Battle of the Dnieper

The Battle of the Dnieper was a military campaign that

took place in 1943 on the Eastern Front of World War
II. It was one of the largest operations in World War
II, involving almost 4,000,000 troops on both sides and
stretching on a 1,400 kilometres (870 mi) long front.[1]
During its four-month duration, the eastern bank of the
Dnieper was recovered from German forces by ve of the
Red Army's fronts, which conducted several assault river
crossings to establish several lodgements on the western
bank. Subsequently, Kiev was liberated in the Battle of
Kiev.

supporting Luftwae forces in the southern Soviet Union

were on the defensive in the southern Ukraine.
By mid-August, Adolf Hitler understood that the forthcoming Soviet oensive could not be contained on the
open steppe and ordered construction of a series of fortications along the line of the Dnieper river.
On the Soviet side, Joseph Stalin was determined to
launch a major oensive in Ukraine. The main thrust
of the oensive was in a southwesterly direction; the
northern ank being largely stabilized, the southern ank
rested on the Sea of Azov.

One of the costliest operations of the war,[1] the casualties are estimated at being from 1,700,000 to 2,700,000
on both sides.[1] One of the most tragic events took place
during the establishment of so-called Bukryn lodgement
near the village of Malyi Bukryn (Myronivka Raion).
The Soviet writer and war veteran Viktor Astafyev in
his memoirs was recalling that 25,000 soldiers who entered the Dnieper from one side, would exit the river
on the other side in amounts of 5-6,000.[1] Due to great
losses, the Dnieper Airborne Assault became the last
mass airborne operation used by the Soviet Union during the World War II.[1]

2 Planning

Some 2,438 soldiers were awarded the Hero of the Soviet

Union which was more than had been awarded previously
since the awards establishment and never again was there
such a big number of laureates.

Strategic situation

Central Front Konstantin Rokossovsky

Voronezh Front Nikolai Vatutin

Map of the battle of the Dnieper and linked operations

Following the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht 's Heer and Steppe Front Ivan Konev
1

PLANNING

The second option would be to stage a massive assault

without waiting, and force the Dnieper on a broad front.
This option left no additional time for the German defenders, but would lead to much larger casualties. For
political reasons (Stalin wanted Kiev to be retaken on 7
November), the second option was chosen.

Southwestern Front Rodion Malinovsky

The assault was staged on a 300-kilometer front almost

simultaneously. All available means of transport were to
be used to transport the attackers to the opposite shore,
including small shing boats and improvised rafts of barrels and trees (like the one in the photograph). The preparation of the crossing equipment was further complicated
by the German scorched earth strategy with the total destruction of all boats and raft building material in the area.
The crucial issue would obviously be heavy equipment.
Without it, the bridgeheads would not stand for long.
2.1.1 Soviet organisation

Southern Front Fyodor Tolbukhin

Central Front (known as the Belorussian Front after 20 October 1943), commanded by Konstantin
Rokossovsky and accounted for 579,600 soldiers
2nd Tank Army, led by Aleksei Rodin /
Semyon Bogdanov (since September)

2.1

Soviet planning

The operation begun on 26 August 1943. Divisions

started to move on a 1,400-kilometer front that stretched
between Smolensk and the Sea of Azov.

9th Tank Corps, led by Hryhoriy Rudchenko

(KIA), Boris Bakharov
60th Army, led by Ivan Chernyakhovsky
13th Army, led by Nikolay Pukhov
65th Army, led by Pavel Batov

Overall, the operation would be executed by 36 Combined Arms, four Tank and ve Air Armies. 2,650,000
personnel were brought into the ranks for this massive
operation. The operation would use 51,000 guns, 2,400
tanks and 2,850 planes.

61st Army, led by Pavel Belov

The Dnieper is the third largest river in Europe, second

only to the Volga and the Danube. In its lower part,
its width can easily reach three kilometres, and being
dammed in several places made it even larger. Moreover, its western shore the one still to be retaken
was much higher and steeper than the eastern, complicating the oensive even further. In addition, the opposite
shore was transformed into a vast complex of defenses
and fortications held by the Wehrmacht.

16th Air Army, led by Serhiy Rudenko

Faced with such a situation, the Soviet commanders had

two options. The rst would be to give themselves time
to regroup their forces, nd a weak point or two to exploit (not necessarily in the lower part of the Dnieper),
stage a breakthrough and encircle the German defenders,
rendering the defence line next to useless (very much like
the German Panzers bypassed the Maginot line in 1940).
This, however, would give them time to get more reserves
and furthermore, would expose the Soviet troops to outanking mechanized attacks - every Soviet commanders
nightmare since 1941.

48th Army, led by Prokoy Romanenko

70th Army, led by Ivan Galanin / Vladimir
Sharapov (September - October) / Aleksei
Grechkin (since October)

Voronezh Front (known as the 1st Ukrainian Front

after 20 October 1943), commanded by Nikolai
Vatutin and accounted for 665,500 soldiers
3rd Guards Tank Army, led by Pavlo Rybalko
1st Tank Army, led by Mikhail Katukov
4th Guard Tank Corps, led by Pavel Poluboyarov
1st Guard Cavalry Corps, led by Viktor Baranov
5th Guards Army, led by Aleksei Zhadov
4th Guards Army, led by Hryhoriy Kulyk /
Aleksei Zygin (KIA) / Ivan Galanin
6th Guards Army, led by Ivan Chistiakov
38th Army, led by Nikandr Chibisov / Kyrylo
Moskalenko (since October)

3
47th Army, led by Pavel Korzun / Pylyp they were concentrated in areas where a Soviet assaultZhmachenko (September - October) / Vitaliy crossing were most likely to be attempted, such as near
Polenov (since October)
Kremenchuk, Zaporizhia and Nikopol.
27th Army, led by Sergei Tromenko

Additionally, on 7 September 1943, the SS forces and

the Wehrmacht received orders to strip the areas they had
52nd Army, led by Konstantin Koroteev
to abandon from anything that could be used by the Red
2nd Air Army, led by Stepan Krasovsky
Army to slow it down, and to try to create supply shortages
for the Soviet forces by implementing a scorched earth
Steppe Front (known as the 2nd Ukrainian Front afpolicy.
ter 20 October 1943), commanded by Ivan Konev
Southwestern Front (known as the 3rd Ukrainian 2.2.1 German organisation
Front after 20 October 1943), commanded by
Rodion Malinovsky
2nd Army - Walter Wei
Southern Front (known as the 4th Ukrainian Front
after 20 October 1943), commanded by Fyodor Tolbukhin

2.2

German planning

Main article: Panther-Wotan line

The order to construct the Dnieper defence complex,

Luftotte 2 (selected units) - Wolfram Freiherr von

Richthofen
(in Ukraine) Army Group South - Erich von
Manstein
4th Panzer Army - Gotthard Heinrici
1st Panzer Army - Eberhard von Mackensen
8th Army - Otto Wohler
6th Army - Karl-Adolf Hollidt
Luftotte 4 - Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen / Otto Deloch (since September)

(in Crimea) Army Group A - Ewald von Kleist

17. Armee - Jaenecke

3 Description of the strategic operation

3.1 Initial attack
Despite a great superiority in numbers, the oensive was
by no means easy. German opposition was ferocious
and the ghting raged for every town and city. The
Wehrmacht made extensive use of rear guards, leaving
some troops in each city and on each hill, slowing down
the Soviet oensive.

Army Group South Erich von Manstein

3.2 Progress of the oensive

Three weeks after the start of the oensive, and despite

known as Eastern Wall, was issued on 11 August 1943 heavy losses on the Soviet side, it became clear that the
and began to be immediately executed.
Germans could not hope to contain the Soviet oensive in
Fortications were erected along the length of the the at, open terrain of the steppes, where the Red Armys
Dnieper. However, there was no hope of completing such numerical strength would prevail. Manstein asked for as
an extensive defensive line in the short time available. many as 12 new divisions in the hope of containing the
Therefore, the completion of the Eastern Wall was not Soviet oensive but German reserves were perilously
uniform in its density and depth of fortications. Instead, thin. Years later, Manstein wrote in his memoirs:[4]

3 DESCRIPTION OF THE STRATEGIC OPERATION

After analysing this situation, I concluded
that we can't keep the Donbass with the forces
that we already possess, and that even a greater
danger for the whole Eastern Front is being created on the north ank of the group. The 8th
and 4th Armies won't be able to contain the Soviet oensive for very long.

3.3

Decisive action

As a result, on 15 September 1943, Hitler ordered Army

Group South to retreat to the Dnieper defence line.
The battle for Poltava was especially bitter. The city was
heavily fortied and its garrison well prepared. After a
few inconclusive days that greatly slowed down the Soviet
oensive, Marshal Konev decided to bypass the city and
rush towards the Dnieper. After two days of violent urban
warfare, the Poltava garrison was overcome.

orders nally got down to company commanders, on the

24th, just 15 minutes before their units, not yet provisioned with spades, anti-tank mines, or ponchos for the
autumn night frosts, assembled on airelds to load for an
1830 take-o. Owing to the weather, not all assigned aircraft had arrived at airelds on time (if at all). Further,
most ight safety ocers disallowed maximum loading
of their aircraft. Given fewer aircraft (and lower than
expected capacities), the master loading plan, ruined,
was abandoned. Many radios and supplies got left behind. In the best case, it would take three lifts to deliver
the two brigades. Units (still arriving by the over-taxed
rail system), were loaded piecemeal onto returned aircraft, which were slow to refuel owing to the less-thanexpected capacities of fuel trucks. Meanwhile, alreadyarrived troops changed planes, seeking earlier ights. Urgency and the fuel shortage prevented aerial assembly
aloft. Most aircraft, as soon as they were loaded and fueled, ew in single le, instead of line abreast, to the dropping points. Assault waves became as intermingled as the
units they carried.

Towards the end of September 1943, Soviet forces

reached the lower part of the Dnieper. The hardest part
As corps elements made their 170 to 220 km ights from
was still to come, though.
four of ve elds (one of which received no fuel), troops
(half of whom had never jumped, except from training
3.4 Dnieper airborne operation
towers) got briefed on drop zones, assembly areas and
objectives only poorly understood by platoon comman(The following is, largely, a synopsis of an account by ders still studying new orders. Meanwhile, Soviet aerial
Glantz[5] with support from an account by Staskov.[6] )
photography, suspended several days by bad weather,
STAVKA (the Soviet high command), detached the had missed the strong reinforcement of the area, early
Central Front's 3rd Tank Army to the Voronezh Front that afternoon. Non-combat cargo pilots ferrying 3rd
to race the weakening Germans to the Dnieper, to save Brigade through drizzle expected no resistance beyond
the wheat crop from the German scorched earth policy, river pickets but, instead, were met by anti-aircraft re
and to achieve strategic or operational river bridgeheads and starshells from the 19th Panzer Division (only coinbefore a German defence could stabilize there. The cidentally transiting the drop zone, and just one of six
3rd Tank Army, plunging headlong, reached the river divisions and other formations ordered, on the 21st, to
on the night of 2122 September and, on the 23rd, So- ll the gap in front of the 3rd Tank Army). Lead aircraft,
viet infantry forces crossed by swimming and by using disgorging paratroopers over Dubari at 1930, came under
makeshift rafts to secure small, fragile bridgeheads, op- small arms, machine gun, and quad-20 anti-aircraft re
posed only by 120 German Cherkassy ak academy NCO from the armored personnel carrier battalion (Pioneers)
candidates and the hard-pressed 19th Panzer Division of the 73rd Panzer Grenadier Regiment and elements of
Reconnaissance Battalion. Those forces were the only the division sta of 19th Panzer Division. Some paraGermans within 60 km of the Dnieper loop. Only a heavy troops began returning re and throwing grenades even
German air attack and a lack of bridging equipment kept before landing; trailing aircraft accelerated, climbed and
Soviet heavy weaponry from crossing and expanding the evaded, dropping wide. Through the night, some pilots
avoided starshell-lit drop points entirely, and 13 aircraft
bridgehead.
returned to airelds without having dropped at all. InSTAVKA, sensing a critical juncture, ordered a hasty air- tending a 10 by 14 km drop over largely undefended terborne corps assault to increase the size of the bridgehead rain, the Soviets instead achieved a 30 by 90 km drop over
before the Germans could counterattack. On the 21st, the fastest mobile elements of two German corps.
the Voronezh Fronts 1st, 3rd and 5th Guards Airborne
Brigades got the urgent call to secure, on the 23rd, a On the ground, the Germans used white parachutes as
bridgehead perimeter 15 to 20 km wide and 30 km deep beacons to hunt down and kill disorganized groups and
on the Dnieper loop between Kaniv and Rzhishchev, to gather and destroy airdropped supplies. Supply bonres, glowing embers, and multi-color starshells illumiwhile Front elements forced the river.
nated the bizarre and macabre battleeld. Captured docThe arrival of personnel at the airelds was slow, neces- uments gave the Germans enough knowledge of Soviet
sitating, on the 23rd, a one-day delay and omission of objectives to arrive at most of them before the disorga1st Brigade from the plan; consequent mission changes nized paratroops.
caused near chaos in command channels. Mission change

3.7

Securing the lodgements

Back at the Soviet airelds, the fuel shortage allowed only

298 of 500 planned sorties, leaving corps 45mm anti-tank
guns and 2,017 paratroops undelivered. Of 4,575 men
dropped (seventy percent of the planned number, and just
1,525 from 5th Brigade), some 2,300 eventually assembled into 43 ad-hoc groups, with missions abandoned as
hopeless, and spent most of their time seeking supplies
not yet destroyed by the Germans. Others joined with
the nine partisan groups operating in the area. About 230
made it over (or out of) the Dnieper to Front units (or
were originally dropped there). Most of the rest were almost casually captured that rst night or killed the next
day (although, on that rst night, the 3rd Co, 73rd Panzer Soviet soldiers preparing rafts to cross the Dnieper (the sign reads
Onwards to Kiev!")
Grenadier Regiment, suered heavy losses while annihilating about 150 paratroopers near Grushevo, some 3 km
west of Dubari).
Kremenchuk. By the end of the month, 23 bridgeheads
The Germans underestimated that 1,500 to 2,000 had were created on the western side, some of them 10 kilodropped; they recorded 901 paratroops captured and meters wide and 1-2 kilometres deep.
killed in the rst 24 hours. Thereafter, they largely ig- The crossing of the Dnieper was extremely dicult. Solnored the Soviet paratroopers, to counterattack and trun- diers used every available oating device to cross the
cate the Dnieper bridgeheads. The Germans deemed river, under heavy German re and taking heavy losses.
their anti-paratrooper operations completed by 2100 on Once across, Soviet troops had to dig themselves into the
the 26th, although a modicum of opportunistic actions clay ravines composing the Dniepers western bank.
against garrisons, rail lines, and columns were conducted
by remnants up to early November. For a lack of manpower to clear all areas, forests of the region would re- 3.7 Securing the lodgements
main a minor threat.
The Germans called the operation a fundamentally sound
idea ruined by the dilettantism of planners lacking expert
knowledge (but praised individual paratroops for their
tenacity, bayonet skills and deft use of broken ground in
the sparsely wooded northern region). STAVKA deemed
this second (and, ultimately, last) corps drop a complete
failure; lessons they knew they had already learned from
their winter oensive corps drop at Viazma had not stuck.
They would never trust themselves to try it again.
Soviet 5th Guards Airborne Brigade commander
Sidorchuk, withdrawing to the forests south, eventually
amassed a brigade-size command, half paratroops,
half partisans; he obtained air supply, and assisted the
2nd Ukrainian Front over the Dnieper near Cherkassy
to nally link up with Front forces on 15 November.
After 13 more days combat, the airborne element was
evacuated, ending a harrowing two months. More than
sixty percent never returned.

Soviet soldiers attacking on a lodgement in October 1943

German troops soon launched heavy counterattacks on almost every bridgehead, hoping to annihilate them before
heavy equipment could be transported across the river.

For instance, the Borodaevsk lodgement, mentioned by

Marshal Konev in his memoirs, came under heavy armored attack and air assault. Bombers attacked both
the lodgement and the reinforcements crossing the river.
Konev complained at once about a lack of organization of
Soviet air support, set up air patrols to prevent bombers
from approaching the lodgements and ordered forward
3.5 Assault-crossing the Dnieper
more artillery to counter tank attacks from the opposite
shore. When Soviet aviation became more organized and
3.6 The assault-crossings
hundreds of guns and Katyusha rocket launchers began
The rst bridgehead on the Dniepers western shore was ring, the situation started to improve and the bridgehead
established on 22 September 1943 at the conuence of was eventually preserved.
the Dnieper and Pripyat rivers, in the northern part of the Such battles were commonplace on every lodgement. Alfront. On 24 September, another bridgehead was created though all the lodgements were held, losses were terrible
near Dniprodzerzhynsk, another on 25 September near at the beginning of October, most divisions were at only
Dnipropetrovsk and yet another on 28 September near 25 to 50% of their nominal strength.

3.8

6 CASUALTIES DEBATE

Lower Dnieper Oensive

Additionally, the Battle of the Dnieper demonstrated the

strength of the Soviet partisan movement. The "rail war"
operation staged during September and October 1943
struck German logistics very hard, creating heavy supply
issues.
Incidentally, between 28 November and 1 December
1943 the Teheran conference was held between Winston
Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Stalin. The Battle
of the Dnieper, along with other major oensives staged
in 1943, certainly gave Stalin a dominant position for negotiating with his Allies.

6 Casualties debate
The Wehrmacht delivers re across the Dnieper

By mid-October, the forces accumulated on the lower

Dnieper bridgeheads were strong enough to stage a
rst massive attack to denitely secure the rivers western shore in the southern part of the front. Therefore, a vigorous attack was staged on the KremenchukDnipropetrovsk line. Simultaneously, a major diversion
was conducted in the south to draw German forces away
both from the Lower Dnieper and from Kiev.

Casualties during the Battle of the Dnieper are still a subject of heavy debate. Some sources give very low gures (200,000 to 300,000 total casualties), which is much
lower than for instance, the Battle of Kursk. However,
given the duration of the campaign and the huge area
involved, more than one historian argues that the losses
involved were huge, easily reaching or even surpassing
those at the Stalingrad, but going unnoticed because of
the large operational area (and of the aura of fame enveloping the latter). The death toll also depends on the
time frame considered. It also depends on whether the
toll of the Battle of Smolensk, which was fought to draw
German forces away from the area in which the Dnieper
battle would be held, is included in the total.

At the end of the oensive, Soviet forces controlled a

bridgehead 300 kilometers wide and up to 80 kilometers
deep in some places. In the south, the Crimea was now
cut o from the rest of the German forces. Any hope of
stopping the Red Army on the Dniepers east bank was
On the subject of Soviet casualties, Nikola Shefov in his
lost.
Russian ghts puts the gure of 373,000 killed in action
(KIA) and more than 1,500,000 total Soviet casualties.
British historian John Erickson, in his Barbarossa: The
4 Criticisms
Axis and the Allies, puts a gure of 173,201 Soviets KIA,
during a time frame from 26 September to 20 December
Stalins determination to recover Kiev before 7 Novem- 1943, therefore not taking into account the period from
ber has raised quite a few criticisms among historians. 24 August to 26 September. Glantz/House 'When TiIt is commonly accepted now that the bridgeheads on tans Clashed' put a gure of 428,000 total losses (103,000
the Lower Dnieper were deliberately left alone to draw KIA) during 26 August to 30 September (ChernigovGerman forces from Kiev, resulting in heavy losses. Poltava Operation) and 754,000 total losses (173,000
While this hypothesis could be true to some extent, one KIA) during 26 September and 20 December.
must not forget that the action of establishing a bridgehead alone is dangerous enough and can (and usually Given the heavy German resistance even before the
Dnieper forced-crossing, this gure seems a low estidoes) lead to heavy casualties.
mate (Soviet sources estimate casualties from the postKursk oensive alone at 250,000 killed, wounded and
captured), the gure of over 300,000 KIA could seem
5 Outcomes
correct, with the wounded in action number following the
3:1 empiric ratio.
The Battle of the Dnieper was another defeat for the
Wehrmacht that required it to restabilize the front further German losses, however, are more dicult to evaluate.
West. The Red Army, which Hitler hoped to contain at The simple rule of 3:1 losses during an oensive operthe Dnieper, forced the Wehrmacht 's defences. Kiev was ation against a heavily defended enemy would lead to a
recaptured and German troops lacked the forces to anni- 500,000 toll. Shefov and other Soviet/Russian historians
hilate Soviet troops on the Lower Dnieper bridgeheads. quote casualties as high as 1,500,000.
The west bank was still in German hands for the most The Battle of the Dnieper is listed among the most lethal
battles in world history.
part, but both sides knew that it would not last for long.

Soviet operational phases

From a Soviet operational point of view, the battle was

broken down into a number of dierent phases and offensives.
The rst phase of the battle :
Chernigov-Poltava Strategic Oensive 26 August
1943 30 September 1943 (Central, Voronezh and
Steppe fronts)
Chernigov-Pripyet Oensive 26 August 30
September 1943

Lyutezh Oensive Operation (1124 October

1943)
Bukrin Oensive Operation (1215 October
1943)
Bukrin Oensive Operation (2124 October
1943)
Kiev Strategic Oensive 313 November 1943
Rauss November 1943 counterattack
Kiev Strategic Defensive 13 November 22 December 1943

Sumy-Priluki Oensive 26 August 30

September 1943
Poltava-Kremenchug Oensive 26 August 30
September 1943
Donbass Strategic Oensive 13 August 22
September 1943 (Southwestern and Southern
fronts)
Dnieper airborne assault 24 September - 24 November 1943
The second phase of the operation includes :
Lower Dnieper Oensive 26 September 20 December 1943
Melitopol Oensive 26 September 5 November 1943
Zaporizhia Oensive 1014 October 1943
Kremenchug-Pyatikhatki Oensive 15 October 3 November 1943
Dnepropetrovsk Oensive 23 October 23
December 1943
Krivoi Rog Oensive 1421 November 1943
Apostolovo Oensive 14 November 23 December 1943
Nikopol Oensive 14 November 31 December 1943
Aleksandriia-Znamenka Oensive 22 November 9 December 1943
Krivoi Rog Oensive 1019 December 1943
Kiev Strategic Oensive Operation (October) (124
October 1943)
Chernobyl-Radomysl Oensive Operation (1
4 October 1943)
Chernobyl-Gornostaipol Defensive Operation
(38 October 1943)

8 Notes
[1] Liberation of Kiev and battle of the Dnieper. How it was.
PHOTO. Ukrayinska Pravda. 6 November 2013
[2] http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter5_10_
1.html#5_10_22
[3] Nikolai Shefov, Russian ghts, Lib. Military History,
Moscow, 2002
[4] Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, oscow, 1957.
[5] The History of Soviet Airborne Forces, Chapter 8, Across
The Dnieper (September 1943), by David M. Glantz,
Cass, 1994. (portions online)
[6] 1943 Dnepr airborne operation: lessons and conclusions
Military Thought, July 2003, by Nikolai Viktorovich
Staskov. (online) See ref at Army (Soviet Army) under
40th Army entry.

9 References
David M. Glantz, Jonathan M. House, When Titans
Clashed:how the Red Army stopped Hitler, University Press of Kansas, 1995
Nikolai Shefov, Russian ghts, Lib. Military History, Moscow, 2002
History of Great Patriotic War, 1941 1945.
oscow, 1963
John Erickson, Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies,
Edinburgh University Press, 1994
Marshal Konev, Notes of a front commander', Science, Moscow, 1972.
Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, oscow, 1957.

10

10

TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

10.1

Text

Battle of the Dnieper Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Dnieper?oldid=673826834 Contributors: Maury Markowitz,

Itai, Dimadick, Bertie, JackofOz, Ancheta Wis, Wwoods, DO'Neil, Bobblewik, Mzajac, Jklamo, Irpen, Pavel Vozenilek, Sfahey, El C,
ThierryVignaud, Darwinek, Sherurcij, Tony Sidaway, Ghirlandajo, Axeman89, Woohookitty, AndriyK, Deansfa, BD2412, Tim!, Habap,
Ground Zero, Avalyn, Kirill Lokshin, Alex Bakharev, Thiseye, Grakm fr, Aaron Schulz, BOT-Superzerocool, Petri Krohn, Deuar,
Yakudza, A bit iy, SmackBot, Roger Davies, Kuban kazak, Michael Dorosh, IstvanWolf, Commander Keane bot, Blindsuperhero, Jayanta
Sen, Corinthian, Je5102, SquarePeg, Duncancumming, SuperDeng, OrphanBot, Britmax, Jmlk17, Yulia Romero, J-Zeth, Prelle~enwiki,
RASAM, Sambot, MarcusGraly, JHunterJ, Volker89, Andreas td, Theoldanarchist, Tufkaa, Valoem, Heqs, Todowd, Danrok, KPbIC, Andrei George, TheCheeseManCan, Telex, Ulritz, CopperKettle, Nirvana77, Bethpage89, Nick Number, PaulVIF, Jj137, Vanjagenije, JAnDbot, Tigga, Inks.LWC, Ironplay, Acroterion, Daborhe, Dodo19~enwiki, Captain Baby Boy, Buckshot06, Muhvi, Chesdovi, The Anomebot2,
MetsBot, JaGa, TheDudeish, Paracel63, Kevinsam, Dapi89, R'n'B, CommonsDelinker, Aleksandr Grigoryev, LordAnubisBOT, Mrg3105,
Wiki1609, Adamdaley, Molly-in-md, MisterBee1966, The Spanish Inquisitor, VolkovBot, Cvllelaw, TXiKiBoT, Andrein, Commuood,
AlleborgoBot, HansHermans, JerrySteal, Greekscavenger, DragonBot, Noneforall, PixelBot, A.h. king, Hadady, Jim Sweeney, Addbot,
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ArthurBot, Xqbot, StoneProphet, CaptainFugu, Full-date unlinking bot, Bedivere.cs, DocYako, Tim1357, DixonDBot, Volga2, Ryan.opel,
Empty Buer, Sergii.Fiot, JoeSperrazza, WorldWarTwoEditor, ClueBot NG, Frietjes, Alphasinus, Tacosburitos, Wiki13, Hahageorge,
Obitauri, Choy4311, Reiftyr, Machho, Yura2404, Hses, Ruddah, Uspzor, Vinukin and Anonymous: 79

10.2

Images

File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-H01757,_Erich_von_Manstein.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5b/

Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-H01757%2C_Erich_von_Manstein.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to
Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal
Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as
provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Unknown
File:Crossing_the_Dnieper.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a7/Crossing_the_Dnieper.png License:
Public domain Contributors: Soviet State photobase Original artist: Unknown
File:Dayosh_Kiev.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/22/Dayosh_Kiev.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: english wikipedia Originally uploaded 07:21, 30 April 2006 (UTC) by Irpen (talk contribs) to en:wiki. Original artist: unknown
war correspondent, soviet army soldier
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Zirlands codes of colors

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File:Flag_of_German_Reich_(19351945).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/99/Flag_of_German_
Reich_%281935%E2%80%931945%29.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Fornax
File:Flag_of_Romania.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/73/Flag_of_Romania.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: AdiJapan
File:Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1923-1955).svg Source:
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Soviet_Union_%281923-1955%29.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: created by rotemliss from Image:Flag of
the Soviet Union.svg.
File:Hitlerdnieper.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e2/Hitlerdnieper.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Transferred from en.wikipedia to Commons. Source: http://victory.rusarchives.ru/catalogue/photo.php?photo_id=256&id=14
photo from the National archives of the Russian Federation Original artist: The original uploader was Ghirlandajo at English Wikipedia
File:IS_Konev_01.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6e/IS_Konev_01.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://oso.rcsz.ru/InfoNet/Site/pic/konev.jpg Original artist: Unknown
File:Map_of_dnieper_battle_grand.jpg Source:
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grand.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: en:image:Map_of_dnieper_battle_grand.jpg Original artist: en:user:Grafikm fr
File:Marshal_of_the_USSR_1973_CPA_4285.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bd/Marshal_of_the_
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File:RokossovskyKK.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c0/RokossovskyKK.jpg License: Public domain
Contributors: http://ez.chita.ru/encycl/person/?id=3835 Original artist: Unknown
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File:Tolbuhin_fi.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c3/Tolbuhin_fi.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: warheroes.ru Original artist: Unknown
File:Vatutin.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ea/Vatutin.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Russia
State Military Archive (RGVA), f.40857, op.1, d.14, l.15 [1] Original artist: Unknown

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