Admin Case Digest

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGESTS
DELEGATION OF POWERS
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
TO
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE

FILIPINAS vs. THE BOARD OF PUBLIC
UTILITY COMMISSIONERS
G.R. No. L-11216 March 6, 1916
Facts:
FILIPINAS is a foreign corporation
organized under the laws of Spain and
engaged in business in the Philippine
Islands as a common carrier of
passengers and merchandise by water:
On June 7, 1915, the Board of Public
Utility Commissioners issued and caused
to be served an order to show cause why
they should not be required to present
detailed annual reports respecting its
finances and operations respecting the
vessels owned and operated by it, in the
form and containing the matters
indicated by the model attached to the
petition.
They are ordered to present annually on
or before March first of each year a
detailed
report
of
finances
and
operations of such vessels as are
operated by it as a common carrier
within the Philippine Islands, in the form
and containing the matters indicated in
the model of annual report which
accompanied the order to show cause
herein.
FILIPINAS denied the authority of the
board to require the report asked for on
the ground that the provision of Act No.
2307 relied on by said board as authority
for such requirement was, if construed as
conferring such power, invalid as
constituting an unlawful attempt on the
part of the Legislature to delegate
legislative power to the board. It is
cumbersome and unnecessarily prolix
and that the preparation of the same
EH 405
would entail an immense amount of

clerical work."
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is constitutional to
require
COMPANIA
GENERAL
DE
TABACOS DE FILIPINAS to pass a
detailed report to the Board of Public
Utility Commissioners of the Philippine
Islands?
Whether the power to require the
detailed report is strictly legislative, or
administrative, or merely relates to the
execution of the law?
HELD:
The order appealed from is set aside and
the cause is returned to the Board of
Public
Utility
Commissioners
with
instructions to dismiss the proceeding.
RULING:
The section of Act No. 2307 under which
the Board of Public Utility Commissioners
relies for its authority, so far as pertinent
to the case at hand, reads as follows:
Sec. 16. The Board shall have
power, after hearing, upon notice,
by order in writing, to require every
public utility as herein defined: (e)
To furnish annually a detailed
report of finances and operations,
in such form and containing such
matters as the Board may from
time to time by order prescribe.
The statute which authorizes a Board of
Public Utility Commissioners to require
detailed reports from public utilities,
leaving the nature of the report, the
contents thereof, the general lines which
it shall follow, the principle upon which it
shall proceed, indeed, all other matters
whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of
the board, is not expressing its own will
or the will of the State with respect to the
public utilities to which it refers.
Page 1

Such a provision does not declare, or set
out, or indicate what information the
State requires, what is valuable to it,
what it needs in order to impose correct
and just taxation, supervision or control,
or the facts which the State must have in
order to deal justly and equitably with
such public utilities and to require them
to deal justly and equitably with the
State. The Legislature seems simply to
have authorized the Board of Public
Utility Commissioners to require what
information the board wants. It would
seem that the Legislature, by the
provision in question, delegated to the
Board of Public Utility Commissioners all
of its powers over a given subject-matter
in a manner almost absolute, and without
laying down a rule or even making a
suggestion by which that power is to be
directed, guided or applied.
The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as
to what shall be, and conferring authority
or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the
law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter no valid objection can be made.
The Supreme Court held that there was
no delegation of legislative power, it said:
The Congress may not delegate its
purely legislative powers to a
commission, but, having laid down
the general rules of action under
which a commission shall proceed,
it may require of that commission
the application of such rules to
particular
situations
and
the
investigation of facts, with a view
to making orders in a particular
matter within the rules laid down
by the Congress.
In section 20 (of the Commerce Act),
Congress has authorized the commission
to require annual reports. The act itself
prescribes in detail what those reports
shall contain. In other words, Congress
EH 405
has laid down general rules for the

guidance of the Commission, leaving to it
merely the carrying out of details in the
exercise of the power so conferred. This,
we think, is not a delegation of legislative
authority.
In the case at bar the provision
complained of does not law "down the
general rules of action under which the
commission shall proceed." nor does it
itself prescribe in detail what those
reports
shall
contain.
Practically
everything is left to the judgment and
discretion of the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners, which is unrestrained as
to when it shall act, why it shall act, how
it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or
what it shall act upon.
The Legislature, by the provision in
question, has abdicated its powers and
functions in favor of the Board of Public
Utility Commissioners with respect to the
matters therein referred to, and that such
Act is in violation of the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902. The Legislature, by the
provision referred to, has not asked for
the information which the State wants
but has authorized and board to obtain
the information which the board wants.
US vs Tang Ho (1922) G.R. 17122
Facts:
At its special session of 1919, the
Philippine Legislature passed Act No.
2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the
monopoly
and
holding
of,
and
speculation in, palay, rice, and corn
under
extraordinary
circumstances,
regulating the distribution and sale
thereof, and authorizing the GovernorGeneral, with the consent of the Council
of State, to issue the necessary rules and
regulations therefor, and making an
appropriation for this purpose".
Page 2

Section 3 defines what shall constitute a
monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or
corn within the meaning of this Act, but
does not specify the price of rice or
define any basic for fixing the price.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General
issued a proclamation fixing the price at
which rice should be sold. Then, on
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed
against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho,
charging him with the sale of rice at an
excessive price. Upon this charge, he was
tried, found guilty and sentenced.
The official records show that the Act was
to take effect on its approval; that it was
approved July 30, 1919; that the
Governor-General
issued
his
proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919;
and that the law was first published on
the 13th of August, 1919; and that the
proclamation itself was first published on
the 20th of August, 1919.
Issue:
WON the delegation of legislative power
to the Governor General was valid.
Held:
By the Organic Law, all Legislative power
is vested in the Legislature, and the
power conferred upon the Legislature to
make laws cannot be delegated to the
Governor-General, or anyone else. The
Legislature
cannot
delegate
the
legislative power to enact any law.
The case of the United States Supreme
Court, supra dealt with rules and
regulations which were promulgated by
the
Secretary
of
Agriculture
for
Government land in the forest reserve.
These decisions hold that the legislative
only can enact a law, and that it cannot
delegate it legislative authority.
The line of cleavage between what is and
what is not a delegation of legislative
EH 405
power is pointed out and clearly defined.

As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:
That no part of the legislative power
can be delegated by the legislature to
any
other
department
of
the
government, executive or judicial, is a
fundamental principle in constitutional
law, essential to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of
government
established
by
the
constitution.
Where an act is clothed with all the
forms of law, and is complete in and of
itself, it may be provided that it shall
become operative only upon some
certain act or event, or, in like
manner, that its operation shall be
suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its
power to make a law, but it can make
a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things
upon which the law makes, or intends
to make, its own action to depend.
It must be conceded that, after the
passage of act No. 2868, and before any
rules and regulations were promulgated
by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice
could sell it at any price, even at a peso
per "ganta," and that he would not
commit a crime, because there would be
no law fixing the price of rice, and the
sale of it at any price would not be a
crime. That is to say, in the absence of a
proclamation, it was not a crime to sell
rice at any price. Hence, it must follow
that, if the defendant committed a crime,
it was because the Governor-General
issued the proclamation. There was no
act of the Legislature making it a crime
to sell rice at any price, and without the
proclamation, the sale of it at any price
was to a crime.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the
violation of the proclamation of the
Governor-General which constitutes the
crime. Without that proclamation, it was
Page 3

no crime to sell rice at any price. In other
words, the Legislature left it to the sole
discretion of the Governor-General to say
what was and what was not "any cause"
for enforcing the act, and what was and
what was not "an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn," and
under certain undefined conditions to fix
the price at which rice should be sold,
without regard to grade or quality, also to
say whether a proclamation should be
issued, if so, when, and whether or not
the law should be enforced, how long it
should be enforced, and when the law
should be suspended. The Legislature did
not specify or define what was "any
cause," or what was "an extraordinary
rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,"
Neither did it specify or define the
conditions upon which the proclamation
should be issued. In the absence of the
proclamation no crime was committed.
The alleged sale was made a crime, if at
all, because the Governor-General issued
the
proclamation.
The
act
or
proclamation does not say anything
about the different grades or qualities of
rice, and the defendant is charged with
the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price
of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a
price greater than that fixed by Executive
order No. 53."
We are clearly of the opinion and hold
that Act No. 2868, in so far as it
undertakes to authorized the GovernorGeneral in his discretion to issue a
proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and
to make the sale of rice in violation of the
price of rice, and to make the sale of rice
in violation of the proclamation a crime,
is unconstitutional and void.
ALEGRE v. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
FACTS:
Petitioner is engaged in the production of
abaca and its exportation to foreign
markets. He applied to the respondent
EH 405
for a permit to export one hundred bales

of abaca to England, but was denied. He
was advised by the respondent that he
would not be permitted to export the
abaca in question without a certificate
from the Fiber Standardization Board.
So he filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus, alleging that the provisions
of the Administrative Code for the
grading, inspection and certification of
fibers, in particular, sections 1772 and
1244 of that Code, are unconstitutional
and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority vested in
the Fiber Standardization Board is a
delegation of legislative power.
HELD: NO.
The Legislature has enacted a law which
provides for the inspection, grading and
baling of hemp before they can be
exported to other countries and the
creation of a board for that purpose,
vesting it with the power and authority to
do the actual work.
Such authority is not a delegation of
legislative power and is nothing more
than a delegation of administrative
power in the Fiber Board to carry out the
purpose and intent of the law. In the very
nature of things, the Legislature could
not inspect, grade and bale the hemp,
and from necessity, the power to do that
would have to be vested in a board or
commission.
The petitioner's contention would leave
the law, which provides for the
inspection, grading and baling of hemp,
without any means of its enforcement. If
the law cannot be enforced by such a
board or commission, how and by whom
could it be enforced? The criticism that
there is partiality or even fraud in the
Page 4

administration of the law is not an
argument against its constitutionality.
PEOPLE v. VERA
Calalang vs. Williams
[GR 47800, 2 December 1940]
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its
resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications that animaldrawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario Street extending
from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to
12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30
p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending
from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to
11 p.m., from a period of one year from
the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission, on 18 July
1940, recommended to the Director of
Public Works the adoption of the measure
proposed in the resolution, in pursuance
of the provisions of Commonwealth Act
548, which authorizes said Director of
Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary
of
Public
Works
and
Communications, to promulgate rules
and regulations to regulate and control
the use of and traffic on national roads.
On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public
Works, in his first indorsement to the
Secretary
of
Public
Works
and
Communications, recommended to the
latter
the
approval
of
the
recommendation made by the Chairman
of the National Traffic Commission, with
the modification that the closing of Rizal
Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn
vehicles be limited to the portion thereof
extending from the railroad crossing at
Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. On
10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public
EH 405
Works and Communications, in his

second indorsement addressed to the
Director of Public Works, approved the
recommendation of the latter that
Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be
closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles,
between the points and during the hours
as indicated, for a period of 1 year from
the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and
the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have
enforced and caused to be enforced the
rules and regulations thus adopted.
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a
private citizen and as a taxpayer of
Manila, brought before the Supreme
court the petition for a writ of prohibition
against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of
the National Traffic Commission; Vicente
Fragante, as Director of Public Works;
Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of
Public Works and Communications;
Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of
Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting
Chief of Police of Manila
Issues:
Whether or not there is a
delegation of legislative power?
undue
Ruling:
There is no undue deleagation of
legislative power. Commonwealth Act
548 does not confer legislative powers to
the Director of Public Works.
The
authority conferred upon them and under
which they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained of is not to
determine what public policy demands
but merely to carry out the legislative
policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote
safe transit upon and avoid obstructions
on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National
Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines and to close
them temporarily to any or all classes of
traffic whenever the condition of the
Page 5

road or the traffic makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest.
The delegated power, if at all, therefore,
is not the determination of what the law
shall be, but merely the ascertainment of
the facts and circumstances upon which
the application of said law is to be
predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on
the use of national roads and to
determine when and how long a national
road should be closed to traffic, in view of
the condition of the road or the traffic
thereon and the requirements of public
convenience
and
interest,
is
an
administrative function which cannot be
directly discharged by the National
Assembly.
It must depend on the discretion of some
other government official to whom is
confided the duty of determining whether
the proper occasion exists for executing
the law. But it cannot be said that the
exercise of such discretion is the making
of the law.
CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL
(G.R. No. L-4043, May 26, 1942)
This is a petition to review a decision of
Auditor General denying petitioners
claim for quarters allowance as manager
of the National Abaca and other Fibers
Corp. (NAFCO).
ISSUES
1. Whether or not Executive Order No.
93
exercising
control
over
Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations (GOCC) implemented
under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null
and void.
2. Whether or not R.A. No. 51
authorizing
presidential
control
over GOCCs is Constitutional.
EH 405
FACTS
-
Petitioner was general manager in

1949 of NAFCO with annual salary
of P15,000.00
NAFCO Board of Directors granted
P400/mo. Quarters allowance to
petitioner amounting to P1,650 for
1949.
This allowance was disapproved by
the Central Committee of the
government
enterprise
council
under Executive Order No. 93 upon
recommendation by NAFCO auditor
and concurred in by the Auditor
general on two grounds
a) It violates the charter of
NAFCO limiting managers
salary to P15,000/year.
b) NAFCO
is in precarious
financial condition.
DECISION
1. R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is
not illegal delegation of legislative
power to the executive as argued
by petitioner but a mandate for the
President to streamline GOCCs
operation.
2. Executive Order 93 is valid because
it was promulgated within the 1
year period given.
3. Petition for review DISMISSED with
costs
PANGASINAN TRANS. CO. v.
SERVICE COM
LOVINA v. MORENO
PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL
PUBLIC
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Manila Electric Company v. Pasay
Transportation Company, Inc.,
Facts:
Page 6

The preliminary and basic question
presented by the petition of the Manila
Electric
Company,
requesting
the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting
as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms
upon
which
certain
transportation
companies shall be permitted to use the
Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric
Company and the compensation to be
paid to the Manila Electric Company by
such transportation companies, relates to
the validity of section 11 of Act No. 1446
and to the legal right of the members of
the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, to act on the petition. Act No.
1446 above referred to is entitled. "An
Act granting a franchise to Charles M.
Swift to construct, maintain, and operate
an electric railway, and to construct,
maintain, and operate an electric light,
heat, and power system from a point in
the City of Manila in an easterly direction
to the town of Pasig, in the Province of
Rizal." Opposition was entered to the
petition by a number of public utility
operators.
Issue:
Validity of SEC. 11 of ACT No. 1446?
Held:
The law calls for arbitration which
represents a method of the parties' own
choice. A submission to arbitration is a
contract. The parties to an arbitration
agreement may not oust the courts of
jurisdiction of the matters submitted to
arbitration. These are familiar rules which
find support in articles 1820 and 1821 of
the Civil Code.
We can also perceive a distinction
between
a
private
contract
for
submission
to
arbitration
and
agreements to arbitrate falling within the
terms of a statute enacted for such
purpose and affecting others than the
parties to a particular franchise. Here,
however, whatever else may be said in
EH 405
extenuation, it remains true that the

decision of the board of arbitrators is
made final, which if literally enforced
would leave a public utility, not a party to
the contract authorized by Act No. 1446,
without recourse to the courts for a
judicial determination of the question in
dispute.
We run counter to this dilemma. Either
the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise
judicial functions, or the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as board of
arbitrators,
exercise
administrative
or quasi judicial functions. The first case
would appear not to fall within the
jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court.
Even conceding that it does, it would
presuppose the right to bring the matter
in dispute before the courts, for any
other construction would tend to oust the
courts of jurisdiction and render the
award a nullity. But if this be the proper
construction, we would then have the
anomaly of a decision by the members of
the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts
and eventually coming before the
Supreme Court, where the Supreme
Court would review the decision of its
members acting as arbitrators. taThe
present petition also furnishes an apt
illustration of another anomaly, for we
find the Supreme Court as a court asked
to determine if the members of the court
may be constituted a board of
arbitrators, which is not a court at all.l
The Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands represents one of the three
divisions of power in our government. It
is judicial power and judicial power only
which is exercised by the Supreme Court.
Just as the Supreme Court, as the
guardian of constitutional rights, should
not sanction usurpations by any other
department of the government, so should
it as strictly confine its own sphere of
influence to the powers expressly or by
implication conferred on it by the Organic
Page 7

Act. The Supreme Court and its members
should not and cannot be required to
exercise any power or to perform any
trust or to assume any duty not
pertaining to or connected with the
administering of judicial functions.
The Organic Act provides that the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as
heretofore provided and such additional
jurisdiction
as
shall
hereafter
be
prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the
Organic Act speaks of the exercise of
"jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it
could not only mean the exercise of
"jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court
acting as a court, and could hardly mean
the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the
as a board of arbitrators. There is an
important
distinction
between
the
Supreme Court as an entity and the
members of the Supreme Court. A board
of arbitrators is not a "court" in any
proper sense of the term, and
possesses none of the jurisdiction
which the Organic Act contemplates
shall be exercised by the Supreme
Court.lawph
aw Confirming the decision to the basic
question at issue, the Supreme Court
holds that section 11 of Act No. 1446
contravenes the maxims which guide the
operation of a democratic government
constitutionally established, and that it
would be improper and illegal for the
as a board of arbitrators, the decision of
a majority of whom shall be final, to act
on the petition of the Manila Electric
Company. As a result, the members of
the Supreme Court decline to proceed
further in the matter.
NOBLEJAS v. TEEHANKEE
PAZ M. GARCIA, vs. HON. CATALINO
MACARAIG, JR.,
EH 405
Facts:
Administrative complaint filed by one Paz
M. Garcia against the Honorable Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., formerly Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI.
Respondent took his oath as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna and San
Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court
was a newly created CFI branch and it
had to be organized from scratch. Under
Section
190
of
the
Revised
Administrative Code, space for his
courtroom, other items and supplies
must be furnished by the provincial
government. The provincial officials of
Laguna,
however,
informed
the
respondent that the province was not in a
position
to
do
so.
Forces
and
circumstances
beyond
his
control
prevented him from discharging his
judicial duties. When respondent realized
that it would be sometime before he
could actually preside over his court, he
applied for an extended leave. Secretary
of Justice, however, prevailed upon
respondent to forego his leave and
instead to assist him, without being
extended a formal detail, whenever
respondent was not busy attending to
the needs of his court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be
charged for dishonesty, violation of his
oath of office, gross incompetence, and
violation of RA 296 of the Judiciary Act of
1948.
Ruling:
Court is convinced that the complaint
must be dismissed. Complainant's theory
is that respondent collected or received
salaries as judge when in fact he has
never acted as such, since the date he
took his oath up to the filing of the
complaint. In the sense that respondent
has not yet performed any judicial
Page 8

function, it may be admitted that
respondent has not really performed the
duties of judge. What is lost sight of,
however, is that after taking his oath and
formally assuming this position as judge,
respondent had a perfect right to earn
the salary of a judge even in the extreme
supposition that he did not perform any
judicial
function.
In
this
case,
government officials or officers in duty
are bound to furnish him the necessary
place and facilities for his court and the
performance of his functions have failed
to provide him therewith without any
fault on his part.
Admittedly respondent has not prepared
and submitted any of the reports of
accomplishments and status of cases in
his sala which are usually required of
judges under existing laws as well as the
corresponding
circulars
of
the
Department of Justice for the reason that
He has not yet started performing any
judicial functions. None of those laws and
circulars apply to him for all of them
contemplate judges who are actually
holding trials and hearings and making
decisions and others. On the other hand,
respondent could not be blamed for
taking his oath as he did, for he had a
valid confirmed appointment in his favor.
The line between what a judge may do
and what he may not do in collaborating
or working with other offices or officers
under the other great departments of the
government must always be kept clear
and jealously observed, least the
principle of separation of powers on
which our government rests by mandate
of the people thru the Constitution be
gradually eroded. It is of grave
importance to the judiciary under our
present
constitutional
scheme
of
government that no judge or even the
lowest court in this Republic should place
himself in a position where his actuations
on matters submitted to him for action or
resolution would be subject to review and
prior approval and, worst still, reversal,
EH 405
before they can have legal effect, by any

authority other than the Court of Appeals
or this Supreme Court, as the case may
be. Needless to say, this Court feels very
strongly that, it is best that this practice
is discontinued.
Macariola v. Asuncion
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
FACTS:
A complaint for partition was filed by
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 in CFI
against
Bernardita
R.
Macariola
concerning the properties left by the
deceased Francisco Reyes, their common
father. A decision was rendered by
respondent Judge Asuncion in said civil
case awarding their share on the
properties to both the plaintiffs and
Macariola
The decision became and subsequently,
a project of partition was submitted to
Judge Asuncion which was approved by
the latter notwithstanding the fact that
the project of partition was not signed by
the parties themselves but only by the
respective counsel of plaintiffs and
defendant. However, both counsels of
the respective parties assured that the
Project of Partition, had been made after
a conference and agreement of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 and
Macariola approving the Project of
Partition, and that both lawyers had
represented to the court that they are
given full authority to sign by themselves
the Project of Partition.
One of the properties mentioned in the
project of partition was Lot 1184 or
rather one-half thereof which according
to the decision was the exclusive
property of the deceased Francisco
Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of
partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita
Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed
Reyes in equal shares, and when the
Page 9

project of partition was approved by the
trial court, the adjudicatees caused Lot
1184 to be subdivided into five lots
denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E
inclusive.
Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D.
Anota,
a
stenographer
in
Judge
Asuncion's court, while Lot 1184-E was
sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who was
issued transfer certificate of title No.
2338. Thereafter, Dr. Arcadio Galapon
and his wife sold a portion of Lot 1184-E
to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria
S. Asuncion, which particular portion was
declared by the latter for taxation
purposes.
Spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon
then conveyed their respective shares
and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.
At the time of said sale the stockholders
of the corporation were Dominador
Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime
Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the
latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with
Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs.
Asuncion as the secretary.
Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed
the instant complaint alleging four
causes of action:
that respondent Judge Asuncion
violated Article 1491, paragraph 5,
of the New Civil Code in acquiring
by purchase a portion of Lot No.
1184-E which was one of those
properties involved in Civil Case
No. 3010 decided by him
that he likewise violated Article 14,

paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of
Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H,
of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the
Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by
associating
himself
with
the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
EH 405
Industries, Inc., as a stockholder

and a ranking officer while he was
a judge of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte;
that respondent was guilty of

coddling an impostor and acted in
disregard of judicial decorum by
closely fraternizing with a certain
Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly
and publicly advertised himself as
a practising attorney when in truth
and in fact his name does not
appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and
is not a member of the Philippine
Bar; and
that there was a culpable defiance

of the law and utter disregard for
ethics by respondent Judge.
The case was referred to Justice Cecilia

Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for
investigation,
report
and
recommendation. After hearing, the said
Investigating Justice submitted her report
recommending that respondent Judge
should be reprimanded or warned in
connection with the first cause of action
alleged in the complaint, and for the
second cause of action, respondent
should be warned in case of a finding
that he is prohibited under the law to
engage in business. On the third and
fourth causes of action, Justice Palma
recommended that respondent Judge be
exonerated.
Complainant herein then instituted an
action before the Court of First which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking
the annulment of the project of partition
made pursuant to the decision in Civil
Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued
by respondent Judge approving the
same, as well as the partition of the
estate and the subsequent conveyances
with damages. The action was dismissed.
Hence, this petition
RULING:
Page 10

THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY
REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS
PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.
1. There is no merit in the contention of
complainant Bernardita R. Macariola,
under her first cause of action, that
respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion
violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of
the New Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E
which was one of those properties
involved in Civil Case No. 3010.
In the aforesaid Article applies only

to the sale or assignment of the
property which is the subject of
litigation
to
the
persons
disqualified
therein.
For
the
prohibition to operate, the sale or
assignment of the property must
take place during the pendency of
the litigation involving the property.
o respondent judge purchased a
portion of Lot 1184-E, the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010
which he rendered on June 8,
1963 was already final, not in
litigation anymore.
o Furthermore, respondent judge
did not buy the lot in directly
from the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio
Galapon who earlier purchased
Lot 1184-E from the plaintiffs.
o Civil Case No. 4234 is of no
moment. It can no longer alter,
change or affect the aforesaid
facts that the questioned sale to
respondent Judge, now Court of
Appeals Justice, was effected
and consummated long after the
finality of the aforesaid decision
or orders.
EH 405
Macariola contended that the sale

of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio
Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela
Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was
only a mere scheme to conceal the
illegal and unethical transfer of
said lot to respondent Judge as a
consideration for the approval of
the project of partition.
o no evidence showing that Dr.
Arcadio Galapon acted as a
mere "dummy" of respondent in
acquiring Lot 1184-E from the
Reyeses.
Macariola
contended
that
respondent Judge acted illegally in
approving the project of partition
although it was not signed by the
parties.
o Respondent
should
have
required the signature of the
parties more particularly that of
Mrs. Macariola on the project of
partition submitted to him for
approval; however, whatever
error
was
committed
by
respondent in that respect was
done in good faith as according
to Judge Asuncion he was
assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo,
the counsel of record of Mrs.
Macariola,
That
he
was
authorized by his client to
submit said project of partition.
While it is true that such written
authority if there was any, was
not presented by respondent in
evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo
appear
to
corroborate
the
statement of respondent, his
affidavit being the only one that
was
presented,
certain
actuations of Mrs. Macariola
lead this investigator to believe
that she knew the contents of
the project of partition and that
she gave her conformity thereto.
Page 11
While it is. true that respondent

Judge did not violate paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the New Civil Code
in acquiring by purchase a portion
of Lot 1184-E which was in
litigation in his court, it was,
however, improper for him to have
acquired the same. He should be
reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics.
2. Respondent Judge violated paragraphs

1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce
when
he
associated
himself
with
the
Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking
officer, said corporation having been
organized to engage in business.
Article 14 The following cannot

engage in commerce, either in
person or by proxy, nor can they
hold any office or have any direct,
administrative,
or
financial
intervention in commercial or
industrial companies within the
limits of the districts, provinces, or
towns in which they discharge their
duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court,
judges
and
officials
of
the
department of public prosecution in
active service. This provision shall
not be applicable to mayors,
municipal judges, and municipal
prosecuting attorneys nor to those
who by chance are temporarily
discharging the functions of judge
or prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Those who by virtue of laws or
special provisions may not engage
in commerce in a determinate
territory.
EH 405
o The provision partakes of the

nature of a political law as it
regulates
the
relationship
between the government and
certain public officers and
employees, like justices and
judges.
o Political Law has been defined
as that branch of public law
which
deals
with
the
organization and operation of
the governmental organs of the
State and define the relations of
the state with the inhabitants of
its. It may be recalled that
political
law
embraces
constitutional law, law of public
corporations, administrative law
including the law on public
officers
and
elections.
Specifically, Article 14 of the
Code of Commerce partakes
more of the nature of an
administrative law because it
regulates the conduct of certain
public officers and employees
with respect to engaging in
business: hence, political in
essence.
o It is significant to note that the
present Code of Commerce is
the Spanish Code of Commerce
of
1885,
with
some
modifications made by the
"Commission de Codificacion de
las Provincias de Ultramar,"
which was extended to the
Philippines by the Royal Decree
of August 6, 1888, and took
effect as law in this jurisdiction
on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty
from Spain to the United States
and later on from the United
States to the Republic of the
Philippines, Article 14 of this
Code of Commerce must be
deemed to have been abrogated
Page 12

because where there is change
of sovereignty, the political laws
of
the
former
sovereign,
whether compatible or not with
those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless
they are expressly re-enacted
by affirmative act of the new
sovereign.
o No enabling or affirmative act
that continued the effectivity of
the aforestated provision of the
Code of Commerce after the
change of sovereignty from
Spain to the United States and
then to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Consequently,
Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce has no legal and
binding effect and cannot apply
to the respondent.
Respondent Judge didnt violated
paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
No
showing
that
respondent
participated or intervened in his
official capacity in the business or
transactions
of
the
Traders
Manufacturing
and
Fishing
Industries, Inc. The business of the
corporation in which respondent
participated has obviously no
relation or connection with his
judicial office
No provision in both the 1935 and
1973
Constitutions
of
the
Philippines, nor is there an existing
law expressly prohibiting members
of the Judiciary from engaging or
having interest in any lawful
business.
We hold that the Civil Service Act of

1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil
Service
Rules
promulgated
EH 405
thereunder, particularly Section 12 of

Rule XVIII, do not apply to the
members of the Judiciary.
Under Section 67 Judiciary Act of

1948, the power to remove or
dismiss judges was then vested in
the President of the Philippines, not
in the Commissioner of Civil
Service, and only on two grounds,
namely, serious misconduct and
inefficiency,
and
upon
the
recommendation of the Supreme
Court, which alone is authorized,
upon its own motion, or upon
information of the Secretary (now
Minister) of Justice to conduct the
corresponding
investigation.
Clearly, the aforesaid section
defines the grounds and prescribes
the special procedure for the
discipline of judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7,
Article X of the 1973 Constitution,
only the Supreme Court can
discipline judges of inferior courts
as well as other personnel of the
Judiciary.
3. The 3rd and 4th causes of action are

not related to the subject.
IN RE: RODULFO MANZANO
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
A. RULE-MAKING POWER
OF
PHILIPPINE LAWYERS VS AGRAVA

G. R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
This is the petition filed by the Philippine
Lawyers Association for prohibition and
injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in
his capacity as Director of the Philippines
Patent Office.
Facts:
Page 13

On May 27, 1957, respondent Agrava
issued a circular announcing that he had
scheduled for June 27, 1957 an
examination
for
the
purpose
of
determining who are qualified to practice
as
patent
attorneys
before
the
Philippines Patent Office, the said
examination to cover patent law and
jurisprudence and the rules of practice
before said office. According to the
circular, members of the Philippine Bar,
engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training
are
qualified
to
take
the
said
examination. It would appear that
heretofore, respondent Director has been
holding similar examinations.
Petitioner contends that anyone has
passed the bar exams and is licensed by
the Supreme Court to practice law, has
good standing, thus duly qualified to
practice before the Patent Office, and
therefore the act of requiring members of
the Bar in good standing to take and pass
an examination given by the Patent
Office as a condition precedent to be
allowed to practice before said office is a
clear excess of his jurisdiction and
violation of the law.
On the other hand, respondent claimed
that he is expressly authorized by the law
to require persons desiring to practice or
to do business before him to submit an
examination, even if they are already
members of the bar. He contends that
our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is
patterned after the United States Patent
Law; and of the United States Patent
Office in Patent Cases prescribes an
examination similar to that which he had
prescribed and scheduled.
(a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at
law in good standing admitted to practice
before any United States Court or the
highest court of any State or Territory of
the United States who fulfills the
requirements and complied with the
provisions of these rules may be
EH 405
admitted to practice before the Patent

Office and have his name entered on the
register of attorneys.
(c) Requirement for registration. No
person will be admitted to practice and
register unless he shall apply to the
Commissioner of Patents in writing on a
prescribed
form
supplied
by
the
Commissioner and furnish all requested
information and material; and shall
establish to the satisfaction of the
Commissioner that he is of good moral
character and of good repute x x x In
order that the Commissioner may
determine whether a person x x x has
the qualifications specified, satisfactory
proof of good moral character and
repute, x x x an examination which is
held from time to time must be taken
and passed. The Respondent states that
the promulgation of the Rules of Practice
of the United States Patent Office in
Patent Cases is authorized by the United
States Patent Law itself which provides:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to
the approval of the Secretary of
Commerce may prescribe rules and
regulations governing the recognition of
agents, attorneys, or other persons
representing applicants or other parties
before his office, and may require of such
persons, agents, or attorneys, before
being recognized as representatives of
applicants or other persons, that they
shall show they are of good moral
character and in good repute, are
possessed of the necessary qualifications
to enable them to render to applicants or
other persons valuable service, and are
likewise to competent to advise and
assist applicants or other persons in the
presentation or prosecution of their
applications or other business before the
Office. x x x
Respondent Director concludes that
Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being
similar to the provisions of law just
reproduced, then he is authorized to
prescribe the rules and regulations
requiring that persons desiring to
Page 14

practice before him should submit to and
pass an examination. We reproduce said
Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for
purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The
Director subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of
all business in the Patent Office.
Issue/s:
WHETHER OR NOT MEMBERS OF THE
BAR SHOULD FIRST TAKE AND PASS AN
EXAMINATION GIVEN BY THE PATENT
OFFICE BEFORE HE COULD BE ALLOWED
TO PRACTICE LAW IS THE SAID OFFICE.
whether or not appearance before the
patent Office and the preparation and the
prosecution of patent applications, etc.,
constitute or is included in the practice of
law.
WHETHER OR NOT DIRECTOR OF THE
PATENT OFFICE IS AUTHORIZED TO
CONDUCT AN EXAMINATION FOR PATENT
ATTORNEYS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
Decision:
The petition for prohibition is granted and
the respondent Director is hereby
prohibited from requiring members of the
Philippine
Bar
to
submit
to
an
examination or tests and pass the same
before being permitted to appear and
practice before the Patent Office.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Supreme Court has the exclusive
and constitutional power with respect to
admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines1 and to any member of the
Philippine Bar in good standing may
practice law anywhere and before any
entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial
or administrative, in the Philippines.
The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
EH 405
embraces the preparation of pleadings

and other papers incident to actions and
social proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law
corporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice as
do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions
consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and
having
no
immediate
relation
to
proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field
of business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They
require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men
and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of
an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of
justice by the courts. No valid distinction,
so far as concerns the question set forth
in the order, can be drawn between that
part which involves advice and drafting
of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public
Page 15

that these manifold customary functions
be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound
moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to
clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re
Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E.
313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs.
Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A.
139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
The practice of law includes such
appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors,
and other persons, and the prosecution
of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto, or the enforcement
of their rights in patent cases.
In conclusion, we hold that under the
present law, members of the Philippine
Bar authorized by this Tribunal to
practice law, and in good standing, may
practice their profession before the
Patent Office, for the reason that much of
the business in said office involves the
interpretation and determination of the
scope and application of the Patent Law
and other laws applicable, as well as the
presentation of evidence to establish
facts involved; that part of the functions
of the Patent director are judicial or
quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals
from his orders and decisions are, under
the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL v THE
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
G.R. No. L-10979
June 30,
1959
affirming the decisions of the Acting

Collector of Customs for the Port of
Manila which decreed the forfeiture of
two shipments from Hong Kong to Manila,
one with 42 and the other with 27
packages of foreign made candies, for
illegal violations of Central Bank Circulars
Nos. 44 and 45 in relation to section
1363 (f) of the Revised Administrative
Code
(forfeiture
of
prohibited
merchandise) which requires a license
from the Monetary Board or release
certificates to be able to receive goods
from any foreign country.
Appellants Contentions:
1. The imported goods do not involve
dollar remittances or the sale of foreign
exchange (as was contemplated in
circular 44) and that Congress has not
authorized the Central Bank to issue
regulations governing imports that do not
require the sale of foreign exchange,
because according to him, it would not
have enacted into law Republic Act No.
1410.
2. Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 were
promulgated by the Monetary Board
without the concurrence of at least five
members and without the approval of the
President
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sixty-nine (69)
packages of candies in question are
subject to forfeiture for violation of
Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 in
relation to section 1363 (f) of the Revised
Administrative
Code
(forfeiture
of
merchandise prohibited by law).
FACTS:
HELD:
There
are
two
cases
(Seizure
Identification Nos. 1899 and 1990) which
were brought on appeal to the Supreme
Court from the decisions of the
respondent Commissioner of customs,
The decision of the Commissioner of

Customs decreeing the forfeiture of the
candies is AFFIRMED. The importations,
assumed to involve the sale of foreign
exchange, were in violation of circulars
EH 405
Page 16

44 and 45 for failure to obtain the
corresponding dollar allocation or foreign
exchange license from the Central Bank
as required by Circular No. 44 of said
bank.
Section 74, Republic Act No. 265
authorized the Monetary Board,
with the approval of the President, to
temporarily suspend or restrict sales
of exchange and to subject all
transactions in gold and foreign
exchange to license during an
exchange crisis in order to protect the
international reserve and to give the
Monetary Board and the Government
time in to take constructive measures
to combat such a crisis. Circular No.
44, prohibiting the release by the
Commissioner of Customs of any item
of import without the presentation of a
release certificate issued by the
Central Bank or any authorized agent
bank in a form prescribed by the
Monetary Board, and Circular No. 45,
requiring "any person or entity who
intends to import or receive goods
from any foreign country for which no
foreign exchange is required or will be
required of the banks, to apply for a
license from the Monetary Board to
authorize such import," are measures
taken to check the unregulated flow of
foreign exchange from the country
and are within the powers of the
Monetary Board.
Contention Number 1: The contention
that The Monetary Board was not
authorized by congress assumes that the
importations do not require the sale of
foreign exchange, a fact which appellant
Francisco Pascual failed to establish. It is
a recognized general mercantile practice
that importations involve the sale of
foreign
exchange.
This
being
so,
importations that do not involve the sale
of foreign exchange must be shown or
proved. In default of such showing or
proof as in fact the petitioner failed to
prove in the instant case, it would be
safe to assume that the importations in
EH 405
question involve the sale of foreign

exchange which is covered by Circular
No. 44 of said bank (which are measures
taken to check the unregulated flow of
foreign exchange, the authority of which
was conferred to the Monetary Board by
Congress by virtue of Section 74, R.A.
265 (see above).
Contention Number 2: . is not
supported by evidence. Circular Nos. 44
and 45 have been published in the
Official Gazette. As such, presumption
that an official duty has been regularly
performed, the ordinary course of
business followed, and the law complied
with.
DOMINGO B. TEOXON vs. MEMBERS
OF THE BOARD OF
ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINE
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
FACTS:
The petitioner sustained physical injuries
in line of duty as a former member of a
recognized guerilla organization which
participated actively in the resistance
movement against the enemy, and as a
result of which petitioner suffered a
permanent,
physical
disability.
For
having been permanently incapacitated
from work, he filed his claim for disablility
pension with the Philippine Veterans
Administration under the Veterans' Bill of
Rights, Republic Act No. 65. However,
respondents in turn would limit the
amount of pension received by him in
accordance
with
the
rules
and
regulations promulgated by them.
Petitioner filed his suit for mandamus
before the CFI of Manila alleging that he
filed his claim for disability pension under
the Veterans' Bill of Rights, Republic Act
No. 65, for having been permanently
incapacitated from work and that he was
first awarded only P25.00 monthly,
thereafter increased to P50.00 a month
Page 17

contrary to the terms of the basic law as
thereafter
amended. 3 His
claim,
therefore, was for a pension effective
May 10, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 a
month up to June 21, 1957 and at the
rate of P100.00 a month, plus P10.00 a
month, for each of his unmarried minor
children below 18 years of age from June
22, 1957 up to June 30, 1963; and the
difference of P50.00 a month, plus
P10.00 a month for each of his four
unmarried minor children below 18 years
of age from July 1, 1963. He would
likewise seek for the payment of moral
and exemplary damages as well as
attorney's fees.
Respondent,
while admitting, with
qualification, the facts as alleged in the
petition, would rely primarily in its special
and affirmative defenses, on petitioner
not having exhausted its administrative
remedies and his suit being in effect one
against the government, which cannot
prosper without its consent.
The CFI found for respondents. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE:
W.O.N. rules and regulations promulgated
by administrative agencies can prevail
over a statue.
HELD:
Petition is affirmed. CFI is reversed.
The Court cited the case of Begosa v.
Chairman,
Philippine
Veterans
Administration, promulgated just a month
before the case at bar, where it
categorically held that a veteran
suffering from permanent disability is not
to be denied what has been granted him
specifically by legislative enactment,
which certainly is superior to any
regulation that may be promulgated by
the Philippine Veterans Administration,
EH 405
presumably
thereof.
in
the
implementation
It added that the decision of the CFI

where it held that the respondent Board
has authority under the Pension law to
process applications for pension, using as
guide the rules and regulations that it
adopted under the law and their
decisions, unless shown clearly to be in
error or against the law or against the
general policy of the Board, should be
maintained" is clearly erroneous.
The Court also cited United States v.
Tupasi Molina, which held that "Of course
the regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions
of the law, and for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions.
By such regulations, of course, the law
itself cannot be extended. So long,
however, as the regulations relate solely
to carrying into effect the provisions of
the law, they are valid." As well as its
ruling in People v. Santos, wherein it held
that an administrative order betrays
inconsistency or repugnancy to the
provisions of the Act, "the mandate of
the Act must prevail and must be
followed."
Finally, the Court said there must be
strict compliance with the legislative
enactment. Its terms must be followed.
The statute requires adherence to, not
departure from, its provisions. No
deviation is allowable. In the terse
language of the present Chief Justice, an
administrative agency "cannot amend an
act of Congress." Respondents can be
sustained, therefore, only if it could be
shown that the rules and regulations
promulgated by them were in accordance
with what the Veterans' Bill of Rights
provides.
Benito Manuel vs. General Auditing
Office
G.R. No. L-28952 December 29, 1971
Page 18

FACTS:
Petitioner Benito C. Manuel applied for
retirement, effective December 31, 1967,
according to law, 3 after having to his
credit more than (20) years of service in
the government, included in which were
four successive terms as Mayor of
Lingayen, Pangasinan from January 1,
1952 to December 31, 1967. Such
application was approved on December
5, 1967. He had likewise sought the
commutation of his vacation and sick
leave, filing with the Municipal Treasurer
of Lingayen, Pangasinan on December
22, 1967 a communication to that effect.
In his memorandum filed with respondent
General Auditing Office to which the
matter was referred, he stressed that he
was entitled to unused vacation and sick
leave earned from May 31, 1957 (date of
effectivity Republic Act No. 1616) to
December 31, 1967, or a period of 10
years and 7 months, and since his
highest salary was P600.00 a month, the
total amount which should accrue to him
is P6,000.00, (one month for every year).
ISSUE:
Whether or not an elective official may
be entitled in the event that he
voluntarily retires or be separated from
the service without fault on his part to
the commutation of his vacation and sick
leave
HELD:
1. It is expressly provided under Section
286 of the Revised Administrative Code
that vacation and sick leave shall be
cumulative, any part thereof not taken
within the calendar year earned being
carried over the succeeding years with
the employee voluntarily retiring or being
separated from the service without fault
on his part, being entitled to the
commutation of all such accumulated
EH 405
vacation or sick leave to his credit

provided that it shall in no case exceed
ten (10) months.
"Officials and employees retired under
this Act shall be entitled to the
commutation of the unused vacation and
sick leave, based on the highest rate
received, which they have to their credit
at the time of retirement."
2. Why then did respondent decide
otherwise? It may have been due to a
misreading of Section 2187 of the
Revised Administrative Code. What must
have misled respondent was a failure to
take due note that this section deals
solely with a situation when a municipal
mayor is absent from his office because
of illness. It does not cover therefore the
specific case here presented of the right
of the elective official to a commutation
of his vacation and sick leave upon his
retirement or separation from the service
through no fault of his own. Moreover it
must have felt justified in view of the
endorsement of the Commission of the
Civil Service, who applied Section 9 of
Civil Service Rule XVI, included in which
is the express injunction that the leave is
not cumulative. Further reflection ought
to have cautioned it that certainly this
rule is far from being applicable as on its
face it is based on the aforesaid Section
2187, which as noted is not in point.
"The recognition of the power of
administrative officials to promulgate
rules in the implementation of the
statute, necessarily limited to what is
provided for in the legislative enactment,
may be found in the early case of United
States v. Barrias decided in 1908. Then
came, in a 1914 decision, United States
v. Tupasi Molina, a delineation of the
scope of such competence. Thus: 'Of
course the regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and for the sole
Page 19

purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions.
the above-mentioned resolution and to

declare the same unconstitutional.
3. Nothing can be clearer therefore than

that the claim of petitioner to a
commutation of his vacation and sick
leave not exceeding ten (10) months
must be upheld, inasmuch as the facts
show that the total amount sought to be
paid to him was precisely in accordance
with the controlled legal provisions. The
ruling now on review must be versed and
petitioner's plea granted.
Rule:
WHEREFORE, the ruling of March 1, 1968

of respondent office refusing to allow in
audit the claim of petitioner Benito C.
Manuel for commutation of his leave
earned as Mayor for the period January 1,
1952 to December 31, 1967 is reversed
and the application of petition for such
commutation
granted.
Without
pronouncement as to costs.
Lupangco vs Court of Appeals
Issue:
Can
the
Professional
Regulation
Commission
lawfully
prohibit
the
examiness
from
attending
review
classes, receiving handout materials,
tips, or the like 3 days before the date of
the examination?
Facts:
PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts
of
its
"Additional
Instructions
to
Examiness," to all those applying for
admission
to
take
the
licensure
examinations in accountancy.
Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to
take the licensure examinations in
accountancy, filed with the RTC a
complaint for injunction with a prayer
with the issuance of a writ of a
preliminary injunction against respondent
PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing
EH 405
We realize that the questioned resolution

was adopted for a commendable purpose
which is "to preserve the integrity and
purity of the licensure examinations."
However, its good aim cannot be a cloak
to conceal its constitutional infirmities.
On its face, it can be readily seen that it
is unreasonable in that an examinee
cannot even attend any review class,
briefing, conference or the like, or
receive any hand-out, review material, or
any tip from any school, college or
university, or any review center or the
like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor,
official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions.
The unreasonableness is more obvious in
that one who is caught committing the
prohibited acts even without any ill
motives will be barred from taking future
examinations
conducted
by
the
respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is
inconceivable how the Commission can
manage to have a watchful eye on each
and every examinee during the three
days before the examination period.
It is an aixiom in administrative law that
administrative authorities should not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in the
issuance of rules and regulations. To be
valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adapted to the end
in view. If shown to bear no reasonable
relation to the purposes for which they
are authorized to be issued, then they
must be held to be invalid.
Resolution
No.
105
is
not
only
unreasonable and arbitrary, it also
infringes on the examinees' right to
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.
Respondent PRC has no authority to
dictate on the reviewees as to how they
should prepare themselves for the
licensure examinations. They cannot be
restrained from taking all the lawful steps
Page 20

needed to assure the fulfillment of their
ambition to become public accountants.
They have every right to make use of
their faculties in attaining success in
their endeavors
Montecillo vs. CSC
G.R. No. 131954. June 28, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 22, Series of
1991, on the ground that its issuance
amounted to an abuse of respondents
power
to
promulgate
rules
and
regulations pursuant to the Civil Service
Law.
Employee positions in the Metropolitan
Cebu Water District (MCWD) were reclassified during the latter part of 1995 to
conform with position descriptions and
corresponding salary grades in the civil
service. Accordingly, while the personnel
structure of the MCWD was being
modified, three of its employees -petitioners Asela B. Montecillo, Marilou
Joan V. Ortega and Charrishe Dosdos -applied for promotional appointment to
the position of Secretary to the Assistant
General Manager or Private Secretary C,
as the position later came to be known.
At the time of their application,
petitioners had been occupying the
position of Department Secretary and
were employed in the MCWD for six to
seven years.
When their appointments were forwarded
to the Civil Service Commission Field
Office (CSC FO) by MCWD General
Manager Dulce Abanilla, the CSC FO
refused
to
approve
petitioners
appointments as permanent on the
ground that the position applied for was
a primarily confidential and co-terminous
position. This ruling was upheld by the
CSC Regional Office and affirmed on
appeal by respondent.
EH 405
ISSUE:
WON CSC abused its rule-making power
HELD:
AFFIRMED. Respondent was expressly
empowered to declare positions in the
Civil Service as may properly be
classified as primarily confidential under
Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987. To our
mind, this signifies that the enumeration
found in Section 6, Article IV of the Civil
Service Decree, which defines the noncareer service, is not an exclusive list.
Respondent
could
supplement
the
enumeration, as it did when it issued
Memorandum Circular No. 22, s. of 1991,
by specifying positions in the civil
service, which are considered primarily
confidential
and
therefore
their
occupants are co-terminous with the
official
they
serve.
The
assailed
memorandum circular can not be
deemed as an unauthorized amendment
of the law. On the contrary, it was issued
pursuant to a power expressly vested by
law upon respondent. As such, it must be
respected by this Court as a valid
issuance
of
a
constitutionally
independent body.
SMART VS NLRC (G.R. No. 151908

August 12, 2003)
FACTS:
Pursuant
to
its
rule-making
and
regulatory
powers,
the
National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating
rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services.
On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a
Memorandum to all cellular mobile
telephone service (CMTS) operators
which contained measures to minimize if
not totally eliminate the incidence of
Page 21

stealing of cellular phone units. The
Memorandum directed CMTS operators
to:
a. strictly comply with Section B(1) of
MC
13-6-2000
requiring
the
presentation and verification of the
identity and addresses of prepaid SIM
card customers;
b. require all your respective prepaid
SIM cards dealers to comply with
Section B(1) of MC 13-6-2000;
c. deny acceptance to your respective
networks prepaid and/or postpaid
customers using stolen cellphone
units or cellphone units registered to
somebody other than the applicant
when
properly
informed
of
all
information relative to the stolen
cellphone units;
d. share all necessary information of
stolen cellphone units to all other
CMTS operators in order to prevent
the use of stolen cellphone units; and
e. require all your existing prepaid SIM
card customers to register and
present valid identification cards.
Another Memorandum dated October 6,
2000
addressed
to
all
public
telecommunications entities, reads:
This is to remind you that the validity
of all prepaid cards sold on 07 October
2000 and beyond shall be valid for at
least two (2) years from date of first
use pursuant to MC 13-6-2000.
In addition, all CMTS operators are
reminded that all SIM packs used by
subscribers of prepaid cards sold on
07 October 2000 and beyond shall be
valid for at least two (2) years from
date of first use. Also, the billing unit
shall be on a six (6) seconds pulse
effective 07 October 2000.
Islacom and Piltel filed an an action for
declaration
of
nullity
of
NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the
Billing
Circular)
and
the
NTC
Memorandum dated October 6, 2000,
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary
EH 405
restraining order. Both alleged, inter

alia, that the NTC has no jurisdiction
to regulate the sale of consumer
goods such as the prepaid call cards
since such jurisdiction belongs to
the
Department
of Trade
and
Industry under the Consumer Act of
the Philippines; that the Billing
Circular is oppressive, confiscatory
and violative of the constitutional
prohibition against deprivation of
property without due process of law;
that the Circular will result in the
impairment of the viability of the
prepaid cellular service by unduly
prolonging
the
validity
and
expiration of the prepaid SIM and
call
cards;
and
that
the
requirements of identification of
prepaid card buyers and call balance
announcement are unreasonable.
Hence, they prayed that the Billing
Circular be declared null and void ab
initio. Petitioners Globe Telecom, Inc and
Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Admit Complaint-in-Intervention which
was granted. Court issued a temporary
restraining order. Motion to dismiss and
reconsideration were denied by the RTC.
Respondent NTC thus filed a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition with
the Court of Appeals which was granted,
hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
validity
or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by the administrative agency in
the performance of its quasi-legislative
function is under the jurisdiction of
regular courts.
HELD:
CA reversed. Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
Administrative
agencies
possess
quasi-legislative
or
rule-making
Page 22

powers
and
quasi-judicial
or
administrative adjudicatory powers.
Quasi-legislative
or
rule-making
power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated
legislation that is within the confines of
the granting statute and the doctrine of
non-delegability and separability of
powers. The rules and regulations that
administrative
agencies
promulgate,
which are the product of a delegated
legislative power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the
effect of law, should be within the scope
of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency.
It is required that the regulation be
germane to the objects and purposes of
the law, and be not in contradiction to,
but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law. They must conform to
and be consistent with the provisions of
the enabling statute in order for such rule
or regulation to be valid. Constitutional
and statutory provisions control with
respect to what rules and regulations
may
be
promulgated
by
an
administrative body, as well as with
respect to what fields are subject to
regulation by it. It may not make rules
and regulations which are inconsistent
with the provisions of the Constitution or
a statute, particularly the statute it is
administering or which created it, or
which are in derogation of, or defeat, the
purpose of a statute. In case of conflict
between a statute and an administrative
order, the former must prevail.
judicial manner an act which is

essentially
of
an
executive
or
administrative nature, where the power
to act in such manner is incidental to or
reasonably
necessary
for
the
performance
of
the
executive
or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In
carrying out their quasi-judicial functions,
the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings,
weigh evidence, and draw conclusions
from them as basis for their official action
and exercise of discretion in a judicial
nature.
In questioning
the validity
or
constitutionality
of
a
rule
or
regulation
issued
by
an
administrative agency, a party need
not exhaust administrative remedies
before going to court. This principle
applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned
was performed pursuant to its
quasi-judicial function, and not when
the assailed act pertained to its
rule-making
or
quasi-legislative
power.
A.1. INTERNAL RULES
MAGLUNOB VS THE NATIONAL
ABACA & OTHER FIBERS
CORPORATION (NAFCO)
G.R. No. L-6203
February 26, 1954
FACTS:
Not to be confused with the quasilegislative or rule-making power of an

administrative agency is its quasijudicial
or
administrative
adjudicatory power. This is the power
to hear and determine questions of fact
to which the legislative policy is to apply
and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in
enforcing and administering the same
law. The administrative body exercises its
quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
EH 405
Petitioner-appellants plead that they are

landless war veterans and recognized
and deserving guerillas qualified to
acquire public lands under RA No. 65 and
as such to enter upon, occupy, settle and
take possession of parts of the parcel of
land involved herein. They contend that
pursuant to Rep. Acts. Nos. 8 and 65, the
directive of the President of the
Philippines dated and the rules and
regulations
promulgated
thereunder,
Page 23

they are entitled to have an award of the
parts of the parcel of land they have
been in possession. According to them,
NAFCO is duty bound legally to make
such award, the petitioners pray for a
writ
to
compel
the
respondent
corporation to respect their right over the
parts of the parcel of land occupied by
them and to execute lease contracts or
deeds of sale to give effect to such right
in compliance with the orders of the
President referred to.
On the other hand, respondent alleges
that the parcel of land described in the
complaint is owned, as evidenced by
Torrens transfer certificate of title issued
by the Register of Deeds in and for the
Province of Davao, managed and
financed by the Furukawa Plantation
Company, separate, apart and distinct
from that of the respondent. Rep. Acts
Nos. 8 and 65 and the directives of the
President invoked by the petitioners
confer no specific legal right upon the
petitioners and impose no ministerial
duty upon the respondent to award to
war veterans and deserving guerillas
parts of the parcel of land owned by the
Furukawa Plantation Company.
They further assert that petitioners are
have no specific legal right to acquire the
parcel of land in question and the
respondent has no ministerial duty to
award to them the parts of the parcel of
land allegedly occupied by them; that
Rep. Act No. 8 gives only authority to the
President of the Philippines "to designate
an
existing
office,
agency
or
instrumentality of the Government, to
take over and administer the properties
acquired under the provisions of this Act
and the disposition of these properties
shall be made in accordance with the
existing laws;" Lastly, RA No. 65 gives to
the persons mentioned in sections 1 and
2 of the Act, all other qualifications being
equal, "preference to purchase public
lands
and
government-owned
or
managed
agricultural
farms
or
EH 405
subdivisions, to obtain homesteads,

concessions and franchises, and other
privileges for the exploitation of the
national resources which are permissible
and made available by existing laws or
the like;" However, granting that
petitioners have a preferential right, they
have lost it, because since the passage
of the law more than three years have
already elapsed. In view of this answer
and upon motion of counsel for the
respondent a preliminary hearing was
held as if a motion to dismiss had been
filed.
ISSUE:
WON RA No. 65 grants specific legal right
to petitioners;
WON the respondent has specific legal
duty enjoined by law to perform in
connection therewith.
RULING:
After hearing the court dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the parcel
of land in question belongs exclusively to
a corporation whose board of directors
happens to be the same board of
directors of the respondent NAFCO and
for that reason the respondent cannot
alienate the lands in question to the
petitioners. A motion for reconsideration
was denied. From the order of dismissal
the petitioners have appealed.
If NAFCO is the manager of the parcel of
land or is managing the plantation
therein, it is not the real party in interest
or the party against whom the action
should be brought . At the preliminary
hearing under section 5, Rule 8, the party
asserting a fact must prove it by
competent evidence. The duplicate for
the owner of the Torrens certificate of
title must have been presented or the
original in the office of the Registrar of
Deeds must have been exhibited to the
Court. Nevertheless, there is another
ground which makes it unnecessary to
Page 24

remand the case for further proceedings
to ascertain who is the owner of the
parcel of land involved in the litigation,
because granting that the parcel of land
is included among those that should be
disposed of in accordance with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 65, still the
petitioners have no specific legal right
and the respondent has no specific legal
duty enjoined by law to perform in
connection therewith. It is only a
preference and that involves a discretion
to determine whether the applicants for
lease or sale of parts of a parcel of land
under
the
management
of
the
respondent are entitled to such lease or
purchase under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 65. Going over the
provisions of the directives referred to in
the petition for mandamus we fail to find
any which confers upon the petitioners a
specific legal right and imposes a duty
upon the respondent enforceable by
mandamus. And it must be so, because
executive orders or directives of the
President are administrative in nature
and they cannot, generally, confer any
right because this is only conferred by
law.
1938 but was able to preserve those for

1939 and 1940. The provincial revenue
agent for Misamis Occidental ascertained
the number of receipts by referring to the
conductors daily report for the said
period 1936 to 1938.
Both the said daily reports of Plaintiffs
conductors and the available stubs did
not state the value of the goods
transported
thereunder.
However,
respondent assumed that the value of
the goods covered by each of the freight
receipts amounted to more than P5, and
assessed a documentary stamp tax of
P0.04 on each of the receipts. The tax
thus assessed amounted to P7,776.24,
which was collected from the deposit of
the Plaintiff in the PNB.
Plaintiff demanded the refund of the
amount, and upon refusal of the
Defendant, Plaintiff filed the action. The
CFI rendered judgment in favor of the
Plaintiff. The CA reversed the decision of
the CFI and absolved the DefendantRespondent from the complaint. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUES:
Upon the second ground, the order

appealed from dismissing the petition for
mandamus is affirmed, without costs.
INTERPROVINCIAL AUTOBUS CO.,
INC. vs. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
[G.R. No. L-6741. January 31, 1956]
FACTS:
Plaintiff-petitioner is a common carrier
engaged in transporting passengers and
freight by means of TPU buses.
Sometime in the year 1941 the provincial
revenue agent for Misamis Occidental
examined the stubs of the freight
receipts that had been issued by the
Plaintiff. The company was not able to
preserve the receipt stubs from 1936 to
EH 405
(1)
Did the Secretary of Finance

infringe or violate any right of the
taxpayer when he directed that the
tax is to be collected in all cases
where the bill of lading or receipt
does
not
state
that
the
shipment is worth P5 or less,
or, in the language of the
Petitioner-Appellant,
when
he
(Secretary)
created
a
presumption of liability to the
tax if the receipt fails to state such
value?
RULING:
1.) NO.
The source of this argument stems
from the validity of Department of
Page 25

Finance Regulation No. 26 which
provides:
SEC. 121. Basis of the tax and affixture
of stamps. Bills of lading are exempt
from the documentary stamp tax
imposed by paragraphs (q) and (r) of
section 1449 of the Administrative Code
when the value of the goods shipped is
P5 or less. Unless the bill of lading
states that the goods are worth P5 or
less, it must be held that the tax is due,
and internal revenue officers will see to it
that the tax is paid in all cases where the
bill of lading does not state that the
shipment is worth P5 or less.
The
above
regulations
were
promulgated under the authority of
section 79 (B) of the Administrative Code
(originally section 2 of Act 2803), which
expressly provides:
The Department Head shall have
power to promulgate, whenever he may
see fit to do so, all rules, regulations,
orders, circulars, memorandums, and
other instructions, not contrary to law,
necessary to regulate the proper working
and
harmonious
and
efficient
administration of each and all of the
offices
and
dependencies
of
his
Department,
and
for
the
strict
enforcement and proper execution of the
laws relative to matters under the
jurisdiction of said Department; but none
of said rules or orders shall prescribe
penalties for the violation thereof, except
as expressly authorized by law .
So, did the Secretary violate any
right? (short answer: NO.)
It cannot be denied that the
regulation is merely a directive to
the tax officers; it does not purport to
change or modify the law; it does not
create a liability to the stamp tax when
the value of the goods does not appear
on the face of the receipt. The practical
usefulness of the directive becomes
evident when account is taken of the fact
that tax officers are in no position to
witness the issuance of receipts and
EH 405
check the value of the goods for which

they are issued. If tax officers were to
assess or collect the tax only when they
find that the value of the goods covered
by the receipts is more than five pesos,
the assessment and collection of the tax
would be well-nigh impossible, as it is
impossible for tax collectors to determine
from the receipts alone, if they do not
contain the value of the goods, whether
the goods receipted for exceed P5, or
not. The regulation impliedly required the
statement of the value of the goods in
the receipts; so that the collection of the
tax can be enforced. This the PetitionerAppellant failed to do and he now claims
the unreasonableness of the provision as
a basis for his exemption. We find that
the regulation is not only useful, practical
and necessary for the enforcement of the
law on the tax on bills of lading and
receipts, but also reasonable in its
provisions.
The regulation above quoted falls within
the scope of the administrative power of
the Secretary of Finance, as authorized in
Section
79
(B)
of
the
Revised
Administrative Code, because it is
essential to the strict enforcement and
proper execution of the law which it
seeks to implement. Said regulations
have the force and effect of law.
In the very nature of things in many
cases it becomes impracticable for the
legislative
department
of
the
Government
to
provide
general
regulations for the various and varying
details for the management of a
particular
department
of
the
Government.
It
therefore
becomes
convenient for the legislative department
of the Government, by Law, in a most
general way, to provide for the conduct,
control and management of the work of
the
particular
department
of
the
Government;
to
authorize
certain
persons, in charge of the management,
control, and direction of the particular
department, to adopt certain rules
Page 26

and regulations providing for the
detail of the management and
control of such department. Such
regulations have uniformly been held to
have the force of law, whenever they are
found to be in consonance and in
harmony with the general purposes and
objects of the law Such regulations, once
established and found to be in conformity
with the general purposes of the law, are
just as binding upon all of the parties, as
if the regulations had been written in the
original law itself.
For the foregoing considerations, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is
declared void (for lack of jurisdiction- SC
really has exclusive appellate juris. in
cases involving the legality of any
tax,etc) and that of the Court of First
Instance, reversed and the RespondentAppellee (nevertheless is) absolved
from the complaint. With costs against
the Petitioner-Appellant.
A.2. PENAL REGULATIONS
US vs. BARRIOS
FACTS:
In the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila the defendant was charged with a
violation of paragraphs 70 and 83 of
Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector
of Customs, duly published in the Official
Gazette and approved by the Secretary
of Finance and Justice. After a demurrer
to the complaint was overruled, it was
proved that, being the captain of the
lighter Maude, he was moving her and
directing her movement, when heavily
laden, in the Pasig River, by bamboo
poles in the hands of the crew, and
without steam, sail, or any other external
power. Paragraph 70 of Circular No.
397 reads as follows:
'"No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or
other similar craft shall be permitted to
move in the Pasig River without being
EH 405
towed by steam or moved by other

adequate power."
Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:
"For the violation of any of the foregoing
regulations, the person offending shall be
liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not
more than P500, in the discretion of the
court."
The counsel of the appellant attacked the
validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds:
First, that it is unauthorized by section 19
of Act No. 355; and, second, that if the
Acts of the Philippine Commission bear
the interpretation of authorizing the
Collector to promulgate such a law, they
are void, as constituting an illegal
delegation of legislative power.
ISSUE:
WON it is an undue delegation of
legislative power to authorize the
Collector to promulgate such law.
HELD:
NO
Rules for local navigation prescribed
by the collector of a port as harbor
master
pursuant
to
statutory
authority may be sustained as not
an undue exercise of a delegated
legislative power.
The fixing of penalties for criminal
offenses is the exercise of a
legislative power which can not be
delegated
to
a
subordinate
authority.
By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136,
passed April 29, 1904, the Collector of
Customs is authorized to license craft
engaged in the lighterage or other
exclusively harbor business of the ports
of the Islands, and, with certain
exceptions, all vessels engaged in
lightering are required to be so licensed.
Page 27

Sections 5 and 8
supports this
conclusion.
"SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs
for the Philippine Islands is hereby
authorized,
empowered,
and
directed to promptly make and
publish
suitable
rules
and
regulations to carry this law into
effect and to regulate the business
herein licensed.
"SEC. 8. Any person who shall
violate the provisions of this Act, or
of any rule or regulation made and
issued by the Collector of Customs
for the Philippine Islands, under
and by authority of this Act, shall
be
deemed
guilty
of
a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction
shall be punished by imprisonment
for not more than six months, or by
a fine of not more than one
hundred dollars, United States
currency, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, at the discretion of
the court: Provided, That violations
of law may be punished either by
the method prescribed in section
seven hereof, or by that prescribed
in this section, or by both."
There is no difficulty in sustaining the
regulation of the Collector as coming
within the terms of section 5. Lighterage,
mentioned in the Act, is the very
business in which this vessel was
engaged, and when heavily laden with
hemp she was navigating the Pasig River
below the Bridge of Spain, in the city of
Manila.
The necessity of confiding to some local
authority the framing, changing, and
enforcing of harbor regulations is.
recognized throughout the world, as each
region and each harbor requires
peculiar rules more minute than
could be enacted by the central
lawmaking power, and which, when
kept within their proper scope, are
in their nature police regulations not
EH 405
involving
an
undue
legislative power.
grant
of
The complaint in this instance was

framed with reference, as its authority, to
sections 311 and 319 [19 and 311] of Act
No. 355, of the Philippine Customs
Administrative Act, as amended by Acts
Nos. 1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 1235,
the Collector is not only empowered to
make suitable regulations, but also to "fix
penalties for violation thereof," not
exceeding a fine of P500. This provision
of the statute does, indeed, present a
serious question.
"One
of
the
settled
maxims
in
constitutional law is, that the power
conferred upon the legislature to make
laws can not be delegated by that
department to any other body or
authority. Where the sovereign power of
the State has located the authority, there
it must remain; and by the constitutional
agency alone the laws must be made
until the constitution itself is changed.
The power to whose judgment, wisdom,
and patriotism this high prerogative has
been entrusted can not relieve itself of
the responsibility by choosing other
agencies upon which the power shall be
developed, nor can it substitute the
judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any
other body for those to which alone the
people have seen fit to confide this
sovereign trust." (Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, 6th ed., p. 137.)
This doctrine is based on the ethical
principle that such a delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to
be performed by the delegate by the
instrumentality of his own judgment
acting immediately upon the matter of
legislation
and
not
through
the
intervening mind of another. In the case
of the United States vs. Breen (40 Fed.
Rep., 402), an Act of Congress allowing
the Secretary of War to make such rules
and regulations as might be necessary to
protect improvements of the Mississippi
River, and providing that a violation
Page 28

thereof
should
constitute
a
misdemeanor, was sustained on the
ground that the misdemeanor was
declared not under the delegated power
of the Secretary of War, but in the Act of
Congress, itself. So also was a grant to
him of power to prescribe rules for the
use of canals. (U. S. vs. Ormsbee, 74 Fed.
Rep., 207.) But a law authorizing him to
require alterations of any bridge and to
impose penalties for violations of his
rules we held invalid, as vesting in him a
power exclusively lodged in Congress. (U.
S. vs. Rider, 50 Fed. Rep., 406.) The
subject is considered and some cases
reviewed by the Supreme Court of the
United States, in re Kollock (165 U. S.,
526), which upheld the law authorizing a
commissioner of internal revenue to
designate
marks
and
stamps
on
oleomargarine packages, an improper
use of which should thereafter constitute
a crime or misdemeanor, the court
saying (p. 533):
"The criminal offense is fully and
completely defined by the Act and the
designation by the Commissioner of the
particular marks and brands to be used
was a mere matter of detail. The
regulation was in execution of, or
supplementary to, but not in conflict
with, the law itself. . . ."
rules and regulations is a matter purely

in the hands of the legislature."
In Massachusetts it has been decided

that the legislature may delegate to the
governor and council the power to make
pilot regulations. (Martin vs. Witherspoon
et al., 135 Mass., 175.)
During trial, prosecution presented

evidence that the defendant was
sentenced and imprisoned for disturbing
public peace.
In the case of The Board of Harbor

Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs.
Excelsior Redwood Company (88 Cal.,
491),
it
was
ruled
that
harbor
commissioners can not impose a penalty
under statutes authorizing them to do so,
the court saying:
"Conceding that the legislature could
delegate to the plaintiff the authority to
make
rules
and
regulations
with
reference to the navigation of Humboldt
Bay, the penalty for the violation of such
EH 405
Having reached the conclusion that Act

No. 1136 is valid, so far as sections 5
and 8 are concerned. We are also of the
opinion that none of the subsequent
statutes cited operate to repeal the
aforesaid section of Act No. 1136. So
much of the judgment of the Court of
First Instance as convicts the defendant
of a violation of Acts Nos. 355 and 1235
is hereby revoked, and he is hereby
convicted of a misdemeanor and
punished by a fine of 25 dollars, with
costs of both instances. So ordered.
THE UNITED STATES, vs.FRANK
TUPASI MOLINA
Facts:
Frank Tupasi Molina was charged of a
crime of perjury, in violation of Section 3,
Act no. 1697, when defendant signed a
petition to be permitted to take the
examination for the position of municipal
policeman and made a false declaration
under oath that he was qualified to the
examinations for municipal police and
have not been charged of any crime
Defendant argues that said Act was not

applicable in the present case since this
Act was only authorizing the appointment
of commissioners, to make official
investigations, fixing their powers, for the
payment of witness fees, and for the
punishment
of
perjury
in
official
investigations.
Issue:
WON lower court committed error in
applying section 3 of Act 1697.
Page 29

Held: No
Under Section 3 of Act No. 1697 it
provides that: Any person who, having
taken an oath before a competent
tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in
which a law of the Philippine Islands
authorizes an oath to be administered,
that he will testify, declare, depose, or
certify truly, or that any written
testimony, declaration, deposition or
certificate by him subscribed is true,
willfully and contrary to such oath states
or subscribes any material matter which
he does not believe to be true, is guilty
or perjury, and shall be punished, etc.
Act
No.
2169,
provides
for
the
reorganization of the municipal police of
the municipalities or provinces and
subprovinces, it further provides that,
subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Commerce and Police, the Director of
Constabulary shall prepare general
regulations for the good government,
discipline,
and
inspection
of
the
municipal police, "compliance wherewith
shall be obligatory for all members of the
organization."
Section 9 of said Act provides that: "To be
eligible for examination, a candidate
shall
have
the
following
requirements: . . . (6) Have no criminal
record."
In accordance with the requirements of
said law, the Director of Constabulary
prepared
an
examination
manual,
prescribing at the same time rules for
conducting
examinations,
which
examination manual was approved by
the Secretary of Commerce and Police,
and thereby was given the force of law.
We have, therefore, a law which
authorizes the administration of an oath
in the present case.
A violation of a regulation prescribed by
an executive officer of the Government in
EH 405
conformity with and based upon a

statute authorizing such regulation,
constitutes an offense and renders the
offender
liable
to
punishment
in
accordance with the provisions of law.
In the very nature of things in many
cases it becomes impracticable for the
legislative
department
of
the
Government to provide general
regulations for the various and
varying details for the management
of a particular department of the
Government. It therefore becomes
convenient for the legislative department
of the Government, by law, in a most
general way, to provide for the conduct,
control, and management of the work of
the
particular
department
of
the
Government;
to
authorize
certain
persons, in charge of the management,
control, and direction of the particular
department, to adopt certain rules and
regulations providing for the detail of the
management and control of such
department. Such regulations have
uniformly been held to have the force of
law, whenever they are found to be in
consonance and in harmony with the
general purposes and objects of the law.
We held in the many cases that said
section 3 was a provision punishing the
crime of perjury generally. We find no
reason, either in law or in the argument
of the appellant in the present case, to
modify or reverse our conclusions in that
case. The defendant was guilty of the
crime charged.
PP. v. MACEREN
GR No. L-32166
FACTS:
This is a case involving the validity of a
1967
regulation,
penalizing
electro
fishing
in
fresh
water
fisheries,
promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and
Page 30

the Commissioner of Fisheries under the
old Fisheries Law and the law creating
the Fisheries Commission.
Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes,
Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and
Carlito del Rosario were charged by a
Constabulary
investigator
in
the
municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with
having violated Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 84-1.
The lower court held that electro fishing
cannot be penalize because electric
current is not an obnoxious or poisonous
substance as contemplated in section I I
of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a
substance at all but a form of energy
conducted or transmitted by substances.
The lower court further held that, since
the law does not clearly prohibit electro
fishing, the executive and judicial
departments cannot consider it unlawful.
As legal background, it should be stated
that section 11 of the Fisheries Law
prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or
poisonous substance" in fishing.
Section 76 of the same law punishes any
person who uses an obnoxious or
poisonous substance in fishing with a fine
of not more than five hundred pesos nor
more than five thousand, and by
imprisonment for not less than six
months nor more than five years.
Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the

Philippine waters" found in section 2, was
changed by the amendatory order to
read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries
in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes,
swamps, dams, irrigation canals and
other bodies of fresh water."
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SECRETARY
OF AGRICULTURE
EXCEEDED ITS
AUTHORITY
IN
ISSUING
ADMINISTARTIVE ORDERS.
HELD:
The Court is of the opinion that the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries exceeded their authority in
issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders
Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders
are not warranted under the Fisheries
Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does
not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As
electro fishing is not banned under that
law, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Commissioner
of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it.
In other words, Administrative Orders
Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro
fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law

does not expressly punish .electro
fishing."
Had the lawmaking body intended to

punish electro fishing, a penal provision
to that effect could have been easily
embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources, upon the recommendation of
the
Fisheries
Commission,
issued
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1,
amending section 2 of Administrative
Order No. 84, by restricting the ban
against electro fishing to fresh water
fisheries (63 O.G. 9963).
That law punishes (1) the use of

obnoxious or poisonous substance, or
explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing
in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking
of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of
sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen
to report the kind and quantity of fish
caught, and (6) other violations.
EH 405
Page 31

Nowhere in that law is electro fishing
specifically
punished.
Administrative
Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing,
does not contemplate that such an
offense fails within the category of "other
violations" because, as already shown,
the penalty for electro fishing is the
penalty next lower to the penalty for
fishing with the use of obnoxious or
poisonous substances, fixed in section
76, and is not the same as the penalty
for "other violations" of the law and
regulations fixed in section 83 of the
Fisheries Law.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to
an executive official the power to declare
what acts should constitute an offense. It
can authorize the issuance of regulations
and the imposition of the penalty
provided for in the law itself. (People vs.
Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am.
Jur. 965 on p. 11 32).
However, at present, there is no more
doubt that electro fishing is punishable
under the Fisheries Law and that it
cannot be penalized merely by executive
revolution because Presidential Decree
No. 704, which is a revision and
consolidation of all laws and decrees
affecting fishing and fisheries and which
was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71
O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro
fishing in fresh water and salt water
areas.
n examination of the rule-making power
of executive officials and administrative
agencies and, in particular, of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (now Secretary of Natural
Resources) under the Fisheries Law
sustains the view that he ex his authority
in penalizing electro fishing by means of
an administrative order.
Administrative agent are clothed with
rule-making
powers
because
the
lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if
not impossible, to anticipate and provide
EH 405
for the multifarious and complex

situations that may be encountered in
enforcing the law. All that is required is
that the regulation should be germane to
the defects and purposes of the law and
that it should conform to the standards
that the law prescribes (People vs.
Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of
Forestry vs. Mu;oz, L-24796, June 28,
1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs.
Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712).
The lawmaking body cannot possibly
provide for all the details in the
enforcement of a particular statute (U.S.
vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing
U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506;
Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll.
of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6).
The grant of the rule-making power to
administrative agencies is a relaxation of
the principle of separation of powers and
is an exception to the nondeleption of
legislative,
powers.
Administrative
regulations or "subordinate legislation
calculated to promote the public interest
are necessary because of "the growing
complexity
of
modem
life,
the
multiplication
of
the
subjects
of
governmental
regulations,
and
the
increased difficulty of administering the
law" Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726;
People vs. Rosenthal and Osme;a, 68
Phil. 328).
Administrative regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for
the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. By such regulations,
of course, the law itself cannot be
extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra).
An administrative agency cannot amend
an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo,
109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members
of the d of Administrators, L-25619, June
30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs.
General
Auditing
Office,
L-28952,
December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660;
Page 32

Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29,
1969, 29 SCRA 350).
destruction of his property during the

war.
The rule-making power must be confined

to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as
it his been enacted. The power cannot be
extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace
matters not covered by the statute. Rules
that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas
vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382,
citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid
regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs.
Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer,
78 Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil.
Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June
27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
Held:
A.3 INTERPRETATIVE RULES

Hilado vs. Collector
GR L-9408, 31 October 1956
Facts:
Emilio Hilado filed his income tax return
for 1951 with the treasurer of Bacolod
City, claiming a deductible item of
P12,837.65 from his gross income
pursuant to General Circular V-123 issued
by the Collector of Internal Revenue. The
Secretary of Finance, through the
Collector, issued General Circular V-139
which revoked and declared void Circular
V-123; and laid down the rule[s] that
losses of property which occurred in
World War II from fires, storms, shipwreck
or other casualty, or from robbery, theft,
or embezzlement are deductible in the
year of actual loss or destruction of said
property.
The
deductions
were
disallowed.
Issue:
Whether Internal Revenue Laws were
enforced during the war and whether
Hilado can claim compensation for
EH 405
Philippines Internal Revenue Laws are not

political in nature and as such were
continued in force during the period of
enemy occupation and in effect were
actually enforced by the occupation
government. Such tax laws are deemed
to be laws of the occupied territory and
not of the occupying enemy. As of the
end of 1945, there was no law which
Hilado could claim for the destruction of
his properties during the battle for the
liberation of the Philippines. Under the
Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1948, the
payment of claims by the War Damage
Commission
depended
upon
its
discretions non-payment of which does
not give rise to any enforceable right.
Assuming that the loss (deductible item)
represents a portion of the 75% of his
war damage claim, the amount would be
at most a proper deduction of his 1950
gross income (not on his 1951 gross
income) as the last installment and
notice of discontinuation of payment by
the War Damage
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC.,
v. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION
On October 15, 1958, the Social Security
Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of
the following tenor: .
Effective November 1, 1958, all
Employers in computing the premiums
due the System, will take into
consideration and include in the
Employee's remuneration all bonuses
and overtime pay, as well as the cash
value of other media of remuneration.
All these will comprise the Employee's
remuneration or earnings, upon which
the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions
will be based, up to a maximum of
P500 for any one month.
Page 33

Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner
Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through
counsel, wrote the Social Security
Commission in effect protesting against
the circular as contradictory to a previous
Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957
expressly excluding overtime pay and
bonus in the computation of the
employers' and employees' respective
monthly premium contributions, and
submitting, "In order to assist your
System
in
arriving
at
a
proper
interpretation of the term 'compensation'
for the purposes of" such computation,
their observations on Republic Act 1161
and its amendment and on the general
interpretation
of
the
words
"compensation",
"remuneration"
and
"wages". Counsel further questioned the
validity of the circular for lack of
authority on the part of the Social
Security Commission to promulgate it
without the approval of the President and
for lack of publication in the Official
Gazette.
Overruling these objections, the Social
Security Commission ruled that Circular
No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that
needed the approval of the President and
publication in the Official Gazette to be
effective, but a mere administrative
interpretation of the statute, a mere
statement of general policy or opinion as
to how the law should be construed.
Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner
comes to this Court on appeal.
The single issue involved in this appeal is
whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or
regulation, as contemplated in Section
4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering
the Social Security Commission "to
adopt, amend and repeal subject to the
approval of the President such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions and purposes of this
Act."
There can be no doubt that there is a
distinction between an administrative
EH 405
rule or regulation and an administrative

interpretation
of
a
law
whose
enforcement
is
entrusted
to
an
administrative
body.
When
an
administrative agency promulgates rules
and regulations, it "makes" a new law
with the force and effect of a valid law,
while when it renders an opinion or gives
a statement of policy, it merely interprets
a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative
Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law,
p. 194). Rules and regulations when
promulgated in pursuance of the
procedure or authority conferred upon
the administrative agency by law,
partake of the nature of a statute, and
compliance therewith may be enforced
by a penal sanction provided in the law.
This is so because statutes are usually
couched
in
general
terms,
after
expressing
the
policy,
purposes,
objectives, remedies and sanctions
intended by the legislature. The details
and the manner of carrying out the law
are often times left to the administrative
agency entrusted with its enforcement.
In this sense, it has been said that rules
and regulations are the product of a
delegated power to create new or
additional legal provisions that have the
effect of law. (Davis, op. cit., p. 194.) .
A rule is binding on the courts so long as
the procedure fixed for its promulgation
is followed and its scope is within the
statutory authority granted by the
legislature, even if the courts are not in
agreement with the policy stated therein
or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit., 195197). On the other hand, administrative
interpretation of the law is at best merely
advisory, for it is the courts that finally
determine what the law means.
Circular No. 22 in question was issued by
the Social Security Commission, in view
of the amendment of the provisions of
the Social Security Law defining the term
"compensation" contained in Section 8 (f)
of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its
amendment, reads as follows: .
Page 34

(f)
Compensation
All
remuneration
for
employment
include the cash value of any
remuneration paid in any medium
other than cash except (1) that
part of the remuneration in excess
of P500 received during the month;
(2)
bonuses,
allowances
or
overtime pay; and (3) dismissal
and all other payments which the
employer may make, although not
legally required to do so.
was merely that a regulation may be

incorporated in the form of a circular.
Such statement simply meant that the
substance and not the form of a
regulation is decisive in determining its
nature. It does not lay down a general
proposition of law that any circular,
regardless of its substance and even if it
is only interpretative, constitutes a rule
or regulation which must be published in
the Official Gazette before it could take
effect.
Republic Act No. 1792 changed the

definition of "compensation" to:
(f)
Compensation
All
remuneration
for
employment
include the cash value of any
remuneration paid in any medium
other than cash except that part of
the remuneration in excess of
P500.00
received
during
the
month.
The case of People v. Que Po Lay (50

O.G. 2850) also cited by appellant is not
applicable to the present case, because
the penalty that may be incurred by
employers and employees if they refuse
to pay the corresponding premiums on
bonus, overtime pay, etc. which the
employer pays to his employees, is not
by reason of non-compliance with
Circular No. 22, but for violation of the
specific legal provisions contained in
Section 27(c) and (f) of Republic Act No.
1161.
It will thus be seen that whereas prior to

the amendment, bonuses, allowances,
and overtime pay given in addition to the
regular or base pay were expressly
excluded,
or
exempted
from
the
definition of the term "compensation",
such exemption or exclusion was deleted
by the amendatory law. It thus became
necessary for the Social Security
Commission to interpret the effect of
such deletion or elimination. Circular No.
22 was, therefore, issued to apprise
those concerned of the interpretation or
understanding of the Commission, of the
law as amended, which it was its duty to
enforce. It did not add any duty or detail
that was not already in the law as
amended.
It
merely
stated
and
circularized
the
opinion
of
the
Commission as to how the law should be
construed.
The case of People v. Jolliffe (G.R. No. L9553, promulgated on May 30, 1959)
cited by appellant, does not support its
contention that the circular in question is
a rule or regulation. What was there said
EH 405
We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22

purports merely to advise employersmembers of the System of what, in the
light of the amendment of the law, they
should include in determining the
monthly
compensation
of
their
employees upon which the social security
contributions should be based, and that
such circular did not require presidential
approval and publication in the Official
Gazette for its effectivity.
It hardly need be said that the
Commission's
interpretation
of
the
amendment embodied in its Circular No.
22, is correct. The express elimination
among the exemptions excluded in the
old law, of all bonuses, allowances and
overtime pay in the determination of the
"compensation" paid to employees
makes it imperative that such bonuses
and overtime pay must now be included
in the employee's remuneration in
pursuance of the amendatory law. It is
Page 35

true that in previous cases, this Court has
held that bonus is not demandable
because it is not part of the wage, salary,
or compensation of the employee. But
the question in the instant case is not
whether bonus is demandable or not as
part of compensation, but whether, after
the employer does, in fact, give or pay
bonus to his employees, such bonuses
shall be considered compensation under
the Social Security Act after they have
been received by the employees. While it
is true that terms or words are to be
interpreted in accordance with their wellaccepted meaning in law, nevertheless,
when such term or word is specifically
defined in a particular law, such
interpretation must be adopted in
enforcing that particular law, for it can
not be gainsaid that a particular phrase
or term may have one meaning for one
purpose and another meaning for some
other purpose. Such is the case that is
now before us. Republic Act 1161
specifically defined what "compensation"
should mean "For the purposes of this
Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such
definition by deleting same exemptions
authorized in the original Act. By virtue of
this express substantial change in the
phraseology of the law, whatever prior
executive or judicial construction may
have been given to the phrase in
question should give way to the clear
mandate of the new law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
Resolution appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against appellant. So
ordered.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS v. SSS
A. QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
1. INSPECTION, INVESTIGATION
AND ADJUDICATION
ANG TIBAY vs. THE COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
EH 405
G.R. No. L-46496

February 27,
1940
FACTS:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang
Tibay a leather company which supplies
the Philippine Army. Due to alleged
shortage of leather, Toribio caused the
layoff of members of National Labor
Union Inc. (NLU). NLU averred that
Toribios act is not valid as it is not within
the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
They also alleged that there are two
labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and
National Workers Brotherhood (NWB).
They further contend that NWB is
dominated by Toribio himself hence he
favors it over NLU. NLU prays for a new
trial as they were able to come up with
new evidence/documents that they were
not able to obtain before, as they were
inaccessible and they were not able to
present it before in the Court of Industrial
Relations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a due
process of law.
HELD:
The SC ruled that there should be a new
trial in favor of NLU.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a
special court whose functions are
specifically stated in the law of its
creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It
is more an administrative than a part of
the integrated judicial system of the
nation. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate,
decide, and settle any question, matter
controversy or dispute arising between,
and/or
affecting
employers
and
employees or laborers, and regulate the
relations between them, subject to, and
in accordance with, the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (Section 1).
Page 36

In fine, it may appeal to voluntary
arbitration in the settlement of industrial
disputes; may employ mediation or
conciliation for that purpose, or recur to
the more effective system of official
investigation and compulsory arbitration
in
order
to
determine
specific
controversies between labor and capital
industry and in agriculture. There is in
reality here a mingling of executive and
judicial functions, which is a departure
from the rigid doctrine of the separation
of governmental powers.
The fact, however, that the Court of
Industrial Relations may be said to be
free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean
that it can, in justifiable cases before it,
entirely
ignore
or
disregard
the
fundamental and essential requirements
of due process in trials and investigations
of an administrative character. There are
primary rights which must be respected
even in proceedings of this character;
(1)
The right to a hearing, which
includes the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof.
(2)
Not only must the party be given
an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented.
(3)
While the duty to deliberate does
not impose the obligation to decide right,
it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, a place when
directly attached.
(4)
Not only must there be some
evidence to support a finding or
conclusion but the evidence must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla; it means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
EH 405
(5)
The decision must be rendered on
the evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected.
(6)
The Court of Industrial Relations or
any of its judges, therefore, must act on
its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy,
and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7)
The Court of Industrial Relations
should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable
from the authority conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental
principles, it is sufficient to observe that,
except as to the alleged agreement
between the Ang Tibay and the National
Worker's Brotherhood, the record is
barren and does not satisfy the thirst for
a factual basis upon which to predicate,
in a national way, a conclusion of law.
The SC further held that that the interest
of justice would be better served if the
movant is given opportunity to present at
the hearing the documents referred to in
his motion and such other evidence as
may be relevant to the main issue
involved. Thus, the motion for a new trial
was granted, and the entire record of the
case was remanded to the Court of
Industrial Relations, with instruction that
it reopen the case, receive all such
evidence as may be relevant and
otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth hereinabove.
IN RE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST ARMANDO RAMOS, JESUS
L. CARMELO v. ARMANDO RAMOS
Facts:
Page 37

Mayor of Manila issued an executive
order
creating
a
committee
"to
investigate the anomalies involving the
license inspectors and other personnel of
the License Inspection Division of the
Office of the City Treasurer and of the
License and Permits Division of this
Office. Petitioner is the chairman of the
committee.
The
committee
issued
subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private
citizen working as a bookkeeper in the
Casa de Alba, requiring him to appear
before it. Claiming that Ramos' refusal
tended "to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the
administrative
proceedings,"
petitioner filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition to declare
Armando Ramos in contempt. After
hearing, during which petitioner was
required to show a prima facie case, the
trial court dismissed the petition. The
lower court held that there is no law
empowering committees created by
municipal mayors to issue subpoenas
and demand that witnesses testify under
oath. It appears that in a statement given
to investigators of the Office of the
Mayor,
Ramos
admitted
having
misappropriated on several occasions,
sums of money given to him by the
owner of Casa de Alba for the payment of
the latter's taxes for 1956-1959 and that
this fact had not been discovered earlier
because Ramos used to entertain
employees in the City Treasurer's office
at Casa de Alba where Ramos was a
bookkeeper as stated above.
Issue:
The main issue in this case is WON the
power, if any, of committee, like the
committee of which petitioner is the
chairman, to subpoena witnesses to
appear before it and to ask for their
punishment in case of refusal?
Held:
Petition is bereft of merit.
EH 405
The rule is that Rule 64 of the Rules of

Court applies only to inferior and superior
courts and does not comprehend
contempt
committed
against
administrative officials or bodies like the
one in this case, unless said contempt is
clearly considered and expressly defined
as contempt of court, as is done in
paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
Section
580
of
the
Revised
Administrative Code which provides as
follows:
Powers incidental to taking of testimony.
When authority to take testimony or
evidence
is
conferred
upon
an
administrative officer or upon any
nonjudicial person, committee, or other
body, such authority shall be understood
to comprehend the right to administer
oaths and summons witnesses and shall
include
authority
to
require
the
production of documents under a
subpoena duces tecum or otherwise,
subject in all respects to the same
restrictions and qualifications as apply in
judicial
proceedings
of
a
similar
character.
One who invokes this provision of the law
must first show that he has "authority to
take testimony or evidence" before he
can apply to the courts for the
punishment of hostile witnesses. There is
nothing said in the executive order of the
Mayor creating the committee about
such a grant of power. All that the order
gives to this body is the power to
investigate anomalies involving certain
city employees. SC does not agree with
the petitioner that a delegation of such
power to investigation implies also a
delegation of the power to take
testimony or evidence of witnesses
whose appearance may be require by the
compulsory
process
of
subpoena.
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the
provisions of section 580 of the
Administrative Code are applicable to the
Page 38

City of Manila as these pertain to national
bureaus or offices of the government.
Even granting that the Mayor has the
implied power to require the appearance
of witnesses before him, the rule, is that
the Mayor can not delegate this power to
a body like the committee of the
petitioner.
VIVO v MONTESA G.R. No. L-24576
July 29, 1968
Facts:
The private respondents Juan, Pedro,
Julio, Marcelo, Jose, Manuel and Benito,
all surnamed "Calacday" arrived in the
Philippines from Hongkong, the first four
on 18 November 1959, and the last three
on 6 December 1959. Upon their arrival
they sought admission as Filipino
citizens. After investigation, a board of
special inquiry, in its decisions of 7 and
11 December 1959, found them to be the
legitimate sons of a Filipino citizen, one
Isaac Calacday, and thus admitted them
into this country. The Bureau of
Immigration then issued to each of them
an identification certificate as a Filipino
citizen. Sometime in February, 1963,
however, Isaac Calacday confessed
before an immigration official that the
seven respondents were not his sons. He
retracted his confession in March, 1963,
in an investigation in the Department of
Justice, with the explanation that, in a fit
of anger, he disclaimed, under oath,
paternity of the respondents because
they refused to give him money (Annex
"I" to Answer).
On 9 May 1963, Commissioner of
Immigration Martiniano Vivo issued
warrants of arrest against the herein
private respondents, stating in said
warrants
their
deportability
under
Section 37 (a) (1) and Section 37 (a) (2)
in relation to Section 29(a) (17) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, for having entered the
Philippines "by means of false and
EH 405
misleading statements and that they

were not lawfully admissible at the time
of entry, not being properly documented
for admission." The warrants directed
any immigration office or officer of the
law to bring the respondents before the
Commissioner, for them to show cause, if
any there be, why they should not be
deported.
Manuel Calacday was
subsequently
arrested.
The
others
remained at large.
On 26 April 1965, the respondents filed
before the respondent court a petition,
docketed as Civil Case No. 60906,
praying for three principal reliefs,
namely: to restrain the arrest of those
petitioners who have not been arrested;
to release Manuel Calacday who had
been arrested; and to prohibit the
deportation of all the petitioners, all upon
the claim that they are Filipino citizens.
RTC granted the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to
restrain the deportation proceedings
Held:
We agree with petitioning Commissioner
that the court below is without
jurisdiction to restrain the deportation
proceedings of respondents Calacdays.
These proceedings are within the
jurisdiction of the Immigration authorities
under Sections 28 and 37 of the
Philippine Immigration Act (C.A. No. 613).
That jurisdiction is not tolled by a claim
of
Filipino
citizenship,
where
the
Commissioner or Commissioners have
reliable evidence to the contrary; and
said
officers
should
be
given
opportunity to determine the issue
of citizenship before the courts
interfere in the exercise of the
power
of
judicial
review
of
administrative decisions.
Page 39

in Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil.
531, 533, this Court said:
While the jurisdiction of the Deportation
Board as an instrument of the Chief
Executive to deport undesirable aliens
exists only when the person arrested is
an alien, however, the mere plea of
citizenship does not divest the Board of
its jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners
should make "a showing that his claim is
frivolous" (Ng Fung Ho vs. White, 259
U.S., 275), and must prove by sufficient
evidence that they are Filipino citizens.
[Kessler vs. Strecker (1939) 307 U.S., 21,
35-36.] If such is the primary duty of
petitioners,
it
follows
that
the
Deportation Board has the necessary
power to pass upon the evidence that
may be presented and determine in the
first instance if petitioners are Filipino
citizens or not. This is inherent-in, or
essential to the efficient exercise of, the
power
of
the
Deportation
Board
(Laurencio vs.Collector of Customs, 35
Phil., 37).
It is well to note here that when the
petition for certiorari and prohibition (the
respondent judge considered it as such)
was filed, deportation proceedings had
been started against the respondents
(petitioners below) but had not been
completed. In view of the non-completion
of the proceedings, the Board of
Commissioners has not rendered as yet
any
decision.
The
respondents
Calacdays, therefore, are not being
deported. Before the Board reaches a
decision, it has to conduct a hearing
where the main issue will be the
citizenship
or
alienage
of
the
respondents. Therefore, there is nothing
so far for the courts to review.
It is clear from the order complained of
that the court below misapprehended the
import of the warrants issued by the
Commissioner herein. Said warrants
required the respondents to be brought
to the immigration authorities, not to be
deported, but "to show cause, if any
EH 405
there be, why he should not be deported

from the Philippines", as expressly
recited therein. There was no case of
"summarily arresting and deporting" the
respondents Calacdays, as unwarrantedly
assumed by the court below.
The Calacdays have alluded in this Court
to certain documents in support of their
claim to Philippine citizenship. The proper
procedure is for said respondents to
appear before the Immigration officials
and there submit these documents as
evidence on their part to show cause why
they should not be deported.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writ
prayed for is hereby granted, the order
issued in Civil Case No. 60906 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila is set
aside, and the proceedings ordered
discontinued. But the warrants of arrest
heretofore issued by the petitioner,
Immigration
Commissioner,
against
herein
respondents
Calacdays
are
declared null and void, without prejudice
to said respondents being required to
furnish bonds in such reasonable sums as
the Immigration Commissioners may fix,
in order to guarantee their appearance at
the hearings and other proceedings in
their case, until final determination of
their right to stay in the Philippines
PLDT v. PSC
EVANGELISTA v. JARENCIO
FACTS:
This is an original action for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction,
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to annul and set aside the order
of respondent Judge, the Honorable
Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, dated
July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305,
Page 40

entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec.
Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc
Pursuant to his special powers and duties
under Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code, 1 the President of
the Philippines created the Presidential
Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO) under Executive
Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. 2
Purposedly, he charged the Agency with
the
following
functions
and
responsibilities: 3
b. To investigate all activities involving
or affecting immoral practices, graft
and corruptions, smuggling (physical
or technical), lawlessness, subversion,
and all other activities which are
prejudicial to the government and the
public interests, and to submit proper
recommendations to the President of
the Philippines.
c. To investigate cases of graft and
corruption and violations of Republic
Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather
necessary evidence to establish prima
facie, acts of graft and acquisition of
unlawfully amassed wealth ... .
h. To receive and evaluate, and to
conduct fact-finding investigations of
sworn complaints against the acts,
conduct or behavior of any public
official or employee and to file and
prosecute the proper charges with the
appropriate agency.
For a realistic performance of these
functions, the President vested in the
Agency all the powers of an investigating
committee under Sections 71 and 580 of
the
Revised
Administrative
Code,
including
the
power
to
summon
witnesses by subpoena or subpoena
duces tecum, administer oaths, take
testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation. 4
Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner
Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of
the Agency, issued to respondent
Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City
EH 405
Public Service Officer of Manila, a

subpoena ad testificandum commanding
him "to be and appear as witness at the
Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON
REFORMS
AND
GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare
and testify in a certain investigation
pending therein."
ISSUE:
Whether the Agency, acting thru its
officials, enjoys the authority to issue
subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding
investigations.
HELD: YES.
It has been essayed that the life blood of
the administrative process is the flow of
fact, the gathering, the organization and
the analysis of evidence. 7 Investigations
are useful for all administrative functions,
not only for rule making, adjudication,
and licensing, but also for prosecuting,
for supervising and directing, for
determining
general
policy,
for
recommending, legislation, and for
purposes
no
more
specific
than
illuminating obscure areas to find out
what if anything should be done. 8 An
administrative agency may be authorized
to make investigations, not only in
proceedings of a legislative or judicial
nature, but also in proceedings whose
sole purpose is to obtain information
upon which future action of a legislative
or judicial nature may be taken 9 and
may require the attendance of witnesses
in proceedings of a purely investigatory
nature. It may conduct general inquiries
into evils calling for correction, and to
report findings to appropriate bodies and
make recommendations for actions. 10
We recognize that in the case before Us,
petitioner Agency draws its subpoena
power from Executive Order No. 4, para.
5 which, in an effectuating mood,
empowered it to "summon witness,
administer oaths, and take testimony
Page 41

relevant to the investigation" 11 with the
authority "to require the production of
documents under a subpoena duces
tecum or otherwise, subject in all
respects to the same restrictions and
qualifications
as
apply in judicial
proceedings of a similar character." 12
Such subpoena power operates in
extenso to all the functions of the Agency
as laid out in the aforequoted subparagraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not
bordered by nor is it merely exercisable,
as respondents would have it, in quasijudicial or adjudicatory function under
sub-paragraph
(b).
The
functions
enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs
(b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine
with one another with the principal aim
of meeting the very purpose of the
creation of the Agency, which is to
forestall and erode nefarious activities
and anomalies in the civil service. To hold
that the subpoena power of the Agency
is confined to mere quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory functions would therefore
imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its
investigatory functions under
subparagraphs (e) and (h). More than that,
the enabling authority itself (Executive
Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction
when and in what function should the
subpoena power be exercised. Similarly,
We see no reason to depart from the
established
rule
that
forbids
differentiation when the law itself makes
none.
There is no doubt that the fact-finding
investigations being conducted by the
Agency
upon
sworn
statements
implicating certain public officials of the
City Government of Manila in anomalous
transactions 23 fall within the Agency's
sphere of authority and that the
information sought to be .
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD vs.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC.
G.R. No. L-40245 1975 April 30
EH 405
Facts:
The Philippine Airlines Inc provides both
domestic and international air service. In
its domestic service PAL provides, among
others, services between Tuguegarao and
Manila (designated as Flight 213) and
between Baguio and Manila (designated
as Flight 205).
On May 12, 1970, PAL had an excess of
twenty (20) passengers from Baguio to
Manila who cannot be accommodated in
its regular flight. To accommodate these
twenty passengers, PAL required the
aircraft operating Flight 213 (Tuguegarao
to Manila) to pass Baguio City on its way
to Manila and pick up these passengers.
Flight 213 at that time was carrying only
five (5) passengers.
Claiming that PAL should have first
obtained the permission of the CIVIL
AERONAUTICS BOARD (CAB) before
operating the flagstop and that such
failure is a violation of Republic Act No.
776, the CAB
imposed a fine of
P5,000.00 upon PAL in a resolution. Upon
motion for reconsideration filed by PAL,
the CAB reduced the fine to P2,500.00
PAL, in its motion for reconsideration,
argued that there is nothing in Republic
Act No. 776 in general, nor in Section
42(k) thereof in particular, which
expressly empowers CAB to impose a
fine and order its payment in the manner
pursued in this case and under CAB
Resolution No. 109(70). It further
stressed that "the power and authority to
impose fines and penalties is a judicial
function exercised through the regular
courts of justice, and that such power
and authority cannot be delegated to the
Civil Aeronautics Board my mere
implication or interpretation".
Issue:
Page 42

Whether or not CAB possesses the
necessary legal authority to impose a
fine.
Ruling:
We have no quarrel with appellant PAL's
contention that the C.A.B. has no power
to impose fines in the nature of criminal
penalty and that only courts of justice
can do so. It could easily be discerned
from a scrutiny of the provision on
Chapter VII of Republic Act 776, on
"Violation and penalties" that whenever
the law provides a penalty for a violation
involving fine and/or imprisonment
(criminal in nature), the words "in the
discretion of the court" always appear
(Sec. 42 (E) (F) (G) (N) Republic Act 776)
for the very simple reason that the C.A.B.
is not authorized to impose a criminal
penalty, but in those cases where the
violation is punishable by a fine or civil
penalty, the law does not include the
words "in the discretion of the court.
There exists but an insignificant doubt in
Our mind that the C.A.B. is fully
authorized by law (Republic Act 776) to
impose fines in the nature of civil
penalty for violations of its rules and
regulations. To deprive the C.A.B. of that
power would amount to an absurd
interpretation of the pertinent legal
provision because the CAB is given full
power on its own initiative to determine
whether to "impose, remit, mitigate,
increase or compromise" "fines and civil
penalties", a power which is expressly
given
to
the
Civil
Aeronautics
Administrator whose orders or decision
may be reviewed, revised, reversed,
modified or affirmed by the CAB. Besides,
to deprive the C.A.B. of its power to
impose civil penalties would negate its
effective general supervision and control
over air carriers if they can just disregard
with impunity the rules and regulations
designed to insure public safety and
convenience in air transportation. If
everytime the C.A.B. would like to impose
EH 405
a civil penalty on an erring airline for

violation of its rules and regulations it
would have to resort to courts of justice
in protracted litigations then it could not
serve its purpose of exercising a
competent,
efficient
and
effective
supervision and control over air carriers
in their vital role of rendering public
service by affording safe and convenient
air transit.
There is no doubt that the fine imposed
on appellant PAL in CAB resolution
109(70) and 132(70) is that fine or civil
penalty contemplated and mentioned in
the foregoing provisions of Republic Act
776 and not a fine in the nature of
criminal penalty as contemplated in the
Revised Penal Code, because the "fine" in
this case was imposed by the C.A.B.
because of appellant PAL's violation of
C.A.B. rules on flagstops without previous
authority on "May 12, 1970 and on
previous
occasions",
said
C.A.B.
explaining clearly in its resolution No.
132(70) that the "imposition of the fine is
not so much on exacting penalty for the
violation committed as the need to stress
upon the air carriers to desist from
wanton disregard of existing rules,
regulations or requirements of the
government regulating agency. In other
words, it is an administrative penalty
which
administrative
officers
are
empowered to impose without criminal
prosecution.
Republic Act 776 created the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the Civil
Aeronautics
Administration.
In
the
exercise and performance of their powers
and duties, they shall consider among
other things, "as being in the public
interest, and in accordance with the
public
convenience
and
necessity"
certain declared policies which include
(c) The regulation of air transportation
in such manner as to recognize and
preserve the inherent advantage
of, assure the highest degree of
safety in, and foster sound
Page 43

economic
condition
in,
such
transportation, and to improve the
relation between, and coordinate
transportation by, air carriers;
(f) To promote safety of flight in air
commerce in the Philippines
The CAB has the power to "investigate,
upon complaint or upon its own initiative,
whether any individual or air carrier,
domestic or foreign, is violating any
provision of this act, or the rules and
regulations issued thereunder, and shall
take such action, consistent with the
provisions of this Act, as may be
necessary to prevent further violation of
such provision, or rules and regulations
so issued" (Section 10(D) Republic Act
776).
Likewise, the CAB has the power to
"review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm
on appeal any administrative decision or
order"
of
the
Civil
Aeronautics
Administrator on matters pertaining to
"imposition of civil penalty or fine in
connection with the violation of any
provision of this Act or rules and
regulations issued thereunder." It has the
power also "either on its own initiative or
upon review on appeal from an order or
decision
of
the
Civil
Aeronautics
Administrator, to determine whether to
impose, remit, mitigate, increase, or
compromise,
such
fine
and
civil
penalties, as the case may be.
ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION v.
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
FACTS:
Jose Hernando acquired ownership over
Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa
Heights Subdivision from the petitioner
Antipolo Realty Corporation. On 28
August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred
his rights over Lot No. 15 to private
respondent Virgilio Yuson. However, for
failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the
EH 405
subdivision project, Mr. Yuson paid only

the arrearages pertaining to the period
up to, and including, the month of August
1972 and stopped all monthly installment
payments falling due thereafter. On
October 14 1976, the president of
Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private
respondent Yuson advising that the
required improvements in the subdivision
had already been completed, and
requesting resumption of payment of the
monthly installments on Lot No. 15.
Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September
1972-October 1976 monthly installments
but agreed to pay the post October 1976
installments. Antipolo Realty responded
by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and
claiming the forfeiture of all installment
payments previously made by Mr. Yuson.
Mr. Yuson brought his dispute with
Antipolo Realty before public respondent
NHA.
After hearing, the NHA rendered a
decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the
reinstatement of the Contract to Sell.
Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for
Reconsideration
asserting
that
the
jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr.
Yuson's complaint was lodged in the
regular courts, not in the NHA.
The motion for reconsideration was
denied by respondent NHA, which
sustained its jurisdiction to hear and
decide the Yuson complaint. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NHA has jurisdiction
over the present controversy.
HELD:
NHA was upheld by the SC.
It is by now commonplace learning that
many administrative agencies exercise
and perform adjudicatory powers and
functions, though to a limited extent only.
Limited delegation of judicial or quasiPage 44

judicial
authority
to
administrative
agencies is well recognized in our
jurisdiction, basically because the need
for special competence and experience
has been recognized as essential in the
resolution of questions of complex or
specialized character and because of a
companion recognition that the dockets
of our regular courts have remained
crowded and clogged. In general the
quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial
powers which an administrative agency
may exercise is defined in the enabling
act of such agency. In other words, the
extent to which an administrative entity
may exercise such powers depends
largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of
the statute creating or empowering such
agency. In the exercise of such powers,
the agency concerned must commonly
interpret and apply contracts and
determine the rights of private parties
under such contracts.
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.
957, known as "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers' Decree", states
that National Housing Authority.
The National Housing Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
real estate trade and business in
accordance with the provisions of this
decree. Presidential Decree No. 1344,
clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial
dimensions of the grant of regulatory
authority to the NHA in the following
manner:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its
functions to regulate the real estate
trade and business and in addition to
its powers provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority
shall
have
exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business
practices:
B. Claims involving refund and any
other claims filed by subdivision lot
or condominium unit buyer against
the project owner, developer, dealer,
EH 405
broker or salesman; and

C.
Cases
involving
specific
performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers
of subdivision lots or condominium
units against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman.
The need for and therefore the scope of
the regulatory authority thus lodged in
the NHA are indicated in the second and
third preambular paragraphs of the
statute. There is no question that under
Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was
legally empowered to determine and
protect the rights of contracting parties
under the law administered by it and
under the respective agreements, as well
as to ensure that their obligations
thereunder are faithfully performed.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI)
vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION (NTC) and JUAN A.
ALEGRE
G.R. No. 93237 November 6, 1992
Facts:
Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife,
Dr. Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH
telegrams through petitioner RCPI's
facilities in Taft Ave., Manila at 9:00 in the
morning of 17 March 1989 to his sister
and brother-in-law in Valencia, Bohol and
another sister-in-law in Espiritu, Ilocos
Norte.
Both telegrams did not reach their
destinations on the expected dates. So,
private
respondent
filed
a lettercomplaint against RCPI with National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
for poor service, with a request for the
imposition of the appropriate punitive
sanction against the company. Taking
cognizance of the complaint, NTC
directed RCPI to answer the complaint
and set the initial hearing.
Page 45

NTC held that RCPI was administratively
liable for deficient and inadequate
service under Section 19(a) of C.A. 146
and imposed the penalty of fine payable
within thirty (30) days from receipt in the
aggregate amount of one thousand
pesos.
Hence, RCPI filed this petition for review
invoking C.A. 146 Sec. 19(a) which limits
the jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission (precursor of the NTC) to the
fixing of rates.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Public
Service
Commission (precursor of the NTC) has
jurisdiction to impose fines
HELD:
The decision appealed from is reversed
and set aside for lack of jurisdiction of
the NTC to render it.
NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine.
Under Section 21 of C. A. 146, as
amended,
the
Commission
was
empowered to impose an administrative
fine in cases of violation of or failure by a
public service to comply with the terms
and conditions of any certificate or any
orders, decisions or regulations of the
Commission. Petitioner operated under a
legislative franchise, so there were no
terms nor conditions of any certificate
issued by the Commission to violate.
Neither was there any order, decision or
regulation
from
the
Commission
applicable to petitioner that the latter
had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied
or disregarded.
No substantial change has been brought
about by Executive Order No. 546
invoked by the Solicitor General's Office
to
bolster
NTC's
jurisdiction.
The
Executive Order is not an explicit grant of
EH 405
power to impose administrative fines on

public
service
utilities,
including
telegraphic agencies, which have failed
to
render
adequate
service
to
consumers. Neither has it expanded the
coverage
of
the
supervisory
and
regulatory power of the agency. There
appears to be no alternative but to
reiterate
the
settled
doctrine
in
administrative law that:
Too basic in administrative law to need
citation of jurisprudence is the rule that
jurisdiction and powers of administrative
agencies, like respondent Commission,
are limited to those expressly granted or
necessarily implied from those granted in
the legislation creating such body; and
any order without or beyond such
jurisdiction is void and ineffective (Globe
Wireless case).
EPZA vs. CHR, et. Al
G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992
Facts:
EPZA (petitioner) purchase a parcel of
land from Filoil Refinery Corporation, and
before petitioner could take possession of
the area, several individuals had entered
the premises and planted agricultural
products therein without permission from
EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. EPZA paid
a P10,000-financial-assistance to those
who accepted the same and signed
quitclaims. Among them were private
respondents (TERESITA VALLES, LORETO
ALEDIA). Ten years later, respondent
Teresita, Loreto and Pedro, filed in the
respondent Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) a joint complaint praying for
"justice and other reliefs and remedies".
Alleged in their complaint was the
information that EPZA bulldozed the area
with acts in violation of their human
rights. CHR issued an Order of injunction
commanding EPZA to desist from
committing such acts . Two weeks later,
EPZA again bulldozed the area. They
allegedly handcuffed private respondent
Page 46

Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at
the other respondents, and fired a shot in
the air. CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion
Bautista issued another injunction Order
reiterating her first order and expanded it
to include the Secretary of Public Works
and Highways, the contractors, and their
subordinates.
EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the
Order of Injunction for lack of authority to
issue injunctive writs and temporary
restraining orders, but same was denied
by the Commission (CHR).
Hence, EPZA, filed in SC this special civil
action of certiorari and prohibition with a
prayer for the issuance of a restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction,
alleging that the CHR acted in excess of
its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion. A temporary restraining order
(TRO) was issued ordering the CHR to
cease and desist from enforcing and/or
implementing the questioned injunction
orders.
In its comment on the petition, the CHR
asked for the immediate lifting of the
restraining order. The CHR contends that
its principal function under Section 18,
Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, "is not
limited to mere investigation" because it
is mandated, among others to provide
appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons
within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos
residing
abroad,
and
provide
for
preventive measures and legal aid
services to the under privileged whose
human rights have been violated or need
protection.
Issue:
WON CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ
of injunction or restraining order against
supposed violators of human rights, to
compel them to cease and desist from
continuing the acts complained of.
Petition for certiorari and prohibition is

GRANTED. The orders of injunction issued
by the respondent Commission on
Human Right are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE and the TRO which this Court
issued is made PERMANENT.
In Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. vs.
Commission on Human Rights, et al., we
held that the CHR is not a court of justice
nor even a quasi-judicial body.
The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of
fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political
rights.
But
fact-finding
is
not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice,
or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered
such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy
may
be
decided
or
determined authoritatively, finally and
definitely, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by
law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
The constitutional provision directing the
CHR to "provide for preventive measures
and
legal
aid
services
to
the
underprivileged whose human rights
have been violated or need protection"
may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for,
if
that
were
the
intention,
the
Constitution would have expressly said
so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by
Held:
EH 405
Page 47

the Constitution or by law". It is
never derived by implication.
The "preventive measures and legal aid
services" mentioned in the Constitution
refer
to
extrajudicial
and
judicial
remedies (including a preliminary writ of
injunction) which the CHR may seek from
the proper courts on behalf of the victims
of human rights violations. Not being a
court of justice, the CHR itself has no
jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued
"by the judge of any court in which the
action is pending [within his district], or
by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of
the Supreme Court. It may also be
granted by the judge of a Court of First
Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any
action pending in an inferior court within
his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of
Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is
an ancillary remedy. It is available only in
a pending principal action, for the
preservation or protection of the rights
and interest of a party thereto, and for no
other purpose.
MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION v.
BUMOLO
from the Comelec Chairman to suspend

the canvass and proclamation of the
winning candidate, but the district board
of canvassers proceeded with the
canvass and proclamation despite the
said verbal order. He also alleged that
there was non-inclusion of 19 election
returns in the canvass, which would
result in an incomplete canvass of the
election returns. The Comelec en banc
issued an order setting aside the
proclamation of petitioner and ruled the
proclamation as void. Hence, this petition
for certiorari seeking the annulment and
reversal of the Comelec order.
ISSUES:
1. whether the COMELEC has the power
to take cognizance of SPC No. 98-143
and SPC No. 98- 206
SPC No. 98-143 an "Urgent Appeal from
the Decision of the Legislative District
Board of Canvassers for Malabon and
Navotas with Prayer for the Nullification
of the Proclamation of Federico S.
Sandoval as Congressman."
SPC No. 98-206. The petition sought the
annulment of petitioner's proclamation
as congressman.
2. whether the COMELEC's order to set
aside petitioner's proclamation was valid.
FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent herein
were candidates for the congressional
seat for the Malabon-Navotas legislative
district during the elections held on May
11, 1998. After canvassing the municipal
certificates of canvass, the district board
of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the
duly elected congressman. The petitioner
took his oath of office on the same day.
Private respondent filed with the
Comelec a petition, which sought the
annulment of petitioner's proclamation.
He alleged that there was a verbal order
EH 405
RULING:
On the first issue, we uphold the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the
petitions filed by private respondent. The
COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over
all pre-proclamation controversies. As an
exception, however, to the general rule,
Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166
prohibits candidates in the presidential,
vice-presidential,
senatorial
and
congressional elections from filing preproclamation cases. It states: "Sec. 15.
Pre-proclamation cases Not Allowed in
Elections for President, Vice-President,
Senator, and Members of the House of
Representatives. For purposes of the
Page 48

elections for President, Vice-President,
Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives, no pre-proclamation
cases shall be allowed on matters
relating to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of
election returns or the certificates of
canvass, as the case may be. However,
this does not preclude the authority of
the appropriate canvassing body motu
propio or upon written complaint of an
interested person to correct manifest
errors in the certificate of canvass or
election
returns
before
it."
The
prohibition aims to avoid delay in the
proclamation of the winner in the
election, which delay might result in a
vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law,
nonetheless, provides an exception to
the exception. The second sentence of
Section 15 allows the filing of petitions
for correction of manifest errors in the
certificate of canvass or election returns
even in elections for president, vicepresident and members of the House of
Representatives for the simple reason
that the correction of manifest error will
not prolong the process of canvassing
nor delay the proclamation of the winner
in the election. This rule is consistent
with and complements the authority of
the COMELEC under the Constitution to
"enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall" and its power to "decide,
except those involving the right to vote,
all questions affecting elections."
We now go to the second issue. Although
the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction
over the subject matter and issue of SPC
No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find
the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted
with illegality. We hold that its order to
set aside the proclamation of petitioner is
invalid for having been rendered without
due process of law. Procedural due
process demands prior notice and
hearing. The facts show that COMELEC
set aside the proclamation of petitioner
EH 405
without the benefit of prior notice and

hearing and it rendered the questioned
order
based
solely
on
private
respondent's allegations.
Public
respondent
submits
that
procedural due process need not be
observed in this case because it was
merely exercising its administrative
power to review, revise and reverse the
actions of the board of canvassers.
We cannot accept public respondent's
argument.
Taking
cognizance
of
private
respondent's petitions for annulment of
petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC was
not merely performing an administrative
function. The administrative powers of
the COMELEC include the power to
determine the number and location of
polling places, appoint election officials
and inspectors, conduct registration of
voters,
deputize
law
enforcement
agencies
and
government
instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections,
register political parties, organizations or
coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the
Commission, prosecute election offenses,
and recommend to the President the
removal of or imposition of any other
disciplinary action upon any officer or
employee it has deputized for violation or
disregard of its directive, order or
decision. In addition, the Commission
also has direct control and supervision
over all personnel involved in the
conduct of election. However, the
resolution of the adverse claims of
private respondent and petitioner as
regards the existence of a manifest error
in the questioned certificate of canvass
requires the COMELEC to act as an
arbiter. It behooves the Commission to
hear both parties to determine the
veracity of their allegations and to decide
whether the alleged error is a manifest
error. Hence, the resolution of this issue
calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of
Page 49

its quasi-judicial power. It has been said
that where a power rests in judgment or
discretion, so that it is of judicial nature
or character, but does not involve the
exercise of functions of a judge, or is
conferred upon an officer other than a
judicial officer, it is deemed quasijudicial. The COMELEC therefore, acting
as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore
the requirements of procedural due
process in resolving the petitions filed by
private respondent.
The COMELEC order dated June 2, 1998

in SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206 is
ANNULLED.
THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF
DOMINICAN HILL, INC.
vs.
COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT
OF LAND PROBLEMS
FACTS
The property being fought over by the

parties is a 10.36-hectare property in
Baguio City called Dominican Hills,
formerly registered in the name of
Diplomat Hills, Inc.
The property was mortgaged to the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
which
eventually
foreclosed
the
mortgage thereon and acquired the
same as highest bidder.
On April 11, 1983, it was donated to
the Republic of the Philippines by
UCPB through its President, Eduardo
Cojuangco. The deed of donation
stipulated that Dominican Hills would
be utilized for the "priority programs,
projects,
activities
in
human
settlements
and
economic
development
and
governmental
purposes" of the Ministry of Human
Settlements.
President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 85 abolishing the
Office of Media Affairs and the Ministry
EH 405
of Human Settlements. All agencies

under the latter's supervision as well
as all its assets, programs and
projects, were transferred to the
Presidential Management Staff (PMS).
On October 18, 1988, the PMS
received
an
application
from
petitioner UNITED RESIDENTS OF
DOMINICAN HILL, INC to acquire a
portion of the Dominican Hills
property.
HOME
INSURANCE
GUARANTY
CORPORATION (HIGC) consented to
act as originator for UNITED. A
Memorandum of Agreement was
signed by and among the PMS, the
HIGC, and UNITED. The Memorandum
of Agreement called for the PMS to
sell the Dominican Hills property to
HIGC which would, in turn, sell the
same to UNITED. The parties agreed
on a selling price of P75.00 per square
meter.
Private respondents entered the
Dominican Hills property allocated to
UNITED and constructed houses
thereon. Petitioner was able to secure
a demolition order from the city
mayor.
Unable to stop the razing of their
houses, private respondents, under
the name DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO
RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION
filed an action for injunction, in the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 4. Private respondents were
able to obtain a temporary restraining
order but their prayer for a writ of
preliminary
injunction
was
later
denied in an Order dated March 18,
1996.
While Civil Case No. 3316-R was
pending, the ASSOCIATION, this time
represented by the Land Reform
Beneficiaries Association, Inc filed a
complaint praying for damages,
injunction and annulment of the said
Memorandum of Agreement between
UNITED and HIGC.
Page 50
Demolition Order No. 1-96 was

subsequently implemented by the
Office of the City Mayor and the City
Engineer's Office of Baguio City.
However, petitioner avers that private
respondents
returned
and
reconstructed
the
demolished
structures.
To forestall the re-implementation of
the
demolition
order,
private
respondents filed on September 29,
1998 a petition for annulment of
contracts with prayer for a temporary
restraining order in the Commission
on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) against petitioner, HIGC,
PMS, the City Engineer's Office, the
City Mayor, as well as the Register of
Deeds of Baguio City. On the very
same day, public respondent COSLAP
issued the contested order requiring
the parties to maintain the status quo.
Without
filing
a
motion
for
reconsideration from the aforesaid
status quo order, petitioner filed the
instant
petition
questioning
the
jurisdiction of the COSLAP.
ISSUE
IS
THE
COMMISSION
ON
THE
SETTLEMENT
OF
LAND
PROBLEMS
[COSLAP] CREATED UNDER EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 561 BY THE OFFICE OF THE
PHILIPPINES EMPOWERED TO HEAR AND
TRY A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
CONTRACTS WITH PRAYER FOR A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
THUS, ARROGATE UNTO ITSELF THE
POWER TO ISSUE STATUS QUO ORDER
AND CONDUCT A HEARING THEREOF?
ASSUMING THAT THE COMMISSION ON
THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS
HAS JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER, IS IT
EXEMPTED FROM OBSERVING A CLEAR
CASE OF FORUM SHOPPING ON THE PART
OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS?
RULING
EH 405
COSLAP is not justified in assuming

jurisdiction over the controversy. It
may not assume jurisdiction over
cases which are already pending in
the regular courts.
Section 3(2) of Executive Order
561 speaks of any resolution,
order or decision of the COSLAP
as having the "force and effect
of a regular administrative
resolution, order or decision."
The qualification places an
unmistakable emphasis on the
administrative character of the
COSLAP's
determination,
amplified by the statement that
such resolutions, orders or
decisions "shall be binding upon
the parties therein and upon the
agency having jurisdiction over
the same." An agency is defined
by statute as "any of the various
units
of
the
Government,
including a department, bureau,
office,
instrumentality,
or
government-owned or controlled
corporation,
or
a
local
government or a distinct unit
therein."
section 3(2) of Executive Order
561 patently indicates that the
COSLAP's
dispositions
are
binding on administrative or
executive agencies.
Private
respondents,
in
filing
multiple petitions, have mocked
our attempts to eradicate forum
shopping and have thereby upset
the
orderly
administration
of
justice. They sought recourse from
three (3) different tribunals in order
to obtain the writ of injunction they
so desperately desired.
A scrutiny of the pleadings filed
before the trial courts and the
COSLAP sufficiently establishes
private respondents' propensity
Page 51

for forum shopping. We lay the
premise that the certification
against forum shopping must be
executed by the plaintiff or
principal party, and not by his
counsel. Hence, one can deduce
that the certification is a
peculiar personal representation
on the part of the principal
party, an assurance given to the
court or other tribunal that there
are no other pending cases
involving basically the same
parties, issues and causes of
action. In the case at bar,
private respondents' litany of
omissions range from failing to
submit the required certification
against forum shopping to filing
a false certification, and then to
forum shopping itself. First, the
petition filed before the COSLAP
conspicuously
lacked
a
certification
against
forum
shopping. Second, it does not
appear from the record that the
ASSOCIATION informed Branch 4
of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City before which Civil
Case No. 3316-R was pending,
that another action, Civil Case
No. 3382-R, was filed before
Branch 61 of the same court.
Another group of homeless
residents of Dominican Hill, the
LAND REFORM BENEFICIARIES
ASSOCIATION, INC. initiated the
latter case.
EH 405
Page 52

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGESTS

COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE

would entail an immense amount of

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has laid down general rules for the

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power is pointed out and clearly defined.

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for a permit to export one hundred bales

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Works and Communications, in his

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extenuation, it remains true that the

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before they can have legal effect, by any

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that he likewise violated Article 14,

Industries, Inc., as a stockholder

that respondent was guilty of

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The case was referred to Justice Cecilia

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In the aforesaid Article applies only

Macariola contended that the sale

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While it is. true that respondent

2. Respondent Judge violated paragraphs

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o The provision partakes of the

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We hold that the Civil Service Act of

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Under Section 67 Judiciary Act of

3. The 3rd and 4th causes of action are

PHILIPPINE LAWYERS VS AGRAVA

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admitted to practice before the Patent

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embraces the preparation of pleadings

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affirming the decisions of the Acting

The decision of the Commissioner of

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question involve the sale of foreign

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It added that the decision of the CFI

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vacation or sick leave to his credit

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the above-mentioned resolution and to

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We realize that the questioned resolution

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SMART VS NLRC (G.R. No. 151908

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restraining order. Both alleged, inter

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judicial manner an act which is

Not to be confused with the quasilegislative or rule-making power of an

Petitioner-appellants plead that they are