforcement officers can
never use race as a factor even if it would help them to identify a suspect. The
proposed legislation would therefor ban a whole range of activities
beyond the already unconstitutional, purely race-based activity . The
legislation would also apply to Customs and immigration-related enforcement activities, as well as criminal law enforcement efforts.
Judicial Action Fails

Courts misunderstand how police surveillance is
conducted and cant act effectively without future
legislation
Rushin, 13 --- Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Illinois College of
Law (Fall 2013, Stephen, Brooklyn Law Review, The Legislative Response to
Mass Police Surveillance, 79 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, Lexis,)
[*24] II. THE LAW OF POLICE SURVEILLANCE Traditionally, courts have shied away from
regulating police surveillance in public spaces. This is because the courts
have operated under a set of jurisprudential assumptions of police
surveillance. These jurisprudential assumptions were reasonable in the past because of the limited technological
efficiency of previous surveillance technologies. In Jones, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to confront these
jurisprudential assumptions in light of modern technology. A majority of the justices indicated that these jurisprudential
the Court
did not alter these doctrinal assumptions in any way, nor did they offer
much indication on how they may alter these assumptions in the
future. Thus, after the Jones decision, the law of police surveillance
today is as incoherent as ever. I have previously argued that the digitally efficient investigative
assumptions were increasingly unsupportable in today's digitally efficient world of policing. n118 But
state does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment, based on the presence of these jurisprudential assumptions, n119 but
dicta in the concurrences of the Jones case imply that these jurisprudential assumptions may not exist for much longer.
Even so, there is no clear indication how the Court could establish a
default rule that both narrowly limits some uses of digitally efficient
technologies without adversely affecting other non-invasive,
legitimate uses. In this section, I evaluate the doctrinal basis for the traditional jurisprudential assumptions
about police surveillance. I then spend considerable time analyzing the dicta in the Jones case to predict how the Court
while the Court will likely make

some effort to rein in the digitally efficient investigative state in the
future, any regulation will be limited in capacity . The regulation will
almost certainly rely upon an often-ineffective enforcement tool like
the exclusionary rule. Thus, even if the judiciary is institutionally
may respond to these technologies in the future. I conclude that,
capable of controlling the digitally efficient investigative state, the

legislature must also take a proactive role in any future regulation .
Judicial oversight fails --- non enforceable, extremely high

standards, and executive privilege
Dalal 14 --- JD Yale Law School, BS University of Pennsylvania (Anjali S,
Michigan State Law Review, SHADOW ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM

AND THE CREATION OF SURVEILLANCE CULTURE, 2014 Mich. St. L. Rev. 59,
Lexis)
1. Judicial Intervention
The Church Committee, reflecting on the Keith decision, emphasized the
importance of judicial intervention in the national security arena when it
reminded the public that warrantless wiretapping "had been permitted by
successive presidents for more than a quarter of a century without 'guidance
from the Congress or a definitive decision of the Courts.'" n308 Unfortunately,
there are three barriers to judicial intervention that facilitate shadow

administrative constitutionalism in the national security arena: the lack of
judicially enforceable rights, the standing hurdle, and the growth of executive
privilege.
a. Judicially Enforceable Rights
By the time the Civiletti Guidelines were issued in 1980, the DOJ made
eminently clear that the Attorney General Guidelines were "solely for the
purpose of internal Department of Justice guidance" n309 and would
otherwise be legally binding. Specifically, the Guidelines made clear that
"[t]hey are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any
rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any
manner, civil or criminal." n310 Such rights-limiting language prevents any
injured party from using the governing document of the FBI to enforce the
self-imposed limitations on the Bureau's power.
[*129] b. The Standing Hurdle
The lack of judicially enforceable rights is not, however, the only problem.
Those who might bring a First Amendment claim based on the surveillance
authorized by the Attorney General Guidelines face immense difficulty simply
getting into court. n311One of the primary problems with surveillance is that
it has the power to coerce people into self-censorship--or chilled speech. This
makes surveillance, fundamentally, a First Amendment issue and a prime
subject for constitutional litigation. As our communications are increasingly
subject to the prying eyes of the government, our ability to speak freely is
directly curtailed. However, after the Supreme Court's decision in Laird v.
Tatum, litigants suing under the First Amendment theory of chilled speech are
subject to a high standing bar that, more often than not, prevents them from
having their case heard at all.
The first mention of the term "chill" in Supreme Court jurisprudence occurred
in 1952 in Wieman v. Updegraff, a case overturning an Oklahoma law that
required all state employees to take a loyalty oath denying all affiliation,
direct and indirect, with "any foreign political agency, party, organization or
Government, or with any agency, party, organization, association, or group
whatever which has been officially determined by the United States Attorney
General or other authorized agency of the United States to be a communist
front or subversive organization." n312 In an important concurrence, Justice
Frankfurter argued that the loyalty oath had "an unmistakable tendency to
chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate
and practice." n313 From that time to when the term "chilling effect" was first
used in Dombrowski v. Pfister n314 thirteen years later, Professor Frederick
Schauer argues that [*130] the term evolved from an "emotive argument
into a major substantive component of first amendment [sic]
adjudication." n315
However, after Laird v. Tatum, litigating on the basis of chilling effects has
become difficult. Tatum requires litigants to first prove that the surveillance in
question led to a cognizable harm before they will be granted standing and
further held that "the mere existence . . . of a governmental investigative and
data-gathering activity that is alleged to be broader in scope than is
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of a valid governmental
purpose" was simply not a cognizable harm. n316
As a result of Tatum, before an individual can bring a First Amendment claim

against FBI based on the authorizations of the Attorney General Guidelines,
she must first prove that she has been harmed by the often-secret
surveillance. n317 Because of the difficulty of first affirmatively identifying
that one is the subject of government surveillance in order to allege a
cognizable harm under the law, such litigation has been made increasingly
unlikely under Tatum.
For example, in 2005, The New York Times exposed the President's
Surveillance Program (PSP), a program developed after 9/11 that secretly
authorized the NSA to intercept "the international telephone calls and
international e-mail messages of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people
inside the United States without warrants over the past three years in an
effort to track possible 'dirty numbers' linked to Al
Qaeda." n318 "Additionally, the NSA told Congress that privileged
communications, such as those between an attorney and her client, would
not be 'categorically excluded' from interception." n319
This discovery led prominent civil rights organizations, including the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), to file [*131] lawsuits against the government
arguing that their speech was chilled because their communications were
likely targets of the surveillance program. n320 The ACLU filed on behalf of
itself and a group of journalists, scholars, and other organizations that
regularly communicate with likely targets of the PSP. n321 Importantly, none
of the plaintiffs had evidence that they were in fact the subject of NSA
surveillance. n322 This was a fact that only the government knew and would
not disclose. The Supreme Court held that, without this information, the
plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their case. n323
The standing barrier created by Tatum is especially problematic given the
nature of surveillance today. Surveillance today no longer presents viable
Fourth Amendment claims because so much of our most personal information
is mediated through third parties, and the third-party doctrine limits the
extent of Fourth Amendment protections. n324 While Justice Sotomayor's
concurrence in United States v. Jones provides some indication that this
doctrine may be up [*132] for reconsideration by the Supreme
Court, n325 until that time, the Fourth Amendment no longer provides a
powerful source of legal recourse against the growth of surveillance authority.
As a result, now, more than ever, the chilling effects doctrine must be revived
in order to provide a First Amendment backstop to the growing problem of
government surveillance.
c. Executive Privilege
As Professor Heidi Kitrosser describes, "A claim of executive privilege is
generally a claim by the President of a constitutional right to withhold
information." n326 It is a claim whose authority lies not in the text of the
Constitution or of any specific law, but rather in the "notion that some
information requests effectively infringe on the President's Article II powers,
threatening his ability to receive candid advice or to protect national
security." n327
Executive privilege as a means of obfuscation facilitates shadow
administrative constitutionalism by preventing judicial oversight. Professor
Jack Balkin first made this claim nearly ten years ago when he
argued that, increasingly we exclude more and more executive action
from judicial review on the twin grounds of secrecy and efficiency. . . . [A]n
independent judiciary plays an important role in making sure that zealous
officials do not overreach. If the executive seeks greater efficiency, this
requires a corresponding duty of greater disclosure before the fact and
reporting after the fact to determine whether its surveillance programs are
targeting the right people or are being abused. n328
The courts have not taken heed to his warning.
In the wake of the disclosure of the PSP, there was one case that survived the
extremely high standing bar set in Tatum. In Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation
v. Bush, an Islamic charity based in Oregon discovered that the government
inadvertently sent them classified documents demonstrating that their
communications were [*133] subject to warrantless surveillance. n329 With
proof that they were in fact subject to surveillance, Al-Haramain proceeded to
court. However, the government argued that the state-secrets privilege
prevented the introduction of the classified documents and permitted the
government to avoid acknowledging the existence of the surveillance
program. n330 Despite the fact that the classified information had already
been disclosed (and in seemingly direct conflict with the government's
otherwise settled third-party doctrine), the Ninth Circuit agreed with the
government's position. n331
The doctrinal barriers that prevent judicial intervention are significantly
harder to overcome than the failures that stymie intrabranch checks and
balances. This is in no small part due to the doctrine of stare decisis and the
value of having binding precedent. Even judges who recognize the problems
with the current system and wish to reassert their role in determining both
small-"c" and ultimately large-"C" constitutional meaning cannot. Judge
Colleen McMahon expressed her frustration with the state-secrets privilege in
a court opinion, saying, "I can find no way around the thicket of laws and
precedents that effectively allow the Executive Branch of our Government to
proclaim as perfectly lawful certain actions that seem on their face
incompatible with our Constitution and laws, while keeping the reasons for its
conclusion a secret." n332 As a result, without a major shift in the doctrine,
the judiciary will be limited in its ability to provide useful oversight.
Rushin admits that judicial action alone wont solve

Rushin, 11 --- PhD student at the University of California, Berkeley,
Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program (Fall 2011, Stephen, University of

Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy, THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO
MASS POLICE SURVEILLANCE, 2011 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol'y 281, Lexis,)
VI. Conclusion Neither judicial responses nor "legislative rulemaking is ...a panacea." n376 Even if the
judiciary successfully recognizes a remedy similar to that discussed
in this Article, the legislatures must play a critical role in developing
more nuanced and specific enactments to implement this
constitutional floor. The potential harms of the digitally efficient investigative state are real. There is
legitimate concern that the broad and integrated use of these
technologies can create a mass surveillance state. Central to this debate is the
proper role of the judiciary in regulating policy activity. Courts have previously relied upon an
often fragile dichotomy between technologies that merely improve
police efficiency and those that offer officers a new, extrasensory

ability. For the first time, the judiciary may be forced to limit the efficiency of
law enforcement technologies. Implicit in this action will be the
recognition that sometimes improvements in efficiency can be, quite
simply, so efficient as to be unconstitutionally harmful. Unregulated efficiency
can facilitate police wrongdoing, discrimination, and calumniate political dissenters. Unregulated efficiency in policing
technology undermines central protections and tenants of a democratic state.
The relationship
between efficiency of criminal investigations and privacy rights will
be a new frontier for the courts in the coming decades. The courts
should forcefully, but prudently, protect against the unregulated
efficiency of emerging investigative and surveillance technologies.
The judicial response offered in this Article would be but one more
example of the courts exercising their proper role as a limited but
effective policymakers.
SPOT (TSA Airports)
CX Questions
1AC Berry evidence:
When a Muslim like Azhar Usman gets onto the plane, faces fall.
Danger is imminent. The anxiety ends only when the plane
lands.People are almost thankful to the Muslim passenger for not
doing what they feared he might. Flying-while-Muslim thus becomes
an extremely public event
What does eliminating the SPOT program do about

that instance of Islamophobia?
1AC Huus evidence:
Thousands of people have been barred altogether from commercial air travel
without any opportunity to confront or rebut the basis for their inclusion, or
apparent inclusion on the no-fly list
What does the plan do to eliminate the no fly list?

How does the plan create a coalition between Muslims,
blacks, and other races? So youre telling me that getting
rid of SPOT will suddenly mean that Muslims go and talk
to black and Latino/a people and try to solve racism?
Your Kumar card says that Islamophobia shapes US
foreign policyhow does eliminating SPOT stop the US
from invading countries in the Middle East?
1AC Dickerson evidence:
If we consider what behavioral science tells us (or can't tell us), it looks like
we really need a new method for airport security checks.
If the 1AC gets rid of the SPOT system, what airport

security is left?
(If they say we still have scannersprove that patdowns from scanners
are also Islamophobic)
Agencies will use Racial Profiling

TSA still racially profiles outside the SPOT program
patdowns and scanners
Bahrampour 10
(Tara, 12/23/10, Washington Post, TSA scanners, pat-downs particularly

vexing for Muslims, other religious groups,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/12/22/AR2010122202919.html?
sid=ST2010122202299, 7/30/15, SM)
Ever since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, a trip to the
airport has been fraught for Muslims, who sometimes feel they are
being profiled as potential terrorists because of their religion . The
addition of full-body scanners, which many say violate Islam's
requirements of modesty, has increased the discomfort. Muslims aren't
alone in their antipathy toward the new security measures. Followers of other religions, including Sikhs and
some Orthodox Jews and evangelical Christians, also say the scanners and pat-downs make them
Muslim women have been

particularly reluctant to subject themselves to the scanners, which
reveal the contours of the human body in glaring detail . In Islam, "a
uncomfortable or breach the tenets of their faiths. But
woman's body and a man's body are both pretty much private," said Ikramullah, 29, who wears a head
scarf. "I choose to cover myself and dress in loose-fitting clothing so the shape of my body is not revealed
to everyone in the street." The other choice, an "enhanced" pat-down in which security agents touch
intimate body parts, was hardly more appealing, said the College Park resident. In recent years,
Ikramullah said, she has been pulled aside for
a milder version of the
pat-
downs almost every time she flies. The reason, she believes, is her
head scarf.
"It can be humiliating when you're standing there and people are walking by, seeing
you get the pat-down," she said. "You
just feel like you have a target on your

head." About 440 advanced imaging technology machines are in use in the United States, and there
are plans to increase that number to 1,000 - in roughly half the nation's security checkpoint lanes - by the
Opponents and civil libertarians have likened the scanning

to a virtual strip search, and it has caused some to rethink their holiday travel. "I've had a lot
end of 2011.
of Muslims, and particularly Muslim women, say they're going to put off travel plans as much as is humanly
possible because they just can't take the humiliation of it all," said Ibrahim Hooper, a spokesman for the
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). "They're tired of being singled out for their attire. We have
reports of Muslim women in tears." Earlier this year, the Fiqh Council of North America, a body of Muslim
full-body
scanners "a violation of clear Islamic teachings" that men and
women not be seen naked, adding that the Koran requires believers to "cover their private
jurists who interpret Islamic law for Muslims in North America, issued a ruling calling the
parts." But the alternative - the enhanced pat-down - has also posed problems for some, including Sikhs,
who wear turbans as part of their religious observance. Since 2007, people with "bulky" clothing, including
Muslim women in head scarves and Sikh men in turbans, have been required to undergo secondary
screenings involving pat-downs. Whether they are willing to go through the new scanners makes no
difference, according to the Transportation Security Administration. "Removal of all head wear is
recommended, but the rules accommodate those with religious, medical or other reasons for which the
passenger wishes not to remove the item," said Greg Soule, a TSA spokesman. If an officer cannot
"reasonably determine that the clothing or head covering is free of a threat item," passengers are referred
for additional screening, he said. People interviewed for this article emphasized that they understand the
importance of security for air travel, but some said the determination of what constitutes "bulky clothing"
is made subjectively, with a bias against religious headgear. "Somebody
could pass
through with a pair of loose pants that is definitely more bulky than
a head covering, but the head covering gets secondary screenings,"
said Ameena Mirza Qazi, deputy executive director and staff attorney for CAIR in Los Angeles, adding that
she has urged the TSA to revisit its policies. "The issue is whether it is being treated differently than other
items of clothing and why it is being treated differently," she said.
Alt cause for IslamophobiaTSA performs random

searches during securitytargets Muslims
Khan 13
(Azeem, 5/19/13, Huffington Post, Airport Profiling: A Familiar Story for
Muslims, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/azeem-khan/racial-profilingmuslim_b_3303582.html, 7/30/15, SM)
I went to Puerto Rico last weekend to celebrate a bachelor party for a friend of mine. On my way to the
airport I joked with my friend that I was going to be picked for a random search because that's what
happens to you when you have a Muslim name like I do. As I went through security, making sure to take all
of the items out of my pocket to go through the scanner, I decided I had gotten it all into those ugly plastic
bins. The official running the bags through the machine commented on my Yankees hat because he is a fan
himself. I was feeling like maybe I was going to get lucky today, and not be searched just because I'm
I walked through the metal detector. It

began to beep. I started to think to myself "here we go again." So I asked the TSA
brown. After he told me to have a nice day
official in front of me if my glasses had set off the machine. He

replied, "No, this is a random search ." What happened next was that I was brought
They proceeded
to open my bag, and go through everything in it while asking me what each
over to an area in front of everyone. I was told that my bag would be checked.
item was. It was hard not to give snarky responses when asked each question because it was just a duffel
bag filled with a bag of dirty clothes and damp board shorts. I knew there was nothing in there they would
find of interest, but it's not like voicing that to them would have been helpful at all. If anything, it would
have just brought me to a back room where I would get interrogated and probed further just because I
decided to stand up for myself. I have a huge issue with what happened that day.
And what
happens to me every single time I go to an airport . This was

supposedly a random search. But it wasn't a random search at all. It
was a "you're a Muslim" search. I'm tired of being told that it's a
random search every single time . I have fewer rights when I walk into an airport
because I'm brown. I always have to feel on edge because I know I'm being looked at suspiciously, and not
being I've done anything wrong, but because I'm one of the two million Muslims living in this country in a
My name is Azeem Khan. It's not James Williams.

That's why I got picked. It wasn't random. I understand that. So does the person
post 9/11 era. I get it.
telling me it's random.
TSA conducts full body pat-downs and physical inspection

of baggage for all passengers from 14 terrorism-prone
countries
Allen 10
(Mike, 1/3/10, Politico, US tightens international air security,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0110/31122.html, 7/30/15, SM)
All travelers flying into the U.S. from foreign countries will receive tightened random screening, and
100
percent of passengers from 14 terrorism-prone countries will be

patted down and have their carry-ons searched , the Obama administration
notified airlines on Sunday.
effect at midnight ,
The
more stringent Transportation Security Administration
rules , to take
follow the attempted Christmas Day bombing of a U.S.
airliner headed into Detroit from Amsterdam . These are changes that werent
widely in place for all carriers or countries on 12/24, a senior administration official told POLITICO. These
are sustainable measures that are a significant enhancement of our security posture. TSA will continuously
review these measures with our global aviation partners to ensure the highest levels of security."
All
passengers from countries on the State Departments State

Sponsors of Terrorism list plus all passengers from other
"countries of interest" such as Nigeria, Pakistan and Yemen will
receive full body pat-down and physical inspection of property , the
official said. The countries on the State Department list are Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria.
Other countries covered by the TSA directive are Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon,
Libya, Saudi Arabia and Somalia. A much higher percentage of all travelers from foreign
countries will receive such screening than is currently the case, the official said. "The screening could also
include explosive detection technology or advanced imaging technology where its available, the official
said. Kristin Lee of the TSA, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security, announced: "Today the
Transportation Security Administration issued new security directives to all United States and international
air carriers with inbound flights to the U.S. effective January 4, 2010. The new directive includes long-term,
sustainable security measures developed in consultation with law enforcement officials and our domestic
and international partners. In other words, there will be a new normal for international travel into the U.S.
The enhanced security measures apply to all international flights to U.S. locations, including both U.S.
and international carriers, the official said. All international passengers will be screened and the majority
of passengers will be screened using threat-based or random measures," the official said. These are
The
measures apply to all passengers with passports from or itineraries
through State Sponsors of Terrorism and countries of interest. This
designed to be sustainable measures that are a significant increase in our security posture."
goes beyond simply looking at passports and now looks at itineraries from and through countries of
interest, the official said. This is a significant step forward. Lee said in her statement: Because
effective aviation security must begin beyond our borders, and as a result of extraordinary cooperation
from our global aviation partners, TSA is mandating that every individual flying into the U.S. from
anywhere in the world traveling from or through nations that are State sponsors of terrorism or countries of
interest will be required to go through enhanced screening. The directive also increases the use of
enhanced screening technologies and mandates threat-based and random screening for passengers on
U.S. bound international flights."
The TSA has a no fly and a selectee list that targets

Muslimstheir evidence
Huus 11
(Kari, 9/13/11, Today, "Muslim Travelers Say They're Still Saddled with 9/11
Baggage", www.today.com/id/44334738/ns/today-today_news/t/muslimtravelers-say-theyre-still-saddled-baggage/#.VafqhnTWKF4, 7/31/15, SM)
The TSA is also required to conduct secondary screening according
to two lists the no-fly list and the selectee list , which are provided by
the Terrorism Screening Center, a division of the FBI. The screening center says there
are 16,000 individuals including about 500 U.S. citizens on the no-fly list,
which bars the individuals on it from flying to, from or within the
United States. Another 16,000 are on the selectee list, which triggers
secondary screening. Both are subsets of a consolidated watch list
called the Terrorism Screening Database of known or appropriately
suspected terrorists. The number of names in the database fluctuates, but at present it
names 420,000 individuals, about 2 percent of them Americans, the screening center says. The FBI
distributes relevant subsets of the database to different frontline agencies such as TSA, CBP, financial
watchdogs and law enforcers. Even people stopped for traffic violations can be quickly checked against the
list. Each agency must comply with the law, as well as its own policies and procedures to protect privacy
rights and civil liberties, the screening center said. The effectiveness of the lists came into question after
an attempted bombing of an airliner on Christmas Day 2009, when Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,
who was not on either watch list, tried to detonate plastic explosives on a flight from Amsterdam to
Detroit. Ultimately he hurt only himself, but the scare prompted the screening center to expand the criteria
it uses to populate the no-fly list. By design, none of the criteria that land an individual in the database or
on the watch lists is made public. People are put on the watch list based on a series of criteria, said
Sheldon Jacobson, a security expert and computer science professor at University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign. Nobody really knows them. They are very secret and they keep evolving. In many ways (the
government) has to keep it private because if they give it out, people will game the system. That secrecy
Some
of the cases involve mistaken identity because a traveler possesses
a common name like Mohammad the Arabic equivalent of Smith. As a result, some
civil rights lawyers believe that the lists affect two to three times as
many fliers as are legitimately on them. Marooned One of the most chilling cases
surrounding the no-fly list is that of Gulet Mohamed, a 19-year-old American citizen of Somali
presents a conundrum for many people who believe they are on a list and do not belong there.
heritage. Mohamed had been visiting family in Yemen and Somalia two countries with active Islamist
terrorist groups. When he went to the Kuwait airport to extend his visa in December, he was arrested and
taken to a detention facility, where he was blindfolded, questioned and beaten by unknown agents,
according to his lawyer, Gadeir Abbas. The questioners were especially interested in information about
Anwar al-Awlaki, a dual U.S. and Yemeni citizen turned Islamic extremist in Yemen, Abbas said. Mohamed
insisted he had no information and, after a week, Kuwait ordered his deportation. But when he tried to
board a flight to the United States, he was told he was on the no-fly list. Only after
Abbas filed a lawsuit on his behalf in January was Mohamed allowed to return home to Virginia. Mohamed
is pursuing a claim for damages and to be removed from the list. The federal government wants the case
thrown out on the grounds that it is irrelevant now that he is back in the U.S. Meantime, it will not confirm
if he is on the no-fly list. The lawsuit is pending, after a judge moved it to a circuit court on jurisdictional
grounds. Its this very Kafkaesque world where no one has charged (people on the list) with any crime
but they can see its effects, said Abbas, an attorney with CAIR. His case is the most heinous example
that Muslim American

travelers have encountered similar violations of their rights,
including some who were forced to take thousand-mile circuitous
land routes to get back into the U.S. or were stuck overseas for
weeks or months until lawyers here took up their cases.
of what the no-fly list can do. Other pending court cases allege
The aff does nothing The CBP, TSA, and ICE will still be
allowed to use racial profilingHorwitz 14
Sari Horwitz, covers the Justice Department and criminal justice issues nationwide for
The Washington Post, where she has been a reporter for 30 years, 12-5-2014, "Racial
profiling will still be allowed at airports, along border despite new policy," Washington
Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/racial-profiling-will-still-be-allowed-atairports-along-border-despite-new-policy/2014/12/05/a4cda2f2-7ccc-11e4-84d47c896b90abdc_story.html//SRawal
DHS officials pushed the White House and Justice Department to allow major
exclusions for prominent DHS agencies such as the TSA, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, and Customs and Border Protection,
officials said. CBP, for instance, will still be allowed to use racial
profiling when conducting inspections at the countrys ports of
entry and interdictions of travelers at the border, officials said .
Some DHS officials also questioned the Justice Departments
authority to set policies for a separate federal agency. DHS Secretary
Jeh Johnson made the case in a series of high-level meetings,
arguing that while his department did not condone profiling,
immigration and customs agents and airport screeners needed to
consider a variety of factors to keep the nation safe, according to
officials familiar with his personal efforts. TSA officials, meanwhile, argued
that they should not be covered by the new limits on the grounds
that the TSA is not a law enforcement agency. We tend to have a very
specific clientele that we look for, said one federal official involved in immigration enforcement, who spoke
In recent months,
on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. If you look at numbers, the vast majority of people we
deal with are Hispanic. Is that profiling, or just the fact that most of the people who come into the country happen to be
Hispanic?
Racial profiling in these agencies is still legally allowedMuslims will be targeted

Rhodan 14
Maya Rhodan, Web Reporter at Time Magazine, 12-8-2014, "New Federal

Racial Profiling Guidelines Worry Civil Rights Groups," TIME,
http://time.com/3623851/justice-department-racial-profiling-muslims-sikhsaclu//SRawal
But some carve-outssuch as screenings and inspections by the
Transportation Security Administration and U.S. Customs and Border
Protectionhave raised eyebrows among groups including the
American Civil Liberties Union, Muslim Advocates and the Sikh
Coalition. Its baffling that even as the government recognizes that
bias-based policing is patently unacceptable, it gives a green light
for the FBI, TSA, and CBP to profile racial, religious and other
minorities at or in the vicinity of the border and in certain national
security contexts, and does not apply the Guidance to most state and local law enforcement, said Laura
Murphy, the director of ACLUs Washington legislative office. Muslim Advocates, a faith-based legal and
educational advocacy organization, echoed those sentiments. While these changes
are welcome, a statement reads, it is difficult to see how the guidance will
improve the lives of law-abiding American Muslims who are singled
out and targeted based on their faith, not evidence of wrongdoing, by the FBI,
Customs and Border Protection, and other law enforcement
agencies. The Department of Justice guidelines do not apply to
activities conducted by military, intelligence or diplomatic personnel .
Border screening activities are also not covered, which has been of particular concern to civil rights groups. After 9/11,
sweeping counterterrorism efforts were imposed that led Arab and Muslim Americansand some perceived to be Muslim
or Arabic such as South Asians and Sikhsto feel singled out and profiled by the federal government. A 2009 ACLU and
Arabs, Muslims and South Asians have been

disproportionately victimized through various government
initiatives including FBI surveillance, questioning, airline profiling
and no-fly lists.
Rights Working Group report found that
No Enforcement
TSA regulation enforcement is ineffective- Sikh turbans
are still invasively searched despite better regulation
Leadership Conference 11
The Leadership Conference, coalition charged by its diverse membership of more

than 200 national organizations to promote and protect the civil and human rights of
all persons in the United States, The Reality of Racial Profiling,
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/racial-profiling2011/the-reality-ofracial.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/, 2011//SRawal
Individuals wearing Sikh turbans or Muslim head coverings are also

profiled for higher scrutiny at airports. In response to criticism from Sikh
organizations, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) recently
revised its operating procedure for screening head coverings at airports. The
current procedure provides that: All members of the traveling public
are permitted to wear head coverings (whether religious or not)
through the security checkpoints. The new standard procedures subject
all persons wearing head coverings to the possibility of additional security
screening, which may include a patdown search of the head covering.
Individuals may be referred for additional screening if the security
officer cannot reasonably determine that the head area is free of a
detectable threat item. If the issue cannot be resolved through a
pat-down search, the individual will be offered the opportunity to
remove the head covering in a private screening area.63 Despite this
new procedure, and TSA's assurance that in implementing it "TSA does not
conduct ethnic or religious profiling, and employs multiple checks and
balances to ensure profiling does not happen,"64 Sikh travelers report that
they continue to be profiled and subject to abuse at airports.65
Amardeep Singh, director of programs for the Sikh Coalition and a secondgeneration American, recounted the following experience in his June 2010
testimony before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil
Liberties of the House Judiciary Committee: Two months ago, my family and I
were coming back to the United States from a family vacation in Playa Del
Carmen, Mexico. At Fort Lauderdale Airport, not only was I subjected to
extra screening, but so was [my 18 month-old son Azaad]. I was sadly
forced to take my son, Azaad, into the infamous glass box so that he could
[be] patted down. He cried while I held him. He did not know who that
stranger was who was patting him down. His bag was also thoroughly
searched. His Elmo book number one was searched. His Elmo book number
two was searched. His minimail truck was searched. The time spent
waiting for me to grab him was wasted time. The time spent going
through his baby books was wasted time. I am not sure what I am going
to tell him when he is old enough and asks why his father and grandfather
and soon himAmericans all threeare constantly stopped by the TSA
100% of the time at some airports.
Program Not Racist, TSA Officers Are

The program is not inherently racist, the TSA officers are
that means that even if the plan passes, racist behavior
will still continue
Rockler 12
(Harmen, 8/20/12, Daily Orange, Report of TSA behavior shows racist
tendencies, http://dailyorange.com/2012/08/report-of-tsa-behavior-showsracist-tendencies/, 8/1/15, SM)
The Transportation Security Administrations attempt to observe
airline passengers behaviors while going through airport security
was revealed to be a cause for racial profiling this week. TSA officers at Logan
Airport in Boston told the New York Times the program has increasingly targeted minorities to search
instead of actual passengers who pose a threat. Racial profiling is not a solution to the security threat the
A security officer at the airport told the Times, They

just pull aside anyone who they dont like the way they look if
they are black and have expensive clothes or jewelry, or if they are
Hispanic. This is not what the intended goal of the program was . The
United States faces.
program was launched in 2011 as a trial, though behavior detection has been used at Logan since 2003.
TSA officers were supposed to have a casual conversation with

passengers after providing a boarding pass and ID , according to TSA
spokesman Greg Soule in the Times article. At the start of the program, Soule said, Officers are
specifically trained to keep questions purposeful and related to
detecting a passengers intent. This program is in no way related to
passengers race or ethnicity. What was found at Logan suggests the program has not
been about passengers behavior but their race. Some think we need to profile. Supporters of racial
profiling proclaim we shouldnt sacrifice our security for political correctness. Because the 9/11 hijackers
looked Middle Eastern, we need to heavily screen those who look similar. Law enforcement officers
instincts should be pursued so we can be safer. Not all terrorists who attack the United States have been
Muslim or even look Middle Eastern. White and nonwhite individuals have committed acts of terrorism on
U.S. soil. All individuals should be equally, fairly scrutinized at airport security because anyone could pose
a threat no matter his or her race. Trying to more heavily screen people who look Arabic is not only a
poor response to the actual threat posed, but it may do further damage to the ability of law enforcement to
protect us from actual threats. We risk alienating the people we need to help us. There is already a culture
of suspicion of Middle Easterners and Muslims caused by the way law enforcement behaves. Earlier this
year, the New York Police Department was found to be spying on Muslim student associations in U.S.
colleges (including Syracuse University) and cataloging mosques in New Jersey. This is one part of the law
enforcement system that may not be treating all citizens as equals. Accounting for other individual
characteristics like age may make more sense than racial profiling. A passengers age could be more useful
than race. The elderly and young children are less likely to pose a threat than others. We should not have
to resort to racial profiling at airports to make us safe.
The behavior detection program
at Logan is one among more than 100 airports that now use the
program. Officers should be trained to ensure race and behavior are
not confused.
Classifying certain races as more prone to attacking the U.S. is not an answer to the
threat we face.
The behavioral signs that TSA officers look for are not
inherently racistthe TSA officers are the ones who are
racist
Cohen 15
(Kelly, 3/27/15, Washington Examiner, TSA: Ordinary passenger behavior a

sign of terrorism, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/tsa-ordinarypassenger-behavior-a-sign-of-terrorism/article/2562165/section/elizabethwarren, 8/1/15, SM)
Regular people who call themselves "terrible travelers" may want to be careful. Many run-of-the-mill flyers
may be raising red flags without knowing,
according to the Transportation Security Administration's
controversial Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques ( SPOT) program. Under the program,
specially trained TSA

officers are deployed to watch and interact with passengers going
through security screening at airports, working off of a checklist of
signs provided by the SPOT program. The checklist, which isn't classified but
which is designed to pick out travelers who could be potential terrorists,
strongly protected by the agency, was obtained by the Intercept and the behavioral clues are,
Exaggerated yawning Excessive

complaints about the screening process Excessive throat clearing
Widely open staring eyes Wearing improper attire for location
Whistling as the individual approaches the screening process Gazing
down Exaggerated or repetitive grooming gestures Face pale from
recent shaving of beard Rubbing or wringing of hands
interesting. Signs You Might Be a Terrorist
Topicality Specific
T- Curtail vs Strict Scrutiny

A. CURTAIL REQUIRES THAT THE PLAN, ON FACE, REDUCES
SURVEILLANCE
Webster's 10 Webster's New World College Dictionary Copyright
2010 by Wiley Publishing, Inc., Cleveland, Ohio. Used by arrangement with
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. http://www.yourdictionary.com/curtail#websters
Curtail transitive verb
to cut short; reduce; abridge
B. THE PLAN DOES NOT CURTAIL ON FACE

Restrictions are direct governmental limitations
Viterbo 12 (Annamaria, Assistant Professor in International Law
University of Torino, PhD in International Economic Law Bocconi University

and Jean Monnet Fellow European University Institute, International
Economic Law and Monetary Measures: Limitations to States' Sovereignty and
Dispute, p. 166, AX)
In order to distinguish an exchange restriction from a trade measure, the Fund
chose not to give relevance to the purposes or the effects of the measure and to
adopt, instead, a technical criterion that focuses on the method
followed to
design said measure. An interpretation that considered the economic effects and purposes of the
measures (taking into account the fact that the measure was introduced for balance of payments reasons
or to preserve foreign currency reserves) would have inevitably extended the Fund's jurisdiction to trade
restrictions, blurring the boundaries between the IMF and the GATT. The result of such a choice would have
been that a quantitative restriction on imports imposed for balance of payments reasons would have fallen
within the competence of the Fund. After lengthy discussions, in 1960 the IMF Executive Board adopted
the distinctive feature of a

restriction on payments and transfers for current international transactions is "whether it
involves a direct governmental limitation on the availability or use of exchange
as such*.47 This is a limitation imposed directly on the use of currency in itself, for all
Decision No. 1034-(60/27).46 This Decision clarified that
purposes.
The plan does not curtail - Strict Scrutiny Standards may

curtail surveillance AFTER judicial ruling but it does not
have a direct effect of curtailing or restricting surveillance
C. THE AFFIRMATIVE INTERPRETATION IS BAD FOR DEBATE
Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash,
and their interpretation makes the topic too big.
Permitting reduction by effect is unlimiting. All sorts of
things affect surveillance. For example, the economy
affects government spending and budgeting for
surveillance, and just about everything affects the
economy.
D. T IS A VOTER because the opportunity to prepare
promotes better debating
T- Surveillance vs SPOT
A. Domestic surveillance is intelligence gathering on US
persons
Small 8
MATTHEW L. SMALL. United States Air Force Academy 2008
Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, Presidential Fellows
Program paper "His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic Surveillance, Civil
Liberties and Executive Power during Times of National Crisis"
http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Small.pdf
Before one can make any sort of assessment of domestic surveillance policies, it is first necessary to
narrow the scope of the term domestic surveillance. Domestic surveillance is a subset of
intelligence gathering. Intelligence, as it is to be understood in this context, is

information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been
collected, processed and narrowed to meet those needs (Lowenthal 2006, 2). In essence,
domestic surveillance is a means to an end; the end being intelligence. The intelligence
community best understands domestic surveillance as the acquisition of nonpublic
information concerning United States persons (Executive Order 12333 (3.4) (i)). With this
definition domestic surveillance remains an overly broad concept. This papers analysis, in terms of
President Bushs policies, focuses on electronic surveillance; specifically, wiretapping phone lines and
obtaining caller information from phone companies. Section f of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 defines
electronic surveillance as:
[T]he acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire
or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States person
who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States
person, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant
would be required for law enforcement purposes;
B. The SPOT program takes people out of line to

interrogate them; that is reactive, not proactive
intelligence gathering, so its not surveillance
and their interpretation makes the topic too big.
Including reactive profiling measures justifies every day
police activity being topical and expands the topic too
much
T- Curtail vs Countergaze
A. CURTAIL REQUIRES THAT THE PLAN, ON FACE, REDUCES
SURVEILLANCE
Webster's 10 Webster's New World College Dictionary Copyright
2010 by Wiley Publishing, Inc., Cleveland, Ohio. Used by arrangement with
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. http://www.yourdictionary.com/curtail#websters
Curtail transitive verb
to cut short; reduce; abridge
B. THE PLAN DOES NOT CURTAIL ON FACE

Countergaze increases surveillance- no scenario in which
this aff results in decrease or curtailment of domestic
surveillance
and their interpretation makes the topic too big. Allowing
any aff that discusses surveillance, even tangentially, is
unlimiting because it justifies affs that are the opposite
direction of the topic verb.
T-Its vs no plan
1NC
T Its
A. USFG is the government established in the constitution
US Legal 13 "Legal Terms, Definitions, and Dictionary"
http://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/
The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal
Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of
the States of US. The Federal government has three branches : i) the legislature, which is the US Congress,
ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of
separation of powers and checks and balances for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The
US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the
Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.
Its means belonging to

Oxford English Dictionary, 2013
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/100354?
redirectedFrom=its#eid
its, adj. and pron. Pronunciation: /ts/
A. adj. As genitive of the pronoun, now possessive adjective.
Of or belonging to it, or that thing (Latin ejus); also refl., Of or belonging
to itself, its own (Latin suus).The reflexive is often more fully its own, for
which in earlier times the own, it own, were used: see own adj. and pron.
B. pron. As possessive pronoun.
[Compare his pron.2] The absolute form of prec., used when no n. follows:
Its one, its ones. rare.
B. Plan violates- not a criticism of USFGs surveillance

C. The affirmative interpretation is bad for debate
and their interpretation makes the topic too big. There
are literally infinite actors of surveillance state
governments, foreign governments, schoolteachers, and
security guards. They dont have to defend USFG action,
but limiting critique to USFG surveillance is a necessary
check on topic explosion.
T- Substantial vs Mosque Outreach

A. Substantially refers to a full class or a broad range over
different classes
O'Connor 2 Justice OConnor delivered the opinion of the Court.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 001089 TOYOTA MOTOR
MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY, INC., PETITIONER v. ELLA WILLIAMS ON WRIT
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT [January 8, 2002] http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/001089.ZO.html
The Court of Appeals relied on our opinion in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., for the idea that a
class of manual activities must be implicated for an impairment to substantially limit the major life
activity of performing manual tasks. 224 F.3d, at 843. But Sutton said only that [w]hen the major life
activity under consideration is that of working, the statutory phrase substantially limits requires that
plaintiffs allege that they are unable to work in a broad class of jobs. 527 U.S., at 491 (emphasis
added). Because of the conceptual difficulties inherent in the argument that working could be a major
life activity, we have been hesitant to hold as much, and we need not decide this difficult question
today. In Sutton, we noted that even assuming that working is a major life activity, a claimant would be
required to show an inability to work in a broad range of jobs, rather than a specific job. Id., at 492.
But Sutton did not suggest that a class-based analysis should be applied to any major life activity other
than working. Nor do the EEOC regulations. In defining substantially limits, the EEOC regulations
only mention the class concept in the context of the major life activity of working. 29 CFR
1630.2(j)(3) (2001) (With respect to the major life activity of working[,] [t]he term substantially
limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training,
skills and abilities). Nothing in the text of the Act, our previous opinions, or the regulations suggests
that a class-based framework should apply outside the context of the major life activity of working.
B. Mosque outreach program violates- only cutting one

small subset of a very large range of Anti-Muslim FBI
practices is not substantial
Goldman et. al, 12
(Adam and Matt are editors for the Associated Press. NYPD Defends Tactics
Over Mosque Spying; Records Reveal New Details On Muslim Surveillance.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/24/nypd-defends-tacticsover_n_1298997.html. Date Accessed- 7/13/15. Anshul Nanda)
NEW YORK -- The New York Police Department targeted Muslim mosques
with tactics normally reserved for criminal organizations, according to
newly obtained police documents that showed police collecting the license plates of
worshippers, monitoring them on surveillance cameras and cataloging
sermons through a network of informants. The documents, obtained by The Associated Press, have
come to light as the NYPD fends off criticism of its monitoring of Muslim
student groups and its cataloging of mosques and Muslim businesses
in nearby Newark, N.J.The NYPD's spokesman, Paul Browne, forcefully defended the legality of
those efforts Thursday, telling reporters that its officers may go wherever the public goes and collect
intelligence, even outside city limits. The new documents, prepared for Police Commissioner Raymond
paid informants monitored conversations

and sermons inside mosques. The records offer the first glimpse of
Kelly, show how the NYPD's roster of
what those informants, known informally as "mosque crawlers,"

gleaned from inside the houses of worship. For instance, when a Danish newspaper
published inflammatory cartoons of Prophet Muhammad in September 2005, Muslim
communities around the world erupted in outrage. Violent mobs
took to the streets in the Middle East. A Somali man even broke into the cartoonist's
house in Denmark with an ax. In New York, thousands of miles away, it was a different story. Muslim
leaders preached peace and urged people to protest lawfully. Write letters to politicians, they said. Some
advocated
boycotting Danish products, burning flags and holding

rallies. All of that was permissible under law and protected by the First Amendment to the
Constitution. All was reported to the NYPD by its mosque crawlers and made its
way into police files for Kelly. "Imam Shamsi Ali brought up the topic of
the cartoon, condemning them. He announced a rally that was to take place on Sunday
(02/05/06) near the United Nations. He asked that everyone to attend if possible and reminded everyone
to keep their poise if they can make it," one report read. At the Muslim Center of New York in Queens, the
report said, "Mohammad Tariq Sherwani led the prayer service and urged those in attendance to
When one Muslim leader

suggested planning a demonstration, one of the people involved in the discussion
about how to get a permit was, in fact, working for the NYPD. "It seems horrible to me that
the NYPD is treating an entire religious community as potential
terrorists," said civil rights lawyer Jethro Eisenstein, who reviewed some of the documents and is
participate in a demonstration at the United Nations on Sunday."
involved in a decades-old class-action lawsuit against the police department for spying on protesters and
lawsuit is known as the Handschu case, and a court

order in that case governs how the NYPD may collect intelligence .
political dissidents. The
Eisenstein said the documents prove the NYPD has violated those rules. "This is a flat-out violation,"
Eisenstein said. "This is a smoking gun." Browne, the NYPD spokesman, did not discuss specific
investigations Thursday but told reporters that, because of the Handschu case, the NYPD operates under
stricter rules than any other department in the country. He said police do not violate those rules. His
statements were intended to calm a controversy over a 2007 operation in which the NYPD mapped and
photographed all of Newark's mosques and eavesdropped on Muslim businesses. Newark Mayor Cory
Booker said he was never told about the surveillance, which he said offended him. Booker and his police
director accused the NYPD of misleading them by not revealing exactly what they were doing. Had they
known, they said it never would have been permitted. But Browne said Newark police were told before and
the police commissioner, and

Mayor Michael Bloomberg have been emphatic that police only
follow legitimate leads of criminal activity and do not conduct
preventive surveillance in ethnic communities. Former and current law
after the operation and knew exactly what it entailed. Kelly,
enforcement officials either involved in or with direct knowledge of these programs say they did not follow
leads. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the
secret programs. But the documents support their claims. The effort highlights one of the most difficult
aspects of policing in the age of terrorism. Solving crimes isn't enough; police are expected to identify
would-be terrorists and move in before they can attack. There are no universally agreed upon warning
signs for terrorism. Terrorists have used Internet cafes, stayed in hostels, worked out at gyms, visited
travel agencies, attended student groups and prayed at mosques. So the NYPD monitored those areas. In
doing so, they monitored many innocent people as they went about their daily lives. Using plainclothes
officers from the squad known as the Demographics Unit, police swept Muslim neighborhoods and
catalogued the location of mosques. The ethnic makeup of each congregation was logged as police fanned
out across the city and outside their jurisdiction, into suburban Long Island and areas of New Jersey.
"African American, Arab, Pakistani," police wrote beneath the photo of one mosque in Newark.
Investigators looked at mosques as the center of Muslim life. All their connections had to be known. David
NYPD's top intelligence officer, wanted a source inside every

mosque within a 250-mile radius of New York, current and former officials said.
Though the officials said they never managed to reach that goal,
documents show the NYPD successfully placed informants or
undercovers - sometimes both - into mosques from Westchester County,
N.Y., to New Jersey. The NYPD used these sources to get a sense of the sentiment of worshippers
whenever an event generated headlines. The goal, former officials said, was to alert police to
potential problems before they bubbled up. Even when it was clear there were no
links to terrorism, the mosque informants gave the NYPD the ability to
Cohen, the
"take the pulse" of the community, as Cohen and other managers put it. When New
York Yankees pitcher Cory Lidle and his flight instructor were killed on Oct. 11, 2006, when their small
plane crashed into a Manhattan high-rise apartment, fighter planes were scrambled. Within hours the FBI
and Homeland Security Department said it was an accident. Terrorism was ruled out. Yet for days after the
event, the NYPD's mosque crawlers reported to police about what they heard at sermons and among
worshippers. (View the PDF documents on Danish cartoons, mosque targeting and summaries of plane
crash.) At the Brooklyn Islamic Center, a confidential informant "noted chatter among the regulars
expressing relief and thanks to God that the crash was only an accident and not an act of terrorism," one
report reads. "The worshippers made remarks to the effect that ìt better be an accident; we don't need
any more heat,'" an undercover officer reported from the Al-Tawheed Islamic Center in Jersey City, N.J. In
NYPD put cameras on light poles and trained them on

mosques, documents show. Because the cameras were in public space,
police didn't need a warrant to conduct the surveillance . Police also
wrote down the license plates of cars in mosque parking lot s,
documents show. In some instances, police in unmarked cars outfitted with
electronic license plate readers would drive down the street and
record the plates of everyone parked near the mosque , former officials
some instances, the
recalled. "They're viewing Muslims like they're crazy.
C. The affirmative interpretation is bad for debate

and their interpretation makes the topic too big. There
are literally infinite actors and programs of surveillance
state governments, foreign governments, schoolteachers,
and security guards. Only creating minimal change in one
subsect of surveillance creates an infinite number of
mechanisms to prepare for
--Losing arguments
*Capitalization PIC(okay
Richard)
1NC
Text: The United States federal government should
______________
Counterplan competes- it doesnt capitalize the term
federal government
Capitalizing the term federal government creates tacit
acceptance of state power
Lock 02
[Neil, State Your Terms!]
In English,
capital letters are not normally used for nouns, except for proper names and
However, it is conventional to use capital letters for
the names of establishment institutions and personages. Examples of such words
are government, king, parliament, president, state, church, pope. To dignify these words
with capital letters Government, President, State, Church, for example gives to the
reader an almost subliminal message of power, respect and even reverence. But, as
historians and lovers of freedom know, many of these organisations and individuals have
shown, by their actions, that they are not worthy of any such respect or reverence.
for the first word of a sentence.
And capitalization empowers state bureaucracy

Parkinson 03
[Rob Parkinson has 35 years of experience in management communications gained as a consultant, an
instructor, a manager, an editor and a writer in both government and the private sector. He has specialized
in briefings for senior executives for 15 years, including six years as the editor for the Deputy Minister of
Natural Resources, Government of Canada. In that capacity, he designed departmental standards for
executive documents that brought about dramatic improvements in the quality of briefing material
prepared for the Minister and the Deputy Minister. M.B.A from the University of Ottowa. Writing for
Results]
We often overuse capitals sometimes out of fear of offending important people, sometimes to show that a certain word is important to us.
, overuse of capitals, particularly when addressing outside readers, can

convey the image of a bureaucracy that is overawed by its own concepts and
processes.
However
Strong state bureaucracy makes genocide and war

inevitable
Martin 90
[Brian Martin, associate professor in Science, Technology and Society at the University of Wollongong, UPROOTING THE
WAR SYSTEM,, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw07.html)]
Is the state system really so bad? War is the most obvious indictment of the system, and this alone
should be enough to justify questioning the state. As wars have become more destructive, there is no
sign that any steps to re-examine or transform the state system are being taken by state elites. This
War is not simply a by-product of the state

system, to be moderated and regulated when it becomes too
should not be surprising.
dangerous to populations. Rather, war is part and parcel of the

state system, so the destructiveness of war makes little
difference. State elites (and many others) see the world as a statestructured world, and all action is premised on this
perspective. War is the external manifestation of state violence. Political
repression is its internal form. Political freedoms are not only at a
premium under military dictatorships and state socialism,
but are also precarious in the representative democracies,
especially in relation to 'national security.' One of the most telling
indictments of the state system is found in Leo Kuper's book Genocide. Kuper documents
the most horrific exterminations in this century, including the killing of the
Jews by the Nazis, the massacre of the Bangladeshis by the Pakistan army
in 1971 and the extermination in Cambodia beginning in 1975. What is damning of the
state system is the reluctance of governments (and of that assemblage of state actors, the
United Nations) to intervene against even the most well documented genocidal killing.
The reason for this reluctance is the concern for the autonomy of the state. In short,
maintaining the 'integrity' of the state system is more important for
state elites than intervening against genocide. There are

many other social problems caused, sustained or aggravated
by the state, including suppression of dissent, state support
for corporate elites, and the activities of spy agencies and secret police. These
problems stem essentially from the system of unequal power
and privilege which the state both is part of and sustains .
The state is not the only way to embody and sustain unequal power and privilege: it is a
particular way involving bureaucracies for administration
and military forces for defending against external and
internal enemies.

Islamophobia Negative - DDI 2015 SWS

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ISLAMOPHOBIA CASE NEG

America, some as South America).

Using the term America when referring to the United

my definition of immigrant includes all people of European descent,

American is placed as the native identity immigrants

Extensions- "AMERICA" PERPETUATES

FRONTLINE - RACE / ETHNICITY

the traditionally narrow conception of "America" in American studies

Until the early nineteenth

EXTENSIONS - RACE / ETHNICITY

the US is a recent minority in the hemisphere, and I

find Bauer's argument to be vitally important. I totally agree that

In response to the inverted logic

"America as US" discourse affects understanding of race

For the literary historian adopting a hemispheric, comparative, and

THE UNITED STATES IS DIFFERENT FROM

"America" is the entire Western Hemisphere

avoid using the term "American" or

"America" includes Canada, Mexico, South America

one should refer to United States of America lawyers as

Mexico and Canada are also part of America

it is often considered offensive to use the word

possible in referring to the various groups being discussed.

Using the term "America" causes ambiguity

beware ambiguous definitions of the

the ambiguity can create subsequent interpretative

it is almost always preferable to define the territory

UNITED STATES IS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

"United States" refers to "The United States of

AFF AT: America PIK

American is used in this Article to refer to the United States of

Use of the term is acceptable to avoid awkward grammar

"American" refers to the United States

America is acceptable for language economy

the word "America" to refer to the United

The term can be used despite problems

I consciously use the terms "America" and "American" in this article to

The disadvantages of the term Islamophobia are significant . Some of

use of the word Islamophobia on its

The key phenomenon to be addressed is arguably

the pertinence of the term Islamophobia for referring to

The word Islamophobia papers over other forms of

The most obvious disadvantage of the

term is that it is understood to be a phobia. As phobias are

of the term prevents either inadvertently or deliberately,

certain identifiable phenomenon was evident.26 In doing so , and in

2nc Language First

Conservative critics often

more likely to support acts of violence committed in their name if

Media analysts such

Normativity not only anesthetizes powerful actors, making it easier

The preoccupation with pretending to be policymakers

normative legal thought, as Robert Cover explained, takes place in a

What is missing in normative legal thought is any serious

normative legal thought is the

the normative appeal of normative legal thought

Penn Law Review, Vol. 139: 933, http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?

The ability of normative assertion to change the way we perceive

the purpose of the experiment was to see whether the

they went along with the

standard, liberal-coined civil rights

law injures the chances of people of color and solidifies racism. 45

Its legit they get 100% of the plan to generate offense