American Grand Strategy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Jonathan Rynhold
Bar-Ilan University
Rynhold@biu.ac.il

American Political Science Association Annual Conference

Washington DC
2014

Please do NOT cite this paper without permission

Abstract
The debate over US policy towards Israel and the peace process is usually framed
without explicit reference to American grand strategy. This is so despite the fact that
approaches to this issue rest implicitly on broader preferences related to US grand
strategy. One of the goals of this paper is to make this relationship explicit. As such, it
demonstrates that proponents of an assertive grand strategy tend to view Israel as a
strategic asset and resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict as unimportant, while
proponents of a cautious grand strategy tend to the opposite conclusions. The paper
then analyzes these grand strategies' approaches to the conflict in empirical terms.
Here it argues that while Israel is an asset, the peace process cannot be ignored. These
insights are then drawn together in the form of a third 'centrist' grand strategy which,
it is concluded, provides a better foundation for approaching the Arab-Israeli conflict.

American Grand Strategy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Introduction
Since 9/11 the Middle East has been at the center of American foreign policy arousing
great controversy. Despite the fact that public sympathy for Israel has risen to new
heights since 9/11, this consensus evaporates when it comes to US policy towards the
peace process.1 This is not new. There has been a long standing debate concerning the
role of Israel in American foreign policy strategic asset or liability a debate that
goes back to the earliest days of the Cold War.2 With the demise of the Soviet Union
and the rise of the peace process in the 1990s that debate waned, but the collapse of
the peace process in 2000 and the 9/11 terror attacks reignited the controversy. This
debate is usually framed without explicit reference to American grand strategy. This
is so despite the fact that approaches to this issue rest implicitly on broader
preferences related to US grand strategy. One of the goals of this paper is to make this
relationship explicit by demonstrating the connection between the specific debate of
US policy to Israel and the peace process to the wider debate over American grand
strategy.

So what is grand strategy and why is it important? Grand strategy involves a selfconscious identification and prioritization of foreign policy goals and a selection of a
plan and the appropriate instruments such as military power or diplomacy to achieve
those goals. It begins with theories about how the world works and what ought to be
the role of one's state in that world.3 As such, grand strategy serves to frame US
policy, though it does not determine it. Grand strategy shifts and approaches to the
Middle East change in response to a variety of external factors, including the policies
pursued by the parties to the conflict towards each other and towards wider US
interests in the region4, as well as, wider shifts in the regional political and strategic
configuration. But these externalities rarely carry an unequivocal message they need
to be interpreted and grand strategy constitutes an important part of the framework
though which these things are interpreted and translated into practical policies.

The paper begins by outlining US strategic interests in the Middle East. In then goes
on to present two rival grand strategies and their attendant approaches to Israel and
2

the Arab-Israeli conflict. Each of these is an ideal-type that has been distilled from the
academic, intellectual and political discourse on the subject. The goal here is to
demonstrate how axioms on the level of grand strategy inform approaches to the
conflict. Specifically, it is demonstrated that proponents of an assertive grand strategy
tend to view Israel as a strategic asset, and resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict as
unimportant, while proponents of a cautious grand strategy tend to the opposite
conclusions. The paper then analyzes these grand strategies' approaches to the conflict
in empirical terms. Here it argues that while Israel is a strategic asset, the peace
process cannot be ignored. These insights are then drawn together in the form of a
third 'centrist' grand strategy which it is concluded, provides a better foundation for
approaching the Arab-Israeli conflict.

US Strategic Interests in the Middle East

Since 1945 there has been a great deal of consensus regarding core US strategic
interests in the Middle East. During the Cold War, the core American strategic
interest was to contain the Soviet Union. Contrary to popular perceptions, the US has
never been dependent on Middle Eastern oil, but the region was still of great strategic
significance, because it was the main source of oil to US allies in Western Europe and
Asia. The concern was that if the USSR or its allies gained control of a large
proportion of these resources they could have used it to pressure US allies to become
neutral. Simultaneously, the US also had a core interest in preventing regional
conflicts involving US and Soviet allies like the Arab-Israeli conflict -- escalating
into a direct military confrontation between the superpowers; especially as such it
might lead to a nuclear exchange.

Following the end of the Cold War, the US no longer had to worry about containing
the Soviet Union or the escalation to a global nuclear confrontation. Moreover, it is
becoming less dependent on foreign oil. In 2005, the US imported 65% of its oil
requirements, by 2013 this had fallen to 40% and this figure is projected to fall
significantly, with some predicting that the US will not need to important any oil by
2030. As of 2012 only about a quarter of all America's oil imports hail from the
Middle East.5

Nonetheless, Middle Eastern energy resources remain of vital importance to the US.
The globalization of oil markets has made the question of who buys and sells a
particular barrel of oil less relevant. US energy security depends on sufficient supplies
to the global economy. Because the US draws energy resources from the global
marketplace, any threat to the stability of that marketplace is a threat to the US.6 The
Middle East has the majority of proven oil reserves in world, as well as nearly half of
the world's natural gas reserves.7 Despite a projected doubling of renewable energy by
2035, the share of fossil fuels in the world energy mix is projected to fall a mere 7%
from 82% to 75%.8 Therefore, the assured supply of oil to the global economy
remains critical. By extension, the US retains a strategic interest in preventing any
hostile power from gaining control over a large enough share of the region's oil so as
they could then use oil revenues to threaten and challenge the US.9

Furthermore, since 9/11 it has become a major strategic priority to prevent terrorist
attacks on the US by radical (primarily Islamist) forces from the region. Most, though
by no means all, also argue that it is very important to prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons, to such groups and
other forces hostile to the US.10 Such proliferation could not only threaten the US
directly but also indirectly, as the use of WMD in the Middle East could threaten the
assured supply of oil to the world economy. This threat has been aptly characterized
as the 'equivalent of a doomsday machine strapped to the global economy.'11

While there has been a consensus regarding most of these strategic interests, there has
been significant disagreement about how to advance them in practice. This debate has
been implicitly informed by different grand strategies. Below, the connection between
these strategies and approaches to Israel and the peace process is made explicit.
US Grand Strategy, Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict12
The conventional way of differentiating grand strategies is by whether they are realist
and liberal, or by the degree of international engagement internationalism verses
isolationism. But these distinctions do not constitute the pertinent dividing lines in
this instance. Indeed, each of the grand strategies identified here has both a liberal and
a realist version. Rather here grand strategies are delineated in terms of the dichotomy
between caution and assertion which, in turn, is measured across the following four
4

dimensions: a) the preferred degree of international engagement and commitment to

allies, b) preferences regarding the required balance between 'hard power' i.e. military
force verses 'soft power' i.e. diplomatic engagement, c) whether international relations
is primarily about rational material interests pursued by nation-states or whether
ideational factors such as extremist ideologies and regime type are more significant,
and d) whether 'blowback' is a central dynamic in international relations. The theory
of 'blowback' asserts that when a state acts in an assertive manner and/or when it
intervenes militarily this generate a strong counter-balancing and/or nationalist
backlash. No assertiveness and intervention, no major hostility.13 This is the most
important parameter.

As for approaches to Israel/Arab-Israeli conflict, they are delineated by the answers

they give to three main questions: i) Is Israel viewed as a strategic asset or as a
liability? ii) What should America's position be regarding the conflict: even-handed or
favor one of the parties? iii) What level of strategic priority is assigned to resolving
the Arab-Israeli conflict? Specifically, does an approach adhere to the doctrine of
'linkage' or not? According to the 'linkage'14 doctrine, the Arab-Israeli conflict is the
lynchpin of regional instability and anti-Americanism in the Middle East and
therefore US energies should be focused on resolving the conflict in such a way as to
satisfy the Arab side. To a large degree, positioning on the first two dimensions
depend on the answer to this question.

The Cautious Grand Strategy - Retrenchment

A cautious, defensive grand strategy is supported by a variety of groups. These
include libertarians, paleoconservatives, and many realist inclined policy-makers like
Scowcroft, Brzezinski, Powell and Hagel, as well as many academic realists, such as
Stephen Walt. Within this school, Realists and Liberals differ regarding the issue of
whether the US should adopt a more unilateral or multilateral strategy, as well as on
US strategy towards international organizations and the promotion of Human Rights
abroad. Some are strongly isolationist, but most favor continued US international
engagement though of a more limited nature than that at present; one with less
alliance commitments and less deployment of the US military abroad. They are very
reluctant to intervene militarily to confront undemocratic regimes, preferring to
engage them diplomatically. Indeed, the dread of getting bogged down and being
5

over-stretched is central to their outlook and it is evident in the Weinberger and

Powell doctrines, which severely circumscribed the terms under which the US would
commit military forces abroad to combat.15 For them, the Vietnam War is a powerful
symbol. The lessons of Vietnam, especially the Tet offensive of 1968, are understood
as demonstrating the strategic futility of military interventionism, for while the US
won many battles militarily including Tet, it was the willingness of its indigenous
nationalist opponent to suffer greater losses that ultimately determined the course of
the war.16 The logic behind this for defensive realists stems from a belief in the
centrality of the logic of the counter-balancing blowback -- in international
relations. From their perspective this dynamic has been compounded following the
end of the Cold War, by the gulf in power between America and other states, which
has lead other countries to be especially fearful of America. Against this background,
defensive Realists advocate that direct US intervention abroad should be extremely
limited.17 Aside from this, defensive Liberals in particular put a positive emphasis of
the power of diplomatic, economic and cultural engagement to build peace by
redressing grievances.18

The Cautious Grand Strategy's Approach towards Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict
Isolationists advocate a complete US withdrawal from the Middle East. They argue
that regional security will take care of itself as states will naturally tend towards a
regionally based balance of power based on mutual deterrence.19 Defensive realists
are less sanguine about the automatic operation of the balance of power. As a result,
they argue the US should continue to deploy its forces in the region 'offshore' i.e. on
aircraft carriers, and only intervene in the last resort if the balance of power
collapses.20 The assumption here is that rational national interests related to
maintaining national sovereignty and state security predominate and that consequently
radical Islamism does not represent an over-arching threat to the US21. Instead, they
posit that while America had discreet conflicts of interests with a variety of different
actors in the Middle East, the vast majority can be handled by political
accommodation, including a nuclear Iran.22 What unites these actors and turns them
into enemies of the US is not religion or ideology, but 'blowback' from American
intervention in the Middle East23, including the stationing of US troops in Saudi
Arabia, the Iraq war24, and critically support for Israel25.

US support for Israel is deemed critical among these factors because supporters of a
cautious grand strategy are drawn to the 'linkage' doctrine that asserts the Arab-Israeli
conflict is the lynchpin galvanizing otherwise desperate sources of instability and
anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Belief in 'blowback' does not necessitate belief
in 'linkage'. But linkage follows a similar logic to blowback and for foreign-policy
generalists who support a cautious grand strategy and who do not know the Middle
East intimately, the prevalence of Israel in American politics, Western media and
Arab rhetoric inclines them to accept the core premise of linkage. From this
perspective Israel is obviously a strategic liability.26 On this view, America's
commitment to the Jewish state constitutes an external intervention in the Middle East
that arouses Arab nationalist rage and 'blowback' against the US. Remove American
support and/or the Arab-Israeli conflict and the threat to the US dissipates.27 As
Scowcroft put it, 'It [the Israeli-Palestinian conflict] creates a sense of grievance and
hatred for us and at some point the chickens will come home to roost.'28 A small
minority, libertarians,29 focus on the first part of the equation removing support for
Israel and withdrawing into isolationism. But for most the focus is on conflict
resolution. As Bill Clinton's National Security Advisor Sandy Berger wrote in 2012,
'There is perhaps no more intractable, yet vital, issue in US foreign policyNone of
these challenges [the threat of a nuclear Iran, the Syrian civil war, the rise of China]
means that Israeli-Palestinian peace is less important now. Indeed, it is more
important.'30 For defensively inclined liberals this logic is reinforced by their
foundational belief in the power of diplomacy to assuage grievances that will lead to
conflict resolution.

While many proponents of retrenchment oppose the 'special relationship with Israel'
and aid to the Jewish state31, others would seek to make the relationship conditional
on Israeli acceptance of their terms for conflict resolution.32 They think that resolving
the Arab-Israeli conflict should be the top priority of US policy towards the Middle
East.33 In this vein, they believe that the US should adopt an 'even-handed' approach
to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which in practice means focusing US pressure on Israel,
which they tend to believe will lead to conflict resolution. This involves the creation
of a Palestinian state, largely irrespective of its internal nature and its underlying
approach to reconciliation with Israel, which is presumably why many advocate
including an unreconstructed Hamas in the diplomatic process.34 As a Center for
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American Progress report put it: ''For all of the institutional problems and corruption
of the Palestinian Authority, the core of the problem remains the Israeli occupation.'35

The Assertive Grand Strategy - Primacy

Among the proponents of an assertive grand strategy are several groups including:
neoconservatives, populist nationalists and liberal hawks. They disagree about the
degree to which the US should promote a US-led world order based on democracy
and Human Rights. But critically, they share a commitment to an assertive
internationalist grand strategy. They are more inclined to intervene in or confront
undemocratic adversaries, whether for idealistic or security-based reasons, than to
engage them and they believe in the utility of hard power and assertiveness in
International Relations. Their focus on hard power is based on a sense that some
conflicts cannot be bridged by diplomacy due to the ideological or theological
character of the adversary in question. In other words, unlike advocate of the cautious
strategy, they do not think that the logic of nationalism and state interests captures the
essence of International Relations. Whereas Vietnam is the historical lesson
emphasized by defensively inclined strategists, avoiding Munich-style appeasement is
the historical lesson emphasized by this group.36

This assertive strategy is inclined to see Israel as a strategic asset for two main
reasons. First, they tend to view totalitarian anti-democratic ideologies as posing an
overarching threat to the United States: Fascism and Nazism in World War II,
Marxist-Leninism in the Cold War and radical Islam in the 21st Century.37 In this
sense, the fact that the US and Israel share common democratic values leads them to
also share common enemies and thus share core common strategic interests.38 As
such, Israel's fight against terrorism is the same as America's fight against terrorism.
Israeli victories against terrorism are American victories against terrorism, while a
defeat for Israel would be a defeat for the US.39 For some, support for Israel as a
democracy is also part of a wider project of expanding a US-led democratic world
order. In addition, Israel is the strongest military power in the Middle East and it has
proven willing to act in an assertive manner, and since they greatly value military
power and assertiveness, this inclines them to value Israel as a strategic asset. (That is
not to say that they support every Israeli policy, indeed they came out very firmly
against Israel arms sales to China, though that issue has now been resolved).40
8

Equally, adherents of assertion reject the doctrine of linkage. In general, they view
anti-Americanism and instability as stemming from radical ideologies and regimes,
not from US actions they reject blowback.41 Thus, they are deeply skeptical of the
value of diplomatically engaging undemocratic regimes. Indeed, even in the 1990s,
they argued that Arab dictators would misconstrue Israel's willingness to compromise
as weakness and they would then exploit it. Indeed, America's embrace of the peace
process reminded them of the appeasement of dictators in the 1930s.42 From their
perspective Israel should not compromise until the Arabs side accepted its legitimacy
recognition of Israel as a Jewish (and democratic) state; otherwise any concession
would just put the Arab side in a better position to weaken America's most reliable
ally. Moreover, without democratization, they feared that any peace Israel made with
one dictator might be overturned by his successor. In other words, genuine ideational
change and regime change are viewed as prerequisite for peace. Consequently,
internal democratic reforms in the Palestinian Authority are more important for peace
and security than diplomatic negotiations between Israel and an unreformed
Palestinian Authority.43 As a result, they argue that resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict
should not be a central concern of US policy and in the meantime the US should lean
heavily towards Israel in the Arab-Israeli arena, in order to back up its strongest, most
reliable and most democratic ally in the Middle East. Israel must be allowed to
militarily defeat Islamist extremism and suicide terrorism when it rears its head. To do
otherwise would constituent appeasement. In the meantime they argue that the US
should support a steadfast Israeli stance based on deterrence. For some, once terrorism
is defeated, this should be combined with US support a major unilateral civilian (not
military) withdrawal from the West Bank to ensure Israeli democracy, combined with
efforts to conduct democratic reform in the Palestinian Authority.44

Assessing Grand Strategies and Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict

In this section the validity of the core suppositions behind each grand strategies
approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict are examined empirically in the context of the
Middle East. The core suppositions that examined are a) whether Israel is a strategic
asset; b) the validity of the 'linkage' doctrine; and c) whether, if linkage is wrong, the
US should basically ignore the peace process, as the assertive strategy suggests.

Evidence for Israel being a Strategic Asset45

Unlike, most of America's allies in the Middle East, Israel is domestically stable,
militarily powerful and reliably pro-American. Whereas, the US has deployed its
forces directly in the Persian Gulf due to the lack of strong reliable allies, in the
Levant, the US is able to remain essentially offshore due to Israel's presence.46
Indeed, Israel has the ability and readiness to intervene militarily to America's
advantage in this sphere. For example, in 2007 Israel destroyed a secret Syrian
nuclear reactor that was part of a secret weapons program. At the time the Bush
administration was constrained from acting militarily to prevent proliferation.47 On a
smaller scale Israel succeeded in assassinating the Hezbollah terrorist Mughniyah,
who had more American blood on his hands than any terrorist apart from Bin Laden.

Israel also provides important intelligence. Its innovative methods, relative

willingness to incur risk, and its cultivation of unique sources, mean that it provides
added value to the US through the sharing raw communications intercepts, and by
providing intelligence regarding terrorist targets. Thus, Israeli information assisted
UN inspectors to dismantle Iraq's WMD program and it also helped to uncover
Russian support for Iran's nuclear program in the 1990s. In the 21st Century the US
and Israel have co-operated to sabotage the Iranian nuclear program by introducing
computer viruses such as Stuxnet into the computer networks running Irans
enrichment program. These joint efforts are believed to have delayed the Iranian
nuclear program by several years. Israel also helped disrupt Hezbollah smuggling and
arms-procurement rings and sleeper cells that were operating in the United States.
Furthermore, it provided information that helped to lead to the arrest of suspects
wanted for the 1998 al-Qaeda bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.48
A leaked, highly classified, NSA memo from April 2013 concluded that, 'Benefits to
the U.S. [of working with Israeli intelligence] include expanded geographic access to
high priority SIGINT targets, access to world-class Israeli cryptanalytic and SIGINT
engineering expertise, and access to a large pool of highly qualified analysts NSAs
cyber partnerships [with Israel] have resulted in unprecedented access and collection
breakthroughs that both sides acknowledge would not have been possible to achieve
without the other.'49

10

The US also benefits from Israel's battlefield experience. The countries Special Forces
train together and Israeli techniques in counter-terrorism have been applied by the US.
For example, the Israeli approach to integrating human and technological collection
means and weapons platforms profoundly influenced the US approach in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen. The employment of Israeli methods reduced US
casualties in an urban environment by deploying thousands of Israeli designed add-on
armor to their armored vehicles and by using trained of dogs to detect bombs. The
latter was critical in reducing deaths from improvised explosive devices, which had
been the main cause of US casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, in the field
of homeland security, Israel has helped the US with infrastructure protection, airport
security, cyber security and emergency planning and response. Tens of thousands of
Americans have been trained in these various techniques.50

Israeli research and development in military technology also benefit the US, for
example in the field of missile defense, where Israel is the US's most sophisticated
and experienced partner, helping to develop the Arrows III which is more advanced
and capable that anything the US has. Israel is also a pioneer in the field of cyber
defense/warfare and at the cutting edge of producing robotic systems for use at land
and sea. Many of the best Israeli firms partner with firms in the US as well as having
factories in the US. Against this background, the US has greatly increased its military
purchases from Israel, which ran at $300 million a year in the 1990s compared to
about $1.5 billion in the decade after 9/11. This includes UAVs, airborne defense
targeting pods, precision air-to-ground munitions, helmet mounted sights, and
battlefield intelligence and surveillance systems. In the longer-run Israeli
technological innovation in the field of energy conservation -- the electric car, solar
energy and wind power -- may help the US strategically by reducing the importance
of Middle Eastern oil to the global economy.51

Finally, although Israel is the largest recipient of American foreign aid since World
War II, about three-quarters of that money is recycled because it must be spent inside
the US. Moreover, aid has meant that the US has not had to deploy its own troops to
protect Israel in stark contrast to the far larger costs the US bears for deploying troops
to defend allies such as South Korea or in the Gulf.52 In any case, if it came to it,
Israel could do without US aid, which constitutes less than 1% of GDP and about 20%
11

of the defense budget. Overall then, a strong case can be made that the relationship
with Israel benefits the US in significant ways. Indeed, most critics of the special
relationship do not deny that such benefits exist, rather they claim that the benefits are
outweighed by political costs because so long as the Arab-Israeli conflict remains
unresolved, US support for Israel constitutes the main source of regional instability
and anti-Americanism in the Middle East. This position the linkage doctrine is
critically examined, below.

Linkage
Instability
First, in terms of casualties, the Arab-Israeli conflict has not been close to being the
bloodiest conflict in the Middle East. Since the end of the Cold War, the death toll
from the conflict has been in the thousands, compared to the hundreds of thousands in
each of the conflicts in Darfur, Algeria and Iraq, respectively.53 In fact, three years of
civil war in Syria led to more deaths than a hundred years of the Arab-Israeli
conflict.54

Second, there have been numerous territorial conflicts in the region that threaten
stability, some of which have disrupted energy supplies that have nothing directly to
do with the Arab-Israeli conflict, for example the conflicts between: Arabs and Blacks
in Mauritania; Morocco and the Western Sahara; Yemen and Eritrea; Iran and
Bahrain; the Algerian civil war; internal conflicts in Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Saudi
Arabia; Sudan and its Darfur province; and the Kurdish question which spans Turkey,
Iran Iraq and Syria. Of the eleven major scenarios which Anthony Cordesman's
evaluated as posing a major threat to energy sources in the Middle East, only three
related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.55

Third, as witnessed in the Arab Human Development Reports a major cause of the
region's instability is its failed political, economic and social development. 56 Virtually
all states in the region face major problems with population growth and creating jobs.
Virtually all have had a high degree of authoritarianism and weak or failed economic
development. According to Freedom House, the Arab Middle East is the least
democratic region in the world. Despite oil revenue, the region's GDP is the lowest in
world outside sub-Saharan Africa.57 The repressive nature of these regimes, combined
12

with their failure to deal with these problems challenges their legitimacy, as became
glaring obvious in the Arab Spring. Solving these problems requires a process social,
domestic social, political and economic reform that has nothing directly to do with the
Israel or the Arab-Israel conflict.

Fourth, despite the failure to fully settle the Palestinian issue, a number of Arab states
that have not as yet signed peace treaties with Israel have quietly developed quasidiplomatic and intelligence ties with the Jewish state, primarily because they, along
with Egypt and Jordan, view themselves as sharing an over-arching strategic interest
vis-a-vis Iran and its allies.58 Thus in 2006, Saudi Arabia lent tacit support to Israel in
its war against Hezbollah by being the first Arab state to publicly condemn Nasrallah
during the Second Lebanon War.59

Anti-Americanism
US policy towards Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict is not the driving force behind
anti-Americanism in the Middle East. The most anti-American actors in the Middle
East, such as Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Qaeda oppose
the US primarily for ideological reasons. They view America as the embodiment of
Western liberal values they oppose and whose material success they find
humiliating.60 Both Khomeini and Bin Laden viewed the US as the only serious force
preventing the spread of Islam.61 On this basis Islamists have opposed the US because
America was viewed as the key external backer of the dictatorial secular Arab
regimes that they sought to overthrow.62 Thus, Al Qaeda is not primarily interested in
the Palestinians and in any case it would not accept any type of peace with Israel.
Indeed, the 9/11 attacks were planned at the height of the Oslo process.63 As even an
advocate of the 'Israel as a strategy liability' doctrine admitted, a change of US policy
on Palestine would not stop terrorism against the US.64

Second, the claim that Arab public opinion on US policy towards Palestine is a major
factor preventing America's Arab allies from supporting US policy is greatly overstated. To begin with, support for Israel is not the most important source of antiAmerican attitudes among the Arab public. Polls suggest that the Palestinian issue and
US support for Israel were significant, but by no means exclusive, factors behind
these anti-American attitudes. In particular, negative sentiments spiked sharply as a
13

result of other post-9/11 developments: the detentions at Guantanamo Bay, the

invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Abu Ghraib scandal and other abuses.
Negative sentiments were also sustained by perceived US hostility toward Islam and
continuing US support for unpopular Arab autocrats. However, Arab publics also
disapproved of American foreign policy during the Clinton administrations intensive
efforts to support the Palestinian Authority and broker the establishment of an
independent Palestinian state.'65 Moreover, Palestine has not been the main issue
driving public demonstrations. Thus, 80% of anti-American public protests in the
Arab world 2000-05, at the peak of the Second intifada, were triggered by a local
issue unrelated to the Arab-Israeli conflict.66 Tellingly, the massive Arab uprisings of
20112012 in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain, and the smaller but still
significant demonstrations elsewhere in the region were driven by domestic issues,
not the Arab-Israeli conflict, and there was virtually no sign of anti-Americanism in
those demonstrations.

Most significantly, US support for Israel has not substantially affected the substance
of America's relationship with its Arab and Muslim allies, except for UN votes which
are largely symbolic. There is no evidence that these countries withheld support for
US efforts to contain Iraq, fight al Qaeda or contain Iran. In fact, since the turn of the
millennium US exports to the Middle East have reached an all-time high.67 In
contrast, it was in the mid-1990s, when the peace process was in full flight, that the
Saudis cut back their support for US due to Saudi fears regarding US policy to Iran
and Iraq, as well as domestic concerns.68 Whereas, in 2004, when the peace process
was at a dead-end, Saudi policy shifted towards greater co-operation with the US in
the war against terror, because they came to the conclusion that appeasing extremists
had failed to protect them from domestic terrorism.69

The Arab-Israeli Conflict and US Strategic interests: Beyond Linkage

Despite the fact that tight 'linkage' does not exist, it does not follow that the US has no
important interests at stake in the Arab-Israeli conflict. To begin with, the US has a
major strategic interest in conflict management; that is, preventing the escalation of
the conflict so that it does not become a regional war that could threaten the supply of
oil to the global economy and possibly result in the use of WMD. This is recognized
in principle even by adherents of an assertive grand strategy; though in practice they
14

often believe that the US interest is best served by allowing Israel to militarily defeat
their common enemies. Indeed, they do have a point. None of the wars since 1973
have escalated to the regional level. All have been contained, despite the fact that
some like the Second Intifada when Israel defeated suicide terrorism, involved a
significant number of casualties and lasted for years.

Second, in any case, the US often has an interest in pursuing a peace process, even
when there is little chance of reaching a final status agreement because negotiations
can assist in conflict management by preventing the development of a vacuum, which
can be exploited by extremists to mobilize for violence. As such a diplomatic process
can help to put radical anti-American forces on the back foot. Obviously, while this
has value as a tactic, it cannot be more than that in the absence of the parties
themselves being willing to move forward. In addition, increasing activity on the
peace process can help give Arab states a fig leaf for supporting controversial US
actions in the region, such as the 1991 and 2003 wars against Iraq.

Third, while proponents of assertiveness are correct to identify the legitimacy deficit
in the Arab world as an important constraint on conflict resolution, especially with
regard to Palestinian policy, the fact is that Israel's peace agreements with Egypt and
Jordan have proved remarkably resilient nonetheless. This indicates, that at the very
least not all Arab actors policies are primarily driven by ideology; other factors
notably regime survival are critically important. Already during the Cold War, proAmerican Arab regimes looked to the US primarily to protect them from radical
Nasserite forces backed the Soviets that sort to overthrow their regimes. In the
contemporary era, these pro-American regimes seek US support to protect them from
Iran and radical Islamist groups who seek to overthrow them. In this regard they share
a common interest with Israel. It is this which has led them to co-operate strategically
with Israel when it has confronted Hamas and the Iranian backed Hezbollah. To
combat this threat, they have proven willing to at least agree in principle to a two-state
solution peace with Israel in the form of the Arab League Peace Initiative. At the
minimum this indicates that they would like to wind down the conflict so that they
can concentrate on combatting the real threat to their regimes. The legitimacy deficit
does constrain their willingness to actively promote the Palestinian concessions that
would be required to match the Israeli concessions needed for genuine conflict
15

resolution.70 Nonetheless, even if complete conflict resolution is not possible, the

peace process can serve the interests of the US and its allies, through the advancement
of partial or interim agreements.

Fourth, the US has an interest in seeking to resolve the conflict in order to remove an
important source of instability even in the absence of linkage so long as any
agreement serves to strengthen the regional position of America's allies at the expense
of its enemies. Indeed, even if the conflict is not ripe for resolution, the US can take
steps which preserve the possibility of future conflict resolution, for example by
pressuring Israel not to expand Israeli settlements, especially those deep inside the
West Bank that have no prospect of being included in a territorial swap in the event of
a peace deal (over three-quarters of the settlers live in blocs that constitute about 5%
of the West Bank). The US could also enhance the prospects of future resolution by
defining and legitimizing a zone of negotiability to gradually help the parties sober up
to realities. Such measures could well lead to political clashes with Israeli
governments (and indeed the Palestinian Authority). This demonstrates that even
though Israel is a strategic asset in a general sense that does not at all mean that every
Israeli action is in the US interest. Certainly, the US has an interest than any peace
agreement genuinely provide for Israel's security, since Israeli security is good for
stability and Israeli power helps to underwrite a pro-American balance of power.
However, Israeli settlement expansion has little to do with security and serves to
weaken pro-American forces on the Palestinian side. That is not to say that
settlements are the main obstacle to a peace deal, they are not. 71 But nonetheless, their
expansion detracts from the strategic value the US gains from Israel. Israeli leaders
seem to have internalized this to some degree, thus even those hailing from the centerright such as Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert and Netanyahu have proven willing, in
principle, to make extensive compromises on the issues of territory and settlements.72

However, just because successful conflict resolution is an American interest, does not
mean it is always in the US interest to pursue it with great vigor. In fact, the
aggressive pursuit of a comprehensive final status peace deal, in the absence of
ripeness, can be detrimental to US strategic interests. Ultimately the key to
implementing a peace agreement successfully lies with the parties. If the parties do
not 'own' an agreement it will collapse. For if the US raises expectations by
16

vigorously pursuing a permanent status deal when the gaps between to the two sides
are ultimately unbridgeable, a dangerous situation could develop. American prestige
will be damaged, violence could break out and escalate, and regional forces opposed
to peace and the US will improve their political standing. To some extent, this can be
said to have happened to the US on both the Palestinian and Syrian tracks in 2000.
For this reason, most administrations have followed the maxim repeated by various
Secretaries of State since 1991 namely that, 'The United Stateswill remain
intimately engaged in this process. We will do our part. But we cannot do your part as
well. We cannot want peace more than you, the parties.'73

All of this indicates that there is a major approach to Israel and the Middle East peace
process that lies somewhere between the poles of caution and assertion outlined
above. In the next section, this centrist grand strategy and its approach to Israel and
the peace process is laid out.

A Centrist Grand Strategy

Between the poles of assertion and caution is a third centrist approach, which again
comes in Realist74 and Liberal75 varieties. Centrists favor the US maintaining its
global leadership and continued deeply engagement in the international arena,
including the maintenance of its extensive alliance network and its leading role in
multilateral institutions. Centrists view US security commitments as a deterrent
against hostile states contemplating expansion and regional hegemony. They also
view such commitments as reducing competition in key regions, by giving the US the
ability to constrain and reassure allies, thereby reducing, rather than increasing, the
risk of the US become entrapped in a regional war. At the same time, they think that
US should promote greater burden-sharing among its allies and that it must prioritize
its geo-strategic interests. In this sense, they advocate pivoting towards Asia.

Centrists believe that the US must be able to project its power, that effective statecraft
requires credibility regarding the use of force and that military responses to certain
threats are unavoidable and sometimes require pre-emption. On the other hand, they
also emphasize prudence and the need to recognize the limits of power, with the key
being the ability to blend diplomacy and military power in 'statecraft' or 'smart power'.
Centrists, especially liberal centrists, believe that the advancement of liberal goals
17

must inform US foreign policy, including the promotion of democracy, human rights,
free trade, and peace. However, they are skeptical regarding the ability of the US to
shape reality in its image by using military force or coercive diplomacy to bring about
democratization, liberalization, successful regime change or the resolution (as
opposed to the management) of local/regional conflicts. All of this depends primarily
on local actors. The US can and should use statecraft to facilitate such positive
changes where local conditions have potential, but it cannot impose change at will.76

Critically, centrists reject the premise that 'blowback' is the central dynamic in
international relations in general and in the context of America's strategic position in
the Post-Cold War era, in particular.77 For centrist realists the dominant logic remains
rational state interests in security and survival. Centrist liberals also recognize the
importance of such logic in constraining ideological regimes, but argue that ideational
factors are powerful drivers of action especially (though not exclusively) among
extremist non-state actors. This is a major reason why centrist liberals prioritize
preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to radical states. Equally, centrist
realists also prioritize this objective, though for slightly different reasons. As per their
general skepticism regarding balancing, they are less sanguine than defensive realists
that the nuclear balance and stable deterrence of the Cold War can be replicated in an
environment with multiple nuclear rivalries, which increases the probably of illicit
transfers, irrational decisions, accidents and unforeseen crises.78

Centrism, Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict

Just as Centrists reject the blowback thesis with regard to American grand strategy, so
they also reject 'linkage' with regard to the Middle East. Rather the Arab-Israeli
conflict is viewed as one of many sources of instability in the Middle East. Even if
Israel did not exist, the region would remain very unstable and anti-American, with
the power vacuum probably filled by anti-American radicals.79 Liberal Centrists in
particular view radical Islam and the lack of democracy and development as major
causes of regional instability. But from a centrist perspective as a whole, Arab
regimes largely shape their foreign policy around regime survival, independent of
both American policy and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.80

18

As they see it the greatest threat to the US in the region stems from anti-American
radicals who are seeking to overturn the pro-American order in the Middle East. This
means radical Sunni Islamists and especially Iran. Were radical anti-American forces
to get control of a large share of oil resources or pose a threat to the supply of oil to
the global economy, this would constitute a major threat to the US and the West. In
addition, allowing Iran to obtain nuclear weapons would be a 'tipping point' that
would lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Against this
background, Israel is perceived as a strategic asset as it is the strongest and most
reliable US ally in the region.81 This means that Centrists tend to lean towards Israel
with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially where it concerns Israeli security.
For some, this position is reinforced by Israel's democratic character, which fits in
with their goal of promoting a US-led liberal international order. However, concern
for Israel's democratic character also inclines them to support the peace process, as
way for Israel to retain its Jewish and democratic character in light of the challenge
posed to this by the on-going occupation. Indeed, while Centrists view Israel as a
strategic asset, their support for Israel is not as unequivocal as that given by
supporters of an assertive grand strategy. For Centrists, the alliance with Israel is also
a tool for influencing Israeli behavior by constraining Israel or encouraging Israel to
make peace, as it is about taking advantage of Israeli power.

Centrists think that the peace process assists in managing the conflict by preventing
the development of a dangerous vacuum that could lead to a violent escalation.82
Although they reject linkage, they believe that U.S. support for the peace process
weakens anti-American forces in the region, while easing co-operation with Arab
allies.83 Though for Centrists that logic flows more powerfully in the reverse
direction. That is, containing radical forces in the region serves to facilitate the peace
process by creating an environment that it more conducive to Arab moderates, while
reducing Israeli security concerns related to territorial concessions. Yet while they
strongly favor heavy US engagement in the peace process, they oppose the idea that
the US should seek to impose a settlement. From this perspective, even in a favorable
regional environment, the successful implementation of any peace agreement is
primarily dependent on the parties' themselves. Without their willingness, an imposed
deal would be likely to unravel quickly with dire consequences. Still, they are willing
to pressure and provide incentives to both sides. In this connection, aid to Israel and
19

the development of the strategic relationship between the countries is designed not
only to strengthen an ally against common enemies, but also to reassure Israel and
thereby encourage it to take the risks required to make peace. 84 In parallel, they also
advocate US aid and support for Palestinian moderates, such as the former moderate
Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salim Fayyad, whose efforts focused on statebuilding and good governance.

A good example of the Centrist approach during the Cold War was Kissinger
diplomacy. Unlike Vietnam, Kissinger viewed the Middle East as an arena in which
core US strategic interests were at stake. These core interests were containing the
Soviet Union and its allies, and managing the Arab-Israeli conflict that is preventing
its escalation to regional war that could threaten the supply of oil to the global
economy and possibly result in the use of WMD. In selecting US regional allies,
Kissinger's policy was dictated primarily by a calculation of the military power and
political reliability of a state, and not by concerns about blowback and linkage.
Whereas America's Arab allies were weak and unreliable, Israel proved itself to be the
opposite. Israel was a strategic asset, helping to assure a pro-American balance of
power in the Middle East. Hence, following Israel's successful intervention in the
Jordan crisis in 1970, US aid to Israel increased by a factor of ten. Kissinger also
supplied Israel with weapons in order to demonstrate to the Arab side that Soviet
weapons would not enable them to achieve the return of their territory.

Yet, Kissinger also viewed the growing strategic relationship with Israel as a means of
influencing and constraining Israeli behavior. At the end of the Yom Kippur War
Kissinger pressured Israel not to destroy the Egyptian Third Army, in order to prevent
an escalation to a direct superpower confrontation. Later, following the Yom Kippur
War, he opposed focusing on trying to reach a comprehensive settlement of the ArabIsraeli conflict because it would provide an opportunity for increased Soviet
influence. In doing so, he rejected the linkage doctrine which held that only a
comprehensive settlement of the conflict on Arab terms could limit Soviet influence.
Instead, he opted to pursue interim agreement between Israel and Egypt that allowed
the US to play the central mediating role alone. Subsequently, as a result of heavy US
pressure, Israel partially withdrew from Sinai in return for an up-grading of its
strategic relations with the US. As a result the US secured several strategic interests.
20

First, Egypt switched sides in the Cold War, altering the balance of power in favor of
the West. At the same time, Kissinger increased US strategic support for Israel, which
preserved America's reputation as an ally, while further enhancing the pro-American
balance of power in the region. Second, Kissinger increased the prospects for conflict
management by turning both Egypt and Israel into American clients dependent on US
aid and weapons. This increased American leverage and the resultant dependency of
both countries on US material made it very difficult for them to sustain an armed
confrontation against each-other in the absence of US willingness to resupply them.
Furthermore with Egypt removed from the equation the prospects of another major
Arab-Israeli war spreading to threaten the stability of the region receded dramatically.

In other words, while Kissinger's approach rejected 'linkage', it nonetheless viewed

the conflict as important both in terms of conflict management and as a factor in the
wider Middle East strategic equation. Israel was viewed as a strategic asset, but the
strategic relationship was as much about the US gaining influence over Israel policy,
as about using Israeli power to forward US interests against common enemies. The
interim agreements Kissinger brokered with Israel did not lead to a comprehensive
peace or even a full bilateral peace, but they represent a critical step in that direction,
and as such a major contribution towards the ultimate goal of conflict resolution.

Conclusion
The logic of different grand strategies engenders different approaches to Israel and the
Arab-Israeli conflict. At one pole, proponents of an assertive grand strategy view
Israel unequivocally as a strategic asset and they dismiss the peace process as at best
irrelevant, and at worst appeasement. At the other pole, proponents of a cautious
grand strategy are equally unequivocal in reaching diametrically opposed conclusions.
It has been argued above that the doctrine of 'linkage' that drives the cautious
approach, is wrong and that consequently Israel is not inherently a strategic liability,
but rather a strategic asset as proclaimed by proponents of the assertive strategy.
However, Israel's status as an asset is not quite as unequivocal as they make out, in
part because advancing the peace process is an American strategic interest, even if it
is not the most important interest in the region. The grand strategy that represents this
position is a centrist one lying between the poles of assertion and caution.

21

Critics of the centrist approach might argue that its attempt to chart a middle course
comes at the expense of clear prescriptions, leaving policy to drift. However, this is
not the case. The centrist approach to the Middle East enunciates a clear set of
strategic priorities and policy preferences. It does allow for a wider menu of policy
options than the other two approaches, giving more room for events in the region and
the policies pursued by local actors there to affect US calculations. Indeed, it requires
much greater attention to the intricacies of local politics in the Middle East. Delving
into those intricacies would require a separate paper all to itself, so it cannot be dealt
with here directly.

By way of contrast, the danger inherent in the other two grand strategies is the pursuit
of a policy that is over-determined by grand strategic axioms. These dangers are
evident with regard to US policy towards Hamas. While US policy-makers differ as to
the degree to which Hamas is a negative phenomenon, nobody claims that
strengthening Hamas should be a goal of US policy. Yet, the unthinking application
of both assertive and cautious grand strategic axioms has led in that direction, albeit to
different degrees. For the Bush administration democratization was a core principle of
its assertive grand strategy. In 2006, it insisted that a Hamas affiliated list be allowed
to run in Palestinian elections, the result of which empowered that radical terrorist
organization. Meanwhile, the Obama administration has adopted a cautious grand
strategy which has sought to engage Islamists and keep a lid on regional conflicts
between pro-Western and anti-Western forces. In this spirit, John Kerry sought to
broker a ceasefire using pro-Hamas intermediaries Turkey and Qatar that would have
given in to many of Hamas' demands and upgraded its status. Following protests by
core US regional allies -- Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority and the Arab League
it seems that Kerry has reversed course.85 In any case, the point is that more
attention needs to be paid to the nexus between grand strategy and approaches to
regional conflicts such as the one examined in this paper.

22

See Jonathan Rynhold, Israel in American Political Culture (Cambridge University Press, 2015)
See for example, Camille Mansour, Beyond Alliance (Columbia University Press, 1993) chapters 1-2;
A.F.K. Organski, The $36 billion Bargain (NY: Columbia University Press, 1990).
3
Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy
(Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 6; Peter Feaver, 'What is grand strategy and why do we need it?'
Foreign Policy April 8, 2009
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/08/what_is_grand_strategy_and_why_do_we_need_it Also on American
grand strategy see Henry Nau, Conservative Internationalism (Princeton University Press, 2014), and
Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World
(Routledge, 2002).
4
Jonathan Rynhold, 'The U.S. & the Middle East Peace Process: Conflict Management vs. Conflict
Resolution' in E. Inbar & E. Gilboa Eds. U.S-Israeli Relations in a New Era (London: Routledge,
2009) pp. 140-157.
5
US Energy Information Administration, 'How dependent are we on foreign oil?'
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/energy_in_brief/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm
6
Anthony Cordesman & Khalid Al-Rodhan The Changing Dynamics of Energy in the Middle East
(Greenwood, 2006); Daniel Yergin, 'Energy Security and Markets' in Jan Kalicki and David Goldwyn
eds. Energy & Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005)
7
John Duffield, Over a Barrel: The Costs of US Foreign Oil Dependence (Stanford University Press,
2007); pp. 11-12, 52-56.
8
International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2013: Executive Summary
http://www.iea.org/media/executivesummaries/WEO_2013_ES_English_WEB.pdf
9
Shibley Telhami, Understanding the Challenge Middle East Journal 56 (1), 2002.
10
Robert Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003): 45-82.
11
Leon Fuerth, 'Energy, Homeland and National security' in Jan Kalicki and David Goldwyn eds.
Energy & Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy (Johns Hopkins University Press 2005);
Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan The Changing Dynamics of Energy in the Middle East
(Greenwood, 2006)
12
This sections draws heavily on chapters 2 and 3 of Jonathan Rynhold, The Arab-Israeli Conflict in
American Political Culture, (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2015).
13
Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York:
Norton, 2005); Patrick Buchanan, A Republic, Not an Empire: Reclaiming Americas Destiny
(Washington, DC, Regnery, 1999).
14
Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, Myths, Illusions and Peace: Finding a New Direction for
America in the Middle East (New York: Viking, 2009).
15
James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (Penguin, 2004), pp. 43-44, 53.
16
Peter Beinart, The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris (N.Y.: Harpers, 2010).
17
Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York:
Norton, 2005); Patrick Buchanan, A Republic, Not an Empire: Reclaiming Americas Destiny
(Washington, DC, Regnery, 1999).
18
Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); John Ikenberry,
'An Agenda for Liberal International Renewal' in Michele Flourney and Shawn Brimley Eds., Finding
Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy (Washington DC: Center for New American Security:
2008) pp. 43-60; John Ikenberry, Thomas Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Tony Smith, The Crisis of
American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century (Princeton NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2009); Henry Nau, Conservative Internationalism Chapter 2.
19
Leon Hadar, Quagmire: America in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Cato, 1992); Leon Hadar,
Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East
20
Stephen M. Walt, 'Taming American Power,' Foreign Affairs, 84: 5 (2005).
21
Leon Hadar, 'What Green Peril,' Foreign Affairs, 72: 2 (Spring 1993).
22
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, America and the World (New York: Basic 2008), p. 2129, 57-59, 77-78; 'Bush 41 Adviser Scowcroft Says He'd Tell Israel To "Calm Down" On Iran Strike,'
Huffington Post, July 22, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/07/22/mccain-adviserscowcroft_n_114379.html; 'U.S. presidential hopeful Ron Paul: 'Friendship' is best way to deal with
Iran,' Ha'aretz, November 6, 2011; Bruce Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology,
and Future (Brookings Press 2008); Michael Lind 'American Strategy Project -- Grand Strategy No.1',
New America Foundation, March 13, 2003
http://asp.newamerica.net/publications/policy/american_strategy_project_grand_strategy_no_1
2

23

23

Daniel Pipes, 'Looking Back on the Middle East: James A. Baker III,' Middle East Quarterly
(September 1994); Michael Desch, 'Ominous President,' The American Conservative, May 5 2003;
Christopher Layne 'Balancing Act,' The American Conservative, September 10, 2007.
24
Brzezinski and Scowcroft, America and the World; Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 'The
Perils of Occupation', October 28, 2004,
http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/downloads/perils_of_occupation_1004.pdf.
25
Doug Bandow, 'Israel's Democracy Dilemma,' The American Conservative, November 3 2003; John
Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby: and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus
& Giroux, 2007), p. 86-87; Taki, 'Not So Clean Break,' The American Conservative, September 11,
2006; Patrick Buchanan, 'The Persecution of the Palestinians,' The American Conservative, June 5,
2006; George Szamuely, 'Thomas Friedman, Dean of Liberal Imperialism,' The American
Conservative, December 2, 2002; John J. Mearsheimer, 'Saving Israel from Itself,' The American
Conservative, May 18, 2009.
26
Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby, pp. 58-77; Scott McConnell, 'America's New Nationalism,'
The American Conservative, March 14, 2005; Leon Hadar, 'Bad For You Too?' The American
Conservative, November 7, 2005; Patrick J. Buchanan, 'Whose War?' The American Conservative,
March 24, 2003; Christopher Layne, 'Balancing Act,' The American Conservative, September 10, 2007
27
Caspar Weinberger, 'Let a Muslim Army Occupy Iraq,' Middle East Quarterly, September 1999, pp.
73-81; Brent Scowcroft, 'The Tools for Peace,' Washington Post, May 17, 2002, p. A29; Coalition for a
Realistic Foreign Policy, 'Ending the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate,' January 1, 2005,
http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/archives/2005/01/ending_the_isra.php ; Patrick J, Buchanan,
'Israels Isolation and Ours.' http://buchanan.org/blog/pjb-israels-isolation-and-ours-589; March 29,
2004; Brent Scowcroft 'Beyond Lebanon: This Is the Time for a U.S.-Led Comprehensive Settlement,'
Washington Post, July 30, 2006; B07; James Baker and Lee Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report
(New York: Vintage Books, 2006), p. 7; Brzezinski and Scowcroft, America and the World, pp, 64, 87,
104; Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby, pp. 58-77, 335-255. Mara Rudman and Brian Katulis,
'U.S. Must Lead for Middle East Progress,' washingtonpost.com, May 28, 2007;Brian Katulis, Marc
Lynch, and Robert C. Adler, 'Window of Opportunity for a Two-State Solution: Policy
recommendations to the Obama administration on the Israeli-Palestinian front,' Center for American
Progress, July 2009; Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda; Robert Reich, 'How To Be Tough On
Terrorism,' The American Prospect, November 5, 2001, p. 48; Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, 'A
Durable Middle East Peace,' The American Prospect, November 2003, p. 55.
28
Brzezinski and Scowcroft, America and the World, p. 85.
29
Leon Hadar, 'Let the Locals Fix the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.' ; Leon Hadar, 'The Real Lesson of
the Oslo Accord: "Localize" the Arab-Israeli Conflict,' Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing, No. 31,
May 9, 2001 ; Srdja Trifkovic, 'An Exercise in Futility,' Chronicles, September 3, 2010 .
30
Sandy Berger and James Baker, 'Forward' in Daniel Kurtzer, ed., Pathways to Peace: America and
the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. vii-xii.
31
Brzezinski and Scowcroft, America and the World (New York: Basic Books: 2008), p. 87;
Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby; Pat Buchanan, 'Foreign Aid: Ever With Us,' December 21,
1994, http://buchanan.org/blog/foreign-aid-ever-with-us-166; Andrew Sullivan, 'Giving Up on Israel,'
http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2010/12/giving-up-on-israel.html; Leon Hadar,
'Let the Locals Fix the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,' June 21, 2001,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/let-locals-fix-israel/palestinian-conflict
32
Brian Katulis, Marc Lynch, and Robert C. Adler, 'Window of Opportunity for a Two-State Solution
Policy. '
33
Shibley Telhami, Brian Katulis, Jon Alterman, Milton Viorst 'Middle Eastern Views Of The United
States: What Do The Trends Indicate?' Middle East Policy Vol13 (3) 2006; Brzezinski and Scowcroft,
America and the World, p. 19.
34
Brzezinski and Scowcroft, America and the World, pp. 19, 80-92; Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel
Lobby pp. 226, 381 ft. 38 ; Patrick J. Buchanan, 'The Prisoner of Sharon,' April 5, 2002,
http://buchanan.org/blog/pjb-the-prisoner-of-sharon-438; John Judis, 'The Real Foreign-Policy Debate,'
American Prospect, May 6, 2002, p. 10; Rudman and Katulis, 'U.S. Must Lead for Middle East
Progress;' Daniel Kurtzer, 'American policy, strategy and tactics' in Kurtzer, ed. Pathways to Peace, p.
196; Katulis, Lynch, and Adler, 'Window of Opportunity for a Two-State Solution;'; Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Thomas Pickering, Lee Hamilton, Carla Hills, and Nancy Kassebaum-Baker,, 'Failure
Risks Devastating Consequences, ' New York Review of Books, November 8, 2007
35
Katulis, Lynch, and Adler, 'Window of Opportunity for a Two-State Solution

24

36

Heilbrun, They Knew They Were Right, pp. 12, 44-47, 95, 114-115; Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside
the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York: HarperCollins, 2008). James Mann, Rise of the
Vulcans , pp. 27-29, 74-75
37
Gary J. Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservativism and the New Pax Americana (London:
Routledge, 2004), p. 181; Author interview with Danielle Pletka, Vice President of Foreign and
Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute, 2013. Norman Podhoretz, World War IV: The
Long Struggle against Islamofascism, (New York: Doubleday, 2007)
38
George Will, 'Netanyahu: Promises to Keep,' Washington Post, June 23, 1996, p. C07; Victor Davis
Hanson, 'Islamic Fascism 101,' National Review Online, September 25, 2006; Clifford May, 'The Battle
Of Gaza,' National Review Online, January 22, 2009.
39
Victor Davis Hanson, 'Why Support Israel?' National Review, February 4, 2002; David Brooks 'A
Season of Cynicism,' The Daily Standard, April 1, 2002; Fred Barnes, 'Bush Stands with Israel; And
against the State Department,' The Weekly Standard; April 29, 2002, p. 12; Robert Kagan and William
Kristol, 'Back on Track?' The Weekly Standard, April 29, 2002, p. 9; William Safire, ' Our 'Relentless'
Liberation, New York Times, October 8, 2001, p. 17; George Will, 'A Plan for Arafat,' Washington
Post, December 4, 2001, p. A25; Norman Podhoretz, 'World War IV: How It Started, What It Means,
and Why We Have to Win,' Commentary, September 2004, pp. 17-54; Michael Ledeen, 'Books in
Review; The War That Never Ended,' The American Spectator, July 2002 - August 2002, pp. 72-73.
40
William Safire, 'Israel's Shame,' New York Times, December 23, 1999, p. 29. Eisenstadt and

Pollock, Asset Test ft 73

41

George Will, 'The End of Our Holiday from History,' Washington Post, September 11, 2001, p. A27;
David Pryce-Jones, 'Why they hate us,' National Review, October 1, 2001, p. 8; Victor Davis Hanson,
'And Then They Came After Us,' National Review Online, July 22, 2005.
42
For example, George Will, 'A Peace With Considerable Risks,' Washington Post, September 9, 1993, p.
A21; George Will, 'No Partners For Peace,' Washington Post, October 22, 2000, p. B07
43
Elliot Abrams, 'Israel and the Peace process,' in Robert Kagan and William Kristol, eds., Present
Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy (San Francisco CA:
Encounter, 2000), pp.221-240. A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm (Washington,
DC: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 1996).
44
David Brooks, 'Keeping It Simple,' The Daily Standard, June 25, 2002; Charles Krauthammer,
'Arafat's War; How to End It'; George Will, 'A War and Then a Wall,' Washington Post, August 17,
2001, p. A23; Hillel Halkin, 'Beyond the Geneva Accord,' Commentary, January 2004, pp. 21-28;
Hillel Halkin, 'Does Sharon Have a Plan?' Commentary, June 2004, pp. 17-22; Dan Darling,
'Hezbollah's Arsenal; It's more lethal than everyone thought,' The Weekly Standard, July 31, 2006; Fred
Barnes, 'Letting Israel Be Israel; Bush's consistent approach to war and peace in the Middle East,' The
Weekly Standard, July 31, 2006; Elliott Abrams, 'Bibi Speaks; Netanyahu endorses a demilitarized
Palestinian state--rejects Obama's call for a settlement freeze,' The Weekly Standard, June 14, 2009
45
The case for Israel as a strategic asset since the end of the Cold war is most comprehensively laid out
put in Michael Eisenstadt and David Pollock, Asset Test, on which this section draws extensively.
46
Martin Kramer, The American Interest, Azure, no. 26 (Fall 2006), pp. 21-33.
47
George W. Bush, Decision Points (London: Random House, 2010), pp. 421-424.
48
Author interviews with Israeli and US officials; Nathan Guttman, US said adopting Israeli army
counter-terror tactics in Iraq Haaretz; Amnon Barzilai, US Army wants to buy more Israeli Hunter
drones Haaretz 8 July 2003; Israeli Technology to See Action in Iraq AP 21 March 2003; Israel,
US to fund laser that shoots down rockets AP 28 October 2003; Broad, Markoff, and Sanger, Israeli
Test on Worm Called Crucial; Eli Lake, Operation Sabotage: Our Secret War against Iran, New
Republic, July 14, 2010, http://www.tnr.com/article/world/75952/operation-sabotage; William Broad
and David Sanger, In Nuclear Nets Undoing, a Web of Shadowy Details, New York Times,
news/25iht-25nuke.15597447.html?pagewanted=all.
49
Amir Oren, 'Leaked classified memo reveals U.S.-Israeli intel cooperation on Egypt, Iran' Ha'aretz
Aug. 5, 2014
50
Eisenstadt and Pollack, Asset Test
51
Ehud Zion Waldoks, 'Sunday Solar Power Company CEO Kobi Dinar Is Thinking Beyond The
Local Scene' JP Nov 23, 2008; David Horowitz 'Obama may adopt Israeli electric car' Jerusalem Post
18 December 2008.
52
A.F.K. Organski, The $36 billion Bargain (NY: Columbia University Press, 1990) pp. 114-132;
Eisenstadt and Pollock, Asset Test.

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53

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darfur_conflict#Mortality_figures ;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_Civil_War;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Iraq_War
54
Estimates of deaths in the Syrian Civil War, per opposition activist groups, vary between 97 000 and
130,000, see Ian Black, Middle East editor. "Syria deaths near 100,000, says UN and 6,000 are
children" The Guardian 30 August 2013; 'Death Toll In Syria Surpasses 130,000, Monitoring Group
Says' Reuters 31 December 2013; for figures of casualties in the Arab-Israeli conflict see
www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/casualtiestotal.html.
55
Cordesman, The Changing Dynamics of Energy in the Middle East, pp. 67, 89.
56
Arab Human Development Reports available at http://www.arab-hdr.org/
57
Kenneth Pollack, A Path Out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East (NY:
Random House, 2008), pp. 71-95.
58
Eli Lake, 'Israel, Gulf States Conducted Secret Diplomacy: Adversaries Fearful of Iran', Washington
Times, December 1, 2010, Yoel Guzansky, Tacit Allies: Israel and the Arab Gulf States, Israel
Journal of Foreign Affairs, 5, no. 1 (2011), pp. 918
59
Saudi News Agency, 13 July 2006.
60
Barry Rubin & Judith Colp Rubin, Hating America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) Ch. 9;
Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York: Random House, 2004),
pp. 69-72; Reuven Paz, 'Islamists and Anti-Americanism', MERIA 7 (4) 2003; Patrick Clawson, "The
Paradox of Anti-Americanism in Iran" MERIA 8 (1) 2004.
61
Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York: Random House,
2004) pp. 78-84, 160-162.
62
Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War against America
(New York: Random House, 2003(
63
Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Berkley Trade 2003 p. 121; Simon
and Benjamin The Age of Sacred Terror p, 147. Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and
Unholy Terror (New York: Random House, 2004) p. xxviii
64
Telhami, Understanding the Challenge.
65
David Pollock Slippery Polls: Uses and Abuses of Opinion Surveys from Arab States (Washington
DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2008); Stephen Brooks, As Others See Us: The Causes
& Consequences of Foreign Perceptions of America (Broadview Press) pp. 123-128.
66
Robert Satloff, Eunice Youmans, and Mark Nakhla, Assessing What Arabs Do, Not What They Say:
A New Approach to Understanding Arab Anti-Americanism (Washington DC: Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, July 2006).
67
Eisenstadt and Pollock, Asset Test
68
Simon Henderson, The New Pillar: Conservative Arab Gulf States and U.S. Strategy Policy
(Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003).
69
Rachel Bronson, Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia (Oxford
University Press/Council on Foreign Relations 2006) p. 231; J. Robinson West, 'Saudi Arabia, Iraq and
the Gulf' in in, Jan Kalicki and David Goldwyn, eds. Energy Security (Washington DC: Woodrow
Wilson Center Press, 2005) pp. 197- 218.
70
Ross and Makovsky, pp. 100-102. On the limitations of the Arab Peace Initiative see Joshua
Teitelbaum, The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects (Jerusalem Center for Public
Affairs, 2009) http://jcpa.org/text/Arab-Peace-Initiative.pdf
71
On Abbas' rejection of Olmert's offer see Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor (New York: Random
House, 2011), p. 723. A few months later Abbas confirmed that he turned down the offer, telling the
Washington Post, 'The gaps were wide' Jackson Diehl, 'Abbas's Waiting Game on Peace with Israel,'
Washington Post, May 29, 2009 www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/05/28/AR2009052803614.html; On Arafat's rejectionism and support for
terrorism see Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 2004); Barry Rubin
and Judith Rubin Colp, Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography (Oxford University Press, 2003); Ehud
Yaari, Super Intifada, Jerusalem Report, October 23, 2000; Amos Harel, 'Barghouti ran terror for
Arafat' Ha'aretz April 18, 2002; Lesley Stah, 'Israel: Terror Linked To Iran , Iraq': Officals Tell About
Seized Documents' CBS September 27, 2002, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-terror-linked-toiran-iraq/; Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 'Barghouti gave orders to terror groups with Arafat's silent
approval', Ha'aretz April 19, 2012; Gilad Sher, The Israeli Palestinian Peace Negotiations 1991-2001
(London: Routledge, 2006); The official Palestinian response to the Framework appeared in Al-Ayyam,
2 January 2001, see also 44 reasons why the Fatah movement rejects the Proposals made by U.S.
President Clinton. www.pna.gov.ps/peace/44_reasons.htm

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72

On Sharon's shift see Jonathan Rynhold and Dov Waxman, 'Ideological Change & Israel's
Disengagement from Gaza' Political Science Quarterly 123 (1) 2008; On the details of Olmert's offer
see, Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor (New York: Random House, 2011), pp. 723-724; Jack
Khoury, 'Abbas: Olmert offered PA land equaling 100% of West Bank,' Ha'aretz December 20, 2009
www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/abbas-olmert-offered-pa-land-equaling-100-of-west-bank1747?trailingPath=2.169%2C2.216%2C; Avi Issacharoff, 'Olmert: I am still waiting for Abbas to call
The Tower May 24, 2013 www.thetower.org/exclusive-olmert-i-am-still-waiting-for-abbas-to-call-will-abbas-ever-sayyes/; 'Olmert: No doubt Israel can evacuate 80,000 settlers from West Bank' Associated Press February
7, 2014 www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.573078; On Netanyahu's moves towards concessions see,
'Address by PM Netanyahu, Bar-Ilan University, June 14, 2009', Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
website www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2009/pages/address_pm_netanyahu_bar-ilan_university_14-jun-2009.aspx;
Netanyahu's Address to U.S. Congress, May, 24 2011 http:/ /www.cfr.org/israel/netanyahus-addressuzsz-congress-may-2011/p25073; Barak Ravid, Netanyahus border proposal: Israel to annex
settlement blocs, but not Jordan Valley, Haaretz, 9 February 2012
www.haaretz.com/blogs/diplomania/netanyahu-s-border-proposal-israel-to-annex-settlement-blocs-butnot-jordan-valley-1.413473; Ben Birnbaum and Amir Tibon, 'The Explosive, Inside Story of How John
Kerry Built an Israel-Palestine Peace Plan and Watched It Crumble' New Republic July 20, 2014
73
'James A. Baker address Middle East Peace Conference' Transcript, US Department of State Dispatch,
February 1992; For similar quotes by subsequent Presidents and Secretaries of State see Jonathan
Rynhold, 'The U.S. & the Middle East Peace Process: Conflict Management vs. Conflict Resolution' in E.
Inbar & E. Gilboa Eds, US-Israeli Relations in a New Era (Routledge, 2008).
74
Stephen G., Brooks, John Ikenberry, William Wohlforth, 'Lean Forward' Foreign Affairs
Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 92 Issue 1: 130-142; S. G. Brooks & W. C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance
(Princeton University Press, 2008)
75
Dennis Ross, Statecraft: How to Restore Americas standing in the World (New York: Farrar, Straus,
and Giroux, 2007).
76
Ross, Statecraft, pp. 3-28, 333.
77
Stephen G., Brooks, John Ikenberry, William Wohlforth, 'Lean Forward' Foreign Affairs
Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 92 Issue 1: 130-142; S. G. Brooks & W. C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance
(Princeton University Press, 2008)
78
Ibid.
79
Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, Myths, Illusions and Peace: Finding a New Direction for America
in the Middle East (N.Y: Viking, 2009), p. 6, 20, 278
80
Kenneth Pollack, A Path out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East (Random
House, 2008), Chapter 5, 10; Ross, Statecraft p. 295; Barry Rubin, The tragedy of the Middle East,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002); Barry Rubin, 'The Real Roots of Arab AntiAmericanism', Foreign Affairs November/December 2002.
81
Ross and Makovsky, Myths, Illusions and Peace; Pollack, A Path out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy
for America in the Middle East; Thomas Friedman, 'Order vs. Disorder', New York Times, July 21, 2006
p. 19; Jeffrey Goldberg, 'The Great Atlantic Israel-Iran Debate' Aug 27 2010, Jeffrey Goldberg, 'Indyk:
U.S. More Likely Than Israel to Bomb Iran,' Aug 16 2010; Ross, Statecraft, pp. 151-158, 306.
82
Ross and Makovsky, Myths, Illusions and Peace; Pollack, A Path out of the Desert.
83
Ross and Makovsky, Myths, Illusions and Peace; Pollack, A Path out of the Desert.
84
Ross and Makovsky, Myths, Illusions and Peace.
85
Jonathan Rynhold, 'The Kerry-Qatar Ceasefire Document: What it Says About American Strategy in
the Middle East' BESA Perspectives, no. 261, August 3, 2014; David Ignatius, 'John Kerrys big
blunder in seeking an Israel-Gaza cease-fire' Washington Post July 28, 2014.

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