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International Relations: One World, Many Theories

Author(s): Stephen M. Walt
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp. 2932+34-46
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International

Relations:
One

World,

Many Theories
M. Walt
byStephen

Why

shouldpolicymakersand practitioners
care about the scholarlystudy of international affairs?Those who conductforeign
policy often dismiss academictheorists(frequently,

one mustadmit,with goodreason),but thereis an inescapablelink

betweenthe abstractworldof theoryandthe realworldof policy.We
that bomof information
need theoriesto makesenseof the blizzard
of "theory"
who are contemptuous
bardsus daily.Evenpolicymakers
mustrely on theirown (often unstated)ideasabouthow the world
worksin orderto decidewhatto do. It is hardto makegoodpolicyif
areflawed,justasit is hardto construct
one'sbasicorganizing
principles
uses
a
without
theories
knowing lot abouttherealworld.Everyone
good
about
theories-whetherhe orsheknowsit ornot-and disagreements
about
the
rest
fundamental
basic
on
more
disagreements
usually
policy
outcomes.
forcesthatshapeinternational
Take,forexample,the currentdebateon how to respondto China.
Fromone perspective,
China'sascentis the latestexampleof the tenandmaster
science
S TEPHEN M. WALTisprofessor
ofpolitical
of thesocialscience
colleattheUniversity
He isa member
editorial
board.
giatedivision
ofFOREIGN
ofChicago.
POLICY'S
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29

Relations
International

dencyforrisingpowersto alterthe globalbalanceof powerin potentiallydangerous

ways,especiallyas theirgrowinginfluencemakesthem
moreambitious.Fromanotherperspective,the key to China'sfuture
conductis whetherits behaviorwillbe modifiedby its integrationinto
worldmarketsandby the (inevitable?)
spreadof democratic
principles.
Fromyet anotherviewpoint,relationsbetweenChinaand the restof
the worldwill be shapedby issuesof cultureand identity:Will China
see itself(andbe seenbyothers)asa normalmemberof the worldcommunityor a singularsocietythatdeservesspecialtreatment?
In the sameway,the debateoverNATO expansionlooksdifferent
dependingon whichtheoryone employs.Froma "realist"
perspective,
is
an
effort
to
influence-well
extend
Western
beyond
NATO expansion
the traditional
sphereof U.S. vital interests-duringa periodof Russian weaknessand is likelyto provokea harshresponsefromMoscow.
From a liberalperspective,however,expansionwill reinforcethe
nascentdemocraciesof CentralEuropeand extendNATO'S conflictmanagementmechanismsto a potentiallyturbulentregion.A third
viewmightstressthe valueof incorporating
the CzechRepublic,Hunand
Poland
within
the
Western
whosememgary,
securitycommunity,
berssharea commonidentitythathasmadewarlargelyunthinkable.
No singleapproachcancaptureall the complexityof contemporary
worldpolitics.Therefore,we arebetteroffwitha diversearrayof competingideasratherthan a singletheoreticalorthodoxy.Competition
between theorieshelps reveal their strengthsand weaknessesand
spurssubsequentrefinements,while revealingflawsin conventional
wisdom.Althoughwe shouldtake care to emphasizeinventiveness
over invective,we shouldwelcomeandencouragethe heterogeneity
of contemporary
scholarship.

WHERE ARE WE COMING FROM?

The studyof international
affairsis bestunderstood
as a protracted
comtraditions.
Realismemphapetitionbetweentherealist,liberal,andradical
sizes the enduringpropensityfor conflictbetweenstates;liberalism
identifiesseveralwaysto mitigatetheseconflictivetendencies;
andthe
radicaltradition
describes
howtheentiresystemofstaterelations
mightbe
transformed.
The boundariesbetweenthese traditionsaresomewhatfuzzy
and a numberof importantworksdo not fit neatlyinto any of them, but
debateswithin and amongthem have largelydefinedthe discipline.
30

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Walt

Realism
Realismwas the dominanttheoreticaltraditionthroughoutthe Cold
affairsas a struggleforpoweramongselfWar.It depictsinternational
interestedstatesand is generallypessimisticaboutthe prospectsfor
eliminatingconflictandwar.Realismdominatedin the ColdWaryears
becauseit providedsimplebutpowerfulexplanations
forwar,alliances,
obstacles
to
and
other
international
imperialism,
cooperation,
phenomena,andbecauseits emphasison competitionwasconsistentwiththe
centralfeaturesof the American-Soviet
rivalry.
Realismis not a singletheory,of course,andrealistthoughtevolved
the ColdWar."Classical"
realistssuchasHans
considerably
throughout
Morgenthauand ReinholdNiebuhrbelievedthat states,like human
beings,hadan innatedesireto dominateothers,whichledthemto fight
wars.Morgenthau
alsostressedthe virtuesof the classical,multipolar,
systemandsawthe bipolarrivalrybetweenthe Unitbalance-of-power
ed Statesandthe SovietUnionas especiallydangerous.
By contrast,the "neorealist"
theoryadvancedby KennethWaltz
human
nature
and
focused
on the effectsof the international
ignored
For
system. Waltz,the international
systemconsistedof a numberof
greatpowers,each seekingto survive.Becausethe systemis anarchic
(i.e., thereis no centralauthorityto protectstatesfromone another),
each statehas to surviveon its own.Waltzarguedthat thiscondition
wouldlead weakerstatesto balanceagainst,ratherthan bandwagon
he claimed
with, morepowerfulrivals.And contraryto Morgenthau,
thatbipolarity
wasmorestablethanmultipolarity.
An importantrefinementto realismwas the additionof offensedefensetheory,as laid out by RobertJervis,GeorgeQuester,and
StephenVan Evera.These scholarsarguedthat warwas morelikely
whenstatescouldconquereachothereasily.Whendefensewaseasier
thanoffense,however,securitywasmoreplentiful,incentivesto expand
declined,and cooperationcould blossom.And if defensehad the
andstatescoulddistinguish
betweenoffensiveanddefensive
advantage,
then
states
could acquirethe meansto defendthemselves
weapons,
withoutthreatening
the effectsof anarchy.
others,therebydampening
Forthese"defensive"
realists,statesmerelysoughtto surviveandgreat

powerscouldguaranteetheirsecurityby formingbalancingalliancesand
choosingdefensivemilitarypostures(such as retaliatorynuclearforces).
Not surprisingly,Waltz and most other neorealistsbelieved that the
United States was extremelysecure for most of the Cold War.Their
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31

Relations
International

itsfavorable
positionbyadoptprinciplefearwasthatit mightsquander
foreignpolicy.Thus,bytheendof theColdWar,
inganoverlyaggressive
darkbrooding
abouthuman
realismhadmovedawayfromMorgenthau's
natureandtakenon a slightlymoreoptimistictone.
Liberalism
The principalchallengeto realismcamefroma broadfamilyof liberal theories.One strandof liberalthoughtarguedthateconomicinterdependencewould discouragestatesfrom using force againsteach
otherbecausewarfarewouldthreateneachside'sprosperity.
A second
often
associated
with
President
Woodrow
strand,
Wilson, saw the
of
as
the
to
world
spread democracy
key
peace,basedon the claimthat
democraticstateswere inherentlymorepeacefulthan authoritarian
states. A third, more recent theory argued that international
institutionssuch as the InternationalEnergyAgencyand the InternationalMonetaryFundcouldhelp overcomeselfishstatebehavior,
statesto foregoimmediategainsforthe greater
mainlybyencouraging
benefitsof enduringcooperation.
Althoughsomeliberalsflirtedwiththe ideathatnew transnational
actors, especially the multinationalcorporation,were gradually
on thepowerof states,liberalism
sawstatesasthe
encroaching
generally
centralplayersin international
affairs.All liberaltheoriesimpliedthat
wasmorepervasive
thaneventhe defensiveversionof realcooperation
ismallowed,buteachviewoffereda differentrecipeforpromoting
it.
RadicalApproaches
Until the 1980s,marxismwasthe mainalternativeto the mainstream
realistand liberaltraditions.Whererealismand liberalismtook the
statesystemforgranted,marxismofferedboth a differentexplanation
forinternational
conflictanda blueprintforfundamentally
transformorder.
ing the existinginternational
Orthodoxmarxisttheorysawcapitalism
asthe centralcauseof internationalconflict.Capitaliststatesbattledeachotheras a consequence
of theirincessantstruggleforprofitsandbattledsocialiststatesbecause
they saw in them the seeds of their own destruction.Neomarxist
"dependency"theory, by contrast, focused on relations between
advancedcapitalistpowersand lessdevelopedstatesand arguedthat the
former-aided by an unholy alliance with the ruling classes of the
developing world-had grown rich by exploiting the latter.The solu32

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Relations
International

tion wasto overthrowtheseparasiticelitesandinstalla revolutionary

development.
governmentcommittedto autonomous
beforethe ColdWar
Bothof thesetheorieswerelargelydiscredited
even ended.The extensivehistoryof economicandmilitarycooperation amongthe advancedindustrial
did
powersshowedthatcapitalism
not inevitablylead to conflict.The bitterschismsthat dividedthe
communistworldshowedthat socialismdid not alwayspromoteharmony. Dependencytheorysufferedsimilarempiricalsetbacksas it
clearthat,first,activeparticipation
in the world
becameincreasingly
a
to
was
better
route
than
autonomous
socialist
economy
prosperity
countries
development;and,second,manydeveloping
provedthemselvesquitecapableof bargaining
with
corsuccessfully multinational
porationsandothercapitalistinstitutions.
As marxismsuccumbedto its variousfailings,its mantle was
assumedby a groupof theoristswho borrowedheavilyfromthe wave
of postmodernwritingsin literarycriticismand social theory.This
"deconstructionist"
approachwas openly skepticalof the effortto
devise generalor universaltheoriessuch as realismor liberalism.
Indeed,its proponentsemphasizedthe importanceof languageand
discoursein shapingsocialoutcomes.However,becausethesescholars
focusedinitiallyon criticizingthe mainstream
but did not
paradigms
offerpositivealternativesto them, they remaineda self-consciously
dissidentminorityformostof the 1980s.
DomesticPolitics
Not allColdWarscholarship
on international
affairsfit neatlyintothe
In particular,
a numberof imporrealist,liberal,or marxistparadigms.
tantworksfocusedon the characteristics
of states,governmental
orgastrandof liberaltheory
nizations,orindividualleaders.The democratic
fits underthis heading,as do the effortsof scholarssuch as Graham
AllisonandJohnSteinbruner
to use organization
theoryandbureaucraticpoliticsto explainforeignpolicybehavior,and thoseof Jervis,
IrvingJanis,andothers,whichappliedsocialandcognitivepsychology.Forthe mostpart,theseeffortsdidnot seekto providea generalthebehaviorbut to identifyotherfactorsthat might
oryof international
lead states to behave contraryto the predictionsof the realistor liberal approaches.Thus, much of this literatureshould be regardedas a
complement to the three main paradigmsrather than as a rival
approachfor analysisof the internationalsystemas a whole.
34

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Walt

NEW WRINKLES

IN OLD PARADIGMS

Scholarshipon internationalaffairshas diversifiedsignificantlysince

the end of the Cold War.Non-Americanvoices are moreprominent,a
wider range of methods and theories are seen as legitimate,and new
issuessuch as ethnic conflict, the environment,and the futureof the
state have been placed on the agendaof scholarseverywhere.
Yetthe senseof dejavu is equallystriking.Insteadof resolvingthe struggle betweencompetingtheoreticaltraditions,the end of the Cold Warhas
merelylauncheda new seriesof debates.Ironically,even as manysocieties
embracesimilaridealsof democracy,freemarkets,and humanrights,the
scholarswho studythese developmentsaremoredividedthan ever.
Realism Redux
Although the end of the Cold War led a few writersto declare that
realismwas destined for the academicscrapheap,rumorsof its demise
have been largelyexaggerated.
A recent contributionof realisttheoryis its attentionto the problem
of relativeand absolutegains.Respondingto the institutionalists'claim
that internationalinstitutionswould enable states to foregoshort-term
advantagesforthe sakeof greaterlong-termgains,realistssuchasJoseph
Grieco and Stephen Krasnerpoint out that anarchyforces states to
worryaboutboth the absolutegainsfromcooperationand the way that
If
gainsare distributedamongparticipants.The logic is straightforward:
one state reapslargergains than its partners,it will graduallybecome
stronger,and its partnerswill eventuallybecome morevulnerable.
Realistshave alsobeen quickto explorea varietyof new issues.Barry
Posen offersa realist explanationfor ethnic conflict, noting that the
breakupof multiethnicstatescouldplace rivalethnic groupsin an anarchic setting,therebytriggeringintensefearsand temptingeach groupto
use force to improveits relativeposition. This problemwould be particularlyseverewhen each group'sterritorycontainedenclaves inhabited by their ethnic rivals-as in the formerYugoslavia-because each
side would be tempted to "cleanse"(preemptively)these alien minorities and expand to incorporateany othersfromtheir ethnic groupthat
lay outside their borders.Realists have also cautioned that NATO,
absent a clear enemy, would likely face increasingstrains and that
expandingits presenceeastwardwouldjeopardizerelationswith Russia.
Finally,scholarssuch as Michael Mastandunohave arguedthat U.S.
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35

Relations
International

Waiting

for

Mr.

The post-ColdWarworldstill awaitsits "X"article.Althoughmany

have tried,no one hasmanagedto pen the sortof compellinganalysis
the
foranearlierera,whenhe articulated
thatGeorgeKennanprovided
the
most
of
a
new
of
containment.
Instead
vision,
imporsingle
theory
in post-ColdWarwritingson worldaffairsisthe contantdevelopment
tinuingclashbetweenthosewhobelieveworldpoliticshasbeen (oris
andthosewhobelievethatthefuture
transformed
being)fundamentally
will looka lot likethe past.
fallinto
Scholarswhoseetheendof theColdWarasa watershed
two distinctgroups.Manyexpertsstillsee the stateas the mainactor
butbelievethatthe agendaof statesis shiftingfrommilitarycompetitionto economiccompetitiveness,
domesticwelfare,andenvironmental protection.Thus,PresidentBill Clintonhas embracedthe view
self-interest
that"enlightened
[and]sharedvalues.., willcompelusto
cooperatein moreconstructiveways."Some writersattributethis
othersto the nuclearstalemate,
changeto the spreadof democracy,
andstillothersto changesin international
norms.
An evenmoreradicalperspective
questionswhetherthe stateis
still the mostimportantinternational
actor.JessicaMathewsbelieves
that "theabsolutesof the Westphalian
fixed
system[of]territorially
states. . . areall dissolving,"
andJohnRuggiearguesthatwe do not
even have a vocabulary
that can adequately
describethe new forces
that (he believes) are transforming
world politics.
contemporary
Althoughthereis still no consensuson the causesof this trend,the
view that statesare of decreasingrelevanceis surprisingly
common
andpolicywonks.
amongacademics,
journalists,
Prominent
realistssuchasChristopher
LayneandKennethWaltz
continueto givethe stateprideof placeandpredicta returnto familiar
RobertKeohaneand
patternsof greatpowercompetition.Similarly,
otherinstitutionalists
alsoemphasize
the centralroleof the stateand
arguethat institutionssuch as the EuropeanUnion and NATO are
becausetheyprovidecontinuityin themidstofdraimportant
precisely
maticpoliticalshifts.Theseauthorsallregardthe endof the ColdWar
asa far-reaching
shiftin the globalbalanceofpowerbutdo notseeit as
a qualitative
transformation
in the basicnatureof worldpolitics.
Who is right?Toosoon to tell, but the debatebearswatching
in the yearsto come.

-S.W.

36

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Walt

insofarasits
foreignpolicyis generallyconsistentwithrealistprinciples,
andto shapea
actionsarestilldesignedto preserveU.S. predominance
postwarorderthatadvancesAmericaninterests.
withinthe realistparThe mostinteresting
conceptualdevelopment
the
"defensive"
and"offenhas
been
the
between
adigm
emergingsplit
sive"strandsof thought.Defensiverealistssuchas Waltz,VanEvera,
andJackSnyderassumedthatstateshadlittleintrinsicinterestin militaryconquestand arguedthat the costs of expansiongenerallyoutweighedthe benefits.Accordingly,
they maintainedthat greatpower
warsoccurredlargelybecausedomesticgroupsfosteredexaggerated
perceptionsof threatandan excessivefaithin the efficacyof militaryforce.
Thisviewis nowbeingchallengedalongseveralfronts.First,asRandallSchwellernotes,the neorealistassumption
thatstatesmerelyseek
to survive"stackedthe deck"in favorof the statusquobecauseit precludedthe threatof predatory
revisioniststates-nationssuchasAdolf
Francethat "valuewhat
Hitler'sGermanyor NapoleonBonaparte's
far
and
covet
more
than
what
they
theypossess" arewillingto riskannihilationto achievetheiraims.Second,PeterLiberman,in his book
DoesConquest
Pay?,usesa numberof historicalcases-such astheNazi
of
occupation WesternEuropeand Soviet hegemonyover Eastern
Europe-to showthatthe benefitsof conquestoftenexceedthe costs,
therebycastingdoubton the claimthatmilitaryexpansionis no longer
cost-effective.Third, offensive realists such as Eric Labs, John
and FareedZakariaarguethat anarchyencouragesall
Mearsheimer,
statesto tryto maximizetheirrelativestrengthsimplybecauseno state
can everbe surewhena trulyrevisionistpowermightemerge.
Thesedifferences
helpexplainwhyrealistsdisagreeoverissuessuch
as the futureof Europe.FordefensiverealistssuchasVanEvera,waris
rarelyprofitableandusuallyresultsfrommilitarism,
hypemrnationalism,
or someotherdistortingdomesticfactor.BecauseVanEverabelieves
suchforcesarelargelyabsentin post-ColdWarEurope,he concludes
that the regionis "primedfor peace."By contrast,Mearsheimer
and
otheroffensiverealistsbelievethatanarchyforcesgreatpowersto comof theirinternalcharacteristics
andthatsecuritycompete irrespective
will
return
to
petition
Europeassoonasthe U.S. pacifieris withdrawn.
New Life for Liberalism
The defeatof communismsparkeda roundof self-congratulationin the
West, best exemplified by Francis Fukuyama'sinfamous claim that
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37

International
Relations

COMPETING
PARADIGMS
MainTheoretical
Proposition

REALISM
Self-interested
states
for
compete
constantly
orsecurity
power

MainUnitsof Analysis States

MainInstruments

Economic
and
especially
military
power

Modern
Theorists

Hans
Morgenthau,
Kenneth
Waltz
of
Waltz,
Theory
International
Politics
"Back
to
Mearsheimer,
theFuture:
Instability
inEurope
after
theCold
War"
(International
Security,
1990)

Representative
Modern
Works

Post-Cold
War
Prediction

MainLimitation

of
Resurgence
overt
great
power
competition
Does
notaccount
for

international
change

38

FOREIGN

LIBERALISM
CONSTRUCTIVISMI
forpower
Concern
overridden
byeconomic/
considerations
political
forprosperity,
(desire
commitment
to
liberal
values)
States
Varies
(international
economic
institutions,
exchange,
promotion
ofdemocracy)
Michael
Doyle,
Robert
Keohane
Keohane,
After
Hegemony
"The
End
of
Fukuyama,
(National
History?"
1989)
Interest,

Increased
cooperation
asliberal
free
values,
and
markets,international
institutions
spreac
Tends
toignore
the

role
ofpower

State
behavior
shaped
beliefs,
byl61ite
collective
norms,
andsocial
identities

Individuals
(especially
l61ites)
Ideas
and
discourse

Alexander
Wendt,
John
Ruggie
Is
Wendt,
"Anarchy
What
States
Make
ofIt"
(International
1992);
Organization,
Koslowski
&
Kratochwil,
"Underin
standing
Changes
International
Politics"
(International
1994)
Organization,
it
because
Agnostic
cannot
the
predict
content
ofideas
Better
atdescribing
the

than
past
anticipating
thefuture

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Walt

humankind
hadnowreachedthe "endof history."
Historyhaspaidlitto
but
attention
this
the
of
the
West did give a
boast,
triumph
tle
notableboostto all threestrandsof liberalthought.
andimportant
hasbeenthe
Byfarthe mostinteresting
development
lively debateon the "democratic
peace."Althoughthe most recent
of
this
debate
had
even
beforethe SovietUnioncollapsed,
phase
begun
it becamemore influentialas the numberof democraciesbeganto
increaseandas evidenceof thisrelationship
beganto accumulate.
Democraticpeacetheoryis a refinementof the earlierclaimthat
wereinherently
democracies
morepeacefulthanautocratic
states.Itrests
the
on
beliefthat althoughdemocracies
seemto fightwarsas oftenas
other states,they rarely,if ever,fight one another.Scholarssuch as
MichaelDoyle,JamesLeeRay,andBruceRussetthaveoffereda number
of explanations
forthistendency,the mostpopularbeingthatdemocracies embracenormsof compromise
that bar the use of forceagainst
similar
It
espousing
groups
principles. is hardto thinkof a moreinfluenrecent
academic
don't
tial,
debate,insofarasthebeliefthat"democracies
each
other"has been an importantjustification
for the Clinton
fight
administration's
effortsto enlargethe sphereof democratic
rule.
It is thereforeironicthatfaithin the "democratic
peace"becamethe
basisforU.S. policyjustasadditional
research
wasbeginningto identify
severalqualifiersto this theory.First,Snyderand EdwardMansfield
pointedout thatstatesmaybe moreproneto warwhentheyarein the
midstof a democratictransition,which impliesthat effortsto export
democracymightactuallymakethingsworse.Second,criticssuchas
absenceof
JoanneGowaandDavidSpirohavearguedthatthe apparent
warbetweendemocracies
is due to the waythat democracy
has been
definedandto the relativedearthof democratic
states(especially
before
1945). In addition,ChristopherLaynehas pointedout that when
democracies
havecomecloseto warin the pasttheirdecisionto remain
at peaceultimately
hadlittledo withtheirshareddemocratic
character.
clearcut
evidencethatdemocracies
donotfighteachotherisconThird,
finedto the post-1945era,and,asGowahasemphasized,
the absenceof
conflictin thisperiodmaybe duemoreto theircommoninterestin containingthe SovietUnionthanto shareddemocratic
principles.
Liberalinstitutionalistslikewisehave continued to adapttheir own
theories.On the one hand,the coreclaimsof institutionalisttheoryhave
become more modest over time. Institutionsare now said to facilitate
cooperationwhen it is in each state'sinterestto do so, but it is widely
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agreedthattheycannotforcestatesto behavein waysthatarecontrary

to the states'own selfishinterests.[Forfurtherdiscussion,pleasesee
suchas
RobertKeohane's
article.]On the otherhand,institutionalists
into
have
extended
the
McCalla
and
Robert
theory new
JohnDuffield
substantive
areas,mostnotablythe studyof NATO.Forthesescholars,
character
helpsexplainwhyit hasbeen
highlyinstitutionalized
NATO'S
of itsmainadversary.
ableto surviveandadapt,despitethedisappearance
aswell.InparTheeconomicstrandofliberaltheoryisstillinfluential
thatthe "globalizaticular,a numberof scholarshaverecentlysuggested
tion" of world markets,the rise of transnationalnetworksand
andthe rapidspreadof globalcommuorganizations,
nongovernmental
nicationstechnologyareundermining
the powerof statesandshifting
attentionawayfrommilitarysecuritytowardeconomicsandsocialwelfare.The detailsarenovel but the basiclogic is familiar:
As societies
aroundthe globebecomeenmeshedin a web of economicand social
theseties will effectivelypreclude
connections,the costsof disrupting
unilateral
stateactions,especiallythe useof force.
This perspectiveimpliesthat warwill remaina remotepossibility
democracies.
It alsosuggeststhatbringamongthe advancedindustrial
China
Russia
into
and
the
relentless
of worldcapitalismis
embrace
ing
the bestwayto promotebothprosperity
andpeace,particularly
if this
processcreatesa strongmiddleclassin thesestatesandreinforces
pressuresto democratize.
Get thesesocietieshookedon prosperity
andcompetitionwillbe confinedto the economicrealm.
Thisviewhasbeenchallengedby scholarswho arguethatthe actual scopeof "globalization"
is modestandthatthesevarioustransactions
stilltakeplacein environments
thatareshapedandregulated
bystates.
the
belief
that
economic
forces
are
traditionNonetheless,
superseding
al greatpowerpoliticsenjoyswidespread
acceptanceamongscholars,
andthe roleof the stateis likelyto be an
pundits,andpolicymakers,
for
future
academic
importanttopic
inquiry.
Constructivist
Theories
Whereasrealismandliberalism
tendto focuson materialfactorssuchas
the impactof ideas.
powerortrade,constructivist
approaches
emphasize
Insteadof takingthe state for grantedand assumingthat it simplyseeks
to survive,constructivistsregardthe interestsand identitiesof statesas
a highly malleable product of specific historical processes.They pay
close attention to the prevailingdiscourse(s)in society because dis40

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Walt

coursereflectsandshapesbeliefsandinterests,andestablishes
accepted
normsof behavior.Consequently,
constructivism
is especiallyattentive
to the sourcesof change,andthis approach
has largelyreplacedmarxismas the preeminentradicalperspective
on international
affairs.
The end of the ColdWarplayedan importantrolein legitimating
constructivisttheoriesbecauserealismand liberalismboth failedto
anticipatethis event andhad sometroubleexplainingit. Constructivists had an explanation:Specifically,formerpresidentMikhail
Gorbachevrevolutionized
Sovietforeignpolicybecausehe embraced
new ideassuchas "commonsecurity."
Moreover,given that we live in an erawhereold normsarebeing
aredissolving,andissuesof identichallenged,once clearboundaries
thatscholarshave
ty arebecomingmoresalient,it is hardlysurprising
been drawnto approachesthat place these issuesfrontand center.
Froma constructivistperspective,in fact, the centralissue in the
post-ColdWarworldis howdifferentgroupsconceivetheiridentities
and interests.Although power is not irrelevant,constructivism
how ideasandidentitiesarecreated,howtheyevolve,and
emphasizes
how theyshapethe waystatesunderstand
andrespondto theirsituation. Therefore,it matterswhetherEuropeans
definethemselvespriin
national
or
continental
whether
terms;
marily
GermanyandJapan
redefinetheirpastsin waysthatencouragetheiradoptingmoreactive
international
roles;andwhetherthe UnitedStatesembracesorrejects
its identityas "globalpoliceman."
Constructivist
theoriesarequitediverseanddo not offera unified
set of predictionson anyof theseissues.At a purelyconceptuallevel,
AlexanderWendthas arguedthat the realistconceptionof anarchy
doesnot adequatelyexplainwhy conflictoccursbetweenstates.The
realissueis how anarchyis understood-inWendt'swords,"Anarchy
is whatstatesmakeof it."Anotherstrandof constructivist
theoryhas
focusedon the futureof the territorial
state,suggestingthat transnationalcommunication
andsharedcivic valuesareundermining
traditionalnationalloyaltiesandcreatingradicallynew formsof political
association.Otherconstructivists
focuson the roleof norms,arguing
thatinternational
lawandothernormativeprincipleshaveerodedear-

lier notions of sovereignty and altered the legitimate purposesfor

which state power may be employed.The common theme in each of
these strandsis the capacityof discourseto shape how political actors
define themselvesand their interests,and thus modifytheir behavior.
SPRING

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1998

41

International
Relations

DomesticPoliticsReconsidered
As in the ColdWar,scholarscontinueto explorethe impactof domestic politicson the behaviorof states.Domesticpoliticsareobviously
centralto the debateon the democraticpeace,and scholarssuch as
Snyder,JeffreyFrieden,andHelenMilnerhaveexaminedhowdomestic interestgroupscandistorttheformation
of statepreferences
andlead
to suboptimalinternationalbehavior.GeorgeDowns,DavidRocke,
andothershavealsoexploredhowdomesticinstitutions
canhelpstates
dealwith the perennialproblemof uncertainty,
whilestudentsof psychologyhave appliedprospecttheoryandothernew tools to explain
why decisionmakersfail to act in a rationalfashion.[Forfurtherdiscussionaboutforeignpolicydecisionmaking,pleasesee the articleby
HermannandJoeHagan.]
Margaret
The pastdecadehas alsowitnessedan explosionof interestin the
conceptof culture,a developmentthatoverlapswiththe constructivist
of ideasandnorms.Thus,ThomasBerger
emphasison the importance
andPeterKatzenstein
haveusedculturalvariables
to explainwhyGerand
have
thus
far
eschewed
more
self-reliant
many Japan
militarypoliof Britishand
cies;ElizabethKierhas offereda culturalinterpretation
Frenchmilitarydoctrinesin the interwar
period;andlainJohnstonhas
tracedcontinuitiesin Chineseforeignpolicyto a deeplyrootedformof
realism."
"cultural
SamuelHuntington's
direwarningsaboutan imminent "clashof civilizations"
aresymptomatic
of thistrendaswell,insofaras his argumentrestson the claimthatbroadculturalaffinitiesare
now supplantingnationalloyalties.Thoughthese and other works
defineculturein widelyvaryingwaysand have yet to providea full
explanationof how it worksor how enduringits effectsmightbe, culturalperspectives
have been verymuchin vogueduringthe pastfive
This
trend
is
years.
partlya reflectionof the broaderinterestin cultural
issuesin the academicworld(andwithinthe publicdebateaswell)and
partlya responseto the upsurgein ethnic,nationalist,andculturalconflictssincethe demiseof the SovietUnion.
TOMORROW'S

CONCEPTUAL

TOOLBOX

While these debatesreflectthe diversityof contemporaryscholarshipon

internationalaffairs,therearealsoobvioussignsof convergence.Mostrealists recognizethat nationalism,militarism,
and other domestic
ethnicity,
factorsare important;liberalsacknowledgethat poweris centralto inter42

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Walt

admitthat ideaswill have

nationalbehavior;and someconstructivists
statesandreinforced
greaterimpactwhenbackedbypowerful
byenduring
materialforces.The boundaries
of eachparadigm
aresomewhatpermeforintellectual
able,andthereis ampleopportunity
arbitrage.
Whichof thesebroadperspectives
shedsthe mostlighton contemaffairs,andwhichshouldpolicymakers
poraryinternational
keepmost
in
mind
when
our
course
into
next
the
firmly
charting
century?
are
Althoughmanyacademics(and morethan a few policymakers)
loatheto admitit, realismremainsthe mostcompellinggeneralframeworkforunderstanding
international
relations.Statescontinueto pay
closeattentionto the balanceof powerandto worryaboutthe possibilityof majorconflict.Amongotherthings,thisenduringpreoccupationwithpowerandsecurityexplainswhymanyAsiansandEuropeans
are now eagerto preserve-andpossiblyexpand-the U.S. military
presencein their regions.As Czech presidentVaiclavHavel has
failsto expand,"wemightbe headingfora newglobwarned,if NATO
al catastrophe... [which]couldcost us all muchmorethanthe two
worldwars."Thesearenot the wordsof a manwhobelievesthatgreat
powerrivalryhasbeenbanishedforever.
As fortheUnitedStates,thepastdecadehasshownhowmuchit likes
one"andhowdetermined
it isto remainin a predominant
being"number
The
United
States
taken
has
of itscurrentsuperioriposition.
advantage
wherever
ty to imposeitspreferences
possible,evenat the riskof irritatof
its
allies.
It
has
forceda seriesofone-sidedarms
ingmany
long-standing
controlagreements
on Russia,dominated
theproblematic
peaceeffortin
andbecome
Bosnia,takenstepsto expandNATOintoRussia's
backyard,
concernedaboutthe risingpowerof China.It has called
increasingly
for greaterrelianceon multilateralism
and a largerrolefor
repeatedly
international
but has treatedagenciessuchas the United
institutions,
Nationsandthe WorldTradeOrganization
withdisdainwhenevertheir
actionsdidnot conformto U.S. interests.
It refusedto jointherestof the
worldin outlawingthe production
of landminesandwaspolitelyuncoat
the
summit.AlthoughU.S. leadersare
operative
Kyotoenvironmental
naked
adeptatcloakingtheiractionsin theloftyrhetoricof"world
order,"
self-interest
liesbehindmostof them.Thus,theendof theColdWardid
not bringthe end of powerpolitics,andrealismis likelyto remainthe single most usefulinstrumentin our intellectualtoolbox.
Yet realism does not explain everything, and a wise leader would
also keep insights from the rival paradigmsin mind. Liberaltheories
SPRING

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1998

43

International
Relations

identify the instrumentsthat states can use to achieve shared interests, highlight the powerful economic forces with which states and
societies must now contend, and help us understandwhy states may
differ in their basic preferences.Paradoxically,because U.S. protection reducesthe dangerof regionalrivalriesand reinforcesthe "liberal peace"that emergedafter 1945, these factorsmaybecome relatively
more important, as long as the United States continues to provide
securityand stability in many partsof the world.
Meanwhile,constructivisttheoriesare best suited to the analysisof
how identities and interestscan change over time, therebyproducing
subtle shifts in the behavior of states and occasionallytriggeringfarreaching but unexpected shifts in international affairs.It matters if
political identity in Europecontinues to shift from the nation-stateto
more local regionsor to a broadersense of Europeanidentity,just as it
matters if nationalism is graduallysupplantedby the sort of "civilizational" affinitiesemphasizedby Huntington. Realism has little to say
about these prospects, and policymakers could be blind-sided by
change if they ignorethese possibilitiesentirely.
In short, each of these competing perspectivescapturesimportant
aspects of world politics. Our understandingwould be impoverished
were our thinking confined to only one of them. The "compleatdiplomat"of the futureshouldremaincognizantof realism'semphasison the
inescapablerole of power,keep liberalism'sawarenessof domesticforces
in mind, and occasionallyreflecton constructivism's
vision of change.

WANT

TO

KNOW

MORE?

For a fair-mindedsurveyof the realist,liberal,and marxistparadigms,

see Michael Doyle'sWays of War and Peace (New York,NY:Norton,
1997). A guide to some recent developmentsin internationalpolitical
thought is Doyle & G. John Ikenberry,eds., New Thinking in International Relations Theory (Boulder,CO: Westview,1997).
Those interestedin realismshouldexamine The Perils of Anarchy:
ContemporaryRealism and InternationalSecurity (Cambridge,MA:
MITPress,1995) by MichaelBrown,Sean Lynn-Jones,& Steven Miller,
eds.; "Offensive Realism and Why States Expand Their War Aims"
(SecurityStudies,Summer1997) by EricLabs;and "Dueling Realisms"
Summer1997) by Stephen Brooks.Foralter(International
Organization,
44

FOREIGN

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Walt

worldpolitics,see John
native realistassessmentsof contemporary
Mearsheimer's
"Backto the Future:Instabilityin Europeafterthe
Summer1990) and RobertJervis'
Cold War"(International
Security,
"TheFutureof WorldPolitics:WillIt Resemblethe Past?"(InternationalSecurity,
Winter1991-92).A realistexplanationof ethnicconflict is BarryPosen's"The SecurityDilemmaand EthnicConflict"
(Survival,
theory
Spring1993);an up-to-datesurveyof offense-defense
canbe foundin "TheSecurityDilemmaRevisited"byCharlesGlaser
(WorldPolitics,October 1997); and recent U.S. foreignpolicy is
explained in Michael Mastanduno's"Preserving the Unipolar
Moment:RealistTheoriesand U.S. GrandStrategyafterthe Cold
War"(International
Security,
Spring1997).
The liberal approachto internationalaffairsis summarized
in
AndrewMoravcsik's
Preferences
A
Liberal
Theo"Taking
Seriously:
Autumn
ry of InternationalPolitics" (International
Organization,
to the debateon the democra1997).Manyof the leadingcontributors
tic peacecan be foundin Brown& Lynn-Jones,
eds.,Debatingthe
DemocraticPeace (Cambridge,
MA: MITPress,1996) and Miriam
Elman,ed.,Paths to Peace: Is Democracythe Answer?(Cambridge,
MA:MITPress,1997).The contributions
of institutionalist
theoryand
thedebateon relativegainsaresummarized
in DavidBaldwin,ed.,Neorealismand Neoliberalism:The Contemporary
Debate (New York,
NY:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993).An importantcritiqueof the
institutionalist
literature
is Mearsheimer's
"TheFalsePromiseof InternationalInstitutions"(Intemrnational
Winter1994-95),butone
Security,
shouldalsoexaminethe responses
in the Summer1995issue.Forapplicationsof institutionalist
"NATO's
theoryto NATO,seeJohnDuffield's
Functionsafter the Cold War"(PoliticalScienceQuarterly,
Winter
and
Robert
McCalla's"NATO's
Persistenceafterthe Cold
1994-95)
War"(International
Summer1996).
Organization,
Authorsquestioningthe roleof the stateincludeSusanStrangein
The Retreatof the State:The Diffusionof Powerin the WorldEconomy(Cambridge:
Cambridge
UniversityPress,1996);andJessicaMathews in "PowerShift" (Foreign
1997). The
Affairs,January/February
Hendrik
in
The
emergenceof the stateis analyzed
by
Spruyt
Sovereign
Stateand Its Competitors
(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,
1994), and its continued importanceis defended in Globalizationin
Question: The InternationalEconomyand the Possibilitiesof Governance (Cambridge:Polity, 1996) by Paul Hirst and GrahameThompSPRING

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1998

45

International
Affairs

son, andGoverningthe GlobalEconomy:InternationalFinanceand

MA:Harvard
the State (Cambridge,
UniversityPress,1994)by Ethan
Kapstein.Anotherdefense(froma somewhatunlikelysource)is "The
WorldEconomy:The Futureof the State"(TheEconomist,
September 20, 1997),anda moreacademicdiscussionof theseissuesis Peter
Evans'"TheEclipseof the State?Reflectionson Statenessin an Era
of Globalization"
October1997).
(WorldPolitics,
Readersinterestedin constructivist
shouldbeginwith
approaches
AlexanderWendt's"AnarchyIs WhatStatesMakeof It: The Social
Constructionof Power Politics"(International
Organization,
Spring
1992), while awaitinghis Social Theory of InternationalPolitics
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,forthcoming).A diverse
arrayof culturaland constructivist
approaches
mayalso be foundin
PeterKatzenstein,
ed., The Cultureof NationalSecurity(New York,
NY:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996) and YosefLapid& Friedrich
Kratochwil,
eds.,The Returnof Cultureand Identityin IR Theory
(Boulder:CO:LynneRienner,1996).
Forlinksto relevantWebsites,aswell as a comprehensive
indexof
relatedarticles,accesswww.foreignpolicy.com.

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aheanwaaetl

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