Professional Documents
Culture Documents
International
Arbitration
Review
Fifth Edition
Editor
James H Carter
The International
Arbitration Review
The
International
Arbitration
Review
Fifth Edition
Editor
James H Carter
www.TheLawReviews.co.uk
PUBLISHER
Gideon Roberton
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The publisher acknowledges and thanks the following law firms for their learned
assistance throughout the preparation of this book:
ABASCAL, SEGOVIA & ASOCIADOS
ADVOKATFIRMAN DELPHI
AMBOS NBGO
ANWALTSBRO WIEBECKE
BAKER & MCKENZIE KRZYOWSKI I WSPLNICY SPK
CRDENAS & CRDENAS ABOGADOS
CHRISTOPHER & LEE ONG
CORRS CHAMBERS WESTGARTH
CURTIS, MALLET-PREVOST, COLT & MOSLE LLP
DEACONS
DE BERTI JACCHIA
DENTONS
DJ ARBITRAJE
DR COLIN ONG LEGAL SERVICES
GARRIGUES
HARASI Y LPEZ
KBH KAANUUN
LETT LAW FIRM
LINKLATERS LLP
Acknowledgements
ii
CONTENTS
Editors Preface
vii
James H Carter
Chapter 1
Chapter 2
ASEAN OVERVIEW18
Colin Ong
Chapter 3
ANGOLA38
Lino Diamvutu
Chapter 4
AUSTRALIA48
James Whittaker, Colin Lockhart, Jin Ooi and Timothy Bunker
Chapter 5
AUSTRIA68
Christoph Liebscher
Chapter 6
BELGIUM77
Kathleen Paisley
Chapter 7
BRAZIL89
Luiz Olavo Baptista and Mariana Cattel Gomes Alves
Chapter 8
BULGARIA111
Assen Alexiev and Boryana Boteva
Chapter 9
CANADA124
Gordon L Tarnowsky QC, Peter J Cavanagh and Michael Beeforth
iii
Contents
Chapter 10
CHILE141
Davor Harasi and Karina Cherro
Chapter 11
CHINA152
Keith M Brandt and Michael KH Kan
Chapter 12
COLOMBIA157
Alberto Zuleta-Londoo and Juan Camilo Jimnez-Valencia
Chapter 13
CYPRUS166
Alecos Markides
Chapter 14
DENMARK176
Ren Offersen
Chapter 15
ECUADOR188
Javier Robalino, Leyre Surez and Rafael Valdivieso
Chapter 16
EGYPT198
Adam El Shalakany
Chapter 17
Chapter 18
EUROPEAN UNION218
Edward Borovikov, Bogdan Evtimov and Anna Crevon-Tarassova
Chapter 19
FINLAND230
Jan Waselius, Tanja Jussila and Josefine Hackman
Chapter 20
FRANCE241
Jean-Christophe Honlet, Barton Legum and Anne-Sophie Duftre
Chapter 21
GERMANY250
Hilmar Raeschke-Kessler
iv
Contents
Chapter 22
GHANA266
Thaddeus Sory
Chapter 23
HONG KONG279
Kwok Kit Cheung and Joseph Chung
Chapter 24
INDIA291
Shardul Thacker
Chapter 25
ISRAEL307
Shraga Schreck
Chapter 26
ITALY335
Michelangelo Cicogna and Andrew G Paton
Chapter 27
LITHUANIA350
Ramnas Audzeviius
Chapter 28
LUXEMBOURG362
Vronique Hoffeld and Antoine Laniez
Chapter 29
MALAYSIA372
Avinash Pradhan
Chapter 30
MEXICO386
Jos Mara Abascal
Chapter 31
NETHERLANDS400
Daniella Strik and Georgios Fasfalis
Chapter 32
NIGERIA410
Babajide Ogundipe and Lateef Omoyemi Akangbe
Chapter 33
POLAND413
Anna Diaby and Marcin Asanowicz
Contents
Chapter 34
PORTUGAL423
Jos Carlos Soares Machado and Mariana Frana Gouveia
Chapter 35
ROMANIA430
Tiberiu Csaki
Chapter 36
RUSSIA440
Mikhail Ivanov and Inna Manassyan
Chapter 37
SINGAPORE453
Paul Tan
Chapter 38
SPAIN467
Carlos de los Santos and Margarita Soto Moya
Chapter 39
SWEDEN483
Peter Skoglund and Sverker Bonde
Chapter 40
SWITZERLAND490
Martin Wiebecke
Chapter 41
TURKEY506
Orun etinkaya
Chapter 42
UKRAINE517
Ulyana Bardyn and Roman Mehedynyuk
Chapter 43
Chapter 44
UNITED STATES543
James H Carter and Claudio Salas
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
vi
EDITORS PREFACE
International arbitration is a fast-moving express train, with new awards and court
decisions of significance somewhere in the world rushing past every week. Legislatures,
too, constantly tinker with or entirely revamp arbitration statutes in one jurisdiction or
another. The international arbitration community has created a number of electronic
and other publications that follow these developments regularly, requiring many more
lawyer hours of reading than was the case a few years ago.
Scholarly arbitration literature follows behind, at a more leisurely pace. However,
there is a niche to be filled for analytical review of what has occurred in each of the
important arbitration jurisdictions during the past year, capturing recent developments
but putting them in the context of the jurisdictions legal arbitration structure and
selecting the most important matters for comment. This volume, to which leading
arbitration practitioners around the world have made valuable contributions, seeks to
fill that space.
The arbitration world is consumed with debate over whether relevant distinctions
should be drawn between general international commercial arbitration and international
investment arbitration, the procedures and subjects of which are similar but not
identical. This volume seeks to provide current information on both of these precincts of
international arbitration, treating important investorstate dispute developments in each
jurisdiction as a separate but closely related topic.
I thank all of the contributors for their fine work in compiling this volume.
James H Carter
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
New York
June 2014
vii
Chapter 22
GHANA
Thaddeus Sory1
I INTRODUCTION
i
1
2
3
266
Ghana
To initiate arbitral proceedings a person may refer the dispute to any person or
institution on the one hand or to the Alternative Dispute Resolution Centre provided for
under Part 4 of the Act. The procedure to be adopted at the arbitral proceedings initiated
depends on the person or institution chosen by the parties to arbitrate over their dispute.
Where any person or institution other than the Alternative Dispute Resolution Centre
is chosen as the arbitrator then the procedure and rules of the arbitral proceedings shall
be as the parties and arbitrators determine.5 On the other hand the rules set out in
the Second Schedule to the Act are the rules to be applied where the parties refer their
dispute to the Centre for resolution.
The procedure set out in the Second Schedule of the Act for regulating arbitration
proceedings are not novel. The arbitral proceedings are initiated by notice of arbitration.
This is followed by the appointment of the arbitrator(s) by the parties if the arbitration
agreement provides a method for appointing the arbitrator(s). In the absence of
agreement as to the method of appointing the arbitrators, each party is at liberty to
appoint an arbitrator and the two appointed shall then appoint a third arbitrator as
chairperson.6 The process of arbitration itself as set out in the rules, mirror the practice
generally followed in arbitral proceedings even internationally.
ii
The Act has introduced some novel rules on arbitration. The Act provides for an
arbitration management conference that must be convened within 14 days from the
date of appointment of the arbitrator(s) for purposes of determining the issue(s) to be
resolved at the arbitration, the law and rules of evidence to be applied in the arbitral
proceedings among others.7 This stage of the arbitral process is generally not provided
for in international arbitration. There may be a pretrial conference in international
arbitration but the main difference between the arbitration management conference
under the Act and the international pretrial conference, lies in the fact that the Act
heavily regulates the matters to be conducted in the domestic arbitration management
conference.
In addition to the arbitration management conference, the Act empowers the
arbitrator(s) to encourage settlement of the dispute referred to arbitration. This is
provided for under Section 47 of the Act. This evolutionary process by which there is a
metamorphosis from arbitration, through mediation and then a very probable return to
arbitral proceedings is not available in international arbitrations.
The Act also provides for expedited arbitral proceedings. These proceedings enable
parties to have the arbitral proceedings expedited. This is provided for under Section 60
of the Act. In international arbitration there is no provision made for special arbitration
proceedings other than that to which the parties have committed under the same rules.
The numerous occasions in which the High Court of Ghana may intervene in
domestic arbitral proceedings provides another distinction between arbitration under
5
6
7
267
Ghana
the Act and international arbitration. First of all, the court has a mandatory obligation
to compel recourse to arbitration where an arbitration agreement can be established8 and
is empowered to refer a dispute to arbitration with the parties consent where the court
itself takes the view that a matter is better resolved by arbitration.9 The instances just
discussed are unlikely to arise in international arbitration.
The High Court of Ghana, unlike in international arbitration, also has ample
powers of control over arbitral proceedings from the time an arbitrator is appointed to
the end of the proceedings. The High Court has very limited jurisdiction to determine
challenges to the appointment of arbitrators,10 revoke their appointment under specific
circumstances,11 and question their jurisdiction where a party is dissatisfied with the
ruling of the arbitral tribunal on the question of the tribunals jurisdiction,12 as well
as to determine references to it of points of law by a party.13 This procedural avenue is
not available to parties in international arbitration. The High Court may also entertain
an application by a party to an arbitration agreement who complains that they have
not been notified of the arbitral proceedings; to question the validity of the arbitration
agreement or whether the matters submitted to arbitration are covered by the arbitration
agreement; to question the constitution of the arbitral panel; or to challenge the award
on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or serious irregularity.14
iii
Article 126(1) of the 1992 Constitution classifies the courts of Ghana into two broad
categories, the superior courts and the inferior courts. The inferior courts include the
circuit and district courts as well as such lower courts or tribunals as Parliament may
by law establish. The superior courts comprise the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal
and the High Court. The Supreme Court is the highest court of the land in accordance
with whose decisions all other courts of the land must dispose of cases over which they
preside.15 The next court in the hierarchy of courts is the Court of Appeal whose decisions
are also binding on all courts lower than it.16 In the list of the courts set out in Article
126(1) the High Court is provided for as the lowest of the superior courts. The High
Court is, however, the court with the widest jurisdiction. The High Court is the only
Superior Court with jurisdiction in all matters, civil and criminal unless the Constitution
or some other statute restricts that jurisdiction in relation to a specific matter.17 The
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
268
Ghana
High Court is therefore the only court with original jurisdiction in all matters relating
to arbitral proceedings.18
Decisions of the High Court are not final, but are subject to appeal to the Court
of Appeal.19 Although the Constitution says in Article 137, clause 2 that an appeal lies as
of right against a judgment, decree or order of the High Court to the Court of Appeal,
the Act has in some respects restricted this right of appeal by introducing qualifications
of leave that must be obtained as a condition precedent to the exercise of such a right of
appeal.20
There appears to be another limitation on the right of parties to appeal in arbitral
matters. Although Article 137(2) of the 1992 Constitution guarantees the right of
litigants to appeal as of right from decisions of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme
Court, it appears that after the determination of an appeal from a judgment of the High
Court in an arbitral matter by the Court of Appeal, there is no further right of appeal to
the Supreme Court. The Act makes no provision for further appeals from the Court of
Appeal upon the determination of an appeal by the Court of Appeal from a decision of
the High Court in a matter pertaining to arbitration, to the Supreme Court. There are
many authorities that say that where a statute that regulates a particular matter does not
expressly provide for an appeal, the right of appeal cannot be exercised by an aggrieved
party.21
iv
Local institutions
The only statutory institution in Ghana that resolves disputes by arbitration is the
National Labour Commission. This institutions mandate insofar as settling disputes by
arbitration is concerned is restricted to labour disputes. To this extent, investors may only
be interested in this institution where a dispute arises between them and their employees.
At the moment the most popular institution in Ghana for the resolution of
arbitration disputes is the Ghana Arbitration Centre. This Centre was established on the
initiative of a team of Ghanaian lawyers. It is a private institution. The Centre has its own
rules of arbitration. These rules are to a very large extent consistent with international
rules on arbitration and can easily be assimilated by arbitration practitioners.
The Act also establishes a statutory body corporate with perpetual succession
known as an alternative dispute resolution centre whose objectives are to provide
facilities for the settlement of disputes through arbitration [...] and other voluntary
dispute resolution procedures, to keep a register of arbitrators to provide on request and
to provide guidelines on their fees.22 Although the Act has been in force for almost four
years, the alternative dispute resolution centre established by the Act is yet to be set up.
In July 2013, the Chief Justice of Ghana called on the government of Ghana to put in
18
19
20
21
22
269
Ghana
place the necessary structures and systems that will make Ghana an arbitration centre
and an attractive destination for disputants.23 At the time of writing the centre is yet to
be established.
v
The introduction of the Act and a more concerted campaign over the last three years to
entrench arbitration as a progressive, viable and reliable method for resolving disputes,
has been received positively by businessmen in Ghana. Quite recently, the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) announced its intentions of establishing an arbitration
centre in Ghana for businesses in Ghana and government this year.24
The number of domestic arbitration disputes settled by the Ghana Arbitration
Centre have also increased quite significantly in the last year. The reason for the increase
is attributable partly to the fact that the courts now have no option but to refer every
dispute in which there is an arbitration agreement to arbitration unless the dispute is not
arbitrable within the context of Section 1 of the Act.25
II
Legislation
This year has not seen the introduction of any legislation with regard to arbitration. Apart
from Section 5 of the Act that imposes an obligation on the courts to enforce arbitration
agreements by ensuring that parties who stipulate for them in their agreements do not
undermine them by pursuing other dispute resolution options, Ghana had earlier, with a
view to attracting foreign direct investment, statutorily guaranteed arbitration as a dispute
resolution option available to all investors in the event that a dispute arises relating to
their investments in Ghana between such investors and the Ghana government. This is
stated clearly in Section 29 of the now repealed Ghana Investment Promotion Centre
Act 1994 (Act 478). Under ACT 478 investors were assured of their right to insist on
arbitration as the dispute resolution option after efforts to amicably resolve a dispute
between an investor and the government fail. The new Ghana Investment Promotion
Centre Act 2013 (Act 865) has, however, abolished the right of an investor to insist on
arbitration unless there is an arbitration agreement that guarantees to the investor the
right to insist on arbitration as the method of dispute settlement between the government
and such an investor. Section 33 of Act 865 provides that in the absence of an arbitration
agreement between the government and the investor and there is disagreement between
the government and the investor as to the method of dispute settlement then the method
of dispute settlement shall be mediation.
23
24
25
270
Ghana
The National Petroleum Authority Act 2005 (Act 691) also guarantees arbitration
as a dispute resolution mechanism for petroleum service providers regarding specific
contractual matters. Arbitration panels set up under the National Petroleum Authority
Act are set up by the Board established under the same Act but must be in accordance
with the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act. This means that for the
purposes of contractual disputes affecting petroleum service providers the Board of the
National Petroleum Authority assumes the function of an appointing authority in terms
of constituting an arbitral panel for determination of such disputes.
Court rules or practices
In terms of procedure, Order 64 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004 (CI 47)
regulates arbitral proceedings. Under the Rules, the High Court may, at anytime before
final judgment, refer a matter pending before it to arbitration where the parties desire
that the matter in dispute be referred to arbitration. Such an arbitrator may be appointed
by the parties or by the Court with the consent of the parties. Having regard to the fact
that there is now a substantive statute that regulates arbitral proceedings, a substantial
part of the rules of court on arbitral proceedings are redundant because such matters
have been regulated by the Act.
Arbitration institution rules or practices
The rules in accordance with which arbitral proceedings are prosecuted depend on the
forum in which the arbitral proceedings are initiated. Where the arbitral proceedings
are initiated at the yet-to-be-established alternative dispute resolution centre, the rules
to be complied with are set out in the second schedule of the Act. These rules are in
substance identical to the UNCITRAL Rules on arbitration in terms of procedure. On
the other hand where the parties initiate their proceedings in some other forum, the
parties are at liberty to adopt their own rules to regulate the arbitral proceedings. The
Ghana Arbitration Centre also has its own rules that parties may adopt in proceedings
initiated at the Ghana Arbitration Centre or determine the rules of procedure to be
adopted by them in such private proceedings.
ii
271
Ghana
Qualifications of or challenges to arbitrators
The Act is quite liberal with regard to the qualifications of arbitrators. Section 12 of the
Act says that a person of any nationality may be appointed as an arbitrator regardless of
the experience or qualification of such a person regarding the subject matter of the dispute
provided the parties are agreed. There is no strict educational requirement necessary to
qualify as an arbitrator. A person with no knowledge at all of arbitration will be unlikely
to survive the arbitral process in his or her capacity as arbitrator because they will be
found wanting in many areas and at various stages of the arbitral process. Challenges to
arbitrators have been quite rare in Ghana. This is mainly attributable to the fact that the
parties themselves are in control of the appointment process.
Judicial assistance in evidence gathering for arbitration proceedings can be
see for example in Order 64, Rule 5 of the Rules of the High Court, which provides
that processes may issue to parties and witnesses in arbitral proceedings may issue in
the same manner as in an ordinary action. Default in compliance with such process
or treating the arbitral panel with contempt attracts the same sanction against the
defaulting party that may be enforced by proceedings initiated in the High Court. The
High Court also has an obligation to support arbitral proceedings by making orders for
the preservation of evidence, injunctions and the preservation or sale of property while
arbitration proceedings are pending and ongoing.26 A party to arbitral proceedings may
by application to the High Court refer a point of law that arises in arbitral proceedings
to the High Court for determination.27 The power of the High Court to determine
questions of law in the course of arbitral proceedings may be precluded by agreement
between the parties.28
Enforcement or annulment of awards
The Act provides for the enforcement of all awards local and foreign, in Ghana. Section
59 of the Act recognises the enforcement regime of the New York Convention, which is
set out in the first schedule of the Act. Arbitral awards are enforceable insofar as they are
regular, valid, proper and still subsisting and in respect of which no appeal is pending
under the law applicable to the arbitration. The award may be enforced but the party
wishing to enforce the award must produce the award in question in English.
iii
Investorstate disputes
26
27
28
272
Ghana
Limited v. The Republic of Ghana).29 The awards in these disputes have raised a few
issues in international commercial arbitration in the areas of arbitrability, separability of
arbitration contracts, the competence principle and estoppel in relation to Ghana law.
The brief facts of the Balkan case are that the government of Ghana desired
investment partners from the private sector to assist in the generation of electrical
power from a barge. A power purchase agreement (PPA) was concluded between the
government and Balkan Energy (Ghana) Limited for this purpose. Although Balkan
was incorporated in Ghana, its directors and shareholders were foreign. Disagreements
having arisen between the government and Balkan, Balkan initiated arbitral proceedings
against the government under the auspices of the PCA. Before the PCA the government
questioned the validity of the PPA and argued that:
a
the determination of the validity of the PPA or the arbitration clause contained
in it required an interpretation of the Ghana Constitution that is non-arbitrable
because such matters fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court of Ghana to determine, Ghana law being the law applicable to the PPA;30
b
the competence-competence principle codified in Article 21(1) of the UNCITRAL
Rules does not apply where the existence or validity of the agreement to arbitrate
is questioned;31
c
although the separability principle provides that an arbitration agreement is not
invalid because the contract underlying it is invalid, the law that renders the
underlying contract invalid may also render the arbitration clause invalid; and32
d
the government is not estopped from relying on the provisions or Article 181(5)
of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana to contest the validity of the PPA.33
The Ghana government lost on all the arguments summarised above. The tribunal held
that:
Arbitration tribunals are not infrequently confronted with the need to interpret and apply
constitutional provisions relevant to the resolution of disputes submitted to them, just as they
are normally required to interpret and apply treaties that are relevant to the disputes. There is
nothing abnormal in exercising a judicial function necessary for the proper administration of
justice. Hence the Tribunal does not consider that, in asserting its competence to determine its
jurisdiction in this case, it is disregarding or in anyway contradicting the force of Article 130 of
the Constitution of Ghana.34
29
30
31
32
33
34
The discussion is based on the interim award of the PCA in the Balkan case dated 22 December
2010 and the award in the Bankswitch case dated 11 April 2014.
See paragraphs 64, 66, 71, 77, 78, 116 and 140 at pages 21, 22, 25, 27, 28, 42 and 54 thereof,
of the award.
Paragraph 74, at page 27 of the award.
Paragraph 76 at page 27 of the award.
Paragraphs, 80 and 126 at pages 29, 47 of the award.
See paragraph 143 at page 54 of the award.
273
Ghana
The tribunal also affirmed the principles of competence-competence and separability and
held that it had jurisdiction to determine arguments questioning its jurisdiction even if
it were agreed that the PPA is void ab initio, the arbitral clause being separable from the
PPA.35 The tribunal also upheld the estoppel arguments made against the government.36
The same issues were raised in the Bankswitch case. As happened in the Balkan case none
of the arguments found favour with the tribunal, which ruled in favour of Bankswitch
on all the points just discussed.
Cases decided locally involving investors and other states
There are no cases decided locally by an arbitral panel involving investors and other states
in Ghana. The disputes determined in domestic institutions so far are disputes involving
local corporate entities and individuals.
III
The decisions of the PCA in the Balkan and the Bankswitch cases have significant
implications for international arbitration, particularly with regard to the enforcement of
the awards against the government. The position taken by the tribunal in the two awards
regarding the arbitrability of issues affecting the Constitution and the jurisdiction of the
arbitral tribunal to determine such issues will surprise many Ghanaian lawyers.
The now entrenched legal principle in Ghana is that any law or act executed
by any body or institution is valid and effective only to the extent that such law or
act is consistent with the Constitution. To the extent that they are inconsistent with
the Constitution they are null and void.37 Articles 2 and 130 provide clearly that the
only forum for determining questions on the interpretation and enforcement of the
Constitution is the Supreme Court of Ghana. The undoubted constitutional law position
in Ghana is that the forum for determining issues of constitutionality is not negotiable
under any circumstances. The question that then arises is this: does the government of
Ghana, and even the Ghana parliament, acting jointly and severally have the capacity in
view of the constitutional provisions of Articles 1, 2 and 130 to compromise the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Ghana Supreme Court to determine constitutional issues by
stipulating in agreements with investors that, when such matters are raised before, at or
during arbitration proceedings, the arbitral tribunal has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Supreme Court to determine them?
35
36
37
274
Ghana
This will mostly be answered in the negative by Ghanaian lawyers.38 This is
because the primary source of law in Ghana is the Constitution.39 Having regard to the
Supreme nature of the Constitution in accordance with which the powers of government
are to be exercised in the manner and within the limits laid down in there can be no
doubt that the awards of the PCA in the two cases just examined notwithstanding the
question as to whether or not the agreement the subject matter of the award is valid will
continue to linger even at the enforcement stage of the award.40 While the Balkan case
was pending for determination by the PCA, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the position
that all constitutional issues must be referred to the Supreme Court for determination.
The decision of the Supreme Court resulted from fresh proceedings instituted by
the Attorney-General of Ghana to determine the constitutionality of the agreement
concluded between Ghana and Balkan.41
It is important to note here that the agreements were concluded before the coming
into force of the Act.42 The Act having come into force, a further argument can be made
with regard to agreements concluded after the Act that, the parties are presumed to have
concluded the arbitration agreement against the backdrop of the Act, Section 1(a) and
(c), which completely excludes from arbitration matters relating to the national and
38
39
40
41
42
Article 130 of the Constitution says categorically that all matters relating to the interpretation
and enforcement of the Constitution is within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Ghana
to the exclusion of all other courts and adjudicating bodies including tribunals to determine.
Where constitutional matter arises in the course of proceedings before a court other than the
Supreme Court the proceedings must be stayed and the specific constitutional issue referred
to the Supreme Court for determination. See the cases of Republic v. High Court (Fast Track
Division) Accra; Ex parte Electoral Commission (Mettle-Nunoo & Others Interested Parties)
[2005-2006] SCGLR 514 at 559, Republic v. High Court (Fast Track Division) Accra; Ex parte
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (Richard Anane, Interested Party)
[2007-2008] 1 SCGLR 213 at 235. The court from which the proceedings emanated is then
required to dispose of the matter in accordance with the interpretative position taken by the
Supreme Court.
This is clear when we examine Article 1 clause 1 of the Constitution says that The Sovereignty
of Ghana resides in the people of Ghana in whose name and for whose welfare the powers
of government are to be exercised in the manner and within the limits laid down in the
Constitution.
In quite recent decisions of the Supreme Court, the Court reiterated the law that the
Constitution is the supreme law of the land for which reason agreements concluded in breach
of any of its provisions are null and void. See the cases of Martin Alamisi Amidu v. AttorneyGeneral & Others Unreported Judgment of the Supreme Court dated the 14th day of June,
2013 and Martin Alamisi Amidu v. Attorney-General & Others Unreported Judgment of the
Supreme Court dated 21 June 2013.
See the decision of the Court in Republic v. High Court (Commercial Division) Accra; Ex parte
Attorney-General (Balkan Energy Ghana Ltd & Others Interested Parties [2012] 2 SCGLR
1183.
The Act came into force on 31 March 2010.
275
Ghana
public interest and the enforcement and interpretation of the Constitution. The effect
of such an argument will be that the parties agreed that matters relating to the national
and public interest and the enforcement and interpretation of the Constitution are not,
within the context of the arbitration agreement, arbitrable.
The position taken by the PCA on the claimants arguments of estoppel against
the Ghana government also fly in the face of authoritative constitutional law decisions in
Ghana on the point. The law in Ghana is that the principle of estoppel has no application
in the face of clear constitutional provisions forbidding a matter.43
While the issue of separability of arbitration agreements from the contracts in
which they are embodied appears settled, the Supreme Court in the case of AttorneyGeneral v. Balkan Energy Ghana Limited & Others 44 spoke on the same principle in
quite an ambivalent manner. In the case just cited the Court held that a PPA concluded
between the Ghana government and Balkan Energy (Ghana) Limited was void. Having
so held, the Supreme Court declared the status of the arbitration agreement that was
contained in the PPA as follows:
An international commercial arbitration is not by itself an autonomous transaction commercial in
nature which pertains to or impacts on the wealth and resources of the country. An international
commercial arbitration draws its life from the transaction whose dispute resolution it deals with.
We therefore have difficulty in conceiving of it as a transaction separate and independent from the
transaction that has generated the dispute it is required to resolve.45
The ruling of the Supreme Court on the arbitration agreement appears ambivalent. First
of all, the Supreme Court held that the arbitration agreement that formed part of the
PPA was not an international business or economic transaction the effect of which is
that the arbitration agreement itself was valid. Indeed in the final order of the Court, the
Court stated that that the arbitration agreement did not require parliamentary approval
as required by the Constitution.
The second part of the ruling of the Supreme Court on the arbitration clause is,
however, problematic. The Supreme Court held that the arbitration agreement took its
life from the transaction whose dispute resolution it deals with. The Supreme Court
therefore held that it did not conceive [because it had difficulty in doing so] of it as a
transaction separate and independent from the transaction that has generated the dispute
it is required to resolve. The Supreme Courts position on the arbitration agreement
contained in the PPA is crystal clear. The Supreme Court very loudly, but by implication,
held that as the arbitration agreement was not a transaction separate and independent
from the transaction that has generated the dispute it is required to resolve, the illegality
of the PPA contaminated the arbitration agreement contained in it (the PPA) rendering
the arbitration agreement also illegal.
43
44
45
See the case of Tuffuor v. Attorney General [1980] GLR 637, which has been applied subsequently
in other cases.
[2012] 2 SCGLR 998.
At page 1037 of the report.
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Ghana
This decision remains the law in Ghana. The decision, however, flies in the face
of the position in international commercial arbitration on the principle of separability
or autonomy of arbitration agreements. The decision is actually per incuriam the clear
provisions of Section 3(1) of the Act which provides in very unambiguous language that
the arbitration agreement is valid even if the agreement from which it draws its life is
invalid or did not come into existence or has become ineffective.
It appears that the issues just discussed will linger on even at the enforcement
stages of the award. Section 59 of the Act recognises the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Tribunal Awards. Article V, clause 1(a) and
(c) and 2(a) of the Convention recognises that a domestic court may refuse to enforce
an arbitral award at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, if that party
furnishes to the competent authority where recognition and enforcement is sought that
the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or
the award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms
of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope
of the submission to arbitration, or the subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country.
Given the provisions of the New York Convention, it is still possible for Ghana
to argue that under Ghana law the agreements and the arbitral agreements contained in
them and that were upheld by the PCA in the two awards are invalid especially in view
of the decisions of the Ghana Supreme Court in Attorney-General v. Balkan Energy &
Others, Martin Alamisi Amidu v. Attorney-General & Others and Martin Alamisi Amidu
v. Attorney-General & Others. Ghana may yet argue that the parties did not contemplate
that issues regarding the Ghana Constitution reserved exclusively for the Ghana
Supreme Court and expressly declared as non-arbitrable will arise for determination.
If the parties had contemplated it, they would have stipulated clearly that such matters
are not arbitrable and especially that the Ghana government cannot negotiate away the
Supreme Courts original jurisdiction. Accordingly, Ghana may further argue that the
award contains decisions on matters beyond submission to arbitration because under
Ghana law, the PCA could not purport to determine a matter exclusively within the
Supreme Courts jurisdiction.
Reading the applicable principles of the New York Convention, it is very easy to
note that while the PCA relied heavily on customary principles of international law to
jettison the arguments canvassed by the Ghana government before it in the two cases, the
New York Convention emphasises the law applicable to the parties and indeed the law of
the country upon which the arbitration agreement was concluded.46
The fact that the same issues may arise at the enforcement stage of the award was
recognised by the tribunal in the Balkan case. Referring to the New York Convention
and a number of authorities on the point, the tribunal agreed that;
46
Ghana argued this point before the tribunal in the Balkan case. See paragraph 79 at page 28 of
the award.
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Ghana
Articles II(3) and V(1) of the Convention recognise that both arbitral tribunals and courts may
consider and decide disputes about the arbitrators jurisdiction. Articles V(1)(a) and V(1)(c) of
the Convention contemplate that an arbitral tribunal may have made an award notwithstanding
jurisdictional objections and will have addressed issues of the validity of the arbitration agreement.
That fact that such determinations are subject to judicial review, as at stage of enforcement, has
as its premise that arbitral tribunals are entitled to pass upon their jurisdiction without prior
judicial determination.47
In view of the issues that have arisen in the two awards of the PCA just discussed, it is
very likely that in the near future, the Supreme Court will have to review its decision in
Attorney-General v. Balkan Energy (Ghana) Limited to take into account the principle of
separability, which in my view the Court did not properly apply in that case. There may
also be a call for legislative intervention to declare expressly that the government has no
capacity to conclude agreements that purport to deny the jurisdiction of the courts in
matters involving the Constitution. Perhaps no legislative intervention is required. All
the government must stipulate in its agreements with investors is that the non-arbitrable
provisions of the Act are applicable to the arbitration agreement.
47
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Appendix 1
THADDEUS SORY
Sory@Law
Thaddeus Sory is the founding and managing partner of Sory@Law. He has extensive
experience as an arbitrator and commercial litigator and has had remarkable success in a
wide range of areas of legal practice. Thaddeus has been involved in numerous domestic
arbitrations for major corporations in various commercial and financial disputes. He
has tremendous experience in litigation and has been involved in arguably the biggest
commercial, constitutional and administrative law disputes in the Republic of Ghana.
He has also assisted and advised offshore counsel in foreign arbitration proceedings on
issues of Ghanaian law.
Thaddeus has recently been nominated by Whos Who Legal as their legal adviser
for Ghana for 20132014 and selected by Arbitration Law Experts as their recommended
lawyer in Ghana for 201415. In the years 2012 and 2013 respectively, he was featured
by the well-known Chambers and Partners publications, in which he was described as a
battle horse who knows all his procedures and an excellent litigation practitioner.
Thaddeus has been lawyer for the Ghana Football Association for almost a decade
and has not only represented state institutions like the Commission on Human Rights
and Administrative Justice, Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly, The National Commission
on Civic Education and the Volta River Authority among others in a number of disputes
but has advised and acted as a resource person at workshops for a number of charitable
institutions such as WaterAid, Actionaid, and the Legal Resources Centre.
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