G.R. No.

158298 August 11, 2010

ISIDRO ABLAZA, petitioner, Vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent
FACTS
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the
celebration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late
brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9,
1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a
marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died
without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano
before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself
included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any
time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.
The RTC dismissed the petition for the following reasons: (1) petition is filed out of time and
(2) the petitioner is not a party to the marriage. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the
RTC denied the petition.
The CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother?
RULING: yes. The petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
The petition is meritorious. Before anything, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue
posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a) explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates line to
distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime
of the Civil Code. The applicable law was the Civil Code. The old and new Civil Code contain no
provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage and when.
The only party who can demonstrate a proper interest can file the action. Interest within the
meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case. Assuming the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material
interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit.
The right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of
whether Cresenciano had any decendants, ascendants, or children, and of whether the
petitioner was the lates Cresencianos surviving heir.
The RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this case. We reversed their
error, in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced.
The petitioner did not implead Leonila, who as the late Cresencianos surviving wife, stood to
be benifited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. Not all marriages celebrated under
the old Civil Code required a marriage license for their validity; hence her participation in this action is
made all the more necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated

without a marriage license and whether the marriage migtht have been a marriage expected from the
requirements of a maariage license.

Republic vs. Dayot

GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008
FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On
August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of
the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy
against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand,
Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in
June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986.
Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a
marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose
and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact
that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose
and Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage
is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any
time.

Perez vs. CA, GR No. 118870, March 29, 1996

(Special Proceedings Custody: A child under seven years shall not be separated from his mother)
Facts: Respondent father, a doctor of medicine and petitioner mother, a registered nurse working in
the US are married couples who are separated in fact with only one child.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody of their son.
The RTC issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child to his mother, citing the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code.
Upon appeal by the father, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts order and awarded custody
of the boy to him ruling that there were enough reasons to deny petitioner custody over the child even
under seven years old. It held that granting custody to the boys father would be for the childs best
interest and welfare.
Article 213, par 2, provides in case of separation of parents that no child under 7 years of age
shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court also states that No child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefore.
Issue: WON custody of the child is to be given to the father.
Held: No. The provisions of the law clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall
not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. The use of the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Sec 6 of the
Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
Couples who are separated in fact are covered within the term separation.
The Family Code in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a child below seven years old shall
not be separated from the mother (Article 363), has expressly repealed the earlier Article 17, par 3 of
the Child and youth Welfare Code which reduced the childs age to 5 years.

(DETAILED DOCTRINE: The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be
separated from his mother finds its raison dtre in the basic need of a child for his mothers loving
care.
Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the courts awarding the custody of such a child to
someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past,
the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and
parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.
The status of the child should be legitimate for this rule to apply.

CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS & OSG

GR 186571
FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz (Gerbert) was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization. He later married a Filipina, Daisylyn Sto. Tomas (Daisy). Gerbert left for
Canada soon after the wedding because of his work. He returned after 4 months to surprise Daisy, but
discovered that she was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned
to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice in Ontario, Canada granted
his petition for divorce.
2 years after the divorce, Gerbert found another Filipina to love. Gerbert went to the Civil Registry
Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisys marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed him that
the marriage between him and Daisy still subsists under Philippine law. To be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to a NSO
Circular.
Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved with the RTC. Daisy did not file any responsive pleading and offered no opposition to the
petition. In fact, Daisy alleged her desire to file a similar case but was prevented by financial
constrains. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to
Gerberts.
The RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was NOT THE PROPER PARTY
to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a NATURALIZED
CANADIAN CITIZEN. It ruled that ONLY THE FILIPINO spouse can avail of the remedy, under Art. 26,
2 of the Family Code.1
Issue
W/N Art. 26(2) of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for
the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
Ruling

The alien spouse can claim no right undert Art. 26(2) of the Family Code as the substantive
right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.

The legislative intent behind Art 26(2) is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree

Art. 17 of the New Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of Art. 26(2) of the Family
Code provides the direct exception to the rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of
the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse
An action based on Art. 26(2) is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If
the court finds that the decree capacitated the aliens spouse to remarry, the courts can declare the
Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,

however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by
the decree) whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law

Remedy Available to Alien Spouse

The availability under Art 26(2) of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the alien
spouse of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national
law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence in
favor of the alien spouse, pursuant to Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgment (Please see pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Sec. 48,
Rule 39 and Sec. 24 Rule 132)
* Please take note: In this case, the SC considered the recording of the divorce decree on Corpuz
and Sto. Tomas' marriage certificate as legally improper. No judicial order yet exists recognizing the
foreign divorce decree, thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree of Corpuz and Sto. Tomas' marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Corpuz (Please see Art. 407 of
the New Civil Code and the Law on Registry of Civil Status -Act No. 3753)

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner vs. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

G.R. No. 166357

January 14, 2015

PONENTE: Bersamin, J.
TOPIC: Psychological incapacity, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
FACTS:
In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who
concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners experts heavily relied on
petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going
out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents
alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to
her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint
for declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for the
conclusion of psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez
was indeed psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with
regard to this case.
Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in this
case.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE
The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be
rigid, such that their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration
of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and
too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of

less specificity obviously to enable some resiliency in its application. Instead, every court should
approach the issue of nullity not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations,
but according to its own facts in recognition of the verity that no case would be on all fours with the
next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every
trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of
psychology,

must

of

necessity

rely

on

the

opinions

of

experts

in

order

to

inform themselves on the matter, and thus enablethemselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable
demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be considered
We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be
accorded to a marriage that is null and void
ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.
There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be
personally examined by a physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that
adequately establishes the partys psychological incapacity. Hence, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing
that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the
expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other
evidence on the causation.
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural
or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish
causation. The experts findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would
justify their exclusion as evidence.

Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional

temperaments
The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was
in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying.
The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological
incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.
The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely
generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and
competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article
36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they
were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after
the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioners factual premises.
The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the
psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for
by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive
evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties
The frequency of the respondents mahjong playing should not have delimited our
determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should
be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she
made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have
known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose
them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the
long-term effects of the respondents obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life,
particularly on her very young children.
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not
only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a
culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of
her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to
the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her childrens moral and mental
development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE
the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November
4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.