Battle of Prokhorovka

The Battle of Prokhorovka was fought on 12 July 1943

near Prokhorovka, 87 kilometres (54 mi) southeast of
Kursk, in the Soviet Union, during the Second World
War. Taking place on the Eastern Front, the ghting was
part of the wider Battle of Kursk, and occurred when the
5th Guards Tank Army of the Soviet Red Army attacked
the II SS-Panzer Corps of the German Wehrmacht in one
of the largest tank battles in military history.[lower-alpha 10]

the German forces inside the Soviet Union, but they were
convinced by a number of key commanders, including
the Deputy Supreme Commander Georgiy Zhukov, to assume a defensive posture instead. This would allow the
Germans to weaken themselves in attacking prepared positions, after which the Soviet forces would be able to
reposture and go on the oensive.[9][10] A similar strategy discussion occurred on the German side, with Field
Marshal Erich von Manstein, arguing for a mobile defence that would give up terrain and allow the Soviets to
advance, while the Germans launched a series of sharp
counterattacks against their anks to inict heavy attrition. For political reasons Hitler insisted that the German
forces go on the oensive, choosing the Kursk salient for
the attack.[11]

At the end of the spring rasputitsa season of 1943, the

German high command began preparing for Operation
Citadel, with the aim of enveloping and destroying the
Soviet forces in the Kursk salient. The Soviet high command, Stavka, learned of the German intentions, and employed a defence in depth strategy, preparing a series of
defensive lines along the routes of the planned German
oensive. The Soviets also massed several armies as
the Steppe Front, which included the 5th Guards Tank
Army, deep behind their defences, which they intended to
use to launch their own counteroensives once the German strength had dissipated. On 5 July 1943, the Germans launched the operation. On the southern side of the
salient, the German 4th Panzer Army, with Army Detachment Kempf on its eastern ank, attacked the Soviet
defences of the Voronezh Front.

The German oensive plan, called Unternehmen Zitadelle (Operation Citadel), envisioned an assault at
the base of the Kursk salient from both the north and
south, with the intent of enveloping and destroying the
Soviet forces in the salient.[12][13] The two spearheads
were to meet near Kursk. From the south, the XLVIII
Panzer Corps and General Paul Hausser's II SS-Panzer
Corps, forming the left and right wings of the 4th Panzer
Army commanded by Colonel General Hermann Hoth,
would drive northward. The III Panzer Corps of Army
Detachment Kempf was to protect Hoths right ank
from counterattack by the Soviet strategic reserves known
to be located just east of the salient. The 4th Panzer
Army and Army Detachment Kempf were under Army
Group South, commanded by Manstein; and their air support was provided by Colonel General Otto Deloch's
Luftotte 4.[14][15][16]

A week into the German oensive, the Soviets launched

powerful counterattacks against the attackers. On the
southern side of the salient at Prokhorovka, the 5th
Guards Tank Army attacked the II SS-Panzer Corps of
the 4th Panzer Army, resulting in a large clash of armour
just outside the settlement on 12 July 1943. The 5th
Guards Tank Army was decimated in the attack, but
succeeded in preventing the Germans from capturing
Prokhorovka and breaking through the third defensive
belt to achieve operational freedom. Subsequently, the
German oensive was cancelled and their forces withdrawn. The Red Army went on a general oensive and
seized the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front, which
it was to hold for the rest of the war.

Multiple delays by the Germans allowed the Soviets a

great deal of time to prepare their defences. Employing
defence in depth, they constructed a series of defensive
lines to wear down the attacking panzer formations. Six
belts made up of extensive mineelds, anti-tank ditches,
and anti-tank gun emplacements were created, although
the last three belts were mostly unoccupied and less fortied than the rst three.[17][18] The Voronezh Front, commanded by General Nikolai Vatutin, defended the south1 Background
ern face of the salient. The Steppe Front, commanded
by Colonel General Ivan Konev, formed the strategic
reserve force to be held deep behind the front until it
See also: Battle of Kursk
was needed for the Soviet counteroensive. It included
Lieutenant General Alexei Zhadov's 5th Guards Army
As the spring rasputitsa season came to an end in 1943, and Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov's 5th Guards
both the German and Soviet commands considered their Tank Army.[19][20]
plans for future operations. Stalin and some senior Soviet ocers wanted to seize the initiative rst and attack
1

BACKGROUND

A Tiger I of a Waen-SS unit res at a target during Operation

Citadel in southern Kursk salient.

5th Guards Armies of the Steppe Front began moving up

from their reserve position, travelling at night to avoid
detection.[28] The 5th Guards Tank Army covered the 390
kilometres (240 mi) over three nights, and arrived at the
Prokhorovka area on the night of 9 July,[29] and the 5th
Guards Armys 33rd Guards Rie Corps arrived at the
settlement on the night of 10 July.[30]

German advance during Operation Citadel (red dashed-line arrows)

1.1

German advance
Prokhorovka

leading

up

to

Main article: Operation Citadel

The Germans launched their attack on the morning of 5
July 1943 and were met with heavy resistance.[21] The
density of Soviet anti-tank guns, mineelds, anti-tank
ditches and large numbers of Soviet tanks were all much
greater than had been anticipated, and made a breakthrough far more dicult to achieve.[22] By the end of
6 July, II SS-Panzer Corps had advanced through the rst
defensive belt and reached the second.[23] But its advance
was greatly behind schedule, as according to the Citadel
plan it should have penetrated the rst two belts and been
on its way to the third by the end of the rst day.[24]
The corps beneted from close air support provided by
the Luftotte 4s VIII Fliegerkorps,[25] commanded by
General Hans Seidemann,[26] whose aircraft helped destroy Soviet strong points and artillery positions. To the
southeast, III Panzer Corps had great diculty crossing
the Northern Donets River on 5 July.[27] They eventually
formed a bridgehead across by the morning of 6 July,[27]
but stubborn Soviet resistance meant they were unable to
protect the east ank of the II SS-Panzer Corps.[21]

On 8 July, the slow progress by the XLVIII Panzer Corps

caused Hoth to shift elements of the II SS-Panzer Corps
to link up with and help the XLVIII Panzer Corps regain the momentum towards Oboyan and Kursk.[31] The
same day, the Soviets launched powerful counterattacks
against the II SS-Panzer Corps with several tank corps.
These failed to destroy the II SS-Panzer Corps as hoped,
but succeeded in greatly slowing its progress.[32][33] By
the end of 8 July, II SS-Panzer Corps had advanced
about 29 kilometres (18 mi) and broken through the rst
and second defensive belts.[34][35][36][37] Starting on the
morning of 10 July, the full eort of the II SS-Panzer
Corps was shifted back to its own forward progress, away
from Oboyan due north, to the northeast toward the town
of Prokhorovka.[38] Hoth had discussed this move with
Manstein in early May, as they expected an eventual arrival of large Soviet armoured forces in the Prokhorovka
area.[39][40][41] The plan originally envisioned elements of
XLVIII Panzer Corps[42][41] and III Panzer Corps joining
in the attack towards Prokhorovka, but this could not be
realized.[41]
Soviet intelligence reports issued from 8 to 9 July indicated that defensive works were being constructed by
German infantry all along the anks of 4th Panzer Army
and that German armoured formations could not be spotted on the anks despite armoured counterattacks that
should have provoked their appearance.[43] The Voronezh
Front headquarters concluded that the Germans were
reaching their limit, and hence it decided on a major
counteroensive as the next course of action.[43]

On morning of 11 July, the II SS-Panzer Corps continued its attack toward Prokhorovka. In the ensuing attacks, its 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte
On the evening of 6 July, the 5th Guards Tank and the SS Adolf Hitler had the most success, penetrating the So-

2.1

German plans for 12 July

Vehicles of II SS-Panzer Corps advancing towards Prokhorovka

on 11 July.[44]

viet defences manned by the 2nd Tank Corps, which had

been reinforced by the 9th Guards Airborne Division and
301st Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, both from the 33rd
Guards Rie Corps.[45][46] They cleared Soviet resistance
at the October state farm (Russian: ), crossed a 15-foot (4.6 m)-deep antitank ditch at
the base of Hill 252.2 and seized the hill itself after a
brief but bloody battle.[47][48][49] North of Leibstandarte,
the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division Totenkopf failed to
expand their bridgehead across the Psel River or capture Hill 226.6, which were defended by the 31st Tank
Corps, the 33rd Guards Rie Corps 95th Guards Rie
Division,[50][51][49] and the 10th Tank Corps 11th MotorPaul Hausser, commanding ocer of the II SS-Panzer Corps
ized Rie Brigade.[52] To the south, the 2nd Guards Tank
Corps and the 48th Rie Corps 183rd Rie Division repelled the attack of the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division
Das Reich.[49]
By days end on 11 July Leibstandarte had advanced deep
into the Soviet third defensive belt and was only 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) from Prokhorovka,[48][53] but its anks
were exposed,[54] as there was a 5-kilometre (3.1 mi) gap
between it and Totenkopf, and Das Reich lagged behind
by 4 kilometres (2.5 mi).[49] Throughout 11 July, the 5th
Guards Tank Army organized itself around Prokhorovka
as it prepared for its forthcoming counteroensive.[55] But
Leibstandarte 's advance disrupted some of these preparations by capturing the 5th Guards Tank Armys planned
artillery positions and assembly areas, forcing Rotmistrov
to hastily revise his plans and select new positions.[56][57]

2
2.1

Planning
German plans for 12 July

Late on the evening of 11 July, General Paul Hausser,

the commander of the II SS-Panzer Corps, issued orders for a classic manoeuvre battle for the following days
advance on Prokhorovka. It was known that the Soviets had dug in many anti-tank guns on the west slopes
of Prokhorovka, making a direct attack by Leibstan-

darte very dicult.[58] The plan was for Totenkopf to

capture Hill 226.6,[59] and advance northeast along the
Psel river to the Kartashvka-Prokhorovka road, and then
strike southeast into the ank and rear of Soviet forces at
Prokhorovka.[58][59] Leibstandarte was ordered to nudge
forward and secure Storozhevoe and Lamki just outside
Prokhorovka,[59] then it and Das Reich were to wait until Totenkopf 's attack had disrupted the Soviet positions,
after which Leibstandarte was to attack the main Soviet
defences on the west slope of Prokhorovka. To Leibstandarte 's right, Das Reich was to advance eastward to
the high ground south of Prokhorovka, then turn south
away from Prokhorovka to roll up the Soviet defences and
force a gap.[58] The VIII Fliegerkorps was to make their
main eort in support of the advance of the II SS-Panzer
Corps, with the XLVIII Panzer Corps to the west assigned
limited air resources.[60]
Unbeknownst to Hausser, on the night of 11 July Rotmistrov had moved his 5th Guards Tank Army to an
assembly area just south of Prokhorovka in preparation
for a massive armoured attack the following day.[61][62]
Throughout the night, German frontline troops could hear
the ominous sounds of Soviet tank engines as the 18th and
29th Tank Corps moved into their assembly areas.[63][64]

2.2

Soviet plans for 12 July

OPPOSING FORCES

mistrovs entire plan by threatening the ank of the 5th

Guards Tank Army.[71][63] Early on 12 July, Vatutin
ordered Rotmistrov to send reinforcements to the Soviet 7th Guards and 69th Armies facing the III Panzer
Corps.[72][40][63] He organised a task force under the command of his deputy, Major General Kuzma Trufanov,
which consisted of the 26th Tank Brigade from the 2nd
Guards Tank Corps, the 11th and 12th Guards Mechanized Brigades from the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps,
and the 53rd Guards Tank Regiment of the 5th Guards
Tank Army.[72] Other units of the Voronezh Front also
joined the group on its way south.[72] In doing so Rotmistrov had committed over half of his reserves to an essential ad-hoc advance before the Battle of Prokhorovka
began.[63][40]
Soviet air support in the southern part of the salient
was provided by the 2nd Air Army and the 17th Air
Army,[73] commanded by Lieutenant General Stepan
Krasovsky and Lieutenant General Vladimir Sudets,
respectively.[74][75] However, the bulk of the air support was committed in support of Soviet units attacking
XLVIII Panzer Corps to the west of Prokhorovka and the
III Panzer Corps to the southeast, and only limited numbers of aircraft were available to support 5th Guards Tank
Armys attack.[73]

3 Opposing forces
Pavel Rotmistrov, commanding ocer of the 5th Guards Tank
Army

See also: Battle of Kursk order of battle

The 5th Guards Army and 5th Guards Tank Army of

the Steppe Front had been brought up from reserve
and reassigned to the Voronezh Front on 8 and 11 July
respectively.[65] On 11 July Vatutin ordered that the following day the armies of the Voronezh Front were to go
over onto the oensive along the entire front of the southern salient.[66] This counterattack was planned to be in
concert with the Soviet Operation Kutuzov in the northern side of the Kursk Salient.[67] Vatutin ordered Rotmistrov to destroy the German forces near Prokhorovka
with his 5th Guards Tank Army, without allowing the
Germans to withdraw southwards.[68]
For the battle, Rotmistrov ordered his tanks to move forward at speed to engage the German armour in order to
nullify the advantages the Tiger tanks had in the range
and repower of their 88 mm guns. He believed the
more manoeuvrable T-34 would be able to quickly close
and obtain eective anking shots against the German
heavy tanks.[58][69] In fact, Soviet intelligence had greatly
overestimated the numbers of Ferdinands and Tigers possessed by the II SS-Panzer Corps.[lower-alpha 11] In actuality
there were no Ferdinands with the 4th Panzer Army, as
they were all deployed in the northern side of the Kursk
salient with the 9th Army.[70]

German forces in the southern area of the Kursk salient during

Operation Citadel

3.1 German

The German forces involved in the Battle of Prokhorovka

were from the three Waen-SS divisions of the II
SS-Panzer Corps: Leibstandarte, Das Reich, and
Totenkopf.[76] On the evening of 11 July, the serviceable armour strength of the II SS-Panzer Corps was
Late on the night of 11 July, the III Panzer Corps crossed 294 tanks and assault guns, which included 15 Tigers.
the Northern Donets at Rzhavets. This jeopardised Rot- The armoured strength of Leibstandarte, Das Reich, and

5
Totenkopf were 77, 95, and 122 tanks and assault guns
respectively.[70] Ten of the Tigers were to the north of the
Psel river with Totenkopf, four were with Leibstandarte,
and Das Reich had just one.[77][69]

German Panzer IV and Sdkfz 251 halftrack

Leibstandarte had advanced the most deeply towards

Prokhorovka and was situated in the centre of the German
position.[78] A railway line, with a 30-feet high railbed, divided the area of Leibstandarte division north and south.
The bulk of the division was positioned to the north of
the rail line, including the divisions 1st SS-Panzer Regiment and 2nd SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment, as well as
its reconnaissance, artillery and command units.[78][79]
To the south of the rail line was Leibstandarte 's 1st SSPanzergrenadier Regiment, along with the divisions 1st
SS-Panzerjger battalion.[78][79] Das Reich was positioned
to the southeast of Leibstandarte, and it protected the
southern ank of the II SS-Panzer Corps.[80] Totenkopf
was positioned to the northwest of Leibstandarte. The divisions 3rd SS-Panzer regiment had largely crossed over
the Psel river in preparation for the assault. Leibstandarte placed its lightly armed 1st SS-Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion in the 5-kilometre (3.1 mi) gap between
it and Totenkopf,[78][81][79] together with the divisions
four remaining Tigers, which were commanded by SSSecond Lieutenant Michael Wittmann, to provide some
ank protection.[81][82]

3.2

Tank Army including the newly attached 2nd Guards

Tank Corps[lower-alpha 2] and 2nd Tank Corps[lower-alpha 3] ,
as well as the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps[lower-alpha 4]
held in reserve facing the II SS-Panzer Corps on 12
July was about 616 tanks and self-propelled guns.[92][93]
In addition, ve artillery regiments, one artillery brigade,
and one anti-aircraft artillery division were attached to
the 5th Guards Tank Army for the assault.[94]
The main attack of the 5th Guards Tank Army was conducted against Leibstandarte by its fresh 29th and 18th
Tank Corps that had been brought up from the Soviet
strategic reserve.[95][96][97] These two Soviet tank formations together provided the greatest number of tanks in
the attack,[92] with the 18th Tank Corps elding 190 tanks
and self-propelled guns, and the 29th Tank Corps elding 212 tanks and self-propelled guns.[96][97] Infantry support to the 18th and 29th Tank Corps was provided by
the 9th Guards Airborne Division.[96] A portion of the
18th Tank Corps was directed against the eastern ank of
Totenkopf 's Regiment Eicke.[96] On the southeastern
wing of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Rotmistrov deployed
the remaining forces of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps that
were not sent south, which numbered about 80 tanks.[92]
The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, supported by the remnants
of the 2nd Tank Corps, was to attack Das Reich.[40][98]
Their infantry support was provided by the 183rd Rie
Division.[99] The northwestern ank of the 5th Guards
Tank Army, which faced Totenkpf, was defended by the
33rd Guards Rie Corps 42nd and 95th Guards Rie
Divisions,[100][101] supported by the remnants of the 31st
Tank Corps and the heavily depleted 23rd Guards Rie
Corps 52nd Guards Rie Division.[102][101] The forces
of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps that were not sent
south were held as reserve north of Prokhorovka,[94][92]
and they numbered about 113 tanks and self-propelled
guns.[97]
Despite having suered signicant losses over the previous weeks ghting, on 12 July the 2nd Air Army still
had some 472 aircraft operational, while the 17th Air
Army had 300 operational aircraft; however, only a few
of these were made available to support the 5th Guards
Tank Army.[73]

Soviet

The main Soviet armoured formation involved in the battle was the 5th Guards Tank Army, which controlled
ve corps by 12 July: the 2nd Guards, 2nd, 5th Guards
Mechanized, 18th and 29th Tank Corps.[83][84][85] All together they elded 793 tanks and 37 to 57 self-propelled
guns for a total of approximately 840 armoured ghting
vehicles.[86][87][88] About two-thirds of these tanks were
T-34s, while the remainder were T-70 light tanks,[89]
with some 31 to 35 Churchill heavy tanks as well.[90][91]
Not all of the 5th Guards Tank Army was present in the
Prokhorovka area during the battle, as part of the formation had been sent south to check the advance of the III
Panzer Corps.[72] The Soviet armour of the 5th Guards

4 Battle
At 05:45 on 12 July, Leibstandarte 's headquarters started
receiving reports from its troops, of the sound of many
tank engines as the Soviet tanks moved into their assembly areas for the attack.[103] At around 06:50, elements of Leibstandarte 's 1st SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment nudged forward and drove the Soviet infantry out
of Storozhevoe,[104][105] and elements of its 2nd SSPanzergrenadier Regiment fanned out from the October
state farm,[104] while the bulk of Leibstandarte waited
to commence their main task for the day.[106] The Soviets began a preparatory artillery barrage at around

4 BATTLE

08:00,[107][105][108] and as the last shells fell at 08:30,

Rotmistrov radioed the code words Stal! Stal! Stal!"
(Steel, Steel, Steel!") the order to commence the
attack.[109][108] With that the Soviet armour of the 5th
Guards Tank Army began their advance.[69][110][111]

4.1

Ground engagement

In total, about 500 tanks and self-propelled guns of the

5th Guards Tank Army attacked the positions of the II
SS-Panzer Corps,[110] doing so in two massive waves,
with 430 tanks in the rst echelon and 70 more in the
second.[112][94]
Down o the west slopes before Prokhorovka charged
the massed Soviet armour of ve tank brigades of the
18th and 29th Tank Corps, ineectually ring as they
came at Leibstandarte 's positions.[113] As the Soviet tanks
rolled down the slopes, they carried the men of the 9th
Guards Airborne Division on their hulls.[110] Exhausted
from the previous weeks ghting, the troops of Leibstandarte were just starting their day at the outset of
the attack and were largely taken by surprise.[114] As the
Soviet armour appeared, several German outposts began ring purple warning ares signaling a tank attack.
Obersturmbannfhrer Rudolf von Ribbentrop, commander of a panzer company under the 1st SS-Panzer Regiment, stated later that he knew at once a major attack was underway.[69] He ordered his company of seven
Panzer IVs to follow him over a bridge across an antitank ditch. Crossing the bridge they fanned out on the
lower slope of Hill 252.2. On the crest of the hill,
Sturmbannfhrer Joachim Peiper's 3rd Panzergrenadier
Battalion of the 2nd SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment were
being overrun.[115][116] As Ribbentrops tanks spread out,
he and the 1st SS-Panzer Regiment was suddenly confronted by Soviet tanks of the 29th Tank Corps 31st
and 32nd Tank Brigades:[117] About 150200 meters in
front of me appeared fteen, then thirty, then forty tanks.
Finally there were too many of them to count.[115][118]
The Soviet armour, ring on the move, charged down the
western slopes of Hill 252.2 into the panzer company,
and a hotly contested tank battle ensued.[115] Four of the
Panzer IVs under Ribbentrop were destroyed by the time
their position was overran.[119] The three surviving tanks
rode along with the advancing Soviet armour unnoticed,
and they reported to have destroyed 14 Soviet tanks from
close range.[120] Rotmistrovs tactic to close at high speed
disrupted the control and co-ordination of the Soviet tank
formations and also greatly reduced their accuracy.[40]
Wittmans company of Tigers were confronted by racing
Soviet tanks from the 18th Tank Corps 170th and 181st
Tank Brigades.[121][82] In a three-hour battle, the Tigers
engaged the Soviet tanks at a range of up to 1000 meters, inicted heavy losses on the Soviet tanks,[122][117]
and successfully repelled the attack.[117] Other elements
of the 170th Tank Brigade engaged the 1st SS-Panzer
Regiment, which was already ghting the 31st and 32nd

Tank Brigades. Despite losing its commander and about

30 tanks in the ght, by early afternoon the 170th Tank
Brigade had forced the 1st SS-Panzer Regiment back to
the October state farm and reached the position of the
1st SS-Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion.[123] At around
18:00, the 170th and 181st Tank Brigades penetrated the
German line connecting Totenkpf and Leibstandarte, but
a counterattack from Totenkpf led by Tigers repelled the
Soviet tanks and re-established the line.[124]
Soviet armour ghting near Hill 252.2 were held up when
they reached the anti-tank ditch at the base of the hill.
Some vehicles crashed into the 15-foot ditch while others
moved along the edge looking for a way to cross. Heavy
ring occurred between the Soviet tanks, as they searched
for a route across the ditch, and the two companies of
an SS-Panzergrenadier Battalion on the opposite side.[125]
Peipers surviving panzergrenadiers engaged the Soviet
infantry and attacked the Soviet tanks with magnetic antitank grenades. Twenty of his battalions half-tracks were
lost in the ghting, some of which were destroyed when
they attempted to ram the much heavier Soviet tanks in
an eort to stop them.[126] Eventually due to heavy Soviet
pressure and dangerously exposed anks, Leibstandarte
tactically withdrew from the October state farm and established rmer defensive lines 1 kilometre (0.62 mi) to
the south.[127]

4.2 Air combat

The 2nd and 17th Air Armies ew 893 sorties compared
to the VIII Fliegerkorpss 654 sorties over the southern
part of the salient. Of note, most of the Soviet sorties own that day were own against the XLVIII Panzer
Corps to the west and the III Panzer Corps to the south.
Low clouds in the morning and thunderstorms in the afternoon inhibited air operations in Prokhorovka by both
sides.[128] Over the Prokhorovka battleeld the Luftwae
gained control of the air. Formations of Stukas, including a small number of experimental 3.7-centimetre (1.5
in) BK 37 cannon-equipped G-2 variants, commanded
by Staelkapitan Hans-Ulrich Rudel, Fw 190 ghterbombers and Hs 129 ground-attack aircraft equipped
with 3-centimetre (1.2 in) anti-tank cannon attacked the
Soviet formations.[112] The 31st Tank Brigade reported:
We suered heavy losses in tanks through enemy artillery and aircraft. At 10:30 our tanks reached the Komsomolets State Farm, but due to continuous air attacks,
they were unable to advance any further and shifted to
the defence.[111] The tank brigade also reported: our
own air cover was fully absent until 13:00.[129] The 5th
Guards Tank Army reported: the enemys aircraft literally hung above our combat formations throughout the
entire battle, while our own aircraft, and particularly the
ghter aviation, was totally insucient.[129]

5.1

4.3

Aftermath

Result of the engagement

7
solidate its front line with Totenkopf 's position.[140] This
attack confronted the defensive positions held by the 33rd
Guards Rie Corps, which had been supplemented by
the remaining armour of the 18th and 29th Tank Corps.
Leibstandarte 's attack was repelled.[140] That afternoon,
Totenkopf was ordered to abandon their positions northwest of Prokhorovka and return to a more defendable positions along the north bank of the Psel River.[141] Soviet
attempts to sever the salient were unsuccessful, and the
unit completed its withdrawal by nightfall.[141]

5.1 Aftermath
A weary ocer lights the cigarette of his NCO in the southern
part of the salient

By the end of the day, Leibstandarte had lost no ground

and still held Hill 252.2,[130] but was exhausted by the effort of turning back ve tank brigades.[40][131] To its left,
Totenkopf had succeeded in capturing Hill 226.6 and its
panzers had advanced along the north bank of the Psel to
reach the Karteschevka-Prokhorovka road, 8 kilometres
(5.0 mi) northwest of Prokhorovka.[132] It was in position to outank the Soviet forces at Prokhorovka, but was
under pressure from Soviet attacks and its hold on the forward ground was tenuous.[133] Forced onto the defensive
by the attacks of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and 2nd
Tank Corps, Das Reich was unable to conduct its planned
attack.[134][99]
On the Soviet side, all the tank units under Rotmistrovs
5th Guards Tank Army involved in the battle suered
heavy losses.[135] The Soviet attack had been repelled
and Rotmistrov was forced to shift his tank army over
to defence.[136]

Following the main engagement

On the night of 12 July, Vatutin ordered the Soviet

forces facing the II SS-Panzer Corps to take a defensive stance.[137] Orders issued by the Germans for 13
July instructed Totenkopf to consolidate its gains of the
previous day and then attack into the ank and rear of
the Soviet forces around Prokhorovka.[138] Leibstandarte
was to strengthen its front line and co-ordinate its attack
on Prokhorovka from the south with Totenkopf 's attack
from the northwest.[138] Das Reich was to consolidate and
strengthen its front line and prepare for an oensive operation to link up with the III Panzer Corps.[139]
On the morning of 13 July, the 5th Guards Mechanized
Corps and the 33rd Guards Rie Corps launched attacks against Totenkopf 's left ank.[140] By afternoon
these Soviet attacks had been beaten o, but they did
prevent Totenkopf from attacking to the south toward
Prokhorovka.[140] Around noon, Leibstandarte was ordered to attack northward toward the Psel River to con-

On 13 July Adolf Hitler summoned Manstein and Field

Marshal Gnther von Kluge to his headquarters, the
Wolfsschanze in East Prussia.[142][143] The Allied invasion
of Sicily on the night of 910 July combined with the Soviet counteroensive of Operation Kutuzov against the
ank and rear of Models 9th Army on 12 July and the
violent attacks by strong Soviet forces at Prokhorovka the
same day had caused him to stop the oensive and shift
forces to the west.[143][144][137] He ordered his generals to
terminate Operation Citadel.[144][145][146]
Kluge welcomed the decision, as he was already in the
process of withdrawing units of the 9th Army from the
Kursk salient to deal with Soviet attacks on his ank.[146]
Manstein was greatly disappointed. He argued that his
forces were now on the verge of achieving a major breakthrough. As he saw it, with his III Panzer Corps about
to link up with the II SS-Panzer Corps at Prokhorovka,
and with the XXIV Panzer Corps available as his operational reserve, they would be halting the oensive just
at the moment when victory was in hand. With an eye
toward the west, Hitler was unwilling to continue the
oensive.[144][147][148] Manstein persisted, proposing that
his forces should at least destroy the Soviet reserves in the
southern Kursk salient before Citadel was nally terminated, so the Soviet ghting capacity in the sector would
be depleted for the rest of the summer.[147][148] Hitler
agreed to continue oensive operations in the southern
salient until Mansteins goal was achieved.[147][148]

5.2 Operation Roland

Manstein hastily put together the plans for Operation
Roland, realizing that he only had a few days to conduct
the operation before he lost the SS-Panzer Corps.[149]
The plan called for Das Reich to attack east and south
and link up with III Panzer Corps, which would attack
to the northwest. Leibstandarte and Totenkopf were to
anchor the left and northern anks of Das Reich. Once
the link was achieved and the Soviet forces encircled,
the Soviet defence would be crippled and Prokhorovka
would likely fall shortly thereafter.[149] The goal of the
operation was to destroy the Soviet armoured reserve
massed in the southern sector of the Kursk salient, and

6 CASUALTIES AND LOSSES

patched south to meet the new Soviet oensives.[167][168]

6 Casualties and losses

A column of Panzer III tanks during Operation Citadel

Losses are dicult to establish for either combatant.

Tank losses attributed to the Germans vary,[169] in part
due to the Wehrmachts methodology for counting and reporting equipment losses. Only equipment that could not
be repaired or that had to be abandoned were counted as
losses, but damaged equipment that could be recovered
and repaired were simply listed as such.[170][171] Likewise, reliable gures for tank and personnel casualties for
the Soviets in the battle of Prokhorovka are dicult to
establish.[172]

thereby check Soviet oensive capacity for the rest of the

summer.[148][150]
The orders for Operation Roland were issued in the closing hours of 13 July 1943.[151][152] However, following
Hitlers meeting with Manstein, Hitler countermanded
the XXIV Panzer Corps deployment to the Kursk salient,
sending them on 14 July to support the 1st Panzer
Army to the south.[153] The assault began at 0400 on
14 July.[151][154][155] Following a brief artillery barrage,
the Der Fuhrer Panzergrenadier Regiment of Das Reich
struck out for the high ground south-west of Pravorot,
evicting the remnants of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps
from the village of Belenikhino following violent houseto-house and hand-to-hand ghting. The panzer regiment
of the division fought o a series of counterattacks, destroying a number of T-34s in the process, and forced the
Soviets to withdraw eastwards to a new line. Zhukov ordered elements of the 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade
out of reserve to reinforce the line. The 7th Panzer Division made contact with Das Reich, but Trufanov, commanding the Soviet forces in the gap, was aware of the
threat and conducted a ghting withdrawal. The link-up
failed to trap the Soviet forces, though they abandoned
a substantial number of their anti-tank guns.[156] Operation Roland failed to produce a decisive result for the
Germans,[157] and Totenkopf began withdrawing from its
positions north of the Psel, following orders issued late on
15 July, as the II SS-Panzer Corps assumed a defensive
stance.[158][159]

6.1 German
The II SS-Panzer Corps reported 842 men killed,
wounded, or missing for 12 July.[173] Since the Germans
controlled the Prokhorovka battleeld until 17 July, they
were able to recover most of their disabled armoured
vehicles.[170] German historian Karl Frieser attributed between three and ve permanent tank losses to the II SSPanzer Corps.[174][175]

Archival data of the II SS-Panzer Corps shows that the

corps had 294 operable tanks and assault guns on the
evening of 11 July[70] and 251 on the evening of 13
July.[176][70] Allowing for the possibility that some repaired tanks were returned to service on 13 July, these
numbers indicate that at least 43 tanks and assault guns
became inoperable during the battle of Prokharovka,
which includes all ten Tigers belonging to Totenkopf and
one belonging to Leibstandarte. However, all of the inoperable Tiger tanks were repairable, and none were writeos.[176] An estimated total of between 60 and 80 of II
SS-Panzer Corps tanks and assault guns were damaged
or destroyed in combat on 12 July.[177][178] By the end
of 16 July, the II SS-Panzer Corps had 292 serviceable
tanks and assault guns, almost the same number it had at
the beginning of the battle on 12 July.[179] On 12 July,
Schlachtgeschwader 1 of the VIII Fliegerkorps and its attached squadron of Stukas reported eleven aircraft damOn 17 July the Soviet Southwestern and Southern Fronts aged, of which six were total write-os, all by Soviet anti[129]
launched a major oensive across the Mius and Donets aircraft artillery.
Rivers against the southern wing of Army Group South,
pressing upon the 6th and 1st Panzer Armies.[160][161] In
the early afternoon of 17 July, Operation Roland was 6.2 Soviet
terminated with an order for the II SS-Panzer Corps to
begin withdrawing from the Prokhorovka sector back to A document prepared on 17 July 1943 by the 5th Guards
Belgorod.[162][158] The 4th Panzer Army and Army De- Tank Army headquarters summarised the combat losses
tachment Kempf anticipated the order and began execut- incurred by the formation from 12 to 16 July inclusive
ing it as early as the evening of 16 July.[163][164] Leib- for all of its ve corps, as well smaller units directly substandarte 's tanks were distributed between Das Reich ordinated to the army headquarters.[180] The document
and Totenkopf and the division was hastily redeployed to reported the following irrecoverable losses: 222 T-34s,
Italy,[165][166] while Das Reich and Totenkopf were dis- 89 T-70s, 12 Churchill tanks, 8 SU-122s, 3 SU-76s, and

8 References
8.1 Notes
[1] The 5th Guards Tank Army was transferred from the control of the Steppe Front to the Voronezh Front on 11 July
(Glantz & House 2004, p. 327). All of its subordinate
corps as of 12 July are listed below (Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 48); the divisions, regiments and battalions
directly subordinate to the Armys Headquarters are not
listed below (Glantz & House 2004, p. 327).

Destroyed Soviet T-34 in the southern salient

240 support vehicles.[180] The document reported damaged vehicles still under repair as 143 T-34s, 56 T-70s,
7 Churchill tanks, 3 SU-122s, 3 SU-76s, and no gures
for support vehicles.[180] The document reported personnel casualties as 2,940 killed in action, 3,510 wounded in
action, and 1,157 missing in action.[180] This adds up to a
total of 334 irrevocable losses in tanks and self-propelled
guns,[172] with another 212 tanks and self-propelled guns
under repair, and 7,607 casualties.
Soviet personnel losses at Prokhorovka for 12 July were
estimated by the historian Christer Bergstrm to have
been as high as 5,500 men.[129] For equipment damaged or destroyed, David Glantz and Jonathan House estimate that the 5th Guards Tank Army lost at least 400
tanks in its attacks on 12 July.[181] George Nipe estimates that between 600 and 650 tanks were damaged or
destroyed.[182] The Soviet historians Grigoriy Koltunov
and Boris Soloviev estimate about 300 tanks and selfpropelled guns of 5th Guards Tank Army were damaged
or destroyed on 12 July.[129][183]

Outcome

Debate exists over the signicance and outcome of

the battle. The Germans destroyed many Soviet tanks
and temporarily degraded the striking power of the
5th Guards Tank Army, but they were unable to take
Prokhorovka or break through into open ground.[40] For
the Soviets, the massive armoured attack of 12 July failed
to destroy the II SS-Panzer Corps or throw it onto the
defensive, but succeeded in exhausting the Germans and
eventually contributed to checking their advance.[184][185]
Thus, neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II
SS-Panzer Corps accomplished their objectives for the
day.[185][186] While the battle is generally considered a
tactical success for the Germans due to the high numbers
of Soviet tanks destroyed,[187][188] ultimately there was no
German breakthrough at Prokhorovka, and with the end
of Operation Citadel the strategic initiative permanently
swung over to the Red Army.[189]

[2] The 2nd Guards Tank Corps was initially not part of the
5th Guards Tank Army. It was transferred from the control of the 1st Tank Army to the 69th Army on 10 July,
and then to the 5th Guards Tank Army on 11 July (Glantz
& House 2004, p. 318).
[3] The 2nd Tank Corps was initially not part of the 5th
Guards Tank Army, but was transferred from the control
of the Southwestern Front to the 5th Guards Tank Army
on 11 July (Glantz & House 2004, p. 321). Due to earlier
combat, by 12 July the 2nd Tank Corps had few tanks left,
many of which were locked in combat elsewhere outside
the battleeld of Prokhorovka and out of contact with their
parent headquarters. Therefore it was reinforced with the
10th Antitank Brigade and relegated to a supportive role
in Prokhorovka (Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 106;
Glantz & House 2004, p. 179,181).
[4] Two of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps four brigades
the 10th, 11th and 12th Guards Mechanized, and the
24th Guards Tank Brigades were sent south to block the
III Panzer Corps, leaving its 10th Guards Mechanized and
24th Guards Tank Brigades near Prokhorovka on 12 July
(Clark 2012, p. 379; Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 101;
Glantz & House 2004, p. 321).
[5] The 5th Guards Army was transferred from the control of
the Steppe Front to the Voronezh Front on 8 July (Glantz
& House 2004, p. 323). Only one of its two corps
were present on the battleeld of Prokhorovka the 33rd
Guards Rie Corps (Glantz & House 2004, p. 167). The
other corps the 32nd Guards Rie Corps was deployed
further west, near Oboyan (Clark 2012, p. 230). The divisions, regiments and other smaller units directly subordinate to the Armys Headquarters are not listed below
(Glantz & House 2004, p. 323).
[6] The 10th Tank Corps was transferred from the control of
5th Guards Army to the Voronezh Front on 7 July and to
the 1st Tank Army on 8 July (Glantz & House 2004, p.
324). Only its 11th Motorized Rie Brigade was in the
battleeld of Prokhorovka on 12 July (Glantz & House
2004, p. 166,195,417). It is not uncommon for this formation to be portrayed as part of the 5th Guards Army
during the Battle of Prokhorovka, but that is a metachronistic error.
[7] The 6th Guards Army bore the brunt of the German oensive from the very opening hours of it; therefore, its subordinate units present at the Battle of Prokhorovka were
already heavily depleted (Glantz & House 2004, p. 167).
[8] These are only for the II SS-Panzer Corps.

10

[9] These are for the whole 5th Guards Tank Army.

REFERENCES

[14] Clark 2012, pp. 194,196197.

[10] See also: Battle of Brody (1941), Battle of Raseiniai,

Operation Goodwood, Battle for Golan Heights (1973),
and others.

[15] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 5153.

[11] A Soviet General Sta report estimated that the II SSPanzer Corps and III Panzer Corps had 100 Tigers and
Ferdinands on 12 July (Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 222).

[17] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 6365.

[16] Glantz 2013, p. 184.

[18] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, pp. 41, 49.

[19] Glantz 2013, p. 195.

8.2

Citations

[1] Healy 2008, p. 347, Excerpt reads: "... a local, tactical

German victory..
[2] Clark 2012, p. 408, Excerpt reads: Even though II
SS-Panzer Corps could claim to have won a tactical victory in the monumental armoured clash at Prokhorovka ...
Haussers men did not do enough to change the course of
the operation..
[3] Showalter 2013, p. 269, Excerpt reads: The Waen-SS
won a tactical victory on July 12..

[20] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 34.

[21] Clark 2012, p. 407.
[22] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 269272.
[23] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 112.
[24] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 8990.
[25] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 101.
[26] VIII. Fliegerkorps.
[27] Clark 2012, pp. 256260.

[4] Nipe 2012, p. 86, Excerpt reads: The small expansion of

the Psel bridgehead by Totenkopf and the advances of Das
Reich around the southern edges of Prochorovka were tactical victories at best and not decisive by any denition..

[28] Glantz & House 2004, p. 138139.

[5] Showalter 2013, p. 269, Excerpt reads: Operationally,

however, the palm rests with the Red Army..

[31] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 133135.

[6] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 561, Excerpt reads:"The

counterattack did not achieve its basic goal. The enemy
[II SS-Panzer Corps] was not routed, but the further advance of the II SS-Panzer Corps beyond Prokhorovka was
nally halted..
[7] Healy 2008, p. 347, Excerpt reads: "... the clash was,
when set against the much wider strategic backdrop of the
oensive, no more than a local, tactical German victory.
It was of no consequence or signicance in helping to realise any of the wider oensive objectives of Operation
Zitadelle, which was in any case by this date already a
failure..
[8] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 108, Excerpt reads: If
we take a look at how the front lines changed during these
ve days one could interpret it as some sort of success
for the Germans ... However, if we compare the outcome
with the German orders for the battle, which stated that
Prokhorovka was the target, it is clear that the Germans
fell short of their goals. The Red Army had hoped to push
the II SS-Panzer Corps back and crush it. This failed completely, but at least the 5th Guards Tank Army prevented
the Germans from taking Prokhorovka..
[9] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 2829.

[29] Healy 2008, p. 296.

[30] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 166167.

[32] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 134135.

[33] Clark 2012, pp. 297299.
[34] Clark 2012, pp. 68, 279, map on page 68 shows 1820
miles.
[35] Glantz & House 2004, p. 130, the map shows 1820
miles.
[36] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 90, this places it at 28 km
at the end of 7 July.
[37] Bauman 1998, pp. 5 to 8-6, this places it at 23 km.
[38] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 146147.
[39] Newton 2002, pp. 6, 7273, 358363.
[40] Brand 2003.
[41] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 2933.
[42] Newton 2002, p. 76.
[43] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 258260.
[44] Clark 2012, pp. 308309.
[45] Clark 2012, pp. 350353.

[10] Clark 2012, p. 189.

[46] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 169, 171.

[11] Healy 2008, p. 43.

[47] Glantz & House 2004, p. 172.

[12] Clark 2012, p. 187.

[48] Clark 2012, pp. 352353.

[13] Glantz 1986, pp. 2325.

[49] Nipe 2012, p. 315.

8.2

Citations

[50] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 95.

[51] Clark 2012, p. 352.

11

[86] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 48, 105106, reports

793 tanks and 57 self-propelled guns.

[52] Glantz & House 2004, p. 166.

[87] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 151, 328, reports 793 tanks
and 37 self-propelled guns.

[53] Dunn 1997, p. 153.

[88] Nipe 2012, p. 39, reports 850 tanks.

[54] Glantz & House 2004, p. 173.

[89] Healy 2008, pp. 171172.

[55] Clark 2012, pp. 350.

[90] Healy 2008, pp. 171172, reports 35 Churchill tanks.

[56] Glantz & House 1999, p. 176.

[91] Glantz & House 2004, p. 328, reports 31 Churchill tanks.

[57] Clark 2012, p. 356.

[92] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 106107.

[58] Nipe 2010, p. 310.

[93] Clark 2012, p. 362.

[59] Glantz & House 2004, p. 178.

[94] Glantz & House 2004, p. 181.

[60] Bergstrm 2007, p. 79.

[95] Licari 2004.

[61] Nipe 2010, p. 276.

[96] Glantz & House 2004, p. 180.

[62] Bergstrm 2007, p. 77.

[97] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 107.

[63] Nipe 2010, p. 315.

[64] Healy 2008, p. 330.
[65] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 323, 326.
[66] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 178, 198.
[67] Glantz & House 2004, p. 227.
[68] Glantz & House 2004, p. 179.
[69] Clark 2012, p. 364.

[98] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 180181.

[99] Glantz & House 2004, p. 192.
[100] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 96.
[101] Glantz & House 2004, p. 184.
[102] Clark 2012, p. 378.
[103] Clark 2012, p. 363.
[104] Glantz & House 2004, p. 182.
[105] Barbier 2002, p. 139.

[70] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 103.

[106] Brand 2003, p. 8.
[71] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 198200.
[72] Glantz & House 2004, p. 202.
[73] Bergstrm 2007, pp. 7881.
[74] 17th Air Army.
[75] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 317,321.
[76] Dunn 1997, p. 154.
[77] Nipe 2010, p. 309.
[78] Nipe 2012, p. 326.

[107] Glantz & House 2004, p. 187, in Moscow time.

[108] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 349.
[109] Glantz & House 2004, p. 188, in Moscow time.
[110] Glantz & House 2004, p. 188.
[111] Bergstrm 2007, p. 80.
[112] Bergstrm 2007, pp. 7980.
[113] Nipe 2010, p. 317.
[114] Nipe 2010, pp. 316317.

[79] Glantz & House 2004, p. 287, information on the specic [115] Nipe 2010, p. 320.
names of the units.
[116] Clark 2012, p. 351, Information on Joachim Peipers rank
[80] Healy 2008, p. 320.
and panzer unit..
[81] Healy 2008, p. 333.

[117] Glantz & House 2004, p. 185.

[82] Clark 2012, p. 368.

[118] Clark 2012, p. 366.

[83] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 48, 101.

[119] Agte 2006, p. 124.

[84] Glantz & House 2004, p. 151.

[120] Agte 2006, p. 125.

[85] Nipe 2012, p. 39.

[121] Nipe 2010, pp. 329330.

12

[122] Nipe 2010, pp. 330331.

[160] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 204, 223.

[123] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 188189.

[161] Newton 2002, p. 24.

[124] Glantz & House 2004, p. 189.

REFERENCES

[162] Glantz & House 2004, p. 223.

[125] Nipe 2010, p. 321.

[126] Nipe 2010, p. 322.

[163] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 514515.

[127] Glantz & House 2004, p. 191.

[164] Barbier 2002, p. 164.

[128] Bergstrm 2007, pp. 7981.

[165] Nipe 2012, p. 72.

[129] Bergstrm 2007, p. 81.

[166] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 139, 218.

[130] Showalter 2013, p. 212.

[167] Glantz & House 2004, p. 245.
[131] Nipe 2010, p. 335.
[132] Showalter 2013, p. 216.
[133] Clark 2012, pp. 388389.
[134] Clark 2012, pp. 381, 389.
[135] Nipe 2012, pp. 48, 52.

[168] Nipe 2012, p. 87.

[169] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 531532, outlines various
gures proposed by various historians over the last three
decades.
[170] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 531532.

[136] Clark 2012, pp. 390391.

[137] Glantz & House 2004, p. 208.
[138] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 209210.

[171] Bauman 1998, pp. 514.

[172] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 108.

[139] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 209, 216.

[173] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 105, 110, 247.

[140] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 212215.

[174] Frieser 2007, p. 130, gives 3 losses.

[141] Clark 2012, p. 394.

[142] Molony et al. 2004, pp. 5565.

[175] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 513, 598, attributes 5 losses
to a claim by Frieser made in 1993.

[143] Clark 2012, p. 397.

[176] Healy 2010, p. 346.

[144] Nipe 2012, p. 71.

[177] Glantz & House 1999, p. 212.

[145] Barbier 2002, p. 153.

[146] Clark 2012, pp. 395397.

[178] Nipe 2012, pp. 6061.

[147] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 217218.

[179] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 103, 105.

[148] Clark 2012, pp. 397398.

[180] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 536538.

[149] Healy 2010, p. 358.

[181] Glantz & House 1995, p. 167.

[150] Glantz & House 2004, p. 218.

[182] Nipe 2012, pp. 8586.
[151] Glantz & House 2004, p. 219.
[152] Barbier 2002, p. 163.

[183] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 102.

[153] Healy 2010, p. 356.

[184] Overy 1997, p. 208.

[154] Clark 2012, pp. 398.

[185] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 108109.

[155] Healy 2010, p. 359, states 15 July in error.

[186] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 553.

[156] Healy 2010, p. 359.

[157] Clark 2012, p. 401.

[187] Clark 2012, p. 408.

[158] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 98.

[188] Nipe 2012, p. 86.

[159] Nipe 2012, p. 70.

[189] Glantz & House 1995, p. 166.

8.3

8.3

Bibliography

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Zetterling, Niklas; Frankson, Anders (2000). Kursk
1943: A Statistical Analysis. Cass Series on the Soviet (Russian) Study of War. London, UK: Taylor
& Francis (Frank Cass). ISBN 0-7146-5052-8.
VIII. Fliegerkorps. Archived from the original on
14 July 2015. Retrieved 11 July 2015.
17th Air Army. Archived from the original on 14
July 2015. Retrieved 11 July 2015.

Further reading
Bellamy, Chris (2007). Absolute War: Soviet Russia
in the Second World War. London: Pan. ISBN 9780-330-48808-2.
Evans, Richard (2010). The Third Reich at War.
New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-14311671-4.
Glantz, David (January 1991). Soviet Operational
Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle. London; Portland,
OR: Taylor & Francis (Frank Cass). ISBN 0-71464077-8.

EXTERNAL LINKS

Glantz, David (December 1991). From the Don to

the Dnepr: Soviet Oensive Operations, December
1942 August 1943. London: Taylor & Francis
(Frank Cass). ISBN 978-0-7146-3350-3.
Guderian, Heinz (1996) [1937]. Achtung-Panzer:
The Development of Armoured Forces, Their Tactics and Operational Potential. London: Arms and
Armour Press. ISBN 978-1-85409-282-3.
Guderian, Heinz (1952). Panzer Leader. New York:
Da Capo. ISBN 0-306-81101-4.
Healy, Mark (1992). Kursk 1943: Tide Turns in the
East. London: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-85532-211-0.
Kasdorf, Bruno (2000). The Battle of Kursk
An Analysis of Strategic and Operational Principles
(PDF). Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College. OCLC 44584575.
von Manstein, Erich (1982). Lost Victories. St.
Paul, MN: Zenith Press. ISBN 978-0-76032-0549.
von Mellenthin, Friedrich (1956). Panzer Battles.
Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky & Konecky. ISBN 156852-578-8.
Moorhouse, Roger (2011). Berlin at War: Life and
Death in Hitlers Capital, 193945. London: Vintage. ISBN 978-0-09-955189-8.
Pinkus, Oscar (2005). The War Aims and Strategies
of Adolf Hitler. Jeerson, N.C: McFarland. ISBN
978-0-7864-2054-4.
Smith, J.R. (1966). Aircraft in Prole No.69 The
Henschel Hs 129. UK: Prole Publications. OCLC
42473519.
Willmott, Hedley Paul (1990). The Great Crusade:
A New Complete History of the Second World War.
New York: Free Press. ISBN 978-0-02-934715-7.
, (2006). [Prokhorovka
The Unknown Battle of the Great War] (in Russian). : X. ISBN 5-17-0395485. Comprehensive description of Soviet and Germany troop movement based on Soviet and German
archives

10 External links
Prokhorovka battle (July 1943)" [
( 1943)] (in Russian). 1998. Retrieved 17 July 2015.
Maps of the Battle of Prokhorovka, July 1943.
Retrieved 17 July 2015.

15
Nipe, George. Kursk Reconsidered: Germanys
Lost Victory. Retrieved 17 July 2015.
Review of Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis". Retrieved 17 July 2015.
Wilson, Alan. Kursk and Prokhorovka, July 1943
(maps)". Archived from the original on 20 April
2012. Retrieved 19 June 2013.

16

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11.1

TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

Text

Battle of Prokhorovka Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Prokhorovka?oldid=677362130 Contributors: Pigsonthewing,

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Images

File:Battle_of_Kursk_(map).jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e0/Battle_of_Kursk_%28map%29.jpg

License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-022-2924-14,_Russland,_Unternehmen_\char"0022\relax{}Zitadelle,_Fahrzeuge.jpg
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%22Zitadelle%22%2C_Fahrzeuge.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the
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File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-022-2950-15A,_Russland,_Panzer_im_Einsatz.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/
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File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0553A-10,_Russland,_bei_Pokrowka,_Soldat_mit_Zigarette.jpg
Source:
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//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/72/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0553A-10%2C_Russland%2C_bei_Pokrowka%
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File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0553A-16,_Russland,_bei_Pokrowka,_Kradschtzen.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.
org/wikipedia/commons/e/e3/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0553A-16%2C_Russland%2C_bei_Pokrowka%2C_Kradsch%C3%
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Koch
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File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0596-12,_Russland,_Panzer_IV_und_Schtzenpanzer_in_Fahrt.jpg
Source:
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File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-220-0630-02A,_Russland,_zerstrter_russischer_Panzer.jpg Source:
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org/wikipedia/commons/c/c7/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-220-0630-02A%2C_Russland%2C_zerst%C3%B6rter_russischer_Panzer.jpg
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File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101III-Groenert-019-23A,_Schlacht_um_Kursk,_Panzer_VI_(Tiger_I).jpg
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File:Rotmistrov.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6a/Rotmistrov.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www.fgcibelluno.altervista.org/leader_sovietici.htm Original artist: USSR

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