G.R. NO.

132197 : August 16, 2005]

ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, INC. and JUANITO KING & SONS,
INC., Petitioners, v.SPOUSES
GERRY
ONG
and
ELIZABETH
ONG, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In a Decision1 dated 6 January 1998, the Former First Division of the Court of
Appeals overturned the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, ruling instead that the MTC had
no jurisdiction over the subject complaint for unlawful detainer. This Petition
for Review prays for the reversal of the aforesaid Court of Appeals' Decision.
The case originated from a complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners
against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 2376, before the MTC of
Mandaue City, Branch I. In the complaint, petitioners alleged the fact of their
ownership of three (3) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. Petitioners likewise acknowledged
respondent Elizabeth Ong's ownership of the lots previous to theirs. On 26
January 1995, Atty. Joseph M. Baduel, representing Mandaue Prime Estate
Realty, wrote respondents informing them of its intent to use the lots and
asking them to vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. But
respondents refused to vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of
said lots, so petitioners alleged.
Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King and Sons, Inc. (petitioners) had
acquired the lands from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale made
on 23 March 1995. In turn, it appears that Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had
acquired the properties from the respondents through a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 14 July 1994. However, this latter deed of sale and the transfers
of title consequential thereto were subsequently sought to be annulled by
respondents in a complaint filed on 13 February 1995 before the Mandaue
RTC against Mandaue Prime Estate Realty. 2 Per record, this case is still
pending resolution.
Meanwhile, the MYC resolved the ejectment case on 24 April 1996, with the
decision ordering respondents to vacate the premises in question and to
peacefully turn over possession thereof to petitioners.

On appeal, the RTC rendered on 1 March 1997 a judgment affirming the

MTC's decision in its entirety.
On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a notice of appeal. However, on the
following day, they filed a motion for reconsideration.
On 23
course
motion
motion

June 1997, the RTC issued an Order which concurrently gave due
to respondents' notice of appeal filed on 8 May 1997; denied their
for reconsideration dated 9 May 1997, 3 and granted petitioners'
for immediate execution pending appeal.

In a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction filed with the Court of Appeals and
treated as aPetition for Review, the appellate court ruled that the MTC had
no jurisdiction over said case as there was no contract between the parties,
express or implied, as would qualify the same as one for unlawful detainer.
Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were set aside.
Petitioners then took this recourse via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The principal issues raised before this Court are: (i)
whether the RTC decision has already become final and executory at the time
the Petition for Review was filed; (ii) whether the allegations in the complaint
constitute a case for unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC; and,
(iii) whether petitioners, as registered owners, are entitled to the possession
of the subject premises.
We resolve the first argument to be without merit.
The following sequence of events is undisputed:
(1) On 1 March 1997, the RTC rendered the questioned decision affirming the
judgment of the MTC.
(2) On 28 April 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned
decision.
(3) On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
(4) On 9 May 1997, respondents filed likewise with the RTC a Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforementioned 1 March 1997 decision.

(5) On 23 June 1997, the RTC of Mandaue issued an Order denying

respondents' Motion for Reconsideration.
(6) On 9 July 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned 23
June 1997Order.
(7) On 24 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their motion
for an additional period of ten (10) days within which to file their Petition for
Review.
(8) On 30 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their Petition
for Review.
Petitioners assert that the Petition for Review was filed beyond the fifteen
(15)-day period for appeal. They theorize that the period started running on
28 April 1995, the date of receipt of the RTC decision, and ended on 13 May
1997. According to them, this reglementary period could not have been
interrupted by the filing on 9 May 1997 of theMotion for
Reconsideration because of the filing one day earlier of the Notice of Appeal.
This Notice of Appeal dated 8 May 1997, albeit the wrong mode of appeal,
expressly manifested their intention to file a Petition for Review to either the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.4
Petitioners further argue that respondents, after having filed the Notice of
Appeal which was given due course by the RTC, cannot take an inconsistent
stand such as filing a Motion for Reconsideration. Such filing, therefore, did
not toll the fifteen (15)-day period which started running from the date of
receipt of the RTC decision on 28 April 1997 and ended on 13 May 1997.
Respondents, in their Comment,5 submit that the filing of the Notice of
Appeal dated 8 May 1997 was improper, and as such did not produce any
legal
effect.
Therefore,
the
filing
of
the Motion
for
Reconsideration immediately on the following day cured this defect. The RTC
refused to subscribe respondents' position. It justified the denial of
the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the respondents had
already filed a Notice of Appeal. The Order dated 23 June 1997 stated:
On record is a Notice of Appeal by Certiorari filed by Defendants on May 8,
1997.
Likewise filed by Defendants on May 9, 1997 is a Motion for Reconsideration.

Considering the Notice of Appeal filed earlier which the court hereby
approves, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
The Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal being meritorious, is
GRANTED.6(Emphasis in the original.)
Strangely enough, the Court of Appeals passed no comment on this point
when it took cognizance of respondents' position and reversed the RTC. But
does this necessarily mean that the RTC was correct when it declared that
the Motion for Reconsideration was barred by the filing of the Notice of
Appeal,
no
matter
how
erroneous
the
latter
mode
was?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Rule 42 governs the mode of appeal applicable in this case. Sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. - - A party desiring to appeal
from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction may file a verified Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals,
paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket
and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and
furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the
petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's
motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon
proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other
lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of
fifteen (15) days only within which to file the Petition for Review . No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the
RTC, petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of
Appeals and not aNotice of Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider this
to have been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court
allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the
filing of the appellee's brief. Applying this rule contextually, the filing of
the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of
the defective Notice of Appeal.

Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for

Reconsideration and started to run again from the receipt of the order
denying the Motion for Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to File
the Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and the ten
(10)-day request for additional period, it is clear that respondents filed
theirPetition for Review on time.
Petitioners invoke to the ruling in People v. De la Cruz 7 that once a notice of
appeal is filed, it cannot be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for
reconsideration. The factual circumstances in the two cases are different.
De la Cruz is a criminal case, governed by criminal procedure. Section 3, Rule
122 of the Rules of Court provides that the proper mode of appeal from a
decision of the RTC is a notice of appeal and an appeal is deemed perfected
upon filing of the notice of appeal.
In the case at bar, a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals is the
proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC. Since the filing of the
notice of appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if no appeal was interposed.
Now on the second and more important issue raised by petitioners: whether
the Complaintsatisfies the jurisdictional requirements for a case of unlawful
detainer properly cognizable by the MTC.
The MTC considered itself as having jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint
and disposed of the same in favor of petitioners. Said ruling was affirmed by
the RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts and found the
complaint to be one not for unlawful detainer based on two (2) grounds,
namely: that the allegations fail to show that petitioners were deprived of
possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and that there
is no contract, express or implied, between the parties as would qualify the
case as one of unlawful detainer.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals.
The complaint for unlawful detainer contained the following material
allegations:
....

3. That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2, which is covered by T.C.T. No.
36466 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City, Lot No. 1-A which is covered
by T.C.T. No. 36467 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City and Lot No. 86A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36468 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue
City, all situated in the City of Mandaue. Copies of said Transfer Certificate of
Titles are hereto attached as Annexes "A", "B", and "C" respectively and
made an integral part hereof;
4. That defendant Elizabeth Ong is the previous registered owner of said lots;
5. That as the previous registered owner of said lots, defendant Elizabeth
Ong and her husband and co-defendant Jerry Ong have been living in the
house constructed on said lots;
6. That on May 6, 1995, plaintiffs, through the undersigned counsel, wrote
defendants a letter informing them or their intent to use said lots and
demanded of them to vacate said lots within 30 days from receipt of said
letter. Copy of said letter is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made an
integral part thereof;
7. That despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still
refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots
from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots;
8. That in unlawfully withholding the possession of said lots from the
plaintiffs, plaintiffs have suffered damages in the form of unearned rentals in
the amount of P10,000.00 a month
. . . .8
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well
as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint
and the character of the relief sought.9
Respondents contend that the complaint did not allege that petitioners'
possession was originally lawful but had ceased to be so due to the
expiration of the right to possess by virtue of any express or implied
contract.

The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals on the presence of a contract

as a requisite to qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer contradicts the
various jurisprudence dealing on the matter.
In Javelosa v. Court of the Appeals,10 it was held that the allegation in the
complaint that there was unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to
make out a case for unlawful detainer. It is equally settled that in an action
for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law.11
Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession
on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other
source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right
and is being withheld by defendant.12 In Rosanna B. Barba v. Court of
Appeals,13 we held that a simple allegation
that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is
sufficient.
Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that:
. . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse
to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from
plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots;14
is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case.
In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the registered
owners of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. By their
implied tolerance, they have allowed respondents, the former owners of the
properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to
respondents asking that the latter vacate the said lots. Respondents refused,
thereby depriving petitioners of possession of the lots. Clearly, the complaint
establishes the basic elements of an unlawful detainer case, certainly
sufficient for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC.
Respondents would like to capitalize on the requisites as cited in the case
of Raymundo dela Paz v. Panis.15 But the citation is a mere reiteration of Sec.
1, Rule 7016 of the Rules of Court. The case doesid not provide for rigid

standards in the drafting of the ejectment complaint. The case of Co Tiamco

v. Diaz17 justifies a more liberal approach, thus:
. . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible
entry and unlawful detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy.
Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature, for they involve
perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible
and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure should be carefully
avoided.18
Moreover, petitioners fail to mention any of the incidents of the pending case
involving the annulment of deed of sale and title over said property.
Petitioners know better than to question this in an ejectment proceeding,
which brings us to the nature of the action in this case.
Respondents insist that the RTC, and not the MTC, had jurisdiction over the
action, it being an accion reivindicatoria according to them, on the ground
that petitioners were constantly claiming ownership over the lands in the
guise of filing an action for ejectment. In theirComment,19 respondents
maintain that they occupy the subject lots as the legal owners. Petitioners,
on the other hand, are seeking recovery of possession under a claim of
ownership which is tantamount to recovery of possession based on alleged
title to the lands, and therefore is within the original jurisdiction of the RTC,
so respondents conclude.
This contention is not tenable.
The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of
real property. This differs from accion publiciana where the issue is the better
right of possession or possession de jure, and accion interdictal where the
issue is material possession or possession de facto. In an action for unlawful
detainer, the question of possession is primordial while the issue of
ownership is generally unessential.20
Neither the allegation in petitioners' complaint for ejectment nor the
defenses thereto raised by respondents sufficiently convert this case into
an accion reivindicatoria which is beyond the province of the MTC to decide.
Petitioners did not institute the complaint for ejectment as a means of
claiming or obtaining ownership of the properties. The acknowledgment in
their pleadings of the fact of prior ownership by respondents does not
constitute a recognition of respondents' present ownership. This is meant

only to establish one of the necessary elements for a case of unlawful

detainer, specifically the unlawful withholding of possession. Petitioners, in
all their pleadings, only sought to recover physical possession of the subject
property. The mere fact that they claim ownership over the parcels of land as
well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the ejectment case.
Even if respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for
ejectment, the conclusion would be the same for mere assertion of
ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not therefore oust the
municipal court of its summary jurisdiction.21This Court in Ganadin
v. Ramos22 stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of
possession, it does not matter if ownership is claimed by either party.
Therefore, the pending actions for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and
Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting of title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356
will not abate the ejectment case.
In Drilon v. Gaurana,23 this Court ruled that the filing of an action for
reconveyance of title over the same property or for annulment of the deed of
sale over the land does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the
forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale being that,
while there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry
case and the suit for annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights
asserted and the relief prayed for are not the same.24
In Oronce v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court held that the fact that respondents
had previously filed a separate action for the reformation of a deed of
absolute sale into one ofpacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage in the
same
Court of First Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy
of ejectment afforded by law to the plaintiff. Consequently, an adjudication
made in an ejectment proceeding regarding the issue of ownership should be
regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the land. The foregoing
doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or
material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and
not possession de jure.
The Court reiterated this in the case of Tecson v. Gutierrez26 when it ruled:

We must stress, however, that before us is only the initial determination of

ownership over the lot in dispute, for the purpose of settling the issue of
possession, although the issue of ownership is inseparably linked thereto. As
such, the lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is
merely provisional, and our affirmance of the trial courts' decisions as well,
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title
to the property, if and when such action is brought seasonably before the
proper forum.
The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a
collateral attack.
In Apostol v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court had the occasion to clarify this:
. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or
cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with
law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be
assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not
the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond
the power of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful
detainer.28
With the conclusion of the second issue in favor of petitioners, there is no
need to discuss the third assignment of error which is related to the second
issue.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 6 January 1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated 24
April 1996 of the Municipal Trial Court of Mandaue City REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Callejo,
Nazario, JJ., concur.
[G.R.

No.

102693.

Sr.,

Austria-Martinez,

September

23,

and

Chico-

1992.]

SPOUSES AGOSTO MUOZ AND ROSARIO MUOZ, SPS. JESSIE

(JESUS) CAGUIOA AND EMMA FUMAR, SPS. RICARDO LOPEZ AND

APOLONIA FABIAN, ZACARIA MARCELINO, MR. CRISANTO CLARIN,
MR. HONORIO YUMUL, MR. EDUARDO YUMUL, MRS. VICTORIA
CAYANAN,
MR.
ALEXANDER
FABIAN
AND
MR.
DIOSDADO
SANTOS, Petitioner, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND NICOLAS
P.
GARCIA, Respondents.
Public

Attorneys

Office,

for Petitioners.

Jose P. Bondoc for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; FORCIBLE ENTRY; DISTINGUISHED
FROM UNLAWFUL DETAINER. The summary actions for unlawful detainer
and forcible entry may be distinguished from each other, as follows: "a. In
forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from
the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth; while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the
defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by reason of the
termination of his right to the possession of the property under his contract
with the plaintiff (Dikit v. Icasiano, 89 Phil. 44). "b. In forcible entry, the law
does not require a previous demand for the defendant to vacate the
premises; but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must first make such
demand, which is jurisdictional in nature (Sec. 2; Medel v. Militante, 41 Phil.
44). "c). In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior
physical possession of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the
defendant; in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior
physical possession (Maddamu v. Judge, 74 Phil. 230; Aguilar v. Cabrera, 74
Phil. 666; Banayos v. Susana Realty, Inc., L-30336, June 30, 1976; Pharma
Industries, Inc. v. Pajarillaga, Et Al., L-53788, Oct. 17, 1980). "d. In forcible
entry, the one-year period is generally counted from the date of actual entry
on the land; in unlawful detainer, from the date of last demand (Sarona, Et.
Al. v. Villegas, Et Al., L-22984, Mar. 27, 1968) or last letter of demand (DBP v.
Canonoy, L-29422, Sept. 30, 1970; Calibayan v. Pascual, L-22645, Sept. 18,
1967; Racaza v. Susana Realty, Inc., L-20330, Dec. 22, 1966). (Regalado,
Florenz D., Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, 5th Revised Edition, pp. 503504)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MATTERS TO BE RESOLVED IN THE ACTION THEREFOR; RULE.
The questions to be resolved in an action for forcible entry are: First, who
had actual possession over the piece of real property? Second, was the
possessor ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint
by force, threat, strategy or stealth? And lastly, does the plaintiff ask for the

restoration of his possession? (Dizon v. Concina, Et Al., G.R. No. L-23756,

December
27,
1969).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECTS OF FAILURE TO ALLEGE THE TIME WHEN UNLAWFUL
DEPRIVATION TOOK PLACE. There was no mention in the complaint nor in
the position paper of the private respondent that he or his co-owners were in
prior possession of the property. There was an allegation that the property "is
presently tenanted" but it did not state when the tenant started to possess
the property. While it is true that possession of the tenant is possession of
the owner, the complaint failed to state that Loreta Garcia was in prior
possession of the property at the time of entry by the petitioners. And, while
the complaint stated that the petitioners obtained possession of the
premises through stealth, it failed to aver when this entry was accomplished
or when the private respondent learned of such entry. The failure of the
private respondent to allege the time when unlawful deprivation took place is
fatal because this will determine the start of the counting of the one year
period for the filing of the summary action of forcible entry. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, the action should either be accion publiciana or
reinvindicatoria in the Court of First Instance (nor Regional Trial Court)
(Sarona
Et.
Al.
v.
Villegas,
Et
Al.,
supra).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE CONVERTED TO UNLAWFUL DETAINER BY THE
FACT THAT A DEMAND WAS MADE TO VACATE THE SUBJECT PREMISE. The
respondent appellate court erred in holding that this case is one for unlawful
detainer. It failed to consider the basic distinction that in forcible entry,
possession is illegal at the inception while in unlawful detainer, possession is
legal until demand is made to recover such possession or until the possessor
does or fails to do an act which makes his continued possession of the
premises illegal. The fact that a demand was made by the private
respondent for the petitioners to vacate the subject premises cannot change
the nature of the latters possession of the property and convert the formers
action from forcible entry to one for unlawful detainer. The respondent
appellate court likewise erred in applying in this case the doctrine that "a
person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by the
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary
action for ejectment is proper remedy against them" because, as We have
said here, the possession by defendants was illegal at the inception as
alleged
in
the
complaint,
hence,
there
was
no
tolerance.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A PROPER ACTION TO CLAIM OWNERSHIP. If the private
respondent is indeed the owner of the premises and that possession thereof
was deprived from him for more than twelve years, he should present his
claim before the Regional Trial Court in an accion publiciana or an accion

reinvindicatoria and not before the Municipal Trial Court in a summary

proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if he is the owner,
possession of the property cannot be wrested from another who had been in
possession thereof for more than twelve (12) years through a summary
action for ejectment. "Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim
ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does
not responsibly address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a
forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of actual condition of
the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be
turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove
prior possession CAN recover such possession even against the owner
himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in
his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on
the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by
accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria. (German Management and
Services Inc. v. CA, 76216-17, September 14, 1988, 177 SCRA 495, 499)
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This case has its origin from a complaint 1 for unlawful detainer filed by
Nicolas P. Garcia (herein respondent) on August 15, 1988 before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Masantol-Macabebe, Masantol, Pampanga. The
complainant alleged that he is a co-owner of an agricultural land identified as
Lot No. 2790 of Subdivision Plan, Cad. 378-D, Macabebe, Cadastre, situated
in the Barrio of Caduang Tete (Saplad David) of the same municipality; that
he and his co-owners acquired the lot by succession from their deceased
father, Pedro B. Garcia who died on April 6, 1939; that the said lot is
tenanted by Loreto Garcia; that the defendants (herein petitioners)
constructed their houses on a portion of the lot without the knowledge and
consent of the owners; that he sent letters of demand on June 6, 1988 asking
the defendants to remove their houses from the lot within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the letters and that despite the demands made by him, the
defendants refused to vacate their houses (pp. 21-22, CA Records).
In their answer, (pp. 44-47, CA Records), the defendants denied the
allegations of Nicolas Garcia and alleged that the tenant, Loreto Garcia is
already deemed the owner of the land pursuant to P.D. 27. The answering
defendants also invoked the following alternative defenses, among others:
(1) lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Municipal Trial Court, the case being
an accion publiciana which is exclusively cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court; (2) no prior conciliation before the Lupong Tagapayapa; (3) misjoinder

of parties since defendants occupy lots distinct from each other; (4) that the
differently lots they are occupying form part of the shore of a navigable river
and partly the shoulder of a public road, hence, of public ownership; (5) that
they are farmworkers of the lot, and are entitled to security of tenure on the
land pursuant to Section 6 of RA 6657 and that they had erected their houses
and had continuously resided on the premises in issue since 1976 or for a
period of twelve years before the filing of the complaint.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
After the issues had been joined, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court heard the
case under the Rules on Summary Procedure and decided the case on the
basis
of
the
position
papers
of
the
parties.
On December 7, 1988, the municipal court rendered a decision in favor of
the plaintiff Nicolas
Garcia, the dispositive portion of which
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1) The defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to remove
their houses from Lot 2790 of Subdivision Plan Cad. 378-D, Macabebe
Cadastre, situated at Saplad David, Caduang Tete, Macabebe, Pampanga;
and to surrender the possession of the same to the plaintiff;
2) Every defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00)
attorneys
fees;
and
3) Every defendants to pay One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) reasonable
monthly rental of the land occupied by said defendants from the filing of the
complaint on August 15, 1988 up to the time the possession of the land
occupied by said defendants is vacated plus the costs." (pp. 72-73, CA
Records).
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court found that the plaintiff is one of the coowners of Lot 2790 of Subdivision Plan Cad. 378-D of Macabebe Cadastre,
consisting of five (5) hectares. As such, he had every right to exercise his
rights as owner and possessor of the property and to demand the removal of
defendants houses. The Municipal Court added that while the defendants
assert that the premises is of public ownership considering that their houses
occupy a part of a shore of a navigable river and part of the shoulder of the
public road, this assertion runs counter to the very claim of defendants that
they are farmhands in the landholding for more than 12 years. Finally, the
Municipal Court also held that since the issue involved in the case is mere
possession and the defendants did not claim ownership, therefore, unlawful
detainer is the proper action for plaintiffs recovery of possession.

The defendants appealed to the Regional Trial Court which reversed the
decision of the municipal court and dismissed the complaint. The Regional
Trial
Court
held
that:cralawnad
"From all the foregoing consideration, the Court finds that plaintiff-appellee
fails to establish his proof of prior physical possession over the land subject
matter of this case where the respective houses of the defendants-appellants
were erected, considering that the case at bar only deals with possession de
facto and not possession de jure. The Court also believes that the subject
matter of this Court is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Macabebe, Masantol-Macabebe, Pampanga is hereby reversed. The
said case is dismissed with costs against the plaintiff." (p. 82, CA Records)
On June 27, 1989, Nicolas Garcia filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Regional Trial Courts decision. The reconsideration sought was denied by
order
of
the
same
court
dated
October
11,
1989.
Nicolas Garcia filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which
rendered a decision on August 6, 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 19154 reversing
and setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court and reinstating the
decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The reconsideration sought by
the defendants before the appellate court was denied on November 11,
1991.
Hence,

this

petition.

The principal question for resolution in this petition is whether or not the
complaint filed by the private respondent before the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court was for the summary proceeding of forcible entry or unlawful detainer
or an accion publiciana. In the latter case, the Regional Trial Court and not
the Municipal Trial Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and try the
complaint.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
The petitioner is of the view that with the following allegations in the
complaint,
to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"2. That the plaintiff is a co-owner of an agricultural land located at Saplad,
David, Macabebe, Pampanga identified as lot no. 2790, of the Subdivision
Plan,
Cad.
378-D,
Macabebe,
Cadastre,
.
.
.;
"x

x.

"4. That the aforesaid agricultural land is presently tenanted by one farmer in
the name of Loreto Garcia with an area of more than five (5) hectares;
"5. That the defendants have constructed their houses on a portion of the
said lot no. 2790 without the knowledge and consent of his co-owners;
"6. That the plaintiff has sent the defendants demand letters dated June 6,
1988 asking said defendants to remove their houses from the said lot within
a period of fifteen (15) days from their receipt of said letters, . . ." (pp. 21-22,
Records).
the complaint which the private respondent filed before the municipal court
was an accion publiciana and not one for unlawful detainer as he had
captioned it. An accion publiciana is exclusively cognizable by the Regional
Trial
Court
and
not
by
the
Municipal
Court.
For his part, the private respondent alleged that the action which he filed
before the municipal court was an action for unlawful detainer. The demand
to vacate dated June 6, 1988 which was served upon the petitioners was well
within the one (1) year period required by the rules for the filing of the
summary action for unlawful detainer the jurisdiction of which belongs to the
municipal
trial
court.
The summary actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry may be
distinguished
from
each
other,
as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"4.

"a. In forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful
from the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth: while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the
defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by reason of the
termination of his right to the possession of the property under his contract
with
the
plaintiff
(Dikit
v.
Icasiano,
89
Phil.
44).
"b. In forcible entry, the law does not require a previous demand for the
defendant to vacate the premises; but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must
first make such demand, which is jurisdictional in nature (Sec. 2; Medel v.
Militante,
41
Phil.
44).
"c. In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical
possession of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant;
in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical
possession (Maddamu v. Judge, 74 Phil. 230: Aguilar v. Cabrera, 74 Phil. 666;
Banayos v. Susana Realty, Inc. L-30336, June 30, 1976: Pharma Industries,
Inc.
v.
Pajarillaga,
Et.
Al.
L-53788,
Oct.
17,
1980).

"d. In forcible entry, the one-year period is generally counted from the date
of actual entry on the land; in unlawful detainer, from the date of last
demand (Sarona, Et. Al. v. Villegas, Et Al., L-22984, Mar. 27, 1968) or last
letter of demand (DBP v. Canonoy, L-29422, Sept. 30, 1970; Calibayan v.
Pascual, L-22645, Sept. 18, 1967; Racaza v. Susana Realty, Inc., L-20330,
Dec. 22, 1966). (Regalado, Florenz D., Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1,
5th
Revised
Edition,
pp.
503-504)
The complaint subject of this case was captioned as "unlawful detainer."
However, the private respondent alleged therein that from the start, the
possession of the petitioner was unlawful as it was stated that the
defendants have constructed their houses on the questioned premises
stealthily, that is, without the knowledge and consent of his co-owners. This
allegation clearly characterized the complaint as one for forcible entry and
not
for
unlawful
detainer.chanrobles.com
:
virtual
law
library
The questions to be resolved in an action for forcible entry are: First, who had
actual possession over the piece of real property? Second, was the possessor
ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint by force,
threat, strategy or stealth? And lastly, does the plaintiff ask for the
restoration of his possession? (Dizon v. Concina, Et Al., G.R. No. L-23756,
December
27,
1969).
There was no mention in the complaint nor in the position paper of the
private respondent that he or his co-owners were in prior possession of the
property. There was an allegation that the property "is presently tenanted"
but did not state when the tenant started to possess the property. While it is
true that possession of the tenant is possession of the owner, the complaint
failed to state that Loreta Garcia was in prior possession of the property at
the time of entry by the petitioners. And, while the complaint stated that the
petitioners obtained possession of the premises through stealth, it failed to
aver when this entry was accomplished or when the private respondent
learned of such entry. The failure of the private respondent to allege the time
when unlawful deprivation took place is fatal because this will determine the
start of the counting of the one year period for the filing of the summary
action of forcible entry. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
effected or how and when dispossession started, the action should either be
accion publiciana or reinvindicatoria in the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) (Sarona Et. Al., v. Villegas, Et Al., supra).
The respondent appellate court erred in holding that this case is one for
unlawful detainer. It failed to consider the basic distinction that in forcible
entry, possession is illegal at the inception while in unlawful detainer,
possession is legal until demand is made to recover such possession or until

the possessor does or fails to do an act which makes his continued

possession of the premises illegal. The fact that a demand was made by the
private respondent for the petitioners to vacate the subject premises cannot
change the nature of the latters possession of the property and convert the
formers action from forcible entry to one for unlawful detainer. The
respondent appellate court likewise erred in applying in this case the
doctrine that "a person who occupies the land of another at the latters
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by the implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing
which, a summary action for ejectment is proper remedy against them"
because, as We have said here, the possession by defendants was illegal at
the inception as alleged in the complaint, hence, there was no tolerance. As
explained in Sarona v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-22984, March 27, 1968, 22 SCRA
1257:chanrobles
virtual
lawlibrary
"But will this rule as to tolerance hold true in a case where there was forcible
entry at the start, but the lawful possessor did not attempt to oust the
intruder for over one year, and only thereafter filed forcible entry suit
following
demand
to
vacate?
"x

x.

"A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word tolerance
confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present
right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a
cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry. Indeed, to
hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons.
First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the
possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the
inferior court provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is
allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy;
and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the
inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed
after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no
action for forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such
defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand,
bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent
prescription to set in and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a
conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that
proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature,
and that the one year time bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary
nature
of
the
action.
"It is well to remember that after the lapse of the one year period, suit must
be started in the Court of First Instance in an accion publiciana.

It is also the contention of petitioners that private respondents claim of

ownership had no basis. He should have at least, introduced muniments of
title to show the extent and character of his possession. Moreover, mere
allegations of ownership does not ipso facto entitle a person to possession of
the
property
claimed.
The main issue in an action for forcible entry and detainer is one of priority of
possession. If the plaintiff can prove prior possession in himself, he may
recover such possession even from the owner. This rule however has no
application in this case. It is true that the private respondent in this case
claimed that he is one of the co-owners of the lot in question. However, he
has not presented any evidence in support of such claim of ownership by
virtue of which he is entitled to its possession. Moreover, he had not shown
nor claimed in his complaint that he was in prior possession of the property.
On the contrary, it is the petitioners who claimed possession of the property
for
more
than
twelve
years.
If the private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises and that
possession thereof was deprived from him for more than twelve years, he
should present his claim before the Regional Trial Court in an accion
publiciana or an accion reinvindicatoria and not before the Municipal Trial
Court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For
even if he is the owners possession of the property cannot be wrested from
another who had been in possession thereof for more than twelve (12) years
through
a
summary
action
for
ejectment.
"Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the
muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsibly address
the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be
stated that regardless of actual condition of the title to the property, the
party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand,
violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover
such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has
the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
reinvindicatoria. (German Management and Services Inc. v. CA, 76216-17,
September
14,
1988,
177
SCRA
495,
499).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Macabebe,
Pampanga
is
REINSTATED.
SO
Grio-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161589, November 24, 2014

PENTA
PACIFIC
REALTY
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. LEY
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is determined from the
allegations of the initiatory pleading.
The Case
Under review is the decision promulgated on October 9, 2003, 1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on June 10, 2002 by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 58, in Makati City 2 nullifying for lack of
jurisdiction the decision rendered on January 12, 2000 by the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 64, in Makati City.3
Antecedents
The petitioner owned the 25th floor of the Pacific Star Building located in
Makati City with an area of 1,068.67 square meters. The respondent leased
444.03 square meters of the premises (subject property) through the
petitioners authorized agent, Century Properties Management, Inc. (Century
Properties). Under the terms of the contract of lease dated January 31, 1997,
the petitioner gave the respondent possession of the subject property under
a stipulation to the effect that in case of the respondents default in its
monthly rentals, the petitioner could immediately repossess the subject
property.
On March 19, 1997, the respondent expressed the intention to purchase the
entire 1,068.67 square meters, including the subject property. The parties
executed a contract to sell, denominated as a reservation agreement, in
which they set the purchase price at US$3,420,540.00, with the following
terms of payment: 20% down payment equivalent of US$684,108.00 payable
within eight months; and US$85,513.00/monthly for eight months with
interest of 9.75%, commencing on the 6 th month. The 80% balance was to be
paid in 13 installments beginning on March 1, 1997 until March 1, 1998. The
reservation agreement contained the following cancellation or forfeiture
provision, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Any failure on [the respondents] part to pay the full downpayment, or

deliver the post-dated checks or pay the monthly amortization on the due
date, shall entitle [the petitioner], at its option, to impose a penalty interest
at the rate of three percent (3%) per month on the outstanding balance or to
cancel this agreement without need of any court action and to forfeit, in its
favor, any reservation deposits or payments already made on the unit,
without prior notice.4
After paying US$538,735.00, the respondent stopped paying the stipulated
monthly amortizations. An exchange of letters ensued between Janet C. Ley,
President of the respondent, or Efren Yap, Assistant to the President of the
respondent, on one hand, and Jose B.E. Antonio, Vice-Chairman of the
petitioner, and the petitioners counsel, Atty. Reynaldo Dizon, on the other.
In the September 23, 1997 letter, 5 the respondent asked the petitioner to
modify the terms of the reservation agreement to allow it to purchase only
the subject property. In the February 5, 1998 letter, 6 the petitioners counsel
reminded the respondent of its US$961,546.50 liability to the petitioner
under the terms of the reservation agreement. In another letter dated
February 5, 1998,7the petitioners counsel informed the respondent of its
failure to pay its amortizations since August 1997, and demanded the
payment
of
US$961,564.50.
Through its letter of February 17, 1998, 8 the respondent submitted the
following proposals, namely: (1) that the US$538,735.00 paid under the
reservation agreement be applied as rental payments for the use and
occupation of the subject property in the period from March 1997 to February
28, 1998; (2) that the balance of US$417,355.45 after deducting the rental
payments from March 1997 to February 28, 1998 should be returned to it;
and (3) that the respondent be allowed to lease the subject property
beginning
March
1998.
The petitioner, through its counsels letter of March 9, 1998, 9 rejected the
respondents proposals, and demanded the payment of US$3,310,568.00,
representing the respondents unpaid balance (as of March 2, 1998) under
the reservation agreement. The petitioner further evinced its intention to
cancel the contract to sell, and to charge the respondent for the rentals of
the subject property corresponding to the period from August 1997 to March
1998,
during
which
no
amortization
payments
were
made.
In the letter dated February 4, 1999, 10 the petitioners counsel informed the
respondent of the cancellation of the reservation agreement and the
forfeiture of the respondents payments; and demanded that respondent pay
the rentals of P9,782,226.50 and vacate the subject property.
In its letter of May 25, 1999, 11 the petitioners counsel wrote to the
respondent thuswise:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We write in behalf of our client, Penta Pacific Realty Corporation, regarding

the Reservation Agreement and/or sale between you and our client over the
latters unit located at the 25 th Floor, Pacific Star Building, Sen. Gil Puyat
Avenue
corner
Makati
Avenue,
Makati
City.
We regret to inform you that in view of your continued refusal and/or failure
to pay to our client the balance of the agreed-upon purchase price of the
office unit you are currently occupying, our client is constrained to make a
notarial cancellation of the Reservation Agreement and/or sale of the abovementioned unit and to forfeit the payments you made in favor of our client.
In this connection, there is no more valid reason for you to continue
occupying the subject premises. Hence, final and formal demand is hereby
made upon you to peacefully and quietly vacate the same within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof. Otherwise, we shall be constrained to file the
appropriate
legal
action
to
protect
our
clients
interests.
Lastly, we would like to inform you that our client will also be constrained to
charge you the amount of P9,782,226.50 corresponding to reasonable rentals
and
other
charges
as
of
January
22,
1999.
Trusting that you are guided accordingly.
On July 9, 1999, the petitioner filed the complaint for ejectment in the MeTC
following the respondents failure to comply with the demands to pay and
vacate.
The respondent resisted the complaint,12 arguing that the contract of lease
dated January 31, 1997 had been simulated or, in the alternative, had been
repealed, negated, extinguished and/or novated by the reservation
agreement; that the petitioner had failed to observe its undertaking to allow
the respondent to collect rentals from the other lessees of the subject
property; that the petitioner had unjustifiably refused to renegotiate or to
amend the reservation agreement; and that the petitioner had violated the
rule on non-forum shopping considering the pendency of another case
between the parties in Branch 57 of the RTC in Makati City.13
Decision of the MeTC
On January 12, 2000, the MeTC, ruling in favor of the petitioner, found that
the respondents lawful possession of the property had been by virtue of the
contract of lease, but had become unlawful when the respondent had failed
to comply with its obligation to pay the monthly rentals for the subject
property; and that, in any event, the reservation agreement proved that the
petitioner had held the better right to possess the subject property as the
owner thereof. The MeTC disposed:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering defendant Ley Construction and

Development Corporation and all persons claiming rights under it to vacate
and surrender the possession of the Property to the plaintiff; to pay the sum
of P32,456,953.06 representing unpaid rentals and other charges as of June
23, 1999; the further amount of P443,741.38 starting July, 1999, and the
same amount every month thereafter as reasonable compensation for the
continued and illegal use and occupancy of the Property, until finally
restituted to the plaintiff; the sum of P100,000.00 for as (sic) attorneys fees
plus cost of suit.14
The
respondent
appealed
to
the
RTC.
In the meantime, on November 6, 2001, the respondent turned over the
possession of the leased premises to the petitioner.
Judgment of the RTC
On June 10, 2002, the RTC rendered its judgment nullifying the MeTCs
decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, holding that the appropriate
action was either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria over which the
MeTC had no jurisdiction. It found that the basis of recovery of possession by
the petitioner was the respondents failure to pay the amortizations arising
from the violations of the reservation agreement; that the complaint did not
specifically aver facts constitutive of unlawful detainer, i.e., it did not show
how entry had been effected and how the dispossession had started; and
that the requirement of formal demand had not been complied with by the
petitioner.
Decision of the CA
The

petitioner

appealed

to

the

CA.

By its decision promulgated on October 9, 2003, the CA affirmed the

judgment of the RTC,15declaring that the respondents possession was not by
virtue of the contract of lease but pursuant to the reservation agreement,
which was more of a contract of sale. 16 It concluded that the petitioners
action was not unlawful detainer, but another kind of action for the recovery
of
possession.17
Not in agreement with the decision of the CA, the petitioner filed the present
petition.
Issue
The decisive question is whether the complaint was for unlawful detainer,
or accion
publiciana,
oraccion
reivindicatoria.

The petitioner submits that the MeTC had jurisdiction because its complaint
made out a clear case of unlawful detainer, emphasizing that the basis of the
complaint was the failure of the respondent to pay the stipulated monthly
rentals under the revived contract of lease; that even if the cause of action
was upon the nonpayment of the purchase price under the reservation
agreement, the MeTC still had jurisdiction over the action because an
unlawful detainer case could also arise from a vendor-vendee relationship;
and that, accordingly, the nonpayment of rentals or of the purchase price
sufficiently established its better right to possess the subject property.
In contrast, the respondent maintains that it had not violated any existing
contract of lease with the petitioner because the contract of lease dated
January 31, 1997 was based on the agreement between the respondent and
Century Properties; that it had entered into the possession of the subject
property as the buyer-owner pursuant to the reservation agreement; and
that the recovery of possession should have been by accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, not unlawful detainer.
Ruling
The appeal has merit.
1.
Kinds of Possessory Actions
There are three kinds of real actions affecting title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, namely: accion de reivindicacion, accion
publiciana and accion interdictal. The first seeks the recovery of ownership
as well as possession of realty. 18 The second proposes to recover the right to
possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding. 19 The third
refers to the recovery of physical or actual possession only (through a special
civil
action
either
for
forcible
entry
or
unlawful
detainer).
If the dispossession is not alleged to take place by any of the means
provided by Section 1,20 Rule 70, Rules of Court, or, if the dispossession
allegedly took place by any of such means but the action is not brought
within one year from deprivation of possession, the action is properly a
plenary action of accion publiciana or accion de reivindicacion. The
explanation is simply that the disturbance of the peace and quiet of the local
community due to the dispossession did not materialize; hence, the
possessor thus deprived has no need for the summary proceeding of accion
interdictal under
Rule
70.
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over accion
interdictal. Until April 15, 1994, the MTC had no original jurisdiction over the

other possessory actions. By such date, its jurisdiction was expanded to vest
it with exclusive original jurisdiction over the other possessory actions
of accion publiciana and accion de reivindicacion where the assessed value
of the realty involved did not exceed P20,000.00, or, if the realty involved
was in Metro Manila, such value did not exceed P50,000.00. The expansion of
jurisdiction was by virtue of the amendment by Section 1 of Republic Act No.
769121 to make Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 pertinently provide
thusly:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive
original
jurisdiction:
x

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxxx
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691 similarly revised Section 33 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 (the provision defining the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the MTC over civil actions) to make the latter provision state, pertinently,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
x

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed
value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the
value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent
lots.
xxxx
As can be seen, the amendments have made the assessed value of the
property whose possession or ownership is in issue, or the assessed value of
the adjacent lots if the disputed land is not declared for taxation purposes

determinative of jurisdiction. The allegation of the assessed value of the

realty must be found in the complaint, if the action (other than forcible entry
or unlawful detainer) involves title to or possession of the realty, including
quieting of title of the realty. If the assessed value is not found in the
complaint, the action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the
trial court is not thereby afforded the means of determining from the
allegations of the basic pleading whether jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action pertains to it or to another court. Courts cannot take judicial
notice of the assessed or market value of the realty.22
2.
MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint of the petitioner
The settled rule is that the nature of the action as appearing from the
averments in the complaint or other initiatory pleading determines the
jurisdiction of a court; hence, such averments and the character of the relief
sought are to be consulted.23 The court must interpret and apply the law on
jurisdiction in relation to the averments of ultimate facts in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading regardless of whether or not the plaintiff or
petitioner is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein.24 The reliefs to which the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled based on
the facts averred, although not the reliefs demanded, determine the nature
of the action.25 The defense contained in the answer of the defendant is
generally
not
determinant.26
Is

this

present

action

one

for

unlawful

detainer?

A suit for unlawful detainer is premised on Section 1, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, of which there are two kinds, namely: (1) that filed against a
tenant, and (2) that brought against a vendee or vendor, or other person
unlawfully withholding possession of any land or building after the expiration
or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract,
express
or
implied.
In an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the main issue is
possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership or
possession de jure that either party may set forth in his pleading.27 The
plaintiff must prove that it was in prior physical possession of the premises
until it was deprived thereof by the defendant. 28 The principal issue must be
possession de facto, or actual possession, and ownership is merely ancillary
to such issue. The summary character of the proceedings is designed to
quicken the determination of possession de facto in the interest of preserving
the peace of the community, but the summary proceedings may not be
proper to resolve ownership of the property. Consequently, any issue on
ownership arising in forcible entry or unlawful detainer is resolved only

provisionally for the purpose of determining the principal issue of

possession.29 On the other hand, regardless of the actual condition of the title
to the property and whatever may be the character of the plaintiffs prior
possession, if it has in its favor priority in time, it has the security that
entitles it to remain on the property until it is lawfully ejected through
anaccion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria by another having a better
right.30
In unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege the cause of action according
to the manner set forth in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheldafter the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any
such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with
damages and costs. (Emphasis supplied)
The complaint must further allege the plaintiffs compliance with the
jurisdictional requirement of demand as prescribed by Section 2, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. Unless
otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only
after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate
is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon
the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises
if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after
fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.
For the action to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC,
therefore, the complaint must allege that: (a) the defendant originally had
lawful possession of the property, either by virtue of a contract or by
tolerance of the plaintiff; (b) the defendants possession of the property
eventually became illegal or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to the
defendant of the expiration or the termination of the defendants right of
possession; (c) the defendant thereafter remained in possession of the
property and thereby deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and (d)
the plaintiff instituted the action within one year from the unlawful
deprivation
or
withholding
of
possession.31

The complaint herein sufficiently alleged all the foregoing requisites for
unlawful detainer, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x
x
x
x
3. On January 31, 1997, the defendant and the plaintiffs authorized agent,
Century Properties Management Inc. (CPMI), a corporation duly organized
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the x x x Philippines x x x
entered into a Contract of Lease whereby the latter leased from the former a
portion of the 25th Floor of the PSB (hereinafter referred to as the PROPERTY).
x
x
x.
4. On March 19, 1997, the defendant decided to purchase from the plaintiff
the 25thFloor of the PSB by virtue of a Reservation Agreement of the same
date.
x
x
x.
5. However, on August 1997, the defendant started to default in its
amortization payments on the above-mentioned purchase. x x x.
x

8. Sometime in March 1999, the defendant requested from the plaintiff and
CPMI that the Reservation Agreement be cancelled and in lieu thereof, the
above-mentioned Contract of Lease be revived. The plaintiff and CPMI
acceded
to
such
request
x
x
x.
9. However, contrary to the express provisions of the Contract of Lease, the
defendant failed to pay to the plaintiff the rentals for the use of the
PROPERTY
when
they
fell
due.
10. x x x the plaintiff also formally made a notarial cancellation of the
aforementioned purchase and demanded that defendant peacefully vacate
the
PROPERTY.
x
x
x.
11. However, despite such demand, the defendant has failed and/or refused
and continues to refuse and fail to peacefully vacate the PROPERTY. x x x.32
As earlier shown, the final letter dated May 25, 1999 of the petitioners
counsel demanded that the respondent vacate the subject property, 33 to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this connection, there is no more valid reason for you to continue
occupying the subject premises. Hence, final and formal demand is hereby
made upon you to peacefully and quietly vacate the same within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof. Otherwise, we shall be constrained to file the
appropriate
legal
action
to
protect
our
clients
interests.
Lastly, we would like to inform you that our client will also be constrained to

charge you the amount of P9,782,226.50 corresponding to reasonable rentals

and other charges as of January 22, 1999.
After the demand went unheeded, the petitioner initiated this suit in the
MeTC on July 9, 1999, well within the one-year period from the date of the
last
demand.
The aforequoted allegations of the complaint made out a case of unlawful
detainer, vesting the MeTC with exclusive original jurisdiction over the
complaint. As alleged therein, the cause of action of the petitioner was to
recover possession of the subject property from the respondent upon the
latters failure to comply with the formers demand to vacate the subject
property after the latters right to remain thereon terminated by virtue of the
demand to vacate. Indeed, the possession of the latter, although lawful at its
commencement, became unlawful upon its non-compliance with the formers
demand
to
vacate.
The jurisdiction of the MeTC was not ousted by the fact that what was
ultimately proved as to how entry by the respondent had been made or when
the dispossession had started might have departed from that alleged in the
complaint. As earlier stated, jurisdiction over the subject matter was
determined from the allegations of the complaint, which clearly set forth a
cause
of
action
for
unlawful
detainer.34
The MeTC correctly exercised its authority in finding for the petitioner as the
plaintiff. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but
became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess;
hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in the action, the
defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the
termination of the defendants right to continue in possession.35
A defendants claim of possession de jure or his averment of ownership does
not render the ejectment suit either accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. The suit remains an accion interdictal, a summary proceeding
that can proceed independently of any claim of ownership. 36 Even when the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership is to be resolved only to determine the
issue
of
possession.37
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision promulgated on
October 9, 2003 by the Court of Appeals affirming the decision rendered on
June 10, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
58; REINSTATE the decision rendered on January 12, 2000 by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 64, of Makati City; and ORDER the
respondent
to
pay
the
costs
of
suit.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R.

No.

L-38510.

March

25,

1975.]

SPOUSES DOLORES MEDINA and MOISES BERNAL, Petitioners, v. THE

HONORABLE NELLY L. ROMERO VALDELLON OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MALOLOS, BULACAN, SPOUSES CIPRIANO VILLANUEVA
and
RUFINA
PANGANIBAN, Respondents.
Ponciano H. Gupit (Citizen Legal Assistance Office), for Petitioners.
Rosendo

G.

Tansinsin,

Jr.

for Respondents.

SYNOPSIS
Respondent Judge dismissed petitioners action for recovery of possession of
a parcel of land on the ground that a land registration case between the
same parties involving the same parcel of land is pending in another branch
of the same court. Petitioners assailed the trial courts dismissal order and
raised the following legal issues for resolution of this Court: (a) whether or
not the pendency of a land registration case bars the institution of an action
for recovery of possession; and in the negative, (b) whether or not the
respondent judge correctly dismissed the latter case in view of the pendency
of the land registration case. The Supreme Court annulled the questioned
order and directed the court below to revive the complaint and amended
complaint and consolidate the trial of the two cases in one branch.
SYLLABUS
1. COURTS; POWER OF CONTEMPT; COUNSEL MAY BE HELD IN CONTEMPT OF
COURT FOR DISRESPECTFUL STATEMENT. For making in his manifestation
and/or comment a statement which the Court considered as disrespectful,
counsel for respondent was declared in contempt of court and suspended
from the practice of law for three months. However, on motion for
reconsideration the Court reconsidered the order of suspension and imposed
instead
a
fine
P300.00
2. ID.; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE AS COURT LIMITED AND SPECIAL
JURISDICTION; EXTENT THEREOF. Court of First Instance acting as land
registration court has a limited and special jurisdiction confined to the
determination of the legality and propriety of the issue of title over the land
subject matter of registration, and it has no power to entertain issues of
rightful possession and claim for damages emanating from ownership.

3. ACTIONS; UNLAWFUL DETAINER DEFINED. An action for unlawful

detainer is defined as "withholding by a person from another for not more
than one year, of the possession of a land or building to which the latter is
entitled after the expiration or termination of the formers right to hold
possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied."cralaw virtua1aw
library
4. ID.; ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION MAY BE FILED IN THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE WITHOUT REGARD TO THE ONE YEAR PERIOD
CONTEMPLATED IN RULE 70 OF THE RULES OF COURT. Where defendants
withheld the possession of land from the plaintiffs for more than the one year
period contemplated in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court concerning actions for
forcible entry and detainer, plaintiffs remedy is to initiate a plenary action
for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) in the court of first instance
which can be filed before the expiration of the one year period, or thereafter,
provided no action for forcible entry and detainer had been commenced
during
that
time
in
the
inferior
court.
5. ID.; DISMISSAL; DISMISSAL OF ACTION ON GROUND OF PENDENCY OF
ANOTHER UNIDENTICAL ACTION BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES IS
ERRONEOUS. The dismissal of the action for recovery of possession
because there is pending in another branch of the same court a land
registration case between the same parties over the same parcel of land is
precipitate; for while identity of parties exists, there is no identity of cause of
action, rights asserted, or relief prayed for in both cases, so that a judgment
rendered in one case is not res judicata for the other case. The rights sought
to be enforced and the relief prayed for in the action for recovery of
possession are separate and distinct from those sought in the land
registration
case.
6. ID.; ID.; MERE PLEA OF TITLE OR OWNERSHIP NOT A GROUND FOR
DISMISSING ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION. It is a fundamental
principle in the law governing unlawful detainer (including recovery of
possession cases) that a mere plea of title or ownership over the disputed
land by the defendant cannot be used as a sound legal basis for dismissing
an action for recovery of possession because an action for recovery of
possession can be maintained even against the very owner of the property.
7. ID.; JUDGMENT IN AN ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION IS NOT
CONCLUSIVE AS TO QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP. An action for recovery of
possession is totally distinct and different from action for recovery of title or
ownership and a judgment rendered in a case of recovery of possession is
conclusive only on the question of possession and not that of ownership;
hence, it does not bind the title or effect the ownership of the land or
building.

8. ID.; CONSOLIDATION; NATURE OF EVIDENCE AS GROUND THEREFOR.

While the issues raised in both cases are not exactly identical, if the evidence
involving the issues of possession and ownership over the land are related
and its presentation before one court would redound to a speedy disposition
of the cases, the consolidation of the trial of both cases may be ordered.
DECISION
ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition to review by certiorari the order dated October 23, 1973 of the Hon.
Nelly L. Romero Valdellon, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch I, which dismissed with costs against the plaintiffs its Civil Case No.
4353-M, entitled "Spouses Dolores Medina and Moises Bernal,Plaintiffs, v.
Spouses Cipriano Villanueva and Rufina Panganiban, Defendants."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
The complaint in Civil Case No. 4353-M of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan alleges that plaintiffs (petitioners in this case) are the owners of a
parcel of land situated at Bo. San Pascual, Hagonoy, Bulacan, with an
assessed value of P800.00 which was purchased sometime in April 1967 from
Margarita Punzalan, Rosal Punzalan, Quaquin Gaddi and Paulina Gaddi; "that
as defendants are family friends of the plaintiffs, defendants were allowed to
remain in the premises and to construct their residential house, subject to
the condition that defendants will return unto the plaintiffs the premises
upon demand" ; "that much to the surprise of the plaintiffs-spouses, on
demand, defendants-spouses refused and remain obstinate in their refusal to
surrender the property in question" ; that because of said defendants
unjustified acts plaintiffs had to institute action and incur damage of P500 as
expenses for court litigation; that "the reasonable value of the use of the
premises is P100 a month, taking into consideration its commercial value" ;
and prayed that the defendants be ordered "to vacate the premises and
surrender unto plaintiffs" the said property and defendants he ordered to pay
plaintiffs "the amount of P500 as incidental expenses and the amount of
P100 a month from the filing of this action to the time they surrender its
possession
to
the
plaintiffs."
A subsequent motion to amend and admit amended complaint was filed by
plaintiffs,
the
amendment
consisting
of:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"4. That as defendants-spouses are family friends of the plaintiffs, they
(defendants) were allowed to build a small house in the premises in April
1967, subject to the condition that they will return to the plaintiffs the

premises

in

1969;

"5. That much to the surprise of the plaintiffs-spouses on demand,

defendants-spouses refused and remains obstinate in their refusal to
surrender the property in question claiming that they are the owners
thereof;"
A motion to dismiss the complaint and an opposition to the motion to amend
and admit the amended complaint filed by the defendants (respondents in
this case) preceded the respondent courts questioned order of October 30,
1973, that dismissed the complaint on the ground of "there being another
case pending between the same parties over the same property, namely
Land Registration Case No. 2814 of this Court." Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied by respondent court in its order dated February
8,
1974.
The

only

legal

issues

raised

are:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Whether or not the pendency of a land registration case will bar the
institution of an action for the recovery of possession; and in the negative,
whether or not the respondent judge can be countenanced in her act of
dismissing the latter case in view of the pendency of the land registration
case."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
When this Court (First Division) on May 10, 1974, resolved "without giving
due course to the petition, to require the respondents to comment thereon,
within 10 days from notice, and both parties to state whether or not there is
any valid reason why Civil Case No. 4353-M of the respondent court should
not be tried and decided jointly with Land Registration Case No. 2814 of
Branch VI of said court, considering that the claim of the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 4353-M (herein petitioners) for damages due to alleged illegal
occupancy of the land involved by the defendants (respondents herein) may
not be properly passed upon and adjudicated in the land registration case,
where only the question of title to the property sought to be registered will
be decided between the applicants and oppositors," counsel for respondents,
Rosendo G. Tansinsin Jr., included in his Manifestation and/or Comment,
dated May 20, 1974, the following statement: "nevertheless, from the
reading of the resolution aforequoted, one will certainly have no doubt that
there is no need for the respondents to make any comment on the matter as
the same will be an exercise of futility since this Honorable Court has not
only given due course to the petition, but has actually decided the
same, . . ." By reason of the disrespectful tone of the aforesaid statement,
said counsel was required by this Courts (First Division) resolution of May 29,
1974, to show cause why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court.
The petitioners by way of compliance with this Courts aforementioned

resolution of May 10, 1974, requested that the order of October 30, 1973 of
the respondent court be set aside and that the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan (Branch I and VI) be ordered to consolidate, try and decide Civil Case
No. 4353-M of Branch I and L. R. C. Case No. 2814 of Branch VI.
The explanation submitted by respondents counsel, although it contained an
apology, was not considered satisfactory by this Court. Hence in its
resolution of July 10, 1974, Atty. Rosendo G. Tansinsin Jr. was declared in
contempt of court and suspended from the practice of law for a period of
three months. His subsequent motion for reconsideration and personal plea
for leniency, sympathy and understanding, coupled with his repeated
apology and regret and the fact that his act appeared to be his first offense
of that nature, made this Court reconsider the suspension from the practice
of law and, instead, ordered him to pay a fine of P300.00 which he has paid.
On the principal issues raised in this case, We have no doubt that the nature
of the action embodied in the complaint in Civil Case No. 4353-M is one for
recovery of possession brought before the Court of First Instance by the
alleged owners of a piece of land against the defendants who were supposed
to have unlawfully continued in possession since 1969 when they were
supposed to return it to plaintiffs, plus damages. That the action is not for
unlawful detainer contemplated in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which falls
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the city courts or municipal courts,
is very apparent because an action of unlawful detainer is defined as
"withholding by a person from another for not more than one year of the
possession of a land or building to which the latter is entitled after the
expiration or termination of the formers right to hold possession by virtue of
a contract express or implied." (Tenorio v. Gomba 81 Phil. 54; Dikit v. Yno 89
Phil. 44) On the basis of the allegations of the complaint in Civil Case No.
4363-M, the defendants withheld possession from the plaintiffs since 1969 or
very much more than the one year period contemplated in unlawful detainer
cases at the time the complaint was filed in July of 1973. Not all cases of
dispossession are covered by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court (Forcible Entry
and Unlawful Detainer cases) because whenever the owner of property is
dispossessed by any other means than those mentioned in the
aforementioned rule, he may initiate and maintain a plenary action to
recover possession in the Court of First Instance, and it is not necessary for
him to wait until the expiration of one year before commencing such action.
(Gumiran v. Gumiran 21 Phil. 174) It may also be brought after the expiration
of said period of one year, if no action had been initiated for forcible entry
and detainer during that time in the inferior court. This plenary action to
recover possession (accion publiciana) must be instituted in the Court of First
Instance
as
was
done
in
this
case.
The respondent courts action in dismissing Civil Case No. 4353-M on the
ground that there is another pending case (L.R.C. No. 2814 of Branch VI of

the same court) between the same parties over the same property is to Our
mind rather precipitate, for We find sufficient merit in petitioners contention
that the rights sought to be enforced and the reliefs prayed for in Civil Case
4353-M (recovery of possession and damages) are entirely separate and
distinct from that sought in L. R. C. Case No. 2814 (where petitioners as
oppositors are seeking the exclusion of their land from that of private
respondents claim of title over a bigger tract of land). It is likewise true that
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VI) acting as a land registration
court has a limited and special jurisdiction confined to the determination of
the legality and propriety of the issue of title over the land subject matter of
registration, and it has no power to entertain issues of rightful possession
and claim for damages emanating from ownership. It is a fundamental
principle in the law governing unlawful detainer cases (including recovery of
possession cases) that a mere plea of title or ownership over the disputed
land by the defendant cannot be used as a sound legal basis for dismissing
an action for recovery of possession because an action for recovery of
possession can be maintained even against the very owner of the property.
(Prado v. Calpo et al, G. R. No. L-19379, April 30, 1964) In the case at bar,
there is not even a plea of title on the part of private respondents over the
disputed property but a mere allegation that there is another action (L. R. C.
No. 2814 pending in Branch VI of that court) for registration of title to that
land the possession of which is being recovered by petitioners in Civil Case
No. 4353-M. An action for recovery of possession is totally distinct and
different from an action for recovery of title or ownership. In fact, a judgment
rendered in a case of recovery of possession is conclusive only on the
question of possession and not that of ownership. It does not in any way bind
the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. (Sec. 7, Rule 70,
Revised
Rules
of
Court).
The inevitable conclusion from the foregoing is that Civil Case No. 4353-M
(for recovery of possession and damages) was arbitrarily and erroneously
dismissed on the basis of the alleged pendency of another action (L. R. C. No.
2814 pending in Branch VI of the same court), because while identity of
parties may be established in both cases, there is no identity of cause of
action or of rights asserted and relief prayed for, so that judgment which
may be rendered in one case would not necessarily result in res judicata for
the
other
case.
We cannot see any sufficient reason for any of the parties in this case to
object to the consolidation of the trial of both cases (L. R. C. Case No. 2814
and Civil Case No. 4353-M), since the evidence that may be presented by the
parties involving possession and ownership of the disputed parcel of land
may facilitate an expeditious termination of both cases. While the issues
raised in both cases are not exactly identical, the evidence involving the
issues of possession and ownership over the same land must be related and
its presentation before one court of justice would redound to a speedy

disposition

of

this

litigation.

WHEREFORE, the respondent courts orders of October 30, 1973, and

February 8, 1974, are hereby declared null and void and set aside; the
complaint and amended complaint in Civil Case No. 4353-M revived; both the
respondent Judge and the Presiding Judge, Branch VI, of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, being directed to consolidate the trial of L. R. C. No.
2814 and Civil Case No. 4353-M in one branch of that court. Costs against
private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
ESTELA L. BERBA, G.R. No. 160032
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
JOSEPHINE PABLO and THE Promulgated:
HEIRS OF CARLOS PALANCA,
Respondents. November 11, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Assailed before the Court on a petition for review on certiorari is the

Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73531, affirming the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No.
170639.
Estela L. Berba, a resident of 978 Maligaya Street, Malate, Manila, was the
owner of a parcel of land located at No. 2338 M. Roxas Street, Sta. Ana,

Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 63726. A house was
constructed on the lot, which she leased to Josephine Pablo * and the Heirs of
Carlos Palanca sometime in 1976. The lease was covered by a lease contract.
Upon its expiration, the lessees continued leasing the house on a month-tomonth basis.
By 1999, the monthly rental on the property was P3,450.00. The
lessees failed to pay the rentals due, and by May 1999, their arrears
amounted to P81,818.00. Berba then filed a complaint for eviction and
collection of unpaid rentals only against Pablo in the Office of the Punong
Barangay. On June 5, 1999, Berba and Pablo executed an Agreement
approved by the pangkat, as follows:
Ako si Josephine Pablo, naninirahan sa 2338 M. Roxas St., Sta.
Ana, Manila, na nasasakop ng Barangay 873, Zone 96, ay
nangangako kay GG Robert Berba na nagmamay-ari ng aking
tinitirahan ay maghuhulog ng halagang Tatlong Libong
Piso P3,000.00 kada ika-sampu ng buwan bilang hulog sa aking
pagkakautang
kay
GG
Berba
na
umaabot
sa
halagang P81,818.00 na ang nasabing halagang ito ay aking
huhulugan hanggang aking mabayaran ng buo ang aking
pagkakautang. Ako rin, si Josephine Pablo, ay nangangako na
ang hindi ko pagsunod o pagbayad ng buwanang hulog, ako ay
kusang aalis sa aking tinitirahan. Bukod pa sa hulog sa aking
pagkakautang, ako rin ay magbabayad ng halagang P3,450.00
bilang aking upa sa aking tinitirahan.[3]
By May 2000, Pablo and the lessees still had a balance of P71,716.00. As
of

May

1,

2001,

the

total

arrearages

of

the

lessees

amounted

to P135,115.63.[4] On May 2, 2001, Berba, through counsel, wrote the

lessees, demanding payment of the said amount and to vacate the house
within 30 days from notice, otherwise she will sue them. [5] The lessees
ignored the demand. On June 21, 2001, Berba filed a complaint[6] against
Josephine Pablo and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca in the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC) of Manila for unlawful detainer. She prayed that, after due
proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed for that

judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff ordering defendant
(sic)
a) to vacate the premises situated at 2338 M. Roxas
Street, Sta. Ana, City of Manila;
b) to pay plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Thirty-Five
Thousand One Hundred Fifteen and 63/100 Pesos
(P135,115.63) representing monthly rentals in
arrears to the present;
c) to pay plaintiff the amount of Four Thousand Five
Hundred Sixty-Two and 63/100 Pesos (P4,562.63)
per month representing monthly rent on the
premises for the year 2001 until finality of the
judgment;
d) to pay plaintiff the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) by way of attorneys fees;
e) to reimburse plaintiff all expenses for litigation
estimated in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos;
f) to pay costs of suit.
Other reliefs just and equitable are, likewise, prayed for under
the premises.[7]

Berba, however, failed to append to her complaint a certification

from the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa that no conciliation or settlement
had been reached.
In their answer to the complaint, the defendants admitted to have
stopped paying rentals because of financial distress. They also alleged that
they were not certain if the plaintiff was the owner of the property. By way of
special and affirmative defenses, they averred that the plaintiff had no cause
of action against them as she failed to secure a Certificate to File Action from
the Lupon.[8]
During the pre-trial conference, the parties manifested to the court
that, despite earnest efforts, no amicable settlement was reached. They
defined the main issue as whether or not the plaintiff had a valid cause of
action for unlawful detainer against the defendants.[9]

In her position paper, Berba appended an Agreement dated June 5, 1999

between her and Pablo, which appeared to have been approved by Punong
Barangay Cayetano L. Gonzales of Barangay 873, as well as other members
of the Lupon,[10] duly approved by the Pangkat. She also appended a
Statement of Account indicating that the defendants back rentals amounted
to P135,115.63.[11]
In their position paper, the defendants insisted that the dispute
did not go through the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa prior to the filing of
the complaint; hence, Berbas complaint was premature. They also
averred that the increase in the rental rates imposed by the plaintiff was
unjustified and illegal.
In her reply, the plaintiff alleged that there was no more need for her to
secure a Certificate to File Action because she was a resident of No. 978
Maligaya Street, Malate, Manila, while the defendants were residing
in Barangay 873, Zone 6 in Sta. Ana, Manila.
On March 14, 2002, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of Berba.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under
them to vacate the premises at 2338 M. Roxas St., Sta. Ana,
Manila and restore possession thereof to the plaintiff. Ordering
the defendant to pay the amount of P135,115.63 representing
monthly rentals since 1999 until December 2000. Ordering the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P4,562.63 per month
beginning January 2001 and for the succeeding months until
finally vacated. Ordering the defendant to pay the reduced
amount ofP10,000.00 as attorneys fees plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[12]

The defendants appealed the decision to the RTC. On motion of the plaintiff,
the RTC issued an order for the execution of the decision pending appeal.
[13]

The defendants filed a motion for the recall of the Order, [14] but before the

court could resolve the motion, the Sheriff turned over the physical
possession of the property to Berba on May 20, 2002.[15]
In their Appeal Memorandum, Pablo and the heirs of Palanca insisted that
Berbas action in the MTC was premature because of the absence of
Certificate to File Action issued by the Lupon. They also claimed that
Berba unlawfully increased the rentals for the house. [16] Berba, on the
other hand, averred that there was no need of a prior referral to
theLupon before filing her complaint. The petitioner cited Section 408(f)
of the Local Government Code, pointing out that she resided in a Barangay in
Malate, 8 kilometers away from Barangay 873 in Sta. Ana, where Pablo and
the Palanca heirs resided.[17]
On August 20, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting the appeal and
setting aside the appealed decision. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court a quo is ordered set
aside. The complaint is also ordered DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. The Writ of Execution issued by the Court a
quo pending appeal is also set aside.
SO ORDERED.[18]
The RTC ruled that under Section 408 of the Local Government
Code, parties who reside in the same city or municipality although in
different barangays are

mandated

to

go

through

conciliation

proceedings in the Lupon.[19] The court cited the rulings of this Court
in Morata v. Go,[20] and Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy.[21]

Berba filed a motion for the reconsideration [22] of the decision, which
the RTC denied in its Order[23] dated October 2, 2002. She then elevated the
case to the CA via petition for review, where she averred:
a) The raising of other affirmative defenses apart from the nonreferral to the Barangay Court by the respondents
constitute a waiver of such requirement; and
b) There was substantial compliance on the part of the petitioner
with
respect
to
referring
her
complaint
before
the Barangay Court.[24]
Citing the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of Appeals,[25] Berba claimed that
Section 408 of the Local Government Code should be construed liberally
together with Section 412. She further averred that she had complied
substantially with the requisites of the law, and recalls that conciliation
proceedings before the Lupon resulted in the execution of an Agreement on
June 5, 1999. Upon failure to comply with the agreement, all chances of
amicable settlement were effectively foreclosed. Hence, Pablo and the Heirs
of Palanca were estopped from claiming that she failed to comply with the
Local Government Codes requirement of prior referral of their dispute to
the Lupon.
After due proceedings, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the
petition

and

affirming

the RTC decision.

Berba

moved

for

reconsideration of the decision, which proved futile.

In the instant petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner alleges
that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
FAILED TO CONSIDER THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT
IN THE CASE OF DIU VS. COURT OF APPEALS (251 SCRA 478) AND
IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
WITH THE MANDATE OF PD 1508 (NOW R.A. 7160) WITH RESPECT
TO PRIOR REFERRAL TO THE BARANGAY COURT, THEREBY
DECIDING THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE COURT.[26]

The petitioner avers that she is a sickly widow, in the twilight of her
years, and whose only source of income are the rentals generated from the
property, which she also uses to pay her medical expenses. She avers that
the continued denial of her right to the fruits of the subject property is highly
unjust and contrary to the spirit behind the enactment of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1508.[27]
The petitioner also points out that, for her to pay obeisance to the
decision of the CA, she would have to go through the tedious, not to mention
horrendous, process of going back to square one; that is, referring the
dispute to the barangay which, in all likelihood, would be rendered useless
considering that respondents had already been validly and effectively
ejected from the leased premises. She would then have to go through the
rungs of the judicial ladder a second time to vindicate her trampled rights.
She further claims that the CAs affirmation of the RTC decision is equivalent
to sanctioning a legal anomaly. She points out that the very purpose
of barangay conciliation is to abbreviate disputes between members of the
same or adjacent barangays to the end that their disputes will not reach the
doors of the courts. Clearly, it does not contemplate a protracted process as
suggested by the RTC ruling and affirmed by the CA.[28]
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the
petitioner was estopped from relying on the June 5, 1999 Agreement
between her and respondent Josephine Pablo before the Lupon because the
respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca were not parties thereto. The respondents
maintained that the petitioner must bear the blame for her failure to comply
with the Local Government Code. At first, she insisted that there was no need
for prior referral of the dispute to the Lupon, claiming that she resided in
abarangay other than where the respondents resided. Thereafter, she made
a volte face and invoked the June 5, 1999 Agreement between her and
respondent Josephine Pablo. Moreover, the respondents aver, the MTC had no

jurisdiction over the petitioners action for unlawful detainer because it was
filed only on June 21, 2001, or more than one year from June 5, 1999 when
the petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo executed the agreement. As
such, the action should be one for recovery of possession of property (accion
publiciana).
On June 2, 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition
and required the parties to file their respective memoranda. [29] The parties
complied.
The Court rules that the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the decision
of the RTC reversing the decision of the MTC and ordering the dismissal of
the complaint for unlawful detainer without prejudice.

The records show that petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo executed
an

Agreement

on

June

5,

1999,

which

was

approved

by

the Lupon. Respondent Josephine Pablo did not repudiate the agreement;
hence, such agreement of the parties settling the case had the force and
effect of a final judgment. As the Court declared in Vidal v. Escueta,[30] the
settlement of the parties may be enforced by the Lupon, through the punong
barangay, within six months; and if the settlement is not enforced after the
lapse of said period, it may be enforced by an action in the proper city or
municipal court, as provided in Section 417 of the Local Government Code:
We also agree that the Secretary of the Lupon is mandated
to transmit the settlement to the appropriate city or municipal
court within the time frame under Section 418 of the LGC and to
furnish the parties and the Lupon Chairman with copies thereof.
The amicable settlement which is not repudiated within the
period
therefor
may
be
enforced
by
execution
by
the Luponthrough the Punong Barangay within a time line of six
months, and if the settlement is not so enforced by
the Lupon after the lapse of said period, it may be enforced only
by an action in the proper city or municipal court as provided for
in Section 417 of the LGC of 1991, as amended, which reads:
SEC. 417. Execution. The amicable settlement or
arbitration award may be enforced by execution by
the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of the
settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement
may be enforced by action in the proper city or municipal
court. (Italics supplied).
Section 417 of the Local Government Code provides a
mechanism for the enforcement of a settlement of the parties
before the Lupon. It provides for a two-tiered mode of
enforcement of an amicable settlement executed by the parties
before the Lupon, namely, (a) by execution of the Punong
Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere
motion of the party/parties entitled thereto; and (b) by an action
in regular form, which remedy is judicial. Under the first remedy,
the proceedings are covered by the LGC and the Katarungang
Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Punong
Barangay is called upon during the hearing to determine solely
the fact of non-compliance of the terms of the settlement and to

give the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily

complying with his obligation under the settlement. Under the
second remedy, the proceedings are governed by the Rules of
Court, as amended. The cause of action is the amicable
settlement itself, which, by operation of law, has the force and
effect of a final judgment.
Section 417 of the LGC grants a period of six months to
enforce the amicable settlement by the Lupon through
the Punong Barangay before such party may resort to filing an
action with the MTC to enforce the settlement. The raison
detre of the law is to afford the parties during the six-month time
line, a simple, speedy and less expensive enforcement of their
settlement before the Lupon.[31]
In the present case, respondent Josephine Pablo failed to comply with her
obligation of repaying the back rentals of P81,818.00 and the current rentals
for the house. Hence, the petitioner had the right to enforce the Agreement
against her and move for her eviction from the premises. However, instead
of filing a motion before the Lupon for the enforcement of the
agreement, or (after six months), an action in the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC) for the enforcement of the settlement, the petitioner
filed an action against respondent Josephine Pablo for unlawful
detainer and the collection of unpaid rentals, inclusive of those
already due before the June 5, 1999 Agreement was executed. The
action of the petitioner against respondent Pablo was barred by the
Agreement of June 5, 1999.
The Court notes that the petitioner even submitted with the MTC a copy of
her June 5, 1999 Agreement with respondent Josephine Pablo. Instead of
dismissing the complaint as against such respondent, the MTC rendered
judgment against her and ordered her eviction from the leased premises.
The Court thus rules that the petitioners complaint against
respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca was premature. It bears stressing
that they were not impleaded by the petitioner as parties-respondents before
the Lupon. The petitioner filed her complaint solely against respondent

Josephine Pablo. Moreover, the said respondent heirs were not privy to the
said agreement, and, as such, were not bound by it. Section 412 of the Local
Government Code, sets forth the precondition to filing of complaints in court,
to wit:
SEC. 412 Conciliation.- (a) Pre-condition to filing of
complaint in court. No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding
involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be
filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office
for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between
the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that
no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by
the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by
the lupon chairman
or pangkat chairman
or
unless
the
settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.
(b) Where parties may go directly to court. The parties
may go directly to court in the following instances:
(1) Where the accused is under detention;
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of
personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional
remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment,
delivery of personal property, and support pendente
lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the
statute of limitations.
(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural
communities. The customs and traditions of indigenous cultural
communities shall be applied in settling disputes between
members of the cultural communities.

Under Sec. 408 of the same Code, parties actually residing in the same
city or municipality are bound to submit their disputes to the Lupon for
conciliation/amicable settlement, unless otherwise provided therein:

SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement;

Exception Thereto. The lupon of each barangay shall have
authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the
same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes
except:
(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision
or instrumentality thereof;
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and
the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one
(1) year or a fine exceeding Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located
in different cities or municipalities unless the parties
thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable
settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside
in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where
such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto
agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may
determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation
of the Secretary of Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the
authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time
before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the luponconcerned
for amicable settlement.

If the complainant/plaintiff fails to comply with the requirements of the

Local Government Code, such complaint filed with the court may be
dismissed for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies.[32]
The petitioners reliance on the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of
Appeals[33] is misplaced. In that case, there was a confrontation by the

parties before the BarangayChairman and no agreement was reached.

Although no pangkat was formed, the Court held in that instance that there
was substantial compliance with the law. In any event, the issue in that case
was whether the failure to specifically allege that there was no compliance
with the barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that
defense. Moreover, no such confrontation before the Lupon occurred with
respect to the unlawful detainer suit against Josephine Pablo before the MTC.
[34]

In this case, the petitioner and the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca
resided in the City of Manila, albeit in different barangays. The dispute
between the petitioner and the respondent heirs was thus a matter within
the authority of the Lupon. Hence, the petitioners complaint for unlawful
detainer and the collection of back rentals should have been first filed
before the Lupon for mandatory conciliation, to afford the parties an
opportunity to settle the case amicably. However, the petitioner filed her
complaint against the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca directly with the
MTC. Clearly then, her complaint was premature. The execution of the June 5,
1999 Agreement between petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo does
not amount to substantial compliance to the requirements of the Local
Government Code on mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings.
Indeed, considering that the MTC had already rendered a decision on
the merits of the case, it is not without reluctance that the Court reaches this
conclusion which would require the petitioner to start again from the
beginning. The facts of the present case, however, do not leave us any
choice. To grant the petition under these circumstances would amount to
refusal to give effect to the Local Government Code and to wiping it off the
statute

books

insofar

as

ejectment

and

other

cases

governed

by

the Rule on Summary Procedure are concerned. This Court has no authority
to do that.[35]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202354

September 24, 2014

AMADA
C.
ZACARIAS, Petitioner,
vs.
VICTORIA
ANACAY,
EDNA
ANACAY,
CYNTHIAANACAYGUISIC,
ANGELITO ANACAY, JERMIL ISRAEL, JIMMY ROY ISRAEL and all other
persons claiming authority under them, Respondents.

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision 1 dated June
20, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 which
reversed the Decision2 dated August 22, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cavite, Branch 18, Tagaytay City and affirmed the Decision 3 dated
October 8, 2010 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Amadeo-Silang,
Cavite, Branch 17 in Civil Case No. 862.
The present controversy stemmed from a complaint 4 for Ejectment with
Damages/Unlawful Detainer filed on December 24, 2008 by
petitioner Amada Zacarias thru her son and attorney-in-fact, Cesar C.
Zacarias, against the above-named respondents, Victoria Anacay and
members of her household. Said respondents are the occupants of a parcel
of land with an area of seven hundred sixty-nine (769) square meters,
situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 18-026-01182 in the name of petitioner and issuedby
Municipal Assessor Reynaldo L. Bayot on August 31, 2007.
The parties were ordered to proceed to the Philippine Mediation Center
pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended. Mediation was unsuccessful and thus the case was returned to
the court.5
After due proceedings, the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
complaint, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is, hereby, rendered in favor of
defendants Victoria Anacay, Edna Anacay, Santiago Amerna, Raymond and
Cynthia Guisic, Angelito Anacay and Myrlinda Yalo, and all persons acting
under them, and against plaintiff Amada C. Zacarias, represented by her
attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias, the instant Complaint for ejectment with
damages, Unlawful Detainer is, hereby, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.6
The MCTC held that the allegations of the complaint failed to state the
essential elements of an action for unlawful detainer as the claim that
petitioner had permitted or tolerated respondents occupation of the subject

property was unsubstantiated. It noted that the averments in the demand

letter sent by petitioners counsel that respondents entered the property
through stealth and strategy, and in petitioners own "Sinumpaang
Salaysay", are more consistent withan action for forcible entry which should
have been filed within one year from the discovery of the alleged
entry. Since petitioner was deprived of the physical possession of her
property through illegal means and the complaint was filed after the lapse
of one year from her discovery thereof, the MCTC ruled that it has
no jurisdiction over the case.
On appeal to the RTC, petitioner argued that unlawful detainer was the
proper remedy considering that she merely tolerated respondents stay in
the premises after demand to vacate was made upon them, and they had in
fact entered into an agreement and she was only forced to take legal action
when respondents reneged on their promise to vacate the property after the
lapse of the period agreed upon.
In reversing the MCTC, the RTC pointed out that in her complaint, petitioner
did not state that respondents entered her property through stealth and
strategy but that petitioner was in lawful possession and acceded to the
request of respondents to stay in the premises until May 2008 but
respondents reneged on their promise to vacate the property by that time. It
held that the suit is one for unlawful detainer because the respondents
unlawfully withheld the property from petitioner after she allowed them to
stay there for one year.
With the subsequent oral agreement between the parties, the RTC ruled that
respondents occupation ofthe property without petitioners consent can be
converted to a contract, such agreement not being prohibited by law nor
contrary to morals or good customs. Having satisfied the requisites for an
unlawful detainer action, the RTC found that petitioners complaint was filed
within the prescribed one-year period counted from the time the final
demand to vacate was received by the respondents on July 24, 2008.
The falloof the Decision of the RTC states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Silang-Amadeo dated October 8, 2010 is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE and a new one is entered ordering the defendants and all claiming
under their rights to: (1) vacate the subject property and surrender
possession and control over the same to the plaintiff; Pay the sum of Two

Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos each as rentals or compensation for the use

thereof starting from July 2008 until the same is paid in full, with interests
thereon at twelve (12%) percent per annum; (2) pay the sum of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, as moral damages; (3) pay the sum of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary damages; and (4) pay the sum
of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.7
With the failure of respondents to file a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period, the above decision became final and executory.8
On November 28, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for issuance of a writ of
execution. At the hearing heldon January 4, 2012,respondents were given a
period of ten days within which to file their comment. At the next scheduled
hearing on February 6, 2012,respondents counsel appeared and submitted a
Formal Entry of Appearancewith Manifestation informing the court that on
the same day they had filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction
before the CA, copies ofwhich were served to petitioner thru her counsel and
to the RTC. Nonetheless, in its Order dated February 6, 2012, the RTC stated
that said manifestation was "tantamount to [a] comment to the pending
motion" and thus gave petitioners counsel a period of ten (10) days within
which to fileher Reply and thereafter the incident will be submitted for
resolution.9
On June 20, 2012, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Order dated
August 22, 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, 4th Judicial
Region, Branch 18, Tagaytay City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
dated October 8, 2010 rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Branch
17 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA held that the MCTC clearlyhad no jurisdiction over the case
as the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a
valid cause for unlawful detainer. Since the prescriptive period for filing
an action for forcible entry has lapsed, petitioner could not convert her
action into one for unlawful detainer, reckoning the one-year period to

file her action from the time of her demand for respondents to vacate the
property.
Further, the CA said that while petitioner has shown that she is the lawful
possessor of the subject property,she availed of the wrong remedy to recover
possession but nevertheless may still file an accion publicianaor accion
reivindicatoria with the proper regional trial court.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred and committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in nullifying the
judgment of the RTC which has long become final and executory. She argues
that the suspension of the strictadherence to procedural rules cannot be
justified by unsupported allegationsof the respondents as to supposed nonreceipt of documents concerning this case.
On their part, respondents maintain that they were not aware of the
proceedings before the RTC and were not furnished a copy of the said courts
adverse decision. They also stress that resort to certiorari was proper and
the suspension of procedural rules was justified by compelling circumstances
such as the imminentdestruction of the only property possessed by
respondents who are indigent, respondents lack of awareness of unfavorable
judgment rendered on appeal by the RTC, substantive merits of the case
insofar as the jurisdictional requirements in a suit for unlawful detainer, lack
of showing that resortto certiorari petition was frivolous and dilatory, and
there being no prejudice caused to the other party.
After a thorough review of the records and the parties submissions, we find
neither reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA.

SC
The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well
as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in
the complaint.11 In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for
which Section 112 of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy, and must show
enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
evidence.13 Such remedy is either forcibleentry or unlawful detainer. In
forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his

land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or

stealth. In illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto
under any contract, express or implied.14
The MCTC and CA both ruled thatthe allegations in petitioners complaint
make out a case for forcible entry but not for unlawful detainer.
In Cabrera v. Getaruela,15 the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges
a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract
with or by toleranceof the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff
to defendant of the termination ofthe latters right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.16
In this case, the Complaint alleged the following:
3. Plaintiff is the owner of that parcel of land situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st,
Silang, Cavite with an area of SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY NINE (769) SQUARE
METERS, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 issued by the
Municipal Assessor of Silang, Cavite. Copy of said tax declaration is hereto
attached as Annex "B";
4. Plaintiff was in lawful possession and control over the subject property.
She had it planted to Bananas and other fruit bearing trees. However,
sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have entered
the subject property and occupied the same;
5. Consequently, Plaintiff demanded that they leave the premises. The
defendants requested for time toleave and she acceded to said request. The
defendants committed to vacate the subject property by the end of May,
2008;

6. Inspite of several repeateddemands, defendants unjustifiably refused to

vacate the subject premises prompting the Plaintiff to seek the assistance of
a lawyer who wrote them a FORMAL and FINAL DEMAND to vacate the
premises and to pay reasonable compensation for their illegal use and
occupancy of the subject property. A copy of the DEMAND LETTER is hereto
attached as Annex "C";
7. Plaintiff also referred this matter to the Lupon Tagapamayapa of
Barangay Lalaan 1st for possible conciliation but to no avail as the
defendants still refused to vacate the subject property. Thus, the said
Barangay issued a CERTIFICATION TOFILE ACTION, as evidenced by a copy
thereto attached as Annex "D";
x x x x17
The above complaint failed to allegea cause of action for unlawful detainer
as it does not describe possession by the respondents being initially legal or
tolerated by the petitioner and which became illegal upon termination by the
petitioner of suchlawful possession. Petitioners insistence that she actually
tolerated respondents continued occupation after her discovery of their
entry into the subject premises is incorrect. As she had averred, she
discovered respondentsoccupation in May 2007. Such possession could not
have been legal from the start as it was without her knowledge or consent,
much less was it based on any contract, express or implied. We stress that
the possession ofthe defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but
became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.18
In Valdez v. Court of Appeals, 19 the Court ruled that where the complaint did
not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful
detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. Thus:
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs
supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of
the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would
be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas:
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner,
still, distinction should be made.

If right at the incipiencydefendants possession was with plaintiffs tolerance,

we do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and
sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from
the date of the demand to vacate.
xxxx
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance"
confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present
right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a
cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to
hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
reasons:First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge tothe right of
the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the
inferior court - provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is
allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to bespeedy;
and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the
inferior court. Second,if a forcible entry action in the inferior courtis allowed
after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no
action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such
defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand,
bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent
prescription to set in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a
conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that
proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature,
and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary
nature of the action. (Italics and underscoring supplied)
It is the nature of defendants entry into the land which determines the cause
of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is
illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible
entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes
illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant,
it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts
as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes
provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The
complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort
to parol testimony.

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publicianaor an
accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. Thus, in Go, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against
respondent alleging that they were the owners of the parcel of land through
intestate succession which was occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of
petitioners as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the issue on whether
or not petitioners case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled:
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property
registered under TCT No. C-32110 from their parents; that possession thereof
by private respondent was by tolerance of their mother, and after her death,
by their own tolerance; and that they had served written demand on
December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate the property.
xxx
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant
illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential
in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that plaintiffs supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession
which is later sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners cause of
action fails. The appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made the
conclusion that the alleged tolerance by their mother and after her death, by
them, was unsubstantiated. x x x
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the
inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering
that defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house
thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and before them,
their mother. xxx Clearly, defendants entry into the land was effected
clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is
categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in
Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muoz vs. Court of Appeals[224 SCRA 216
(1992)] tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought
to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer
not of forcible entry x x x.
xxxx

In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any
averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners claim that they
permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The
complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents without any color
of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in
the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing
has been said on how respondents entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the
parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts
constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy
the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the
municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.It is in this light that
this Court finds that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal
trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint. (Emphasis supplied.)
The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to allege how and
when entry was effected. The bare allegation of petitioner that "sometime in
May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have enterep the subject
property and occupied the same", as correctly found by the MCTC and CA,
would show that respondents entered the land and built their houses thereon
clandestinely and without petitioner's consent, which facts are constitutive of
forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no
jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly erred in reversing the lower
court's ruling and granting reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.
Lastly, petitioner's argument that the CA gravely erred in nullifying a final
and executory judgment of the RTC deserves scant consideration.
It is well-settled that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by
law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance
of and to render judgment on the action. 20 Indeed, a void judgment for want
of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor
the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and
any writ of execution based on it is void.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
June 20, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 151369

March 23, 2011

ANITA MONASTERIO-PE and the SPOUSES ROMULO TAN and EDITHA

PE-TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE JUAN TONG, herein represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, JOSE Y.
ONG, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal and nullification of the Decision 1 and
Order,2 respectively dated October 24, 2001 and January 18, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 24.
The instant petition stemmed from an action for ejectment filed by herein
respondent Jose Juan Tong (Tong) through his representative Jose Y. Ong
(Ong) against herein petitioners Anita Monasterio-Pe (Anita) and the spouses
Romulo Tan and Editha Pe-Tan (Spouses Tan). The suit was filed with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3, Iloilo City and docketed as
Civil Case No. 2000(92).
In the Complaint, it was alleged that Tong is the registered owner of two
parcels of land known as Lot Nos. 40 and 41 and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-9699 and T-9161, together with the
improvements thereon, located at Barangay Kauswagan, City Proper, Iloilo
City; herein petitioners are occupying the house standing on the said parcels
of land without any contract of lease nor are they paying any kind of rental
and that their occupation thereof is simply by mere tolerance of Tong; that in
a letter dated December 1, 1999, Tong demanded that respondents vacate
the house they are occupying, but despite their receipt of the said letter they
failed and refused to vacate the same; Tong referred his complaint to
the Lupon of Barangay Kauswagan, to no avail.3

In their Answer with Defenses and Counterclaim, herein petitioners alleged

that Tong is not the real owner of the disputed property, but is only a dummy
of a certain alien named Ong Se Fu, who is not qualified to own the said lot
and, as such, Tong's ownership is null and void; petitioners are the true and
lawful owners of the property in question and by reason thereof they need
not lease nor pay rentals to anybody; a case docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
52676 (RTC Civil Case No. 20181) involving herein petitioner Pe and
respondent is pending before the Court of Appeals (CA) where the ownership
of the subject property is being litigated; respondent should wait for the
resolution of the said action instead of filing the ejectment case; petitioners
also claimed that there was, in fact, no proper barangay conciliation as Tong
was bent on filing the ejectment case before conciliation proceedings could
be validly made.4
On March 19, 2001, the MTCC rendered judgment in favor of herein
respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, finding the defendants Anita MonasterioPe, and Spouses Romulo Tan and Editha Pe-Tan to be unlawfully withholding
the property in litigation, i.e., Lot. Nos. 40 and 41 covered by TCT Nos. T9699 and 9161, respectively, together with the buildings thereon, located at
Brgy. Kauswagan, Iloilo City Proper, and they are hereby ordered together
with their families and privies, to vacate the premises and deliver possession
to the plaintiff and/or his representative.
The defendants are likewise ordered to pay plaintiff reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises in the amount
of P15,000.00 per month starting January, 2000 until they actually vacate
and deliver possession to the plaintiff and attorney's fees in the amount
of P20,000.00.
Costs against the defendants.
SO DECIDED.5
Aggrieved by the above-quoted judgment, petitioners appealed the decision
of the MTCC with the RTC of Iloilo City.
In its presently assailed Decision, the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 24 affirmed in
its entirety the appealed decision of the MTCC.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

At the outset, it bears emphasis that in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may
be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court. 6 It is a settled rule
that in the exercise of this Court's power of review, it does not inquire into
the sufficiency of the evidence presented, consistent with the rule that this
Court is not a trier of facts.7 In the instant case, a perusal of the errors
assigned by petitioners would readily show that they are raising factual
issues the resolution of which requires the examination of evidence.
Certainly, issues which are being raised in the present petition, such as the
questions of whether the issue of physical possession is already included as
one of the issues in a case earlier filed by petitioner Anita and her husband,
as well as whether respondent complied with the law and rules
on barangayconciliation, are factual in nature.
Moreover, the appeal under Rule 45 of the said Rules contemplates that the
RTC rendered the judgment, final order or resolution acting in its original
jurisdiction.8 In the present case, the assailed Decision and Order of the RTC
were issued in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Thus, petitioners pursued the wrong mode of appeal when they filed the
present petition for review on certiorariwith this Court. Instead, they should
have filed a petition for review with the CA pursuant to the provisions of
Section 1,9 Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
On the foregoing bases alone, the instant petition should be denied.
In any case, the instant petition would still be denied for lack of merit, as
discussed below.
In their first assigned error, petitioners contend that the RTC erred in holding
that the law authorizes an attorney-in-fact to execute the required certificate
against forum shopping in behalf of his or her principal. Petitioners argue
that Tong himself, as the principal, and not Ong, should have executed the
certificate against forum shopping.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that the first paragraph of Section 5, 10 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court,
requires that the certification should be signed by the "petitioner or principal

party" himself. The rationale behind this is because only the petitioner
himself has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar
actions or proceedings in different courts or agencies. 11 However, the
rationale does not apply where, as in this case, it is the attorney-in-fact who
instituted the action.12 Such circumstance constitutes reasonable cause to
allow the attorney-in-fact to personally sign the Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping. Indeed, the settled rule is that the execution of the certification
against forum shopping by the attorney-in-fact is not a violation of the
requirement that the parties must personally sign the same.13 The attorneyin-fact, who has authority to file, and who actually filed the complaint as the
representative of the plaintiff, is a party to the ejectment suit. 14 In fact,
Section 1,15 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court includes the representative of the
owner in an ejectment suit as one of the parties authorized to institute the
proceedings. In the present case, there is no dispute that Ong is
respondent's attorney-in-fact. Hence, the Court finds that there has been
substantial compliance with the rules proscribing forum shopping.
Petitioners also aver that the certificate against forum shopping attached to
the complaint in Civil Case No. 2000(92) falsely stated that there is no other
case pending before any other tribunal involving the same issues as those
raised therein, because at the time the said complaint was filed, Civil Case
No. 20181 was, in fact, still pending with the CA (CA-G.R. CV No. 52676),
where the very same issues of ejectment and physical possession were
already included.
Corollarily, petitioners claim that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. 2000(92) on the ground that the issue of physical possession raised
therein was already included by agreement of the parties in Civil Case No.
20181. As such, petitioners assert that respondent is barred from filing the
ejectment case, because in doing so he splits his cause of action and
indirectly engages in forum shopping.
The Court does not agree.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the disputed properties, along
with three other parcels of land, had been the subject of two earlier cases
filed by herein petitioner Anita and her husband Francisco against herein
respondent and some other persons. The first case is for specific
performance and/or rescission of contract and reconveyance of property with
damages. It was filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo City

and docketed as Civil Case No. 10853. The case was dismissed by the CFI.
On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) upheld the decision of the
trial court. When the case was brought to this Court, 16 the decision of the IAC
was affirmed. Subsequently, the Court's judgment in this case became final
and executory per Entry of Judgment issued on May 27, 1991.
Subsequently, in 1992, the Spouses Pe filed a case for nullification of
contract, cancellation of titles, reconveyance and damages with the RTC of
Iloilo City. This is the case presently cited by petitioners. Eventually, the case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 20181, was dismissed by the lower court on the
ground of res judicata. The RTC held that Civil Case No. 10853 serves as a
bar to the filing of Civil Case No. 20181, because both cases involve the
same parties, the same subject matter and the same cause of action. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 20181. Herein
petitioner Anita assailed the judgment of the CA before this Court, but her
petition for review on certiorari was denied via a Resolution17 dated January
22, 2003. On June 25, 2003, the said Resolution became final and executory.
The Court notes that the case was disposed with finality without any showing
that the issue of ejectment was ever raised. Hence, respondent is not barred
from filing the instant action for ejectment.
In any case, it can be inferred from the judgments of this Court in the two
aforementioned cases that respondent, as owner of the subject lots, is
entitled to the possession thereof. Settled is the rule that the right of
possession is a necessary incident of ownership. 18 Petitioners, on the other
hand, are consequently barred from claiming that they have the right to
possess the disputed parcels of land, because their alleged right is
predicated solely on their claim of ownership, which is already effectively
debunked by the decisions of this Court affirming the validity of the deeds of
sale transferring ownership of the subject properties to respondent.
Petitioners also contend that respondent should have filed an accion
publiciana and not an unlawful detainer case, because the one-year period to
file a case for unlawful detainer has already lapsed.
The Court does not agree.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provide:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings and when. Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the

possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or

stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration
or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages
and costs.
Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. Unless
otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only
after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate
is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon
the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises
if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after
fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.
Respondent alleged in his complaint that petitioners occupied the subject
property by his mere tolerance. While tolerance is lawful, such possession
becomes illegal upon demand to vacate by the owner and the possessor by
tolerance refuses to comply with such demand. 19 Respondent sent petitioners
a demand letter dated December 1, 1999 to vacate the subject property, but
petitioners did not comply with the demand. A person who occupies the land
of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy against him.20 Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
the one-year period within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be
filed should be counted from the date of demand, because only upon the
lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful. 21 Respondent filed
the ejectment case against petitioners on March 29, 2000, which was less
than a year from December 1, 1999, the date of formal demand. Hence, it is
clear that the action was filed within the one-year period prescribed for filing
an ejectment or unlawful detainer case.1avvphi1
Neither is the Court persuaded by petitioners' argument that respondent has
no cause of action to recover physical possession of the subject properties on

the basis of a contract of sale because the thing sold was never delivered to
the latter.
It has been established that petitioners validly executed a deed of sale
covering the subject parcels of land in favor of respondent after the latter
paid the outstanding account of the former with the Philippine Veterans
Bank.
Article 1498 of the Civil Code provides that when the sale is made through a
public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of
the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary
does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. In the instant case, petitioners
failed to present any evidence to show that they had no intention of
delivering the subject lots to respondent when they executed the said deed
of sale. Hence, petitioners' execution of the deed of sale is tantamount to a
delivery of the subject lots to respondent. The fact that petitioners remained
in possession of the disputed properties does not prove that there was no
delivery, because as found by the lower courts, such possession is only by
respondent's mere tolerance.
Lastly, the Court does not agree with petitioners' assertion that the filing of
the unlawful detainer case was premature, because respondent failed to
comply with the provisions of the law on barangay conciliation. As held by
the RTC, Barangay Kauswagan City Proper, through its Pangkat Secretary and
Chairman, issued not one but two certificates to file action after herein
petitioners and respondent failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. The
Court finds no error in the pronouncement of both the MTCC and the RTC that
any error in the previous conciliation proceedings leading to the issuance of
the first certificate to file action, which was alleged to be defective, has
already been cured by the MTCC's act of referring back the case to
the Pangkat Tagapagkasundo of Barangay Kauswagan for proper conciliation
and mediation proceedings. These subsequent proceedings led to the
issuance anew of a certificate to file action.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 24, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22984

March 27, 1968

MARGARITO
SARONA,
ET
AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIPE VILLEGAS and RAMONA CARILLO, defendants-appellees.
Aportadera
&
Palabrica
for
Castillo Law Offices for defendants-appellees.

plaintiffs-appellants.

SANCHEZ, J.:
The key question thrust upon us is whether the present is a case of
forcible entry or one of unlawful detainer.
The problem arose because on January 28, 1963, plaintiffs lodged with
the Municipal Court of Padada, Davao, against defendants as complaint,
styled "Unlawful Detainer." 1 They there aver that they are the absolute
owners and in possession of a parcel of land in Paligue, Padada. Their
complaint then proceeds to recite:
3. That on April 1, 1958, defendants entered upon said land Lot
"F" constructed their residential house thereon and up to date remain
in possession thereof, unlawfully withholding the possession of the
same from the plaintiffs;
4. That the reasonable rental for said Lot is P20.00 per month;
5. That on December 28, 1962, plaintiffs demanded of
defendants to vacate the premises and to pay the rentals in arrears but
then defendants failed to do so; that defendants' possession thus
became clearly unlawful after said demand;
xxx

xxx

xxx

They asked that they be restored into possession, and that defendants
be made to pay rents, attorneys' fees, expenses of litigation, and costs.
Defendants met the complaint with a motion to dismiss on the sole
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the municipal court. They say that the case is
one of forcible entry, and the reglementary one-year period had elapsed
before suit was started.
The municipal court overturned the motion to dismiss.

On May 15, 1963, defendants registered their answer. They reiterated

the court's lack of jurisdiction, and by way of affirmative defenses, stated
that plaintiffs have no cause of action, and that "the present residential
house of the defendants was transferred to the present site after plaintiffs
sold to defendants a portion of their land, which includes the site of the
present house and from and after said sale, defendants have occupied the
said portion legally and with the knowledge and consent of plaintiffs." They
counterclaimed for damages.
The municipal court's judgment directed defendants to vacate the
premises, to pay plaintiffs a monthly rental of P10.00, from April 1, 1958 until
possession is restored, and P200.00 as attorneys' fees, and costs.
Defendants, on appeal to the court of First Instance of
Davao, renewed their bid to throw out of court plaintiffs' complaint for want
of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' opposition and defendants' reply thereto were also
submitted.
2

On December 26, 1963, the Court of First Instance of Davao dismissed

the case. The court reasoned but that the suit was one of forcible entry and
was started beyond the reglementary one-year period.
Plaintiffs appealed to this Court.
Plaintiffs' position is that the municipal court had original jurisdiction;
that consequently the Court of First Instance had appellate jurisdiction. Their
theory is that suit was well within the one-year period. They say that the
parting date is December 28, 1962, when plaintiffs demanded of defendants
to vacate the premises and pay rentals in arrears; and that the complaint
was registered in court on January 28, 1963.
Solution of the problem turns on this question: Is the complaint one of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer? 1wph1.t
1. Section 1, Rule 70 (formerly Section 10, Rule 72) of the Revised
Rules of Court, states that a person deprived of possession of land "by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth," or a person against whom the
possession of any land "is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express
or implied," may at any time "within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper

inferior court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or

depriving of possession." The next legal precept, Section 2 of the same Rule,
provides that the landlord may not sue his tenant for ejectment "for failure to
pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease, unless the tenant
shall have failed to pay such rent or comply with such conditions for a period
of fifteen (15) days, or five (5) days in the case of building, after demand
therefor, . . . ."
It is plain that the foregoing rules define two entirely distinct causes of
action, to wit: (a) action to recover possession founded on illegal occupation
from the beginning forcible entry; and (b) action founded on unlawful
detention by a person who originally acquired possession lawfully unlawful
detainer. 3
The law and jurisprudence leave no doubt in our mind that what
determines the cause of action is the nature of defendants' entry into the
land. If entry is illegal, then the cause of action which may be filed against
the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand,
entry is legal but thereafter possession became illegal, the case is one of
illegal detainer which must be filed within one year from the date of the last
demand.
2. We observe a lack of precision-tooling in the complaint. Defendants'
alleged entry into the land is not characterized whether legal or illegal. It
does not say how defendants entered the land and constructed their
residential house thereon. It is silent, too, whether possession became legal
before plaintiffs made the demand to vacate and to pay rentals.
Nor does the complaint as much as intimate that defendants are
plaintiffs' tenants. So that the case would not come within the coverage of
Section 2 of Rule 70 (summary action by landlord against tenant).
Failure to specifically aver in the complaint facts which definitely show
that plaintiffs' action is for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, is not to be
lightly treated. Jurisdiction here challenged in a motion to dismiss
depends upon, factual averments. The jurisdictional facts must appear on
the face of the complaint. Where, as here, the only definite ultimate facts
averred are that on April 1, 1958, defendants entered upon the land and
constructed their residential house thereon, remained in possession thereof,
and that demand to vacate and pay rentals only was made on December 28,

1962, well beyond the one-year period, the municipal court of Padada did not
have jurisdiction.
The want of jurisdiction is the more accentuated when we consider the
facts that surfaced during the trial as found by the municipal court, viz:
In the course of the hearing of this case it is clear that, according
to the plaintiff, Margarito Sarona, the defendants transferred their
house on April 1, 1958 to the litigated area which is designated as Lot
F, (Exhibit "C-1") without their consent and permission. At that time he
was just living 200 meters away from the lot. He requested the
defendants not to place the said house in the litigated area but the
defendants refused. He did nothing and only on December 28, 1962,
when the formal letter of demand to vacate and to pay rental was
made by the plaintiff through their lawyer, Atty. Palabrica, and
addressed the said letter to the defendants but the defendants refused
to vacate the area and to pay a rental of P20.00. . . .
It is then too plain for argument that defendants entered the land on
April 1, 1958 without plaintiffs' consent and permission; that plaintiff
Margarito Sarona "requested the defendants not to place the said house in
the litigated area but the defendants refused."
The findings of the municipal court itself may not be downgraded in
the present case. And this, for the reason that the complaint did not
specifically state the manner of entry of defendants into the land legal or
illegal. Since the parties went to trial on the merits, and it came to light that
defendants' entry was illegal at the inception, the municipal court should
have dismissed the case. That court cannot close its eyes to the truth
revealed by plaintiffs' own evidence before it. A court of limited jurisdiction,
said municipal court, should not have proceeded to render an on-the-merits
judgment thereon. 4
Clearly, plaintiffs' case fits in the jurisprudential precept of forcible
entry. Because the entry is forcible. Long had it been made evident that in
forcible entry cases, no force is really necessary
In order to constitute the use of "force," as contemplated in this
provision, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor
is it even necessary that he should use violence against the person of
the party in possession. The act of going on the property and excluding

the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force

over the property, and this is all that is necessary. Under the statute
entering upon the premises by strategy or stealth is equally an
obnoxious as entering by force. The foundation of the action is really
the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has
entered without right. The words "by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition under which
one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude
another, who has had prior possession, therefrom. If a trespasser
enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person
already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the
latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from
the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can
unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the
trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts
of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party. 5
3. But plaintiffs would want to make out a case of illegal detainer upon
their belated claim that they tolerated defendants' possession. To be
observed on this point is that there has been no allegation in the complaint,
and no showing during the trial in the municipal court, that possession of
defendants ever changed from illegal to legal any time from their illegal
entry to the demand to vacate. No averment there is in the complaint which
recites as a fact any overt act on plaintiffs' part indicative of permission
to occupy the land. Without resorting to mind-reading, we are hard put to
conclude that there was such a change from illegal to legal possession of
defendants until the demand to vacate was made.
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the
owner, still, distinction should be made.
If right at the incipiency defendants' possession was with plaintiffs'
tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the
premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within
one year from the date of the demand to vacate. Because, from the date of
demand, possession became unlawful. And the case is illegal detainer. 6
But will this rule as to tolerance hold true in a case where there was
forcible entry at the start, but the lawful possessor did not attempt to oust

the intruder for over one year, and only thereafter filed forcible entry suit
following demand to vacate?
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are
"those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of
property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they
are generally those particular services or benefits which one's property can
give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner,
who permits them out of friendship or courtesy." 7 He adds that: "[t]hey are
acts of little disturbances which a person, in the interest of neighborliness or
friendly relations, permits others to do on his property, such as passing over
the land, tying a horse therein, or getting some water from a well." And,
Tolentino continues, even though "this is continued for a long time, no right
will be acquired by prescription." 8Further expounding on the concept,
Tolentino writes: "There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which
are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of knowledge and silence on the
part of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By virtue of
tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or license, acts
of possession are realized or performed. The question reduces itself to the
existence or non-existence of the permission." 9
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance"
confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present
right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a
cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry. Indeed, to
hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of
the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the
inferior court provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is
allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy;
and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the
inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed
after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no
action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such
defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand,
bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent
prescription to set in and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a
conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that
proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature,

and that the one year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the
summary nature of the action. 10
It is well to remember that after the lapse of the one year period, suit
must be started in the Court of First Instance in an accion publiciana.
Jurisdiction in the case before us is with the Court of First Instance.
For the reasons given, the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao
of December 26, 1963 dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction in the
Municipal Court of Padada, is hereby affirmed.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellants. So ordered.