Aguilar v CA borthers rent 2/3 & 1/3

Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers; Virgilio is the youngest of
seven (7) children of the late Maximiano Aguilar, while Senen is the fifth. On 28
October 1969, the two brothers purchased a house and lot in Paraaque
where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful
neighborhood. Initially, the brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in the coownership was two-thirds while that of Senen was one-third. By virtue of a written
memorandum dated 23 February 1970, Virgilio and Senen agreed that henceforth
their interests in the house and lot should be equal, with Senen assuming the
remaining mortgage obligation of the original owners with
the Social Security System (SSS) in exchange for his possession and
enjoyment of the house together with their father. Since Virgilio was then
disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS, the brothers agreed that the
deed of sale would be executed and the title registered in the meantime in
the name of Senen. After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner demanded
from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the property be
sold and proceeds thereof divided among them. In his complaint, petitioner prayed
that the proceeds of the sale, be divided on the basis of two-thirds (2/3) in
his favor and one-third (1/3) to respondent. Petitioner also prayed for
monthly rentals for the use of the house by respondent after their father died.
On 26 July 1979, rendering judgment by default against defendant, the
trial court found him and plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot, in equal
shares on the basis of their written agreement. The trial court also upheld the right
of plaintiff as co-owner to demand partition. Court of Appeals set aside the order of
the trial court of 26 April 1979 as well as the assailed judgment rendered by default.
RATIO: petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and
lot in equal shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot
at anytime and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of
the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests. Private
respondent and his family refuse to pay monthly rentals to petitioner from the time
their father died. We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner,
except as to the effectivity of the payment of monthly rentals by respondent as coowner which we here declare to commence only after the trial court ordered
respondent to vacate in accordance. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no
co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner
may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his
share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever
the thing is essentially, indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be,
allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its
proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition
the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the
property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of
the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them
shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the
co-owners. However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house
and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use
the property owned in common long as it is in accordance with the purpose for
which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-

owners. When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the
trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the coownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession
jointly also ceased.

Adille v CA redeemed only heir partial redemption"

Land in question originally belonged to one Felisa Alzul as her own private
property; she married twice in her lifetime; the first, with one Bernabe Adille,
withwhom she had as an only child, herein defendant Rustico Adille; in
her second marriage with one Procopio Asejo, her children were herein plaintiffs,
now, sometime in 1939, said Felisa sold the property in pacto de retro to certain 3rd
persons, period of repurchase being 3 years, but she died in 1942without being
able to redeem and after her death, but during the period of redemption,
herein defendant repurchased, by himself alone, and after that, he executed a deed
of extra-judicial partition representing himself to be the only heir and child of his
mother Felisa with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name
alone also. Plaintiffs, filed present case for partition with accounting on the position
that he was only a trustee on an implied trust when he redeemed,-and this is the
evidence, but as it also turned out that one of plaintiffs, Emeteria Asejo was
occupying a portion, defendant counterclaimed for her to vacate that, Trial
Judge sustained defendant in his position that he was and became absolute owner,
he was not a trustee. The respondent Court of appeals reversed the trial Court.
ISSUE: May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in
common?
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with aspect to his share
alone. While the records show that the petitioner redeemed the property in its
entirety, shouldering the expenses therefore, that did not make him the owner of all
of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership.
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to collect
reimbursement from the remaining co-owners. There is no doubt that redemption of
property entails a necessary expense. ART. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to
compel the other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the
thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt
himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may
be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made
if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership. The result is that the property remains to be
in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the
Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the redemption
by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him
ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the
vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his name. But
the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire
property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership. Neither does

the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title over the parcel
in his name terminate the existing co-ownership. Registration of property is
not a means of acquiring ownership. It operates as a mere notice of existing title,
that is, if there is one. The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the
property on behalf of the private respondents.
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it
is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes. We agree with the respondent Court
of Appeals that fraud attended the registration of the property. The
petitioner's pretension that he was the sole heir to the. This Court is not unaware of
the well-established principle that prescription bars any demand on property
(owned in common) held by another (co-owner)following the required number of
years. In that event, the party in possession acquires title to the property and the
state of co-ownership is ended . In the case at bar, the property was registered in
1955 by the petitioner, solely in his name, while the claim of the private
respondents was presented in 1974. Has prescription then, set in?
We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of coownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act
of repudiation, in turn is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner
repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly
made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive, and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law.
We are not convinced that he had repudiated the co-ownership; on the
contrary, he had deliberately kept the private respondents in the dark by
feigning sole heirship over the estate under dispute. He cannot therefore be said to
have "made known" his efforts to deny the co-ownership. Moreover, one of the
private respondents, Emeteria Asejo, is occupying a portion of the land up to the
present, yet, the petitioner has not taken pains to eject her there from. It is true that
registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has
likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud.
The registration in the names of petitioners of the titles to the properties is not an
act of repudiation of the co-ownership.

Delima v CA issuance of a new title prescription

During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the TalisayMinglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on installments from the
government. Lino Delima later died in 1921 leaving as his only heirs three
brothers and a sister. On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now
substituted by respondents, executed an affidavit of "Extra-judicial Declaration
of Heirs." Based on this affidavit, TCT No. 2744 was cancelled and TCT
No. 3009 was issued on February 4,1954 in the name of Galileo Delima alone
to the exclusion of the other heirs. Petitioners, who are the surviving heirs of Eulalio
and Juanita Delima, filed withthe Court of First Instance of Cebu (now Regional
Trial Court) an action for reconveyance and/or partition. The trial court rendered a
decision in favor of petitioners. Respondent appellate court reversed the trial
court's decision and upheld the claim of Galileo Delima that all the other brothers
and sister of LinoDelima, namely Eulalio, Juanita and Vicente, had already
relinquished and waived their rights to the property in his favor, considering that
he (Galileo Delima) alone paid the remaining balance of the purchase price of the
lot and the realty taxes thereon
Issue: The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not petitioners'
action for partition is already barred by the statutory period provided by law
which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by
acquisitive prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shares
in the disputed property. Article 494 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Ratio: Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned. Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the
thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid.
This term may be extended by anew agreement. A donor or testator may
prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years. Neither shall
there be any partition when it is prohibited by law. No prescription shall run in favor
of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not
be presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all. If, as such
owner, he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation of
delivering it to his co-owners or co-heirs, is under the same situation as a
depository, a lessee or a trustee. Thus, an action to compel partition may be filed at
any time by any of the co-owners against the actual possessor. In other words, no
prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership However, from the
moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and

exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the
question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership.. In such case,
the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or
applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property
as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by
prescription. It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a
trustee. In order that such possession is considered adverse to the cestui que trust
amounting to a repudiation of the co-ownership, the following elements must
concur: 1) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster
of the cestui que trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been made
known to the cestui que trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon should be clear
andconclusive. We have held that when a co-owner of the property in question
executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof obtained the cancellation
of the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new one wherein
he appears as the new owner of the property, thereby in effect denying or
repudiating the ownership of the other co-owners over their shares, the statute
of limitations started to run Since an action for reconveyance of land based on
implied or constructive trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the date of
the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes
of the statute of limitations is counted The issuance of this new title constituted an
open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten (10)
years of adverse possession by Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was
sufficient to vest title in him by prescription. As the certificate of title
was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to the land, such
rejection was binding on the other heirs and started as against them the
period of prescription. Hence, when petitioners filed their action for
reconveyance and/or to compel partition on February 29,1968 (14
years), such action was already barred by prescription.
Cruz v Leis widow loan right of repurchase"
Adriano and Gertrudes were married, Gertrudes acquired from the then
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) a parcel of land.TCT No.
43100 was issued in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro," who was also referred to
therein as a "widow." On 2 December 1973, Adriano died. It does not appear that he
executed a will before his death. On 5 February 1985, Gertrudes obtained a loan
from petitioners, the spouses Alexander and Adelaida Cruz. The loan was secured
by a mortgage over the property covered by TCT No. 43100.
Gertrudes, however, failed to pay the loan on the due date. Gertrudes executed two
contracts in favor of petitioner Alexander Cruz. The first is denominated as
"Kasunduan" which the parties concede is a pacto de retro sale, granting Gertrudes
one year within which to repurchase the property. The second is a "Kasunduan ng
Tuwirang Bilihan," a Deed of Absolute Salecovering the same property for the
price of P39,083.00, the same amountstipulated in the "Kasunduan."
For failure of Gertrudes to repurchase the property, ownership thereof
wasconsolidated in the name of Alexander . On 9 June 1987, Gertrudes Isidro died.
Thereafter, her heirs, herein private respondents, received demands to
vacate the premises from petitioners, the new owners of the property.

The RTC held that the land was conjugal property since the evidence
presented by private respondents disclosed that the same was acquired during the
marriage of the spouses and that Adriano contributed money for the
purchase of the property. Thus, the court concluded, Gertrudes could only sell to
petitioner spouses her one-half share in the property. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners are now before this Court
seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals. First, they contend that
the subject property is not conjugal but is owned exclusively by Gertrudes, who was
described in the Deed of Sale between Gertrudes and the DANR as well as
in TCT No. 43100 as a widow.
Ratio: The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his
share alone (CIVL CODE, art. 1612; CIVIL CODE (1889), art. 1514.). While the
records show that petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety,
shouldering the expenses therefore, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In
other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership(Supra, Art.
489). Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other coowners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in
common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this
obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to
his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial
to the co-ownership. The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of
co-ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not
be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir
or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it.
Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to
retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607).
But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire
property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership. It is
conceded that, as a rule, a co-owner such as Gertrudes could only
dispose of her share in the property owned in common.
Article 493 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co--owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership. Unfortunately for private respondents, however, the property
was registered in TCT No. 43100 solely in the name of "Gertrudes
Isidro, widow." Where a parcel of land, forming past of the undistributed properties
of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a widow to a purchaser
who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto, issued solely in the
name of the widow, the purchaser acquires a valid title to the land even as against
the heirs of the deceased spouse.