,/.- " Miriam Suzanne Pia .

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German Idealism

Philosophies in Europe have been written in national languages since the middle of the
I seventeenth century. Sutton circumscribed 'Europe' and 'European culture'. "Europe in any cultural

I .sense only came into being with the onset of the Reformation. And for the purposes of philosophy I

propose to date Europe from the final demise of Christendom, for which one may take the Treaty of

I Westphalia of 1648, which marks the end of the religious wars on the Continent- in Britain the

corresponding date would be 1660," (Sutton, p.3).

I Claud Sulton has noted a characteristic of the German tradition in philosophy. "[It] has not on

the whole fallen into the extreme one-sidedness of positive-scient ism on the one hand or the
I introspective psychologism on the other. Most writers in its different epochs ... give fair weight to the
f

I perceptive and the active, the emotional and the intellectual, the individual and the social aspects of the

human person. The relation of human beings, though the written records note more of the male human

I beings, rather than the female human beings to the world were often emphasised in historical German

philosophy.

I In its most general sense, German Idealism rests on the assumption that intelligibility pervades

the world of nature and culture, and that this can be viewed through history and by examining the
I current state of affairs. (Sulton, 57-G5). Hegel's system is a unique effort to find the concepts that

I govern this rational order. His endeavour grew out the German tradition, especially out of the Kantian

aspiration to delineate the categories of the human thought, and to trace the limits of reason. Schelling

I and Fichte, the other German Idealists works were also rooted in Kant: the former in Kant's Critique of

Judgement, the latter in Immanuel Kant's Critique o(Practical Reasoll. (Sutton, ps.53-57). Apart from

I Kant, the main influences on Hegel and the other German Idealists were Goethe- as part of the Sturm

I
_und Drang movement in German literature, the Romantic movement in Germany, and the French

Revolution in politics. Of these, the women's movements of the time were most closely bound up with

I Romanticism. Caroline Schlegel, Schelling was, along with both Misters Schlegel and Schelling an

active member of the intellectual Jena Circle. Hegel and Goethe, though themselves not Romantics,

I
,
were closely involved with the members of this group, both socially and intellectually, (Seyla
 J .r:»: Miriam Suzanne Pia
4708 N College Ave
3
Indianapolis, IN 46205-1962

I Benhabib.tp.Sz). ,
Of the German Idealists, Mr. Schelling was the most Romantic, whereas Mr. Fichte

IJ was the most religious. Between these relative extremes was Hegel, and his thought. Before we

I
address Hegel's idealism in itself, let us briefly examine it in relation to Kantian philosophy.

J Hegel's brand of idealism also differed from others. "Subjective idealism, the view that the

world is my ideas or sensations ... Hegel, too hoped to solve ... [problems of self and world] by some

I type of idealism, but his idealism is not that of Berkeley, Kant or Fichte. The contrast is pointed by the

f 'fact' that whereas Dr. Johnson thought that kicking a stone refuted idealism, Hegel held that if anything

it confirmed it. Realism, according to Hegel, maintains that physical objects are independent of

I oneself. Practical involvement with them - eating them or possessing and using them- both establishes

that thcy are not," (lnwood,p.143). This last sentence is not true. Realism does rely partially upon

'I extrapolation for its argument. This consists of accepting the reality of the world prior to one's own

birth, and after one has died. The fact that humans effect other beings and things in our/their world
) does not mean that those things and beings are not independent of us [or their original existence.
J

Similarly, the reality of places, beings, things etc. that remain beyond my own, or your experiential
J
boundaries is independent of my experiencing them. My subjectivity, or yours for that matter, is

1 constituted predominantly by personal experience .. However, individuality is also constituted by

limitation- in both form and experience. DilTerentiation is one quality that requires this limitation.

I This leads us to the principle that there is more to other people and to the world than our own limited

consciousness. Mortality is another expression of the limitation which thorough individuality demands.

I This is the line of thought by which the subjectivity of the ego is at once realised. That this subjective

I reality, this individualised experience makes up the totality of our uniqueness, but not of the reality of

the objective world. It is true that each of us depends upon our own subjectivity to experience the

world, yet it is equally obvious that our subjectivity, our lives, have emerged from other people and are
I
I
!
dependent upon the world of which are apart- not the other way round. Further, that we can effect !
\ iI
other beings and objects in reality does not show their dependence upon our subjectivity for their

construction; it reveals, rather, that we, ourselves and the objects of our experience are qualitatively as
I
real as one another. If this were not the case, the entire world would dissolve and end every time

anyone died. The unique compilation of experience is lost whenever and individual dies, but the reality

of which that person (or other life-form for that matter) was a part does not. The greatest discomfort

that this creates, is that it tends to make a very powerful case against the capacity for individuals to

I
I, '-~7~
Miriam Suzanne Pia

- -, 4

I know everything. For philosophers, this has sometimes been, and can be a difficult realisation. The

I next question that this brings up is the relation or truth, to the individual.

leap and posit the spiritual realm as the realm of Truth-as-Being,

If we take a metaphysical

we can interpret every manifestation

I of life and, for that matter, of inanimate being as a manifestation of Truth as truth. Here the 'truth'

means a unique, fully differentiated specific formulation of the Truth/Goddess/God. In other words;

I each being is a specific instance of the cosmic Truth in a unique set of relations. The diversity of

. manifestations is a means by which Truth/Goddess/God/Reality expresses itself in its fullness.

I Aristotle would have said: Reality actualises all of its potentialities. This formulation keeps the union

I with the Divine/Truth can be actualised by individuals. This results, however, not in individuals who

'know everything from an omniscient perspective' but in another expression of the Truth with its own

I set of relations to the other Truth from which it has differentiated. This results in 'truth'. A 'truth' is

defined as a 'concrete' mortal expression of the eternal. What was just described might be categorised J
I as a Spiritual Realism. It will not be discussed further in this paper. It is quite distinct from and yet

largely comprehensible in relation with one of Hegel's main metaphysical tenets: "There is no supreme
I being beyond; the spirit is not to be found in another world; the infinite spirit has to be found in the

I comprehension of this world, in the study of the spirits summoned in the Phenomenology

'History comprehended' must replace theology," (Kaufmann, p.148).

of Geist.

I
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I
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Hegel & Kant

I Kantian idealism is based in a belief wherein objective reality is only recognised with

reference to a subject. Hence, further discussion of philosophy from Kant proceeds from the Subject.

I Objective reality is constituted, Kant's system only as 'existing for the subject'. He went on to argue

I
that objective reality is ordered solely by the perceiver, group of perceivers. Characteristic of a series

of philosophers who followed after Descartes, Kant devised yet another egocentric philosophy in which

I the independence of the world from the subject was not realised.

These basic axioms, with which the authoress does not, as it happens, agree, lead to a

I situation in which we should be able to predict some of the characterisitcs which we would be derived

from such a starting point. First, rather than finding the order in the world, such philosophers as Kant

I would consider the order in experience to be rooted in the subject. The sex/gender of such philosophers

I would be relevant, as the order of reality as imposed would be effected by the qualities of the perceiver.

Such a philosophy would probably be intolerant since the perceiver would be simultaneously
J

I perceiving in a unique way and living in the delusion that 'it must be like this for everyone'.

which is perfectly expressed by Kant's Categoricallmperitive

A delusion

which implies that everyone should

I respond in precisely the same manner given the same circumstances. If taken precisely literally, this is

nonsense. It only retains its validity in the 'realm' of the abstract. Although can raise a principle of

I 'adjustments for differences' to the same 'realm'; these two principles will often conflict with one

I
another. The second reveals the 'intolerant quality' of the first.

What other qualities, or problems might we expect in any philosophy which posits

I the subject, but not the world-except as a derivative of the subject? Such systems would be apt to be

blind to the role of nature on the perceiver's behaviour, and to the state of the subject as part of the

I world. Hegel, after Kant, did cite the 'pantheistic intuition'; however, from a Realist metaphysics,

Hegel's was a 'false pantheism' since what Hegel referred to was actually merely a conjuration of the

I subject's rather than the recognition of a truth greater than itself, that is RealitylTruth.

I Kant's and Hegel's philosophies do have several of the flaws noted above. Hegel's

and Kant's metaphysics (or epistemologies,

,
if you prefer) are certainly different. As W.H. Walsh

I pointed out, "There is plenty of evidence to show that Hegel repeatedly read Kant in particular ... the

early writings, which might be said to constitute a continuing Ausienandesetzung with Kant on morality

I and religion, there arc at least three places in [IIegcl's] works as we have them now where Hegel

I
 Miriam Suzanne Pia
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undertakes a full review of and criticism of the Kantian philosophy: in the essay Glauben und Wissen

... in the introductory section ... [to the] Logic in the Encyclopaedia oOhe Philosophical Sciences and

.. ~in the posthumously published Lectures 011 the History o(Philosophy. There are also repeated

references to and discussions of particularly Kantian doctrines in ... the Science o[Logic," (Walsh,

p.96). Walsh's comments are in agreement the synopses of the Hegelian system, and of German

Idealism made by Sutton. Commentators Kaufmann and Sutton both refer to this area of Hegel's

system of thought as the 'realm of shadows' where principles are worked out in abstraction. They claim

that it is in this realm where consciousness is rigorously discliplined, and in so doing they intimate its

connection with morality on the one hand, and science on the other. Kaufmann has claimed that it is in

considering opposite concepts such as 'being-nothing' and 'infinite-finite' that the one-sidedness of these

abstractions becomes clear. They are found together in experience where sense experience operates in

conjuction with 'abstract consciousness'. This aspect of the Logic then, rejoins the explication of

Hegel's dialectical procedure.

Sutton has made an objection to a presumption made by some that, through using

categories such as 'being' and 'nothing' one can deduce the nature of the Absolute. His objection relates

to the process used by the other German Idealist Fichte, who did make deductions from a few abstract

postulates. Yet, as we find elsewhere in this paper, in the discussion of the dialectic, Hegel's dialectic

was more complex than a mode of deduction.

 Miriam Suzanne Pia
7
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Overview of Hegel's Philosophy

Hegel's work went through a major transition during his lifetime. He is known for having

been a firebrand in his youth, during which he wrote as an advocate of free love. He fathered a son with
I . a woman to whom he was not wed. He later married a different woman. It is not clear whether he

ceased to write on free love before or after his experience of unexpected paternity. He is also famed for

having written a 'Life of Jesus' and other pieces in which he severely criticised Christianity. Kaufmann

has cited Hegel's desire to succeed as an academic as one of the major forces which transformed his

fervent writings up to the Phellomenologv o[Spirit into such highly structured tomes as the

Encvclopaedia o[Plzilosophical Sciences. For better and for worse, the simple factor of maturation

was probably as potent of a force in reshaping Hegel's style of writing. Hegel's early writings are still

considered of import, especially to those specialising in Hegel and to many feminist authors. Doubtless

this is partly due to the fact that some of what Hegel wrote in his youth, is not radical at the e~ld of the

twentieth century. Free love, for example, in a society where birth control is commonly used, and the

people are educated about it, is radically different from Irce love in an era and society in which birth

control was itself radical. As such, many feminist writers have found his early works to have more to

offer, and that they need undergo less pain in order to find the good within them. This may be one

factor that separated Hegel from the Romantics, as was his view regarding reason. So to were Hegel's

views about the relations between the sexes, different from those of the Romantics-a problem iliat is

addressed in more detail later in this paper.

Unlike Kant, Hegel considered the passions and emotions to be important in human affairs;

he differed from the Romantics because he maintained that reason remained above the passions in

importance. Unlike Kant's, Hegel looked to both the Greeks and to Goethe in formulating an ethic, In

it, Hegel advocated combining inclinations with duties, thus making it possible to be good and to enjoy

being good. This formula is a magnificent combination of the acceptance of corporeality as natural

soul with the freedom and active will of the spirit. This will be further explored in a section devoted to

embodiment. For the mature Hegel, the concept of reason came to include the desires and emotions;

this is a notable alteration from the Kantian notion of 'pure rationality' as reason. This redefinition of

reason was inspired by Greek conceptions of unity; how Hegel worked this out is expressed in his

notions of individuality as the union of subjective and objective spirit. Hegel cited spirit as the activity

of the will combined with intelligence. Paraphrased from the Anthropology: Idea and activity-
 .~.
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Miriam Suzanne Pia 8
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inclusive of embodiment are part of a conscious effort to conquer the mistake of dualism by taking an

alternative approach to the issue. The freedom and activity of this spirit is simultaneously a birthright

of humanity's and sets humanity apart from the rest of nature. In disagreement with Hegel, women are

distant from, and as close to nature as are men. The temptation arises to view one sex as closer to

nature than the other when inasmuch as the Other sex (males for we women and females for you men)

arises simply because the individual is set apart from the world. From this viewpoint, the opposite sex

is perceived more in the manner of the rest of the world and of nature. "In general, sentience is the

individual spirit living in healthy partnership with its corporeity," (Allthropology, Petry's English,

p.I G I). Although Hegel regards the pantheistic intuition as normal for a healthy mind, he claimed that

it is the 'unnatural' character of the active human will which is the most spiritual and most sublime

achievement of humanity. The main difficulty with this idea, is that it seems to confound the natural

human characteristic of intelligence and the types of goals which emerge from use of this capacity for

something 'unnatural', Whereas Hegel would argue that free will operates 'independently' from natural

laws, it is here argued that free will alters the application of natural laws through the use of intelligence,

but does not act in opposition to natural laws. This is because human beings have emerged from nature

in the first place. In the second place, human beings, inclusive of all our various and sundry

technological devices remain a part of the natural unity of the world in which we live. This unity

consists in everything from our dependence upon the environment for the air we breathe, the food we

eat, and etc. to the materials with which we devise all of our technology. At the same time, both as

individuals and as a group, humans of both sexes exhibit free will.

Hegel himself argued that willing takes place in an unresisting medium, (Inwood, p.lS3).

When he so claimed, he meant to be referring solely to human cultural phenomenon- and especially to

portions of the culture where men were more prevalent than women. However, this itself contrasts

sharply from the idealisation of 'man's relation to nature'. James Schmidt gave Rosen's view, which

follows. "As a consequence of the break with the ancient conception of nature and the substitution of a

program for the domination of nature through a conception of reason modelled on calculation and best

exemplified by Descartes, modem philosophy gains practical mastery at the price of a loss of its own

foundations. In morality, this same attitude is exhibited as the human drive for self-control, and for the

sublimation of interpersonal relations. The individual spirit 'dominating nature' chooses to co-operate

with others, for example. The human group spirit strives to 'dominate nature' in a wide range of ways,
,I ' .•;~;:,>\ ..,
Miriam Suzanne Pia
,. - 9
4708 N College "to. Indianapolis, IN

I including farming. Yet farming is a prime example of the cultivation of nature, and working with

I nature. These concepts are not as mutually exclusive as the thinkers in the German tradition believed

them to be. The emergence of needs and goals, such as peaceful social relations between individuals in

I place of fighting is closely related to the intelligence and describes a way of acting and willing. These

goals do not 'oppose nature' nor do they require the 'domination of nature'. Rather, they require

I emphasising other aspects of nature. Group co-operation does include the domination in individuals of

I their 'natural' drives to egocentricity; however, co-operation also expresses and improves the chances

for individuals and groups of humans to not only survive, but to thrive. This latter effect of what Hegel

I incorrectly termed 'unnatural will' also describes why the conception of 'nature' as 'in need of being

dominated' is untenable. Hegel also failed to recognise that when there was a conception of 'a program

I to dominate nature' his concept of willing as taking place in an unresisting medium falls entirely apart.

It is clear that he attempted to maintain both of these ideas, by viewing culture as 'unnatural' and

I distinct from nature, but we have found here that this is not the case.

I Michael Inwood has provided a very different criticism of Hegel's conception of action. In his

article 'Hegel on Action' he stated that Hegel described only two types of actions. One was action in an

I entirely unresisting medium, the other was the inter-action of a co-operative endeavour. Hegel

claimed, according to Inwood, that any other type of act was Sisyphean. This was especially so with

I respect to acting in a resistant medium- of which the women's movement of the time was a prime

example. Hegel also argued that action is always, or nearly always, about maintaining- an institution or

I a habit, etc. Inwood objected to this by pointing out that most actions can be described in terms of

I 'maintaining'.

simultaneously
What Inwood did not mention was how this relates to the aforementioned puzzle of

having a program 'for the domination of nature' and only acting in an 'unresisting

I medium'. Yet Hegel's general description of the progress of spirit is not of the "natural and easy rise of

self consciousness" in the Phel/olllellology. There are two ways of interpreting the movements in the

I Phellomenology. First, we can view each stage, or 'form' of spirit as the summed up story of a

generation, or generations of people. Within each of these stages the individuals may have 'acted in an

I unresisting medium', but most periods of history have radicals and other 'nonconforrnists'/subcultures

I living in them. Second, we can envisage the phases of spirit as being found both in periods of history

and as a partial description of the spiritual development of individuals. Only if we use the first

I interpretation is there any evidence for 'action in an unresistant medium'. For, if anything, the
'. Miliam Suzanne Pia
41 "T ..:ollc;;"

•
Indianapolis, IN ,~r
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Phenomellology o(Spirit always contains at least an element of struggle in the progression through the

• phases of spirit. Change and not maintenance, is the feature of action which rousts spirit into

•
increasing self-awareness, So, in Inwood's article, we find a troublesome Hegelian account of action

that clashes with Hegel's description of the process of spirit's progress in the Phenomenology. As it is

•
described in Hegel: A Reinterpretation, "We find a vision of the world, of man, and of history which

emphasises development through conflict, the moving power of the human passions, which produce

• wholly unintended results," (Kaufmann, 161).

Let us then continue to criticise Hegel's view and begin the sowing of a new formulation of Spirit's

• development in which nature/culture are found together and in relation.

•
We might say, that this recognition of the coexistence of nature and culture, and the sense of

culture as a willed cultivation of specific aspects of nature is the realisation of the grounds

• (foundations) which were noted above as having been lost. This loss, in turn, comes to a particularly

clear consciousness in the work of Kant and Fichtc (6-11, 2-60,92-104). Paralleling this inability of

• theoretical reason to obtain clarity about its grounds is the moral nihilism whose cultural manifestations

Hegel explores in the Phenomenology's discussion of the self -estrangement wrought by the

• Enlightenment (193-202). Rosen argues that the crisis visible in Kant and Fichte and made more

•II
tangible in the disaster of the French Revolution provides the impetus for a productive renewal of the

main themes of classical Greek philosophy which reach their culmination in Plato and Aristotle. Thus

Hegel's primary response to his age is to be sought.. .on the level of Hegel's theoretical philosophy

proper, the Logic," (Schmidt, p.114). These are part of his Encyclopaedia o[Philosophical Sciences.

• In these later writings Hegel espouses a view of Christianity which simultaneously differs a great deal

from the theological doctrines of the orthodox Lutheran and Catholic churches and yet recognises and

• justifies Christianity. Essentially, Hegel includes Christianity within his system of thought. Charles

•I
Taylor noted, "In any case, it is clear that Hegel is neither a theist in the ordinary sense nor an atheist.

Whatever the sincerity of his claims to be an orthodox Lutheran, it is clear that Hegel only accepted a

Christianity which had been systematically reinterpreted to be a vehicle of his own philosophy,"

(Taylor, p.39).

I Part of what makes Hegel's works so interesting is his effort to include everything, all aspects

oflife, in his analyses. This is also a main contributing factor into the complexity of Hegel's thought.

I In his later works, this is exacerbated by the obscurity of his written style, a difficulty that has plagued
 M'~)AM 5, PIA
I

•I
11

both translators and readers. Walter Kaufmann provided an excellent diagram of Hegel's system in the

form of a circle, which I include here:

I .~\.
cfl
I ..l.0
.# Sittlichkeit Art
~
,

8' Moralitat Religion ~

I lW
Philosophy SB.s..
,...

I Philosophy
of Spirit

I
I :c.
.$
\
Psychology
Phenomenology
Logic

I
~

,~ \S'
Anthropology

Philosophy
of Nature
I
I
, Hegel's system contained within it a philosophy of sex and gender, although it has not often

been recognised as such. This problematises the matter of interpreting Hegel's philosophy, particularly

,
, when striving for a clear comprehension both of Hegel's meaning and of the value for women and

egalitarians of both sexes, of Hegel's system. There are major discussions within Hegel's works

regarding the relation of family to state, esp. in Philosoph v o(Right in which women figure largely-

•,
i
though often in a way, which is anathema to the free women citizens of today, and to the men, who are

our co-citizens. Hegel also addresses relations between the sexes in the 'Philosophy of Subjective

,
Spirit' Anthropology and also in the Phenomenology o(Spirit.

Hegel himself recognised that his philosophy was only current up to his own time; it was only

intended to be. The current trends in our society include sexual egalitarianism, and greater freedom for

•I. both sexes in determining our social roles. These tendencies are multinational. If we take another look

at Hegel's philosophy, can we fmd valuable ways to re-evaluate aspects of Hegel's work which can both

allow us to discover new philosophical problems which require solving, and can we find out which of
•
•
12

Hegel's ideas continue to operate? It is both easy and optimistic to announce the feminisation of

• culture- into an egalitarian system, as a progress of the spirit of humanity. A progress in which men

•
have become more self-aware and ethical in their relations with women, who have also become more

self-aware of themselves (ourselves) as free citizens. Indeed, the concept of motherhood as a matter of

•
choice has perhaps existed in the past 'in the dark' as a suppressed issue, but is now in the light of day.

Clearly this alters dramatically the relationships of family, of the sexes- both within and beyond the

• 'boundaries' of family, civil society, and state. All of these factors add to the value of re-evaluating

Hegel; perhaps his methodology, if nothing else, offers the contemporary readers of both sexes tools

• for a deeper alteration, or for a progressive growth out of his old system. At the very least, it is a great

•
movement of the dialectic. Doubtless, many would agree with Fukuyama, that the increase in

democratic states is another clear example of spirit's progress.

•
Although the sex/gender theory within Hegel's philosophy is not in and of itself the most

; important part, it is extremely significant in that it pervades the whole of his system of thought. There

• is some debate as to whether the Phenomenology oLSpirit or the section of the Encyclopaedia

Philosophical Sciences is the more important of Hegel's works. "[Both] Taylor and Findlay preface
oL

•.- their discussion of the discussion of the system with an account of the Phenomenology

despite the subsequent immersion of a discipline termed phenomenology

Subjective Spirit, the Phenomenology

arguing that

within the Philosophy oL

of 1806 continues to play an important role as prolegomenon tot

he system proper," (Schmidt, p.114). I find the debate to be a bit too presumptuous, in that the scope

-•• covered by Hegel's system make him of interest to religious, political, feminist thinkers as well as

philosophers 'proper'. Yet even within the category of philosophers, most have a bent towards one or

.- another modes of thought in mind when they philosophise.

Encvclopaedia is more important to comprehending

It is this lady's belief that the whole

Hegel's system, than is the Phenomenology .

••
What is the most significant about Hegel is the axiom that spirit is both progressing (or evolving-

though Hegel himself did not think that anything evolved) and that spirit is actual (wirklichkeit) in the

world. The notions of embodiment and of actuality in Hegel's philosophy are the most important due

~ to their metaphysical and cultural implications. His analysis of individuality, and of the individual in

relation to the universal of a culture (a noteworthy limitation by Hegel of ,universal') is fascinating and
~

.- under-appreciated. That this is the medium of uniting the subjective and the objective in spirit really

re-vitalises existentialist notions and sets existentialism into a different relation to metaphysics (these
 13

modes operate effectively regardless of whether spirit, matter or mind are taken as the ontological

ground of being). For reasons which become clear through the dissertation, I think that the

•
Encyclopaedia, with the emphasis on 'Absolute Spirit', and the sections relating to the construction and

operation of universal feeling soul in union with spirit as individuality are the most important features

• of Hegel's philosophy.

We shall now go a bit further into detail about several of Hegel's works. Hegel's

• Phenomenology o[Spirit contained Hegel's insistence that philosophy should be scientific, yet

exemplifies the opposite. That philosophy can be excellent even when it is not scientific. Sutton

• described the Phenomenology as a highly personal, autobiographical account of Hegel's own spiritual

•
pilgrimage. It was a journey, "from a dissatisfaction with Christianity, Kantian morality and

revolutionary enthusiasm, to a rather new kind of rationalism arising out of and tinged with religion,"

•I· (Sulton, p.G5-G). For Kaufmann, what is most significant about the Phenomenology

constitutes "a study of the forms in which spirit manifests itself'.

is that it

In both, the objective manifestation

of spirit is implied. Hegel felt that the world of the divine- of spirit was found in the comprehension

the reason of the world. Hegel's view was that he had examined and explicated this progression
of

• through various forms of male spirit, and in doing so had accomplished a philosophical and religious

•I
endeavour. This becomes quite clear in his later works, wherein he makes explicit the structure of

'Absolute Spirit'. One neglected aspect this reveals it that Hegel's philosophy reflects the Christian

theological problem in that it failed to significantly, or interestingly address the matter of the progress

of female spirit; neither the Phenomenology, nor Christianity develop this. Hegel did do a strike a

• vicious blow against women when he argued against the spiritual development of women in his

Philosophvo[Right.

• As such, this project aims to make another step towards the development of egalitarian

•I
philosophies that respect: the differences betwixt the sexes, and similarities amongst women and men

that transcend gender. The following includes sections that cover: philosophy and feminism, wherein

feminist theory is both criticised and explicated. Then, the significance of embodiment in Hegelian

philosophy and an examination of the famous 'Lordship and Bondage' section of the Phenomenology

I are made. In the latter, Hegel's model of the origin of self-consciousness

at least, the beginnings of a model for emergent self-consciousness

is refuted, and the creation of,

in women is created, as well as the

I seeds of an alternative model for emergent self-consciousness in men. Their follows a 'bits n Pieces'
••
•
14

section where additional specific problems in Hegel's philosophy are addressed. The dissertation ends

• with a section on women's history. Because so many of us have only learnt history 'through the eyes of

•
men', some sense of Hegel's era from the point of view of the women who lived in that time (and who

were interested in bettering themselves and their situation) requires that it be included.

•
"Hegel's system is a circle which he recognised will have to be gone over and rectified again

by subsequent philosophers. As for the individual enquirer, [he or she] can I believe, enter the circle at

• anyone of the points on the circumference, according to one's personal interests or the social concerns

of the age; but once bitten by the spirit of philosophy one is constrained to go all round it. .. It was

• Hegel's merit to see that. .. these manifestations of the spirit are tied together, the individual with the

•
social, the contemplative with the active," (Sutton, p.69).

•
•
•
•I ,

II !
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I Philosophy and Feminism

I
Women who practice philosophy or engage with a canon of male philosophers seek effective

I ways of approaching the subject matter. Many of the attitudes which women take towards texts are

I envisaged as forms of feminist thinking.

men in philosophy.
Some of these ways are, or were, more encouraged by the

One of these ways has been labelled 'liberal feminism.' This consists mainly of

I women reading the texts 'as men' wherein 'men' means human being, rather than 'male'. It is the most

innocuous; some would say- ineffectual, way for women to engage with the canon. It is a method,

I which does not rock the boat. It is a means women and men can use without having to actual face up to

issues of sex and gender. Another way of viewing it is to claim that our contemporary beliefs are so

I much more significant than those espoused in the canon, that there is no need to justify our own ideas,

I nor to refute the bad ideas, or customs of the past. In her article, 'Martha Nussbaum and Unreasonable

Philosophy', Joanna Kerr argues vehemently against this way of reading the philosophical canon. TIle

I authoress) of this dissertation has come to agree that 'liberal feminism' is not an acceptable means of

engaging with the philosophical canon.

I One major reason why other ways of reading philosophy are necessary is that 'liberal

feminism' actually perpetuates sexist structures by idleness. Another is that ways of living described in

I philosophies cannot actually be simply 'lived the same way by men and by women'. Primarily, in any

I system, such as Hegel's, where the men are urged to live in a way that relies upon women living in

subjugation cease to exist as possibilities in a society where both women and men are free. Hence, to

I even attempt to work with such models, is not only bad for the women readers, but is also bad for the

men- especially for those happy with the current movements towards freedom for both the sexes.

I There are two main ways of handling this. TIle first is to dismiss those aspects of the canon with which

one does not agree, and to leave it entirely at that. This is a method employed, quite possibly, by the

I vast majority of readers. The second is to address the issues directly, and to enjoy the work ofre-

I evaluation. Kerr argues essentially that whenever women 'work along traditional lines' in philosophy,

the 'tradition' coerces women into writing in and working with a conceptual structure which is anti-

I feminist, and anti-woman. This means that women philosophers are being coerced into working as

their own enemies: a misogynist project. Kerr explains that this effectively perverts the egalitarian

I ideals of 'liberal feminism'. This manifests as a claim that women have to imitate male voices in order
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I to get heard, read, and respected. That males are not required to 'imitate women', but that women are

I required to 'imitate men' makes explicit that a sexist double standard is at work. She also points out

that for women to 'posit [themselves/ourselves] into another's defining structure is to perpetuate the

I [false myth] of inferiority.' In her article, Stella Sandford cites two other women philosophers who

have found Hegel's errors with respect to women to have pervaded his system through his philosophy

I of sex and gender. "Mills main point in her critique of Hegel is that his treatment of women limited

I [limited women and limited] 'his philosophy so that he cannot the universality that he [sought)'

(1995 :87). Finally Hodge argues convincingly that liberal feminist readings of Hegel's Phenomenology

I orSpirit which argue that women can be included in Hegel's notion of citizenship, for example if only

his prejudices can be overcome." (Sandford, p. 80). This is specifically followed up in the following

I section of this paper. "Hegel, Hodge argues, sacrificed internal consistency to produce false

justifications for the exclusion of women, and she concludes that 'it is Hegel, and political theory, not
I women who are the enemy of the progress of reason and history in the world, since it is [Hegel and

I misogynist political theories] who, against reason and justice [denied the reality of] reason [in women

and denied] justice ... to women' (1987: p.155-6), "(Sandford, p.80). This is explained in more detail

I when the goals of the women's movement of the turn of the eighteenth century, and how aware Hegel

was of this, are covered in the final section of this dissertation. Women and men who really respect

I both the sexes (regardless of whether they are called feminist, or pro-feminist, or not) realise that this is

unacceptable as a solution. As philosophy is about reality and truth, women's aspirations to greatness

I at the philosophicalleve\ need and deserve to be articulated. This demands that: male-man-as-Other be

I thcorised, that values of the 'subcultures' of women and men be recognised and evaluated, that currently

used theories of the canon be subjected to ruthless examination in order to determine which

I philosophers and parts or philosophies have the best ideas for modern students of both sexes to study.

The good news is that this is exciting work. The bad news is that it requires a lot of work, and it

I requires that (esp. men) need to learn to read old works a bit differently.

Proponents of 'liberal feminism' may dismay. To really sort out how women as equals effects

I the philosophical systems written in the past means that men, and women have to think about women a

I lot more. It is easier to write directly off the surface of the tradition. Philosophically however, it results

in extreme distortion of both the canonical writers and of the writings of contemporary philosophers.

I
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*I Man (as a male) is a very warped image of woman indeed. Likewise, woman as a human being, a man,

but who is not male is abstract at best, twisted at its worst.

Bringing Hegel into perspective, particularly for a mixed audience, demands ascertaining

I characteristics of the society for both women and men. In Feminism and Methodology Joan Kelly-

Gadol has faced this issue. "Women's history has a dual goal: to restore women to history and to

I restore our history to women ... But there is another aspect of women's history that needs to be

I considered: it's theoretical significance ... women's history has re-vitalised theory, for it has shaken the

conceptual foundations of historical study. It has done this by making problematical 3 of the basic

I concerns of historical thought: 1) periodisation, 2) the categories of social analysis, and 3) theories of

social change.

I "... A notion which is basic to feminist consciousness ... that the relation of the sexes is a social

and not a natural one," (Joan Kelly-Gadol, p 15-16). She notes that periodisation in women's history is

I an effort to understand women's lives as participants in a coexistent history with men. Due to the

I complexities of the relations of the sexes, including social institutions and the effects of changes in

men's lives on women and vice versa, this alters our sense and interpretation of historical narratives. In

I order to understand Hegel's thought- for the time in which he wrote, and to be clear on Hegel's

contemporary significance- we need to have both sexes in historical and cultural context. In respectful

I criticism of this type of feminism, it is my belief that the relations between the sees are a combination

of natural and 'unnatural' i.e. socially constructed.

I Orthodox academic feminists are like their philosophical counterparts, not free from error. In

I researching for this paper, severe ignorance was found in the guise of inaccurate presumptions within

feminist works. Also, there was at least one question that went unasked. Most of the feminist writers

I
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who were used for this research were wrong about a most basic tenet of their project. Patriarchy is not

universal. Matriarchy does exist in real life, and has been recorded as part of the history of, at least, the

I
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Iroquoian Confederacy in North America. This culture continues to exist today, though it is

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unfortunately a minority, and has been matriarchal for at least five centuries. This culture only became

'suppressed' over the past two hundred years.

The society is matrilineal.

This culture is called matriarchal for several reasons.

All the land of the tribes and families is the property of the women of the

tribe. Women hold all of the hereditary titles. Women select all the male chiefs of the tribe. The roles

I of men function as duties and positions delegated by women. Even the decision of whether or not to
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'. send male warriors into war was made by the women of the tribe. Gender roles in both these societies,
18

•• and in European societies were rather strict. Since the women delegated many tasks to the men, men

did often also function as independent sub-groups much of the time. In a council meeting, for example,

•• unless women relatives chose to be present, the men ran the government of the tribe amongst

themselves- except when regulations had to be voted upon, by both the women and men of the tribe.

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This brings up the unasked question: is an egalitarian society possible with either matrilineal or

I
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patrilineal systems 'of naming and genealogy? Unfortunately this question cannot be answered here

Simone DeBeauvoir was one of several important philosophers who mistakenly perpetuated

I the myth of 'universal patriarchy' due partly to their ignorance of cultures such as that of the Native

American Iroquois. In this respect she was both as brilliant and as wrong as many of her male

I counterparts. Several European feminists wrongly deduced that farming and cattle holding eroded

matriarchal social structures. However, the Iroquoian peoples had relied upon farming more than
I
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hunting for centuries. What has had the strongest effect on the matriarchal system was that the cultural

I pressures upon the nations from the surrounding USA. Financial constraints were the main argument

set forth by Handsome Lake that a family should have both partners and women should not divorce

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I their husbands (throw them out permanently) whenever they wanted, but only under somewhat severe

circumstances. The settlers, with their European patriarchal systems and attitudes effected the

r I Iroquoian culture- if only by effecting how the settlers dealt with the natives. In spite of this, the

I I Iroquois have continued to exist and to have a matriarchal and matrilineal society, (Parker

Iroquois, Parker).
011 the

I • This renews the question: what constitutes a truly egalitarian society- one that is neither

patriarchal nor matriarchal? To what extent do rights and privileges involve presumptions of sex?

I
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How much of what is known as feminism and egalitarianism actually about freeing both the sexes from

I too rigid roles based upon sex? This final question emerged when research revealed that even in a

I
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matriarchal society 'women are women and men are men'. Gender roles, relating to sexual difference

I and expectations influenced the division of labour within the Iroquois society as much as it did in

I
! Europe. For both peoples, the effect of the prevalence of birth control has the potential to alter the

I sex/gender roles.

These are very intriguing questions, which can hopefully be answered. However, it is not

I
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possible to address them all here.

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Hegel's Dialectical Method & The Question of Science

Dialectic as a method has been revered and used by philosophers since ancient

Greece. It emerged, according to Diogenes LaertiusIX.5, from the Eleatic philosopher Zeno.

Zeno considered paradoxes to be fundamental to philosophical development. This method

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continued to flourish and retained its reknown with Plato. One school of Neoplatonism

derived a triadic system that described: unity (mone), going out of oneself (prohodos), and

• retum into oneself (epistrophe). These methods were used into the Middle Ages- at which

time dialectic was one of the liberal arts.

These means of comprehending a world which extends well beyond the

boundaries of mathematics and of 'mathematical logic' rernerged in Germany around the time

of the French Revolution. For the educated rationalist, of in the 'Enlightenment culture' the

'pure (mathematical) rational version of reason' does really help in comprehending life and yet

is insufficient to handle and to solve many of life's problematics. This fact led, at the tum of

the nineteenth-century, to a cultural condition in which some 'intellectuals' abandoned this

rational form of reason. Disillusioned by its limitations, they turned to an adoration of art as a

means to find and express truth in conjunction with self-consciously valuing passions and

emotions over reason-as-Kantian-rationality. An altemative mode for those educated in and

disappointed by Kantian rationality was to embrace, once again, dialectical method with a

view to redefining reason.

Although Kant had involved synthesis in his four triads of categories, it was

the zealous German idealist Fichte who resusitated a form of the dialectic- rather the Eleatic

style, as the three-step of "thesis, antithesis, synthesis". Kaufman pointed out that Schelling

adopted Fichte's form of dialectic, but Hegel did not, (Kaufmann, p154). Hegel did use

another form of dialectic. In the Phenomenology, this is characterised by the passage of spirit

through self-estrangement and 'Unhappy Consciousness', which express the Neoplatonic style

of dialectic mentioned above. Hegelian dialectic does not simply fuse opposites into a

synthesis. Rather it is the movement of dialectic which causes what appears to be opposites to

be comprehended at another level and in a different relation to each other than previously.

This is what makes Hegel's philosophy more than a 'philosophy of the understanding'. R.G.

Mure and others have explained this distinction in other ways. Hegel's notion of reason is
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more than 'Kantian rationality', Part of what dialectic and this altered meaning of reason

involves is that understanding and 'pure' rationality have not faded away but have ceased to

[unction as the categories through which life or reality can be grasped,

In his article, 'Kant as Seen By Hegel', Walsh claimed: "Hegel's obsession with the
"

production and reconciliation of opposites, which underlies his whole conception of dialectical

thinking and manifests itself in every part of his philosophy, would without doubt have struck

Kant as far-fetched," (Walsh,p. 99). The problem of these opposites, of the dialectic, as it

relates to the philosophy of sex and gender within Hegel's system, and beyond is expressed in

Hegel's description of the relation offamily and state. For in these discussions Hegel

simultaneously validates and values women as family members and as members of society,

yet Hegel also fought against women becoming members of both the state and of civil society;

Hegel even opposed women's education- except for domestic education. Hegel associated

Antigone with the state, and recognised women as carriers of divine law when they governed

by familial law; in other words, when and only when they were monarchs or the equivalent of

monarchs. These are merely brief samples of how the contradictory quality of Hegel's

dialectic manifests in his system as an element of his philosophy of sex and gender.

Walter Kaufmann brought up the question of the relation of Hegel's dialectic to

Hegel's own claim that philosophy be scientific. "The fact that Hegel himself never used the

dialectic to predict anything, and actually spurned the very idea that it could be used that way,

suggests plainly that Hegel's dialectic never was conceived as what we should call a scientific

method .. .In other words, Hegel's dialectic is a method of exposition, not a method of

discovery," (Kaufmann, p. 161). One problem here is that Kaufmann imposed a concept of

science which is really confined to that of the natural sciences, wherein prediction is a

necessary quality. A science ca, however, be a systematic ordering of information without

having to be predictive. Taxonomy is one example of this other type of science. Taxonomical

information can be applied in such a way as to make certain specific predicitons, but the

information can only be so used when it is applied in the reverse. First comes the science of

discovering, compiling, ordering and analysing taxonomical information. Then, and only

then, can a new discovery be explained by, or categorised according to the accumulated

taxonomy. Only by reference to a developed body of taxonomical science can predicitons be

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made. For this reason Kaufmann was erroneous in his claim that Hegel's system was

unscientific. This claim does hold true, in a sense, for the Phenomenology since that work

describes the activities of discovery, but they are not presented in an analysed and structured

form until the Encyclopaedia.

Indeed the role of Hegel's dialectic in his philosophy is methodology, just as the

scientific method is used for discovery and organisation of theory, as well as for testing theory

against the state-of-affairs by experiment. Again, dialectic can be applied, as is the scientific

method, in order to achieve desired results. In the case of dialectic the desired results are often

clarification, or refutation, or alteration of concepts. Dialectic does further discoveries, and is

scientific in another sense. Hegel's system is scientific, more so in its later form. Some

evidence of this, is that his methodology can be applied to analyse our own time, whilst also

being able to be modified. Like other theories there may well be limits to how the system can

be applied.
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Hegel & Embodiment

Whereas philosophers such as Leibniz devalued sense-experience, Hegel included

. embodiment and sensation as requisite for people (consciousness) to acquire knowledge. "The

knowledge in which Hegel was interested was [is] essentially embodied, and sensation could not be

dismissed without forgetting embodiment," (Walsh, pI 07). This makes it clear that the relation of sex,

as integral to embodiment, is also relevant to self - consciousness. This is explicitly relevant for both

sexes; hence, this legitimates both feminist re-evaluations of Hegelian philosophy with a view to

creating female oriented formulations and it also serves to justify some feminist philosophers'
\
arguments against 'liberal feminism' and against the limitation of feminist philosophies to 'extensions of

male oriented concepts to women'.

Since embodiment includes individuality as well as sex and is required by Hegelian

philosophy as a "necessary presumption", some re-evaluation of how concepts such as citizenship, civil

society can be applied to both women and to men whilst also retaining difference on both the

theoretical and practical levels is necessary, There has been quite some feminist discussion of

embodiment. Embodiment has been treated as an extraordinarily helpful concept, especially for

creating developmental accounts of self-consciousness, Embodiment has been found to be a potent

argument against dualism, as well as a refutation against the schools of philosophy that renounced

sense experience in the first instance, In the twentieth century some of these types of philosophies

(such as that of Leibniz) have been used to argue against the relevance of sexual difference as a partial

means of arguing against feminist critiques of philosophy and revision of the philosophical canon.

Although G.W.F. Hegel would not have used the notion of embodiment in order to advance a

social, cultural and political egalitarianism (equality of the sexes in theory and practice), many writers,

• including the author of this work, do include embodiment as a philosophically

egalitarian philosophies.
necessary axiom for

Corporeality is not only important for an egalitarian project; Hegel was

•• correct to view sensory experience as a legitimate means to knowledge. Further embodiment

incorporates individuality, which itself involves the union of subjective and objective spirit- of vital

•• importance to Hegel's philosophy.

•••
Hegel does recognise the logical operations and reasoning which occurs or is formulated without the

senses. These he describes as abstract; freedom in its 'pure' state is abstract. However, for Hegel, the
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actual freedom is an embodied activity of will by which the subjectivity of the individual is

externalised and objectified.

These conceptions: of embodiment, offreedom, and individuality are woven together by

Inwood when he states, "Hegel believes that action as opposed to knowledge or contemplation, is
"""

especially connected with self-consciousness. At the most primitive level, action arises out self-centred

"'" desires ... By contrast, the expression of the cognitive altitude is non-egocentric .. .In action I both

require and confirm my awareness of [myself as an embodied entity] (Inwood, p 142). In his
.- Anthropology, Hegel united the abstractness of 'will and intelligence' through free action. This he

noted as being the 1110Stspiritual behaviour, and as the expression of individuality. Hegel called this

awakeness; for "Objective Spirit' this is action, esp. in civil society and in the state. When this is the

case the philosophical questions regarding the tremendous difference between oneself and the world is

raised.

In contrast, Hegel discusses the sleeping spirit and especially the sleeping and/or feeling soul.

Here undifferentiation is the pivotal quality. The unity, be it of mother and baby, man and woman, and

family, Hegel argues, is in opposition to individuality. This can, Hegel has argued, also transpire with

the world. Although Hegel goes so far as to analyse extrasensory phenomena and divination as

occurences within feeling soul's immediacy, this concept has also been described by Nietzsche as the

non-differentiation of the Greek and the world as frenzied Dionysian rite in his Birth of Tragedy.

Hegel called the 'sleeping state' or the unhealthy activities of the feeling soul, severed from spirit.
•.•.. When the feeling soul is connected with Spirit, the awake individual is active. Unlike Hegel, I do not

believe that family life necessitates the destruction of nor the submergence of the individual of either

sex. Whether this simply expresses the spirit of late zo" century American (or at least English

speaking industrialised) feminine culture or whether other philosophers would have agreed with this

author cannot at the moment be ascertained. One might speculate that this is yet another progression of

spirit.
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I culture this would become a test for survival. This is generally what adulthood entails, to varying

degrees. For Hegel's original model, however I think that either adult individuals of both sexes could

survive on their own, or that adults tended to remain in co-operative groups, at least part of the time.

Hegel's model retains the status of one possibility, although an unlikely one.

For women there is less reason to suspect that the presence ofa stranger of the same sex, in
. the same state of maturity would lead to combat. Perhaps this is simply caused by observation: that

amongst mammals, adult females often congregate into groups. This is not only true in herd animals.

This tendency to co-operate with one another socially means that fights between females are usually

triggered by risks to their young or limited resources.

Whilst adult male mammals (including humans) tend often to compete within their own se for

reproductive opportunities, adult female mammals tend to guard their resources for their own and their

offspring's survival. Reproductive opportunities tend to present themselves, if not even to impose
... themselves in the lives of females. The presence of other females can both improve circumstances-

greater ease in hunting when females share looking after young, additional protection from other

predators, and even protection of young, and each other from the odd dangerous male. Of course,

limited resources could under certain circumstances worsen conditions. The presence of multiple

females in nature, and in culture has virtually no effect upon the reproductive opportunities of

individuals; the point being that this is not really a factor in natural female-female social relations

whereas it is a major factor in male-male relations.

Relations between the sexes appear different through the eyes of women than from the

viewpoint of men. The combination of the active forces of sexual attraction, reproductive potentiality,

and (when it exists) maternal relations combine with difference in size to make male and female

I responses to members of the other sex distinctive from their responses to members of the same sex.

Each of the sexes also has its own way of relating to members of the same sex. To this extent, I agree

I with Hegel on this point.

•I"
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Let us briefly address the notion of 'natural mutual recognition' between the sexes.

can, but do not always, constitute a threat to female self-consciousness.

subjugation.
Males

Adult males, aside from

standing out as a strong contrast to normality; i.e., they are Other, tend to cause moments of distress or

There is an irony of the relations between the sexes, which makes man somehow

I dominant in moment's of woman's life, and yet man does not dominate all of women's lives regardless