Domingo v Rayala

NACHURA, J.:
Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced "superiority"
which is enough to dampen an employees spirit and her capacity
for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her
life.1
Before this Court are three Petitions for Review on Certiorari
assailing the October 18, 2002 Resolution of the CAs Former Ninth
Division2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026. The Resolution modified the
December 14, 2001 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals Eleventh
Division, which had affirmed the Decision of the Office of the
President (OP) dismissing from the service then National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala (Rayala)
for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
All three petitions stem from the same factual antecedents.
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then
Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual
harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma
of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
To support the Complaint, Domingo executed an Affidavit narrating
the incidences of sexual harassment complained of, thus:
xxxx
4. Sa simula ay pabulong na sinasabihan lang ako ni Chairman
Rayala ng mga salitang "Lot, gumaganda ka yata?"
5. Sa ibang mga pagkakataon nilalapitan na ako ni Chairman at
hahawakan ang aking balikat sabay pisil sa mga ito habang ako ay
nagta-type at habang nagbibigay siya ng diktasyon. Sa mga
pagkakataong ito, kinakabahan ako. Natatakot na baka mangyari
sa akin ang mga napapabalitang insidente na nangyari na noon
tungkol sa mga sekretarya niyang nagbitiw gawa ng mga
mahahalay na panghihipo ni Chairman.
6. Noong ika-10 ng Setyembre, 1998, nang ako ay nasa 8th Floor,
may nagsabi sa akin na kailangan akong bumaba sa 7th Floor kung
nasaan ang aming opisina dahil sa may koreksyon daw na gagawin
sa mga papel na tinayp ko. Bumaba naman ako para gawin ito.
Habang ginagawa ko ito, lumabas si Chairman Rayala sa silid ni Mr.
Alex Lopez. Inutusan ako ni Chairman na sumunod sa kaniyang
silid. Nang nasa silid na kami, sinabi niya sa akin:
Chairman: Lot, I like you a lot. Naiiba ka sa lahat.
At pagkatapos ako ay kaniyang inusisa tungkol sa mga personal na
bagay sa aking buhay. Ang ilan dito ay tungkol sa aking mga
magulang, kapatid, pag-aaral at kung may boyfriend na raw ba
ako.
Chairman: May boyfriend ka na ba?
Lourdes: Dati nagkaroon po.
Chairman: Nasaan na siya?
Lourdes: Nag-asawa na ho.
Chairman: Bakit hindi kayo nagkatuluyan?
Lourdes: Nainip po.
Chairman: Pagkatapos mo ng kurso mo ay kumuha ka ng Law at
ako ang bahala sa iyo, hanggang ako pa ang Chairman dito.
Pagkatapos ay kumuha siya ng pera sa kaniyang amerikana at
inaabot sa akin.
Chairman: Kuhanin mo ito.
Lourdes: Huwag na ho hindi ko kailangan.

Chairman: Hindi sige, kuhanin mo. Ayusin mo ang dapat ayusin.

Tinanggap ko po ang pera ng may pag-aalinlangan. Natatakot at
kinakabahan na kapag hindi ko tinanggap ang pera ay baka siya
magagalit kasabay na rito ang pagtapon sa akin kung saan-saan
opisina o kaya ay tanggalin ako sa posisyon.
Chairman: Paglabas mo itago mo ang pera. Ayaw ko ng may
makaka-alam nito. Just the two of us.
Lourdes: Bakit naman, Sir?
Chairman: Basta. Maraming tsismosa diyan sa labas. But I dont
give them a damn. Hindi ako mamatay sa kanila.
Tumayo na ako at lumabas. Pumanhik na ako ng 8th Floor at
pumunta ako sa officemate ko na si Agnes Magdaet. Ikinwento ko
ang nangyari sa akin sa opisina ni Chairman. Habang kinikwento ko
ito kay Agnes ay binilang namin ang pera na nagkakahalaga ng
tatlong libong piso (PHP 3,000). Sinabi ni Agnes na isauli ko raw
ang pera, pero ang sabi ko ay natatakot ako baka magalit si Sir.
Nagsabi agad kami kay EC Perlita Velasco at sinalaysay ko ang
nangyari. Sinabi niya na isauli ko ang pera at noong araw ding iyon
ay nagpasiya akong isauli na nga ito ngunit hindi ako nagkaroon ng
pagkakataon dahil marami siyang naging bisita. Isinauli ko nga ang
pera noong Lunes, Setyembre 14, 1998.
7. Noong huling linggo ng Setyembre, 1998, ay may tinanong din
sa akin si Chairman Rayala na hindi ko masikmura, at sa aking
palagay at tahasang pambabastos sa akin.
Chairman: Lot, may ka live-in ka ba?
Lourdes: Sir, wala po.
Chairman: Bakit malaki ang balakang mo?
Lourdes: Kayo, Sir ha! Masama sa amin ang may ka live-in.
Chairman: Bakit, ano ba ang relihiyon ninyo?
Lourdes: Catholic, Sir. Kailangan ikasal muna.
Chairman: Bakit ako, hindi kasal.
Lourdes: Sir, di magpakasal kayo.
Chairman: Huh. Ibahin na nga natin ang usapan.
8. Noong Oktubre 29, 1998, ako ay pumasok sa kwarto ni Chairman
Rayala. Ito ay sa kadahilanang ang fax machine ay nasa loob ng
kaniyang kwarto. Ang nag-aasikaso nito, si Riza Ocampo, ay nakaleave kaya ako ang nag-asikaso nito noong araw na iyon. Nang
mabigyan ko na ng fax tone yung kausap ko, pagharap ko sa kanan
ay nakaharang sa dadaanan ko si Chairman Rayala. Tinitingnan ako
sa mata at ang titig niya ay umuusad mula ulo hanggang dibdib
tapos ay ngumiti na may mahalay na pakahulugan.
9. Noong hapon naman ng pareho pa ring petsa, may nag-aapply
na sekretarya sa opisina, sinabi ko ito kay Chairman Rayala:
Lourdes: Sir, si Pinky po yung applicant, mag-papainterview po
yata sa inyo.
Chairman: Sabihin mo magpa-pap smear muna siya
Chairman: O sige, i-refer mo kay Alex. (Alex Lopez, Chief of Staff).
10. Noong Nobyembre 9, 1998, ako ay tinawag ni Chairman Rayala
sa kaniyang opisina upang kuhanin ko ang diktasyon niya para kay
ELA Oscar Uy. Hindi pa kami nakakatapos ng unang talata, may
pumasok na bisita si Chairman, si Baby Pangilinan na sinamahan ni
Riza Ocampo. Pinalabas muna ako ni Chairman. Nang maka-alis na
si Ms. Pangilinan, pinapasok na niya ako ulit. Umupo ako. Lumapit
sa likuran ko si Chairman, hinawakan ang kaliwang balikat ko na
pinipisil ng kanang kamay niya at sinabi:

Chairman: Saan na ba tayo natapos?

Palakad-lakad siya sa aking likuran habang nag-didikta. Huminto
siya pagkatapos, at nilagay niya ang kanang kamay niya sa aking
kanang balikat at pinisil-pisil ito pagkatapos ay pinagapang niya ito
sa kanang bahagi ng aking leeg, at pinagapang hanggang kanang
tenga at saka kiniliti. Dito ko inalis ang kaniyang kamay sa
pamamagitan ng aking kaliwang kamay. At saka ko sinabi:
Lourdes: Sir, yung kamay ninyo alisin niyo!
Natapos ko rin ang liham na pinagagawa niya pero halos hindi ko
na maintindihan ang na-isulat ko dahil sa takot at inis na
nararamdaman ko.4
After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of absence
and asked to be immediately transferred. Thereafter, she filed the
Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of Administrative
Order No. 250, the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7877 in
the Department of Labor and Employment.
Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the
Complaint to the OP, Rayala being a presidential appointee. The
OP, through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered
Secretary Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the Complaint
and create a committee for such purpose. On December 4, 1998,
Secretary Laguesma issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 280,
Series of 1998,5 constituting a Committee on Decorum and
Investigation (Committee) in accordance with Republic Act (RA)
7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.6
The Committee heard the parties and received their respective
evidence. On March 2, 2000, the Committee submitted its report
and recommendation to Secretary Laguesma. It found Rayala guilty
of the offense charged and recommended the imposition of the
minimum penalty provided under AO 250, which it erroneously
stated as suspension for six (6) months.
The following day, Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the
Committee Report and Recommendation to the OP, but with the
recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for six (6)
months and one (1) day, in accordance with AO 250.
On May 8, 2000, the OP, through Executive Secretary Zamora,
issued AO 119,7 the pertinent portions of which read:
Upon a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, I concur with the
findings of the Committee as to the culpability of the respondent
[Rayala], the same having been established by clear and
convincing
evidence.
However,
I
disagree
with
the
recommendation that respondent be meted only the penalty of
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day considering the
circumstances of the case.
What aggravates respondents situation is the undeniable
circumstance that he took advantage of his position as the superior
of the complainant. Respondent occupies the highest position in
the NLRC, being its Chairman. As head of said office, it was
incumbent upon respondent to set an example to the others as to
how they should conduct themselves in public office, to see to it
that his subordinates work efficiently in accordance with Civil
Service Rules and Regulations, and to provide them with healthy
working atmosphere wherein co-workers treat each other with
respect, courtesy and cooperation, so that in the end the public
interest will be benefited (City Mayor of Zamboanga vs. Court of
Appeals, 182 SCRA 785 [1990]).
What is more, public service requires the utmost integrity and
strictest discipline (Gano vs. Leonen, 232 SCRA 99 [1994]). Thus, a
public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of
honesty and integrity, and "utmost devotion and dedication to
duty" (Sec. 4 (g), RA 6713), respect the rights of others and shall
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, and good morals (Sec.
4(c)). No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a
public office is a public trust, and enjoins all public officers and
employees to serve with the highest degree of responsibility,

integrity, loyalty and efficiency (Section 1, Article XI, 1987

Constitution).
Given these established standards, I see respondents acts not just
[as] a failure to give due courtesy and respect to his co-employees
(subordinates) or to maintain good conduct and behavior but
defiance of the basic norms or virtues which a government official
must at all times uphold, one that is contrary to law and "public
sense of morality." Otherwise stated, respondent to whom stricter
standards must apply being the highest official [of] the NLRC had
shown an attitude, a frame of mind, a disgraceful conduct, which
renders him unfit to remain in the service.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Rogelio I.
Rayala, Chairman, National Labor Relations Commission, is found
guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct and
is hereby DISMISSED from the service effective upon receipt of this
Order.
SO ORDER[ED].
Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a
Resolution8 dated May 24, 2000. He then filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure before
this Court on June 14, 2000.9 However, the same was dismissed in
a Resolution dated June 26, 2000 for disregarding the hierarchy of
courts.10 Rayala filed a Motion for
Reconsideration11 on August 15, 2000. In its Resolution12 dated
September 4, 2000, the Court recalled its June 26 Resolution and
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for appropriate
action.
The CA rendered its Decision13 on December 14, 2001. It held that
there was sufficient evidence on record to create moral certainty
that Rayala committed the acts he was charged with. It said:
The complainant narrated her story complete with details. Her
straightforward and uninhibited testimony was not emasculated by
the declarations of Commissioner Rayala or his witnesses. x x x
Moreover, Commissioner Rayala has not proven any vicious motive
for Domingo and her witnesses to invent their stories. It is very
unlikely that they would perjure themselves only to accommodate
the alleged conspiracy to oust petitioner from office. Save for his
empty conjectures and speculations, Rayala failed to substantiate
his contrived conspiracy. It is a hornbook doctrine that conspiracy
must be proved by positive and convincing evidence (People v.
Noroa, 329 SCRA 502 [2000]). Besides, it is improbable that the
complainant would concoct a story of sexual harassment against
the highest official of the NLRC and thereby expose herself to the
possibility of losing her job, or be the subject of reprisal from her
superiors and perhaps public ridicule if she was not telling the
truth.
It also held that Rayalas dismissal was proper. The CA pointed out
that Rayala was dismissed for disgraceful and immoral conduct in
violation of RA 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees. It held that the OP was correct in
concluding that Rayalas acts violated RA 6713:
Indeed, [Rayala] was a public official, holding the Chairmanship of
the National Labor Relations Commission, entrusted with the
sacred duty of administering justice. Occupying as he does such an
exalted position, Commissioner Rayala must pay a high price for
the honor bestowed upon him. He must comport himself at all
times in such a manner that the conduct of his everyday life should
be beyond reproach and free from any impropriety. That the acts
complained of were committed within the sanctuary of [his] office
compounded the objectionable nature of his wrongdoing. By daring
to violate the complainant within the solitude of his chambers,
Commissioner Rayala placed the integrity of his office in disrepute.
His disgraceful and immoral conduct warrants his removal from
office.14
Thus, it dismissed the petition, to wit:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby

DISMISSED and Administrative Order No. 119 as well [as] the
Resolution of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 00-E-9118
dated May 24, 2000 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No cost.
SO ORDERED.15
Rayala timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Justices Vasquez
and Tolentino voted to affirm the December 14 Decision. However,
Justice Reyes dissented mainly because AO 250 states that the
penalty imposable is suspension for six (6) months and one (1)
day.16 Pursuant to the internal rules of the CA, a Special Division of
Five was constituted.17 In its October 18, 2002 Resolution, the CA
modified its earlier Decision:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated December [14], 2001 is
MODIFIED to the effect that the penalty of dismissal is DELETED
and instead the penalty of suspension from service for the
maximum period of one (1) year is HEREBY IMPOSED upon the
petitioner. The rest of the challenged decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review18 before this Court, which we
denied in our February 19, 2003 Resolution for having a defective
verification. She filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court
granted; hence, the petition was reinstated.
Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review19 with this Court
essentially arguing that he is not guilty of any act of sexual
harassment.
Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
CAs October 18, 2002 Resolution. The CA denied the same in its
June 3, 2003 Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, by a majority vote, public respondents Motion for
Reconsideration, (sic) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.20
On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the three
(3) petitions.
G.R. No. 155831
Domingo assails the CAs resolution modifying the penalty imposed
by the Office of the President. She raises this issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in modifying the penalty for the
respondent from dismissal to suspension from service for the
maximum period of one year. The President has the prerogative to
determine the proper penalty to be imposed on an erring
Presidential appointee. The President was well within his power
when he fittingly used that prerogative in deciding to dismiss the
respondent from the service.21

I. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE

ACTS OF HEREIN PETITIONER DO NOT CONSTITUTE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT AS LAID DOWN BY THE En Banc RULING IN THE CASE
OF AQUINO vs. ACOSTA, ibid., AS WELL AS IN THE APPLICATION OF
EXISTING LAWS.
II. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT IN A CASE FOR
SEXUAL HARASSMENT. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ITS
FINDING THAT IT IS AN OFFENSE THAT IS MALUM PROHIBITUM.
III. THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, AND NOW, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HAS
MISAPPLIED AND EXPANDED THE DEFINITION OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE UNDER R.A. No. 7877, BY
APPLYING DOLE A.O. 250, WHICH RUNS COUNTER TO THE RECENT
PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.23
Invoking Aquino v. Acosta,24 Rayala argues that the case is the
definitive ruling on what constitutes sexual harassment. Thus, he
posits that for sexual harassment to exist under RA 7877, there
must be: (a) demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor; (b)
the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re-employment, or
continued employment; or (c) the denial thereof results in
discrimination against the employee.
Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any
sexual favor, demand, or request from petitioner in exchange for
her continued employment or for her promotion. According to
Rayala, the acts imputed to him are without malice or ulterior
motive. It was merely Domingos perception of malice in his
alleged acts a "product of her own imagination"25 that led her
to file the sexual harassment complaint.
Likewise, Rayala assails the OPs interpretation, as upheld by the
CA, that RA 7877 is malum prohibitum such that the defense of
absence of malice is unavailing. He argues that sexual harassment
is considered an offense against a particular person, not against
society as a whole. Thus, he claims that intent is an essential
element of the offense because the law requires as a conditio sine
qua non that a sexual favor be first sought by the offender in order
to achieve certain specific results. Sexual harassment is committed
with the perpetrators deliberate intent to commit the offense.26
Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in RA
7877. In particular, he assails the definition of the forms of sexual
harassment:
Rule IV
FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment. Sexual harassment may
be committed in any of the following forms:
a) Overt sexual advances;
b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;

She argues that the power to remove Rayala, a presidential

appointee, is lodged with the President who has control of the
entire Executive Department, its bureaus and offices. The OPs
decision was arrived at after affording Rayala due process. Hence,
his dismissal from the service is a prerogative that is entirely with
the President.22

c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but not limited to

going out on dates, outings or the like for the same purpose;

As to the applicability of AO No. 250, she argues that the same was
not intended to cover cases against presidential appointees. AO
No. 250 refers only to the instances wherein the DOLE Secretary is
the disciplining authority, and thus, the AO does not circumscribe
the power of the President to dismiss an erring presidential
appointee.
G.R. No. 155840

He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand,

request, or requirement do not constitute sexual harassment as
contemplated by the law.28 He alleges that the rule-making power
granted to the employer in Section 4(a) of RA 7877 is limited only
to procedural matters. The law did not delegate to the employer
the power to promulgate rules which would provide other or
additional forms of sexual harassment, or to come up with its own
definition of sexual harassment.29

In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues:

G.R. No. 158700

d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes of

sexual gratification which is generally annoying, disgusting or
offensive to the victim.27

The Republic raises this issue:

Whether or not the President of the Philippines may validly dismiss
respondent Rayala as Chairman of the NLRC for committing acts of
sexual harassment.30
The Republic argues that Rayalas acts constitute sexual
harassment under AO 250. His acts constitute unwelcome or
improper gestures of affection and are acts or conduct of a sexual
nature, which are generally annoying or offensive to the victim.31
It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CAs reduction
of the penalty imposed by the OP. Rayalas dismissal is valid and
warranted under the circumstances. The power to remove the
NLRC Chairman solely rests upon the President, limited only by the
requirements under the law and the due process clause.
The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides only a
one (1) year suspension, it will not prevent the OP from validly
imposing the penalty of dismissal on Rayala. It argues that even
though Rayala is a presidential appointee, he is still subject to the
Civil Service Law. Under the Civil Service Law, disgraceful and
immoral conduct, the acts imputed to Rayala, constitute grave
misconduct punishable by dismissal from the service.32 The
Republic adds that Rayalas position is invested with public trust
and his acts violated that trust; thus, he should be dismissed from
the service.
This argument, according to the Republic, is also supported by
Article 215 of the Labor Code, which states that the Chairman of
the NLRC holds office until he reaches the age of 65 only during
good behavior.33 Since Rayalas security of tenure is conditioned
upon his good behavior, he may be removed from office if it is
proven that he has failed to live up to this standard.
All the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up in two
ultimate questions, namely:
(1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?
(2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty?
Initially, however, we must resolve a procedural issue raised by
Rayala. He accuses the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as
counsel for the Republic, of forum shopping because it filed a
motion for reconsideration of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026
and then filed a comment in G.R. No. 155840 before this Court.
We do not agree.
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse
judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and
possibly securing a favorable opinion in another forum, other than
by appeal or special civil action for certiorari.34 It consists of filing
multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment.35
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1)
identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the
same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted
and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of
facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars such that
any judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis
pendentia.36
Reviewing the antecedents of these consolidated cases, we note
that the CA rendered the assailed Resolution on October 18, 2002.
The Republic filed its Motion for Reconsideration on November 22,
2002. On the other hand, Rayala filed his petition before this Court
on November 21, 2002. While the Republics Motion for
Reconsideration was pending resolution before the CA, on
December 2, 2002, it was directed by this Court to file its Comment
on Rayalas petition, which it submitted on June 16, 2003.

When the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Republic

filed its own Petition for Review with this Court on July 3, 2003. It
cited in its "Certification and Verification of a Non-Forum Shopping"
(sic), that there was a case involving the same facts pending
before this Court denominated as G.R. No. 155840. With respect to
Domingos petition, the same had already been dismissed on
February 19, 2003. Domingos petition was reinstated on June 16,
2003 but the resolution was received by the OSG only on July 25,
2003, or after it had filed its own petition.37
Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the OSG is guilty of
forum shopping. We must point out that it was Rayala who filed the
petition in the CA, with the Republic as the adverse party. Rayala
himself filed a motion for reconsideration of the CAs December 21,
2001 Decision, which led to a more favorable ruling, i.e., the
lowering of the penalty from dismissal to one-year suspension. The
parties adversely affected by this ruling (Domingo and the
Republic) had the right to question the same on motion for
reconsideration. But Domingo directly filed a Petition for Review
with this Court, as did Rayala. When the Republic opted to file a
motion for reconsideration, it was merely exercising a right. That
Rayala and Domingo had by then already filed cases before the SC
did not take away this right. Thus, when this Court directed the
Republic to file its Comment on Rayalas petition, it had to comply,
even if it had an unresolved motion for reconsideration with the
CA, lest it be cited for contempt.
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the OSG "file[d] multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment."
We now proceed to discuss the substantive issues.
It is noteworthy that the five CA Justices who deliberated on the
case were unanimous in upholding the findings of the Committee
and the OP. They found the assessment made by the Committee
and the OP to be a "meticulous and dispassionate analysis of the
testimonies of the complainant (Domingo), the respondent
(Rayala), and their respective witnesses." 38 They differed only on
the appropriate imposable penalty.
That Rayala committed the acts complained of and was guilty of
sexual harassment is, therefore, the common factual finding of
not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee, the OP
and the CA. It should be remembered that when supported by
substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality
by the courts.39 The principle, therefore, dictates that such
findings should bind us.40
Indeed, we find no reason to deviate from this rule. There appears
no valid ground for this Court to review the factual findings of the
CA, the OP, and the Investigating Committee. These findings are
now conclusive on the Court. And quite significantly, Rayala
himself admits to having committed some of the acts imputed to
him.
He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual
harassment, because Domingo did not allege in her complaint that
there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a
condition for her continued employment or for her promotion to a
higher position.41 Rayala urges us to apply to his case our ruling in
Aquino v. Acosta.42
We find respondents insistence unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule,
which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer
may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action
for each can proceed independently of the others.43 This rule
applies with full force to sexual harassment.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA
7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in
this wise:

Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment

Defined. Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is
committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the
employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any
other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy
over another in a work or training or education environment,
demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the
other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement
for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment
harassment is committed when:

environment,

sexual

(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the

employment, re-employment or continued employment of said
individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant
the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the
employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or privileges
under existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive environment for the employee.
This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the
criminal aspect of the unlawful act of sexual harassment. The same
section, in relation to Section 6, authorizes the institution of an
independent civil action for damages and other affirmative relief.
Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for
administrative cases, viz.:
Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related,
Education or Training Environment. It shall be the duty of the
employer or the head of the work-related, educational or training
environment or institution, to prevent or deter the commission of
acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the
resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment.
Towards this end, the employer or head of office shall:
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation
with and jointly approved by the employees or students or
trainees, through their duly designated representatives, prescribing
the procedure for the investigation or sexual harassment cases and
the administrative sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the
proper courts for unlawful acts of sexual harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this section (a)
shall include, among others, guidelines on proper decorum in the
workplace and educational or training institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on
sexual harassment. The committee shall conduct meetings, as the
case may be, with other officers and employees, teachers,
instructors, professors, coaches, trainors and students or trainees
to increase understanding and prevent incidents of sexual
harassment. It shall also conduct the investigation of the alleged
cases constituting sexual harassment.
In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall be
composed of at least one (1) representative each from the
management, the union, if any, the employees from the
supervisory rank, and from the rank and file employees.
In the case of the educational or training institution, the committee
shall be composed of at least one (1) representative from the
administration, the trainors, teachers, instructors, professors or
coaches and students or trainees, as the case maybe.

The employer or head of office, educational or training institution

shall disseminate or post a copy of this Act for the information of
all concerned.
The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayalas culpability is not to be
determined solely on the basis of Section 3, RA 7877, because he is
charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal infraction,
of sexual harassment.44 It should be enough that the CA, along
with the Investigating Committee and the Office of the President,
found substantial evidence to support the administrative charge.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayalas acts strictly by the standards
set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be administratively liable.
It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor." But it is not necessary that the
demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in
a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with
equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and
squeezing Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her
neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with
her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise
of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable
sexual overtones all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening
clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayalas claim, it is not essential that the
demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for
continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is
enough that the respondents acts result in creating an
intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee.45
That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile
environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual
finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that
Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last
incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to
another unit.
Rayalas invocation of Aquino v. Acosta46 is misplaced, because
the factual setting in that case is different from that in the case at
bench. In Aquino, Atty. Susan Aquino, Chief of the Legal and
Technical Staff of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), charged then CTA
Presiding Judge (now Presiding Justice) Ernesto Acosta of sexual
harassment. She complained of several incidents when Judge
Acosta allegedly kissed her, embraced her, and put his arm around
her shoulder. The case was referred to CA Justice Josefina G.
Salonga for investigation. In her report, Justice Salonga found that
"the complainant failed to show by convincing evidence that the
acts of Judge Acosta in greeting her with a kiss on the cheek, in a
`beso-beso fashion, were carried out with lustful and lascivious
desires or were motivated by malice or ill motive. It is clear from
the circumstances that most of the kissing incidents were done on
festive and special occasions," and they "took place in the
presence of other people and the same was by reason of the
exaltation or happiness of the moment." Thus, Justice Salonga
concluded:
In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's pecks on the
cheeks of the complainant should be understood in the context of
having been done on the occasion of some festivities, and not the
assertion of the latter that she was singled out by Judge Acosta in
his kissing escapades. The busses on her cheeks were simply
friendly and innocent, bereft of malice and lewd design. The fact
that respondent judge kisses other people on the cheeks in the
'beso-beso' fashion, without malice, was corroborated by Atty.
Florecita P. Flores, Ms. Josephine Adalem and Ms. Ma. Fides Balili,
who stated that they usually practice 'beso-beso' or kissing on the
cheeks, as a form of greeting on occasions when they meet each
other, like birthdays, Christmas, New Year's Day and even
Valentine's Day, and it does not matter whether it is Judge Acosta's
birthday or their birthdays. Theresa Cinco Bactat, a lawyer who
belongs to complainant's department, further attested that on
occasions like birthdays, respondent judge would likewise greet her
with a peck on the cheek in a 'beso-beso' manner. Interestingly, in
one of several festive occasions, female employees of the CTA
pecked respondent judge on the cheek where Atty. Aquino was one
of Judge Acosta's well wishers.

In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed transpired on those six

occasions. Judge Acosta's acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her cheek
were merely forms of greetings, casual and customary in nature.
No evidence of intent to sexually harass complainant was
apparent, only that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were given
malicious connotations by the complainant. In fact, she did not
even relate to anyone what happened to her. Undeniably, there is
no manifest sexual undertone in all those incidents.47
This Court agreed with Justice Salonga, and Judge Acosta was
exonerated.
To repeat, this factual milieu in Aquino does not obtain in the case
at bench. While in Aquino, the Court interpreted the acts (of Judge
Acosta) as casual gestures of friendship and camaraderie, done
during festive or special occasions and with other people present,
in the instant case, Rayalas acts of holding and squeezing
Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and
tickling her ear, and the inappropriate comments, were all made in
the confines of Rayalas office when no other members of his staff
were around. More importantly, and a circumstance absent in
Aquino, Rayalas acts, as already adverted to above, produced a
hostile work environment for Domingo, as shown by her having
reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident,
filing for a leave of absence and requesting transfer to another
unit.
Rayala also argues that AO 250 does not apply to him. First, he
argues that AO 250 does not cover the NLRC, which, at the time of
the incident, was under the DOLE only for purposes of program and
policy coordination. Second, he posits that even assuming AO 250
is applicable to the NLRC, he is not within its coverage because he
is a presidential appointee.
We find, however, that the question of whether or not AO 250
covers Rayala is of no real consequence. The events of this case
unmistakably show that the administrative charges against Rayala
were for violation of RA 7877; that the OP properly assumed
jurisdiction over the administrative case; that the participation of
the DOLE, through the Committee created by the Secretary, was
limited to initiating the investigation process, reception of evidence
of the parties, preparation of the investigation report, and
recommending the appropriate action to be taken by the OP. AO
250 had never really been applied to Rayala. If it was used at all, it
was to serve merely as an auxiliary procedural guide to aid the
Committee in the orderly conduct of the investigation.
Next, Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual
harassment is an offense malum prohibitum. He argues that intent
is an essential element in sexual harassment, and since the acts
imputed to him were done allegedly without malice, he should be
absolved of the charges against him.
We reiterate that what is before us is an administrative case for
sexual harassment. Thus, whether the crime of sexual harassment
is malum in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial.
We also reject Rayalas allegations that the charges were filed
because of a conspiracy to get him out of office and thus constitute
merely political harassment. A conspiracy must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence. His bare assertions cannot stand against
the evidence presented by Domingo. As we have already ruled, the
acts imputed to Rayala have been proven as fact. Moreover, he has
not proven any ill motive on the part of Domingo and her witnesses
which would be ample reason for her to conjure stories about him.
On the contrary, ill motive is belied by the fact that Domingo and
her witnesses all employees of the NLRC at that time stood to
lose their jobs or suffer unpleasant consequences for coming
forward and charging their boss with sexual harassment.
Furthermore, Rayala decries the alleged violation of his right to due
process. He accuses the Committee on Decorum of railroading his
trial for violation of RA 7877. He also scored the OPs decision
finding him guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under the
Revised Administrative Code and not for violation of RA 7877.
Considering that he was not tried for "disgraceful and immoral
conduct," he argues that the verdict is a "sham and total nullity."

We hold that Rayala was properly accorded due process. In

previous cases, this Court held that:
[i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized
to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive
notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard
personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses
and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a
tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to
afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of
honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal
which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or
made known to the parties affected.48
The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all these
procedural due process safeguards. Although in the beginning he
questioned the authority of the Committee to try him,49 he
appeared, personally and with counsel, and participated in the
proceedings.
On the other point raised, this Court has held that, even in criminal
cases, the designation of the offense is not controlling, thus:
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part
thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law
made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged
and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged.
Every element of the offense must be stated in the information.
What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein
must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials
of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements
of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature
of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense.50
It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to
disgraceful and immoral conduct.51 Thus, any finding of liability for
sexual harassment may also be the basis of culpability for
disgraceful and immoral conduct.
With the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that Rayala
committed sexual harassment, we now determine the proper
penalty to be imposed.
Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by the OP. He alleges that
under the pertinent Civil Service Rules, disgraceful and immoral
conduct is punishable by suspension for a period of six (6) months
and one (1) day to one (1) year. He also argues that since he is
charged administratively, aggravating or mitigating circumstances
cannot be appreciated for purposes of imposing the penalty.
Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six
(6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, while the penalty for
the second offense is dismissal.52 On the other hand, Section
22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 198753 and Section 52 A(15) of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service54 both
provide that the first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is
punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one
(1) year. A second offense is punishable by dismissal.
Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office
during good behavior until he or she reaches the age of sixty-five,
unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law or becomes
incapacitated to discharge the duties of the office.55
In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper
disciplining authority, who would determine whether there is a

valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This

power, however, is qualified by the phrase "for cause as provided
by law." Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed
guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did
not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the
penalty provided by law for such offense. As cited above, the
imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative
offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral
conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1)
year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to
impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a
penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a second
offense.

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN

Z. MALTO of VIOLATION OF SECTION 5(b), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC
ACT 7610, AS AMENDED, committed as follows:

Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took

advantage of his high government position, it still could not validly
dismiss him from the service. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,56 taking undue
advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an aggravating
circumstance57 and where only aggravating and no mitigating
circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed.58 Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on
Rayala is suspension for one (1) year.

Contrary to law.[5]

Rayala holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the rank
equivalent to a CA Justice. Thus, it is not unavailing that rigid
standards of conduct may be demanded of him. In Talens-Dabon v.
Judge Arceo,59 this Court, in upholding the liability of therein
respondent Judge, said:
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that
complainant is one of his subordinates over whom he exercises
control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He took
advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful
and lascivious desires. Instead of he being in loco parentis over his
subordinate employees, respondent was the one who preyed on
them, taking advantage of his superior position.
In yet another case, this Court declared:
As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more exacting
work ethics. He failed to live up to his higher standard of
responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And
when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate,
he provides a justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of trust
and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every employer to
protect its employees from oversexed superiors.60
It is incumbent upon the head of office to set an example on how
his employees should conduct themselves in public office, so that
they may work efficiently in a healthy working atmosphere.
Courtesy demands that he should set a good example.61
Rayala has thrown every argument in the book in a vain effort to
effect his exoneration. He even puts Domingos character in
question and casts doubt on the morality of the former President
who ordered, albeit erroneously, his dismissal from the service.
Unfortunately for him, these are not significant factors in the
disposition of the case. It is his character that is in question here
and sadly, the inquiry showed that he has been found wanting.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the October 18,
2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 is
AFFIRMED. Consequently, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 155831,
155840, and 158700 are DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs
John Malto v People
This is a petition for review[1] of the decision[2] dated July 30,
2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25925
affirming with modification the decision[3] of Branch 109 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 00-0691
which found petitioner Michael John Z. Malto guilty for violation of
paragraph 3, Section 5(a), Article III of RA 7610,[4] as amended.
Petitioner was originally charged in an information which read:

That on or about and sometime during the month of November

1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induce and/or seduce his
student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17
years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse for several times with
him as in fact said accused had carnal knowledge.

This was subsequently amended as follows:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN
Z. MALTO of VIOLATION OF SECTION 5(a), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC
ACT 7610, AS AMENDED, committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime during the month of November
1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage and exert
influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and induce and/or
seduce his student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a
minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse and
lascivious conduct for several times with him as in fact said
accused has carnal knowledge.
Contrary to law.[6]
Petitioner did not make a plea when arraigned; hence, the trial
court entered for him a plea of not guilty. After the mandatory pretrial, trial on the merits proceeded.
The prosecution established the following:
At the time of the incident, private complainant AAA was 17 years
old.[7] She was a college student at the Assumption College in San
Lorenzo Village, Makati City. Petitioner, then 28, was her professor
in her Philosophy II class in the first semester of the school year
1997 to 1998.
On July 18, 1997, AAA was having lunch with her friends when
petitioner joined their group. He told them to address him simply
as Mike. He handed them his organizer and asked them to list
down their names and contact numbers.
On October 3, 1997, while AAA and her friends were discussing the
movie Kama Sutra, petitioner butted in and bragged that it was
nothing compared to his collection of xxx-rated films. To the shock
of AAAs group, he lectured on and demonstrated sexual acts he
had already experienced. He then invited the group to view his
collection.
On October 10, 1997, petitioner reiterated his invitation to AAA and
her friends to watch his collection of pornographic films. Afraid of
offending petitioner, AAA and two of her friends went with him.
They rode in his car and he brought them to the Anito Lodge on
Harrison St. in Pasay City. They checked in at a calesa room.
Petitioner was disappointed when he found out there was neither a
video cassette player (on which he could play his video tapes) nor
an x-rated show on the closed-circuit television. He suggested that
they just cuddle up together. AAA and her friends ignored him but
he pulled each of them towards him to lie with him in bed. They
resisted until he relented.
AAA and her friends regretted having accepted petitioners
invitation. For fear of embarrassment in case their classmates got
wind of what happened, they agreed to keep things a secret.
Meanwhile, petitioner apologized for his actuations.
Thereafter, petitioner started to show AAA amorous attention. He
called her on the phone and paged[8] her romantic messages at
least thrice a day. When semestral break came, his calls and

messages became more frequent. Their conversation always

started innocently but he had a way of veering the subject to sex.
Young, naive and coming from a broken family, AAA was soon
overwhelmed by petitioners persistence and slowly got attracted to
him. He was the first person to court her. Soon, they had a mutual
understanding and became sweethearts.
When AAA secured her class card in Philosophy II at the start of the
second semester, petitioner told her that he gave her a final grade
of 3. She protested, stating that her mid-term grade was 1.2. He
gave her a grade of 1.5 when she promised not to disclose his
intimate messages to her to anyone. He also cautioned her not to
tell anyone about their affair as it could jeopardize his job.

On November 29, 1997, he attended AAAs 18th birthday party.

That was the last time he saw her.

On November 19, 1997, at around 11:00 a.m., AAA agreed to have

lunch with petitioner outside the premises of the college. Since she
was not feeling well at that time, he asked her to lie down in the
backseat of his car. She was surprised when he brought her to
Queensland Lodge[9] on Harrison St. in Pasay City. Once inside the
motel room, he kissed her at the back and neck, touched her
breasts and placed his hand inside her blouse. She resisted his
advances but he was too strong for her. He stopped only when she
got angry at him.
On November 26, 1997, petitioner asked AAA to come with him so
that they could talk in private. He again brought her to Queensland
Lodge. As soon as they were inside the room, he took off his shirt,
lay down in bed and told her, halika na, dito na tayo mag-usap. She
refused but he dragged her towards the bed, kissed her lips, neck
and breasts and unsnapped her brassiere. She struggled to stop
him but he overpowered her. He went on top of her, lowered her
pants and touched her private part. He tried to penetrate her but
she pushed him away forcefully and she sat up in bed. He hugged
her tightly saying, Sige na, AAA, pumayag ka na, I wont hurt you.
She refused and said, Mike, ayoko. He angrily stood up saying,
Fine, hindi na tayo mag-uusap. Dont come to the faculty room
anymore. You know I need this and if you will not give in or give it
to me, let us end this. She replied, Mike, hindi pa ako ready and it
was you who said it will be after my debut on December 3, 1997.
He insisted that there was no difference between having sex then
and after her debut. He told her, kung hindi ko makukuha ngayon,
tapusin na natin ngayon. Pressured and afraid of his threat to end
their relationship, she hesitantly replied Fine. On hearing this, he
quickly undressed while commenting ibibigay mo rin pala,
pinahirapan mo pa ako and laughed. They had sexual intercourse.
In July 1999, AAA ended her relationship with petitioner. She
learned that he was either intimately involved with or was sexually
harassing his students in Assumption College and in other colleges
where he taught. In particular, he was dismissed from the De La
Salle University-Aguinaldo for having sexual relations with a
student and sexually harassing three other students. His
employment was also terminated by Assumption College for
sexually harassing two of his students. It was then that AAA
realized that she was actually abused by petitioner. Depressed and
distressed, she confided all that happened between her and
petitioner to her mother, BBB.

The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to
sustain petitioners conviction. On March 7, 2001, it rendered a
decision finding petitioner guilty.[10] The dispositive portion read:

On learning what her daughter underwent in the hands of

petitioner, BBB filed an administrative complaint in Assumption
College against him. She also lodged a complaint in the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Pasay City which led to the filing of Criminal
Case No. 00-0691.
In his defense, petitioner proffered denial and alibi. He claimed that
the alleged incidents on October 3, 1997 and October 10, 1997 did
not happen. He spent October 3, 1997 with his colleagues Joseph
Hipolito and AJ Lagaso while he was busy checking papers and
computing grades on October 10, 1997. The last time he saw AAA
during the first semester was when she submitted her final paper
on October 18, 1997.
On November 19, 1997, between 10:30 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., he
sorted out conflicts of class schedules for the second semester at
the Assumption College. On November 26, 1997, he was at St.
Scholasticas College (where he was also teaching) preparing a
faculty concert slated on December 12, 1997. At lunch time, he
attended the birthday treat of a colleague, Evelyn Bancoro.

According to petitioner, AAA became his sweetheart when she was

already 19 years old and after he was dismissed from Assumption
College. On December 27 and 28, 1998, they spent time together,
shared their worries, problems and dreams and kissed each other.
On January 3, 1999, he brought her to Queensland Lodge where
they had sexual intercourse for the first time. It was repeated for at
least 20 times from January 1999 until they broke up in July 1999,
some of which were done at either his or her house when no one
was around.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Michael John
Malto y Zarsadias guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Article III, Section 5(a)[,] paragraph 3 of RA 7610[,] as amended
and hereby sentences him to reclusion temporal in its medium
period or an imprisonment of seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay civil
indemnity in the amount of Php 75,000.00 and moral and
exemplary damages of Php 50,000.00 to minor complainant with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.[11]

Petitioner questioned the trial courts decision in the CA. In a

decision dated July 30, 2004,[12] the appellate court affirmed his
conviction even if it found that his acts were not covered by
paragraph (a) but by paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA
7610. It further observed that the trial court failed to fix the
minimum term of indeterminate sentence imposed on him. It also
ruled that the trial court erred in awarding P75,000 civil indemnity
in favor of AAA as it was proper only in a conviction for rape
committed under the circumstances under which the death penalty
was authorized by law.[13] Hence, the CA modified the decision of
the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of conviction is AFFIRMED,
with the MODIFICATION that (1) appellant MICHAEL JOHN MALTO y
ZARSADIAS is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor as minimum, to
Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of reclusion
temporal as maximum; and (2) the sum of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity is DELETED.[14]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in sustaining his conviction
although it found that he did not rape AAA. For him, he should
have been acquitted since there was no rape. He also claims that
he and AAA were sweethearts and their sexual intercourse was
consensual.
Petitioner is wrong.
THE OFFENSE STATED IN THE INFORMATION WAS WRONGLY
DESIGNATED
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[15]
Pursuant thereto, the complaint or information against him should
be sufficient in form and substance. A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of
the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place
where the offense was committed.[16]
The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating

circumstances.[17] If there is no designation of the offense,

reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it.[18] The acts or omissions constituting the offense and
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in
ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language
used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as
well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the
court to pronounce judgment.[19]
The designation of the offense in the information against petitioner
was changed from violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 to
violation of Section 5(a), Article III thereof. Paragraphs (a) and (b)
of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provide:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children,
whether male or female, who, for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
(a)
Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child
prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the following:
1.

Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;

2.
Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by
means of written or oral advertisements or other similar means;
3.
Taking advantage of influence or relationship to
procure a child as a prostitute;
4.
Threatening or using violence towards a child to
engage him as a prostitute; or
5.
Giving monetary consideration, goods or other
pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in
prostitution.
(b)
Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336
of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, that the penalty
for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
The elements of paragraph (a) are:
1.
the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or
induces child prostitution;
2.
the act is done through, but not limited to, the
following means:
a.
acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
b.
inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by
means of written or oral advertisements or other similar means;
c.
taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure
a child as a prostitute;
d.
threatening or using violence towards a child to engage
him as a prostitute or

e.
giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary
benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in prostitution;
3.
the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in
prostitution and
4.
the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years
of age.
On the other hand, the elements of paragraph (b) are:
1.
the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct;
2.
the act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse and
3.
the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years
of age.
Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected
with child prostitution. It contemplates sexual abuse of a child
exploited in prostitution. In other words, under paragraph (a), the
child is abused primarily for profit.
On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution but
also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only
a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a
child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.[20]
The information against petitioner did not allege anything
pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It did not aver
that AAA was abused for profit. What it charged was that petitioner
had carnal knowledge or committed sexual intercourse and
lascivious conduct with AAA; AAA was induced and/or seduced by
petitioner who was her professor to indulge in sexual intercourse
and lascivious conduct and AAA was a 17-year old minor. These
allegations support a charge for violation of paragraph (b), not
paragraph (a), of Section 5, Article III, RA 7610.

THE REAL NATURE OF THE OFFENSE IS DETERMINED BY FACTS

ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION, NOT BY THE DESIGNATION

The designation in the information of the specific statute violated is

imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the
opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. However, the
failure to designate the offense by statute,[21] or to mention the
specific provision penalizing the act,[22] or an erroneous
specification of the law violated[23] does not vitiate the
information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting
the crime charged.[24] What controls is not the title of the
information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts
recited in the information.[25] In other words, it is the recital of
facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the
offense, that determines the crime being charged in the
information.[26]
The facts stated in the amended information against petitioner
correctly made out a charge for violation of Section 5(b), Article III,
RA 7610. Thus, even if the trial and appellate courts followed the
wrong designation of the offense, petitioner could be convicted of
the offense on the basis of the facts recited in the information and
duly proven during trial.

PETITIONER VIOLATED SECTION 5(B), ARTICLE III OF RA 7610, AS

AMENDED

The first element of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertains to

the act or acts committed by the accused. The second element

refers to the state or condition of the offended party. The third

element corresponds to the minority or age of the offended party.
The first element was present in this case. Petitioner committed
lascivious conduct against and had sexual intercourse with AAA in
the following instances: (1) on November 19, 1997, when he kissed
her at the back and neck, touched her breasts and placed his hand
inside her blouse to gratify his lust; (2) on November 26, 1997,
when, with lewd designs, he dragged her towards the bed of the
motel room and forcibly kissed her on the lips, neck and breasts
and (3) when he exerted moral influence on her and pressured her
until she surrendered herself to him on November 26, 1997. His
acts were covered by the definitions of sexual abuse and lascivious
conduct under Section 2(g) and (h) of the Rules and Regulations on
the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases promulgated
to implement the provisions of RA 7610, particularly on child
abuse:

VIOLATION OF SECTION 5(B), ARTICLE III OF RA 7610 AND RAPE

ARE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT CRIMES
Petitioner was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5(b),
Article III of RA 7610, not rape. The offense for which he was
convicted is punished by a special law while rape is a felony under
the Revised Penal Code.[28] They have different elements.[29] The
two are separate and distinct crimes. Thus, petitioner can be held
liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 despite a
finding that he did not commit rape.

CONSENT OF THE CHILD IS IMMATERIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES

INVOLVING VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE III OF RA 7610

(g) Sexual abuse includes the employment, use, persuasion,

inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or
assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children;

Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and touches and
consented to have sexual intercourse with him. They engaged in
these acts out of mutual love and affection. But may the
sweetheart theory be invoked in cases of child prostitution and
other sexual abuse prosecuted under Section 5, Article III of RA
7610? No.

(h) Lascivious conduct means the intentional touching, either

directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade,
or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or public area of
a person. (emphasis supplied)

The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape,

felonies committed against or without the consent of the victim. It
operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It
requires proof that the accused and the victim were lovers and that
she consented to the sexual relations.[30]

The second element was likewise present here. The following

pronouncement in People v. Larin[27] is significant:

For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child

abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is
unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with
another person.

A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other

sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration;
or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group. (emphasis supplied)

The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish

On November 19, 1997, due to the influence of petitioner, AAA

indulged in lascivious acts with or allowed him to commit lascivious
acts on her. This was repeated on November 26, 1997 on which
date AAA also indulged in sexual intercourse with petitioner as a
result of the latters influence and moral ascendancy. Thus, she was
deemed to be a child subjected to other sexual abuse as the
concept is defined in the opening paragraph of Section 5, Article III
of RA 7610 and in Larin.
The third element of the offense was also satisfied. Section 3 (a),
Article I of RA 7610 provides:

Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving

violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having
sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child
who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse
constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is
proscribed.

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.

(a) Children refers [to] persons below eighteen (18) years of age
those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves
protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability
condition; (emphasis supplied)

or
or
or
or

On November 19, 2007 and November 26, 2007, AAA was a child
as she was below 18 years of age. She was therefore within the
protective mantle of the law.
Since all three elements of the crime were present, the conviction
of petitioner was proper.

[t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious

conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse.

A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws.[31]

This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as
she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or
import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of
their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully.
[32] Those of tender years deserve its protection.[33]
The harm which results from a childs bad decision in a sexual
encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad
business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful
consequences[34] of her attempts at adult sexual behavior.[35] For
this reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly
consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the
act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford
her special protection
against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be
justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as
fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is presumed
by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious
act or sexual intercourse.[36]

This must be so if we are to be true to the constitutionally

enshrined State policy to promote the physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual and social well-being of the youth.[37] This is
consistent with the declared policy of the State
[T]o provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development; provide sanctions for
their commission and carry out a program for prevention and
deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse,
exploitation, and discrimination.[38] (emphasis supplied)
as well as to
intervene on behalf of the child when the parents, guardian,
teacher or person having care or custody of the child fails or is
unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation, and
discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed
by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and
custody of the same.[39] (emphasis supplied)
This is also in harmony with the foremost consideration of the
childs best interests in all actions concerning him or her.
The best interest of children shall be the paramount consideration
in all actions concerning them, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the principles of
First Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted
to promote the welfare of children and enhance their opportunities
for a useful and happy life.[40] (emphasis supplied)
PETITIONER MAY ENJOY THE BENEFITS OF THE INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE LAW
The penalty prescribed for violation of the provisions of Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua. In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion temporal
in its maximum period, the medium of the penalty prescribed by
the law.[41] Notwithstanding that RA 7610 is a special law,
petitioner may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law.[42] Since the penalty provided in RA 7610 is taken from the
range of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, it is covered by the
first clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[43]
Thus, he is entitled to a maximum term which should be within the
range of the proper imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period (ranging from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20
years) and a minimum term to be taken within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the law: prision mayor in
its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period
(ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months).
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES SHOULD BE MODIFIED
The trial court awarded AAA P75,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as
moral and exemplary damages. The CA deleted the award for civil
indemnity. It correctly reasoned that the award was proper only in
a conviction for rape committed under the circumstances under
which the death penalty is authorized by law. Consistent, however,
with the objective of RA 7610 to afford children special protection
against abuse, exploitation and discrimination and with the
principle that every person who contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for
the same,[44] civil indemnity to the child is proper in a case
involving violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610. Every
person criminally liable is civilly liable.[45] The rule is that, in
crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all
damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the
act or omission complained of.[46] Thus, P50,000 civil indemnity ex
delicto shall be awarded in cases of violation of Section 5(b), Article
III of RA 7610.[47]
Moreover, the CA erred in affirming the grant of P50,000 as moral
and exemplary damages. The rule is that, in every case, trial courts
must specify the award of each item of damages and make a

finding thereon in the body of the decision.[48] Thus, moral

damages and exemplary damages should be separate items of
award.
AAA testified that she was emotionally devastated and lost touch
of her inner self as a result of what petitioner did to her. Because of
the mental anxiety and wounded feelings caused by petitioner to
her, she had several sessions with the dean for student affairs[49]
and the guidance counselor of Assumption College as well as with
a psychiatrist. This was corroborated by her mother and the dean
of student affairs of Assumption College. Thus, she is entitled to
moral damages of P50,000. However, in the absence of an
aggravating circumstance, the grant of exemplary damages is
unwarranted.[50]
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. Petitioner Michael John
Z. Malto is hereby found guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of
RA 7610, as amended, for which he is sentenced to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum. He is further ordered to pay AAA P50,000
as civil indemnity and P50,000 for moral damages.
Costs against petitioner.
MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007
Corona, J.
Doctrine:
The sweetheart theory cannot be invoked for purposes of sexual
intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA
7610. Consent is immaterial because the mere act of having sexual
intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is
subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. Moreover, a
child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent
to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.
Facts:
Sometime during the month of November 1997 to 1998, Malto
seduced his student, AAA, a minor, to indulge in sexual intercourse
several times with him. Prior to the incident, petitioner and AAA
had a mutual understanding and became sweethearts. Pressured
and afraid of the petitioners threat to end their relationship, AAA
succumbed and both had sexual intercourse.
Upon discovery of what AAA underwent, BBB, AAAs mother lodged
a complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City which
led to the filing of Criminal Case No. 00-0691.
The petitioner did not make a plea when arraigned. Hence, the trial
court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The trial court found
the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain petitioners
conviction. The trail court rendered a decision finding petitioner
guilty and sentenced him to reclusion temporal and to pay an
indemnity of Php. 75,000 and damages of Php. 50,000.
Petitioner questioned the trial courts decision in the CA. The CA
modified the decision of the trial court. The appellate court
affirmed his conviction and ruled that the trial court erred in
awarding Php. 75,000 civil indemnity in favor of AAA as it was
proper only in a conviction for rape committed under the
circumstances under which the death penalty was authorized by
law.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in sustaining petitioners conviction on the
grounds that there was no rape committed since their sexual
intercourse was consensual by reason of their sweetheart
relationship
Held:
No. The sweetheart theory cannot be invoked for purposes of
sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases
under RA 7610. Consent is immaterial because the mere act of
having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a
child who is subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense.

Moreover, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving

rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.
People v. Shirley Casio
Chicks mo dong?1
With this sadly familiar question being used on the streets of many
of our cities, the fate of many desperate women is sealed and their
futures vanquished. This case resulted in the rescue of two minors
from this pernicious practice. Hopefully, there will be more rescues.
Trafficking in persons is a deplorable crime. It is committed even
though the minor knew about or consented to the act of trafficking.
This case involves Republic Act No. 9208,2 otherwise known as the
Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.3
Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of Republic
Act No. 9208, Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a). The
information
against
accused,
dated
May
5,
2008,
states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 3rd day of May 2008, at about 1:00 oclock
A.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, with
intent to gain, did then and there hire and/or recruit AAA, a minor,
17 years old and BBB for the purpose of prostitution and sexual
exploitation, by acting as their procurer for different customers, for
money, profit or any other consideration, in Violation of Sec. 4, Par.
(a), Qualified by Sec. 6, Par. ( a), of R.A. 9208 (Qualified Trafficking
in Persons).
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The facts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, are
as follows:
On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM),5 a nongovernmental organization, coordinated with the police in order to
entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City.6
Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe
Altubar, PO1 Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso composed
the team of police operatives.7 PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso were
designated as decoys, pretending to be tour guides looking for girls
to entertain their guests.8 IJM provided them with marked money,
which was recorded in the police blotter.9
The team went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and 25.
These rooms were adjacent to each other. Room 24 was designated
for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of the police
team.10
PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in
Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu Citys red light district. Accused
noticed them and called their attention by saying Chicks mo
dong? (Do you like girls, guys?).11
During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso testified that their
conversation
with
accused
went
as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accused: Chicks mo dong? (Do you like girls, guys?)
PO1 Luardo:
Unya mga bag-o? Kanang batan-on kay naa mi
guests naghulat sa motel. (Are they new? They must be young
because we have guests waiting at the motel.)
Accused: Naa, hulat kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait and Ill get
them.)12
At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI Ylanan that
they found a prospective subject.13
After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB, private
complainants in this case.14
Accused:
Kining duha kauyon mo ani? (Are you satisfied with these two?)
PO1 Veloso:
Maayo man kaha na sila modala ug kayat? (Well, are they good in
sex?)15

Accused gave the assurance that the girls were good in sex. PO1
Luardo inquired how much their services would cost. Accused
replied, Tag kinientos (P500.00).16
PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo convinced accused to come with them
to Queensland Motel. Upon proceeding to Room 24, PO1 Veloso
handed the marked money to accused.17
As accused counted the money, PO1 Veloso gave PSI Ylanan a
missed call. This was their pre-arranged signal. The rest of the
team proceeded to Room 24, arrested accused, and informed her
of her constitutional rights. The police confiscated the marked
money from accused.18 Meanwhile, AAA and BBB were brought to
Room 25 and placed in the custody of the representatives from the
IJM and the DSWD.19
During trial, AAA testified that she was born on January 27, 1991.
This statement was supported by a copy of her certificate of live
birth.20
AAA narrated that in 2007, she worked as a house helper in
Mandaue City. In March 2008 she stopped working as a house
helper and transferred to Cebu City. She stayed with her cousin,
but she subsequently moved to a boarding house. It was there
where she met her friend, Gee Ann. AAA knew that Gee Ann
worked in a disco club. When Gee Ann found out that AAA was no
longer a virgin, she offered AAA work. AAA agreed because she
needed the money in order to help her father. AAA recalled that
she had sex with her first customer. She was paid P200.00 and
given an additional P500.00 as tip. For the first few weeks, Gee Ann
provided customers for AAA. Eventually, Gee Ann brought her to
Barangay Kamagayan, telling her that there were more customers
in that area.21
AAA stated that she knew accused was a pimp because AAA would
usually see her pimping girls to customers in Barangay
Kamagayan.22 AAA further testified that on May 2, 2008, accused
solicited her services for a customer. That was the first time that
she was pimped by accused.23 Accused brought her, BBB, and a
certain Jocelyn to Queensland Motel.24
AAA testified that Jocelyn stayed in the taxi, while she and BBB
went to Room 24. It was in Room 24 where the customer paid
Shirley. The police rushed in and told AAA and BBB to go to the
other room. AAA was then met by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development personnel who informed her that she was
rescued and not arrested.25
AAA described that her job as a prostitute required her to display
herself, along with other girls, between 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. She
received P400.00 for every customer who selected her.26
The prosecution also presented the police operatives during trial.
PSI Ylanan, SPO1 Mendaros, and SPO1 Altubar testified that after
PO1 Veloso had made the missed call to PSI Ylanan, they rushed
to Room 24 and arrested the accused.27 SPO1 Altubar retrieved
the marked money worth P1,000.00 from accuseds right hand
and upon instruction from PCINSP Ylanan recorded the same at
the police blotter prior operation. . . .28
The trial court noted that AAA requested assistance from the IJM
in conducting the operation against the accused.29
Version of the accused
In defense, accused testified that she worked as a laundrywoman.
On the evening of May 2, 2008, she went out to buy supper. While
walking, she was stopped by two men on board a blue car. The two
men asked her if she knew someone named Bingbing. She replied
that she only knew Gingging but not Bingbing. The men informed
her that they were actually looking for Gingging, gave her a piece
of paper with a number written on it, and told her to tell Gingging
to bring companions. When accused arrived home, she contacted
Gingging. Gingging convinced her to come because allegedly, she
would be given money by the two males.30
Ruling of the trial court

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City found accused

guilty
beyond
reasonable
doubt
and
held31
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accused had consummated the act of trafficking of person[s] . . .
as defined under paragraph (a), Section 3 of R.A. 9208 for the
purpose of letting her engage in prostitution as defined under
paragraph [c] of the same Section; the act of sexual intercourse
need not have been consummated for the mere transaction i.e.
the solicitation for sex and the handing over of the bust money
of Php1,000.00 already consummated the said act.
....
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused, SHIRLEY A. CASIO, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of trafficking in persons under paragraph
(a), Section 4 as qualified under paragraph (a), Section 6 of R.A.
9208 and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of TWENTY (20) YEARS
and to pay a fine of ONE MILLION (Php1,000,000.00).
Finally, accused is ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.
SO ORDERED[.]32
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but
modified the fine and awarded moral damages. The dispositive
portion of the decision33 reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal
is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 10 August 2010
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in
Crim. Case No. CBU-83122 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The
accused-appellant is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and a fine of Php2,000,000 and is ordered to pay
each of the private complainants Php150,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.34
Accused filed a notice of appeal35 on August 28, 2013, which the
Court of Appeals noted and gave due course in its resolution36
dated January 6, 2014.
The case records of CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 01490 were received by
this court on March 17, 2014.37
In the resolution38 dated April 29, 2014, this court resolved to
notify the parties that they may file their respective supplemental
briefs within 30 days from notice. This court also required the
Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women to confirm
the confinement of accused.39
Counsel for accused40 and the Office of the Solicitor General41
filed their respective manifestations, stating that they would no
longer file supplemental briefs considering that all issues had been
discussed in the appellants brief and appellees brief filed before
the Court of Appeals. Through a letter42 dated June 17, 2014,
Superintendent IV Rachel D. Ruelo confirmed accuseds
confinement at the Correctional Institution for Women since
October 27, 2010.
The sole issue raised by accused is whether the prosecution was
able to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
However, based on the arguments raised in accuseds brief, the
sole issue may be dissected into the following:
(1)
Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the police was
valid, considering that there was no prior surveillance and the
police did not know the subject of the operation;43
(2)
Whether the prosecution was able to prove accuseds guilt beyond
reasonable doubt even though there was no evidence presented to
show that accused has a history of engaging in human
trafficking;44 and
(3)
Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking in persons,
considering that AAA admitted that she works as a prostitute.45

Arguments of accused
Accused argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, she
was instigated into committing the crime.46 The police did not
conduct prior surveillance and did not even know who their subject
was.47 Neither did the police know the identities of the alleged
victims.
Accused further argues that under the subjective test, she should
be acquitted because the prosecution did not present evidence
that would prove she had a history of engaging in human
trafficking or any other offense. She denied being a pimp and
asserted that she was a laundrywoman.48 In addition, AAA
admitted that she worked as a prostitute. Thus, it was her decision
to display herself to solicit customers.49
Arguments of the plaintiff-appellee
The Office of the Solicitor General, counsel for plaintiff-appellee
People of the Philippines, argued that the trial court did not err in
convicting accused because witnesses positively identified her as
the person who solicited customers and received money for AAA
and BBB.50 Entrapment operations are valid and have been
recognized by courts.51 Likewise, her arrest in flagrante delicto is
valid.52 Hence, the trial court was correct in stating that accused
had fully consummated the act of trafficking of persons. . .53
We affirm accused Shirley A. Casios conviction.
I.
Background of Republic Act No. 9208
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime (UN CTOC) was adopted and opened for signature,
ratification and accession54 on November 15, 2000. The UN CTOC
is supplemented by three protocols: (1) the Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children; (2) the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by
Land, Sea and Air; and, (3) the Protocol against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and
Components and Ammunition.55
On December 14, 2000, the Philippines signed the United Nations
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children (Trafficking Protocol).56 This was
ratified by the Philippine Senate on September 30, 2001.57 The
Trafficking Protocols entry into force was on December 25,
2003.58
In the Trafficking Protocol,
as:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article 3

human

trafficking

is

defined

Use of terms
For the purposes of this Protocol:
(a) Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a
position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services,
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of
organs;
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended
exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be
irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a)
have been used;

(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt

of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered
trafficking in persons even if this does not involve any of the
means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;
(d) Child shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.
Senator Loren Legarda, in her sponsorship speech, stated that the
Anti-Trafficking Act will serve as the enabling law of the countrys
commitment to [the] protocol.59
Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada also delivered a sponsorship speech
and
described
trafficking
in
persons
as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Trafficking in human beings, if only to emphasize the gravity of its
hideousness, is tantamount to modern-day slavery at work. It is a
manifestation of one of the most flagrant forms of violence against
human beings. Its victims suffer the brunt of this insidious form of
violence. It is exploitation, coercion, deception, abduction, rape,
physical, mental and other forms of abuse, prostitution, forced
labor, and indentured servitude.
....
As of this time, we have signed the following: the Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the
1995 Convention on the Rights of the Child; the United Nations
Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and their Families;
and the United Nations Resolution on Trafficking in Women and
Girls, among others.

the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the

consent of a person having control over another; and
(3)
The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the
removal or sale of organs.63
On January 28, 2013, Republic Act No. 1036464 was approved,
otherwise known as the Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act
of 2012. Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 was amended by
Republic Act No. 10364 as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:
(a) Trafficking in Persons refers to the recruitment, obtaining,
hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining,
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victims
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means
of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage
of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which
includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

II.

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or

receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation or when the
adoption is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative
purposes shall also be considered as trafficking in persons even if
it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in
persons have been expanded to include the following
acts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1)
The act of recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,
transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victims consent or knowledge, within
or across national borders;
(2)
The means used include by means of threat, or use of force, or
other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of
power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person
(3)
The purpose of trafficking includes the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by
accused when their services were peddled to the police who acted
as decoys.65 AAA was a child at the time that accused peddled her
services.66 AAA also stated that she agreed to work as a prostitute
because she needed money.67 Accused took advantage of AAAs
vulnerability as a child and as one who need money, as proven by
the testimonies of the witnesses.68

Elements of trafficking in persons

III.

The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its

definition under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1)
The act of recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or
receipt of persons with or without the victims consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders.
(2)
The means used which include threat or use of force, or other
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or
of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or,

Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic

Act No. 9208.

Moreover, we have also expressed our support for the United

Nations Convention Against Organized Crime, including the
Trafficking Protocol in October last year.
At first glance, it appears that we are very responsive to the
problem. So it seems.
Despite these international agreements, we have yet to come up
with a law that shall squarely address human trafficking.60
During the interpellation of Republic Act No. 9208, then numbered
as Senate Bill No. 2444, Senator Teresa Aquino-Oreta asked if there
was a necessity for an anti-trafficking law when other laws exist
that cover trafficking.61
Senator
Luisa
Ejercito
Estrada
explained:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At present, Mr. President, the relevant laws to the trafficking issue
are the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipino Act, R[epublic] A[ct] No. 6955 or the
Mail-Order Bride Act, and Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine
Passport Act. These laws address issues such as illegal recruitment,
prostitution, falsification of public documents and the mail-order
bride scheme. These laws do not respond to the issue of recruiting,
harboring or transporting persons resulting in prostitution, forced
labor, slavery and slavery-like practices. They only address to one
or some elements of trafficking independent of their results or
consequence.62 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Republic Act No. 9208 was enacted in order to fully address
the issue of human trafficking. Republic Act No. 9208 was passed
on May 12, 2003, and approved on May 26, 2003.

Accused claims that AAA admitted engaging in prostitution even

before May 2, 2008. She concludes that AAA was predisposed to
having sex with customers for money.69 For liability under our
law, this argument is irrelevant. As defined under Section 3(a) of
Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in persons can still be committed
even if the victim gives consent.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:
Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation,
transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the

victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by

means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs.
The recruitment transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a
child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as
trafficking in persons even if it does not involve any of the means
set forth in the preceding paragraph.70 (Emphasis supplied)
The victims consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive,
abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human
trafficking.71 Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or
deceptive means, a minors consent is not given out of his or her
own free will.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208 enumerates the different acts of
trafficking in persons. Accused was charged under Section 4(a),
which states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. It shall be unlawful for any
person, natural or judicial, to commit any of the following acts.
a. To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a
person by any means, including those done under the pretext of
domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for
the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,
forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;72
Republic Act No. 9208 further enumerates the instances when the
crime of trafficking in persons is qualified.
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. The following are
considered as qualified trafficking:
When the trafficked person is a child;
When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043,
otherwise known as the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 and
said adoption is for the purpose of prostitution, pornography,
sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage;
When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale.
Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with
one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group;
When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a
person who exercise authority over the trafficked person or when
the offense is committed by a public officer or employee;
When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution
with any member of the military or law enforcement agencies;
When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement
agencies; and
When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons,
the offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is
afflicted with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). (Emphasis supplied)73
Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 defines child
as:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:
b.
Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one
who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or
protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition.74
Based on the definition of trafficking in persons and the
enumeration of acts of trafficking in persons, accused performed
all the elements in the commission of the offense when she
peddled AAA and BBB and offered their services to decoys PO1

Veloso and PO1 Luardo in exchange for money. The offense was
also qualified because the trafficked persons were minors.
Here, AAA testified as to how accused solicited her services for the
customers waiting at Queensland Motel. AAA also testified that she
was only 17 years old when accused peddled her. Her certificate of
live birth was presented as evidence to show that she was born on
January 27, 1991.
The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
accused committed the offense of trafficking in persons, qualified
by the fact that one of the victims was a child. As held by the trial
court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he act of sexual intercourse need not have been
consummated for the mere transaction i.e. that solicitation for
sex and the handing over of the bust money of Php.1,000.00
already consummated the said act.75
IV.
Validity of the entrapment operation
In People v. Doria,76 this court discussed the objective test and the
subjective test to determine whether there was a valid entrapment
operation:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
. . . American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the
subjective or origin of intent test laid down in Sorrells v. United
States to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The
focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit
the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination before his
initial exposure to government agents. All relevant facts such as
the accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses,
activities, his eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation,
etc., are considered to assess his state of mind before the crime.
The predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to
commit the offense rather than the officer's misconduct and
reflects an attempt to draw a line between a trap for the unwary
innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal. If the accused was
found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any
favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail even if a
police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement.
Some states, however, have adopted the objective test. . . . Here,
the court considers the nature of the police activity involved and
the propriety of police conduct. The inquiry is focused on the
inducements used by government agents, on police conduct, not
on the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime. For the
goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct. The test of
entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent
was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one
who is ready and willing, to commit the offense; for purposes of
this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person would normally
resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the
simple opportunity to act unlawfully. (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)77
Accused argued that in our jurisprudence, courts usually apply the
objective test in determining the whether there was an entrapment
operation or an instigation.78 However, the use of the objective
test should not preclude courts from also applying the subjective
test. She pointed out that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Applying the subjective test it is worth invoking that accusedappellant procures income from being a laundry woman. The
prosecution had not shown any proof evidencing accusedappellants history in human trafficking or engagement in any
offense. She is not even familiar to the team who had has [sic]
been apprehending human traffickers for quite some time.79
(Citations omitted)
Accused further argued that the police should have conducted a
prior surveillance before the entrapment operation.
Time and again, this court has discussed the difference between
entrapment and instigation. In Chang v. People,80 this court
explained that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes
to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual
commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused is
induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the
two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the

mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and
the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the
law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to
the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.81
Accused contends that using the subjective test, she was clearly
instigated by the police to commit the offense. She denied being a
pimp and claimed that she earned her living as a laundrywoman.
On this argument, we agree with the finding of the Court of
Appeals:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[I]t was the accused-appellant who commenced the transaction
with PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso by calling their attention on
whether they wanted girls for that evening, and when the officers
responded, it was the accused-appellant who told them to wait
while she would fetch the girls for their perusal.82
This shows that accused was predisposed to commit the offense
because she initiated the transaction. As testified by PO1 Veloso
and PO1 Luardo, accused called out their attention by saying
Chicks mo dong? If accused had no predisposition to commit the
offense, then she most likely would not have asked PO1 Veloso and
PO1 Luardo if they wanted girls.

Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which

states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:

The entrapment would still be valid using the objective test. The
police merely proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay
Kamagayan. It was accused who asked them whether they wanted
girls. There was no illicit inducement on the part of the police for
the accused to commit the crime.

(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;

When accused was arrested, she was informed of her constitutional

rights.83 The marked money retrieved from her was recorded in
the police blotter prior to the entrapment operation and was
presented in court as evidence.84
On accuseds alibi that she was merely out to buy her supper that
night, the Court of Appeals noted that accused never presented
Gingging in court. Thus, her alibi was unsubstantiated and cannot
be given credence.85
With regard to the lack of prior surveillance, prior surveillance is
not a condition for an entrapment operations validity.86 In People
v. Padua87 this court underscored the value of flexibility in police
operations:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an
entrapment or buy-bust operation, the conduct of which has no
rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a trait of good police work.
However the police carry out its entrapment operations, for as long
as the rights of the accused have not been violated in the process,
the courts will not pass on the wisdom thereof. The police officers
may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the need
for prior surveillance.88 (Citations omitted)
This flexibility is even more important in cases involving trafficking
of persons. The urgency of rescuing the victims may at times
require immediate but deliberate action on the part of the law
enforcers.
V.
Imposition of fine and award of damages
The Court of Appeals properly imposed the amount of
P2,000,000.00. Section 10 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 provides
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions. The following penalties and
sanctions are hereby established for the offenses enumerated in
this Act:
c.
Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6
shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less
than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five
million pesos (P5,000,000.00);
However, we modify by raising the award of moral damages from
P150,000.0089 to P500,000.00. We also award exemplary damages
in the amount of P100,000.00. These amounts are in accordance
with the ruling in People v. Lalli90 where this court held
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The payment of P500,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as
exemplary damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34, and 35.
....
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an
analogous case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or
other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a
prostitute without ones consent and to be sexually violated four to
five times a day by different strangers is horrendous and atrocious.
There is no doubt that Lolita experienced physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation when she was
trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking
in Persons was aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the
award of exemplary damages is likewise justified.91
Human trafficking indicts the society that tolerates the kind of
poverty and its accompanying desperation that compels our
women to endure indignities. It reflects the weaknesses of that
society even as it convicts those who deviantly thrive in such
hopelessness. We should continue to strive for the best of our
world, where our choices of human intimacies are real choices, and
not the last resort taken just to survive. Human intimacies enhance
our best and closest relationships. It serves as a foundation for two
human beings to face lifes joys and challenges while continually
growing together with many shared experiences. The quality of our
human relationships defines the world that we create also for
others.
Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB, therefore, to be
trafficked, we affirm the text and spirit of our laws. Minors should
spend their adolescence moulding their character in environments
free of the vilest motives and the worse of other human beings.
The evidence and the law compel us to affirm the conviction of
accused in this case.
But this is not all that we have done. By fulfilling our duties, we
also express the hope that our people and our government unite
against everything inhuman. We contribute to a commitment to
finally stamp out slavery and human trafficking.
There are more AAAs and BBBs out there. They, too, deserve to be
rescued. They, too, need to be shown that in spite of what their
lives have been, there is still much good in our world.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated June 27, 2013, finding accused Shirley A.
Casio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4(a),
qualified by Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, and sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
P2,000,000.00, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant
shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate
Sentence Law) in accordance with Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9346.92

The award of damages is likewise MODIFIED as follows:

Accused is ordered to pay each of the private complainants:
(1) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and
(2) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Dr. Rico Jacutin v People
In an accusatory Information, dated 22 July 1996, petitioner, City
Health Officer Rico Jacutin of Cagayan de Oro City, was charged
before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, with the crime of
Sexual Harassment, thusly:
That sometime on or about 01 December 1995, in Cagayan de Oro
City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court pursuant to
the provisions of RA 7975, the accused, a public officer, being then
the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City with salary grade 26
but a high ranking official by express provision of RA 7975,
committing the offense in relation to his official functions and
taking advantage of his position, did there and then, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, demand, solicit, request sexual favors
from Ms. Juliet Q. Yee, a young 22 year-old woman, single and fresh
graduate in Bachelor of Science in Nursing who was seeking
employment in the office of the accused, namely: by demanding
from Ms. Yee that she should, expose her body and allow her
private parts to be mashed and stimulated by the accused, which
sexual favor was made as a condition for the employment of Ms.
Yee in the Family Program of the Office of the accused, thus
constituting sexual harassment.[1]
Upon his arraignment, petitioner pled not guilty to the offense
charged; hence, trial proceeded.
Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing, averred
that on 28 November 1995 her father accompanied her to the
office of petitioner at the City Health Office to seek employment.
Juliets father and petitioner were childhood friends. Juliet was
informed by the doctor that the City Health Office had just then
filled up the vacant positions for nurses but that he would still see
if he might be able to help her.
The following day, 29 November 1995, Juliet and her father
returned to the City Health Office, and they were informed by
petitioner that a medical group from Texas, U.S.A., was coming to
town in December to look into putting up a clinic in Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro, where she might be considered. On 01 December
1995, around nine oclock in the morning, she and her father went
back to the office of petitioner. The latter informed her that there
was a vacancy in a family planning project for the city and that, if
she were interested, he could interview her for the job. Petitioner
then started putting up to her a number of questions. When asked
at one point whether or not she already had a boyfriend, she said
no. Petitioner suggested that perhaps if her father were not around,
she could afford to be honest in her answers to the doctor. The
father, taking the cue, decided to leave. Petitioner then inquired
whether she was still a virgin, explaining to her his theory on the
various aspects of virginity. He hypothetically asked whether she
would tell her family or friends if a male friend happened to
intimately touch her. Petitioner later offered her the job where she
would be the subject of a research program. She was requested to
be back after lunch.
Before proceeding to petitioners office that afternoon, Juliet
dropped by at the nearby church to seek divine guidance as she
felt so confused. When she got to the office, petitioner made
several telephone calls to some hospitals to inquire whether there
was any available opening for her. Not finding any, petitioner again
offered her a job in the family planning research undertaking. She
expressed hesitation if a physical examination would include
hugging her but petitioner assured her that he was only kidding
about it. Petitioner then invited her to go bowling. Petitioner told
her to meet him at Borja Street so that people would not see them
on board the same car together. Soon, at the designated place, a
white car driven by petitioner stopped. She got in. Petitioner held

her pulse and told her not to be scared. After dropping by at his
house to put on his bowling attire, petitioner got back to the car.
While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her
bath, and she said she was so in a hurry that she did not find time
for it. Petitioner then inquired whether she had varicose veins, and
she said no. Petitioner told her to raise her foot and lower her pants
so that he might confirm it. She felt assured that it was all part of
the research. Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her knees
and held her thigh. He put his hands inside her panty until he
reached her pubic hair. Surprised, she exclaimed hala ka! and
instinctively pulled her pants up. Petitioner then touched her
abdomen with his right hand saying words of endearment and
letting the back of his palm touch her forehead. He told her to raise
her shirt to check whether she had nodes or lumps. She hesitated
for a while but, eventually, raised it up to her navel. Petitioner then
fondled her breast. Shocked at what petitioner did, she lowered her
shirt and embraced her bag to cover herself, telling him angrily
that she was through with the research. He begged her not to tell
anybody about what had just happened. Before she alighted from
the car, petitioner urged her to reconsider her decision to quit. He
then handed over to her P300.00 for her expenses.
Arriving home, she told her mother about her meeting with Dr.
Jacutin and the money he gave her but she did not give the rest of
the story. Her mother scolded her for accepting the money and
instructed her to return it. In the morning of 04 December 1994,
Juliet repaired to the clinic to return the money to petitioner but
she was not able to see him until about one oclock in the
afternoon. She tried to give back the money but petitioner refused
to accept it.
A week later, Juliet told her sister about the incident. On 16
December 1995, she attempted to slash her wrist with a fastener
right after relating the incident to her mother. Noticing that Juliet
was suffering from some psychological problem, the family referred
her to Dr. Merlita Adaza for counseling. Dr. Adaza would later testify
that Juliet, together with her sister, came to see her on 21
December 1995, and that Juliet appeared to be emotionally
disturbed, blaming herself for being so stupid as to allow Dr. Jacutin
to molest her. Dr. Adaza concluded that Juliets frustration was due
to post trauma stress.
Petitioner contradicted the testimony of Juliet Yee. He claimed that
on 28 November 1995 he had a couple of people who went to see
him in his office, among them, Juliet and her father, Pat. Justin Yee,
who was a boyhood friend. When it was their turn to talk to
petitioner, Pat. Yee introduced his daughter Juliet who expressed
her wish to join the City Health Office. Petitioner replied that there
was no vacancy in his office, adding that only the City Mayor really
had the power to appoint city personnel. On 01 December 1995,
the afternoon when the alleged incident happened, he was in a
meeting with the Committee on Awards in the Office of the City
Mayor. On 04 December 1995, when Juliet said she went to his
office to return the P300.00, he did not report to the office for he
was scheduled to leave for Davao at 2:35 p.m. to attend a hearing
before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. He submitted in
evidence a photocopy of his plane ticket. He asserted that the
complaint for sexual harassment, as well as all the other cases
filed against him by Vivian Yu, Iryn Salcedo, Mellie Villanueva and
Pamela Rodis, were but forms of political harassment directed at
him.
The Sandiganbayan, through its Fourth Division, rendered its
decision, dated 05 November 1999, penned by Mr. Justice Rodolfo
G. Palattao, finding the accused, Dr. Rico Jacutin, guilty of the crime
of Sexual Harassment under Republic Act No. 7877. The
Sandiganbayan concluded:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, convicting the accused
RICO JACUTIN Y SALCEDO of the crime of Sexual Harassment,
defined and punished under R.A. No. 7877, particularly Secs. 3 and
7 of the same Act, properly known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment
Act of 1995, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. Accused is further ordered to indemnify the

offended party in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand

(P300,000.00) Pesos, by way of moral damages; Two Hundred
Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos, by way of Exemplary damages and
to pay the cost of suit.[2]
In the instant recourse, it is contended that I. Petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of sexual harassment
in view of the inapplicability of Republic Act No. 7877 to the case at
bar.
II. Petitioner [has been] denied x x x his constitutional right to due
process of law and presumption of innocence on account of the
insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.
[3]
The above contentions of petitioner are not meritorious. Section 3
of Republic Act 7877 provides:
SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment
Defined. Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is
committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent
of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or
any other person who, having authority, influence or moral
ascendancy over another in a work or training or education
environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual
favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment
harassment is committed when:

environment,

sexual

(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the

employment, re-employment or continued employment of said
individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant
the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the
employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee.
Petitioner was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, a
position he held when complainant, a newly graduated nurse, saw
him to enlist his help in her desire to gain employment. He did try
to show an interest in her plight, her father being a boyhood friend,
but finding no opening suitable for her in his office, he asked her
about accepting a job in a family planning research project. It all
started from there; the Sandiganbayan recited the rest of the story:
x x x. Succeeding in convincing the complainant that her physical
examination would be a part of a research, accused asked
complainant if she would agree that her private parts (bolts) would
be seen. Accused assured her that with her cooperation in the
research, she would gain knowledge from it. As complainant looked
upon the accused with utmost reverence, respect, and paternal
guidance, she agreed to undergo the physical examination. At this
juncture, accused abruptly stopped the interview and told the
complainant to go home and be back at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon of the same day, December 1, 1995. Complainant
returned at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, but did not proceed
immediately to the office of the accused, as she dropped by a
nearby church to ask divine guidance, as she was confused and at
a loss on how to resolve her present predicament. At 3:00 oclock in
the afternoon, she went back to the office of the accused. And once
inside, accused called up a certain Madonna, inquiring if there was
a vacancy, but he was told that she would only accept a registered
nurse. Complainant was about to leave the office of the accused
when the latter prevailed upon her to stay because he would call
one more hospital. In her presence, a call was made. But again
accused told her that there was no vacancy. As all efforts to look
for a job in other hospitals failed, accused renewed the offer to the
complainant to be a part of the research in the Family Planning
Program where there would be physical examination. Thereafter,
accused motioned his two (2) secretaries to go out of the room.
Upon moving closer to the complainant, accused asked her if she
would agree to the offer. Complainant told him she would not agree
because the research included hugging. He then assured her that

he was just kidding and that a pre-schooler and high schooler have
already been subjected to such examination. With assurance given,
complainant changed her mind and agreed to the research, for she
is now convinced that she would be of help to the research and
would gain knowledge from it. At this point, accused asked her if
she was a tomboy, she answered in the negative. He then
instructed her to go with him but he would first play bowling, and
later proceed with the research (physical examination). On the
understanding of the complainant that they will proceed to the
clinic where the research will be conducted, she agreed to go with
the accused. But accused instructed her to proceed to Borja St.
where she will just wait for him, as it was not good for people to
see them riding in a car together. She walked from the office of the
accused and proceeded to Borja St. as instructed. And after a
while, a white car arrived. The door was opened to her and she was
instructed by the accused to come inside. Inside the car, he called
her attention why she was in a pensive mood. She retorted she
was not. As they were seated side by side, the accused held her
pulse and told her not to be scared. He informed her that he would
go home for a while to put on his bowling attire. After a short while,
he came back inside the car and asked her if she has taken a bath.
She explained that she was not able to do so because she left the
house hurriedly. Still while inside the car, accused directed her to
raise her foot so he could see whether she has varicose veins on
her legs. Thinking that it was part of the research, she did as
instructed. He told her to raise it higher, but she protested. He then
instructed her to lower her pants instead. She did lower her pants,
exposing half of her legs. But then the accused pushed it forward
down to her knees and grabbed her legs. He told her to raise her
shirt. Feeling as if she had lost control of the situation, she raised
her shirt as instructed. Shocked, she exclaimed, hala ka! because
he tried to insert his hand into her panty. Accused then held her
abdomen, saying, you are like my daughter, Day! (Visayan word of
endearment), and let the back of his palm touch her forehead,
indicating the traditional way of making the young respect their
elders. He again told her to raise her shirt. Feeling embarrassed
and uncomfortable, yet unsure whether she was entertaining
malice, she raised her shirt up to her breast. He then fondled her
breast. Reacting, she impulsively lower her shirt and embraced her
bar while silently asking God what was happening to her and
asking the courage to resist accuseds physical advances. After a
short while, she asked him if there could be a right place for
physical examination where there would be many doctors. He just
exclaimed, so you like that there are many doctors! Then he asked
her if she has tooth decay. Thinking that he was planning to kiss
her, she answered that she has lots of decayed teeth. He advised
her then to have them treated. Finally, she informed him that she
would not continue with the research. The accused retorted that
complainant was entertaining malice and reminded her of what she
earlier agreed; that she would not tell anybody about what
happened. He then promised to give her P15,000.00 so that she
could take the examination. She was about to open the door of the
car when he suddenly grabbed her thigh, but this time,
complainant instantly parried his hand with her bag.[4]
While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing
city personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a
recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel
in the municipal health office could carry good weight. Indeed,
petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words
and actions, an impression that he could facilitate Juliets
employment. Indeed, petitioner would not have been able to take
undue liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high
position in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. The
findings of the Sandiganbayan were bolstered by the testimony of
Vivian Yu, petitioners secretary between 1979 to 1994, of Iryn Lago
Salcedo, Public Health Nurse II, and of Farah Dongallo y Alkuino, a
city health nurse, all of whom were said to have likewise been
victims of perverse behavior by petitioner.
The Sandiganbayan rightly rejected the defense of alibi proffered
by petitioner, i.e., that he was at a meeting of the Committee on
Awards; the court a quo said:
There are some observations which the Court would like to point
out on the evidence adduced by the defense, particularly in the

Minutes of the meeting of the Awards Committee, as testified to by

witness Myrna Maagad on September 8, 1998.

and incommunicable evidence on the deportment of witnesses at

the stand, an opportunity that is denied the appellate court.[7]

First, admitted, Teresita I. Rozabal was the immediate supervisor of

witness Myrna Maagad. The Notices to hold the meeting (Exh. 3-A
and 3-B) were signed by Teresita Rozabal. But the Minutes of the
meeting, Exh. 5, was signed by Myrna Maagad and not by Teresita
Rozabal. The documents, Exhs. 3-A and 3-B certify that the
officially designated secretary of the Awards Committee was
Teresita Rozabal.

Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the grant of moral and

exemplary damages by the Sandiganbayan must be tempered to
reasonable levels. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a
complainant but are awarded only to enable an injured party obtain
some means that would help obviate the sufferings sustained on
account of the culpable action of an offender. Its award must not
appear to be the result of passion or undue prejudice,[8] and it
must always reasonably approximate the extent of injury and be
proportional to the wrong committed. Indeed, Juliet should be
recompensed for her mental anguish. Dr. Merlita F. Adaza, a
psychological counseling expert, has found Juliet to be emotionally
and psychologically disturbed and suffering from post trauma
stress following her unpleasant experience with petitioner. The
Court finds it fitting to award in favor of Juliet Yee P30,000.00 moral
damages. In addition, she should be entitled to P20,000.00
exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against, or as a
negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious actions.[9]

Second, why was Myrna Maagad in possession of the attendance

logbook and how was she able to personally bring the same in
court when she testified on September 8, 1998, when in fact, she
admitted during her testimony that she retired from the
government service on December 1, 1997? Surely, Myrna Maagad
could not still be the custodian of the logbook when she testified.
And finally, in the logbook, under the sub-heading, Others Present,
the attendance of those who attended was individually handwritten
by the persons concerned who wrote and signed their names. But
in the case of Dr. Tiro and Dr. Rico Jacutin, their names were
handwritten by clerk Sylvia Tan-Nerry, not by Dr. Tiro and Dr.
Jacutin. However, Myrna Maagad testified that the logbook was
passed around to attending individuals inside the conference room.
[5]
Most importantly, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the
factual findings of the Sandiganbayan must be respected by, if not
indeed conclusive upon, the tribunal,[6] no cogent reasons having
been sufficiently shown to now hold otherwise. The assessment on
the credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court
because of its unique position of being able to observe that elusive

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan in

Criminal Case No. 23799, finding Dr. Rico Jacutin y Salcedo GUILTY
of the crime of Sexual Harassment defined and punished under
Republic Act No. 7877, particularly Sections 3 and 7 thereof, and
penalizing him with imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a
fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED. The
Sandiganbayans award of moral and exemplary damages are
MODIFIED; instead, petitioner is ordered to indemnify the offended
party, Juliet Yee, in the amount of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00 by
way of, respectively, moral damages and exemplary damages.
Costs against petitioner.