Telecoms Law Case Digest

2nd Semester, A.Y. 2014 - 2015

PLDT vs. THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND

CELLCOM, INC., EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS CO., INC (ETCI)
G.R. No. 88404
October 18, 1990
FACTS: On 22 June 1958, RA 2090 was enacted granting Felix Alberto & Co. (later
ETCI) a franchise to establish radio stations for domestic and transoceanic
telecommunications. On 13 May 1987, ETCI filed an application with the NTC for the
issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to operate, etc. a Cellular
Mobile Telephone System and an alpha numeric paging system in Metro Manila and in
the Southern Luzon regions, with a prayer for provisional authority to operate within
Metro Manila. PLDT filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss. On 12 November
1987, NTC overruled PLDTs opposition and declared RA 2090 should be liberally
construed so as to include the operation of a cellular mobile telephone service as part
of services of the franchise. On 12 December 1988, NTC granted ETCI provisional
authority to install, operate, and maintain a cellular mobile telephone service initially in
Metro Manila subject to the terms and conditions set forth in its order, including an
interconnection agreement to be entered with PLDT.
PLDT filed an Opposition with a Motion to Dismiss alleging that ETCI is not authorized
under its franchise to a nationwide operation, that ETCI lacks the technical and financial
capability to pursue such operation, PLDT has a pending application for the same
services sought by ETCI and as such the prior operator or protection of investment
doctrine must apply to its case and that the PA if granted, will result in a harmful and
needless duplication.
NTC overruled the opposition of PLDT and declared that RA 9020 shall be liberally
construed as to include the services applied for by ETCI included in that franchise.
PLDT filed a motion for reconsideration but to no avail. NTC later on issued a PA
granting the operation applied for ETCI regarding Phase A of its project in Metro Manila
subject to some conditions including an interconnection agreement with PLDT.

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PLDT filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order alleging that the interconnection was
violated due process and that the order granting PA to ETCI was jurisdictionally and
procedurally infirmed. NTC denied reconsideration and set the date for hearing for
continuation of the main proceedings.
The Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining NTC to cease and
desist from all or any of its on-going proceedings and ETCI from continuing with any of
its projects as granted in the issued PA by the NTC. The motion filed by ETCI to lift the
TRO was denied.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the provisional authority was properly granted.
Held: The provisional authority granted by the NTC (which is the regulatory agency of
the National Government over all telecommunications entities) has a definite expiry
period of 18 months unless sooner renewed; may be revoked, amended or revised by
the NTC; covers one of four phases; limited to Metro Manila only; and does not
authorize the installation and operation of an alphanumeric paging system. It was
further issued after due hearing, with PLDT attending and granted after a prima facie
showing that ETCI had the necessary legal, financial and technical capabilities; and that
public interest, convenience and necessity so demanded. Provisional authority would
be meaningless if the grantee were not allowed to operate, as its lifetime is limited and
may be revoked by the NTC at any time in accordance with law.
2. Whether ETCIs franchise includes operation of cellular mobile telephone system
(CMTS)

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HELD: The NTC construed the technical term radiotelephony liberally as to include
the operation of a cellular mobile telephone system. The construction given by an
administrative agency possessed of the necessary special knowledge, expertise and
experience and deserves great weight and respect. It can only be set aside by judicial
intervention on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.
3. Whether PLDT can refuse interconnection with ETCI.
HELD: The NTC merely exercised its delegated authority to regulate the use of
telecommunication networks when it decreed interconnection. PLDT cannot refuse
interconnection as such is mandated under RA 6949 or the Municipal Telephone Act of
1989. What interconnection seeks to accomplish is to enable the system to reach out to
the greatest number of people possible in line with governmental policies. With the
broader reach, public interest and convenience will be better served. Public need,
public interest, and the common good are the decisive, if not the ultimate,
considerations. To these public and national interests, public utility companies must
yield.
The NTC order does not deprive PLDT due process as it allows the parties themselves
to discuss and agree upon the specific terms and conditions of the interconnection
agreement instead of the NTC itself laying down the standards of interconnection which
it can very well impose.

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2nd Semester, A.Y. 2014 - 2015

GMCR INC.; SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; INTL COMMUNICATIONS CORP.;

ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC., vs. BELL COMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC.;
THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND HON. SIMEON
KINTANAR
GR 16496
April 30, 1997
FACTS:

Bell

Telecommunications

(BellTel)

filed

before

the

National

Telecommunications Commission (NTC) an application for a Certificate of Public

Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) to procure, install, operate and maintain
Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services (NITS) and a Provisional Authority
(PA) to effect such. During such application, BellTel has not been given a legislative
franchise to engage in the telecoms service which made in unable to participate in the
deliberations for service area assignments for local exchange carrier service (LEC)
where the petitioners above participated in. Subsequently, RA 7692 was enacted
granting BellTel a congressional franchise.
On 12 July 1994, BellTel filed a second application for a certificate of public
convenience, proposing to install 2.6 million telephone lines in 10 years and to provide
a 100% digital local exchange network (NTC Case 94-229). It also moved for the
withdrawal of the first application, without prejudice, which was granted by the NTC.
BellTels application (2nd ) was opposed by various telecommunication companies.
BellTels application was referred to the Common Carriers Authorization Department
(CCAD), which found BellTels proposal technically feasible and BellTel to be financially
capable. The two deputy commissioners of the NTC signified their approval of the
CCAD recommendation. The working draft was prepared by the legal department, was
initialed by the two deputy commissioners, but was not signed by NTC Commissioner
Simeon Kintanar.
The petitioners questioned the validity of the PA because according to them it is the
prevailing policy and procedure in the NTC that the Commissioner has the exclusive

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authority to sign, validate and promulgate any and all orders, resolutions and decisions
of the NTC and only his vote counts. BellTel filed two motions to resolve the application
and the issuance of the PA but the NTC did not act on it. In that relation, the petitioners
filed an Opposition. Commissioner Kintanar issued an Order setting said motions for
hearing but did not resolve said motions. However, no hearing was conducted and it
was rescheduled.

BellTel filed a motion to promulgate, after previously filing two urgent ex-parte motion to
resolve application, which was not acted upon by the NTC. On 4 July 1995, the NTC
denied the motion in an order signed solely by Commissioner Kintanar. On 17 July
1995, BellTel filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition against NTC
before the Supreme Court. The Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to Paragraph 1, Section 9 of BP 129. The Court of Appeals granted BellTels
position. Hence, the petitions for review by the opposing telecommunication companies
and Commissioner Kintanar.
ISSUE: Whether the vote of the Chairman of the Commission is sufficient to legally
render an NTC order, resolution or decision.

HELD: Having been organized under Executive Order 146 as a three-man

commission, the NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial body even during the time
it was acting as a one-man regime. NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out
of three members of the commission in order to validly decides a case or any incident
therein. The vote alone of the chairman of the Commission, absent the required
concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least
arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution
or decision. EO 546, which created the NTC under the Ministries of Public Works and of
Transportation and Communication, does not specifically provide that the NTC is not a
collegiate body nor did it mention that NTC should meet En Banc in deciding its case or

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quasi-judicial functions. However, this does not militate against the collegial nature of
the NTC because the Rules of Procedure and Practice applied by the NTC in its
proceedings states that in cases heard by the Board En Banc, the resolution or order
should be reached with the concurrence of at least two regular members after
deliberation and consultation. NTC Circulars 1-1-93, 3-1-93 and the Order of Kintanar,
declaring the NTC as a single entity or non-collegial entity, are contrary to law and thus
are null and void.

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ADDITIONAL TELECOM CASES:

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. and PILIPINO TELECOMMUNICATION
CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 151908
August 12, 2003
FACTS:

On 16 June 2000, the NTC issued Memorandum Circular 13-6-2000,

promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services; which

includes provisions pertaining to the use and sale of pre-paid cards and unit of billing for
cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS). A second memorandum was issued
addressed to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators, which contained
measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidents of stealing cellular phone
units.
SMART filed a petition to nullify the memorandum regarding the billing and Islacom and
Piltel alleged that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods
such as prepaid call cards since the jurisdiction belongs to the DOTC under the
Consumer Act of the Philippines. It further alleged that Billing memo is oppressive,
confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property
without due process of law and that such memo will impair the viability of the prepaid
cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and
call cards and the requirement in the memo that the identification of prepaid buyers and
call balance announcement are unreasonable thus praying for the nullification of the
Billing Circular.
The lower court granted the issuance of the injunction. NTC moved for reconsideration,
but was denied. NTC thereafter filed a special civil action for certiorari and probation
before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court granted the petition and dismissed the

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companies complaint without prejudice to the referral of their grievances with the NTC.
Hence, the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether a party should have exhausted administrative remedies before it filed
the case in court.
HELD: No, the parties need not exhaust administrative remedies.
A party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to Court, when
questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency. The principle only applies when the act of the agency was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed and
pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The quasi-legislative function or
rule-making power of an administrative agency is different from its quasi-judicial or
administrative ad judicatory power. The first is the product of a delegated legislative
power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. It must
be in accordance with the Constitution and other requirements by the law. The second
involves the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards lay down by the law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
Since the issuance by the NTC of the two circulars was pursuant to its rule-making
power, the petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power of the RTC to assail
the constitutionality and validity of said circulars.

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PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORP., vs. GLOBE TELECOM, INC.

May 25, 2004
G.R. No. 147324
FACTS: Several years back before 1991, Globe has been engaged in the coordination
of the provision of various communication facilities for the US military bases in
Pampanga and Zambales. The said communication facilities were installed and
configured for the exclusive use of the US Defense Communications Agency (USDCA),
and for security reasons, were operated only by its personnel or those of American
companies contracted by it to operate said facilities. The USDCA contracted with said
American companies, and the latter, in turn, contracted with Globe for the use of the
communication facilities. Globe, on the other hand, contracted with local service
providers such as the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat) for
the provision of the communication facilities.
In 1991, Globe and Philcomsat entered into a contract wherein the latter obliged itself to
establish, operate and provide an earth station in Zambales which will last for 5 years.
Globe in turn, promised to pay rentals for each leased circuit. At that time, both parties
knew that the US military bases which is the basis for the occupancy of the military
base in Zambales is to expire in the same year according to our Constitution which
states that the military bases, troops and facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
unless a new treaty is signed which will allow the same. Despite that, Philcomsat built
the earth station as agreed with Globe. Thereafter, the Senate of the Philippines did not
concur in a new treaty, which will extend the term of use by the US military troops in
their presently occupied bases.

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Due to that event, Globe professed its intention to discontinue the use of the earth
station with Philcomsat. It contented a part in their agreement that neither party shall be
held liable or deemed to be in default for any failure to perform its obligation under this
Agreement if such failure results directly or indirectly from force majeure or fortuitous
event. Force majeure according to their contact include circumstances beyond the
control of the party involved including, but not limited to, any law, order, regulation,
direction or request of the Government of the Philippines, strikes or other labor
difficulties, insurrection riots, national emergencies, war, acts of public enemies, fire,
floods, typhoons or other catastrophes or acts of God. However, there is also a
stipulation in that same agreement regarding the payment after discontinuance of
service, which binds Globe to pay rentals for a particular period. Despite of several
demands to pay were sent to Globe by Philcomsat, the former did not pay any.
Philcomsat then filed a complaint praying for the payment of all money claims against
Globe. Globe in return insist on its defense of force majeure in non-payment of the
rentals.
The RTC ruled in favor of Philcomsat but the amount it prayed for was not granted
precisely and it affirmed the defense of Globe regarding the issue of force majeure.
Both parties appealed to the CA. Since affirmed the decision of the RTC but ordered
Globe to pay rentals from the actual time of use until the time the US military vacated
the bases in the month of December 1992. Both parties appealed the case to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUES:

1) Whether the termination of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement

constitutes force majeure which would exempt Globe from complying with its obligation
to pay rentals; 2) whether Globe is liable to pay rentals under the Agreement for the
month of December 1992; and 3) whether Philcomsat is entitled to attorneys fees and
exemplary damages.
HELD: As to the first issue, the SC ruled in favor of Globe as the termination of the RPUS Military Bases Agreement is a force majeure. Contrary to the position of Philcomsat

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that such event is not unforeseeable, but were possibilities known to it and Globe at the
time they entered into the Agreement, such events cannot exempt Globe from
performing its obligation of paying rentals for the entire five-year term thereof, the court
held that Article 1174, which exempts an obligor from liability on account of fortuitous
events or force majeure, refers not only to events that are unforeseeable, but also to
those which are foreseeable, but inevitable. The events which the parties included in
the enumeration of what force majeure is as to their contract does not have the effect of
expanding the force majeure enumerated in the Civil Code. Furthermore, under Article
1306 of the Civil Code, parties to a contract may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem fit, as long as the same do not run counter to
the law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
Regarding the second issue, Globe should not be made to pay the rentals for
December of 1992. The aforementioned events made impossible the continuation of the
Agreement until the end of its five-year term without fault on the part of either party. The
Court of Appeals was thus correct in ruling that the happening of such fortuitous events
rendered Globe exempt from payment of rentals for the remainder of the term of the
Agreement. Moreover, it would be unjust to require Globe to continue paying rentals
even though Philcomsat cannot be compelled to perform its corresponding obligation
under the Agreement.
Finally, in resolving the third issue, the court affirmed the findings of the CA in not
awarding Philcomsat attorneys fees and exemplary damages. Exemplary damages
may be awarded in cases involving contracts or quasi-contracts, if the erring party acted
in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. In the present case,
it was not shown that Globe acted wantonly or oppressively in not heeding Philcomsats
demands for payment of rentals. It was established during the trial of the case before
the trial court that Globe had valid grounds for refusing to comply with its contractual
obligations after 1992.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ENERGY REGULATORY

BOARD petitioner, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondent.
G.R. No. 141314.
November 15, 2002
FACTS: On December 23, 1993, MERALCO filed with the ERB an application for the
revision of its rate schedules. The application reflected an average increase of 21
centavos per kilowatt-hour (kwh) in its distribution charge. The application also included
a prayer for provisional approval of the increase pursuant to Section 16(c) of the Public
Service Act and Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172.
On January 28, 1994, the ERB issued an Order granting a provisional increase of
P0.184 per kwh, subject to the following condition:
In the event, however, that the Board finds, after hearing and submission by the
Commission on Audit of an audit report on the books and records of the applicant that
the latter is entitled to a lesser increase in rates, all excess amounts collected from the
applicants customers as a result of this Order shall either be refunded to them or
correspondingly credited in their favor for application to electric bills covering future
consumptions.
On February 11, 1997, the COA submitted its Audit Report SAO No. 95-07 (the COA
Report) which contained, among others, the recommendation not to include income
taxes paid by MERALCO as part of its operating expenses for purposes of rate
determination and the use of the net average investment method for the computation of
the proportionate value of the properties used by MERALCO during the test year for the
determination of the rate base. The ERB held that income tax should not be treated as
operating expense as this should be borne by the stockholders who are recipients of
the income or profits realized from the operation of their business hence, should not be
passed on to the consumers. On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the ERB
decision insofar as it directed the reduction of the MERALCO rates by an average of

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P0.167 per kwh and the refund of such amount to MERALCOs customers beginning
February 1994 and until its billing cycle beginning February 1998. The regulation of
rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State
and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid
exercise thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the State exercises its Police Power in regulating rates for
public use.

HELD: In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public
against arbitrary and excessive rates while maintaining the efficiency and quality of
services rendered. However, the power to regulate rates does not give the State the
right to prescribe rates, which are so low as to deprive the public utility of a reasonable
return on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must be one that yields a
fair return on the public utility upon the value of the property performing the service and
one that is reasonable to the public for the services rendered. The fixing of just and
reasonable rates involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests. It is a
settled rule that the goal of rate-making is to arrive at a just and reasonable rate for both
the public utility and the public, which avails of the formers products and services.
However, what is a just and reasonable rate cannot be fixed by any immutable method
or formula. Hence, it has been held that no public utility has a vested right to any
particular method of valuation.
Accordingly, with respect to a determination of the proper method to be used in the
valuation of property and equipment used by a public utility for rate-making purposes,
the administrative agency is not bound to apply any one particular formula or method
simply because the same method has been previously used and applied.

In fact,

nowhere in the previous decisions cited by MERALCO, which applied the trending
method, did the Court rule that the same should be the only method to be applied in all
instances. Thus, the burden is upon the oppositor, MERALCO, to prove that the rates
fixed by the ERB are unreasonable or otherwise confiscatory as to merit the reversal of
the ERB. In the instant cases, MERALCO was unable to discharge this burden.

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Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are GRANTED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 46888 is REVERSED.
Respondent MERALCO is authorized to adopt a rate adjustment in the amount of
P0.017 per kilowatt-hour, effective with respect to MERALCOs billing cycles beginning
February 1994. Further, in accordance with the decision of the ERB dated February 16,
1998, the excess average amount of P0.167 per kilowatt-hour starting with the
applicants billing cycles beginning February 1998 is ordered to be refunded to
MERALCOs customers or correspondingly credited in their favor for future
consumption.

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THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE CITY TREASURER OF

QUEZON CITY, DR. VICTOR B. ENRIGA,
vs. BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
G.R. No. 162015
March 6, 2006
FACTS: Respondent Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. (Bayantel) is a legislative
franchise holder under Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 3259 4 to establish and operate radio
stations for domestic telecommunications, radiophone, broadcasting and telecasting.
On July 20, 1992, barely few months after the LGC took effect, Congress enacted Rep.
Act No. 7633, amending Bayantels original franchise. The amendatory law (Rep. Act
No. 7633) contained the following tax provision:
SEC. 11. The grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes
on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this franchise, as other
persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. In addition
thereto, the grantee, its successors or assigns shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to
three percent (3%) of all gross receipts of the telephone or other telecommunications
businesses transacted under this franchise by the grantee, its successors or assigns
and the said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings
thereof. Provided, That the grantee, its successors or assigns shall continue to be liable
for income taxes payable under Title II of the National Internal Revenue Code. It is
undisputed that within the territorial boundary of Quezon City, Bayantel owned several
real properties on which it maintained various telecommunications facilities.
In 1993, the government of Quezon City, pursuant to the taxing power vested on local
government units by Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, infra, in relation to
Section 232 of the LGC, supra, enacted City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93, otherwise
known as the Quezon City Revenue Code (QCRC), 5 imposing, under Section 5 thereof,
a real property tax on all real properties in Quezon City, and, reiterating in its Section 6,
the withdrawal of exemption from real property tax under Section 234 of the LGC, On

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January 7, 1999, Bayantel wrote the office of the City Assessor seeking the exclusion of
its real properties in the city from the roll of taxable real properties. With its request
having been denied, Bayantel interposed an appeal with the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals (LBAA). And, evidently on its firm belief of its exempt status,
Bayantel did not pay the real property taxes assessed against it by the Quezon City
government.
On account thereof, the Quezon City Treasurer sent out notices of delinquency for the
total amount of P43,878,208.18, followed by the issuance of several warrants of levy
against Bayantels properties preparatory to their sale at a public auction set on July 30,
2002.
Threatened with the imminent loss of its properties, Bayantel immediately withdrew its
appeal with the LBAA and instead filed with the RTC of Quezon City a petition for
prohibition with an urgent application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ
of preliminary injunction
ISSUE: Whether or not Bayantels real properties in Quezon City are, under its
franchise, exempt from real property tax.
HELD: The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our
jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely be virtue of
a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5,
Article X of the Constitution. Under the latter, the exercise of the power may be subject
to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide which, however, must
be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
In net effect, the controversy presently before the Court involves, at bottom, a clash
between the inherent taxing power of the legislature, which necessarily includes the
power to exempt, and the local governments delegated power to tax under the aegis of
the 1987 Constitution.

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Now to go back to the Quezon City Revenue Code which imposed real estate taxes on
all real properties within the citys territory and removed exemptions theretofore
"previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or
juridical..," there can really be no dispute that the power of the Quezon City
Government to tax is limited by Section 232 of the LGC which expressly provides that
"a province or city or municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an
annual ad valorem tax on real property such as land, building, machinery, and other
improvement not hereinafter specifically exempted." Under this law, the Legislature
highlighted its power to thereafter exempt certain realties from the taxing power of local
government units. An interpretation denying Congress such power to exempt would
reduce the phrase "not hereinafter specifically exempted" as a pure jargon, without
meaning whatsoever. Needless to state, such absurd situation is unacceptable.
As we see it, then, the issue in this case no longer dwells on whether Congress has the
power to exempt Bayantels properties from realty taxes by its enactment of Rep. Act
No. 7633 which amended Bayantels original franchise. The more decisive question
turns on whether Congress actually did exempt Bayantels properties at all by virtue of
Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633.
Admittedly, Rep. Act No. 7633 was enacted subsequent to the LGC. Perfectly aware
that the LGC has already withdrawn Bayantels former exemption from realty taxes,
Congress opted to pass Rep. Act No. 7633 using, under Section 11 thereof, exactly the
same defining phrase "exclusive of this franchise" which was the basis for Bayantel s
exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC. In plain language, Section 11 of Rep. Act
No. 7633 states that "the grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the
same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this
franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by
law to pay." The Court views this subsequent piece of legislation as an express and real
intention on the part of Congress to once again remove from the LGCs delegated taxing
power, all of the franchisees (Bayantels) properties that are actually, directly and
exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.

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Aala v. Globe Telecom

CA G.R. No. 78049
FACTS: Petitioners Elizabeth Aala, et.al. are the principal, teachers and students of
Solano National High School located at Barangay Quirino, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.
They are all permanent residents of Brgy Quirino except for the teachers and students
of the school who are considered transients to said barangay where the cellsite antenna
tower of Globe is being constructed. Petitioners seasonably registered their protest and
opposition to the construction of the said cell site antenna on the grounds of security
and safety concerns and it being a health hazard. They presented their witness, Dr.
Felixberto Ayahao, who finished Otalaryngology, head and neck surgery. The latter
claimed that non-ionizing radiation could cause biological effects in the individual. On
the other hand, an amicus curiae, Dr. Agnes Peralta, Director of Health Devices and
Technology of DOH, claimed, among others, that if a person is at the minimum safe
distance or beyond, there is no harmful effect. The DOH press release stated also that
Sec. Manuel Dayrit declared that present transmitters could cause cancer. The WHO
has also issued a statement that present scientific knowledge does not prove that
radiation from cellular phone transmitters could cause cancer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proposed cellsite will prejudice the health, safety, and
security concerns of the petitioners and stakeholders.
HELD: This tribunal has to admit that it does not have the resources and competence
to rule on the issue. The best that the Court can do is to sustain the present stand of
Bureau of Health Device and Technology under DOH, that the radiation emitted by
cellsite antennas is not hazardous to human health if the minimum safe distance is
observed.

We, therefore agree with the trial court finding that while the rights of the appellants
to safe and healthy environment enshrined under Sec.15 and 16 of 1987

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Constitution is recognized the failure of the petitioners to substantiate their

allegations of health, safety and security risks rendered their petition for injunction
for without basis.
We admire their vigilance especially in the light of the findings of the WHO that there
are gaps in the knowledge that have been identified for further research to make
better assess health risk.

Telecoms Law Case Digest

2nd Semester, A.Y. 2014 - 2015