G.R. No.

L-1800
January 27, 1948
CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority Parties, petitioner,
vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, Mayor of City of Manila, respondent.
FERIA, J.:
This is an action of mandamus instituted by the petitoner, Cipriano Primicias, a campaig manager of the
Coalesced Minority Parties against Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to compel the latter to
issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on Sunday afternoon, November 16, 1947,
for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress to grievances on the groun that the respondent
refused to grant such permit. Due to urgency of the case, this Court, after mature deliberation, issued a writ
of mandamus, as prayed for in the petition of November 15, 1947, without prejudice to writing later an
extended and reasoned decision.
The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the Constitutions of
democratic countries. But it a casettled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that
the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, not injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to
regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power" which is the
power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its
legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may
be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities, and cities authorizing their legislative
bodies, called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.
The Philippine legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila, which according to section 2439 of the Administrative Code is the legislative body of the City. Section
2444 of the same Code grants the Municipal Board, among others, the following legislative power, to wit:
"(p) to provide for the prohibition and suppression of riots, affrays, disturbances, and disorderly assemblies, (u)
to regulate the use of streets, avenues ... parks, cemeteries and other public places" and "for the abatement of
nuances in the same," and "(ee) to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of prosperity and the promotion of morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience,
and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants."
Under the above delegated power, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, enacted sections 844 and 1119.
Section of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as an offense against public peace, and section 1262 of
the same Revised Ordinance penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or
procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any
unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." And section 1119
provides the following:
"SEC. 1119 Free for use of public The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free and
clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the same shall
only be used or occupied for other purposes as provided by ordinance or regulation: Provided, that the
holding of athletic games, sports, or exercise during the celebration of national holidays in any streets
or public places of the city and on the patron saint day of any district in question, may be permitted by
means of a permit issued by the Mayor, who shall determine the streets or public places or portions
thereof, where such athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And provided, further, That the
holding of any parade or procession in any streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit therefor
is first secured from the Mayor who shall, on every such ocassion, determine or specify the streets or
public places for the formation, route, and dismissal of such parade or procession: And provided, finally,

That all applications to hold a parade or procession shall be submitted to the Mayor not less than
twenty-four hours prior to the holding of such parade or procession."
As there is no express and separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City regulating the holding of
public meeting or assembly at any street or public places, the provisions of saif section 1119 regarding the
holding of any parade or procession in any street or public paces may be applied by analogy to meeting and
assembly in any street or public places.
Said provision is susceptible to two constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with
unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting,
parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and the other is that the
applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with the view to
prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to
provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder.
After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the second construction, that
is construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to
refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or
public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held.
Our conclusions find support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox vs. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S.,
569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire P.L. Chap. 145, section 2, providing that "no parade or
procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be
obtained from the select men of the town or from licensing committee," was construed by the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfetted discretion to refuse to grant the license,
and held valid. And the Supreme Court of the United States in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice
Hughes firming the judgement of the State Supreme Court, held that " a statute requiring pewrsons using the
public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not
an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or a freedom of speech and press, where, as the
statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses,
to a consideration, the time, place, and manner of the parade and procession, with a view to conserving the
public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing and are not invested with
arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, ... ."
We can not adopt the alternative construction or constru the ordinance under consideration as conferring upon
the Mayor power to grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be tantamount to authorizing him to
prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for holding of meetings, parades or processions,
because such a construction would make the ordinance invalid and void or violative of the constitutional
limitations. As the Municipal Boards is empowered only to regulate the use of streets, parks, and the other
public places, and the word "regulate," as used in section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code, means
and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but can not be construed a synonimous with
construed "suppressed" or "prohibit" (Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil., 103), the Municipal Board can
not grant the Mayor a power that it does not have. Besides, the powers and duties of the Mayor as the Chief
Executive of the City are executive and one of them is "to comply with and enforce and give the necessary
orders for the faithful performance and execution of laws and ordinances" (section 2434 [b] of the Revised
Administrative Code), the ligislative police power of the Municipal Board to enact ordinances regulating
reasonably the excercise of the fundamental personal rights of the citizens in the streets and other public
places, can not be delgated to the Mayor or any other officer by conferring upon him unregulated discretion or
without laying down rules to guide and control his action by which its impartial execution can be secured or
partiality and oppression prevented.
In City of Chicago vs. Trotter, 136 Ill., 430, it was held by the Supreme Court of Illinois that, under Rev. ST. Ill.
c. 24, article 5 section 1, which empowers city councils to regulate the use of public streets, the council has no
power to ordain that no processions shall be allowed upon the streets until a permit shall be obtained from the

superintendent of police, leaving the issuance of such permits to his discretion, since the powers conferred on
the council cannot be delegated by them.
The Supreme COurt of Wisconsin in State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N.W., 1104, held the
following:
"The objections urged in the case of City of Baltimore vs. Radecke, 49 Md., 217, were also, in
substance, the same, for the ordinance in that case upon its face committed to the unrestrained will of a
single public officer the power to determine the rights of parties under it, when there was nothing in the
ordinance to guide or cintrol his action, and it was held void because "it lays down no rules by which its
impartial execution can be secured, or partiality and oppression prevented." and that "when we
remember that action or nonaction may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal or
animosity, from favoritism and other improper influences and motives easy of concealment and difficult
to be detected and exposed, it becomes unnecessary to suggest or to comment upon the injustice
capable of being wrought under cover of such a power, for that becomes apparent to every one who
gives to the subject a moment's consideration. In fact, an ordinance which clothes a single individual
with such power hardly falls within the domain of law, and we are constrained to pronounce it
inoperative and void." ... In the exercise of police power, the council may, in its discretion, regulate the
exercise of such rights in a reasonable manner, but can not suppress them, directly or indirectly, by
attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any other officer. The discretion with which
the council is vested is a legal discretion, to be exercised within the limits of the law, and not a
discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer and arbitrary authority, making him in its
exercise a petty tyrant."
In re Frazee, 63 Michigan 399, 30 N.W., 72, a city or ordinance providing that "no person or persons, or
associations or organizations shall march, parade, ride or drive, in ou upon or through the public streets of the
City of Grand Rapids with musical instrument, banners, flags, ... without first having obtained the consent of the
mayor or common council of said city;" was held by the Supreme Court of Michigan to be unreasonable and
void. Said Supreme Court in the course of the decision held:
". . . We must therefore construe this charter, and the powers it assumes to grant, so far as it is not
plainly unconstitutional, as only conferring such power over the subjects referred to as will enable the
city to keep order, and suppress mischief, in accordance with the limitations and conditions required by
the rights of the people themselves, as secured by the principles of law, which cannot be less careful of
private rights under the constitution than under the common law."
"It is quite possible that some things have a greater tendency to produce danger and disorder in cities
than in smaller towns or in rural places. This may justify reasonable precautionary measures, but
nothing further; and no inference can extend beyond the fair scope of powers granted for such a
purpose, and no grant of absolute discretion to suppress lawful action altogther can be granted at all. . .
. ."
"It has been customary, from time immemorial, in all free countries, and in most civilized countries, for
people who are assembled for common purposes to parade together, by day or reasonable hours at
night, with banners and other paraphernalia, and with music of various kinds. These processions for
political, religious, and social demonstrations are resorted to for the express purpose of keeping unity of
feeling and enthusiasm, and frequently to produce some effect on the public mind by the spectacle of
union and numbers. They are a natural product and exponent of common aims, and valuable factors in
furthering them. ... When people assemble in riotous mobs, and move for purposes opposed to private
or public security, they become unlawful, and their members and abettors become punishable. . . ."
"It is only when political, religious, social, or other demonstrations create public disturbances, or
operate as a nuisance, or create or manifestly threaten some tangible public or private mischief, that
the law interferes."
"This by-law is unreasonable, because it suppresses what is in general perfectly lawful, and because it
leaves the power of permitting or restraining processions, and thier courses, to an unregulated official

discretion, when the whole matter, if regualted at all, must be permanent, legal provisions, operating
generally and impartially."
In Rich vs. Napervill, 42 Ill., App. 222, the question was raised as to the validity of the city ordinance which
made it unlawful for any person, society or club, or association of any kind, to parade any of the streets, with
flags, banners, or transparencies, drums, horns, or other musical instruments, without the permission of the
city council first had and obtained. The appellants were members of the Salvation Army, and were prosecuted
for a violation of the ordinance, and the court in holding the ordinance invalid said, "Ordinances to be valid
must be reasonable; they must not be oppressive; they must be fair and impartial; they must not be so framed
as to allow their enforcement to rest on official discretion ... Ever since the landing of the Pilgrims from the
Mayflower the right to assemble and worship accordingto the dictates of one's conscience, and the right to
parade in a peaceable manner and for a lawful purpose, have been fostered and regarded as among the
fundamental rights of a free people. The spirit of our free institutions allows great latitude in public parades and
emonstrations whether religious or political ... If this ordinance is held valid, then may the city council shut off
the parades of those whose nations do not suit their views and tastes in politics or religion, and permit like
parades of those whose nations do. When men in authority are permitted in their discretion to exercise power
so arbitrary, liberty is subverted, and the spirit of of our free institutions violated. ... Where the granting of the
permit is left to the unregulated discretion of a small body of city eldermen, the ordinance cannot be other than
partial and discriminating in its practical operation. The law abhors partiality and discrimination. ... (19 L.R.A.,
p. 861)
In the case of Trujillo vs. City of Walsenburg, 108 Col., 427; 118 P. [2d], 1081, the Supreme Court of Colorado,
in construing the provision of section 1 of Ordinance No. 273 of the City of Walsenburg, which provides: "That
it shall be unlawful for any person or persons or association to use the street of the City of Walsenburg,
Colorado for any parade, procession or assemblage without first obtaining a permit from the Chief of Police of
the City of Walsenburg so to do," held the following:
"[1] The power of municipalities, under our state law, to regulate the use of public streets is conceded.
"35 C.S.A., chapter 163, section 10, subparagraph 7. "The privilege of a citizen of the United States to
use the streets ... may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be
excercised in subordination to the general, be abridged or denied." Hague, Mayor vs. Committee for
Industrial Organization, 307 U.S., 496, 516; 59 S. Ct., 954, 964; 83 Law, ed., 1423.
[2, 3] An excellent statement of the power of a municipality to impose regulations in the use of public
streets is found in the recent case of Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569; 61 S. Ct., 762, 765; 85
Law, ed. 1049; 133 A.L.R., 1936, in which the following appears; "The authority of a municipality to
impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public
highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of
safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of
cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of
highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot
be disregarded by the attempted excercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be
entitled to protection. One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he
thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that means to direct public
attention to an announcement of his opinions. As regulation of the use of the streets for parades and
processions is a traditional excercise of control by local government, the question in a particular case is
whether that control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the
opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially
associated with resort to public places. Lovell vs. Criffin, 303 U.S., 444, 451;58 S. Ct., 666, 668, 82
Law. ed., 949 [953]; Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S., 496, 515, 516; 59 S.
Ct., 954, 963, 964; 83 Law. ed., 1423 [1436, 1437]; Scheneider vs. State of New Jersey [Town of
Irvington]; 308 U.S., 147, 160; 60 S. Ct., 146, 150; 84 Law. ed., 155 [164]; Cantwell vs. Connecticut,
310 U. S., 296, 306, 307; 60 S. Ct., 900, 904; 84 Law. ed., 1213 [1219, 1220]; 128 A.L.R. 1352."

[4] Our concern here is the validity or nonvalidity of an ordinance which leaves to the uncontrolled
official discretion of the chief of police of the municipal corporation to say who shall, who shall not, be
accorded the privilege of parading on its public streets. No standard of regulation is even remotely
suggested. Moreover, under the ordinance as drawn, the chief of police may for any reason which he
may entertain arbitrarily deny this privelege to any group. in Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569,
85 Law. ed., 1049, 1054, said:
"In the instant case the uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege of using the public streets in a
lawful manner clearly is apparent from the face of the ordinance before us, and we therefore hold it null
and void."
The Supreme Court of the United States in Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S., 496,
515, 516; 83 Law. ed., 1423, declared that a municipal ordinance requiring the obtaining of a permit for a public
assembly in or upon the public streets, highways, public parks, or public buildings of the city and authorizing
the director of public safety, for the purpose of preventing riots, disturbances, or disorderly assemblage, to
refuse to issue a permit when after investigation of all the facts and circumstances pertinent to the application
he believes it to be proper to refuse to issue a permit, is not a valid exercise of the police power. Said Court in
the course of its opinion in support of the conclusion said:
". . . Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The
privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on
national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be
exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and
good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.
"We think the court below was right in holding the ordinance quoted in Note 1 void upon its face. It does
not make comfort or convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables
the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent 'riots,
disturbances or disorderly assemblage.' It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of
arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs for the prohibition of all speaking
will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities. But uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege
cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the right."
Section 2434 of the Administrative Code, a part of the Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that the
Mayor shall have the power to grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes, cannot be cited as
an authority for the Mayor to deny the application of the petitioner, for the simple reason that said general
power is predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board requiring licenses or permits to be
issued by the Mayor, such as those found in Chapters 40 to 87 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of
Manila. It is not a specific or substantive power independent from the corresponding municipal ordinances
which the Mayor, as Chief Executive of the City, is required to enforce under the same section 2434. Moreover
"one of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws
cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority," except certain powers of local
government, specially of police regulation which are conferred upon the legislative body of a municipal
corporation. Taking this into consideration, and that the police power to regulate the use of streets and other
public places has been delegated or rather conferred by the Legislature upon the Municipal Board of the City
(section 2444 [u] of the Administrative Code) it is to be presumed that the Legislature has not, in the same
breath, conferred upon the Mayor in section 2434 (m) the same power, specially if we take into account that its
exercise may be in conflict with the exercise of the same power by the Municipal Board.
Besides, assuming arguendo that the Legislature has the power to confer, and in fact has conferred, upon the
Mayor the power to grant or refuse licenses and permits of all classes, independent from ordinances enacted
by the Municipal Board on the matter, and the provisions of section 2444 (u) of the same Code and of section

1119 of the Revised Ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, such grant of unregulated and unlimited
power to grant or refuse a permit for the use of streets and other public places for processions, parades, or
meetings, would be null and void, for the same reasons stated in the decisions in the cases above quoted,
specially in Willis Cox vs. New Hampshire, supra, wherein the question involved was also the validity of a
similar statute of New Hamsphire. Because the same constitutional limitations applicable to ordinances apply
to statutes, and the same objections to a municipal ordinance which grants unrestrained discretion upon a city
officer are applicable to a law or statute that confers unlimited power to any officer either of the municipal or
state governments. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly
granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency. As stated in State ex
rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, supra, "The discretion with which the council is vested is a legal discretion to be
exercised within the limits of the law, and not a discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer an
arbitrary authority making in its exercise a petty tyrant."
It is true that Mr. Justice Ostrand cited said provision of article 2434 (m) of the Administrative Code apparently
in support of the decision in the case of Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57 Phil., 255- 261, but evidently the
quotation of said provision was made by the writer of the decision under a mistaken conception of its purview
and is an obiter dictum, for it was not necessary for the decision rendered. The popular meeting or assemblage
intended to be held therein by the Communist Party of the Philippines was clearly an unlawful one, and
therefore the Mayor of the City of Manila had no power to grant the permit applied for. On the contrary, had the
meeting been held, it was his duty to have the promoters thereof prosecuted for violation of section 844, which
is punishable as misdemeanor by section 1262 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. For, according
to the decision, "the doctrine and principles advocated and urged in the Constitution and by-laws of the said
Communist Party of the Philippines, and the speeches uttered, delivered, and made by its members in the
public meetings or gatherings, as above stated, are highly seditious, in that they suggest and incite rebelious
conspiracies and disturb and obstruct the lawful authorities in their duty."
The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable
ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the
losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith
and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten
breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." As the request of the petition was for a permit "to hold
a peaceful public meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful
assemblage, the reason given for the refusal of the permit can not be given any consideration. As stated in the
portion of the decision in Hague vs. Committee on Industrial Organization, supra, "It does not make comfort
and convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the Director of Safety
to refuse the permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent riots, disturbances or disorderly
assemblage. It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free
expression of views on national affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such
eventualities." To this we may add the following, which we make our own, said by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his
concurring opinion in Whitney vs. California, 71 U. S. (Law. ed.), 1105-1107:
"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared
witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears.
To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will
result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger
apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is
a serious one . . .
"Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change.
They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. . . .
"Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions essential
effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious. Prohibition of free speech and
assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively

trivial harm to a society. . . . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of
property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the
state. Among freemen, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crimes are education and
punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly." Whitney
vs. California, U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep., 71 Law., ed., pp. 1106-1107.)
In view of all the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is granted and, there appearing no reasonable objection
to the use of the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, for the meeting applied for, the respondent is ordered to issue the
corresponding permit, as requested. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon and Briones, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-62270 May 21, 1984

CRISPIN MALABANAN, EVELIO JALOS, BEN LUTHER LUCAS, SOTERO LEONERO, and JUNE
LEE,petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE ANASTACIO D. RAMENTO, in his capacity as the Director of the
National Capital Region of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, et al respondents.
FERNANDO, CJ.:
The failure to accord respect to the constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable assembly and free speech is
the grievance alleged by petitioners, students of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, in this certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus proceeding. The principal respondents are Anastacio D. Ramento, Director of the
National Capital Region of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports and the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation. 1 The nullification of the decision of respondent Ramento affirming the action taken by respondent
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation finding petitioners guilty of illegal assembly and suspending them is
sought in this petition.
The facts are not open to dispute. Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent
University. They sought and were granted by tile school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M.
to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general
assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such
permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they
manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of
Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward the Life
Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. They continued their
demonstration, giving utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities and using
megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the nonacademic employees, within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise created. They were
asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on
September 9, 1982, they were formed through a memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for
their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science Building. The validity
thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a petition for
mandamus with damages against private respondents 2 and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and
Sports. On October 20, 1982, respondent Ramento, as Director of the National Capital Region, found
petitioners guilty of the charge of having violated par. 146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools more
specifically their holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted
resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic
year. Hence this petition.
On November 16, 1982, this Court issued the following resolution: "Acting on the urgent ex-parte motion for the
immediate issuance of a temporary mandatory order filed by counsel for petitioners, dated November 12,
1982, the Court Resolved to ISSUE A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining all respondents or any
person or persons acting in their place or stead from enforcing the order of the Ministry of' Education and
Culture dated October 20, 1982 finding the petitioners guilty of the charges against them and suspending them
for one (1) academic year with a stern warning that a commission of the same or another offense will be dealt
with utmost severity, effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court, thus allowing
them to enroll, if so minded. 3
Both public and private respondents submitted their comments. Private respondents prayed for the dismissal of
the petition "for lack of factual and legal basis and likewise [prayed] for the lifting of the temporary restraining
order dated November 16, 1982." 4 Public respondent Ramento, on the other hand, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, prayed for the dismissal of the petition based on the following conclusion: "Consequently, it is
respectfully submitted that respondent Director of the MECS did not commit any error, much less abused his
discretion, when he affirmed the decision of respondent University finding petitioners guilty of violations of the
provisions of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and the Revised Student's Code of Discipline .and

ordering their suspension for one (1) academic school year. However, since said suspension has not been
enforced except only briefly, thereby enabling petitioners Leonero, Jr., Lucas and Malabanan to finish their
courses, and allowing petitioners Lee and Jalos to continue their schooling, if they so desire, this proceeding is
now moot and academic. 5
With the submission of such comments considered as the answers of public and private respondents, the case
was ready for decision.
This petition may be considered moot and academic if viewed solely from the fact that by virtue of the
temporary restraining order issued by this Court petitioners were allowed to enroll in the ensuing semester,
with three of them doing so and with the other two equally entitled to do so. Moreover, there is the added
circumstance of more than a year having passed since October 20, 1982 when respondent Ramento issued
the challenged decision suspending them for one year. Nonetheless, with its validity having been put in issue,
for being violative of the constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable assembly and free speech, there is need
to pass squarely on the question raised.
This Court accordingly rules that respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech
calls for the setting aside of the decision of respondent Ramento, the penalty imposed being unduly severe. It
is true that petitioners held the rally at a place other than that specified in the permit and continued it longer
than the time allowed. Undeniably too, they did disturb the classes and caused the work of the non-academic
personnel to be left undone. Such undesirable consequence could have been avoided by their holding the
assembly in the basketball court as indicated in the permit. Nonetheless, suspending them for one year is out
of proportion to their misdeed. The petition must be granted and the decision of respondent Ramento nullified,
a much lesser penalty being appropriate.
1. As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, 6 the invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable
assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are
embraced in the concept of freedom of expression which is Identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which "is not to be limited, much
less denied, except on a showing ... of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a
right to prevent." 7
2. In the above case, a permit was sought to hold a peaceful march and rally from the Luneta public park to the
gates of the united States Embassy, hardly two blocks away, where in an open space of public property, a short
program would be held. Necessarily then, the question of the use of a public park and of the streets leading to
the United States Embassy was before this Court. We held that streets and parks have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and have been used for purposes of assembly to communicate thoughts
between citizens and to discuss public issues. 8
3. The situation here is different. The assembly was to be held not in a public place but in private premises,
property of respondent University. There is in the Reyes opinion as part of the summary this relevant excerpt:
"The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public
placewhere and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the
one entitled to its legal possession is required." 9 Petitioners did seek such consent. It was granted. According
to the petition: "On August 27, 1982, by virtue of a permit granted to them by the school administration, the
Supreme Student Council where your petitioners are among the officers, held a General Assembly at the
VMAS basketball court of the respondent university." 10 There was an express admission in the Comment of
private respondent University as to a permit having been granted for petitioners to hold a student
assembly. 11 The specific question to be resolved then is whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the
disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and
its cognate right of free speech.
4. Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so. They
enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those
disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion
of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 12 "shed their constitutional rights to

freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 13 While, therefore, the authority of educational
institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of
constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level there is persuasive force to this formulation in the Fortas
opinion: "The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed
hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication
among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an
important part of the educational process. A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom
hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he
may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without
'materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school' and without colliding with the rights of others. ... But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which
for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." 14
5. As tested by such a standard, what is the verdict on the complaint of petitioners that there was a disregard of
their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. It must be in their favor, but subject to
qualification in view of their continuing their demonstration in a place other than that specified in the permit for
a longer period and their making use of megaphones therein, resulting in the disruption of classes and the
stoppage of work by the non-academic personnel in the vicinity of such assembly.
6. Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by the student leaders. That there
would be a vigorous presentation of views opposed to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science
with the Institute of Agriculture was to be expected. There was no concealment of the fact that they were
against such a move as it confronted them with a serious problem (iisang malaking suliranin.") 15 They
believed that such a merger would result in the increase in tuition fees, an additional headache for their parents
("isa na naman sakit sa ulo ng ating mga magulang."). 16 If in the course of such demonstration, with an
enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose,
that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid, diffident types. They are likely to be
assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious
language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to
their fiery exhortations. They take into account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to
exaggerate, the exuberance of youth, They may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but with the
activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public
disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, which, to borrow
from Tinker, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
7. Nor is this a novel approach to the issue raised by petitioners that they were denied the right to peaceable
assembly. In a 1907 decision, United States v. Apurado, 17 the facts disclosed that shortly before the municipal
council of San Carlos, Occidental Negros, started its session, some five hundred residents of the municipality
assembled near the municipal building, and, upon the opening of the session, a substantial number of such
persons barged into the council chamber, demanding that the municipal treasurer, the municipal secretary, and
the chief of police be dismissed, submitting at the same time the proposed substitutes. The municipal council
gave its conformity. Such individuals were wholly unarmed except that a few carried canes; the crowd was
fairly orderly and well-behaved except in so far as their pressing into the council chamber during a session of
that body could be called disorder and misbehavior. It turned out that the movement had its origin in religious
differences. The defendant Filomeno Apurado and many other participants were indicted and convicted of
sedition in that they allegedly prevented the municipal government from freely exercising its duties. On appeal,
the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Carson, who penned the opinion, correctly pointed out that "if the
prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a
crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities,
then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare and

the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all
those who took part therein to the severest form of punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did
not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities." 18 The principle to be followed is enunciated thus: "If
instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and
punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and
seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising." 19 A careful
reading of this decision is in order before private respondents attach, as they did in their comments, a
subversive character to the rally held by the students under the leadership of petitioners.
8. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that transpired. Admittedly,
there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place other than that specified, in the
second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the VMAS building of the University. Moreover, it was
continued longer than the period allowed. According to the decision of respondent Ramento, the "concerted
activity [referring to such assembly] went on until 5:30 p. m. 20 Private respondents could thus, take disciplinary
action. On those facts, however, an admonition, even a censure-certainly not a suspension-could be the
appropriate penalty. Private respondents could and did take umbrage at the fact that in view of such infraction
considering the places where and the time when the demonstration took place-there was a disruption of the
classes and stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. They would not be unjustified then if they did
take a much more serious view of the matter. Even then a one-year period of suspension is much too severe.
While the discretion of both respondent University and respondent Ramento is recognized, the rule of reason,
the dictate of fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. If the concept of proportionality between the offense
connoted and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise
to a due process question. To avoid this constitutional objection, it is the holding of this Court that a one-week
suspension would be punishment enough.
9. One last matter. The objection was raised that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. That is
true, but hardly decisive. Here, a purely legal question is presented. Such being the case, especially so where
a decision on a question of law is imperatively called for, and time being of the essence, this Court has
invariably viewed the issue as ripe for adjudication. What cannot be too sufficiently stressed is that the
constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are invoked by petitioners. Moreover, there was,
and very likely there will continue to be in the future, militancy and assertiveness of students on issues that
they consider of great importance, whether concerning their welfare or the general public. That they have a
right to do as citizens entitled to all the protection in the Bill of Rights.
10. It would be most appropriate then, as was done in the case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, 21 for this Court to lay
down the principles for the guidance of school authorities and students alike. The rights to peaceable assembly
and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss
matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or
subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the
state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the
placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an
advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to
correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought
from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In
granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of
classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms,
the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision dated October 20, 1982 of respondent Ramento imposing
a one-year suspension is nullified and set aside. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court in the
resolution of November 18, 1982 is made permanent. As of that date, petitioners had been suspended for
more than a week. In that sense, the one-week penalty had been served. No costs.
[G.R. No. 126183. March 25, 1999]

LUZVIMINDA DE LA CRUZ, MERCY DE LEON, TERESITA EUGENIO, CORAZON GOMEZ, ELENA

GUEVARRA, ROSALINA JINGCO, LOIDA IGNACIO, and EMERITA PIZARRO, petitioners vs.,
COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 129221. March 25, 1999]
ROLANDO ALURA, CLARA ALVAREZ et al, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, and SECRETARY OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
These consolidated petitions[1] are among several petitions filed with this Court arising from the muchpublicized public school teachers' mass actions of September/October 1990.
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously
charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D.
Cariio of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), in decisions issued by him which
uniformly read This is a motu-propio administrative complaint separately filed by the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports against the following public school teachers x x x x based on the report submitted by their respective
school principals wherein it was alleged that the above-named teachers participated in the mass action/illegal
strike on Sept. 19-21, 1990 and subsequently defied the return-to-work order dated September 17, 1990
issued by this Office, which acts constitute grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil
Service Law, Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross
insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without official leave
(AWOL), in violation of Presidential Decree 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines.
Required to explain within a period of not less than 72 hours but not more than 5 days from receipt of the
complaint, respondents failed to submit the required answer within the given time up to the present, and
despite the denial of their request for extension of 30 days within which to submit their answers dated
September 25, 1990 filed by their counsel, Atty. Gregorio Fabros, in a letter of this Office to him dated
September 28, 1990, respondents failed to submit the same, which failure, is considered a waiver on their part
of their right to answer the charges and to controvert the same.
Wherefore, after a careful evaluation of the records, this Office finds the respondents guilty as charged.
In accordance with Memorandum Circular 30 s. 1989 of the Civil Service Commission on Guidelines in the
Application of Penalty in Administrative Cases, the herein respondents are dismissed from Office effective
immediately.
The decisions dismissing petitioners were immediately implemented.
Petitioners appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and then to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). In 1993 the CSC found petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service" for having participated in the mass actions and imposed upon them the reduced penalty of six (6)
months' suspension. However, in view of the length of time that petitioners had been out of the service by
reason of the immediate implementation of the dismissal orders of Secretary Cario, the CSC likewise ordered
petitioners' automatic reinstatement in the service without back wages.
Petitioners were unhappy with the CSC decision. They initially filed petitions for certiorari with this Court,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 111998,[2] 114435-5506,[3] and 116312-19,[4] which were all referred to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, [5] and there re-docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
37620, CA-G.R. SP No. 37619 and CA-G.R. SP Nos. 37784, 37808-37014, respectively.
On 29 November 1995 the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals[6] rendered a joint decision in CAG.R. SP Nos. 37619-20 dismissing the petitions for lack of merit. [7] The appellate court ruled that the

questioned resolutions of the Civil Service Commission finding petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service were based on reasonable and justifiable grounds; that petitioners' perceived
grievances were no excuse for them not to conduct classes and defy the return-to-work order issued by their
superiors; that the immediate execution of the dismissal orders of Secretary Cario was sanctioned by Sec. 47,
par. (2), of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292) as well as Sec. 37, par. (b), Art. IX of PD No. 807,
[8]
and Sec. 32, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.0. No. 292. Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied on 15 May 1997, [9] petitioners then appealed by certiorari to this Court on
26 June 1997, docketed as G.R. No. 129221.
Meanwhile, on 24 April 1998 the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals[10] rendered a joint decision in CAG.R. SP No. 37784 and Nos. 37808-14 likewise dismissing the petitions for lack of merit.[11] The appellate court
rejected petitioners' contention that they should not have been penalized for participating in the
September/October 1990 mass actions because they were merely exercising their constitutional right to free
assembly. In so ruling the Court of Appeals cited Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr.
[12]
wherein this Court ruled that the public school teachers' mass actions of September/October 1990 were "to
all intents and purposes a strike x x x constitut[ing] a concealed and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence
from, work which it was the teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic
reasons." Petitioners' contention that Secretary Cario's decision to dismiss them was not supported by
evidence was likewise rejected in view of petitioners' admissions and/or failure to refute the factual finding that
petitioners actually joined the mass actions based on the report of absences submitted by their respective
school principals. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied in the resolution of 20 August 1996,
[13]
petitioners then filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court on 1 October 1996, docketed as G.R.
No, 126183.
By resolution of 7 October 1997 we granted petitioners' motion for the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 126183
and 129221 involving as they did common questions of fact and law.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals grievously erred in affirming the CSC resolutions finding
them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when their only "offense" was to exercise
their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of their
grievances. Moreover petitioners insist that the mass actions of September/October 1990 were not "strikes" as
there was no actual disruption of classes. Petitioners therefore ask for exoneration or, in the alternative, award
of back wages for the period of three (3) years when they were not allowed to work while awaiting resolution of
their appeals by the MSPB and CSC, deducting the period of six (6) months' suspension eventually meted
them.
The petitions must be denied in view of previous rulings of this Court already settling all the issues raised
by petitioners. It is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle
of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases
where the facts are substantially the same. [14] Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
disturb not what is settled.[15]
As early as 18 December 1990 we have categorically ruled in the consolidated cases of Manila Public
School Teachers Association v. Laguio Jr.[16] and Alliance of Concerned Teachers v. Hon. Isidro Cario[17] that
the mass actions of September/October 1990 staged by Metro Manila public school teachers "amounted to a
strike in every sense of the term, constituting as they did, a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of or
absence from work which it was said teachers' sworn duty to perform, carried out for essentially economic
reasons -- to protest and pressure the Government to correct what, among other grievances, the
strikers perceived to be the unjust or prejudicial implementation of the salary standardization law insofar as
they were concerned, the non-payment or delay in payment of various fringe benefits and allowances to
which they were entitled, and the imposition of additional teaching loads and longer teaching
hours." In Rolando Gan v. Civil Service Commission, [18] we denied the claim that the teachers were thereby
denied their rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances reasoning that
this constitutional liberty to be upheld, like any other liberty, must be exercised within reasonable limits so as

not to prejudice the public welfare. But the public school teachers in the case of the 1990 mass actions did not
exercise their constitutional rights within reasonable limits. On the contrary, they committed acts prejudicial to
the best interest of the service by staging the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes
and refusing to go back even after they had been ordered to do so. Had the teachers availed of their free time
- recess, after classes, weekends or holidays - to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper
authorities within the bounds of law, no one - not the DECS, the CSC or even the Supreme Court - could have
held them liable for their participation in the mass actions.[19]
With respect to our ruling in PBM Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., [20] invoked
by petitioners, we have likewise already ruled in the Rolando Gan case[21] that the PBM ruling - that the rights
of free expression and assembly could not be lightly disregarded as they occupy a preferred position in the
hierarchy of civil liberties - was not applicable to defend the validity of the 1990 mass actions because what
were pitted therein against the rights of free expression and of assembly were inferior property rights while the
higher consideration involved in the case of the striking teachers was the education of the youth which must, at
the very least, be equated with the freedom of assembly and to petition the government for redress of
grievances.[22]
We affirmed the foregoing rulings in Bagana v. Court of Appeals[23] by denying a similar petition filed by
another group of teachers who participated in the 1990 mass actions but who claimed to have been merely
exercising their constitutional right to free assembly. We held in Bagana that the Court of Appeals committed
no reversible error in affirming the CSC resolutions finding the teachers guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and imposing penalties of six (6) months' suspension without pay. In Bangalisan v.
Court of Appeals[24] we added that the persistent refusal of the striking teachers to call the mass actions by the
conventional term "strike" did not erase the true nature of the mass actions as unauthorized stoppages of work
the purpose of which was to obtain a favorable response to the teachers' economic grievances. We again
stressed that the teachers were penalized not because they exercised their right to peaceably assemble but
because of the manner by which such right was exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and unilateral absences
thus disrupting classes in various schools in Metro Manila which produced adverse effects upon the students
for whose education the teachers were responsible. But herein petitioners contend that classes were not
actually disrupted because substitute teachers were immediately appointed by Secretary Cario. Besides
being a purely factual assertion which this Court cannot take cognizance of in a petition for review, the fact that
the prompt remedial action taken by Secretary Cario might have partially deflected the adverse effects of the
mass protests did not erase the administrative liability of petitioners for the intended consequences thereof
which were the very reason why such prompt remedial action became necessary.
Considering the foregoing, we find that respondent Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the CSC
resolutions finding petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
As an alternative prayer, petitioners ask that in the event their exoneration is not decreed they be awarded
back wages for the period when they were not allowed to work by reason of the supposed unjustified
immediate implementation of the dismissal orders of Secretary Cario while awaiting resolution of their appeals
by the MSPB and CSC.
The issue of whether back wages may be awarded to teachers ordered reinstated to the service after the
dismissal orders of Secretary Cario were commuted by the CSC to six (6) months' suspension is already
settled.
In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals[25] we resolved the issue in the negative on the ground that the teachers
were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended, two (2) circumstances necessary for the grant of back
wages in administrative disciplinary cases. Like herein petitioners, those in Bangalisan were also teachers
who participated in the 1990 mass actions for which they were dismissed by Secretary Cario but ordered
merely suspended for six (6) months by the Civil Service Commission. On a plea that the immediate
implementation of the dismissal orders of Secretary Cario was unjustified, thus warranting an award of back
wages the Court said -

As to the immediate execution of the decision of the Secretary against petitioners, the same is authorized by
Section 47, paragraph (2), of Executive Order No. 292, thus: "The Secretaries and heads of agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decision shall be final
in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding
thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office is appealable to the Commission, the
same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only
after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
And since it was already the final dismissal orders of Secretary Cario which were being carried out,
immediate implementation even pending appeal was clearly sanctioned by the aforequoted provision of the
Administrative Code of 1987.[26] Hence, being legal, the immediate execution of the dismissal orders could not
be considered unjustified.
The cases cited by petitioners to support their prayer for back salaries, namely, Abellera v. City of
Baguio[27] and Bautista v. Peralta[28] being cases which involved the unjustified immediate execution of the
dismissal orders of the then Civil Service Commissioner pending appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals
are therefore not applicable to justify petitioners' prayer. Neither could petitioners be considered to have been
exonerated from the charges levelled against them by Secretary Cario from the mere fact that they were
found guilty only of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service by the CSC. It must be remembered
that Secretary Cario charged petitioners with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of civil
service law, rules and regulations, etc., for having participated in the 1990 illegal mass actions. On appeal the
CSC while affirming the factual finding that petitioners indeed participated in the mass actions found them
liable only for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Clearly the CSC decision did not proceed
from a finding that petitioners did not commit the acts complained of. Having been found to have actually
participated in the illegal mass actions although found answerable for a lesser offense, petitioners could not be
considered as fully innocent of the charges against them.[29] Being found liable for a lesser offense is not
equivalent to exoneration.[30]
Thus in Bangalisan we denied the claim for back wages of those teachers who were found to have
actually participated in the 1990 mass actions but granted the claim of one Rodolfo Mariano who was absent
only because he attended the wake and interment of his grandmother. In Jacinto v. Court of
Appeals[31] we again denied the claim for back wages of teachers found to have given cause for their
suspension, i.e., their unjustified abandonment of classes to the prejudice of their students but granted the
claim of Merlinda Jacinto who was absent because of illness.
Petitioners do not deny, nay they even admit, having participated in the 1990 mass actions. Thus having
given cause for their supension, their prayer for back wages must be denied conformably with settled rulings of
this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED and the assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 1995 and 24 April 1996 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO,

PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA,
BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a
legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and
petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,
Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March
4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first
shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and
from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed
demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent
Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties parties
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration at
Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated
by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00
A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the
Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S.
de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio
Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna
and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass
demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as
spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the
meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO
that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon
warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who
without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following
morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing
CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked Company
represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino,
Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March
3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers
may join the Malacaang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4,
1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus
utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA,

particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this
warning of the Company shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the
officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The union
panel countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacaang
demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company
which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows:
'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION
MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite
the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the
demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from
6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4,
1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first
shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15,
all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20,
rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B",
pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief
Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because
they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said
mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses
of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not
directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador,
in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and
herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair
labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the
respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that
they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for
reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the
evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16
and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred
that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September
15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners
had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for
reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be
accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo, 1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of the
five-day period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period
elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in
support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of
herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules
(Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).

At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24, 1969 and
addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17,
as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed
within five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order
of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the order dated
October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to
excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office
clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and
"K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein
petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the case at
bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the
central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an
individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of
his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with general principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and
property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may
not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that "the
happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be
judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise." 5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas
that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the
minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas
cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the
liberties of all are protected.7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights
essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these
freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their
suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The
citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights
are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of

government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the
influential and powerful, and of oligarchs political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as
they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives
these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or
rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property
rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent
criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right
to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and
reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo
inGonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs.
Sullivan, 14believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in
relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice
Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule
formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration
of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein
petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with
private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles governing
a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4,
1969 before Malacaang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer,
herein private respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom
expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before
appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig.
They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police
excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union
and its members fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm
to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its
productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees
with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by
the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own
employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have
been all the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against
alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were
fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the untrammelled
enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by
reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for
the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the
difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic
situation was a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace
officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-avis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of

their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being
broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester
and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of
which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this
basic tenet as a coveted boon at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human
personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and social
justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate
happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of
bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for
the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well
as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the
respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular working
hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the
workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual
tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom
should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by
any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally
appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar
concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any
industrial dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex
"F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and
that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work
in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an
effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well
as their total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of
their cause but also immediately action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction
over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of
expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised
by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the
purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial
indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police
persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of their projected demonstration
and the company could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by
reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse
only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union
reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the
mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of
the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its
mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig
police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as
it is unconstitutional.
III

The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the
respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police
abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress
of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No.
8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm
on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was
interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such common action to better shield
themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the
workers for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of
dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection as the
concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with immorality,
nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled
in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of
Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be
involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance
of their interests.24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court dated
September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable
right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that
matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who
shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief).
Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the
issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more important to them because they had the
courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to
them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One
day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to
forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police
abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free
speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers proof of the
truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such
abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint
and to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and
action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed
to a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did
not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only
mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost
expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it
by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were

cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment
or materials or products were damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the
company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and
electric consumption that day. Such savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages
it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition
for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding
with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes
upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the
people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution
that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the
State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor
of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless
constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the
policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by
employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of
their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of
Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed
to keep faith with its avowed mission its raison d'etre as ordained and directed by the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as
a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at
the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the
finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is
convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against selfincrimination; 25or who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty
without due process of law, 26 even after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these constitutional
immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to
which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these
basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the
questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are
imperative on all public offices including the courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise
and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial
Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to
the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The
right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of
one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient
whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise
these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal.
The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer and its
laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend
his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for
competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should filed
within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten

(10) days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of
procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September
22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have
filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the
petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere
Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or
appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The
answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of
the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible
with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate
rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the
constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be
affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or
strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the
enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was
pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the
Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short,
especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses
therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed
for the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56,
Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one day
if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial
are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on the
ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced
during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments
pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60,
rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp.
70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the
filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution
dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond
the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or where the
arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of
Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject of 29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable.
But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be specifically
raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is
deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it
appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis
mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and complete determination of the dispute can be
made. 30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a
constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of
Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the
institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their defense to the said charge.

In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most
compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human
rights.30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to
except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo
in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without concerning itself
about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case, without
further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially
impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words,
when all the material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been
duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We
can then and there render the appropriate judgment. Is within the contemplation of this doctrine
that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts
without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be
beyond the admit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any
error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of
jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the errors this
Court has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or
excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said
decision here and now even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or
only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to
the lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis
supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this particular case at bar
would an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose
basic human freedoms, including the right to survive, must be according supremacy over the property rights of
their employer firm which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no
actual material damage has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more
imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human rights sanctioned
and shielded with resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be
stressed that the application in the instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon
by herein respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it
subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and
circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with reference to the
case at is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the
Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for
the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new trial is not
"newly discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts,
We hold that such criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section
20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or
procedure and shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided,
however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy
and in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice

and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and
shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is disengaged
from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not even
restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as may be
deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts
that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940;
Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that
this provision is ample enough to have enabled the respondent court to consider whether or not
its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to
the technical meaning of newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua
Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule
in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary
of human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel erroneously
believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed
his motion for reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late considering that
September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of justice,
for the attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr.
Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The
Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600
[1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30,
1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its proper-office
as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained committed. The
late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the
interpretation of procedural rule should never "sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural laws
are no other than technicalities" view them in their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends
themselves for the compliance with which courts have organized and function, but as means
conducive to the realization the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have
remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of
substantial rights of a litigant in altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred
principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly
put by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of the situation." (Urbayan v.
Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point promulgated
in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3
SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules
of procedure "are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to help
secure substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or
termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence
from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the
dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who participated in the
demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the
Union members who are not officers, were not dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers
were specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the firm (pp.
16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates

that not all the 400 or so employee participated in the demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its
thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If
that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and
that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all should have been simply to charge said one-day
absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a
most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as
well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same
time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to destroy
our system of Government, but from men of goodwill good men who allow their proper
concerns to blind them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment
of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however, is
thatpreservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same
effect whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against
misguided zeal is a constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in
our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another,
larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure because
we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of Rights
is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must be
observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic
understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local
police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their
fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer
opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the
immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank
dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank
president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism
as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that the
latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were
nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right
of self organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of
the Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been
aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in
furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace
Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be
contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their
grievances.

xxx xxx xxx

The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents'
libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-organization of
employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right
of the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ.
Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the
normal exercise of the right of the employer to select his employees or to discharge them. It is
directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self
organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...
xxx xxx xxx
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as
an interference with the employees' right of self-organization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as
a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and
intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings
case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such
recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more
justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the company
nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated September
15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their
separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have
realized from other sources during their separation from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.

G.R. No. 169838

April 25, 2006

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon,
Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima Tajar, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of
the Philippine National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL,
and Western Police District Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Petitioners come in three groups.
The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838,1 allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the
Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated
in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.
The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., in G.R. No. 169848,2 who allege
that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held on September 26, 2005
was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. They further assert that on October 5, 2005, a group they
participated in marched to Malacaang to protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the country
under an "undeclared" martial rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them
were arrested and suffered injuries.
The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No. 169881,3 allege that they conduct
peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual members as citizens,
specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of
"Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to implement it.
KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola
bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing
injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which
KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the University of Santo
Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented
them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them.4 Three other
rallyists were arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12,
13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no
permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced.
B.P. No. 880, "The Public Assembly Act of 1985," provides:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880
An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise By The People Of Their Right Peaceably To Assemble And Petition The
Government [And] For Other Purposes
Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled:
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. To this end,
the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and
equal protection of the law.
Sec. 3. Definition of terms. For purposes of this Act:
(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of
mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or
expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any
state of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of
grievances.

The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for religious
purposes shall be governed by local ordinances; Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as
provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by
workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing
rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other
thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are
allowed access.
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace
keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.
(d) "Modification of a permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly,
rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar
changes.
Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required. A written permit shall be required for any person or
persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the
public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private
property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or
in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules
and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign
period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.
Sec. 5. Application requirements. All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the
purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used
for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public
address systems to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of the applicant under Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose
jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public
assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or
municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or
municipal building.
Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application.
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless
there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger
to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days
from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for
any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit,
said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be
deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting
the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on
the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in
his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.

(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate court, its decisions may be
appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond
and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms
satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of
filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in
his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
Sec. 7. Use of Public throroughfare. Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for an appreciable
length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his
behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the
participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious or undue
interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.
Sec. 8. Responsibility of applicant. It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a
public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall
be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to
the following:
(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;|avvphi|.net
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the
lawful activities of the public assembly;
(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public
assembly may be held peacefully;
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit;
and
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering
with the rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly.
Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with
the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent
under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one
hundred (100) meters away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.
Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested. It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their
assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their
responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the
freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following
guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete
uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and
dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be
equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high
shoes with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless
the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate
destruction of property.
Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed.
However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:

(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible
disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are
thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the
ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the
disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or
abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the
participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall
immediately order it to forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly
unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such
arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public assembly shall not
constitute a ground for dispersal.
Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. When the public assembly is held without a permit
where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. The following shall constitute violations of the Act:
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having
first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such
permit for such purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That
no person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise
peaceful assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by
the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf;
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit
by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful
assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to
disperse the public assembly;
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of
the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:
1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the
like;
2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
3. the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a
motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.
Sec. 14. Penalties. Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the
immediately preceding section shall be punished as follows:
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six
months;
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by
imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;

(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day
to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;
(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one
day to thirty days.
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity
of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions
which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings
may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks
within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act.
Sec. 16. Constitutionality. Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity
or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby.
Sec. 17. Repealing clause. All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or parts
thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified
accordingly.
Sec. 18. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, October 22, 1985.
CPR, on the other hand, is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacaang dated September 21, 2005,
shown in Annex "A" to the Petition in G.R. No. 169848, thus:
Malacaang Official
Manila, Philippines NEWS
Release No. 2 September 21, 2005
STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
On Unlawful Mass Actions
In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government groups to inflame the political
situation, sow disorder and incite people against the duly constituted authorities, we have instructed the PNP
as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a "no permit, no rally" policy, disperse groups that run
afoul of this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of the land as well as ordinances on the proper
conduct of mass actions and demonstrations.
The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force, in lieu of maximum tolerance. The authorities will
not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of people and inciting them
into actions that are inimical to public order, and the peace of mind of the national community.
Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The majority of law-abiding citizens have the right to be protected by
a vigilant and proactive government.
We appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in lawful and peaceful conduct befitting of a
democratic society.
The Presidents call for unity and reconciliation stands, based on the rule of law.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines
is a signatory.5
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant
to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for
which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in
support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the
exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that
the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based
legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of
the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid
exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and
allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.
Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. The two standards
stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent.
Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance
set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication.
Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore
B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can
set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on
clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day
requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise
interest on the issue would possibly wane.
As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the
rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it
contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling
effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
Respondents in G.R. No. 169838 are Eduardo Ermita, as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor Lito
Atienza, Chief, of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Gen. Arturo Lomibao, National Capital Region Police
Office (NCRPO) Chief, PNP Maj. Gen. Vidal Querol, and Manila Police District (MPD) Chief Gen. Pedro
Bulaong.
Respondents in G.R. No. 169848 are Eduardo Ermita as Executive Secretary and in his personal
capacity;Angelo Reyes, as Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments; Arturo Lomibao, as Chief Vidal
Querol, as Chief, NCRPO; Pedro Bulaong, as Chief, MPD, and all other public officers and private individuals
acting under their control, supervision and instruction.
Respondents in G.R. No. 169881 are the Honorable Executive Secretary, PNP Director General Arturo
Lomibao, the Honorable Mayor Joselito Atienza, and PNP MPD Chief Pedro Bulaong.
Respondents argue that:
1. Petitioners have no standing because they have not presented evidence that they had been "injured,
arrested or detained because of the CPR," and that "those arrested stand to be charged with violating
Batas Pambansa [No.] 880 and other offenses."
2. Neither B.P. No. 880 nor CPR is void on its face. Petitioners cannot honestly claim that the time,
place and manner regulation embodied in B.P. No. 880 violates the three-pronged test for such a
measure, to wit: (a) B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral, i.e., it has no reference to content of regulated
speech; (b) B.P. No. 880 is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, i.e., the
interest cannot be equally well served by a means that is less intrusive of free speech interests; and (c)
B.P. No. 880 leaves open alternative channels for communication of the information.6
3. B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of the law. Section 5 requires the statement of
the public assemblys time, place and manner of conduct. It entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave
public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade.
Furthermore, nothing in B.P. No. 880 authorizes the denial of a permit on the basis of a rallys program
content or the statements of the speakers therein, except under the constitutional precept of the "clear
and present danger test." The status of B.P. No. 880 as a content-neutral regulation has been
recognized in Osmea v. Comelec.7
4. Adiong v. Comelec8 held that B.P. No. 880 is a content-neutral regulation of the time, place and
manner of holding public assemblies and the law passes the test for such regulation, namely, these
regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to support them.

5. Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court9 held that a local chief executive has the authority to
exercise police power to meet "the demands of the common good in terms of traffic decongestion and
public convenience." Furthermore, the discretion given to the mayor is narrowly circumscribed by
Sections 5 (d), and 6 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), 13 and 15 of the law.
6. The standards set forth in the law are not inconsistent. "Clear and convincing evidence that the
public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health" and "imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil"
both express the meaning of the "clear and present danger test."10
7. CPR is simply the responsible and judicious use of means allowed by existing laws and ordinances
to protect public interest and restore public order. Thus, it is not accurate to call it a new rule but rather
it is a more pro-active and dynamic enforcement of existing laws, regulations and ordinances to prevent
chaos in the streets. It does not replace the rule of maximum tolerance in B.P. No. 880.
Respondent Mayor Joselito Atienza, for his part, submitted in his Comment that the petition in G.R. No. 169838
should be dismissed on the ground that Republic Act No. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit
independently of B.P. No. 880; that his denials of permits were under the "clear and present danger" rule as
there was a clamor to stop rallies that disrupt the economy and to protect the lives of other people; that J. B. L.
Reyes v. Bagatsing,11 Primicias v. Fugoso,12 and Jacinto v. CA,13 have affirmed the constitutionality of requiring
a permit; that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880
is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.
The petitions were ordered consolidated on February 14, 2006. After the submission of all the Comments, the
Court set the cases for oral arguments on April 4, 2006,14 stating the principal issues, as follows:
1. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12 13(a) and 14(a)
thereof, and Republic Act No. 7160:
(a) Are these content-neutral or content-based regulations?
(b) Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness?
(c) Do they constitute prior restraint?
(d) Are they undue delegations of powers to Mayors?
(e) Do they violate international human rights treaties and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights?
2. On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR):
(a) Is the policy void on its face or due to vagueness?
(b) Is it void for lack of publication?
(c) Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the rallies of September 26 and October 4, 5 and 6,
2005?
During the course of the oral arguments, the following developments took place and were approved and/or
noted by the Court:
1. Petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their
petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR
is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
2. The Solicitor General agreed with the observation of the Chief Justice that CPR should no longer be
used as a legal term inasmuch as, according to respondents, it was merely a "catchword" intended to
clarify what was thought to be a misunderstanding of the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No.
880 and that, as stated in the affidavit executed by Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and submitted
to the Ombudsman, it does not replace B.P. No. 880 and the maximum tolerance policy embodied in
that law.
The Court will now proceed to address the principal issues, taking into account the foregoing developments.
Petitioners standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly
and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which
requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nations streets and parks. They have, in fact,

purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit
can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have
challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit.
Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together
with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of
constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without
which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. As stated in Jacinto v. CA,15 the Court, as
early as the onset of this century, in U.S. v. Apurado,16 already upheld the right to assembly and petition, as
follows:
There is no question as to the petitioners rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress
of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as
to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution,
particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII.
Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the peoples exercise of
these rights. As early as the onset of this century, this Court in U.S. vs. Apurado, already upheld the right to
assembly and petition and even went as far as to acknowledge:
"It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest
against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high
pitch of excitement, and the greater, the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule
will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be
permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an
excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right
to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to
exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took
part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not
happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such
occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be
exercised in drawing the line betweendisorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable
assembly and a tumultuous uprising."
Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso,17 the Court likewise sustained the primacy of freedom of speech and to
assembly and petition over comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks.
Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. In Primicias, this Court
said:
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of
democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the
exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to
regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power," which is
the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its
legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may
be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative
bodies called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.18
Reyes v. Bagatsing19 further expounded on the right and its limits, as follows:

1. It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free
speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit:
"No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." Free speech, like free
press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern
without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of
views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or
contempt proceedings unless there be a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State]
has a right to prevent." Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for
consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost
deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case
with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right
to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a
necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. To
paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court in
Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the
press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable.
In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is
called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a
limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is
the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals,
public health, or any other legitimate public interest.
2. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and peaceable assembly better
expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: "It must never be forgotten,
however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free speech
lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It
was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication
that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of violence
can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such
utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution." What was rightfully stressed is the
abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether verbal or printed, being in a context of violence. It must
always be remembered that this right likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the
opportunity to give vent to their views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For if the
peaceful means of communication cannot be availed of, resort to non-peaceful means may be the only
alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. It means more than just the right to
be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value may
lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true
ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well-defined limits. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly.
One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of
dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is
ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As pointed
out in an early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United States v. Apurado: "It is rather to
be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against
grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high
pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as
a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers." It bears repeating
that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism

must be avoided. To give free rein to ones destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a
mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our scheme of values.
There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. The Philippines is
committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939 vintage, of Justice Roberts in Hague v.
CIO: "Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens. The
privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on
national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be
exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and
good order; but must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied." The above excerpt was
quoted with approval in Primicias v. Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was implicit in Municipality of
Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where this Court categorically affirmed that plazas or parks and
streets are outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of
plaintiff-municipality. Reference was made to such plaza "being a promenade for public use," which
certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a
permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally starting from a public park that is the
Luneta.
4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to the gates of the US embassy,
hardly two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on
the matter. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila should grant a permit for a public
meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, this Court categorically declared: "Our conclusion finds support in
the decision in the case of Willis Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the
statute of New Hampshire P.L. chap. 145, section 2, providing that no parade or procession upon any
ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from
the selectmen of the town or from licensing committee, was construed by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the
license, and held valid. And the Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by
Chief Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that a statute requiring
persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from
the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of
speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are
strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the
parade or procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity
to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, * * *.
"Nor should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored:
"Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society
maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted
abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and
convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with
civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately
depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of
social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public
convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right
which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection."
xxx

6. x x x The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these
words: "The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not
as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the
speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the
Constitution protects." There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were
marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. Even then, only the guilty parties
should be held accountable. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of
discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered
discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur
but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially
so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must be for the
assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking
for the American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some
other place."
xxx
8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing
authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private
place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such
application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise
whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public
place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger
test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so
minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly,
along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It
cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, -- even more so than on the other departments
rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred
rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so
felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of judgment." Nonetheless, the
presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as
they do precedence and primacy. x x x.
B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in Reyes.
The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes:
Reyes v. Bagatsing
(G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983,
125 SCRA 553, 569)
8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit
to hold an assembly should inform the licensing
authority of the date, the public placewhere and the
time when it will take place. If it were a private
place, only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required. Such
application should be filed well ahead in time to
enable the public official concerned to appraise
whether there may be valid objections to the grant
of the permit or to its grant but at another public

B.P. No. 880

Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not
required.-- A written permit shall be required for any
person or persons to organize and hold a public
assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall
be required if the public assembly shall be done or
made in a freedom park duly established by law or
ordinance or in private property, in which case only
the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required, or in the campus of a
government-owned and operated educational
institution which shall be subject to the rules and
regulations of said educational institution. Political

place. It is an indispensable condition to such

refusal or modification that the clear and present
danger test be the standard for the decision
reached. If he is of the view that there is such an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter,
his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus
if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper
judicial authority.

meetings or rallies held during any election

campaign period as provided for by law are not
covered by this Act.
Sec. 5. Application requirements.-- All applications
for a permit shall comply with the following
guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and
shall include the names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such public
assembly; the date, time and duration
thereof, and place or streets to be used for
the intended activity; and the probable
number of persons participating, the
transport and the public address systems to
be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty
and responsibility of applicant under Section
8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the
office of the mayor of the city or municipality
in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is
to be held, at least five (5) working days
before the scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which
must be duly acknowledged in writing, the
office of the city or municipal mayor shall
cause the same to immediately be posted at
a conspicuous place in the city or municipal
building.
Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application.
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a
permit unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that the public assembly will create
a clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his
behalf shall act on the application within two
(2) working days from the date the
application was filed, failing which, the
permit shall be deemed granted. Should for
any reason the mayor or any official acting in
his behalf refuse to accept the application for
a permit, said application shall be posted by
the applicant on the premises of the office of
the mayor and shall be deemed to have

been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is
imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil warranting the denial or modification of
the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in
writing and served on the applica[nt] within
twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his
behalf denies the application or modifies the
terms thereof in his permit, the applicant
may contest the decision in an appropriate
court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial
Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the
Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate
Appellate Court, its decisions may be
appealed to the appropriate court within
forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the
same. No appeal bond and record on appeal
shall be required. A decision granting such
permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to
the applicant shall be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this section
shall be decided within twenty-four (24)
hours from date of filing. Cases filed
hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to
the executive judge for disposition or, in his
absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be
appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by
formal appeals are hereby allowed.
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that
simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmea v.
Comelec,20 where the Court referred to it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of
holding public assemblies.21
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies22 that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based
because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled
to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly
content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of
grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum
tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in
the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public
safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the
right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, thus:
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 20
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
xxx
Article 29
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality
is possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are
determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general
welfare in a democratic society.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of
the United Nations.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 19.
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and
responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are
provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or
morals.
Contrary to petitioners claim, the law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions. "Public" does not
have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known. Websters Dictionary defines it, thus:23
public, n, x x x 2a: an organized body of people x x x 3: a group of people distinguished by common interests
or characteristics x x x.
Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to "rally, demonstration, march, parade,
procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place." So it does not cover any and
all kinds of gatherings.
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the
extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard the clear and
present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to "imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil" in
Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent
Mayor has the same power independently under Republic Act No. 716024 is thus not necessary to resolve in
these proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum through the creation
of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time:
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity
of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions

which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings
may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks
within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act.
This brings up the point, however, of compliance with this provision.
The Solicitor General stated during the oral arguments that, to his knowledge, only Cebu City has declared a
freedom park Fuente Osmea.
That of Manila, the Sunken Gardens, has since been converted into a golf course, he added.
If this is so, the degree of observance of B.P. No. 880s mandate that every city and municipality set aside a
freedom park within six months from its effectivity in 1985, or 20 years ago, would be pathetic and regrettable.
The matter appears to have been taken for granted amidst the swell of freedom that rose from the peaceful
revolution of 1986.
Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essential part of the laws system of regulation of
the peoples exercise of their right to peacefully assemble and petition, the Court is constrained to rule that
after thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, no prior permit may be required for the exercise of such
right in any public park or plaza of a city or municipality until that city or municipality shall have complied with
Section 15 of the law. For without such alternative forum, to deny the permit would in effect be to deny the
right. Advance notices should, however, be given to the authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly
proceedings.
The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated earlier, the Solicitor General has conceded that the
use of the term should now be discontinued, since it does not mean anything other than the maximum
tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880. This is stated in the Affidavit of respondent Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita, submitted by the Solicitor General, thus:
14. The truth of the matter is the policy of "calibrated preemptive response" is in consonance with the legal
definition of "maximum tolerance" under Section 3 (c) of B.P. Blg. 880, which is the "highest degree of restraint
that the military, police and other peacekeeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the
dispersal of the same." Unfortunately, however, the phrase "maximum tolerance" has acquired a different
meaning over the years. Many have taken it to mean inaction on the part of law enforcers even in the face of
mayhem and serious threats to public order. More so, other felt that they need not bother secure a permit when
holding rallies thinking this would be "tolerated." Clearly, the popular connotation of "maximum tolerance" has
departed from its real essence under B.P. Blg. 880.
15. It should be emphasized that the policy of maximum tolerance is provided under the same law which
requires all pubic assemblies to have a permit, which allows the dispersal of rallies without a permit, and which
recognizes certain instances when water cannons may be used. This could only mean that "maximum
tolerance" is not in conflict with a "no permit, no rally policy" or with the dispersal and use of water cannons
under certain circumstances for indeed, the maximum amount of tolerance required is dependent on how
peaceful or unruly a mass action is. Our law enforcers should calibrate their response based on the
circumstances on the ground with the view to preempting the outbreak of violence.
16. Thus, when I stated that calibrated preemptive response is being enforced in lieu of maximum tolerance I
clearly was not referring to its legal definition but to the distorted and much abused definition that it has now
acquired. I only wanted to disabuse the minds of the public from the notion that law enforcers would shirk their
responsibility of keeping the peace even when confronted with dangerously threatening behavior. I wanted to
send a message that we would no longer be lax in enforcing the law but would henceforth follow it to the letter.
Thus I said, "we have instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a no permit,
no rally policy . . . arrest all persons violating the laws of the land . . . unlawful mass actions will be dispersed."
None of these is at loggerheads with the letter and spirit of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880. It is thus absurd for
complainants to even claim that I ordered my co-respondents to violate any law.25
At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no
valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something else.

Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum
tolerance, which specifically means the following:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms. For purposes of this Act:
xxx
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace
keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.
xxx
Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with
the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent
under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one
hundred (100) meters away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.
Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested. It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their
assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their
responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the
freedom of expression is primordial.1avvphil.net Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the
following guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete
uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and
dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be
equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high
shoes with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless
the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate
destruction of property.
Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed.
However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible
disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are
thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the
ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the
disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or
abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the
participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall
immediately order it to forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly
unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such
arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
(d) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public assembly shall not
constitute a ground for dispersal.
xxx
Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. When the public assembly is held without a permit
where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. The following shall constitute violations of the Act:
(e) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;

(f) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse
the public assembly;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the
public assembly or on the occasion thereof:
xxx
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle,
its horns and loud sound systems.
Furthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by petitioners where mayors do not act on
applications for a permit and when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not produce one, the rally
is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary consequence and part of maximum tolerance,
rallyists who can show the police an application duly filed on a given date can, after two days from said date,
rally in accordance with their application without the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit being then
presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of the authorities to show that there has been a denial of the
application, in which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the procedure of maximum tolerance
prescribed by the law.
In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people, especially
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said
that "in cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against the government and in favor
of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions that
restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy presumption against their validity. These laws and
actions are subjected toheightened scrutiny."26
For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and
must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some
police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it
does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place
and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the
government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to
the constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a
deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after
that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and
plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of
whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the
police and the mayors office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the
Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with
Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable
freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this
Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to
peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied
with Section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR), insofar as it would purport
to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents
are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and toSTRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum
tolerance. The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa
No. 880 is SUSTAINED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.