Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Peirce
collected and analyzed by
Robert Marty
Department of Mathematics
University of Perpignan
Perpignan, France
With an Appendix of
Alfred Lang
Dept of Psychology
University of Bern
Bern, Switzerland
Abbreviations:
MS = Manuscripts
CP = Collected Papers of Charles Peirce
NEM = New Elements of Mathematics
SS = Semiotics and Significs: Letters to Lady Welby
- Original
paper at
current
location
- Marty's
current
website
- Albert Lang's
additional
material at
current
location there
B.U. August
6, 2011
which is a sign of the direction of the wind, must really turn with the wind.
This word in this connection is an indirect one; but unless there be some way
or other which shall connect words with the things they signifie, and shall
ensure their correspondance with them, they have no value as signs of those
things. Whatever has these two characters is fit to become a sign. It is at least a
symptom, but it is not actually a sign unless it is used as such; that is unless it
is interpreted to thought and addresses itself to some mind. As thought is itself
a sign we may express this by saying that the sign must be interpreted as
another sign. [...]
6 - v. 1873,- MS 389 - On representations .
A representation is an object which stands for another so that an experience of
the former affords us a knowledge of the latter. There are three essential
conditions to which every representation must conform. It must in the first
place like any other object have qualities independent of its meaning. It is only
through a knowledge of these that we acquire any information concerning the
object it represents.[...] In the second place, representation must have a real
causal connection to its object. [...] In the third place, every representation
addresses itself to a mind. It is only in as far as it does it that it is a
representation. The idea of the representation itself excites in the mind another
idea and in order that it may do this it is necessary that some principle of
association between the two ideas should already be established in that mind.
[...]
7 - 1885 - 3-360 - On the algebra of logic .
A sign is in a conjoint relation tothe thing denoted and to the mind. If this triple
relation is not of a degenerate species, the sign is related to its object only in
consequence of a mental association, and depend upon a habit. Such signs are
always abstract and general, because because habits are general rules to which
the organism has become subjected. They are, for the most part, conventional
or arbitrary. They include all general words, the main body of speech, and any
mode of conveying a judgement. For the sake of brevity I will call them
tokens.
8 - 1896 - C.P. 1-480 - The logic of mathematics .
[...] Indeed, representation necessary involves a genuine triad. For it involves a
sign, or representamen, of some kind, inward or outward, mediating between
an object and an interpreting thought. [...]
9 - v. 1897_- C.P. 2-228 - Division of signs .
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates
in the mind of that person an equivalent sign or perhaps a more developed sign.
That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign
stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but
in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the
representamen. [...]
10 - v 1899 - C.P. 1-564 - Notes on "A new list of categories" .
[...] A very broad and important class of triadics characters [consist of]
representations. A representation is that character of a thing by virtue of which,
for the production of a certain mental effect, it may stand in place of another
thing. The thing having this character I term a representamen, the mental
effect, or thought, its interpretant, the thing for which it stands, its object.
11 -l901- C.P. 5-569 -CP 5-569. Truth and falsity and error .
[...] A sign is only a sign in actu by virtue of its receiving an interpretation, that
is, by virtue of its determining another sign of the same object. This is as true
of mental judgments as it is of external signs.[...]
12 - 1902 - C.P. 2.303 - Dictionary Baldwin - "Sign" .
Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an
object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant
becoming in turn a sign, and so on an infinitum.
No doubt, intelligent consciousness must enter into the series. If the series of
successive interpretants comes to an end, the sign is thereby rendered
imperfect, at least. If, an interpretant idea having been determined in an
individual consciousness it determines no outward sign, but that consciousness
becomes annihilated, or otherwise loses all memory or other significant effect
of the sign, it becomes absolutely undiscoverable that there ever was such an
idea in that consciousness; and in that case it is difficult to see how it could
have any meaning to say that that consciousness ever had the idea, since the
saying so would be an interpretant of that idea.
13 - 1902-2.92 - Partial synopsis of a proposed work in logic .
[...] Genuine mediation is the character of a Sign. A sign is anything which is
related to a Second thing, its Object, in respect to a Quality, in such a way as to
bring a Third thing, its Interpretant, into relation to the same Object, and that in
such a way as to bring a Fourth into relation to that Object in the same form, ad
infinitum. If the series is broken off, the Sign, in so far, falls short of the perfect
significant character. It is not necessary that the Interpretant should actually
exist. A being in futuro will suffice.
14 - 1902 - NEM IV pp. 20 - 2. Parts of Carnegie Applications .
On the definition of Logic.
Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will be
given which not more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line
as the place with a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.
Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant
sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with
something, C, its object, as that in which itself stand to C. It is from this
definition, together with a definition of "formal", thah I deduce mathematically
the principles of logic. [...]
15 - v. 1902 - C.P. 2-274- Syllabus .
A sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third,
called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which
it stand itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is genuine, that is its three
members are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any
complexus of dyadic relations. That is the reason the Interpretant, or Third,
cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object, but must stand in such a
relation to it as the Representamen itself does. Nor can the triadic relation in
which the third stands be merely similar to that in which the First stands, for
this would make the relation of the THird to the First a degenerate Secondness
merely. The Third must indeed stand in such a relation, and thus be capable of
determining a Third of its own; but besides that, it must have a second triadic
relation in which the Representamen, or rather the relation there of to its
Object, shall be its own (the Thrid's) Object, and must be capable of
determining a Third to this relation. All ths must be equally be true of the
Third's Third and so on endlessly; and this, and more, is involved in the
familiar idea of a Sign; and the term Representamen is here used, nothing more
is implied. A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant.
Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs. Thus, if a sunflower,
in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without
further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely way
toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive power, the
sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun. But thought is the chief,
if not the only, mode of representation.
16 - v. 1902 - MS 599 -Reason's rules .
A Sign does not function as a sign unless it be understood as a sign. It is
impossible, in the present state of knowledge, to say, at once fully precisely
and with a satisfactory approach to certitude, what is to understand of a
sign. ..., it does not seem that conciousness can be considered as essential to
the understanding of a sign. But what is indispensable is that there should,
actually or virtually, bring about a determination of a sign of the same object of
which it is itself a sign. This interpreting sign, like every sign, only functions of
a sign so for as it again is interpreted, that is, actually or virtually, determines a
sign of the same object of which it is itself a sign. Thus there is a virtual
endless series of signs when a sign is understood; and a sign neveer understood
can hardly be said to be a sign.
17 - 1903 - C.P. 1=53B- - Lowell Lectures: Lecture III, vol. 21, 3d Draught .
Every sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it can only be a sign
of that object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a sign or thought.
For the sign does not affect the object but is affected by it; so that the object
must be able to convey thought, that is, must be of the nature of thought or a
sign. [...]
18 - 1903 - C.P. 1-346 - Lowel Lectures: vol. I, 3d Draught .
[...] Now a sign is something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some
interpretant thought, C.
19 - 1903 - C.P. 1-540 - Lowell Lectures: Lecture III, vol. 21, 3d Draught.
[...] In the first place, as to my terminology I confine the word representation to
the operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the interpreter of the
representation. The concrete subject that represents I call a sign or
representamen. I use these two words, sign and representamen, differently. By
a sign I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any
way, as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known tous. Now I start with
this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a sign,
and I define a representamen as being whatever that analysis applies to. [...]
20 - 1903 - C.P. 1-541 - Lowell Lectures: Lecture III, vol. 21, 3d Draught .
My definition of a representamen is as follow:
A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its
OBJECT, FOR a third, called is INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being
such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the
same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant.
21 - 1903 - C.P. 5-138 - Lowell Lectures: Lecture V .
The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of repetition.
[...] This repetitory character of the
representamen involves as a consequence that it is essential to a representamen
that it should contribute to the determination of another representamen distinct
from itself. [...] I call a representamen which is determined by another
representamen, an interpretant of the latter. Every representamen is related or is
capable of being related to a reacting thing, its object, and every representamen
embodies, in some sense, some quality, which may be called its signification,
what in the case of a common name J.S. Mill call its connotation, a particularly
objectionable expression.
22 - 1903 - C.P. 2_242 - Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as
shown by the precise equivalence between any verb in the indicative and the
same made the object of "I tell you". "Jesus wept" = "I tell you that Jesus
wept".
34 - 1906 - C.P. 4-531 - Apology for pragmaticism .
First, an analysis of the essence of a sign, (stretching that word to its widest
limits, as anything witch, being determined by an object, determines an
interpretation to determination, through it, by the same object), leads to a proof
that every sign is determined by its object, either first, by partaking in the
characters of the object, when I call the sign an Icon; secondly, by being really
and in its individual existence connected with the individual object, when I call
the sign an Index; thirdly, by more or less approximate certainty that it will be
interpreted as denoting the object, in consequence of a habit (which term I use
as including a natural disposition), when I call the sign a Symbol.
35 - v, 1906 - C.P. 5-473 - Pragmatism .
[...] That thing which causes a sign as such is called the object (according to
the usage of speech, the "real", but more accurately, the existent object)
represented by the sign : the sign is determined to some species of
correspondence with that object.[...]
For the proper significate outcome of a sign, I propose the name, the
interpretant of the sign. [...]
Whether the interpretant be necessarily a triadic result is a question of words,
that is, of how we limit the extension of the term "sign"; but it seems to me
convenient to make the triadic production of the interpretant essential to a
"sign", calling the wider concept like a Jacquard loom, for example, a "quasisign". [...]
36 - v. 1906 - MS 292. Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism .
A sign may be defined as something (not necessarily existent) which is so
determined by a second something called its Object that it will tend in its turn
to determine a third something called its Interpretant in such a way that in
respect to the accomplishment of some end consisting in an effect made upon
the interpretant the action of sign is (more or less) equivalent to what that of
the object might have been had the circumstances been different.
37 - 1907 -MS 321. Pragmatism, pp. 15-16 .
[...] How any sign, of whatsoever kind, mediates between an Object to some
sort of conformity with which it is moulded, and by which it is thus
determined, and an effect which the sign is intended to bring about and which
it represents to be the outcome of the object influence upon it. It is of the first
importance in such studies as these that the two correlates of the sign should be
clearly distinguished : the Object by which the sign is determined and the
term, an Interpretant, that which the sign expresses, the result which it
produces in its capacity as sign. [...]
b - [...] Now any sign, of whatever kind, mediates between an object to some
sort of conformity with which it is moulded, and which thus determines it, and
an effect which it is intended to produce, and which it represents to be the
outcome of the object. These two correlates of the sign have to be carefully
distinguished. The former is called the object of the sign; the latter is the
"meaning", or, as I usually term it, the "interpretant" of the sign. [...]
c - [...] Now the essential nature of a sign is that it mediates between its object
which is supposed to determine it and to be, in some sense, the cause of it, and
its meaning, or, as I prefer to say, in order to avoid certains ambiguities, its
Interpretant which is determined by the sign, and is, in a sense, the effect of it;
and which the sign represents to flow as an influences, from the object. [...]
d - [...] ...to which it is, therefore, conceived to be moulded, and by which to be
determined, and an effect; on the other hand, which the sign is intended to
bring about, representing it to be the outcome of the object influence upon it. I
need not say that this influence is usually indirect and not of the nature of a
force. [...]
e - [...] A sign is whatever there may be whose intent is to mediate between an
utterer of it and an interpreter of it, both being repositories of thought, or quasiminds, by conveying a meaning from the former to the latter. We may say that
the sign is moulded to the meaning in the quasi-mind that utters it, where it
was, virtually at least (i.e. if not in fact, yet the moulding of the sign took place
as if it had been there) already an ingredient of thought.
But thought being itself a sign the meaning must have been conveyed to that
quasi-mind, from some anterior utterer of the thought, of which the utterer of
the moulded sign had been the interpreter. The meaning of the moulded sign
being conveyed to its interpreter, became the meaning of a thought in that
quasi-mind; and as these conveyed in a thought-sign required an interpreter, the
interpreter of the moulded sign becoming the utterer of this new thought-sign".
f - I am now prepared to risk an attempt at defining a sign, -since in scientific
inquiry, as in other enterprises, the maxim holds : nothing hazard, nothing gain.
I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates
between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object
relatively to the interpretant, and determining the interpretant in reference to
the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the
object through the mediation of this "sign".
The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the sign;
the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. Moreover, the sign
being defined in terms of these correlative correlates, it is confidently to be
expected that object and interpretant should precisely correspond, each to the
other. In point of fact, we do find that the immediate object and emotional
bestimmt ), by something other than itself, called its object (or, in some cases,
as if the Sign be the sentence "Cain killed Abel", in which Cain and Abel are
equally Partial Objects, it may be more convenient to say that that which
determines the Sign is the Complexus, or Totality, of Partial Objects. And in
every case the object is accurately the Universe of which the special object is
member, or part), while, on the other hand, it so determines some actual or
potential Mind, the determination whereof I term the Interpretant created by
the sign, that that interpreting mind is therein determined mediately by the
Object.
50 - 1909 - MS 278 : [Unidentified fragments] .
l909 Oct.28
Another endeavour to analyze a Sign.
A Sign is anything which represents something else (so far as it is complete)
and if it represents itself it is as a part of another sign which represents
something other than itself, and it represents itself in other circumstances, in
other connections. A man may talk and he is a sign of that he relates, he may
tell about himself as he was at another time. He cannot tell exactly what he is
doing at that very moment. Yes, he may confess he is lying, but he must be a
false sign, then. A sign, then, would seem to profess to represent something
else.
Either a sign is to be defined as something which truly represents something or
else as something which professes to represent something.
51 - 1909 - NEM III/2 p.867 - Letter to William James dated "1909 Dec 25".
[...] I start by defining what I mean by a sign. It is something determined by
something else its object and itself influencing some person in such a way that
that person becomes thereby mediately influenced or determined in some
respect by that Object.[...]
52 - v. 1909 - C.P. 6-347 -Some Amazing Mazes, Fourth Curiosity.
[...] Suffice it to say that a sign endeavours to represent, in part at least, an
Object, which is therefore in a sense the cause, or determinant, of the sign even
if the sign represents its object falsely. But to say that it represents its object
implies that it affects a mind, and so affects it as, in some respect, to determine
in that mind something that is mediately due to the Object.
That determination of which the immediate cause, or determinant, is the sign,
and of which the mediate cause is the Object may be termed the Interpretant
[...]
53 - v. 1909 - C.P. 6-344 - Some Amazing Mazes, Fourth Curiosity .
Signs, the only thing swith which a human being can, without derogation,
consent to have any transaction, being a sign himself, are triadic; since a sign
denotes a subject, and signifies a form of fact, which latter it brings into
connexion with the former. [...]
54 - 1910 - MS 654 : Essays (Essays 1st Pref.)
Bya sign I mean anything whatever, real or fictive, which is capable of a
sensible form, is applicable to something other than itself, that is already
known, and that is capable of being so interpreted in another sign which I call
its interpretant as to communicate something that may not have been
previously known about its object there is thus a triadic relation between an
sign, an Object, and an Interpretant.
55 - 1910 - C.P. 2-230 - Meaning .
The word sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only
imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense -for the word "fast", which is a
sign, is not imaginable, since it is not this word itself that can be set down on
paper or pronounced, but only an instance of it, and since it is the very same
word when it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is one word when it
means "rapidly" and quite another when it means "immovable", and a third
when it refers to abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it
must "represent" , as we say, something else, called its Object, although the
condition that a sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if
we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a sign that is
a part of a sign. [...] A sign may have more than one Object.
Thus, the sentence "Cain killed Abel", which is a sign, refers at least as much
to Abel as to Cain, even if it be not regarded as it should, as having "a killing"
as a third object. But the set of objects may be regarded as making up one
complex Object. In what follows and often elsewhere signs will be treated as
having but one object each for the sake of dividing difficulties of the study. If a
Sign is other than its object, there must exist, either in thought or in expression,
some explanation or argument or other context, showing how -upon what
system or for what reason the sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it
does. Now the sign and the Explanation together make up another sign, and
since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an additional
explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign will make up
a still larger sign; and proceeding in the same way, we shall, or should,
ultimately reach a sign of itself, containing its own explanation and those of all
its significant parts; and according to this explanation each such part has some
other part as its Object. According to this every sign has, actually or virtually,
what we may call a Precept of explanation according to which it is to be
understood as a sort of emanation, so to speak, of its Object.
56 - 1911 - MS 849 :
imperative signs, than that, as long as nobody else concerns himself with the
analysis of the action of such signs, the logician is obliged to assume that office
in order by the did of its contrast with the action of cognitional signs to perfect
the definition of this latter. [...]
59 - 1911 - MS 854 - Notes on logical critique of the essential Articles of
religious Faith (20.11.1911) .
Nature of a Sign . Its object is all that the sign recognize; since the sign cannot
be understood until the Object is already identically known, though it may be
indefinite. It so, it need only be known in its indefiniteness. The interpretant is
the mental action on the Object that the sign excites.
For instance the word dog -meaning some dog, implies the knowledge that
there is some dog, but it remains indefinite. The Interpretant is the somewhat
indefinite idea of the characters that the "some dog" referred to has. And we
have to distinguish between the Real Object and the Object as implied in the
sign. The latter is some one of the dogs known already by direct experience or
some one of the dogs which we more or less believe to exist.
The word dog does not excite any other notion than of the characters that ..... to
possess.
The "Object" dog causes us to think of is such a dog as the person addressed
has any notion of. But the real Object includes alternatively other dogs which
are not known to the party addressed as yet but which he may come to know .
As to the characters we know it has four legs, is a carnivorous animal, etc.. and
here we must distinguish then
- first the essential characters which the word implies -the essential
interpretant.
- second the idea it actually does excite in the particular interpreter.
- third the characters it was intended specially to excite -perhaps only a part of
the essential characters perhaps others not essential and which the word now
excites though no such thing has hitherto been known.
In order to understand a Sign better we must consider that what it excites some
sort of mental action about is in its Real Being either a history or a Part of a
history and one part of it may be a Sign of another part.
Some Dog is a ....
Excites the idea of a Dog....is sign of a Dog and its Interpretant is forced by the
interpreter own belief in the truth of the sign to regard its being a dog to admit
that it is possible a ratter.
The sign may appeal to the Interpreter himself to assert that the Matter of Fact
denoted does call for the....of certain character... or the Sign may exert a Force
to cause the Interpreter to attach some Idea to the Object of the Sign.
60 - MS 670 :
A Sign, then, is anythin whatsoever -whether an Actual or a May-be or a
Would-be,- which affects a mind, its Interpreter, and draw that interpreter's
attention to some Object whether Actual, May-be or Would-be) which has
already come within the sphere of his experience; and beside this purely
selective action of a sign, it has a power of exciting the mind (whether directly
by the image or the sound or indirectly) to some kind of feeling, or to effort of
some kind or to thought; [...]
For instance, ...... the sign, the sentence "Let'songster of `Heliopolis' be our
designation of the phenix" we may variously regard as B, either the phenix or
the writer's determination, etc.. In any case howewer what is essential to the
relation between the sentence and B is the writer's determination of mind to
have the phenix called the songster of Heliopolis. This determination would be
so shaped howewer whether expressed in this sentence or not. And the
subsequent statement the sense in which certain correlates of a given
relationship are said to be `active' or `passive' is that considering the different
characters of all the correlates excepting only these that are immediately
implied in the statement of the relationship none which involves only nonpassives correlates will by immediate essential necessity vary with a variation
of those involving only passive correlates; while no variation of which involve
only non-active correlates will by immediate essential necessity carry with
them variation of those which involve only active correlates; while by `activepassive' is meant active in respect to some correlates and passive in respect to
others ........`active or passive' meaning........ active and ......without being active
passive.
67 - MS 793 -[On Signs]1.
[...] which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to the
Interpretant is a Form. It is not a singular thing; for if a Singular thing were
first in the Object and afterward in the Interpretant outside the Object, it must
thereby cease to be in the Object. The form that is communicated does not
necessarily cease to be in one thing when it comes to be in a different thing,
because its being is the being of a predicate. The Being of a Form consist in the
truth of a conditional proposition. Under given circumstances something would
be true. The Form is in the Object, one may say, entitatively, meaning that that
conditional relation, or following of consequent upon reason, which constitutes
the Form is literally true of the Object. In the Sign the Form may .... be
embodied entitatively, but it must be embodied representatively, that is, in
respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produce upon the interpretant an
effect similar to that which the Object would under favorable circumstances.
68 - MS 793[On Signs] .
For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium for the
communication of a Form. It is not logically necessary that any thing
possessing consciousness, that is, feeling or the peculiar commun quality of all
our feeling should be concerned. But it is necessary that there should be two, if
not three, quasi-minds, meaning things capable of varied determinations as to
forms of the kind communicated.
As a medium the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which
determines it and to its Interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the
Object, the sign is passive, that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is
brought about by on effect upon the sign, the Object remaining unaffected. On
the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the sign is active determining
mind that this mind is thereby influenced by the Object; and I term that which
is called forth in the mind the Interpretant of the sign. This explanation will
suffice for the present; but distinctions will have to be drawn are long.
74 - MS 810 :[On the formal Principles of Deductive Logic] .
A mental representation is something which puts the mind into relation to an
object. A representation generally (I am here defining my use of the term) is
something which brings one thing into relation with another. The conception of
third is here involved, and therefore, also, the conceptions of second or other
and of first or an. A representation is in fact nothing but a something which has
a third through an other. We may therefore consider an object :
1. as a something, with inward determinations;
2. as related to an other;
3. as bringing a second into relation to a third.
75 - MS 914 : [ Firstness, Secondness, Thirness, and the Reductibility of
Fourthness] .
The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a sign; and it is shown that
every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign has an object, which may
be regarded either as it is immediately represented in the sign to be, and as it is
in its own firstness. It is equally essential to the function of a sign that it should
determine an Interpretant, or a second correlate related to the object of the sign
as the sign is itself related to that object; and this interpretant may be regarded
as the sign represents it to be, as it is in its pure secondness to the object, and as
it is in its own firstness.
76 - MS 1345.
On the Classification of the Sciences .
A Representamen can be considered from three formal points of view, namely,
first, as the substance of the representation, or the vehicle of the Meaning
which is common to the three representamen of the triad, second, as the quasiagent in the representation, conformity to which makes its Truth, that is, as the
Natural Object, and third, as the quasi-patient in the representation, or that
which modification in the representation make its Intelligence, and this may be
called the Interpretant. Thus, in looking at a map, the map itself is the vehicle,
the country represented is the Natural Object, and the idea excited in the mind
is the Interpretant.
Furthermore, every representamen may be considered as a reagent, its
intellectual character being neglected; and both representamen and reagent
may be considered as quales, their relative character being neglected. This we
do, for example, when we say that the word man has three letters.
agreement, it seems to me, with Peirce (since from l905 he no longer uses the
word representamen in any definitions except towards 1911 in the text n57.
However, the date attributed to this text being an estimation, it is possible to
put it in doubt, and as in any event Peirce uses it in this text in a restricted
sense, equivalent to legisign, there is no need to preserve this " horrible word "
and "sign" should be quite suitable. There would have perhaps been some
interest, on the other hand, in preserving representamen so as to concretize the
different conceptualizations of semiotic phenomena as between the Saussurohjelmslevian tradition and the Peircean tradition. But the adoption of this
viewpoint would be a sort of renunciation of the debates on the profound
nature of these phenomena according to these two traditions ; the passive
acceptance of the fact that both traditions should develop independently would
thus deprive us of the clarity that the opening of conflicts can bring about in
the semiotic field.
To designate the object of the sign, Peirce employs on nearly every occasion
the word "object" accompanied with considerations that render it, explicitly or
implicitly, that which is connected to this object of direct experience that is the
sign. Sometimes Peirce designates it by the expression "some thing " and even
in the text n23 the sign is said to represent an aspect of the "True" (the
"Truth", the true universe), another representamen in the text n21, and a
subject in the n53. Moreover, the object is often qualified: Real, Natural or
Original in addition to the distinction between immediate object and dynamic
objects.
Despite these remarks, there is no problem in denominating as "Object" this
other object whose presence to the mind produced by the perception of the sign
is characteristic of semiotic phenomena. It is clear that a third element is
needed because it is essential in semiotic phenomena to define an element
capable of explaining the necessary connection of the two objects that are
potentially present to the mind (the perceived sign, as such, and the object to
which it is connected). For if the sign, an object of direct experience, is
distinguishable because it evokes another object different from itself, because it
enables a supplementary perceptive choice (at least) it constitutes, by this very
fact, an association between these two objects. That the sign is one of the two
objects does not change anything in the matter; it both exists for itself and
exists for another. But this association can be conceived only in the mind and
by the mind to which the two objects are present. In a sign in actu this
association is truly a matter of fact; it is a psychic fact that the mind that
constructs two different perceptual judgements on the same percept is in a
special state, different from that which it is in, in the case of ordinary
phenomena, that is to say in the simple presentation of an object, due to the
fact of this dual presence (it is the thesis that I develop in my work in French
"The Algebra of signs" (1990, John Benjamins, Amsterdam/Philadelphia). One
can say that this special state of mind gives at this very instant a real existence
to this association, even in the most "natural " cases. Friday's footprint in the
sand stands for a human presence only because of the association in Robinson's
mind, even if its production and therefore its existence are totally independent
of his mind. In every sign there intervenes therefore the determination of a
mind, distinct from the two objects, which is therefore an element necessarily
implied in the factuality of the sign and without which one cannot hope to
describe semiotic phenomena correctly. The subject is therefore implied in a
certain manner in this approach. It is necessary therefore to attach a third
element to the Sign and to the Object. Peirce gives it the name of Interpretant.
Now, let us examine the various denominations by which he himself grasped
this necessity. Note immediately that the last sentence of the textn6 (1873)
covers exactly the argument we have just developed: "The idea of the
representation itself excites in the mind another idea and in order that it may do
this it is necessary that some principle of association between the two ideas
should already be established in that mind". One finds again this idea in the
text n64 (n.d) :
That mind must conceive it to be connected with its object so that it is possible
to reason from the sign to the thing.
and in the text n 58 (v.1911), the Interpretant is
"a special mental effect upon a mind in which certain associations have been
produced".
A systematic list of the words that Peirce uses to give content to the concept of
the interpretant shows that he attributes the following characteristics, according
to what he is saying at that moment and to the maturation of his thinking: - it is
a thought or interpretant thought in texts n,8, l0, 18, 28.
- - it is an effect created or determined or modelled by the sign on a person, a
mind or a quasi -mind in textsn9, 12, 14, 16, 21, 32, 33,39, 40 (b,c,d, e),46,
47, 48, 49, 51, 56, 58,61, 73, 75.
-- it is a determination of a mind or quasi -mind or an influence on a person or
a mind, this determination or influence being realised through the sign, the
object by being the mediate cause in texts n34, 37, 40(a,b,c,e,f,) 52.
- It is a Third that according to the case is a third correlate of a triadic
relationship or a "Tertian", (that is to say a member of the Third universe, a
Thirdness) in texts n13,15, 20, 22, 36, 69(b,c,d,e). Moreover, in n30 iit is
described as a "passive" correlate and in n76 it is a quasi - patient.
- it is a meaning, or cognition, or a result which it produces in textsn35,37, 38,
40(a,b).
- it is a sign of the same object in 11, 12, 16, 24,25, 26, 27, 29, 54.
One sees that these characteristics (by excluding the last that is of a radically
different nature), can be classified in two groups:
- Those that refer to a sign in actu, that describe therefore this third element of
the semiotic phenomenon in its particularity and that are practically reducible
the sign, as soon as the sign was established, and that the process of
establishment of the sign consisted in communicating (or conveying) this form
from the Object to the Interpreter through the Sign. This step does not exclude
triadicity insofar as it is precisely the presence of this "form"that, we think,
allows us to link triadically the three elements of the semiotic phenomenon (by
being incorporated in each of them). It would be the ground evoked by Peirce
in 2-228 (text n9, v.1897). One sees therefore that the two main theoretical
approachs that we have just elucidated in this group of texts, are not exclusive.
In conclusion we will distinguish therefore, without opposing them, two
Peircean conceptions of the sign: - a conception that, for convenience, we will
call "global triadic " derived from an analysis of semiotic phenomena which
considers as essential the fact that the three elements therein are necessarily
linked by a triadic relationship. - a conception that we will call" analytic
triadic" derived from a finer analysis in terms of the determination of some
elements by others (of the sign by the object and the interpretant by the sign),
the interplay of these two determinations leading to the establishment of a
triadic relationship between the three elements necessarily present in semiotic
phenomena (it is the presence of the conveyed Form in the course of these
successive determination that creates the triadic relationship). To grasp this
second conception better it is necessary to clarify what Peirce understands by
"determination" in the precise case of the sign, or, in view of the difficulty of
the task, to try to discern this notion better. Because the explanations given by
Peirce as to the sense in which he uses the words "active" and "passive"in texts
n30 and 66 appear to us to be no longer operative. To the extent that we have
been able to understand his thinking, it seems to us that Peirce considers that
there is character determination of one correlate by those of another, the
correlate B being active with reference to the correlate A, if all characters of
this latter which are involved in the semiotic phenomenon are implied by the
characters of B. Friday's footprint in the sand perfectly illustrates this notion
since it is just what it is, that is to say possessed of characters that make it a
sign, because the foot that has produced it has communicated them without
being modified itself, and it is thus a purely active correlate. The imprint itself
is a purely passive correlate for opposite reasons . However if now one
photographs this imprint, it is going to produce an image on the film which
owes all its characters to the imprint itself. In relation to this photographic
image the imprint will be therefore an active correlate and it is clear that, for
Peirce, the interpretant C is a purely passive correlate determined by the
imprint, this interpretant, triadic in nature, being such that it incorporates, as an
induced diadic relationship, the diadic relationship established between
Friday's foot and its imprint. However the example that we quote is particular,
it is a scholastic example. Nevertheless it is, we think, by generalizing the case
of signs of this type ( index) that Peirce obtained the definition n 30.In others
texts he has used terms that allow us to higthlight somewhat this conception:
- in texts n37 and 40a, the sign is said to be "modeled to a sort of conformity
with its object".
- in 40c the Object is, in a certain sense, the cause of the sign which represents
the influence of this object, and that this influence is "indirect and is not of the
APPENDIX
12 Further Sign Definitions or Equivalent
proposed by Alfred Lang
Psychology, Univ. Bern, Switzerland (lang@psy.unibe.ch)
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