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What is Philosophy?
The Seminar of Alain Badiou
2010

Alain Badiou

Edited by Srdjan Cvjeticanin

How mad would he have to be to say, He

beheld
An order and thereafter he belonged
To it? He beheld the order of the northern
sky.
But the beggar gazes on calamity
And thereafter he belongs to it, to bread
Hard found, and water tasting of misery.
For him colds glacial beauty is his fate.
Without understanding, he belongs to it
And the night, and midnight, and after, where
it is.
What was he? What he has he has. But what?
It is not a question of captious repartee.
What has he that becomes his hearts strong
core?
He has his poverty and nothing more.
His poverty becomes his hearts strong core
A forgetfulness of summer at the pole.
Sordid Melpomene, why strut bare boards,
Without scenery or lights, in the theatres
bricks,
Dressed high in heliotropes inconstant hue,
The muse of misery? Speak loftier lines.
Cry out, I am the purple muse. Make sure
The audience beholds you, not your gown.
Wallace Stevens, In a Bad Time

Editors Note
by Srdjan Cvjeticanin

What is Philosophy?
by Alain Badiou

1. Day One
1.1 Lecture I
1.2 Lecture II

2. Day Two
2.1 Lecture III
2.2 Lecture IV

3. Day Three
3.1 Lecture V
3.2 Lecture VI

4. Day Four
4.1 Lecture VII

Contents

7

11


13
38

52
77

93
117

138


4.2 Discussion I

5. Day Five
5.1 Lecture VIII
5.2 Lecture IX

6. Day Six
6.1 Lecture X
6.2 Discussion II

163

181
201

214
242

Editors Note

Editors Note

The lectures transcribed in this short book were given by Alain
Badiou in the summer of 2010, over the course of six days, at
the European Graduate School. The problem at stake was to
think philosophy its definition, its universal operation. This
was not the first time Badiou addressed this question. Indeed,
what is philosophy, had already been addressed in numerous
written texts. For instance, in the Introduction to Being and
Event, we find maybe the most condensed articulation:
philosophy circulates between ontology, theories of the subject
and its own history. There are also two short text included in
Conditions and Manifesto for Philosophy, titled Definition of
Philosophy, and The (Re)turn of Philosophy Itself both of
which must be read with the above definition. In addition to
these explicit accounts there are numerous remarks throughout
the edifice: in Metapolitics for instance, as well as in Polemics,
Ethics, Handbook of Inaesthetics, and etc. Finally, following the
thesis of Truth as the compossibility of truths and ontology, it
must affirmed that the full definition of the Badiouian
philosophy is found in Being and Event, from cover to cover
the other half of which is Logics of Worlds. Nonetheless, these
lectures constitute the longest explicit meditation on this
reflexive definition.
In fact, within these lectures we find a number of novel
articulations of this deceptively difficult operation to define. For
instance, Badiou here proposes that there are five conditions of
the birth of philosophy, that philosophy has a very peculiar
relation to time including its own past that it is oriented
towards the future, and charged with aiding its production by
way of a new collective desire, that it is structurally distinct from
other forms of thought, such as nihilism and mysticism, and so
on. That being said, everything proposed in these lectures is
nonetheless consistent with the doctrine introduced in Being and
Event, and its supplements.

What is Philosophy?

If I may, I would like to draw attention to a single proposition

within these lectures: as one of the conditions of the birth of
philosophy, Badiou in apparent paradox proposes the
presence of the philosopher. The idea of the presence of a master
as constitutive of the philosophical operation, in fact, returns a
number of times throughout. For instance: the asymmetrical
positions of philosopher and student, and the distinction of
philosophy from other forms of thought, as well as its sublation
of them. And, of course, it operates in style throughout. My
reason for mentioning this part is two-fold: it points at the
apparently curious remark in Being and Event that a profound
question of philosophy is the measure in which an event
determines its fidelity, a curiosity found also in Badious remark
that the trial of truth, and so, also Truth, cannot be endured
without an encounter with the voice of a master, and second, the
context of struggle within which he enounced it. It could be
added that from within the concept of truth, mastery at the
beginning, no less then at the end, appears curious. Certainly,
with Badiou we do not stand in Kant or Lacan, but we do hear
an echo of think and obey. These Two, it must be wagered, do
not stand to one another as two feet planted still, but the walk of
a march which is also the walk of love.
This Seminar was spoken in English, with only marginal notes.
In view of these facts, I have here transcribed Badiou seminar
word for word, and assumed the liberty of editing his thought
with the soul aim of trying to maintain the rhythm, the style,
without compromising the exact sequnce of words. I have made
only minimal adjustments, and in all such cases any mistakes are
mine.

March, 2015,
Sran Cjvjetianin

Ce texte provient de notes prises par des tudiants lors de mon

sminaire de l't 2010 l'European Graduate School. C'est donc
le reflet d'une exposition orale, souvent improvise, et qui ne
correspond aucun texte crit existant. Je n'ai pas relu ces notes,
car j'aurais eu envie de tout rcrire, ce qui n'tait pas dans
l''esprit de cette tentative. Par consquent, tout usage et toute
citation de ce texte devra tre accompagne d'une indication
prcise de sa provenance, de faon ce que personne ne puisse
penser que je l'ai crit ou revu.
This text is based on notes taken by students during the seminar
I presented at the European Graduate School in the summer of
2010. It then reflects an oral contribution, with some degree of
improvisation, and does not correspond to any written text. I did
not re-read these notes as this would have lead me to a complete
rewriting, which would not have been consistent with the initial
spirit of this seminar. Consequently, any use or quotation of this
text will have to be accompanied with a precise indication of its
origin, so that nobody could think that I have either written or
proof-read it.
A.B.

11

What is Philosophy?

The Seminar of Alain Badiou

2010

13

1. Day One

1.1 Lecture I

Good morning to all of you!

I will begin with three very concrete problems. The first
problem: why must we speak English? It is a real question, after
all. It is the particularity of our world that everywhere we must
speak English.
It is an intellectual form of economic
globalization, and also a philosophical form of economic
globalization.
There is one world, in some sense. And, if really there is one
world, then there is one language of this world. English is the
language of our world, in some sense, but this is a problem too.
It's a problem because philosophy is also the consideration of all
difference, of the multiplicity of cultures and so on. Can we
speak this one language being inside globalization and
accept the unity of this world, which is the world today, but not
necessarily a good world? After all, maybe its not a good world?
Must philosophy be inside the world? It must, in some sense. It
must because it is it's world, this world of today! It's a real
problem.
We shall examine in detail this very interesting question. Not the
general and objective question of globalization, as a
characteristic of our world today, but the more specific question
of the relationship between philosophy and this situation. The
question why we must speak English is only an aspect of this
very massive problem of the relationship between the
philosophical determination, which is also something like the

What is Philosophy?

15

subjective determination, and an objective situation, which,

finally, is for us an obligation, the obligation to speak English,
here, in Saas-fee. But if the European Graduate School was in
Taiwan or Africa we would speak English too, and so it is not a
question of this specific place, its a question of the world, of the
totality.
It's also a paradoxical question why we speak this language
because it's not an historical result for philosophy itself. We can
say something like this: philosophy has been written in three
languages, principally Greek, French and German. Or,
somewhat dogmatically, we can say: there is no philosophy
which has been written in English. If we globalize the history of
philosophy, from the beginning to today, we can say: the three
major languages of philosophy have been Greek, French and
German, certainly. And so, English is not a philosophical
obligation, not at all. It would be, certainly, more interesting to
speak Greek, for example, and it would be more difficult, for me
as well much more difficult than to speak English, and to
speak English is very difficult for me, but to speak Greek is
probably more difficult.
Finally, the result is here as a question: we must speak English,
but why? Principally because we must today address philosophy
to other people, to everybody, finally, and today everybody as
such speaks English. In fact it's not true in everyday life,
naturally in everyday life we speak French and German, and,
as you know, Chinese is certainly, in everyday life, more
important than English. But, at the philosophical level, today, to
address philosophy to other people we must speak English, we
must be translated into English and so on. For example, when I
speak to Chinese people we speak English.
So, we must. And so I want to say some words concerning my
English. The American poet Wallace Stevens, says somewhere
that French and English are in fact the same language. And its

16

Day One

true of the English of Wallace Stevens, and its true of

something French, it's a poetical characteristic of Stevens. For
me, this was good news French and English are the same
language but it was not my conviction. But, if a great poet says
something like that, then maybe it's true. So my English is
something like French dressed up as English, or French
disguised into English. But the problem is that I cannot speak
that sort of English, because its French, in fact in the sense of
Wallace Stevens. So its something like poetic English. But the
problem is that very often it's very difficult for me to understand
your English. Which is not, generally, French dressed up as
English, but much more it's difficult to say pure English
something much nearer to English, than mine. And, I can say,
finally: your English is not enough French.
And so, as a consequence, I propose to you to give me,
principally not only, but principally written questions. And
so, finally, its a concrete problem, in some sense. You will give
me written questions, and I shall answer these questions and
open a discussion concerning your questions during two lessons
here: the second part of the afternoon tomorrow and the day
after. You will write your name on the question. You have two
complete lessons to discuss your questions. This would be the
best possible organization of the collective discussion in a place
where we have many people.
That is the first concrete problem. But it's not only a concrete
problem it's also a very profound problem, which is the
relationship today in this world between philosophy and
universality. Is the universality of philosophy precisely its
inscription, its presence, in the world as it is? Another possibility
is that philosophy is universal precisely because it is not
completely inside the world as it is, that philosophy is in a
world, which, in some sense, does not exist. 'Does not exist' not
because this world is a pure fiction, although that is a possibility

What is Philosophy?

17

many people, in fact, are saying that philosophy is useless or

that it is nothing precisely because the world of philosophy does
not exist. Can we not say the reverse: philosophy is useful
because the world of philosophy is not exactly the world as it is,
but something which is between the world as it is and the world
as it must be. And, in fact, that this is how the world desires. So,
the place of philosophy is between something realistic, the world
as it is and we must know the world as it is, we must
understand the world as it is, we must propose something like a
clear vision of the world as it is and the point of view of
something else, the point of view of the world not exactly as it
is, from the position of what a sort of desire says concerning the
world. This is the first question.
The second question which is a consequence of the first is:
what exactly is the question of language in philosophy? Not only
the abstract question of the structure of languages, the
grammatical question, the logical question and so on, but the
precise question of: in which language does philosophy exist?
It's a very difficult question because there are today two
possibilities. The first possibility is that today philosophy exists
in the dominant language of globalization, that philosophy
accepts being inside the world as it is, and so speaks the
universal language of today, which is a sort of English in fact,
not a pure English, but a sort of jargon. It's the first possibility,
and there is something like an obligation to do something like
that. I am a pure example: I speak to you in English. I am a
proof of the necessity of that sort of inscription of philosophy in
the world as it is. But I think that we cannot do only that, it's not
a real creative possibility, after all. The creative possibility is to
inscribe philosophy in the multiplicity of languages.
But what does it mean to say that philosophy is inside the
difference of languages? It's not reducible to one language,
because if philosophy is reducible to one language, and can be

18

Day One

expressed only in this particular language, then it cannot be

universal, certainly. There is this temptation. For example,
Heidegger has explicitly said that German is today the real
language of philosophy after Greek, after Ancient Greek and
so that being speaks German. And, you know, this is in some
sense a purely nationalist position, and now, finally, we can also
say that it is something like a fascist position. I think that
Heidegger is a great philosopher, but this position, this specific
position concerning the language of philosophy, is absolutely
against the universality of philosophy, against the recognition
that something exists which is humanity as such, and not only
humanity in the form of a specific language, a specific culture
and so on. We'll return to this problem, which is not so simple.
Philosophy, in my sense it's my condition is not possible if
we dont recognize that there exists something like humanity as
such. Naturally, there are many cultures and differences and so
on and so on, and humanity as such is a pure multiplicity in
some sense, but this multiplicity is also something which must
be recognized in its unity, in its fundamental unity. There is
something like to take a more technical word a generic
humanity: a humanity which is a humanity as such, and not
reducible, not immediately reducible, to its immanent
differences, or to any particularity.
If you say that philosophy speaks only one language, you can do
that in two different meanings. The first meaning: we must
speak English, not because being speaks English poor being
German, Ancient Greek and so on, not because of this
technical reason, not because being speaks English, but because
in the world as it is we must speak English. But this is a
necessity of today, and not a metaphysical necessity you
understand that. Or, the other position the position which is the
position of Heidegger, but has also been the position of Leibniz,
and so it's really something important in German history is: we

What is Philosophy?

19

must speak English for ontological reasons, because there is

something fundamental in the relationship between being as
such and that language.
But these two possibilities are not good possibilities for
philosophy. The first one, because there is something abstract in
the fact of speaking English. I understand, of course, that it is a
necessity to speak English in business, but the law of philosophy
cannot be exactly the law of business, after all philosophy is
not a business. This is a question for philosophy today, because
today everything is business. And so the question is: is
philosophy today able to be an exception? And this is a great
question in philosophy, this question of: does there exist
something like a philosophical exception? We cannot be reduced
to the laws of business, we cannot be reduced to the idea of
being speaking one language and not the others. Sometimes,
however, this idea that we must speak only our specific language
is what is opposed to the abstract idea of everyone having to
speak English. This, in fact, is a form of the main contradiction
of today: the contradiction of nationalist reaction against
globalization. It's a possibility, and it is also, in some sense, a
philosophical possibility. It would not exactly be a properly
philosophical position, but we could affirm that because we
cannot accept to speak the common business language, which is
English, we must speak only our proper language, our language
of ordinary life and so on.
Sometimes I think that the major risk concerning philosophy is
to be structured by this sort of contradiction: on one side abstract
universality, in the form of globalization and business, and on
the other side a sort of nationalistic reaction, which assumes that
we must be absolutely closed in our particularity. This is
something which concerns the contemporary world. Naturally,
my conviction is that we must go beyond this opposition, we
must say that there is something like universality, that there is

20

Day One

something like the unity of the world, the unity of humanity as

such, and, on the other side, we must recognize, completely, the
differences, including the differences of languages. But to go
beyond the contradiction is a dialectical problem.
How is it possible to resolve that sort of contradiction? It is, I
think, the most important contradiction of the world today: the
contradiction of abstract universality, which is, finally, the
universality of imperialism, the universality of business,
capitalism and so on, and the formal language of this process is
English, and, on the other side, the reaction of different cultures
against this abstract universality, but in the form of the pure
affirmation of their particularity. It's a great difficulty for
philosophy today, because the fidelity to the history of
philosophy as such is always to propose to move beyond that
sort of closure, the closure between abstract universality, purely
abstract universality, which is an oppressive universality, a
universality against the life of different people and so on, and a
purely reactive particularity, which affirms the particularity as
such, in a fight against abstract universality. We can understand
that sort of fight, but there is no possibility for philosophy to be
inscribed purely in that sort of opposition. And so, philosophy
can affirm neither the abstract vision of the world of
globalization our peaceful world of business nor the obscure
position of Heidegger being speaks German. If you want:
neither 'business speaks English, so we must speak English', nor
'I am a German and so I must speak German and nothing else'.
This is, also I think a political contradiction, naturally, and
not only a philosophical one or a cultural one. It's a political
opposition between something like the political position on the
side of globalization, which assumes, which affirms, that
globalization, business, English and so on, are the destiny of
humanity, the only possibility of humanity, and the absolute
affirmation of particularity. The philosophical name of the first

What is Philosophy?

21

of these political positions is abstract universality. Abstract

universality is the political position that the Western World is
the paradigm for the history of all humanity, that we have today
a single possibility, a single political possibility, which is,
finally, the expansion, the universal expansion, of the world as it
is it is, simply put, the affirmation that the world as it is is the
only possibility of the world as it is. It is a political position to
say something like that. To say 'we are inside a world of which
the only possibility is the continuation of this world as it is,'
naturally with something a little better, something a little more
green, and so on, is a political position which, at the global level,
affirms that the future of the world as it is is, in some sense, the
world as it is, and not something else something else' in a
radical sense.
This political position is the real conservative one today. The
true enemy today I speak in the vocabulary of war the true
enemy is absolutely not the obscure position, because it's not the
dominant position. The obscure position exists, and it is an
enemy too, but the true enemy is much more the position that we
must continue purely and simply, that we must continue, that
there is no possibility for the world other than to continue the
world as it is, that we have nothing to do other than continue the
world as it is. This position is also the position that the worlds as
it is is the peace of business the peace of business, which is, as
you know, imposed in some parts of the world by war the war
to impose on everybody the peace of business.
I insist on the point that this position is the true conservative one
today: generally we name the conservative position what is, in
fact, the obscure position. A position which affirms that we must
return to the old world, to family, to old laws for instance
concerning freedom of sexuality, and so on that we must return
under the law of God and to the old world with its rites and so
on and so on. Naturally, this obscure position is something

22

Day One

dangerous and something horrible, and we must act against all

that, but it's not the true fundamental enemy at the end. It is
something like a reaction against the true conservative position,
which is, the reactive position, and which claims that we must
continue the process of the world as it is and that we have no
other possibility. This is the position of practically all
governments of the great countries today the great countries of
Europe, the United States, China and so on. They have
contradictions, differences between them, as always, but they
have something in common, which is fundamental: they all
affirm that we have finished with proposing completely new
visions of this world as possibilities of this world, not as fictions,
not as utopias, but as possibilities which are real possibilities of
the world as it is. That that is the first tendency, the dominant
tendency, of today: the affirmation that the world as it is has no
true possibility inside itself other than to continue the world as it
is. And that is, in fact, the definition the philosophical
definition of the conservative position, which I have named the
reactive position.
On the other side of the contradiction, we have today, probably,
only the obscure position, and this that these are the only two
possibilities this is the danger of our situation. The obscure
position is not the continuation of the world as it is, the
continuation of the good world, but the position that we must
return to something which is in the form of the old world, which
is, as we know, a religious reaction, some form of radical Islam,
and so on, but also Bush, and by some respects, my dear
Sarkozy, and, in Italy, Berlusconi, and so on. Finally, the
obscure position is in my vision of the political world only
something like the reverse of the reactive one, but which is
inside the conservative one.
The dominant conservative position affirms the necessity to
continue the world as it is, and the obscure one says that we

What is Philosophy?

23

must desire the world of the past, the same world, but of the
past. And so, I think the dominant idea today on one side and on
the other side, of both the conservative position and the obscure
position is: no real future, no real future.
If the only possibility of the world is to continue the world as it
is, then there is no real future, no real future. What is a real
future? A real future is something different. If we do not have
the possibility of something different, then we do not have a real
future, we have, rather, a continuation of the present, a sort of
enormous present. And this is the time of today: the time of
today is to reduce time to the pure present, to the continuation, to
the transformation, the immanent transformation of the present
as such. This is why we have the philosophical affirmation of
the end of history, the classical idea, which is, in some sense, a
Hegelian idea: we are at the end, the world as it is is the world.
And, if the world as it is must continue the world as it is, its, in
fact, the end of history, it's the abolition of the future.
To finish with this first concrete problem why we must speak
English I can say: if philosophy is really useful today, it is
because philosophy must be on the side of the attempt to escape
that sort of false contradiction the contradiction between the
conservative position and the reactive position. This is our
contradiction, which is the dominant contradiction, but, finally,
it is also a false contradiction, because there is something in
common in that contradiction, which is, no future. No future
because if the world has no other possibility than itself, then
there is no future. And, if the world has no desire other than a
return to the past, then there is no future. So we can define one
goal of philosophy if philosophy is something useful, if it is
something else than an academic exercise, if philosophy is really
something useful to our life: philosophy must propose the
possibility of a real future, or to examine the conditions for the
existence of a real future. This is the first concrete problem.

24

Day One

The second concrete problem is: what is our duty, our duty here,
in this room? What are the duties of a professor and students?
My duty, my duty as a professor, is to be with you for three
hours a day during six days, six successive days. And we can say
that, after all, it's a professional duty my duty as professor is to
be with you. What is your duty as students? It is also the duty to
be with me, for three hours a day, for six days. But what sort of
duty is that, finally? What sort of duty? It's not completely clear,
and it's particularly not completely clear concerning this sort of
university, because you are not exactly young students coming,
finally, to become something in business, or in the world as it is
it's not exactly the situation here. You know that. So, your duty
is not exactly a professional duty. It's a difference between you
and me. It is possible for me to understand my duty in a purely
professional manner but that's not exactly your case. There is
something like a freedom of choice to be here.
My idea is that we can speak, that we must speak, of something
like a philosophical duty, a duty not reducible to the interests of
the human animal to be in a business, to have money, to buy
something, some products, to have a good life and so on and so
on. A philosophical duty cannot be something like that. And
the point is that if your duty is of philosophical nature, if it is of
philosophical nature, then it is, in some sense, a disinterested
duty, it is a duty not reducible to your individual interests and
nothing else. If this is the case if there is this disinterestedness
to you duty then it is of philosophical nature, and not purely
professional. And so, we have here again a dialectical situation.
This is the real situation of a class of philosophy, a real class of
philosophy: there is a common duty that is of philosophical
nature by itself, because it is not reducible to something else.
And I must transform my duty into a philosophical one, and your
duty as students is transformed into a philosophical duty too, in

What is Philosophy?

25

some sense. And so, we constitute a philosophical community

it is our ideal, maybe it's not exactly true, or always true, but it is
our ideal. And this constitution of a philosophical community is
a philosophical question. It's not the same as if you are here to
learn mathematics, for example. It's not identical. I know this
because I love mathematics and sometimes I transform myself
into a professor of mathematics, and immediately I can
understand that the community is not the same: it is not the same
because the dissymmetry in knowledge is not the same. We must
explain this and it is our second concrete question: why is a
class of philosophy not the same thing as a class of geography,
of mathematics, and so on? It is, I think, because of the
dialectical nature of philosophy, form Plato to today.
The dialectical nature of philosophy produces a new form of the
relationship between the professor and the students. Why?
Because we must create, we must attempt to create it can be a
failure, naturally we must create something like a new
common desire. The question of philosophy is the question of
creating a new desire it's not just to give answers to some
problems. Naturally we propose some answers to some
problems, but that is not the goal of philosophy. The goal of
philosophy is not like the goal in mathematics to explain a
problem and a solution of the problem. The goal is not as it is in
empirical questions either to learn something new, concerning
the geography of some country, or history and so on. It's not to
know the laws of the world, like in economy, for instance, and
so on. It is really to create in everybody a new desire. And if we
create a new community, it is because there is something in
common and not only between the professor and students
which is precisely the possibility of that sort of new desire. The
creation of that sort of new desire is of dialectical nature because
we are not you and me in the same position at the beginning,
we are different: I speak and you learn, you write and I speak,
and so on. It is not the same position, not at all. But the goal is

26

Day One

not to continue indefinitely that difference, in fact it is to not

continue that difference indefinitely, the goal is to produce
something common, which is precisely a new desire. And it is to
produce this as a result of this difference of position!
As you immediately understand a new common desire is not
exactly the same desire there is something individual in a new
desire. Everybody understands the situation in a different
manner and so on. But what is in common is the problem of a
new desire, as the result of a philosophical process. This is the
case not only in a class, but also when you read the book of
philosophy. If you really read a book of philosophy, that is, if
your reading is of a philosophical nature, it's not to learn what
there is in the book naturally, very often its the case, because
you have exams and so on, and you must learn something, and
you read the book, and 'oh yeah, its a horrible book, its very
difficult, and abstract, and so on' but all that is not of a
philosophical nature, it is of an academic nature. What is of a
philosophical nature when you read the book is also to open a
new desire. And so, it is also something like a subjective
transformation. This is the point. The question of philosophy is
not a new knowledge, but a new desire. It's true from Plato to
today it is not a new idea.
And so the dialectical nature we return to this point of
philosophy is that the goal of philosophy is not the production of
knowledge and the accumulation of knowledge, but a qualitative
subjective transformation, by way of the creation of a new
common desire. The very nature of philosophy is here the
very nature of philosophy is here. Philosophy is not a
knowledge, it is not an academic field, it is not books, and so on.
Naturally, it is all that, but all that are means they are just
means, it is not the thing itself. Philosophy itself philosophy
itself is the process of subjective transformation. And if we must
be together you and me during some hours and days, we can,

What is Philosophy?

27

naturally, say that it is because it is the program of the European

Graduate School, for me and for you, finally its true, its exact.
But what is the norm of success, the norm of a victory, if you
want, concerning this sort of situation? What is a victory here?
The victory is not to come to know something that you did not
know before maybe there is something like that, but it's not the
philosophical victory of the class. The collective victory of the
class which always includes you and me is the emergence of
something like a new desire, or a new possibility in thinking, a
new vision. And this is a small part, a small part, but a part of
the first question the creation of a new collective future, the
creation of a new possibility. But a new possibility begins by a
new subjective position, because if we are subjectively reduced
to the world as it is, then, naturally, we cannot support any new
possibilities. This is why a class of philosophy, but also the
reading by one person of a book of philosophy, has as a norm of
success of philosophical success something like a small
subjective transformation, which is a small part of the opening
of new possibilities of the world itself.
This is a philosophical question because we must be conscious
that when we have a new possibility, a new real possibility, this
is a part of the general problem of a new possibility. And this is
why philosophy is simultaneously purely individual and
completely universal. It's purely individual because it's not
politics we dont create a philosophical organization, a
philosophical party, that is a question of politics, properly.
Everybody knows that the goal of philosophy is not to create a
new political organization, a new revolutionary party, or
something like that. Philosophy at its proper level is an
individual question, it is really an individual question. It is, after
all, the possibility of a new desire of somebody, and not of
humanity as such. Humanity as such, in some sense, exists and
does not exist. I cannot speak to humanity as such, but I can
speak to you. And, certainly, you are a collection of individuals,

28

Day One

but you are not a party or an organization yes you are at

European Graduate School, but European Graduate School is not
a political party.
So I speak to you, that is, I speak to everybody in the class.
Philosophy is purely individual, in some sense, and at this level
there are differences, dissymmetries, and so on my position,
for example, is not the position of everyone in the class and so
on. But if the goal of philosophy is a new desire concerning the
world, if it is a new individual desire but a new desire
concerning the world as it is, concerning a new possibility of
life, a new possibility for existence, and not only a new
knowledge of what is, then that sort of desire is also a part of a
collective transformation. And we must understand, finally, that
what is at question here is not the creation of a new future but
the creation of the possibility of a new future there is a
difference, there is a difference between the two.
The dialectical nature of philosophy is that philosophy is the
relationship between the individual and the world, in fact, it is
the transformation of the relationship between the individual and
the world, by the means of thinking, by means of a new desire in
thinking, because thinking is also a question of desire, naturally.
At the beginning we have a big difference between the
philosopher or the book and the individual, but the result
the goal is the emergence of a new common desire concerning
the relationships between individuals and the world. After that
maybe there are some actions, some engagements and so on. But
philosophy itself is the creation of the possibility of all that. And
this possibility is made possible by way of a new subjective
position of individuals.
Philosophy is one-by-one, and not a collective address, which is
why a class is not a political meeting or something like that, but
a class, a collection of individuals. Philosophy is one-by-one,

What is Philosophy?

29

really, but this one-by-one is not the closure of the one on itself,
it is not the closure of the individual within himself or herself.
On the contrary, it is the opening of the individual to something
like a new possibility, which can be, and generally is, also a
collective possibility, but a collectively possibility seen from the
point of view of the individual.
Our first question concerns the dialectical nature of philosophy,
the question is: what is philosophy? And this is, in fact, the old
question of philosophy what is philosophy. And, in fact, this
question and that it is a philosophical question, that it is a
question within philosophy itself is a part of the dialectical
nature of philosophy. As you know, the question what is
mathematics? is not a mathematical question. There is no
theorem, no definition or proposition concerning the question
what is mathematics in mathematics. And the question what is
painting? is not a question in painting, and so on. But what is
philosophy is a question of philosophy. Philosophy is
necessarily dialectal because the question of its proper nature is
precisely one of its questions. There is something reflexive in
philosophy, and it is always reflexive, and this reflexivity is not
only the sense of psychological reflection and so on. No. There
is something objectively reflexive, because the question of
philosophy is a philosophical question. And this point is also
connected to my affirmation that the goal of philosophy is to
create a new desire. The two cannot be separate because if
philosophy did not include the question of philosophy, then
philosophy would be a knowledge, it would be a knowledge of
something. And so my duty would be to transmit to you this sort
of knowledge, like in mathematics or history and so on. If
philosophy is something the goal of which is to create a new
individual desire concerning the possibilities of the world, then,
by necessity, philosophy is also the question of philosophy itself,
and not a closed body of knowledge.

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Day One

For philosophy to be the opening of the individual to a new

desire we must have an opening of philosophy itself if
philosophy is closed it creates something closed, naturally. To
create something open, philosophy must be open too, and the
opening of philosophy is precisely that in philosophy we have
the question of philosophy. Philosophy does not begin by 'I
know what is philosophy, and, okay, I go'. No. Philosophy
always begins by a question, it begins by the question what is
philosophy. This is why the question of Socrates is what is
philosophy, explicitly. And my dear friend Deleuze, with
Guattari, also wrote a book What is Philosophy? And so, at the
very beginning and at the end we have what is philosophy.
And we know that the answer to this question is an answer
which is itself open, and it must be open because the answer to
the question is always the point of departure of another manner
of forming the question. And so we have the repetition of this
question across the history of philosophy, we have it across the
entire history up until now. If you read Deleuze the
magnificent book, What is Philosophy? you will see that it is
just another possibility, another manner of putting the question
what is philosophy. And so the history of philosophy is also
the history of the question concerning philosophy, absolutely.
There is no ahistorical determination, no final determination, of
the answer to what is philosophy, and then, after that,
philosophy. No. There is a constant repetition of the question
what is philosophy, and, naturally, there is something like a
sequence of different answers to this question. And so, there is
something absolutely open in philosophy. And it's a necessity
because all forms of the closure of philosophy are also the death
of philosophy, because the life of philosophy is the possibility of
opening the thinking of individuals to new possibilities.
If philosophy must be something like that, then it is, in some

What is Philosophy?

31

sense, opposed to the world. It is opposed to the world because

the dominant position in the world today is the conservative one,
which is the affirmation that the only possibility of the world is
to continue what it is. If philosophy is as we have proposed, then
philosophy cannot be in accord with the world. And the opening
of philosophy is not in accord with the conservative position,
because philosophy itself is always saying that philosophy must
be something else. And it is the fact of this question that
explains why there exist philosophers, different philosophers.
Why? Because there is a constant transformation not only of
philosophy, but of the question what is philosophy, and the
two, naturally, are not separate. And so philosophy by itself is
already the affirmation of the possibility of something else. The
continuation of philosophy, therefore, is not conservative, it
cannot be conservative, the history of philosophy cannot be of
the form of the continuation of a philosophy. Maybe we could
even say that what continues is the question... the problem of
philosophy.
And as you know every philosopher begins by saying 'I am
writing something completely new'. Certainly it's not completely
true, but we cannot begin in any other manner, we must begin
all the works of philosophy by saying 'I propose something
absolutely new'. The history of philosophy is not a history of
continuity but a history of ruptures, the history of philosophy is a
succession of ruptures. And the beginning itself is never the
same the beginning of Aristotle is not the beginning of Plato,
and so on.
We must be clear on this point: if philosophy is something like
that a succession of ruptures then there is, in fact, something
revolutionary in philosophy itself. There is something
revolutionary in philosophy itself because at the conceptual level
it is the idea of a rupture in thinking, it is the idea of a new way.
If there is always something like that in philosophy, then and I

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Day One

return to this point philosophy today is not in accord with the

world because the dominant vision of the world today is the
conservative one, which supposes that there is no other
possibility than the development of the world as it is, that the
final success of humanity is the democratic and capitalistic
world. But philosophy is not compatible with the idea of a final
success. There is no final success possible in philosophy,
because philosophy cannot give a definite answer to what is
philosophy. Philosophy cannot give a definite answer to
anything. Even concerning itself, philosophy cannot give a final
answer, it cannot say what is philosophy and have it be the final
success of that question.
But, in some sense, the conservative position exists in
philosophy, and it consists in saying that philosophy is exactly
like other knowledges a succession of good problems and good
answers. The name of this position, as you all know, is analytic
philosophy. Analytic philosophy assumes the fact that
philosophy must be rational in a completely rigid sense of
rational and that philosophy must be a succession of problems
collectively assumed, with good answers and bad answers, and
so on. The result is, finally, that in this sense of philosophy
you could have a professor of philosophy who says that all that
is really important are the papers of the last ten years of
philosophy. And in this sense it would be exactly like science,
because in science what is important for the creative scientist are
the papers of the last ten years, naturally. And so, we have today
a conservative position in philosophy, which is the reduction of
philosophy to collection of good problems, and a collection of
good solutions. And so philosophy would not at all be a question
of creating a new desire, a new future, or a new possibility.
Rather, philosophy would be something that is only concerned
with being precise, with being in a field of knowledge logical,
grammatical, linguistic, and so on with being a conceptual

What is Philosophy?

33

knowledge, with very clear rules, with very determined rules,

with very clear positions, and a very clear and determined
horizon. And this is a very strong position today, because it's
position which is really inside the world as it is, it's a position
which is in conformity with the world, a position which is not a
succession of ruptures, but a collective and rational continuation
of the same thing, of the same discipline. And so philosophy, in
this case, would be completely reduced to an academic exercise.
In which case it would be something that exists only and fully in
universities, and something that is not addressed to humanity as
such any more than geography, chemistry, or something like
that. But we can see that that sort of position suppresses, that it
abolishes, the dialectical nature of philosophy. And, finally, we
can see that the name analytic philosophy is appropriate to this
position, we can see that it is a good name, because in the
tradition of philosophy there is precisely the opposition between
dialectic and analytic.
Conceptually analytical is the contrary of dialectical. And so, the
analytical position in philosophy is the abolition of the
dialectical nature of philosophy, precisely by the affirmation that
we know what is philosophy because we can define the rules and
objectives of philosophy, and the proposition that all we can do
and all the we must do is continue all of that. And this position
is, consequently, also the suppression of the creative position of
philosophy in the sense of the existence of philosophers.
Naturally, if you have good rules, good problems, good answers,
you can work collectively, no problem exactly like a
laboratory of scientists.
There is a link, a relationship, between the question of what is
philosophy, the dialectical nature of philosophy, the creation of
new possibilities, the question of a new desire, and so on. But
this knot is not the dominant position today, the dominant
position is analytic philosophy, because it is in accord with the

34

Day One

world, because it is inscribed in the world as it is. But we must

also understand that this dominant position is also the closure of
philosophy, the end of philosophy. This is the best definition of
this position: to the question of philosophy we have an answer, a
definite answer, exactly as we have a definite answer to what is
the good world the good world is the world as it is, with
imperfections and defects, but the history will be a good one.
And, finally, we must understand that these two answers are not
separate they are not separate not at all.
And so, there is a fight, a real fight here it is not a peaceful
situation. We have a fight between these two positions, between
the two possible general orientations of philosophy. There is,
first, the dialectical position, which is the idea of philosophy as
an open question, as a creation of a new desire, as something
like the production of the idea of a future its not the creation
of the future, the creation of the future is a political question, an
artistic question, a question of action, of creation, and so on, but
the creation of the idea of a future, of the possibility of a future.
The conservative position, on the other hand, is the attempt of a
closure of philosophy, exactly like the attempt of the closure of
the world. In this vision we have the impossibility of a true
rupture with this vision. Maybe, at the very abstract level, the
question of today is the contradiction between the analytic vision
and the dialectical vision. It's certainly the contradiction in
philosophy.
We can probably generalize this vision. In philosophy it is clear,
it is absolutely clear. Sometimes this contradiction has been
called the contradiction between continental philosophy and
analytic philosophy, but it is more complex than that. We can
generalize because philosophy is and this is another possible
definition of philosophy a symptom, a symptom of the world,
because the divisions in philosophy are always also divisions in
the world itself. And today probably in all fields of creation

What is Philosophy?

35

the fight is between opening and closure, between the dialectical

vision and the analytical vision. Certainly this is the stake in
philosophy, but philosophy is a symptom of something much
more important. And in politics it is clear as well: reactive
politics and obscure politics are both different forms of closure,
and the question is whether there is another possibility, a third
possibility. The war today between the Western World and
'terrorism' is, in fact, a war between two forms of closure. We
must see this! We must see that they are both forms of closure.
Ultimately, this war is a war between closure by the continuity
of the present and closure by a return to the past. But a closure
by a return to the past and a closure by a continuity of the
present have something in common, something very important,
which is that there is no future, no true future, that there is no
other possibility. The true contradiction, however, is that the
formal contradiction is based on an excluded third possibility.
And so what we have today is a conservative war, in some sense.
And what is horrible is not only that it's a war, but that it's a war
between two false visions.
In philosophical terms we can say that in this war both positions
are analytical, and not dialectical: it is a war between two
analytical positions, between two positions which are both
closed, between two positions neither of which is an opening to
the future. And both are, finally, of a defensive nature: it is not
the creation of something new, but of a choice between a return
and a continuation. To this position we can oppose the
dialectical nature of philosophy, and its affirmation of the
necessity of a new future, its affirmation of the possibility of a
new possibility, its affirmation that in the world as it is we must
open the possibility of another world, and that this possibility
cannot be just a fiction but a real possibility I insist on this
point. And we must absolutely resist the common affirmation
that philosophy, radical political visions, and so on are pure
fictions, fantasies, or senseless propositions. Such affirmations

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Day One

are a part of the war, they are a part of the ideological war, they
are instruments against the idea of the possibility of a new
possibility. And they are false, they are not true, finally, they are
not true because the possibility of a new possibility is a not just a
possibility.
Our philosophical problem is not to propose a sort of closed
fiction, a pure utopia. A utopia is a closed fiction, after all: it is
another sort of closure, because if you say that the world as it is
is not good and you propose a pure fiction of another world
which does not exist, and which is not a possibility of our future,
then you are also in a closure, a negative closure but a closure.
With such a proposal we would not be in the conservative
position the only possibility of the world is the world as it is
nor in the obscure position the world is not good, and we must
return to an old world but we would be proposing a pure
phantasmagoria, a pure fiction, a pure phantasm of the world.
The question is of the possibility inside the world of something
that is really different that is our problem. If something like
that does not exist, then the dialectical position of philosophy
would be void, it is true. And so, the analytical camp would be
victorious, and it would be the end of history. And, finally, it is
my position that this would be the end of everything which is of
interest, because it would be the end of the idea of creation... the
end of the idea of creation... it would be the end of artistic
creation, the end of scientific creation because science
becomes the slave of technology and business it would be the
end of love as a creative position of existence as such, it would
be the end of all that is rupture, of all that is creative, of all that
is true in human existence. It is a position, a horrible position.
In some sense the only norm of the conservative vision is
security. The dialectical position, on the other hand, involves the
acceptance of some risk certainly you cannot have the
dialectical position and pure security, it's impossible, you must

What is Philosophy?

37

accept some risk. We perfectly know that we cannot have

perfect security with love, for example I take this example
because its the most common. When we are engaged in true love
we cannot expect pure security, it's absolutely impossible. And
it's the same thing when you are in artistic experimentation:
when you want to create something new, a new critique of some
forms, and so on, you cannot say 'ah, yes, but I desire absolute
security, no failure, only success!', that would be absurd,
naturally. But that is the reactive vision. The most important
name in the conservative vision is security. In politics this is
clear, but the other fields too are under the law of security. And
the analytic position is philosophy with security. That is another
possible definition: analytic philosophy is philosophy with
complete security, complete predictabilty, a philosophy of only
good problems and good answers.
This is the great fight of the contemporary world: analytical
vision and dialectical vision, security or creativity. The problem
is that the position of the analytic vision security, continuation
of the world as it is is a very strong position, it is a very strong
position because humanity as such is divided, humanity as such
loves security, it demands security. This fight is a fight inside
subjectivity itself.
As you all know, Socrates was condemned to death because
philosophy is the corruption of young people. But what is
corruption of young people? It is precisely to teach them that
security is not the true desire of humanity, and it is to propose to
them a dialectical vision, a vision where we assume some part of
risk, some part of chance, some part of uncertainty, and also the
desire of difference and not the very powerful demand of
sameness. And it is clear, it is absolutely clear that the
fundamental demand of the contemporary world is for sameness,
for the identical, for continuation, for the continuation of itself.
Philosophical corruption showed that philosophy is something

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Day One

completely different from all of that, and that philosophy has a

desire that is different from that of the contemporary world.
This is our second problem, and so, naturally, we have two
possibilities concerning our class. I have an idea, a goal for this
class, a goal for what I am doing here, but it is only one
possibility, it is only one possibility out of two. There is, first,
the analytic possibility I can give you some new knowledge, I
can show you some good problems and good answers and
there is the dialectical possibility. But this possibility involves
some risk not the risk of death, and maybe not the risk of love
it involves the risk of a modification, the risk of a
transformation, maybe a small transformation, a very small
transformation, but a rupture, a small rupture in the subjective
position of our community.
We stop, finally.

What is Philosophy?

39

1.2 Lecture II



We have examined the first two concrete problems. The first
was to decide why we must speak English. As we saw, the true
meaning of this small question is the anthropological situation of
philosophy, which is philosophys relationship to the world, to
the concrete world, to the questions of culture, globalization,
languages and so on. Abstractly, the question is: how is it that
philosophy is not reducible to anthropological determination?
The key of the problem is the notion of possibility. You
understand why? Possibility is something which is inside and
outside: it is inside because the possibility must exist in the
world, but it is also outside because if something is possible and
not realized its not exactly in the world. The first question,
therefore, is the relationship between philosophy and possibility.
The second concrete question was the problem of our role here,
of our duty, of what we must do in the concrete situation of this
room. The general problem of this question is the dialectical
nature of philosophy, and the proposition between this
dialectical nature of philosophy and the conservative vision of
analytical philosophy. We have seen without detail that this
contradiction is a symptom, a philosophical symptom, of what is
probably the most important contradiction of the contemporary
world, the contradiction between the analytic and the dialectic
vision.
We have seen that all of that is a part of the question 'what is
philosophy'. I will give you three possible short references for
reading concerning this question, and the repetition, the very
strange repetition of this question from the beginning of

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Day One

philosophy to today: I think its possible to read - its just a

suggestion, not an obligation What is Metaphysics?, of
Heidegger, What is Philosophy?, of Deleuze and Guattari, and
my Manifesto for Philosophy if you accept a narcissistic
indication.
We can now, finally, name our third concrete problem, which is
very, very concrete: why is there this sort of situation where an
old man speaks to much younger people? As you know the
philosophical form transforms everything into a question! But
we must understand in what sense it is a question.
Probably you know that I am seventy-three years old, and so my
historical existence includes the Second World War, the Chinese
Revolution, the imperialist wars in Algiers, Vietnam, and so on,
May '68 in France, Roosevelt, Churchill, de Gaulle, Stalin, but
also Kennedy, Castro, Che Guevara and so on. And my
historical existence is an important part of.... Certainly, we can
say that my historical world, the concrete becoming of this
world the different events, the ruptures, the continuities and so
on is not same as yours. And my philosophical framework is
specific, naturally. For example, it implies Sartre, Heidegger,
and also directly, not as something finished, but as something
in becoming Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, Deleuze and so on. I
can say, if you want, that my life goes across practically four
sequences concerning philosophy.
I can give you a sort of approximate knowledge of this history.
During the '50's, of the last century, the dominant position in
Europe was phenomenology Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre,
Merleau-Ponty, and so on and the most important concept was
the question of consciousness, or subjectivity. And, maybe, the
most important question was 'what exactly is freedom'. And in
that sort of context the discussion was between phenomenology,
on one side, and on the other side as the conservative position,
if you want was positivism, philosophy of sciences and so on.

What is Philosophy?

41

It was in this contradiction that, as a young man, I was in my

first contact with philosophy.
Immediately after that we have something very different the
name of which in France was structuralism the English name
was French Theory. In the '60's and part of the '70's the
dominant position was structuralism, that is, a philosophy of
structure, a philosophy of objective structures and also
philosophy of language. Naturally, this moment was a critique of
the previous moment of philosophy, and so it was a critique of
the concept of subject and a critique of consciousness as the
most important concepts in philosophy. We find something like
this, for example, in the critique of the concept of humanity by
Foucault, or in the critique of the concept of subjectivity by
Althusser, and so on. Certainly structuralism was largely a
critique of phenomenology in fact, it is often the case that what
succeeds is a critique of what is succeeded. And for me,
naturally, this passage was a difficulty because I was really
Sartrean I was on the side of consciousness and so it was
very difficult for me to go across a radical critique of
consciousness, and to accept the apology of structure and the
determination of the subject by language and so on.
After that we have something like a third sequence purely in
philosophy, the political sequences are different during the
'80's and '90's, which is the sequence of deconstruction and postmodernity. It was the idea of something like the end of
philosophy, not in the analytic sense of closure, but in the sense
that philosophy itself is too closed. It was the idea that the
opening of classical philosophy was a form of closure, and that
the name of this closure was metaphysics, naturally.
There was something Heideggerian in this sequence, because it
was the sequence of the end of philosophy as the end of
metaphysics. But as Derrida also learned to say 'the end' is
too much, because 'the end' itself is a closure! And so it is the

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Day One

end of the end! It was the continuation of the end, it was the end
without end, the end which does not end. This is why
deconstruction is infinite. Deconstruction is infinite because the
end of metaphysics must also be the deconstruction of
deconstruction. It was, certainly, the idea of a radical opening, of
an absolute opening. Not absolute as the end of thinking, as the
goal of thinking, but the absolute as the realization of the end, a
realization itself infinite. Deconstruction, then, was a radical
critique of some aspects of the sequence before, because the
sequence before was constructivist structuralism is
constructivism, and it was the idea that you could understand the
thing itself by its structure. The sequence of post-modernity and
deconstruction is the sequence of the critique of that sort of
constructivism, because it proposed that the idea of construction
is a closure. But it also proposed the same for deconstruction,
and so it was necessary to deconstruct not only the construction,
but also the deconstruction of the deconstruction, and so on. It
was the idea of an infinite task, an infinite obligation, of
something without immanent end in fact, it was the first
appearance of this idea in the history of philosophy. Another
aspect of this sequence was to assume all of the past. In the field
of art this assumption is very clear, it is very clear because in art
today we have a sort of game with all forms, all historical forms,
precisely because we are not obliged to the new form and only
the new form.
During this sequence there is also a powerful academic reaction.
Maybe it is not true for the whole of the Anglo-Saxon world, but
at least in the United States and England the contradiction during
this sequence was a contradiction between deconstruction and
analytic philosophy, strictly speaking. But philosophers like
Deleuze and I were outside of this contradiction, we were
outside because our positions were neither that of postmodernity like the position of Lyotard for example, but also
many others nor that of analytic philosophy. We were not on

What is Philosophy?

43

the side of Derrida, but we were not on the side of the enemies
of Derrida either, and so we were in some sense outside the
contradiction, outside the violent contradiction of this sequence.
After that after the contradiction between deconstruction and
post-modernity and the academic reaction we have something
like a new sequence which is probably still obscure and not yet
completely clear. The English word for this sequence is postpost-modernity post-post-modernity. Is it possible that the
sequence after this is post-post-post-modernity? I can understand
what is post-post-modernity in the sense that we return to some
concepts of classical philosophy without being an academic
reaction. That is my definition of something like that. We are not
in deconstruction and post-modernity, because we can assume
that some metaphysical concepts like being, subject, truth and so
on, are valid. And so, naturally, it appears as if we have returned
to classical metaphysics, but it is not the case, it is not exactly
the case for Deleuze or for me. But there is no problem in
assuming that our position is a metaphysical one, because,
precisely, we are not in the field of the deconstruction of
metaphysical concepts. The idea is precisely to assume some
classical concepts of metaphysics but without being a return to
the metaphysical sequence of the history of philosophy. And so,
naturally, we must give new meanings to all classical concepts
I will return to this problem later. This is why I understand postpost-modernity in this sense: it is not post-modernity, it is not
deconstruction, or freedom in the game of forms and so on, it is
not an absolute negation of metaphysics, of all the concepts of
classical metaphysics, such as subject, truth, etc., but it is not a
return to classical metaphysics either. Equally, post-postmodernity is not in the analytic and academic reaction to all of
that either. We are beyond that contradiction, and to be beyond
that contradiction means that we are in a new sequence. Maybe
its the sequence of post-post-modernity, I can accept the name.

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Day One

So, we can say that all that constitutes four sequences in the
fifty, sixty years of my life.
I can add something else: during practically the entirety of the
first two sequences we have two fundamental references,
Marxism and psychoanalysis, Marx and Freud, if you want.
Everybody who was in the phenomenological framework in
the sense of Sartre or Merleau-Ponty and also everybody who
was in the field of structuralism, has these two major references.
There is something in Marxism and psychoanalysis that is not
reducible to the succession of sequences, and which cuts across
all of them. In fact, even in the third sequence somebody like
Derrida is in constant discussion with Freud and Marx Derrida
wrote about Marx directly, a book, an entire book. It is very
important to see that in European philosophy, in continental
philosophy, Marxism and psychoanalysis go cross the three first
sequences. which are, on other points, very different, very
exclusive.
At the end of these three sequences there was a very strong
reaction against these two references. In France, this reaction
took the form of the New Philosophers. Today, in fact, there is
again a very violent fight over Freud. Maybe the particularity of
post-post-modernity with Deleuze, me, in some sense Slavoj
iek, in France Quentin Meillassoux, and so on is to return to
these two references, and to completely assume that we are in
discussion with Marxism and psychoanalysis, with Marx and
Freud.
My philosophical framework, then, goes across four different
sequences, four sequences which are very different, very
opposed. And so, certainly, we are in the definition of
philosophy given by Kant, because Kant said that philosophy is
a battlefield. Across this context, across these four sequences,
there are battles, there are victories, real victories and apparent
victories, and there are returns, there are returns of ideas

What is Philosophy?

45

supposed defeated, dead. In philosophy we can absolutely say

that there are ideas, thoughts, which we assumed are abolished,
which disappeared, but which return, which rise again.
And so like my historical context, my philosophical context is a
very vibrant battlefield. But my context also includes a very
complex history of art, from the beginning of abstract painting to
the modern from of deconstruction in the field of art, a complex
history of music, transformations in the question of sexual
difference, and sexuality as such, transformations in the
questions of love, and so on and so on. During this span of time
this fifty, sixty years there are very fundamental
transformations in all fields, in philosophy, in politics, in history,
in the arts, in concrete existence, and so on. And so, finally, this
sequence of apparition and disparition is completely opposed to
the conservative vision of the world as it is as a final and closed
horizon. And so, I can say that maybe my vision cannot be
exactly the same as that of today, that it cannot be exactly the
same as that of a young man or woman today, not because the
world is not the same, but more profoundly because my
experience is not at all the experience of the continuity of a
particular existence of the world, but fundamentally an
experience of ruptures, of a sequence of ruptures.
Maybe my vision of the necessity of ruptures is only my
biography, maybe this is my vision only because of the
philosophical projection of my life.
If we cannot say that you live in a false world, if the world today
is the true world, that is, if its really true that we are in a moment
of history where the world as it is must continue, then it is also
true that my experience, my personal experience during my life,
is in contradiction with this world. And maybe my hypothesis,
my philosophical vision of the world, is only a projection of my
world, a projection of my experience, of my individual life, as a
norm for the world as it is. If I desire a new possibility maybe its

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Day One

only because my life was a life with many sequences, many new
emergences, many new possibilities, a life of catastrophic wars,
of resistances and revolts, and so on and so on. And now we are
progressively in the peaceful globalization of the world, we are
in a world that is stable, a world which is a good world, and so
on.
If all of this is true, then my first question 'why as an old man I
am speaking to much younger people' was, in fact, a question
of contradiction, of the contradiction between a vision of the
world of my experience and this world of today. This other
world was not the same as this world now, and it was not the
same not only because of some little differences, but mostly
because it was a world of change, a world of revolution, if you
want, in all fields of humanity. It was a world of change and
ruptures not only in politics, history and so on, but also in art, for
example. And so it was not only a different world, but a world
the fundamental law of which was different, it was a world
under a very different law of the becoming of the world. Our
situation in this class, then, is a dialectical one because there is a
contradiction between two different, two absolutely different
experience of the world as it is.
If our class is this sort of contradictory situation, then there are
two distinct possibilities. The first possibility is that I transmit to
you my experience with some philosophical concepts,
naturally and after that you do what you want with this
experience. And this is an interesting possibility, certainly. But it
would transform our situation into something like a historical
one, since all that would take place is the transmission of some
historical experiences. In which case my duty is to transmit to
you an experience of a world that was very different from your
world, from the world of today. But there is a second possibility,
which is that the relationship between us is not principally one
of transmission, but rather an experience of the strange

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47

relationship between philosophy and time. There is a subtle but

profound difference between the first possibility and the second.
The first possibility assumes that by the act of me telling you my
experience and especially my philosophical experience, the
four sequences all that can be achieved is the mere
transmission of it to you, and so, that it is not possible to
immediately produce any common consequences out of this
contradiction. And so, the creation of a new common desire
would not be possible. Finally, if I transmit to you my
experience in this way, then I cannot know exactly what you will
do with this experience. Naturally, this is because I cannot be on
both sides. In this vision of the situation of the confrontation of
my experience and your situation in the world today, the first
possibility is reduced to one which is, in some sense, not a
philosophical one, not only because it is historical in its very
nature but much more because I cannot hope to directly create in
you something like a new desire, a new desire which would be
common to me and to you. And so we cannot hope to create a
new community.
The second possibility is different. It is different because the
point is that maybe the relationship between philosophy and
time is not that sort of contradiction, and that it is not at all
reducible to the contradiction between my experience and your
experience. Naturally this difference is important and defines a
sort of contradiction, but if philosophy, as apropos to time, is not
reducible to the present, then it is possible that you and I could
have some common use of this contradiction. Its a possibility,
its a possibility, but only if philosophy is not reducible to the
present.
Certainly you recognize the conviction of the analytic vision
here? Philosophy for the analytic position is absolutely reducible
to the present, to the problems of the present. And this is why in
the analytic tradition all that is really important are the papers of

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Day One

the last ten years and the last ten years are the present. The
conviction is that the only real problems and answers are those
of the present, and that we must and can solve them. In the
analytic vision, finally, the difference in time between two
experiences cannot be useful for the present. And this is what we
find in the analytic tradition the conviction that the history of
philosophy Plato, Descartes, Sartre, and so on is too old
too old, too old to be useful. In this sense the analytic
philosopher is exactly like the mathematician who says that
Euclid is true and interesting, but finally of no value at all for
modern mathematics. If philosophy was in the analytic position,
then we could not use the difference between the past and
present in a common way in the present.
You understand the problem? The point is to propose the idea
that the relationship between philosophy and time is not
absolutely reducible to the present of philosophy. We can say
something like this: in philosophy the question is the question of
the future, but as a question of the present posed from the point
of view of the possibility of a new future, and the construction of
this possibility is conditioned by a new transmission of the past.
I repeat: the question of philosophy is the question of the
possibility of a future in the present. The question of possibility
is a very subtle question, because possibility is something that
concerns the future but in some sense exists in the present the
future exists in the present in the form of possibility.
If philosophy is really something like this if it is something
which helps the existence of possibility in the present then
there is a construction of the future by means of a possibility,
and I propose to say that in philosophy specifically in
philosophy this construction of the future in the present is also
a new transmission of the past. The consequence of this point is
that the present of philosophy is also composed by the totality of
its past the present of philosophy is constructed by the totality

What is Philosophy?

49

of its past. But the philosophical thought of its own past is not a
pure repetition, which would be a purely academic position, a
reactive positions.
In France, for example, we know perfectly that the reduction of
philosophy to the history of philosophy is the academic position,
a purely academic position. But this is not what I am proposing
here. My proposition is that the present of philosophy is the
totality of its past not by a repetition of the history of its past, but
by the proposition of a new interpretation of its past or a part
of its past. And why? Why must there be a new interpretation of
the past in the present? For the construction of a future! It is for
the construction of a future that is also a big future, and not a
small future, but a future as big as the past! It is a future as big
as the past because in the construction of this future there is a
new interpretation of the past! And so there is a complete
contemporaneity of philosophy to itself! Plato is with us, now! It
is not something old, which is completely abolished. Its not
dogmatists, existentialists and so on, and we have no use of all
that. Not at all! Philosophy exists precisely because Plato,
Aristotle, Descartes and Kant and so on are with us, now! Why
are they with us now? Why? Because we can use of all of these
old philosophers as a part of the construction of the future, as a
part of the construction of the future by way of a new
interpretation of the past. And so, in this future, which is in some
sense a real and completely different future, there is also the
presence of the totality of the philosophical past, because the
new interpretation of Plato, for example, is a new interpretation
for the future, in this future we have a new Plato. And this new
Plato will be the new present of the future. It is only in
philosophy that we have something like that only in
philosophy.
Naturally, maybe this is also a possibility in theatre, but that's
another problem, and maybe I shall speak on this problem later.

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Day One

And there is a very complex relationship between philosophy

and theatre, a relationship that has existed from the very
beginning. And you know why? Because in theatre too we can
re-stage the past, we can re-stage Sophocles, Aeschylus, and so
on, and so they are with us. But when we re-stage there is,
naturally, a new interpretation precisely because we re-stage
Sophocles in a different manner, in a different place than the
Sophocles of the Greeks. And so, in theatre too we constantly
have the possibility of a new interpretation of the past in the
present for the future for the future. This difficulty is
absolutely essential.
And so we have another contradiction because a part of the
obscure position in philosophy is to say that philosophy, finally,
is nothing else than the history of philosophy. This position
studies Plato, Aristotle and so on, but in a strictly obscure
manner, exactly like someone who desires the return of old
religious forms of existence. Its the same thing, its the same
thing its the fetishization of the past. And this position is
different from the analytic position, which states that all of the
history of philosophy is closed, is finished, is of no interest, of
no use for us. And this is the truly conservative position, and
also the dominant position.
It is exactly the same contradiction that we had between the
obscure position and the conservative position in politics, and
so, to oppose it we have to use all of the past in another manner.
We cannot repeat and we cannot return to the past, nor can we
abolish this past. What we must do and what we can do is
interpret this past in the light of the future.
What we must explain is how it is possible that the present of
philosophy is also the interpretation of the past for the future.
This is the second possibility of my speech here: an historical
experience completely different than the world as it is today,
transmitted in the form of a new interpretation, and somehow

What is Philosophy?

51

common to you and to me. We can have the same future, you
and me. And if we can create a community, it is, naturally,
because we can have this point is common, which is the
possibility of a new future somehow in the present. This is a
very powerful idea: the unity of humanity is in the point of view
of a future. Its a necessity it is not only a philosophical
symptom that in philosophy we clearly see the past, all of the
past, under a new interpretation as useful for the creation of a
new future. But, finally, and more generally speaking, if you
have the dream of a humanity, of generic humanity beyond the
differences of sex, nationality, culture and so on, and of a
generic humanity which respects these differences, and where
these differences are inside this form of humanity, it is clear that
this community is from the point of view of the future, because
no matter how many differences there are between people they
can have the same future, a future can unify them in their
differences. This is why philosophy is important! It is a sort of
paradigm of all that!
In philosophy it is clear that all of the past is with us. All of the
past is with us because we can have a new future by means of a
new interpretation of this past. And if all of that is true, then
when I speak to you it is not only a transmission, a historical
transmission, of an experience which is different from your
experience, but a sort of experimentation of the philosophical
possibility to transform the past into a future... to transform the
past into a future. That is precisely the fundamental goal of
philosophy, and it is also a clear answer to the reason for why
you and me are in this room all together, together across the very
important differences of historical experiences, philosophical
experiences, artistic experiences, and so on between us. This
answer is positive because it is not reducible to a pure exercise
of transmission, which would be something interesting,
certainly, but something very different than a philosophical
experience.

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Day One

And so we have our three concrete problems, and three

generalizations of these concrete problems. Now, finally, I can
propose our three subjects for the next few days:
First, the anthropological nature of philosophy: the relationship
between philosophy and anthropological circumstances, or, if
you want, philosophy as an exception, or even, the relationship
between universality and particularity in philosophy, or, in
another manner, the relationship between the universality of
truth and the particularity of culture. Philosophy is a symptom of
this very important problem today, which is the contradiction of
the universality of truth and the particularity of culture. And we
shall see that this relationship between universality and
particularity is today the most important philosophical problem,
and the most difficult. And second, the dialectical nature of
philosophy: the dialectical nature of philosophy is the question
of a rupture in philosophy, or, the question of philosophy as the
thinking of ruptures and the relationship between continuity and
ruptures. So it is the question of possibility, the question of
possibility inside the world as it is. But more precisely the
dialectical nature of philosophy is the question of what is in
philosophy the fundamental contradiction and what is the goal of
philosophy. We can say something like that for the moment, but
what is more precise, naturally, is the idea that the fundamental
contradiction in philosophy is a subjective one, and yet the goal
is a common desire, not a common state or a common existence,
but a common desire. And, finally, the paradoxical relationship
between philosophy and time.
We have a good program in these three points, and we shall
begin the treatment of this program tomorrow. Thank you to all
of you.

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53

2. Day Two

2.1 Lecture III

This afternoon we will return to the question of what Ive named
the anthropological nature of philosophy, that is, the relationship
between the goal of philosophy, the goal of philosophical
discourse, of philosophical references and so on, and the
particularity of some culture, some country, some language and
so on. In a very brutal form, the question can be: was there
philosophy in old China? Or: was there philosophy in precolonial Africa? Or even: was there philosophy in Greece before
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle? And so on. Generally that sort of
question is objected to for the rational reason of the form: if you
say that, for example, philosophy did not exist in old China, then
you are saying that something was missing in that culture, and if
you say that this thing which was missing in that culture is
present in your culture, you are affirming the superiority of one
culture over another. This is a very common argument against a
proposition that asserts the non-existence of something in some
culture. And you can all imagine what the progressive position is
regarding such a proposition: it is precisely to find something
like philosophy in old China, something like philosophy in precolonial Africa, and so on, because the idea of something
missing, of something absolutely absent, in some culture is a sort
of objection to that culture.
My answer is different: I think we can, absolutely, say no to that
sort of question. I affirm that in old China there was no
philosophy at all, and I will try to justify this point of view.
Abstractly, we can say something like this: if you say that

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Day Two

something is missing in a culture, all that you are saying is that

there is a difference between one culture and another culture.
And we can say that, generally speaking, if you establish a
comparison between two cultures there is always something
missing in one in comparison to the other, precisely because
they are different. If everything that exists in one culture also
exists in the other culture, then the two cultures are only
variations of the same theme. And so, abstractly, there is no
reason to identify the affirmation 'something is missing in some
culture' with the affirmation 'something is inferior in this culture,
in comparison to the other'... all we affirm by such a proposition
is that something is missing, and, finally, that there is a
difference between the two.
If you want to transform the affirmation 'something is missing in
this culture' into an affirmation that proves the superiority of that
culture over another, then you would have to give a proof not
only that something is missing in the second culture but also
that the presence of that sort of something is a proof of
superiority. And this is a different argument, absolutely
different. For example, we can absolutely affirm that many
things are missing in our culture in comparison to many other
cultures. I take one example: in many Indian cultures of North
America we can find very extraordinary subjectivities in their
myths. Levi-Strauss himself affirmed that to have myths with
such subjectivities, and to have such references to the concrete
situation of the collectivity and so on, is a sort of superiority of
the Indian cultures over his own. We have, after all, no
equivalent at all of something like that. And so, we can say that
these sorts of mythologies, these sorts of stories concerning the
destiny, the collective destiny of the people is missing in our
culture. Okay! And it is so by necessity, if our culture is, in fact,
different from the cultures of small Indian peoples in North
America. This should not be surprising, after all, there is a
difference between our culture and the cultures of Native

What is Philosophy?

55

Americans. But we must also affirm that, naturally, something is

missing in the Indian cultures in regard to ours. We can affirm,
then, that the difference between cultures can always be
expressed by the determination of something missing in one
culture, something that is in the first culture and not in the
second. I have no problem concerning this point.
Maybe we can find in countries and cultures where philosophy
does not exist something else, something else. For example, we
can find different forms of wisdom, traditional wisdom which
is very different from philosophy, but which is something really
precious, and really unique. We can find different forms of
morality, different representations of the relation to others, and
so on. We can find, naturally, different forms of religious
conviction concerning the destiny of life, different organizations
of collectivity and so on. We can find different forms, very
different forms, concerning the relationship to nature its a very
important question today, as you know and we can find some
cultures some cultures which are disappearing because of our
culture, which is an aggressive culture, a destructive culture, if
you want which have something really precious concerning the
general vision of the relationship of humanity and nature, and so
on and so on. And so, we must affirm that certainly something
can be missing in other cultures, but in our culture too! And
philosophy is something very particular. Of course, you could
respond and say, 'okay, but philosophy must be universal'. Yes,
philosophy must be universal... but every creation of a culture is,
in principle, the possibility of a new universalism. Philosophy
must be universal! But this is not an affirmation of concrete
universality, and it is not an affirmation that a culture where
philosophy does not exist is immediately a bad culture there is,
strictly speaking, no immediate relationship between two such
affirmations.

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Day Two

We can affirm that philosophy, properly speaking, exists

historically, and begins historically, in particular conditions and
in particular cultures, without saying that this culture is superior
to others on the basis of this fact alone. And why? Why does
philosophy appear in its complete form in Greece, maybe five or
six centuries before Christ? I think we can give reasons to this
fact it is a fact, and we can give reasons for this fact. I propose
to say that there are five conditions for the existence of
philosophy. And, finally, we must affirm that philosophy begins
in Greece only because historically these five conditions were
realized in Greece by chance, by chance! It is not a miracle
the Greek miracle... but chance! By chance these five things
were together in Greece, and so the possibility, the birth of
philosophy was realized. I want now to examine these five
conditions.
First, I affirm that philosophy is a discourse, a proposition,
concerning new propositions, new intellectual novelties
concerning many questions. But there is a common point that is
very important: philosophy accepts as a law the examination of
all its propositions by others. If you want, philosophy is
discussion. When the philosopher speaks, when the philosopher
writes, he knows that all that he says and all that he writes will
be discussed by others, by other philosophers and, finally, by
everybody, everybody who freely reads the book, everybody
who encounters the philosopher and so on. The philosopher as
such is not the guarantee of the discourse, for the philosopher is
not a king, he is not a priest, nor a prophet. It is not, therefore,
the particularity or the absolute singularity of the position of the
philosopher which is the guarantee of the discourse of the
philosopher. The discourse of the philosopher is not a discourse
from some sacred place of society. Maybe the philosopher says
something true, but we would only know this by way of a
discussion of what he has said, and not because the philosopher
is a philosopher.

What is Philosophy?

57

Naturally, some philosophers can use your... position, and

transform this law of philosophy into something else. There is
some effect of transference in psychoanalytic language there
is some position of authority in play. This is always possible, but
this is not in the very essence of philosophy. Philosophy is
defined by discussion, and it is why the form of discussion is the
appropriate form of philosophy in Plato. The dialogues in Plato
are used precisely to give proofs something like false proofs,
proofs that are a little arranged, proofs that are of a theatrical
nature, but they are proofs. And these dialogues are also proofs
that philosophy is that which is exposed to discussion all that
is said in philosophy is exposed to discussion.
Philosophy, then, proposes a very different position on the
question of the truth truth as arrived at through discussion
than the conception of truth where the guarantee is the position
of the one who speaks, be it a king, a priest, a prophet, or,
finally, a God. Philosophy is, principally, the ambition to say the
truth without the place of a God. The prophet, on the other hand,
speaks because he is a sort of interpreter of God, and the king
speaks because he has the power to speak, and, finally, the priest
speaks because he is a religious representation, and so on, but
the philosopher speaks only because he can produce arguments
concerning what he says. And so we can say that philosophy is a
free determination of thinking, a free determination of thinking
from a social point of view.
Everybody can be a philosopher! Its not a fact, naturally, but it
is a possibility, and this possibility is absolutely immanent to the
definition of philosophy. Everybody can be a philosopher and
everybody can discuss with the philosopher. And, again, we find
this in the work of Plato: Socrates discusses with everybody,
after all. And so, its really a free determination of thinking
because the place, the social place of the philosopher is not
prescribed by society, and the value of the discourse is not

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Day Two

prescribed by the place of the philosopher in society, but only by

the intrinsic value of the discourse. And this value is
experimented by the discussion not only by the discussion in
that moment, but by discussions afterwards too, including new
interpretations of that philosophy much, much later in the future.
Everybody can speak that is a right of the philosophic idea.
And everybody can refute, everybody can refute.... And so, the
first condition for the birth of philosophy is democracy,
absolutely. But it is democracy in a very large sense: everybody
can refute what is said by everyone else.
As you know generally speaking this is not the case in many
other forms of society. In most societies it is not true that
everybody can refute the king, or that everybody can refute the
dictator, and so on. And certainly in many civilizations its not
true that everybody can refute the religious authority. If God is
really the law of society, naturally, it cannot be the case that
everyone can refute what He says. If God is God how could
everybody refute Him? How could Gods words, His authority
be exposed to discussion discussion by everyone? It is by
definition that what God says is true, and so it is not exposed to
discussion. The philosophical form of verification was,
therefore, really something new, something very new. And so
this first condition of philosophy was also a new conception of
truth.
I insist on the point: philosophical truth defined by the fact that
it resists objections, resists refutations is a new conception of
truth. And this sort of negative definition of a truth is
fundamental in philosophy. It is not an affirmative definition
its true because God said it, its true because the priest said it,
because the king said it, and so on its a negative definition,
because it is true only if across discussions there is something
which resists refutation it is a proof, it is not an authority. We
must, then, understand that truth is not a fact but a result, a result

What is Philosophy?

59

of the experience of discussion. We can say, therefore, that in

philosophy there is a collective dimension to truth, because it is
a collective judgment across discussions and not a collective
submission to power, including the power of God... if God
speaks. We can image that God is mute, certainly, but generally,
in the religious framework, God speaks, too much maybe.... In
any case, there is something new, something different with
philosophy. For example, even if a philosophy, or a philosopher,
gives a proof of the existence of God in classical metaphysics
its practically always the case that the problem is to find proofs
of the existence of God even if a philosopher gives proofs of
the existence of God, there is no consequence that this proof is
the speech of God Himself. Such a proof if such a proof is
possible is a proof by the rational means of philosophy itself,
and so there is no immediate contradiction between the
philosophical conviction that God exists and the fact that
philosophy is a free determination of thinking. In such an
instance, the philosopher proposes a proof of the existence of
God, and after that the proof is discussed, exactly as a proof in
mathematics. After all, we can always find somebody who says
that some proof is not a proof, that the proof is not good, and so
on. And so, finally, we can affirm that even the existence of God
Himself can be in the field of free philosophical thinking the
existence of God is itself exposed to discussion, and not imposed
by power or proved by revelation or some sacred book and so
on.
We can, therefore, affirm that philosophy is defined by the lack
of any sacred place or sacred book it is only arguments, and
free determination of thinking. Democracy in the large sense
of the term therefore, is a condition for something like
philosophy. Philosophy cannot appear, and certainly it cannot
begin, in a context where the notion of truth is not completely
detached from a form of power. The dependency of truth on
power is an interdiction for philosophy. And so, I name

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Day Two

democracy not in the sense of the organization of the state with

polls and so on, but in the more general sense of a disjunction
between truth and power the first condition for philosophy. In
philosophy there is no relationship between truth and power, be
it divine power or the power of a king. Philosophy can appear
only in a democratic context this is the first condition. And, as
you know politically speaking democracy is a creation of the
Greek society.
The second condition is not this freedom. This freedom of
thinking, in fact, supposes on the contrary the existence of a
common law of thinking. And so, while the first condition is a
sort of freedom, the second condition which is a condition for
the possibility of argument, proof and the drawing of
consequences is not in the direction of freedom but in the
direction of a law, a common law. After all, it is impossible to
discuss a proposition without some law common to the
philosopher and his interlocutor, some law concerning what is a
discussion, some law concerning what is a rational discussion.
Naturally, it is possible that someone responds to the
philosopher merely by saying that what he says is not true, but if
he merely say no, it is not true and nothing else if he does not
give an argument then it is not a discussion. And if there exists
something like a discussion, then there must exist something like
a common law of thinking appropriate to this discussion. And
so, the possibility of a peaceful discussion philosophy is not
war, it is not civil war, after all is the existence of common
laws of thinking, common laws of regulating the discussion.
And what is civil war, after all? Civil war is when we discuss
power, when we discuss determination, without any common
law. Naturally, in such a case we must fight, we must fight and
we must be victorious. In philosophy it is the same: if there is no
common conception of rationality we cannot have a true
exposition of the philosophical proposition to a collective
discussion.

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And so, the absolute freedom of thinking no sacred place,

everybody can speak, everyone can question, and so on is the
first condition. But after that, the existence of philosophy
requires that there exists the conviction that there is something
like a common law, which is precisely rationality or logic, in a
general sense. Therefore, we can say that discussion, rational
discussion exists only if there exists a common logical
framework, a common logic. And why? Precisely because
argumentation is made out of the consequences of some
proposition: you affirm something and after that you affirm
something else, something that is a consequence of the first
affirmation. And how do we pass from the first affirmation to
the second as a consequence? It is possible only by something
like a logical law, which is something like a proof or conviction
that the second affirmation is the consequence of the first.
Always, always there is something like this in the context of
philosophy. If we propose to somebody to go from a first
proposition (P1) to a second proposition (P2), there must be a
rational passage, a rational transition, and we must suppose that
the conception of rationality in this other person is common to
ours. And so, it is an absolute necessity that there exists
something like a common logical framework, a common law of
rationality, in order for anyone to expose something to
philosophical discussion.
There are, then, two very different conditions: the first one is
freedom in thinking and the second is something like discipline,
something like order, something rational, logical, not the power
of a particular place but a rational common. These two first
conditions, in fact, dispose something like a cultural framework:
at the most elementary level freedom and logic, and their
combination absolute freedom, in some sense, and absolute
logic, in another sense are the axes of any culture. As you all
know, when you read a philosophy you always find the two, you
always find some combination of the two. For example, some

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philosopher may ultimately say that there is no limit, that there is

absolute freedom, but, in fact, this is impossible because this
freedom in the very exposition of itself to another must assume
the idea of a common law. And so, a philosophy is always a very
strange mixture between freedom and something like the
absolute power of the law not absolute power in the political
sense, not absolute power like the power of the king, but an
absolute power which is immanent, a power which is accepted
by the freedom of thinking itself. If we do not have that sort of
mixture, that sort of dialectical mixture between absolute
freedom and absolute determination determination within the
framework of logic we cannot have philosophical discourse,
we cannot have philosophy.
The fact is that in Greece for the first time in history we have
the idea of a proof. And the idea of a proof is a very specific
idea: a proof is the idea that we can verify something as true
purely by the strict consequences of a first affirmation we have
evidence of the first affirmation, but we deduce the
consequences concerning the final destiny of that first
affirmation. Minimally, that is the essence of a proof, of giving a
proof. This is an invention, and it is an invention at a very
specific place and time. In Greece proof was invented in the
invention of demonstrative mathematics. We cannot say that the
Greeks invented mathematics in general, because we find
mathematics in other cultures we find arithmetic, we find
numbers, we find a sort of geometry, and so on. In fact, it has
been demonstrated that even in some very small cultures there
have been many mathematical manipulations, and so we cannot
say that the birth of mathematics took place in Ancient Greece.
But we can affirm that there was the birth of demonstrative
mathematics, which is the idea that all mathematical
propositions can be proved, that there is a proof for every
mathematical sentence. And so, while the first condition of
philosophy is democracy, the second is mathematics. The two

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63

are not at all the same mathematics, after all, is not very
democratic. In mathematics, in fact, it is often said 'you have to
obey the law'. And this, certainly, is part of why mathematics is
very difficult: mathematics is, in some sense, creativity,
extraordinary creativity of thinking, but, in another sense, it is
the sovereignty of the law, the absolute sovereignty of the
logical law. This mixture is necessary, it is absolutely necessary
for philosophy. And we find the two in Ancient Greece.
The third condition is the possibility of universality. Universality
is the idea that all of that affirmations, consequences,
discussions, and so on is addressed to everybody without
restriction. There is a very important passage of Plato on this
point: in Meno, Socrates wants to prove that everybody has the
possibility to reach the fundamental ideas, and to give proof of
this he speaks to a slave because, in Ancient Greece, a slave is
an example of someone who is, in some sense, outside of
society, someone with whom the citizens have almost nothing in
common. And so the discussion is a double proof: it is, certainly,
a proof of a geometrical problem and so a proof of some truth,
but the goal of the text is the proof that the slave is absolutely
equal to everybody else, at least on the level of thinking as such.
It is not an argument of political nature, because the conclusion
of Socrates is not the abolition of slavery, or freedom for
everybody, no, not at all. But it is a purely philosophical
demonstration a philosophical proof and a concrete proof of
absolute equality in the field of thinking. As we know, the slave
is precisely the representation of humanity as such, he is the
representation of the generic part of humanity, because the slave
is without a particular place. Finally, there is nothing in common
between Socrates and the slave, nothing except that both are
human beings, and that both can think.
This was this is still a very fundamental moment in the
history of philosophy precisely because it is an affirmation that

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rational discussion can be exposed to everybody, to everybody

without any restriction even to a slave. That is the universality
of philosophy and Meno is a concrete situation of this
universality. The universality of philosophy is not reducible to
the universality of its propositions, because it is also and more
profoundly in my opinion the proposition that philosophy is
addressed to everybody philosophy is addressed to
everybody. Philosophy is for everybody, it is not only
formally universal, it is there for everybody!
And so, there is in philosophy a fundamental idea of equality. In
some sense, the first condition is liberty, but the third is equality.
Obviously it is not the case that there was social equality in
Ancient Greece equality in this sense only came to exist as a
possibility in the 19th century. There existed, however, the idea
of equality in the field of thinking, and that is the philosophical
sense of equality. The demonstration of Socrates is the
philosophical affirmation and proof that the slave is equal in the
discussion, in the philosophical discussion there, at least, he is
equal to everybody.
This philosophical equality is composed of two terms. The first
is the concept of truth. But what is a truth, in fact? A truth is
something that is not reducible to particularities, and so a truth is
something that is for everybody, in the absolute sense. For
example, it is the case that everyone is equal before a truth,
everyone has access to truth, even a slave and in the context of
Plato the slave is the representation of humanity as such,
because, after all, there is nothing to the slave which is like me,
except that he too is a man and he too can think. Truth is the
name of something a proposition, or something else which is
for everybody in an absolute sense, which is for everybody
without exception. The second term of this equality is that there
exists something like human being in general, something which
is not reducible to being a slave, being an aristocrat, being a rich

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65

man or a poor man, being Greek or barbarian, and so on. This

something that is not reducible to any particularity, this
something that is in every concrete human being, is the generic
part of human being. The philosophical idea is that there is a
generic part in every individual: in every individual, regardless
of their culture, sex, age and so on, there is something which is
an exception to particularity, which is that this is a man, this is a
woman. And this affirmation is universal by itself, it is
universality itself.
There is, therefore, in philosophy the recognition of the
existence of something which is the generic part of human being
in every individual, and a truth is something which is addressed
precisely to this generic part. There are, consequently, no
particular conditions required for understanding and accepting a
truth particularity, if it is a condition for access, a condition for
the possibility of understanding, can only be in opposition to a
truth. In principle, a truth is disposed to the generic part of a
human being, to the generic part of every individual. A truth is
in exception to all particularity. You see, then, that there is a
relation between truth and its address? We can name this generic
part the subject of human being, it is the human subject it is a
philosophical name. And so, we can affirm that philosophical
universality is the composition of two fundamental concepts:
truth and subject. We can find this idea under other names, more
traditional names: subject can be the 'individual', or 'person', it
can be 'consciousness', it can be many other names, and truth can
be 'exception', 'transcendence', it too can be named by many
names, many different names. The history of philosophy is, after
all, a sequence of ruptures. But, finally, across the entire history
we have the fundamental correlation between truth and subject,
which is, finally, the correlation between what is universal and
what is the subject of this universality. And this is why in the
history of philosophy the question of truth and the question of
subject are so fundamental they are fundamental precisely

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because there is no philosophy without an understanding of what

is equal in all human beings. And so universality is the third
condition of philosophy.
But why is this a condition? Because very often in many cultures
and maybe in every culture there has been, or there still is, a
tendency to believe that a true human being is a human being of
that culture, and that a human being of another culture is not
exactly a human being. This is a very important fact in the entire
history of humanity. For the Greeks themselves the question is
somewhat obscure, because for the Ancient Greeks there were
Greeks and barbarians, and so, maybe, a human being is first of
all a Greek man. But philosophically this is not true.
Philosophically we must affirm the idea of the equality of human
beings in the field of thinking. And so, in philosophy there is
something that is not reducible to any particular culture,
something that is always, in some sense, beyond the laws of any
proper culture. And, once more, we find this idea in Plato:
philosophy is the corruption of young people.
Why is philosophy corruption? Precisely because in it there
exists the idea that there is something which is more important
than the law of a society, that there is something more important
than the laws of any particular culture. This is not a negation of
culture, and its not a negation of particularities, but only the
affirmation that something can be more important. As you
probably know, this is the subject of the great play of Sophocles
Antigone because the central idea of that play is that there
exist laws that are beyond the laws of the city, beyond the laws
of the country. And so, we can say that this play of Sophocles is,
absolutely, a part of the conditions of philosophy, because it is
an affirmation that there is something more important than the
particularity of any culture, more important than the particularity
of some political situation. And that something is a new
equality: it is an equality between human beings and not only

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67

between the citizens of some country, it is an equality that

affirms the absolute equality of all human beings as such, it is an
equality between subjects, in the sense I give to the word.
Philosophy is impossible without truth and subject these two
correlated ideas are a condition for the very possibility of
philosophy.
The fourth condition the fourth condition is related to the
problem of language. And, naturally, it is related to the third
condition universality. We discussed this point yesterday:
philosophy cannot affirm that it is in an exclusive relationship to
one language, one particular language. And why? Because it
would be a return to something that would not be philosophical
under the first condition: if you affirmed that philosophy is by
necessity in one language, and only in that language, then we
would lose the complete freedom of thought the complete
exposition of a proposition to opposed judgments, to public
judgment which is constitutive of philosophy. In such a case
philosophy would be something closed, something closed from
the very beginning. If we want complete rational freedom of
thinking we cannot affirm that philosophy must speak German,
or Greek, or something like that. And so, when Heidegger writes
that being speaks German or Greek, for that matter he is
proposing something that is not philosophical. And so, at that
moment, at the moment he proposes restricting philosophy to a
single language on ontological grounds, he is not a philosopher,
because he is proposing something that is outside philosophy,
something that is not philosophy, and, in fact, something that is
against philosophy.
Naturally, many philosophers from time to time say something
that is outside of philosophy, something that is not philosophy,
something that is non-philosophical or anti-philosophical there
is, after all, no guarantee that a philosopher always, or only,
speaks philosophically. And so, a philosopher can certainly say

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something non-philosophical, he can propose some absurdity,

some falsity and so on, and some aberration too. Philosophers,
as we know, are precisely not kings, priests, prophets and so on,
they are human beings and nothing else, and so they too can say
something which is not at all in the genius of philosophy,
something which is outside philosophy, something which is a
position of nationalism, sectarianism, dogmatism, and so on.
But, in principle, philosophy cannot admit any particular
language as a sacred language, precisely because there does not
exist a single language proper to philosophy, there does not exist
a single particular language that would be the only possible
language for philosophy. Such a language, if it existed would
regardless of which language it is be a sacred language, and
philosophy is that which does not have a sacred language.
But there is another question: if the language of philosophy
cannot be German, Greek, etc., then, finally, what is the
composition of philosophical language? What is the language of
philosophy, finally? The answer to this question is strange. In
one sense philosophical language is rational: it is discussion,
arguments, consistency of the discourse, proofs, and so on. In
this sense philosophical language is very near mathematical
language. This proximity is, as you all know, evident across the
history of philosophy. The Ethics of Spinoza, for example, is
written as such: it is proposition, definition, axiom, principle and
so on, it is written in and this is its classical name
geometrical form. You find something like that also in the
Tractatus of Wittgenstein, and we find something like that in the
logical work of Aristotle too. Across the entire history of
philosophy we have the possibility that philosophical language is
a formal language, in some sense, or at least that it is near formal
language. But across this same history we also find the contrary
possibility: we find the possibility that philosophy is written in
the language of poetry. We find this, for example, is Lucretius,
but also in Plato the great myths and so on, which are

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69

absolutely of poetical nature, with images, metaphors,

inventions, and so on. Philosophical language even if we just
look at the history is between two possibilities: the
mathematical possibility, which is a formal language, and, on the
other side, poetic language, with images, metaphors and so on. If
we read Nietzsche, for example, we find poems, we find images,
we find something which is very close to prophesy, but when we
read Spinoza we have the contrary, we have mathematical form.
This is strange, after all... it is strange....
Why is philosophy possible in such different languages? And we
cannot propose a choice between the two this is absolutely
impossible! And, in fact, we have this mixture form the very
beginning! In Plato, for example, we find long sequences of pure
argumentation, precise discussions of words, definitions and so
on, and then we find the contrary, we find some strange stories
from non-existent countries, we find strange myths, obscure
visions and so on. From the very beginning and across the entire
history of philosophy we find this fundamental impurity of
philosophical language. There is no pure philosophical language
it does not exist.
We can say what is pure mathematics: it is when mathematics is
written in practically a pure formal language. And we can
also say what is pure poetry: when the poem is clearly written in
a poetical style, with verses, and so on. But we cannot define
philosophical language. In fact, we can absolutely affirm that
there is no philosophical language. And this is a difficulty it is
a real difficulty. In consequence, and as a condition of the
existence of philosophy, we must admit a language that is
absolutely impure, a language which is neither mathematics nor
poetry, but both. And, as you all know, it is this impurity that is
so often the cause of the great difficulty of reading philosophy.
Why? Because philosophy can pass from absolute and terrible
abstraction, to very concrete considerations of examples, to,

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finally, poetry. For example, in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit

which is a very, very difficult text the last words are a poetic
citation in Hegel there is a poetic citation at the end! And in
this book of Hegel, in this great book of philosophy, we pass
from references to theatre and discussions of mathematics, to the
history of philosophy, to Schiller, and so on it is a complete
impurity!
And, finally, why is such a situation a condition of philosophy?
Because we must accept that language can be absolutely impure.
In society, in general, there is a classification of different sorts of
languages poetry, mathematics, politics and so on but in
philosophy we must accept that all languages are possible. And
so the invention of philosophy is also the invention of something
that is beyond the normal forms of languages, beyond the
normal classification of languages and differences between
languages. In philosophy we can go from mathematics to poetry
and this is absolutely paradoxical! In philosophy all the forms
are possible. And, finally, there is something inside of this
impurity of language that is real a communication, a real
transmission.
In some cultures it is impossible to do this, it is impossible to
have the mixture of different languages, and so it is impossible
to have philosophical language. This is the case in some
civilizations, in some great civilization, where it is precisely the
classification of languages which is most important, the most
important law the language of the prophet cannot be the
language of the ordinary life, it cannot be the language of the
poet, or of the priest, and so on.
There is, therefore, something of philosophy that is opposed to
classification. This is an important idea: philosophy is against
classification, in particular against the classification of
languages, and it is why there has been for a long time a
contradiction between philosophy and the university, between

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71

philosophy and academic discourse. As you know, I am a

professor I affirm this absolutely and there are many
philosophers in the university. And so, its not an empirical
contradiction, but it is a fundamental contradiction. And why?
Because the discourse of the university to speak as Lacan is
a discourse where classification is something that is very
important. In the university, as you all know, there is
classification: there is science and there is literature, and so on,
and then there is more classification, for example, within history
you have histories of certain types, modern history,
contemporary history, history of this, history of that, and so on.
And this is the genius of the university: its genius is precisely the
continuous invention of new classifications, new specializations,
its genius is the establishment of ever more specific
particularizations. Even science, finally, is decomposed into
many parts, and so you have cellular biology, zoology of insects,
and so on and so on. And then you constantly have the choice of
something, the choice of a language, and the choice of some part
of a language.
There is, of course, a fight against this particularization within
the university itself: interdisciplinary studies, mixtures between
different specialties, and so on and so on. And all that is, in fact,
a fight against the genius of the university itself. Its a fight
against the university from inside the university something like
that. But it is also why this fight is always a failure. Why?
Because even with the combinations of fields and with
interdisciplinary studies we return, slowly but eventually, to ever
further classification. Why? Because it is the law, it is the law of
the university, and it is the law of the world today.
The origin of the discourse of the university, however, is from
inside of philosophy, in fact. The invention of classification in
the sense of classification within the university was an
invention of Aristotle. In fact, we can say that Aristotle is really

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the man because of whom there exists the possibility of

academic philosophy. Why? Because inside of the philosophy of
Aristotle classification is absolutely fundamental. This was, in
fact, the genius of Aristotle and it was he who created the
discourse of the university. Undoubtedly Aristotle was the first
great professor! Plato is not a professor nobody in the
dialogues says, definitively, what Plato is thinking. What is
Platos final thought? Where is it? We cannot find it! It is never
definitively stated, but is always a sort of vague circulation of
discussion. And who is Plato, after all? In all the books of Plato
there is Socrates. In Plato it is always something or someone else
who speaks a stranger, Socrates, Thrasymachus, Protagoras,
and so on. Its a theatre, a theatre! And so we have the theatre of
Plato and the university of Aristotle, at the very beginning of
philosophy its a form of the impurity of language, after all.
But to accept this language without closure, this impurity of
language, we must accept to go beyond classification, which is
also to go beyond the university. And so there is always a
tension between philosophy and the university sometimes
inside the university itself. For the true philosopher the academic
discourse is not completely adequate. The university is adequate
only for the analytic position, but there, naturally, you accept
classification!
In Greece we have the creation of the possibility of the impurity
of language, and the creation of a language that is completely
impure. In fact, in some sense, in Ancient Greece we have the
invention of all of the possibilities of philosophical language
from poetry to mathematics. We have great philosophical poems
in Greece Parmenides, for example, was a poet, and Heraclitus
too but we also have the language of the university, in
Aristotle definition, classification, and so on and even in
Plato we have in some passages a language of philosophy
which very near mathematics. In Plato we have mathematization

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73

but we also have myths, stories, metaphors, images, and so on

in Plato we have it all! Its a theatre, its really a theatre! And so,
in Ancient Greece we do not find the invention of the language
of philosophy, but precisely the in-existence of the language of
philosophy. And to invent something which does not exist is
very difficult. For example, the invention of God....
The invention of God is something very extraordinary because
to invent something that probably does not exist is a true
creation! And, as you know, in theological discourse it is said
that this is how God created the world he created it from
nothing. And so, pure creation is creation from nothing! But I
propose that a great example, maybe the greatest example, of
creation from nothing is God himself He is really created from
nothing! It is much more God who was created from nothing
than the world by God. Why? Because if there is God God is
not really, but if there is God, there is no problem: God is
without limit by definition, and so we can perfectly accept that
He could create something out of nothing we cannot impose
limits on God, after all, we cannot limit him to creating
something only from something else, God is pure potency, and
so God can create the world from nothing, its not a problem.
But how can we, how can human beings create something from
nothing? Its much more difficult, certainly. But it is possible,
and I think that God himself is a perfect example. And God is
a creation! Hes really a creation, a creation from nothing! But
he is a negative creation, finally, because there is nothing in the
world which could have been an example, nothing that could
have been the material, the substance for the creation of
something like God everything in the world is finite and God
is infinite, everything in the world has limits and God has no
limits, and so on. And so, He is a negative creation, and a
creation that absolutely proves the genius of human being, which
is the capacity of man to create something out of nothing. After

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that, if God creates something from nothing it is really not so

surprising.
You must understand that the point is that philosophy demands
that we accept a language that is absolutely impure the
language of philosophy cuts across all languages, from poetry to
mathematics and, finally, a language that in-exists. Philosophy
accepts a language that is not a language, because, finally, there
is no language of philosophy. With philosophy the old Greeks
invented something the language of which does not exist as a
specific form of language, they invented something the
possibility of which is to go across all forms of language the
juridical form, the mathematical form, the poetical form, and so
on. And, as I have said, you find this impurity across the entirety
of philosophys history. At the time of Plato and Aristotle all the
possible forms of language existed, and as a consequence
philosophy became a possibility.
In fact we can even say that this creation is, in some sense,
homologous to the creation of God, because it is really a creation
from nothing and the creation of something that does not exactly
exist. We could ask, for example: what is the possibility of a
language that is not reducible to any particular existent language,
to any real language? And this impurity is the source of both the
difficulty of philosophy and the strength of philosophy. It is the
source of difficulty because it is difficult to go across such
different languages. I am aware of this problem because, as you
know, I go from pure mathematics and poetry I go across all
the different languages. The difficulty is not the use of a
particular language, but the passage from one language to
another, the difficulty is to move across such different languages
and yet create something unified. This unity, this unification, is
the great difficulty of a philosophical construction, certainly.
And, in fact, it is not so much the conceptual construction itself
that is difficult, the difficulty really is within the question of

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75

language, because we have to say something in one language

and something else in another language, and we must pass from
the first to the second.
The last condition is the question of the transmission of
philosophy. The problem of philosophy is that philosophy is not
reducible to written texts... and the transmission of philosophy is
not reducible to the written. There has always been what I name
physical transmission, that is, transmission with the body of the
philosopher... like here, finally: there is the body of the
philosopher, the voice of the philosopher, the presence of the
philosopher, and so on. From the very beginning philosophy
exists not only in the form of texts written texts, books and so
on but always also in the presence of the philosopher the
voice, the body and the physical existence of the philosopher.
And, finally, this is why there exists something like an effect of
a philosopher and a philosophy: in the transmission of
philosophy there is something like transference, something like
love, in fact if love is something that requires the presence of
the other, its physical presence. Naturally, you could object and
say but you are also a professor of mathematics. but it is not
the same, it is not the same. And why? Because the potency of
mathematics, of the transmission of mathematics, is mathematics
itself, absolutely. Certainly, there are good professors and bad
professors in mathematics, but this is not the point. With
philosophy and with the transmission of philosophy we
cannot separate it from the philosopher. In philosophy we have
proper names Plato, Aristotle, Heidegger, Sartre, Deleuze and
so on and they are important, absolutely. And in this sense
philosophy is like art, like poetry with Mallarme, Stevens,
Valery, Celan, and so on and precisely not like science. In
science there exist, naturally, the proper names of the scientists,
but they are not at all important, what is important is the names
of the theorems. In philosophy you cannot escape the proper
names: if we speak of Plato we speak of Plato.

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The transmission of philosophy is not purely rational, and it

cannot be purely rational the transmission cannot be purely
rational! Why? Why? Precisely because the transmission of
philosophy includes the philosopher! The ideal of philosophy is,
certainly, rational the philosopher is not a king, or a priest, or a
God, and so what is said is exposed to discussion, and what is
said is true only through discussion, through argument, through
proof but the transmission of all that, and so the very cause of
entering into philosophy, into a philosophy, is not completely
reducible to the rational discourse, because of this surplus
element in the transmission, and in the discussion, which is the
presence of the philosopher, his voice, and so on.
Certainly the most paradoxical case concerning the presence of
the philosopher is Derrida. The work of Derrida is at least in
part a polemic against presence and for writing, and so it is a
polemic for the written against the voice. There are, Derrida has
said, illusions of presence in the voice, in the physical
expression, and so true transmission is writing. But Derrida was
constantly present, he was more present than any other
philosopher he was everywhere! He spoke for hours and hours
and hours and hours and, finally, the oral work of Derrida is
much more important than his written work. I dont say this
against him, not at all I say it only as a proof, a proof that we
cannot escape the fact of the physical existence of the
philosopher. And this fact is why after the death of some
philosopher something continues.
In Ancient Greece, in fact, immediately after the Greek sequence
of philosophy there were many books on the lives of the great
philosophers it was, practically, a new genre of literature in
Greece. And these books, very often, were novels, pure
inventions, but they were inventions concerning precisely the
physical presence of the philosophers, the lives of the
philosophers. And, of course, we still have this today. And it is a

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symptom of this surplus. It is a symptom of the idea that

something was said by the philosopher, but is not in the books,
that the philosopher said something and that this something is
the real key, the real secret of the philosopher. But why does all
of this exist? Because there really is something in the
transmission of philosophy something necessary for the
transmission of philosophy which cannot be purely rational,
something which is somehow effective, somehow material,
physical, something like love for another.
And why? Because at the core of philosophy is a subjective
transformation and it is as rational as possible. There is, at the
core of philosophy, a rational transformation, but a rational
transformation by means that are not completely rational, which
cannot be completely rational. And again, why? Because
subjectivity as such is not purely rational, is not reducible to
something purely rational the rational, the universal, are a part
of human being, but not the totality. And so, naturally, if you
want a subjective transformation, there is a part of that
transformation which is not reducible to rational arguments.
Finally, philosophy the goal of which is not only rational
conviction, but a new desire also must have a presence, and
not only the presence of a book. Philosophy is not reducible to
books! Philosophy is not reducible to books. Books are
important, absolutely, but even books are not reducible to books!
To read a book of philosophy is not reducible to the arguments
of the book. There must be love there must be something of
love at the very beginning of philosophy. There is some
presence there, maybe, something like a spiritual presence.
Okay, we stop.

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2.2 Lecture IV



I have supposed a geographical, historical and human place
where, by chance, the five conditions of philosophy existed: we
had in this place the form of democracy not real political
democracy and so the possibility of free discussion, we had
mathematics, and so the possibility of a proof, we had also the
possibility of the impurity of languages, a sense of universality
not in the political sense, but in the sense that there is something
in every human being which is its generic part, and that
philosophy is addressed to this part of every subject, and so, that
truth is beyond every particularity and, finally, we had the
philosopher, his presence. All that existed in a place, a small
place, in fact, and for a short time. The existence of philosophy
is a possibility, and this possibility was for the first time realized
in a small part of the Greek empire. This small place, naturally,
was Athens, and this short time was three or four centuries
which is not a great time with two fundamental centuries,
before the birth of Christ. And this is really the beginning of
what we can name philosophy properly.
Naturally, we can name philosophy some other things: its a
possibility, for example, to name philosophy some Oriental
wisdom, or some Native American mythologies, and so on. But
if we take philosophy in a limited and precise sense, then it came
to existence in a small place and short time and in this place
and at this time philosophy was born. And after this there is no
real continuity of philosophy, but only something like a series of
great historical moments of the existence of philosophy.
Between these moments of philosophys existence there has

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been something else, something we can name analytic

philosophy or scholasticism.
I name scholasticism precisely the idea that philosophy is a set
of good problems and good answers. And there is something like
that during the entirety of the Medieval sequence, and there is
something like that today with analytic philosophy. Analytic
philosophy is clearly scholastic. And scholasticism is something,
it is not nothing at all: scholasticism is really something which
exists, something which proposes some problems, studies some
histories and some ideas, and, finally, some answers too, and so
on. I only wish to say that, for me, it is not philosophy proper,
but something else, something else something which comes
from philosophy but which is not exactly philosophy because it
is a reduction of philosophy to the discourse of the university. It
is not philosophy but it is not nothing. And scholasticism, in
the positive sense, is a good name: it is a set of problems and
answers, collectively discussed, within the world as it is, and in
some closed place during the Medieval sequence it was in the
monastery, and it was an activity of religious people, and today
it is an activity in the university, in the closure of the university.
There are, in fact, many similarities between scholasticism
during the in the Medieval sequence and analytic philosophy in
the university today.
We have academic philosophy every time that there is
something homologous to the misunderstanding of Greek
philosophy during the Roman Empire. Its the same case,
always! In each case there is something which has the
appearance of philosophy but which is not really philosophy.
And why? Precisely because the conditions, the true conditions
of philosophy, are absent, are lacking. As you know, for
example, during the sequence of the Roman Empire there is
practically no mathematics at all. There was democracy not in
the political sense, but in the sense of the possibility of free

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discussion but it was quickly destroyed. In all, during this time

the conditions of philosophy were not there, and so philosophy
was not there! But, and maybe more importantly, there was a
sort of repetition of Greek philosophy but without a true
understanding the genius of philosophy itself. It is very
interesting, for example, to read the Roman translations of some
books of Greek philosophy for example Ciceros translations
of Plato because, if you read them, you will not recognize the
translations, the translations are something else, something very
much outside of the significance of Greek philosophy.
The history of philosophy, then, is made of ruptures, of
discontinuities there is no continuity but only great historical
moments of the history of philosophy. For example, we have the
great metaphysicians of the 17th century: Descartes,
Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz. This century was certainly a
century of great philosophical creation, and the central concept
of this sort of metaphysics was God. Certainly it was not a
homologous century, philosophically there were many
differences, many disagreements and so on, and, finally, many
different but essential proofs of His existence but, the central
concept was God, and the central problem was His existence.
But this God, as Quentin Meillassoux has explained this God
of 17th century metaphysics was not at all the religious God. In
fact, at this time there was something like a transformation of the
religious God into something else, into, precisely, the
metaphysical God and the two are absolutely not the same.
Naturally the metaphysicians claimed that it was the same God
they could not say that it was not at all the same God, that was,
of course, too dangerous but they are not at all the same, the
metaphysical God is not the religious God. And so, when Pascal
said that the God of Descartes is not the true God, he was right
its true, the God of Descartes was not the religious God, and It
was not Pascals God, certainly not. The God of Pascal was,
really, the Christian God, and the God of Descartes was an

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abstraction, a mathematical abstraction. This is why Descartes

can give a proof of Gods existence. The existence of the
Christian God, the religious God, cannot be proved, because it is
a revelation its a revelation Christ, the Father and the Son
and so on, we cannot have a demonstration of all that, its not
possible.
The 17th century the century of the great metaphysicians is
the creation of the conceptual vision of monotheism, of the
vision of God as a concept, of the transformation of God from an
existence to a concept, and it is why we have a return to
existence by proof. But if you must give a proof of the existence
of God you are not in religion, naturally. In religion there is
something else first, which is precisely the existence of God and
not the existence of the concept of God. With existence by proof
we are in philosophy, we are really in philosophy: its not the
God of religion, its not the sacred God, its not the God who
speaks, its really a philosophical construction, a human
construction, by the means of rational concepts which propose a
definition of God, and, after that, a proof of the existence of
God, no different then the construction of a mathematical proof.
The God of 17th century metaphysics is, finally, a mathematical
God! This is the case for Descartes, its the case for Leibniz, and
its the case for Spinoza. The case for Malebranche is more
complex, because... Malebranche is an extraordinary thinker
because Malebranche wanted to prove the Christian God, he
wanted to give a proof of the existence of the Christian God, of
the necessity of the Redemption by Christ and so on.
Malebranche is a baroque philosopher because the goal of
Malebranche is to transform Christianity itself into a philosophy,
and not to efface, not to injure, but to make it into a philosophy.
Its a complete failure, naturally, but its interesting, very
interesting. This was the first great moment of the history of
philosophy.

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The second great moment of philosophy after Ancient Greece

and the 17th century is German Idealism, with Kant, Hegel,
Fichte, and Schelling. This time the most important concept is
the subject. We have moved from God to the subject and this,
in fact, was the great revolution of Kant. Later, Kant too would
return to God, but He was in a secondary position. For Kant the
most important concept is the subject, absolutely, and its the
same across all of German Idealism at the beginning of the 19th
century.
After this there is the very international moment before the First
World War. At its beginning at the end of the 19th century is
Nietzsche, but after that we have Husserl in Germany, Bergson
in France, Russell in England and so on. This moment too is
very interesting, very creative, but also very international. And,
on the whole, we can say that the most important concept of this
moment is life. And so we have across these moments a
movement from God, to subject, to life.
And, finally this is, naturally, not the complete history of
philosophy, but only a sequence of its greatest moments we
have what I name the French moment of the second part of the
last century. This moment extends if you permit me another
narcissistic example from Sartre to me. Over its course we
have Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Lacan, Althusser, Foucault,
Lyotard, Derrida, Deleuze, Ranciere, and so on, for example,
me. And in this moment I think we have an attempt to
construct a philosophy with structure, subject and life but
without God, without God.... And, certainly, the most difficult
problem of this sequence is to realize some synthesis between
structure and subject between structure and subject, yes,
something like that.... The idea is that there is something
subjective, something not completely reducible to structure, and
the task is to define how in this small interval something like
freedom is possible. Naturally, if the subject is purely reducible

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to structure, then we have no place for freedom. In the

philosophy of consciousness like in Sartre, for example we
have no place for freedom because the subject itself is freedom.
On the other hand, if the subject is a structure like it clearly is
across practically all of this sequence then there is no clear
place for freedom. And so, the place of freedom is just between
subject and structure.
All of these examples across their differences show us that
the fundamental problem of philosophy is universality. We can
even say that philosophy is universal by itself! The goal of
philosophy is to open the possibility of something universal, of
something that is really for every subject. And, as we have seen,
the relation between truth and subject is precisely the attempt to
realize that sort of universal proposition. But this process the
construction of this universality is always situated, completely
situated in a concrete world, in a space and time. These
constructions are not only situated in concrete worlds very
different from one another, but they are generally very short
sequences in history, they are not at all some great permanent
constructions, which continue indefinitely. They are moments,
only moments of history. And why? Because this universality is
conditioned there are conditions for the possibility of
philosophy and so philosophy has the possibility of coming
into existence only in very specific conditions of place and time.
And so we must ask: how is something like that possible? Or:
how we can explain that something universal is precisely inside
some very particular conditions?
As you know that there is today a judgment that, finally,
philosophy is something like an ideology of the western world,
from Greece to today from Greece to the United States and
not at all a universal disposition of humanity as such. The
argument is simple: how can we speak of universality when it is
clear that the creation, development and existence of philosophy

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is absolutely linked to small places and short times in the general

history of humanity? And if we say that there is no philosophy in
old China, no philosophy in pre-colonial Africa, and so on, and
maybe that, finally, the places of philosophy have only been
Greece, France, Germany three small countries in the world as
such how we can we maintain the idea that philosophy is really
of universal in nature? Its a great problem. And what is the
philosophical translation of this problem? Its an empirical
argument, after all, that the process of philosophy is linked to
very particular conditions. There are two possibilities.
The first possibility is to maintain that philosophy, in fact, exists
as something particular and is a part of our situation you can
be absolutely relativist, its a possibility. And to the question
what is philosophy you would then give the answer:
philosophy is a part of the ideological existence of the western
world and nothing else. It is a possibility, certainly. And if you
are a relativist you could maintain that all that exists are cultures,
that all that exists is particularity, and so you could ask: why
would philosophy be an exception to that? The first possibility is
precisely to maintain that philosophy is not an exception, that
philosophy cannot pretend to be an exception, that there is no
exception that everything of intellectual nature, all ideas, in
fact, are ideological, that they are all relative, particular, and so
on. Finally, the first possibility is to say that philosophy cannot
escape the judgment that everything is explained by
particularity, and, naturally, that everything pertains only to
cultural particularities. This is the first possibility.
The second possibility is to conceptually transform the problem
and to explain to propose, in fact a new conception of
universality and truth. After this, you would then have to explain
how it is that even if a truth is constructed within a very specific
context, this is not, by itself, an objection to the universality of
that truth. And so, the second possibility demands that you

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explain not only how the conception of the universality of truth

is possible in spite the particularity of its existence, but how its
possible from within the particularity of its existence. For this
solution we have to propose philosophically that the idea of
universality, or more generally a truth, is by necessity in
relationship with a theory of the concrete world, in which that
sort of truth is constructed or appears, but is irreducible to it.
And this, in essence, is precisely my problem: my philosophical
problem is to solve the question of truth, universality and so on,
without the easy solution of pure relativism, which consists in
the suppression of the problem. The relativist solution is the easy
solution we simply suppress the problem and the other
possibility is, certainly, more difficult.
I have attempted to solve this problem by a complete
transformation of the relationship between universality and
particularity. My first affirmation is to affirm that all that exists
is particularity, and so a truth if something like truth exists is
in a particular world and is constructed with particular material.
Mathematical truths, for example, appear in Greece for very
material and explicit reasons, and there is a relationship, an
explicit relationship, between the universality of mathematics
and the process of the construction of mathematics in Greece.
We must admit this, but we must also affirm and prove that this
particular process can have some results which are beyond the
process itself, results which can be understood from a
completely different point of view, from another world, in fact.
There are many example of this: for instance, the demonstrations
of Euclid can be understood today, even though we are in a
completely different context than Euclid we can read his
demonstrations, and we can understand that they are proofs, and,
finally, we agree with these proofs, with the result of these
proofs. And how? How is this possible, if it was written by some
Greek many centuries ago? Our task, then, is to explain this
strange fact: we must explain how its possible that something

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has been written, produced, understood and so on, in a

completely concrete context without being reduced to the
context.
The concept that I propose is immanent exception: in some
circumstances, under some concrete and particular conditions, it
is possible that a completely concrete process in a determinate
world produces a result which, in part, is not reducible to the
context and the process itself, and which is, in some sense, an
exception to this context, to the laws of this context. But its not
an exception in the sense of the difference between God and
nature, or an exception in the sense of the difference between the
intelligible world and the sensible world, like in Plato first in
Plato, but after that as well no, its an immanent exception: all
the material of the construction of a truth is inside the particular
world, but the result which, materially, is absolutely of this
world is some new truth which can be understood from
another word, from a world which is completely different. And
so this exception is not an exception that comes from outside,
but an immanent exception concerning something inside the
world itself.
We must understand that a truth is situated, that it is not in
another world a truth is not God... it is not something from
some other divine world. A truth is a construction, a human
construction, truth is a human construction there is no other
world but the world of humanity. But this human construction
can be understood from another point... not always, but it is a
possibility universality is a possibility. We return to our
beginning: universality is a possibility, it is the possibility of
being understood from another world, and not only in the world
of its construction.
During long sequences nobody understands a truth. Its a fact,
for example, for the last inventions in the mathematical field by
Archimedes: during many centuries nobody understood anything

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of what he meant, and then, finally, at the end of the 16th

century, there is an understanding of that sort of truth it was
absolutely obscure during many centuries. And so, we have
something like a resurrection of a truth: the truth was dead, in
some sense, it was reduced to the context of its birth and it was
dead, but it can be resurrected, and this resurrection is its
universality. Universality, finally, is the constant possibility that
if something is a truth, then there can be a resurrection of this
truth in another world. And its not miracle, but precisely a
change of circumstances, and with new circumstances that sort
of truth can finally be understood again.
All that must be explained, but first I can give some examples of
what I name a truth they are only examples because you
must first be able to recognize the nature of that sort of
exception. The examples, naturally, are very arbitrary. For
example, new forms of thinking war and strategy in old China
I commence with old China because I have said that there was
no philosophy in old China, and so, I want to absolutely affirm
that there were some truths in old China. We must recognize that
there is no symmetry here: we can have truths without
philosophy, but it is impossible to have philosophy without first
having some truths. In fact this is the more common situation
we have truths but no philosophy because philosophy is
precisely the construction of the concept of Truth out of artistic
truths, political truths, scientific truths, and so on. And so we can
also absolutely confirm that truths are a problem and
construction of art, science, politics, and so on, and not of
philosophy whose construction is Truth. With Sun Tzu,
certainly, there was the creation within the context of old
China of a conception of strategy and the thinking of war
which is absolutely of universal nature, because we have
something like that in Clausewitz another great thinker of war
and after that Mao Zedong and so on. And we know, we can
absolutely confirm, that Sun Tzu's conceptions explained

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many, many centuries before us of what is a strategy, and, in

fact, of what is a defensive strategy in war and the strength of
defensive war is a truth from within a completely different
world than his. Another example is mathematics in Greece:
geometry and arithmetic. Another is the new form of love
proposed in Medieval Japan. The testimony of this is the
extraordinary novel The Tale of Genji probably the most
beautiful novel ever written concerning the question of love. Its
extraordinary. And it is a novel of a woman Murasaki Shikibu
in Medieval Japan. And this book, in fact, is a proof not only
of the creation of an amorous truth in Japan, but also a proof of
an artistic creation the novel in Japan many, many years
before its resurrection in the western world. This book is as
profound, as sublime, and as beautiful as Proust there is, in
fact, something near Proust in the novel of Murasaki Shikibu.
Another example is the new physics in Italy with Galileo Galilei.
Another is the new forms of sculpture in pre-colonial Africa. As
you know, there has been a resurrection of African sculpture in
the field of modern art. In fact, sculpture after Picasso, is
completely fascinated by African sculpture, which is the creation
of many centuries ago, and in a world which was completely
different than ours. And so, this resurrection of pre-colonial
African sculpture is a very powerful example of what is a
resurrection: the context of contemporary art, in France, in
Spain, in the United States, after during and after the First
World War is completely different than the world where these
great African sculptures were made centuries before
colonization, and yet a great part of contemporary sculpture is
directly a resurrection of pre-colonial African sculpture. There is
also the new form of cinema in the United States, before and just
after the First World War, with Chaplin, Griffith, and so on.
Another example is contemporary new music in Austria at the
end of the 19th century, with Schoenberg, Webern and Berg and
so on. New painting in France at the end of the 19th century too,

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with Cezanne, Picasso and Braque. There are many more

examples, but we will stop here.
All of these are what I name truths: they are all exceptions to
reducibility to context, they are all creations which give the
possibility of resurrection in another world. Naturally and this
we all know very well the great majority of, for example,
artistic creations disappear and cannot be truly resurrected. But
there exist exceptions, which are universal precisely because it is
possible that one day, in some other world completely different,
and sometimes many, many centuries later, we can have an
understanding, a completely new understanding because we
would be in a different context, a different world of this
creation, and we can continue this creation. This is the history of
universality. Universality is not at all a matter of general
propositions or something like that, it is not a question of
abstraction. Universality is creation, human creation, it is human
creation and human resurrection not of something general, but of
something singular. Universality is the character of some
creation that comes to constitute a part of the history of
humanity. If I can use a technical term: it is a question of
subtraction and not abstraction.
That sort of universality exists, its not a problem we do not
have to discuss that fact, the fact exists. We have many, many
examples of something like that intellectual creations, artistic
and political creations, which have the strength, the possible
strength to be exposed to resurrection and so we can say that
the universality of truth, the possible universality of what I name
truth, is not a possibility but a fact. The question of truth, in fact
and this is my conviction is not an abstract question, but an
empirical one.
The most impressive fact is, certainly, the paintings found in the
Chauvet-Pont-dArc cave, in France: these paintings are thirtythousand years old, and they are magnificent paintings, and they

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can be compared and yet we find the resurrection of this

ancient paintings in Picasso. I gave this example at the
beginning of my book Logics of Worlds because its
something truly fascinating. We cannot imagine what the life of
man was thirty-thousand years before us its complete
speculation, we can know very little about it and yet we see
this painting and we have an emotion, an effect, an
understanding of all that of the beauty, the strength, the
signification of that sort of painting and that, finally, is a proof
of the existence of human being, not of cultures, but of the
generic part of cultures. Maybe even our understanding is not
the same as those men and women of whose lives we can
know nothing but there are these paintings, and there is
resurrection, and we affirm it the moment we see the paintings. I
affirm that the existence of creativity, of truths, by humanity is a
fact, and not a speculation it is not a pure and abstract
possibility, but a fact.
Philosophy comes after. But philosophy must affirm that the fact
of the universality of truths is rational philosophy must explain
this fact, it must be exposed, this is a task of philosophy. The
task of philosophy is not to create universal truths which is a
fact of human being but to explain this fact, and to give the
lesson of this fact. And this lesson is very important, because if
something like a generic part of humanity exists we must display
this part, and we must organize our life by this part.
And so philosophy is not only something abstract, but also
something that very concretely can give an orientation to life.
We return, finally, again to the beginning: philosophy confirms
that true life means that we are not only inside the world as it is,
philosophy is what corrupts the corrupted vision that the world
as it is is all that there is. Life to live is not at all always the
same. There is an infinite difference between a life which, from
beginning to end, is only inside the world as it is inside some

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particular culture and a life which while within a particular

culture is also in relationship to something else, not something
like a transcendental world, but to something of the infinite
creative possibility of human being, a life in relationship to
something universal, something true, of something that is
beyond the world as it is. True life is precisely a question of
creating, of helping to create something that exists for everyone,
today, here, but also in completely other worlds in time and in
space.
There are two conceptions of what is a human life, and there is a
fight between these two conceptions. The first conception is that
human life can be reduced to the question of what is our interest
in the world as it is. This is the common conception, the normal
conception. But there is another possibility: human life is,
certainly, something like that we have to take care of our
interests in the world as it is but with the possibility of
something else. But I repeat this possibility is not only a
possibility, its also a fact, because something like that exists it
is a possibility only in the sense that it is a possibility for you to
participate, that it exists is a fact. Some men have organized
their lives to create something of universal nature, and humanity
in its generic sense is on this side, it is on the side of
universal creations, on the side of truths. And so, probably, we
too must give our proper contribution to these aspects of the life
of humanity. And so we must in this sense, in this sense
introduce something of universal nature into our common life,
and into our collective life. Philosophy, ultimately, is always a
question of accepting that there is something irreducible to our
proper interests in the present, and, in fact, something greater.
I think that philosophy is the possibility to rationally explain all
of that, and it is why the anthropological nature of philosophy is
so complex. If philosophy recognizes the existence of universal
truths and if philosophy explains why universal truths exist

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they exist, but philosophy must explain how this is possible, it

must explain why such existence is possible if philosophy is
something like that, then philosophy itself is not reducible to its
context, because the very existence of philosophy is completely
dependent on the existence of universal truths, and the
resurrection of these truths. Philosophy exists not because
society, ordinary life, ordinary language, private interests and so
on exist. No, philosophy exists because there exist things like the
novel of Murasaki Shikibu, things like Greek mathematics,
African sculpture and so on. That is the world of philosophy: the
world of philosophy is not reducible to the world as it is, to the
concrete and our proper interests in it the world of philosophy
is the world of truths, the world of philosophy is the always of
time!
The world of philosophy is certainly a practical world, but the
true world of philosophy is the world of truths, a world the
destination of which is beyond our proper interests and beyond
the limits of our particular world. And it is not at all the same to
be merely a citizen of the world and to be a citizen of humanity.
And philosophy creates something like that, it creates the
possibility of being a citizen of humanity, which is not in
contradiction with our proper existence as a citizen of some
country, or some culture, but which introduces some exception
into particularity.
We are a concrete existence in a determined world, and so we
cannot become a pure universality that is absolutely
impossible. But we can introduce into our lives some great
moments of exception, where we experiment with the possibility
of being a citizen of humanity, on the basis of our proper world
and our proper culture. We experience something like that when,
in our lives, in our common lives, something happens which
cannot be reduced to our ordinary existence it can be a

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magnificent book, a painting, a political event, a love... many

things, after all.
We have the chance to participate in the creation and
resurrection of truths, this chance exits in life itself, and its a
pity to refuse this chance. Thank you.

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Day Three

3. Day Three

3.1 Lecture V

Over these days we will move across three questions, three
particular questions: the first was the anthropological nature of
philosophy, the second is the dialectical nature of philosophy,
and the third will be the paradoxical relationship between
philosophy and time. This morning we have come to the second
question, the question of the dialectical nature of philosophy.
We have said that the dialectical nature of philosophy is opposed
to the idea of analytic philosophy. More generally, this
opposition is also the opposition between two conceptions of
philosophy: the first is that philosophy, finally, is a knowledge, a
knowledge like any other, from mathematics to the human
sciences, and the second is that philosophy is in relationship
with knowledge. Naturally, philosophy is not outside the
question of knowledge. It is possible to say that in classical
philosophy, for example, the question of knowledge is the most
important question of philosophy we know something, we can
know something, or, finally, we know nothing. Certainly all of
that is a great and very old discussion inside of philosophy. We
cannot say that philosophy is without relationship to knowledge
that would be completely absurd but we must ask the
question of whether philosophy itself is a knowledge.
As we have seen, when there exists the question of something
the question of what it is this question, generally speaking, is
not inside that something itself. For example, the question 'what
is mathematics' is not a mathematical question its a
philosophical question, in fact. And we have also said that if the

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question 'what is philosophy' is inside philosophy, then this is a

sort of exception it is an exception. This is because the
question 'what is this thing', 'what is this other thing', and so on
this questions of 'what is', in general is always a philosophical
question. Its the question of the very essence of something:
what is this something really, what is the sense of this
something, of mathematics, but also of nature, of God, and so
on. And so, if the question 'what is' is a philosophical question
which we can apply to philosophy itself if the question of
'what is philosophy' is inside philosophy it is, probably,
because philosophy is not exactly a knowledge.
A knowledge is determined by its object a knowledge is
always the knowledge of something, after all. And, naturally, as
a knowledge of something its not reducible to the something
itself, because there is necessarily a distance between the
knowledge of something and the existence of that something. A
knowledge, then, is first the question of its object: what is the
object of science, what is the object of physics, what is the
object of history, and so on. You understand, then, that it is not
possible to say that the question 'what is philosophy' is a
question of the knowledge of an object, precisely because
philosophy is not an object. And so, if we have a field where the
question of itself exists inside of it, this field is not a field of the
relationship between knowledge and the thing its different, its
absolutely different.
Concerning this problem we have a very classical tradition,
which says that philosophy is not a knowledge, because,
precisely, philosophy is a question the very essence of the
existence of philosophy is the existence of some particular
questions. This is a very classic affirmation. And, at the
beginning of a class of philosophy, the professor will say that
philosophy is an infinite question, in fact, that its not at all some
answer but precisely a question. We shall see that this definition

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is not really precise: philosophy is a question, okay, but there are

many fields of human activity where some questions exist and
which are not reducible to philosophy. And so, if philosophy is a
field of questions it is a field of singular questions and not of
questions in general. But, finally, what we must first understand
is that philosophy is not an object, and so the fact that 'what is
philosophy' is a question inside philosophy means that
philosophy cannot be reduced to a knowledge of philosophy, of
the history of philosophy. Certainly, philosophy is a question of
itself what is philosophy but its not reducible to a
knowledge of itself.
The dialectical nature of philosophy means that philosophy is
not a positive knowledge, it is not a science philosophy is
something without any object. This conception of philosophy is
in a precise opposition to the idea of analytic philosophy,
because if we assume the analytical vision of philosophy we
propose, in fact, that philosophy is a knowledge, a knowledge
with some definite object. For example, it could be the
knowledge of language, and so it would have the questions of
meaning, of what is a sentence with a meaning, or what is
sentence which is non-sense, all of which would constitute a
possible field for a specific knowledge, and this knowledge
would be philosophy.
For the moment, then, the dialectical vision of philosophy is
something purely negative: philosophy is not a knowledge. From
this point we can go to the famous affirmation of Socrates: 'the
only thing that I know is that I know nothing'... the only thing
that I know is that I know nothing.... This is, precisely, a clear
affirmation that philosophy is not a knowledge 'I know
nothing'. But there is, here, a dialectical ambiguity, because
Socrates is also saying that he knows something, he knows
something.... What is that sort of thing? Precisely nothing. So, in
fact, the sentence of Socrates proposes that at one point

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something is the same as nothing. Why? Because we can know

this 'nothing', and, in fact, it is the unique thing which we can
know. We have, here, a sort of equation, a primitive equation
and not only in my vision of Socrates, but across the entire great
history of philosophy which is the equivalence of thing and
nothing. In philosophy, then, there is a proposition of the
possibility of an absolutely paradoxical equivalence, the
equivalence of thing and nothing.
For philosophy there is the possibility to examine this sort of
equivalence. But what sort of question is this? This question is
the question of negativity, it is the question of negation, of the
function of nothingness, and so on. What Socrates proposed
when he made the equation between thing and nothing, when he
said that he could know nothing is, maybe, that if philosophy is
not a knowledge, its precisely because the object of philosophy
is not a thing it is not a country, it is not nature, it is not some
physical object, and so on. The great question of philosophy is
the question of nothingness, the question of the existence of
negativity. And this is why, form the very beginning, there is a
close relationship between the dialectical nature of philosophy
and the question of negativity. Philosophy is the question of
negativity in all of its aspects the question of the relation
between thing and nothing, the question of the existence of
nothingness, of the paradoxical existence of nothingness.
There is something like a hidden affirmation in philosophy
across the entire history of philosophy which comes out of the
question of negativity: is it possible to know something which
does not exist is it possible to think something which does not
exist.... And so, why is philosophy not a knowledge? Because
the answer to this question is certainly not that there is a
knowledge of something that does not exist if something exists,
then there is a specific knowledge of that sort of thing, whatever
it may be some natural object, some psychological state, and

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so on. But if something does not exist, then the relationship to

this non-existence cannot be a knowledge, because knowledge is
a knowledge of an object, and something which does not exist is
not an object.
And so the existence of philosophy is always also the question
of the possibility of something that does not exist, something
that does not exist as an object, as an object of the world. And so
we can say that philosophy is entirely based on a difference a
very obscure and complex difference between to be and to
exist. This question of the distance between to be and to exist is
also, naturally, the question of the distance between thing and
nothing, the distance between being and nothingness, and so on.
I say all of this in order to give you an idea of the dialectical
nature of philosophy: the dialectical nature of philosophy is to
not be reducible to the question of the knowledge of an object,
but to introduce the possibility of the being of something which
does not exist, which is not in the form of an object and which
can be affirmed in its presence, in its being, outside the form of
knowledge of an object.
We can name positivism which is a sort of anti-philosophical
philosophy the affirmation that there exists only knowledge,
and that the idea of a distance between to be and to exist, or the
thesis that there is something which is equivalent to nothing, are
absurd. Positivism affirms that the only things which exist are
those which are in the form of objectivity, and that our
relationship to objectivity is knowledge. Finally, it is the
affirmation that the true form of knowledge is science. This is
the definition, the clear definition, of positivism. The positivist
proposes that all that exists is objectively existent that this is
the only form of being, and that the only form of positive
relationship to objectivity is knowledge, and, finally, science. So
the positivist conclusion is: either philosophy is a science or
philosophy does not exist, and philosophy is imaginary, illusion

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and so on, a pure faith, a pure faith without any objective value.
In fact, positivism is in my conviction the only consistent
form of the analytic point of view if you are in the analytic
point of view you must, finally, be a positivist. If you are a
positivist, you must say that in the form of knowledge we have
our only rational relationship to what exits, and you must affirm
because its the case in the contemporary world that the real
and efficient form of knowledge is science. And so, if we were
positivists we would have to say that the ideal of philosophy is
science philosophy must become a science. And, if this is not
the case if philosophy does not reach the ideal of science
then philosophy must be criticized, and, finally, it must be
suppressed. True positivism affirms the necessity to restitute all
forms of knowledge to the field of science, and philosophy
dialectical philosophy and precisely metaphysics, is something
like a dream, something like a dream, an imaginary dream.
Naturally, the problem with that sort of assertion is of
philosophical nature: positivism is, finally, itself not a science.
And why is it not a science? It is not a science because there
does not exist a science of sciences, there does not exists a
science which says what is science. And so, when the positivist
says 'all that really exists is science, and we must transform
philosophy into the form of science,' he says it not from a
position inside of a science, but from a position that is, finally,
inside philosophy. And so, we can reply to the positivist with a
proper question: from what position can you say that that sort of
process is a science and that sort of process is not a science? If
all knowledge is science, then knowledge of what is a science
must also be a science. And so, the positivist, in fact, affirms the
existence of a science of sciences. But a science of sciences does
not really exist, or, if something like that exists then it is
philosophy. And why? Because to affirm something as the
science of sciences we would have to discern what is the real
being of science and not only the existence of science.

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We know that there exists mathematics, biology, physics, and so

on, history, scientific history maybe, but when we say that all
that is of scientific nature we are saying something concerning
all sciences and so something which is not inside any particular
science a science does not propose why it is a science. When
we say that an existing science is a science we say it not from
the strict point of view of their existence but from the point of
view of their being we say: they are sciences. What exists is
not the science, but many sciences, many different sciences. And
so when we say that there is something which is common across
all sciences, what authorizes us to say that all of this is of
scientific nature is not a question of existence, but precisely a
question of being. You understand? And so the distance between
to be and to exist is in fact assumed by the positivist. And if the
question of the distance between to be and to exist is of
dialectical nature, then its impossible to reduce all that the
positivist proposes, all that he affirms including the position
from which he speaks to the analytic point of view. Therefore,
there is something dialectical in positivism itself.
All that is a proof of what? All that is a proof that, ultimately,
positivists assume a part of philosophy. Strict positivism
assumes and it must assume a part of philosophy, or, if you
want, the analytical vision must assume a part of the dialectical
vision. And when is there such a necessity? Precisely when the
analytical point of view affirms the analytical point of view,
because the dialectical position is a necessity precisely when you
are in the analytical point of view. If you are a positivist, then
when you make your affirmation when you say that there is
nothing other than what exists objectively, than what can be
known you also affirm something else you also say
something else. In fact, when you say that the analytical point of
view is true and the dialectical point of view is false, you are
saying something which is in the dialectical point of view, by
necessity, by necessity! Why? Because you assume the

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distinction between to be and to exist, you assume it because you

assume a position from which you can affirm what is the being
of science, the being of science as it is common across all
sciences.
And so, the opposition between the dialectical point of view and
the analytical point of view is dialectical. When the analytical
philosopher criticizes the dialectical philosopher he is inside the
dialectical point of view, he cannot be inside a purely analytical
point of view. In the purely analytical point of view you cannot
be in the form of negativity, and so, if you say something
negative you are in contradiction with yourself. If you say 'the
dialectical point of view is not true', the 'not true', naturally,
assumes the distinction between what exists and what is, because
the dialectical point of view exists. And so, if you say that its
false, you are saying something concerning not its existence but
its being, naturally, because we cannot say that the dialectical
point of view does not exists, its exists. When the positivist says
that the dialectical position exists but is false, he is saying
something that is not reducible to the question of existence or
non-existence to be and to exist are not on the same level. This
is a proof, its a proof, its a dialectical proof, but its a proof. Its
a proof that positivism exists but that it assumes by necessity
a small part of dialecticity as a point of view, not as a pure
existence, naturally. So, when the analytical point of view
criticizes the dialectical point of view it necessarily assumes
something of the dialectical point of view itself.
This is, again, why the question of negativity is always at the
very beginning of philosophy itself.
We have two fundamental examples of this beginning in
negativity: Socrates and Plato, and Descartes. Socrates as we
have said announced the only thing that I know is that I know
nothing. This affirmation places the question of negativity into
the first sentence of philosophy because he proposed an

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equivalence, a possible equivalence, of thing and nothing the

only thing that I know is that I know nothing. And so, finally,
the first proposition of Socrates at the very beginning of
philosophy, as the very beginning of philosophy is that there is
a possible equivalence of thing and nothing. And to say that
there is a possible equivalence of thing and nothing, is to say
that something can be and not exist. We have, here, a very
profound and original point you understand. This question of
the distance between to be and to exist is really the
philosophical question.
There are, naturally, many ways to say that there exists this
distance. But to say that there is this distance between to be
and to exist finally, is purely abstract, and says nothing of the
distance itself. And so, when we affirm this distance, we affirm
it, in fact, as a question, as a question. And, finally, this is
why throughout its history philosophy is in a relationship to
ontology.
If we name ontology.... Ontology is a word, which like many,
many others, was created by Aristotle Aristotle the man of
classifications, the great creator of the discourse of the
university, who invented many words of traditional, classical
and modern philosophy. So, what is ontology? Ontology as
you know is the science of being as such, the science of being
qua being. It is the proposition of a complete science of the verb
to be, the complete science of the signification of this verb.
There is always a part of ontology in any philosophy, and this
part is precisely the possibility of giving signification to the
distance between to be and to exist. Ontology affirms that to be
is not reducible to what we know to exist as an object in the
world. And so, the question of the distance between to be and to
exist is of ontological nature in the sense of Aristotle and it is
absolutely at the very core of the dialectical vision. And this
distance, this irreducibility, is always at the beginning of a

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philosophy we find it at the beginning of Plato, as the

beginning of Descartes, at the beginning of Kant and Heidegger
also, at the beginning of Deleuze, and me, it is the same in each
case.
At the beginning we cannot say anything concerning being as
such, because its not a knowledge. And, in fact, when
something is not a knowledge you cannot continue by
transmission. In some sense, this point is difficult and obscure. If
something is a knowledge then you can have a teacher, a
professor, who transmits this knowledge which you don't then
have, and this knowledge knowledge itself doesn't really begin
then continues by successive transmissions. So what is
transmission? Transmission is always a transmission of the state
of a knowledge, the contemporary state of a knowledge. Maybe
you for didactic reasons begin at a sort of beginning, but,
finally, the transmission is the transmission of a knowledge as
such, and knowledge itself does not begin, it continues. And so a
transmission of knowledge is, in fact, always in the form of
repetition or continuation it is a continuity of knowledge
because knowledge is cumulative. There is, for example, Greek
mathematics and, after that, you continue that knowledge.
But why is it that we can continue a knowledge? It is because a
knowledge has a precise object, and so you have a field, you
have an objectivity, and in relationship to this objectivity you
have successive progressions in that knowledge. And so the
ideology, the positivist ideology of progress, of continuity and
so on, is absolutely in relationship to the definition of knowledge
itself. And so, knowledge continues, history continues, physics
continues, and so on. And we can speak of progress, of a
continuing progress of some knowledge, and we can speak of
the transmission of the contemporary state of problems and
solutions in an objective field of knowledge.
Philosophy, on the other hand if philosophy is not a knowledge

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cannot properly continue. Philosophy always begins.

Philosophy always begins, and philosophy always begins by
assuming its past, it assumes its past as a sort of succession of
beginnings Plato begins, Aristotle begins, Descartes begins,
Kant and others begin. Philosophy is always a beginning of
philosophy, with a past, but a past composed of beginnings. And
so the question of the beginning is a very important question in
philosophy.
A philosophy begins, but how can we begin a philosophy? What
is a beginning of a philosophy? What is the beginning of
Socrates, the beginning of Plato, if they dont continue
something? What is the beginning if a philosopher does not
begin by a continuation, if he does not say okay we know this,
we know that, and so on, and we will continue this knowledge,
and we will come to know something else? This is never the
case. In fact, if you read a book of philosophy it never says all
the philosophers before me knew something, proved something,
and so we have this knowledge, and I will continue this
knowledge. No, nevernever. Every philosopher has said: I
begin, I begin there is a great history, but I cannot continue all
of that, and so I must begin again. In this sense, philosophy is
absolutely different from positive knowledge there is no
continuity, properly speaking. Instead, what we find in the
history of philosophy in its relation to its own past is a
sequence of new interpretations of this past. And we can,
absolutely, begin with a new interpretation of Plato, a new
interpretation of Aristotle, and so on. But our beginning is not
Platos, it cannot be Aristotles. Our beginning the beginning
of every new philosophy is not a continuation of the past, but a
new interpretation of this past.
But we must ask: how is some interpretation new? It is new if it
begins something, if it begins something new. But what exactly
is a beginning? We know what a beginning is in a knowledge,

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because we can know the objectivity of that knowledge. But, in

philosophy if philosophy is, finally, the creation of a new
subjective desire and so on what is a beginning? And how can
we begin something of dialectical nature, something which is in
relationship to negativity? We must begin by negativity that is
the only possible conclusion. Why? Precisely because we cannot
begin by an object, by a positive object we cannot begin with
an object because we are not in a field of knowledge. And so, we
must begin with negativity.
We must begin exactly as Socrates said: we must begin by
nothing, we must begin in nothing. And, as we know, practically
all of the great philosophers began by nothingness, in
nothingness. The only thing that I know is that I know nothing
...I know nothing! There is, after all, a positive affirmation in
Socrates, in this negative beginning: I cannot know a thing, but I
know nothing. But what is the sense of 'I know nothing'? Its
really obscure 'I know nothing'.... Can you represent the
signification of something like that, of the attempt to know
nothing?
At the beginning of a philosophy is not a knowledge. And when
Socrates says 'I know nothing' its a joke, naturally, its a verbal
joke 'the only thing I know is that I know nothing', its a joke, a
verbal joke. The reality is that its impossible to know nothing.
The relationship to nothingness is not a knowledge, but an
experience, a subjective experience. And the form of this
primitive experience is very fundamental in the differences
between philosophies. For example, you know that the
experience of nothingness in Descartes is the duped, the absolute
duped 'I know nothing, really, I know nothing'. But 'I know
nothing' cannot be a knowledge, and so the duped is a pure
subjectivity to know nothing is an experience. And to be
really duped is not easy, it is very difficult, in fact. It is not the
imaginary experience of ok, I can picture it: I am in my chair, I

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am duped, I know nothing. No, it is a traumatic experience, its

a subjective experience, which must be a real experience: I
myself must have the concrete experience of being totally duped
and it is a traumatic experience it is, finally, something like
the destruction of a world, of my world, a subjective destruction
of the world.
As a philosopher I must go to this experience this subjective
experience where all is nonsense, where I know nothing and
its not easy, its not something that I can just write in a
dissertation I know nothing. If its something like that,
then its a joke, then its nothing at all. And so, the duped the
Cartesian duped, the duped of the great rationalism of Descartes
is existential in nature, it is not at all a rational moment. And
so there is something dramatic, something purely subjective,
something negative a negative experience and, finally,
something existential, at the beginning of what may come to be a
reconstruction of the possibility o knowledge. And, in fact, the
subject the primitive philosophical subject is negativity. The
subjective dimension of philosophy is precisely the negative
dimension it is not reducible to an object, to a positive object,
it is the subjective experience of the power of negativity. You
must understand that you can be in the situation of the totally
duped only if it is an experience, a personal experience. In
Kierkegaard and Heidegger it is precisely that sort of experience
which is the experience of anxiety. It is not at all a positive
experience, a clear movement of the discovery of something, no,
its the power of negativity, and when we are really in the
position of the totally duped we dont know if its possible to go
beyond. Maybe we stay in the duped, maybe we stay in anxiety,
maybe we stay in that sort of radical experience of negativity it
is a possibility there is a risk.
And so the beginning of philosophy is something subjective,
something existential, something like a radical experience, and it

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is why philosophy cannot continue at an individual level.

Naturally, you can prepare, you can read books you must, you
must read the books of some great philosophers, and so on but
that cannot be the beginning of philosophy, precisely because all
of that is history the history of philosophy, maybe and so it is
a positive knowledge. To know the history of philosophy cannot
on its own be the beginning of philosophy, and so we must
affirm that philosophy cannot begin by books alone.
This experience and, certainly, it can be many different
experiences after all is something which happens, it is not
something that we decide decide clearly by some rational
decision it is something which happens. And you can see that
the duped in Descartes is a sort of story, a subjective story: for a
long time there is no duped in Descartes, and Descartes is only
continuing scholastic philosophy, and then, one day, one night,
something happens. There is something like conversion,
something like a subjective transformation, at the beginning of
philosophy. And this transformation is always in the form of
some negative experience it cannot be the experience of some
positive object, or the experience of some situation, it is, across
all instances, a pure experience of some negativity, of the
possibility of nothingness.
As you all know other forms of Socrates' sentence 'the only
thing that I know is that I know nothing' are found in the
famous quotations of many philosophies. Leibniz, for example,
says: 'why is there something and not nothing?' And why, in
fact, is there something rather than nothing? Why does
something exist? Why does anything exist? Why we are not in
nothingness? Is there any reason for this? Technically, in
Leibniz this is the question of the principle of sufficient
reason the principle of sufficient reason: the principle which
explains that if something exists there is a reason for its
existence, that there is a reason which explains why this thing

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exists. But, finally, the great question concerning the principle of

sufficient reason is: why is there a reason for the existence of
something? Or: why is there something and not nothing... why
we are not?
This question is not purely the question of the possibility of
nothingness, but the question of the possibility of the
nothingness of existence from the point of view of being: if we
say that existence is absurd, we necessarily say this from the
point of view of being, from inside the distance between to be
and to exist. This is another form of the negative beginning of
philosophy there is always a negativity at the beginning, it is a
condition of philosophy, and so philosophy must always begin.
Without such a moment where there is the possibility of the
complete non-sense of existence, the complete nothingness of
signification, the complete nothingness of existence itself
philosophy cannot begin. And so if for the moment we name
the experience of this nothingness anxiety we could define a
philosophy as something like a form of subjective victory over
anxiety.
In Husserl we find a very similar experience: epoch epoch is
the Greek word for the suspension, the interruption of any
relation to objectivity. At this moment I decide that objectivity is
illusion, that it is not here, that it does not exist, and so I reduce
all existence to my pure perception of it there is not objectivity
before me. Such an experience, naturally, is also a purely
negative experience, and very much like the one of Descartes, it
is an experience of pure subjectivity. The pure experience of
subjectivity is always the pure experience of nothingness,
because its subjectivity without objectivity, so its a negation of
the entire field of objectivity. You understand that by necessity
the beginning of philosophy if philosophy is not a knowledge,
like science is in negativity, because philosophy cannot be the
development of a knowledge of objectivity. If knowledge

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continues it is because it is guaranteed by objectivity, and so

without the guarantee of objectivity there is no knowledge, there
is pure subjectivity, and pure subjectivity is the experience of
something without objective existence.
So you understand that, finally, its something like the
experience of pure being, pure being as apart from existence.
And this is exactly the conclusion of Descartes, it is the victory
of Descartes against the duped: the victory of Descartes is the
affirmation that something is, that something really is. And what
is? Subjectivity itself, the duped itself.
When Descartes, by the affirmation of the existence of the
subject the subject who is in the duped, and who exists if the
duped exists goes beyond the duped he affirms the existence of
something within negativity, he affirms from within negativity
that something really is. And what? The experience itself. And
so, the existence of the experience of negativity is the victory
against pure negativity. It is the same in Socrates, logically... the
only thing that I know is that I know nothing. Finally, you go
from nothing to thing. This is the fundamental gesture of
philosophy: the possibility at the moment of the pure
experience of negativity to go from nothingness to existence,
or, if you want, to go from being to existence, from the pure
being of something which does not exist to something which
exists, from the duped to the existence of the subject of the
duped, and so on.
There are many forms of this movement, because there are many
beginnings, many philosophers, finally. And so, while there are
many forms of that process, there is a general abstract form,
which is the movement where something can transit from
nothingness to the affirmation of some existence, from pure
being to existence, or from experience the dramatic existence
of nothingness to the clear affirmation of the existence, the
certainty of the existence of something. And that is, if you want,

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the first victory of philosophy. If there is no such victory, then

you are in a form of anti-philosophical philosophy, then you are
in another form of anti-philosophical philosophy, which is
nihilism... nihilism.
What is nihilism? Nihilism is, finally, the proposition that we
cannot go beyond the experience of negativity. In Cartesian
language it is the duped, the duped without God, the duped
without the existence of supreme subjectivity. We now have two
enemies of philosophy, two different enemies, two contrary
enemies of philosophy. The first enemy of philosophy is
positivism, all forms of positivism 'the only serious thing is
knowledge, and finally, philosophy is a collection of jokes, and
non-sense'. Sometimes, you will find something like that in
Wittgenstein: all propositions of metaphysics are non-sense, all
such suppositions are, ultimately, imaginary, philosophy is a
fantasy, and, finally, philosophy is something like myth, like
some beautiful stories, and so on, but its not serious ... its not
serious. The second enemy of philosophy is nihilism, a nihilism
which is, finally, more profound than skepticism. Nihilism is
precisely the conviction that there is something which is not
knowledge, and it is the proposition that it is knowledge which is
not serious, which is imaginary, and so on. And so, it is the
complete reverse of positivism. For a true nihilist what is
important is, precisely, the subjective experience. And this
moment of the subjective experience of negativity, of
nothingness, is the common point between nihilism and
philosophy. If you want, we can say that what is common to
nihilism and philosophy is that both are a critique of positivism,
and for both the first moment is this critique, which is the radical
subjective experience of nothingness.
But philosophy cannot be reduced to nihilism, because nihilism
is also the conviction that the experience of negativity cannot be
interrupted. For nihilism we stay in the experience of negativity,

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we stay in anxiety, anxiety is our world, it is our destiny, and

there is no future, there is no knowledge. If you want, the nihilist
says: 'I must only exist, I must only exist in nothingness itself, so
I must drink, enjoy, enjoy the nothingness'. Nihilism is a very
strong position, today, but also before. We must understand, and
we must understand very clearly, that philosophys opposition to
nihilism is not the same as its opposition to positivism. In fact,
the two are very much contradictory oppositions. I think that
positivism is the position on the right of philosophy and nihilism
is the position of the ultra left. Nihilism is a radical ultra leftist
position: it mistakes the radial experience, and states that we
cannot go beyond it, that we cannot affirm anything, that there is
only negativity... only negativity.
Philosophy, properly, is neither positivism nor nihilism.
Philosophy tries to open the possibility of a thinking that is not
reducible to knowledge or positivism, but not reducible to the
primitive experience of negativity either, even if this experience
is a necessity for philosophy itself. And so, the fundamental
position of philosophy is that we have the possibility go outside
the experience of negativity, to go beyond it, to go, finally, from
being to existence. Nihilism, naturally, responds by saying:
'nothing exists, and my being is to affirm the fundamental inexistence of everything all that exists is existence itself, the
experience of existence'.
And so the beginning of philosophy is nihilism in some sense
but we must go across nihilism. Without some experience of
nihilism, there is, I think, no philosophy at all we must know
what is anxiety, we must know what is the experience of
nothingness, we must be open to the possibility of nothingness,
because if we do not open the possibility of nothingness there is
pure objectivity and knowledge, and nothing else, no
philosophy, in fact, no serious philosophy. Philosophy is serious
because of the experience of nothingness at the beginning,

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without it, it is only academic, reducible to knowledge without

nihilism it is scholasticism. But philosophy is also the idea that
we can go beyond nihilism. And it can go beyond by the
affirmation that truths exist, that there is something like truths,
that there is a positive affirmation of existence. And so, we must
fully understand the distance between being and existence it is
the very place of philosophy, what must be divided by
philosophy, and, also, what must be traversed by philosophy.
For nihilism there is no understanding of all that, there is only
the experience, the living experience, of nothingness, and it is
the last word of nihilism. But for philosophy this is not the last
word certainly, we must have that sort of experience, we must,
but we must, and we can, also go beyond it. In fact, it is only by
going beyond nihilism that we can find a true understanding of
that distance, the negative distance between to be and to exist,
and, finally, have a thought of the negativity and not only an
experience of it. The movement of philosophy is, therefore, also
this movement from experience to thinking. We can say that
positivism is thinking without the experience of negativity, and
nihilism the experience of negativity without thinking. Within
these two possibilities, we have, in some sense, the space of our
determination, our vital determination.
Finally, we can say that for humanity there exist three positions,
and everyone must choose. There is the positivist position: one
must be and exist in the world as it is, with knowledge,
technology and interests, and one must be positive be positive
one must be a positivist. The second position is nihilism: one
must accept that all that there is is the experience, the experience
of nothingness, of anxiety, the experience of pure life, as, in fact,
pure nothingness, and one must enjoy, that is all that one can do
in the end, finally, nihilism is life under the power of death.
The third position I name the philosophical one. And we must
understand that philosophy, in this sense of a position in life, is

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something much more important than pure philosophical

discourse. And, in fact, the positivist position too is much more
important than pure positivism: it is, in fact, the position of
ordinary contemporary life, which is something like resignation,
like the acceptance of the closure of knowledge, the acceptance
of something like the closure of the world. The second position
which is extremist, in some sense is a refusal of the world as it
is, and a resignation to negativity, to nothingness, because there
is no beyond. And as a position of life nihilism too is more
important, because it is the complete refusal of the world as it is,
of the positive experience of the world as it is: it is a radical
critique of the world as it is, in some sense, but without the
possibility of something else, without the possibility of another
world, and so, it is a refusal of the idea that within the world as it
is there exists a possibility of another world. And philosophy
the philosophical life is to assume the necessity of nihilistic
experience but to simultaneously affirm that we must, and so,
that we can, go beyond this sort of experience. The philosophical
position, therefore, is that we can go beyond the experience of
pure negativity to a positive affirmation which is outside, or
which is other to, positivism.
The beginning of philosophy, then, is negativity, but the great
question of philosophy is affirmation the beginning is a rupture
with the positivist position, but the great question is the rupture
with nihilism. This is the double fight of philosophy, the double
fight of philosophy against the positivist resignation but also
against nihilism as the impossibility of affirmation.
You will find this double fight in every philosophy. And, in fact,
it is another way in which to read philosophers: we can ask
where is the fight against positivism and where is the fight
against nihilism in any particular philosophy. We could even say
that you can find the singularity of a philosophy by the
articulation of these two great fights. For example, some

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philosophies propose that the critique of positivism is much

important than the critique of nihilism, others say the reverse,
and so on and so on there are many possibilities. Maybe we
could say that a system of philosophy is like a musical
symphony: in a musical symphony there are two essential
moments, there is the rupture with silence and there is return to
the silence, there is a break at both ends. Music, in all its forms,
is also a double fight: the fight of the organization of the music
itself, the structure of the music itself, against the silence, which
is at the beginning you begin all music in silence, naturally,
since it is impossible to begin music by another manner but its
also, always, the preparation of the return of the silence, which is
the end. The question in music, in fact, is largely that of the
beginning and of the end, with some movement between the
two, a movement which is a movement from silence to silence.
And so, in music too we can find a double fight: the fight against
the idea of the pure silence of the world, if you want, the
nothingness of all noise, and on the other side we have the
organization of an affirmation of the other form of silence, the
silence that is inside of music itself. And this is why it is difficult
to finish a composition and this is true of every form of music:
there is music which continues indefinitely, there is music which
makes a brutal end, and there is music which prepares the end,
repeatedly, or even music which is just a long preparation of the
end. In Beethoven, for example, there is the end, and then the
end, and then the end, and another end... and, finally, the true
end, at the end, after all. But also in jazz, for example, the
question of the structure of the end is precisely the norm of the
history of jazz. At the beginning of jazz with the New Orleans
style, Armstrong, and so on there is something very coded:
you have a definition of the theme, variation and then the end.
But in Coltrane, on the other hand, the end becomes absolutely
erratic, there is no end at all, in fact. But why do I mention all of
this? Because it is exactly the same in philosophy: there is a

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double fight in music, and in philosophy and there are

different forms of organizing the double fight, there is the fight
against silence at the beginning and the fight against silence at
the end, and they are not the same thing at all, they are
contradictory fights.
So my proposition is for you to read philosophy in the manner
that you listen to music, and so to have a sensibility not only for
the rational and conceptual organization of philosophy which
is very important, naturally but also for something which is
like the tonality of a philosophy, which is always in relationship
to the tonality of nihilism and the tonality of positivism.
In some cases this suggestion is absolutely clear: you know
perfectly well that you immediately find the relationship to
nihilism in Kierkegaard's theory of anxiety, or in the theory of
eternal return in Nietzsche. So there are philosophies which have
the tonality of nihilism immediately and clearly present, and, on
the other side, there are philosophies where the tonality of
positivism is clearly and immediately present with positive
knowledge, and so on and you find that in Aristotle and Searle,
for example. The true reading of a philosopher is precisely to
find the tonality which is not the obvious tonality: it is to find
the nihilism in Descartes, for example, or to find not nihilism in
Kierkegaard which is not very difficult but the positivism of
Kierkegaard, to find the affirmations of Kierkegaard and that
is difficult to find.
The understanding of a great philosopher is always the
understanding of the two tonalities, and, certainly, there is
always, in every philosophy, a tonality which is more important
than the other. You know that in the history of philosophy, in
philosophers like Hume or Kierkegaard, Nietzsche or Heidegger,
the nihilist tonality is absolutely present, you can find that
without any difficulty. And so the true reading is to find in them
the other tonality! In Aristotle, Descartes or Spinoza, on the

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other hand, naturally, the rationalist and positivist tonality is

clearly present, and so, to find the nihilist moment is the true
reading. Finally, we must affirm that it is important to read
philosophers in the dialectical manner, that is, to find
contradictory tonalities in the development of a philosophy. And
why? Because there is a double fight: philosophy is against
positivism and against nihilism, and against positivism it is with
nihilism, and against nihilism it is, in some sense, with
positivism. But the movement, the fundamental movement, is
the movement to go beyond nihilism because the beginning is
always in nihilism itself, the beginning is always some
experience of negativity.
You can take, for example, the case of Kant, which is a rational
critique of all the pretensions of classical metaphysics and so on,
and which is the beginning of the modern critique Kant is,
after all, the beginning of the end of classical metaphysics. But
the beginning of Kant is absolutely negative: all that philosophy
has affirmed concerning God and nature is illusion, all of it is
imaginary, its false, and we cannot know real being, we cannot
know what they really are, what they are in themselves. This is
the first fundamental affirmation of Kant! So the first experience
of Kant is not at all a clear and rational experience, no! The first
experience is of a negative nature: our dream to really know the
distance between to be and to exist, between things-inthemselves and as they appear to us, our dream to really be in
that sort of reality is, finally, absolutely impossible. And so, the
beginning of Kant is also a traumatic experience of theoretical
anxiety: Kants problem at the beginning is, finally, that if he
cannot know being as such, then what is the status of our
knowledge? After that Kant reconstructs the possibility of a sort
of knowledge which is the affirmative part of his construction,
the positivist part, finally but the beginning itself is purely of
negative nature! And so we can stop here for the moment we
can define philosophy as a primitive movement from pure

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negativity to a first affirmation, to a first affirmation just after

the nihilist temptation... philosophy is the movement from the
nihilist temptation to a first affirmation. In Descartes, for
example, this first affirmation is the affirmation of the real
existence of the subject itself, and after that Descartes
reconstructs all of the world, all knowledge, all positivity. The
simple representation of philosophy is something like this:

01
This is a schema, the schema of philosophy. The problem, the
great problem, is: what exactly is 0, and what exactly is 1? 0 is
the emblem of the nihilist experience, the nihilist experience of
nothingness and negativity, and its the true beginning, and 1 is
the emblem of the first affirmation. But we can also by an
ontological projection say that the movement in philosophy is
this:

Maybe, philosophy is this movement: the movement from the

anti-set to omega, to the infinite, the first infinite. We stop here.

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3.2 Lecture VI



The dialectical nature of philosophy defines philosophy as not
merely pure theory but as a movement, a real movement, a
movement that creates, that establishes, new possibilities in
thinking. The scheme proposed in the last lesson () is the
inscription of this movement.
If philosophy was only on the side of zero, on the side of the
void, it would, in fact, be nihilism. The nihilistic position we
have seen is precisely the proposition that there is only
experience, the pure experience of the void of existence, and that
there is no name, and that any affirmative or constructive
knowledge is impossible. On the other hand, if philosophy was
only on the side of the one or omega as a symbol for the
infinite then, finally, philosophy would be either positivism or
positivist theology, that is, it would be on the side of the
metaphysics of God. But philosophy is neither of these, it is a
movement, it is the movement from the nihilist position to the
affirmative position it is not reducible to either of the two
positions. And this is why in the Hegelian tradition but it was
also the position of Heraclitus at the very beginning
philosophy is movement, its a movement. And this is also why
we have a beginning and a goal: a beginning in the experience of
negativity and the goal of the transformation of subjectivity the
corruption of young people, after all.
Naturally this movement has different stages, different steps. It
is not a pure gesture, nor an immediate passage from negativity
to affirmation, from the void to the infinite. And so, we have in

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the dialectical conception of philosophy the question of the

different moments of the construction of a new affirmation.
Between the beginning and the goal we have a sequence of
different steps, different moments of this movement. And when
we speak of these different steps, we are speaking about
something like a decomposition of the movement:
|||||..........
It is these moments constitutive of the movement from the
void to the infinite which make philosophy systematic. And
why is it that philosophy exists only in systematic form?
Precisely because we cannot reduce the movement of philosophy
to a pure intuition, a pure instance, a pure revelation
philosophy is not mysticism!
We can name mysticism the idea that the movement from inside
nihilism to infinite affirmation is a single experience. Mysticism
is the idea that it is the same experience, the same movement,
which goes immediately across nihilism to the infinite itself.
There is a description of this sort of experience in the great
mystics, in Saint Simon Lacroix, for example, but also in some
parts of oriental wisdom. We cannot say that this mystical
movement does not exist it exists. And, in fact, in some sense
mysticism is near philosophy: they have a common origin, and a
common end. The difference is that in mysticism this movement
is a pure experience, something outside of language, and, in fact,
outside of transmission, outside of rational transmission.
Ultimately, mysticism is the idea of a pure and immediate
experience of the infinite from inside nothingness.
As you know, the great mystic poems describe precisely such
experiences: they describe the nothingness of pure existence,
and, in that sort of destruction of themselves, a pure access to the
glory of the infinite. Generally this infinite accessed by the

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mystic takes the name 'God' omega as God. We can represent

the movement of mysticism like this:

In mysticism we are nothing from the point of the infinite, but

we can have a pure access to the infinite through the complete
realization of our nothingness. If we accept our concrete finitude
and nothingness, if we accept to be nothing in regard to the
infinite, we open an immediate access to the infinite itself, and
we come into a relationship with this infinite. In fact it is a close
and intimate relationship, a personal relationship with the
infinite. This sort of experience is often described as a love
experience. Its not at all a linguistic or rational experience, but a
pure experience, where we by an absolute acceptance of our
nothingness open an access to the infinite. In return we
experience the love of God for us that is the prize, finally.
And, certainly, it is a very beautiful and magnificent experience.
I dont know the experience as such... but I can read about it....
The expression of that sort of experience is of poetical nature,
always. The great poems of the great mystics are magnificent
pieces of literature, certainly. And we can perfectly understand
why: if the experience is an experience of love and not at all an
experience which is determined by a rational movement, then
the natural inscription of such an experience cannot be a treatise,
a system, or a construction, and so on, but the poem, a pure

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writing, a creation. If we are in the world of mysticism we are in

a world organized by the relationship between love and art. We
will return to all the problems that follow from such a position.
There is absolutely no relationship to science and politics in
mysticism. The relationship between the finite and infinite is
completely enclosed by love and art. Love, in fact, is the
experience itself. It is really is an experience of love: the
infinite's love for the finite, God's love of creation, and so on.
But it is a love that can be experienced only if creation accepts
that it is only creation. In mysticism love is an interpretation of
the experience of nothingness before God, an experience which
is immediately also an intense experience of God's love of
creation. And it is, certainly, very beautiful, but we understand
that its also a closure and this is the difference with
philosophy. It is not a critique to say that.
Its a representation, a personal representation of the experience
of a sort of negativity that is enclosed, finally, in the potency of
the infinite, for example, in God if God is the name of the
infinite. Naturally, there are different names for the infinite the
name of that sort of experience isnt by necessity God. And its
an experience we find in many cultures, in very different
cultures, and in very different religious contexts. And, as you
know, it is another possibility by which to go beyond nihilism,
another possibility than philosophy.

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Mysticism

Philosophy ()

We know that if the first point () is isolated we have nihilism.

And if the second point () is isolated we have two possibilities:
positivism and theology, but theology in rational form, as a
knowledge, precisely. A rational theology organizes the
possibility of a rational representation of God and so on. And so
we have two possibilities for this movement (): mysticism
and philosophy ().
Mysticism, therefore, affirms the religious question of going
beyond nihilism, but not in the form of a rational and
transmissible construction. Rather, it is a matter of finding an
access, an opening, from inside the pure experience itself. And
so, in some sense, it is a nihilism which transforms itself into
something absolute it reaches the absolute through the pure
experience of nothingness. It is a possibility, but it is, finally, an
absolutely closed possibility because the mystic is alone,
absolutely alone. And this is the problem, the limit, of
mysticism: a mystic is in a form of radical solitude, radical
solitude with God and God is a strange companion! In fact,
this is precisely what mystics themselves say: God is a strange
companion. And, very often, mystics will say that they cannot
fully describe this experience there exist some poems,
naturally, but they are just approximations and not the true
articulation of the experience. The true experience is... they

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cannot describe the pure experience, there can be no full

transmission, and this is why mysticism is a pure solitude. The
true experience as such is a revelation, and so it cannot be
described by any rational or transmissible means. And so the
mystic always faces a choice, a radical choice: to be with God
and not with the world, and, finally, not with other people, or to
be with the world, to be with others but without God. The mystic
is alone, absolutely alone with God. And the effect of
mysticism, finally, is something like a pure effect of attraction.
There is a description of this experience in Bergson, in Les Deux
Source de la Morale et de la Religion.
Les Deux Source de la Morale et de la Religion is a fundamental
work of Bergson, and there we find a description of the position
of mysticism: Bergson explains that the position of mysticism is
not a position which can be transmitted or described, but that
there is a particular kind of action, a kind of affect, on other
people by the mystic, and that it is a pure attraction, by pure
example. It is very difficult to understand, but the idea is that we
an have access to the experience by a sort of attraction,
something like the effect of the sun on the movement of the sea,
or of the moon on the movement of the sea. It is something like
elevation, finally, an elevation in the direction the obscure
direction of the mystic. But, finally, it is purely individual, it is
a purely individual destiny, it is a purely singular encounter of
one person with God. It is, then, something like an event, but a
purely personal event, and it is only by chance maybe by grace
that one can have that sort of experience. It is, finally, very
difficult to say something concerning mysticism because there is
really a part of all that which is completely obscure in the
closure of pure subjectivity in the closure of pure
subjectivity.... But it is, in some sense, the same movement as
philosophy. And so, mysticism is something like philosophy
immediately, philosophy without patience, without work,

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without labor, it is like philosophy, but reduced to a pure

moment.
Finally, because mysticism is absolutely not reducible to
nihilism it is a very specific experience of nothingness which
is immediately, and in the same intimate movement, transformed
into a relationship with the infinite and yet it is not philosophy
either it is not a step-by-step rational construction of this
movement, in fact, we can say that mysticism is exactly the
opposite of a system we have four distinct possibilities:
positivism, nihilism, mysticism and philosophy.
If we now return to philosophy, we must understand that
philosophy is not mysticism. But the relationship between
philosophy and mysticism is not at all the same as the
relationship between philosophy and nihilism or positivism.
Philosophy is not against mysticism the criticism of mysticism,
the destruction of mysticism, is not a task of philosophy
because they are, in some sense, the same movement. If
mysticism exists this is not a problem for philosophy. In fact,
how could we even say something against mysticism? You
understand why this is impossible? If a mystic says that that sort
of experience exists, what could we say but that it does not exist,
that it is a sort of illusion? And that, finally, would not even be a
very strong argument. And so, does such an experience exist?
Does there exist such a movement on a purely individual level,
as something like a purely personal event? Maybe. Finally, there
is nothing more that philosophy can say on this point.
And so there are only two enemies of philosophy positivism
and nihilism because we cannot exactly say that mysticism is
an enemy of philosophy. In some sense, both affirm the same:
first there is an experience, a necessary experience of
nothingness, and second there exists a possibility of going
beyond nothingness. There is, however, something in philosophy

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which is more on the side of patience, construction,

conceptualization, labor, and so on the movement is not pure
and immediate. And it is strange, very strange to imagine a
society of mystics, a society where everyone is a mystic, where
everyone is completely captured in God. Such a society would
be a dissolution of collectivity, a dissolution of all collectivity,
of all positive collectivity. Its a strange image, an image of
science fiction in fact: a society where there is pure juxtaposition
of all individuals individually with God, a society where all
individuals are an in immediate and exclusive relationship with
God. Maybe this would be the situation of angels if angels
exist? As you know, in Medieval philosophy's descriptions of
angels, the angel is in such an intimate relationship with God
that all which is not God does not exist for the angel, in some
sense. In fact, the most complete angels in the tradition of
Aristotle, maybe there could be a classification of angels: poor
angels, very aristocratic angels, and so on the purest angels
would be in a constant mysticism, a constant and immediate
relationship with the infinite, a constant experimentation of the
love of God for the angel, and, consequently, there would be a
complete disparition of everything which is not of that sort of
experience. And so, maybe a society of mystics would be
something like a society of angels. The difference, in some
sense, between philosophy and mysticism is that philosophy
says that we are not angels. Maybe some of us are angels
why not? Hidden angels, angels disguised as human beings.
But, finally, for philosophy it is very important to confirm that
we are not angels, and so that mysticism is not an obligatory
destiny, that it is not our destiny.
To distinguish philosophy from mysticism we must, therefore,
affirm that the construction of the philosophical movement is
always systematic. Today as we all know to say that
something is systematic is to depreciate that thing. And this is
especially the case for philosophy. But it really is an absolute

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criteria of philosophy: philosophy is systematic, and so the end

of systems would be the end of philosophy. Finally, to say that
something is systematic does mean that it is in the image of a
machine, or that there is no freedom, it means only that we have
a construction, its only this: we have a definition of some steps,
and we have a description of the movement.
A system, then, is something like a consciousness of the
existence of different steps in the movement from negativity to
affirmation it simply affirms that the movement is not an
immediate revelation, but that we have to learn, that we have to
understand, that we have to have a sort of patience, that there
exist some moments of repetition, and finally, that all of this is
rational and transmissible. And across the history of philosophy
we have many different systems, many different possibilities of
constructing this movement. Each philosophy, in fact, proposes
a particular construction of this passage, a particular systematic
construction of the passage from nothingness to affirmation,
from zero to one, from the void to the infinite.
The most clear example of such a construction is a number line,
which is a simple inscription of the movement from zero to the
infinite.
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, n, n+1,
As you can see, the number line is also a form of repetition
moving towards the infinite. As you all know, there is no last
number, there is no final number, and so the succession on
numbers is infinite. This line is for us a sort of image of the
passage from nothingness 0 is the numerical name for
nothingness to something beyond all numbers, to the first
infinite. As you can see the passage from 1 to 2, to 3, and so on,
is a repetition. It is a repetition because we repeat the same
operation, the same process, and this process is the passage from

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n to n +1. Each step is, therefore, a repetition of the step before.

The question that we must ask is: is the philosophical passage of
the same nature as the numerical succession?
This scheme is not a philosophical one, but an arithmetical one.
It is an image for the philosopher, its only an image, an image
of the passage from zero in direction to the infinite. But this
image is interesting on two points. First, the passage contains a
repetition, not a repetition of the object, but the repetition of the
passage from one object to another object. You know that, for
example, 3 is not the same number as 2, so it is not the repetition
of the object the sequence is not 1, 1, 1, 1 and so on. There
is really something new with each repetition: the number 3 is not
the number 2, and so repetition is something like a new number.
What repeats is not the result, the construction, but the operation
of the construction. Philosophically, what we have is a process
of the production of difference and not a process of pure
repetition of the same object. This image represents the
possibility of creating something new inside, or by the means of
repetition: the passage from 2 to 3 is, in some sense, a pure
repetition of the passage from 1 to 2, and so on, it is exactly the
same operation, and yet the result is not the same, because 3 is
not 2, and 2 not equal to 1, and so on. We produce, therefore,
something new by the repetition of the same operation. This is,
in fact, a very simple dialectics of difference and identity: we
have difference, the production of difference infinitely
different numbers by the means of repetition, by the means of
something which is not at all different but absolutely identical.
This is an image of this dialectics, it an image of what finds its
most achieved philosophical determination in the philosophy of
Hegel Hegels philosophy is entirely the extraordinary
construction of something new with the dialectic of identity and
difference. Finally, we can say that the number, which is purely
arithmetical, is, in some sense, dialectical. And so, the most
elementary and most clear object of mathematics is not purely

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analytical but dialectical. This is the first point. And this first
point is very important: if philosophy must go beyond nihilism
not in the mystic form, but in the form of a real process it will
be by a process which is a mixture, a dialectical mixture, of
identity and difference.
Today, as you know, the question of identity and differences is
at the very center of the ideological fight: the fundamental
question of politics today is the question of identity, of respect
for differences, of the Derridean concept of diffrance, and so
on. We must come to understand that dialectics is not at all an
old and dogmatic question, we must affirm that the question of
dialectics, the possibility of dialectics, is of fundamental
importance today. And, in some sense, we find the essence of all
that in the simple succession of numbers. It is just an image, a
very simple but also very clear image, of something very
complex and very difficult, but it is also the image of something
very important today, of something very important politically.
After all, if there is something which is political today, it is the
problem of the relationship between identity and difference we
have, for example, the question of gender, the question of
different cultures, of minorities, of immigration, and finally, of
the excluded. And all of those questions are so many forms of a
problem that can be abstractly presented in the succession of
numbers.
You all know perfectly well that in the relationship with the
other, the question is simultaneously the difference from the
other and the identity with the other. And we must ask: what is
more important, difference or identity? This is absolutely a
political question, and, in fact, a question which is a constant
difficulty. Ultimately we must affirm, we must absolutely affirm,
that it is identity, and yet we must make this affirmation in a way
that respects and accepts all difference. But we must decide
which is more important. After all, if identity is more important

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than difference the consequences are not at all the same as if we

were to affirm that difference is more important than identity.
Even in our image we find this choice, and, ultimately, this
contradiction: we can say 'all the numbers are absolutely
different, 3 is completely different from 2', or we can say 'yes,
but 3 comes from 2 by exactly the same operation as 2 came
from 1'. And so, even in this simple image, in the identity of the
process and the difference of the result we have a real dialectical
contradiction.
The second point which we can find in this image, is that this
term 'omega' () does not result from repetition: omega as such
is not the result of a sequence operated by something like n+1. If
we take a number as big as you want this number +1 is
another number. This sequence, therefore, can never succeed in
reaching the infinite. Certainly, the process goes in the direction
of omega, but it can never produce omega. The infinite cannot
be produced by this process because it can never reach the
infinite as such. Why? Because the number that succeeds the
first number is itself a finite number which can itself be
succeeded and not an infinite number. This is the second point:
this process is a process from zero towards the infinite, but the
infinite as such is not the result of the process. Therefore, there
must be a cut here between n+1 and there must be
something like an interruption of this process oriented towards
the infinite but never capable of reaching the infinite.
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ... n, n+1, |
The totality of the process from 0 to is, therefore,
constituted not only by the repeated passage from one number to
the next, but also by some interruption of this repetition.
Repetition as such has no end after every number we can
produce, by the operator of succession, another number and so
the infinite can only be on the other side of this repetition. And

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so, if the philosophical process is really the passage from pure

negativity to an absolute affirmation like with the succession
of numbers we must affirm that there is not only one
operation, but two completely different operations.
The first operation is a repetitive one. And there is in every
philosophy a repetitive operation, an operation which is always
of the same form. We can immediately give many examples: in
the Hegelian dialectic, in the Kantian critique, in the
metaphysics of Descartes, or Leibniz, you can very easily
identify some operations which are constantly repeated by the
philosopher, some passage form one notion to another notion,
which creates a new concept. Naturally, the repeated operation is
very important in any philosophy, and in philosophy in general.
In Descartes, for example, its the deductive passage of one
sentence to another sentence, with a mathematical method. For
Hegel, on the other hand, it is the dialectical passage by
negativity from one assertion to another assertion.
But there is another operation, which is the operation of a cut, of
an interruption of repetition. We must assume also this second
form of operation, which is a rupture inside repetition, an
interruption of repetition. The image of that is clearly the
position of the first infinite number, which is omega (), in
regard to all the other numbers, all the finite numbers. Repetition
certainly goes in the direction of the last term, which is the first
infinite number. But there is no possibility of reaching this term
by the strict action of the repetitive operation. And so, if you
affirm the existence of omega, you must create a cut in
repetition, a cut with repetition. Omega, we can say, is the
beyond of repetition in mathematics, in fact, is it said that
omega is the limit of repetition.
And so, in philosophy where the question is to go from the
experience of negativity to an absolute affirmation, but not in a

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mystical way, not in an immediate way we must consider two

absolutely different operations. This duality is a fundamental
aspect of philosophy, because there is always a moment in
philosophy where we cannot only continue the fundamental
operation. In Plato this is very clear. The fundamental operation
is as you know the dialectic discussion. And these
discussions involve arguments, sometimes opposed arguments,
which propose successive definitions of something. For
example, we have a discussion about the question of the very
essence of courage, and in this discussion there is a sequence of
successive refutations of opposed arguments until the definition
of the thing in question is reached, until in this instance the
definition of courage is found. The dialectical discussion is
certainly the fundamental operation in the philosophy of Plato.
But, finally, we cannot go forth only in the form of discussion.
And so, Plato creates something completely different, which is a
myth, a poetic myth, or a story, the story of Err at the end of
Republic, for example. And these images are exactly in the
position of the cut.
The dialectical discussion is the successive production of many
possibilities of definitions, new concepts, and so on, but at the
end, when you are at the question of the absolute, we cannot go
further by this same operation, and it is why Plato proposes
something like an image. A characteristic, absolutely
characteristic text is when Plato proposes the conception of the
Idea of the Good at the end of the discussion, and he explicitly
says that he cannot propose a pure concept, a pure definition of
this Idea, but only an image, and its the image of the sun he
says that the Idea is, in regard to all the concepts, in the same
position as the sun is in regard to life, in regard to the world.
But why is it just an image? Why can we not continue? Precisely
because there is a moment where, by necessity, there is an
operation which is in the form of a cut, an interruption, and not a

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continuation of the dialectical discussion. And so the presence of

myths in Plato is not at all an idiosyncrasy of some dialogue, it is
not at all something strange but precisely the second operation,
the second operation after the rational creation of concepts by
means of rational discussion. And it is always like this in Plato
and across all philosophy, in fact. And to find the two distinct
operations in the philosophical system is another possible way to
read the great philosophers. In every philosophical system there
is always a moment where the fundamental operation of the
philosopher is no longer useful and must be replaced with
something else in Plato, we know, this is the myth, which is
proposed after a long sequence of rational discussions. We find
two such operations in absolutely every philosopher. And maybe
if the system is very complex we find three or four
operations.
This is why my most important concepts I speak of myself, for
a moment are precisely of the same form. As you know, my
question is to find something that is the dialectical result of
universality and particularity, something like the singularity in
Hegel. But the question is: by what sorts of operations can we
arrive at something like that? When I propose that truth is the
name for that sort of exception, that sort of immanent exception,
which is simultaneously of particular nature and addressed to
everybody, with the possibility of resurrection in another world,
the question is: what sorts of operations are necessary for the
construction of such a truth? Certainly, therefore, I must propose
a name for creative repetition, like the passage from 1 to 2 I
say creative repetition because there is a repetition of the
passage, of the operation, and yet the results are new, and so it
is, strictly speaking, a creative repetition, I do the same thing,
but the result is different. I must propose something like that, but
I must also propose something that describes the cut, the second
operation. The name I propose for the cut, for the second
operation, is the concept of event: an event is precisely in the

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position of the interruption of repetition. And for the first

operation I propose the concept fidelity: fidelity is the name for
creative repetition. The uniqueness of my position is, ultimately,
that and here we have the difference with arithmetical image
before 0 there is a cut as well. Why? Because it is a question of
the beginning, and the beginning cannot be the result of
repetition.
We have said that at the beginning there is an experience, a pure
experience of negativity, and we must understand that if that sort
of experience happens it cannot be the result of repetition it is
a cut, it is a cut in our lives. When, at some moment, you have
such an experience a true experience of anxiety, of
nothingness, of nihilism it is something which is not a
repetition of our normal lives, but something which happens,
and which is, very often, not so pleasant. The name of this
moment is event, and it is something which is precisely an
interruption of our lives, of the world as it is, in some sense. The
process of the construction of a truth, therefore, begins by an
event. The entire sequence is then something like this:
event

truth

The process is a movement from an event to a truth. And so, it is

not exactly like the arithmetical image, but something different.
However, there is something like omega in the concept of truth,
and something like zero in the concept of event. There is, then,
an interruption at the beginning and at the end. We must
understand that if truths exist, and if they are immanent
exceptions, then there must always be these two types of
operations, the second of which is at the beginning and at the
end! There must be an interruption at the beginning because a
beginning cannot be the result of repetition, if it were it would

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not be a beginning but a continuation! In my philosophical

system there are two interruptions one as the beginning, and
one as the end the names of which are event and truth, and
between them we have the operation of fidelity, which is,
naturally, fidelity to an event, fidelity to some interruption. To
finish, I will propose a succession of concepts:

existence

event

fidelity

subject

truth

being

We have here a succession of concepts, which is a recapitulation

of what we have said. First we have being and existence, the
dialectical contradiction between being and existence. And this
is a question of ontology. An event, in some sense, is always a
rupture inside the question of the relationship between being and
existence. It opens a new possibility, and, in some sense, it is
like the cut that creates the possibility of an infinite number
beyond the succession of finite numbers. An event is, ultimately,
what opens a new possibility. In some sense it is exactly like the
cut that creates the possibility of the infinite beyond all finite
numbers, but more generally it is always something which
creates the possibility of a rupture in a certain form of the
relationship between being and existence, and in this way creates
a new possibility.
Fidelity is the organization of the consequences of the event, and
so, it is something like creative repetition. In fact, this is
precisely the definition of fidelity in the field of love: love is not
reducible to not having a sexual relationship with another

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person, it is a construction, the construction of a love. And so it

is the continuation of something, but a continuation which
cannot continue by strict repetition, it is a continuation which
must be creative. As all of us know, to continue by strict
repetition is impossible: the problem of love is how to continue
and not to repeat, how to invent something new inside the
continuation of a love. In love, the event is the amorous
encounter when you encounter someone it is, maybe, the
beginning of a love. But, after that, we must construct
something, we must create something. And this process is, in
some sense, a repetition I continue with the same person but
in another sense it is a construction, an invention. This process is
a creative repetition, it is a fidelity.
Inside of fidelity and in order to orient a fidelity we must, by
necessity, have a new subject. And this subject, naturally, will be
determined by the particular event in the initial situation of the
relationship between being and existence. The subject is the
operator of fidelity. This sequence of concepts is what creates a
truth a true love, a truth in science, an artistic truth, and so on.
Within this sequence there is something that is appropriate to
each of these fields. To think the event, we have art. It is not
philosophy which allows us to think what exactly an event is,
but art philosophy creates the concept of event, and develops
its formal characteristics, but if we want to describe a particular
event it is always art which is the strongest possibility. And this
is why mysticism which is the reduction of the entire process
to a single moment, to the event alone is always expressed in
poetic form, it is always expressed by art. Fidelity, on the other
hand, we find in logic, which is an abstract theory of creative
repetition. But, much more generally, logic is a theory of
consequences, and as a theory of consequences it is, finally, an
abstract representation of fidelity, of the same operation which
when repeated creates something new. The classical field for the

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subject is psychology, if we speak of the individual subject, and

politics, if we speak of a collective subject. And, finally, the
theoretical field of truth is epistemology, which describes the
conditions of a truth, of what is a truth, what is a scientific truth,
and so on.

existence

event

fidelity

subject

truth

being

ontology

art

logic

epistemology
politics/psychology

I can now conclude. The beginning of a process of truth is in the

relationship of being and existence, and that is a question of
ontology. How else can we begin, after all, but by what exists,
by what is? We always begin with the world as it is, in its being
and its existence. After that in order to open the possibility of
something new we have a rupture with repetition, and so we
have the event. And to construct something on the basis of this
rupture must have some form of creative repetition, which is a
fidelity to an event. Once more, let me say that love is probably
the clearest example of this. All of this, it is true, constructs a
new subject, a new individual or a new collective subject of the
event. For example, love construct a new subject which is not a
one + one, but a Two, and this Two is the new subject because it
does not exist before the encounter, and it does not exist before
fidelity. And, finally, a truth is something affirmative in the
construction of event-fidelity-subject, and which is a possibility
for everyone. In fact as we have said a truth can be
resurrected in another world. And so, it is something which can

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be understood and continued in a completely different world,

and this is as true of love as it is of mathematics, art or politics.
As philosophers, what we must affirm is that philosophy can
explain all of that: philosophy is always the affirmation that
something like the process of a truth exists and that it can be
understood by rational means.
Philosophy is the general thinking of this movement: it is the
thought of its constitution by two distinct operations
interruption and creative repetition and of its sequence of
moments existence-being, event, fidelity, subject, and truth.
We can now, finally, affirm that these moments cannot be
studied separately, at least, not as philosophy. And if they are
studied separately, then it is not properly philosophy but
scholasticism that is at stake. To separate this sequence, this
process, into ontology, aesthetics, logic, politics, and so on, to
separate these moments from one another, is, finally, to reduce
philosophy to the discourse of the university. But, philosophy is
not exactly the addition of these moments, or their proper fields
it is not a little logic, a little epistemology, a little politics, a
little art, and so on. No! Philosophy is the understanding of the
complete path, of the complete process of a truth. And so,
naturally, in every great philosophy we find ontology, aesthetics,
logic, politics, and so on, but this is not the same as to say that
philosophy is the pure sum of these elements. No! Philosophy is
the movement, the integral movement, of the construction of a
truth. And so, we cannot affirm that there are different pieces
which can be put together, because there is only the construction
of the process, and this process is constructed in such a way that
it is rational and universally transmissible.
This point is profound: I am not saying something directly
against this academic disposition, after all, maybe it would be
interesting to have some notions concerning the different parts
independently, but it would not be philosophy! And this is

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precisely why we cannot divide the great philosophers Plato,

Aristotle, Kant, Heidegger, Deleuze and so on into separate
parts, we cannot cut them into pieces. We know that there exists
something like the philosophy of Deleuze, but its not ontology,
and aesthetics, and politics, and so on. No! It is the philosophy
of Deleuze! And its also a style, a form of writing, a feeling,
and, finally, it is something that goes from an existential
experience to the creation of concepts, without being a
decomposition of the process into pieces. Philosophy, finally, is
a single thing, there is a unity of the philosophical construction!
And, in this sense, it is very much like a work of art, because it
is not a collection of different disciplines, techniques, colors and
so on, a work of art is a creation of something, and its the same
in philosophy. Philosophy, finally, is much more like a work of
art than something like an academic learning.
Thank you.

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4. Day Four

4.1 Lecture VII

There will be three parts to this afternoon. First, the end of
something concerning the philosophical conceptual process
with existence, being, event, fidelity, subject, truth and so on.
Second, a lecture, by me, of a text not the text you have, but
another text, which you will have as well. And, after that, a
discussion of your questions.
This morning we said that the philosophical process which is a
process with different steps, different conceptual constructions
and so on, and which is not an immediate intuition of the
infinite, as in mystical experience begins by something of
ontological nature existence, being and that at the end we
have truth, and that within this process we also have event,
fidelity and subject. All of this, naturally, can be different, in the
sense of a different language, with different conception, different
invention, and so on. And, sometimes there is a change of order
or a change of accent. But, finally, we find all of this in every
philosophical system. This sequence of concepts, this sequence
of constructions being, existence, event, fidelity, subject and
truth is the philosophical process in my proper language.
I can explain two differences, two details. First, the beginning is
something ontological, that is, it is something concerning being
and existence, or the two concepts in their relation. We can say
that the beginning is in a situation, and, in fact, all processes
begin in a situation, in a concrete situation. But a situation can
be thought from the point of view of being or from the point of
view of existence. At the beginning, therefore, there is a

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concrete situation, but at the philosophical level situation has

two possible meanings: first, a purely ontological one, and so
situation in the broad sense, or second, the situation from the
point of view of appearance, from the point of view of what
really exists in the situation. We have already seen that this is
precisely the dialectical nature of philosophy philosophy
always thinks the difference between being and existence.
All of this is to say that for philosophy there are two different
possible interpretations, two different analyses two different
philosophical analyses of the sequence of ontology, event,
fidelity, subject, and, finally, truth. There are two different ways
to think all of that: first from the point of view of being as such,
and so the situation is thought in its being, or second, from the
point of view of existence, that is, from the point of view of
appearance, from the point of view of what exists, of what
appears in the world.
We find a clear example of this difference in Hegel: in Hegel we
have two great books, The Phenomenology and The Logic. It is
clear: The Logic is the question of truth from the point of view
of being as such, and so Hegel begins the Logic with the
completely void concept of being as such we begin with being.
The Phenomenology the other great book of Hegel is from
the point of view of existence, and from the point of view of
consciousness its the other possibility. And the two books are
not at all in contradiction they are just two different
interpretations of the construction of the truth: first from the
point of view of pure being, and second from the point of view
of historical existence, from the specificity of a world, from the
history of consciousness. This distinction is very general and we
find it across the entire history of philosophy. For example, in
Plato we can find the same division: a book like Parmenides is
from the point of view of being, absolutely, but a book like The
Apology, for example, is form the point of view of concrete

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existence. But the question is the same! The question is not at all
a different question it is always the question of immanent
exception, and so the question of truth.
And so the distinction between pure being and appearance, or
being and existence, is also a methodological difference in
philosophy. It is not only an ontological difference, naturally,
but also a difference in the writing of philosophy. The two are
the two forms of writing philosophy. When you write from
existence very often your writing your style is not the same
as if you were to begin from pure being. In general, we can say
that when a philosopher begins by pure being the writing is very
logical, very strict, and very near mathematics, while if the
philosopher begins on the side of the concrete world, on the side
of existence or consciousness, the writing will be much more
like a novel, like a philosophical novel, like the story of truth in
a concrete world. And this distinction is not a contradiction, not
at all. It creates probably across the entire history of
philosophy two tendencies, two obscure tendencies, two styles
of writing philosophy. We have philosophers who prefer to
begin with the concrete world, with existence, and so on, and we
can name them existentialists, in some sense. And so
existentialists exist from the very beginning of philosophy. The
other tendency, which prefers to begin with pure being, we can
name essentialist and so we have something like existentialists
against essentialists from the very beginning. But, finally, every
great philosopher is both sometimes there is an exception,
sometimes.
In Heidegger this is the distinction between... being and being
between tre and tant the English language is not an
ontological language! The great English philosophical tradition
is empiricism, and its a great creation, a very important concept
its the creation of Hume, and Locke, and so on. But in
empiricism the idea is that we have to affirm that there is no

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difference between existence and being, that what we see, that

what exists in the world is really what exists absolutely, and that
there is nothing other than what appears. Finally, empiricism is
the idea that all that exists is our experience: everything of
which we have experience exists and also is, and only that is and
exists. But in every great attempt to be rigorously empiricist we
recognize something at the end, which is of ontological nature.
And why? Because its impossible to develop a consistent
philosophy which is strictly empiricist, its impossible. But the
idea is that there is no difference, that there is no difference
between being and existence. And it is why sometimes we
cannot translate a philosophical notion into English. Some
French distinctions, for example on the side of subjectivity,
begin by the subject, but it is a French word and not an English
word the English word is self, and it is not at all the same
thing as subject. On the side of ontological philosophy German
philosophy the difficulty of translating philosophy into English
concerns ontological concepts. And so the distinction with what
exists... between to exist and to be is very difficult to understand
in its complete consequences in English. When we must
translate the German present participle of being and the
infinitive to be we cannot translate it fully into English, its
impossible. And so, generally, the solution is to name being with
a big B and what exists with a small b.
So you see, language is always a symptom, because on the side
of to be we have a big B, and so there is a condition in
language for something more majestic, something more
important. But the tendency in empiricism is to say that this very
majestic, great Being is, in fact, nothing at all that Being is
nothing at all. And so, we must be content with the small b,
which is, finally, what exists and all that is. As you all know, all
of that is the history of what Heidegger named ontological
difference. For Heidegger, in fact, the entire history of
philosophy is the history of ontological difference. And the

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history of that sort of distance between to be and to exist is a

central concept in the philosophy of Heidegger explicitly, but it
is, ultimately, also a central concept in every philosophy. And
Heidegger is a great historian of philosophy precisely because
his interpretation of the entire history of philosophy is really
consistent with that distinction, with that sort of consistent vision
of the ontological difference between to be and to exist.
And so for philosophy there is not only one sequence of
concepts from ontology to epistemology from ontology to the
question of truth, from the question of being to the question of
truth but two possible interpretations of this sequence the
purely ontological interpretation, and the interpretation that
begins much more with appearance and existence. Sometimes
this distinction is named in the form of the opposition of
dogmatic philosophy, which is a philosophy of being, and
empiricist philosophy, which is exactly the philosophy of
existence. But I repeat every attempt to construct a
philosophical system is always a mixture of the two
interpretations. It is simply that sometimes the beginning is
much more on the side of empiricism, and sometimes the
beginning is much more on the side of ontology. But, finally, we
can always interpret a philosophy as an interdependency
between the two possibilities.
And, finally, this is why a lecture, or a reading of philosophy, is
practically always divided, and why its difficult to completely
unify a lecture, a reading, an interpretation.... Philosophy is
difficult not only because of the tension between particularity
and universality, or because we have the question of the nihilist
experience of nothingness and after that the construction of
affirmation, or even because philosophy is something which is
impure in its language, but also because there are two possible
beginnings for philosophy. There are two possible beginnings in
any treatise of philosophy, or any philosophical construction,

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and so we always have the question of the relationship between

the two, and also the reason for the choice of one beginning
rather than the other and all that is, finally, a subjective choice.
And it is because it is a subjective choice that we find both
beginnings across the entire history of philosophy. There is no
historical passage from the one beginning to the other. No! It
really is a subjective choice, a subjective choice between the two
beginnings.
What is the nature of this choice? When a philosopher, and
finally everybody everybody who reads philosophy prefers
one over the other, we must ask what the cause of this
preference is. I think that the grounds for this choice are the
different possible manners of confronting the primitive
experience of nihilism. That is the point. The cause is this
relationship to nothingness... because the experience of nihilism,
of nothingness, is purely a subjective one. Its an experience, its
really an experience, and not at all something which is of a
conceptual nature. And so the difference of subjectivity is also
the difference in the nature of this experience, which is, finally,
an experience of anxiety. We can absolutely recognize that sort
of experience in the style of the philosopher. Sometimes it is a
terrible experience, and the philosophy is then also something
like a means to escape this experience. The experience is a
necessity, certainly, but if the experience is a terrible thing, then
we have the desire to escape quickly, we have the desire to not
stay in nihilism. If you read the circumstances of the life of the
philosopher, there is always something like that. Generally that
sort of experience prefers the beginning on the side of being,
because existence is completely on the side of anxiety. And so
that sort of philosophy is a movement that desires to go
completely beyond the primitive experience of negativity to
some affirmation, and to do so as quickly as possible. But there
is also a form of philosophy where, on the contrary, the
experience of negativity is a temptation, and, in fact, something

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like a measure of the potency of life. In such a case the

experience is something like an experience of the limit of life.
And so, it is a temptation, and the philosopher then does not go
beyond that sort of experience quickly, but dwells in the
experience, he dwells on the description of that experience, on
the consequences of experience. This experience the very
nature of this experience then assumes a large place in the
philosophical disposition. Why? Precisely because it is not just a
point to be moved beyond.
I return to the example of Descartes, since Descartes is typical of
the first tendency. In Descartes we have a very precise
description of the negative character of the duped, of the
possibility of complete nihilism, of a complete destruction of all
possible knowledge. But Descartes moves very quickly to the
first affirmation which is precisely the affirmation of the pure
being of subjectivity. But if you read Nietzsche, or Kierkegaard,
on the other hand, you find a very long description of the
experience of negativity, and a great importance placed on this
existential experience of negativity. And in Schopenhauer, for
example, you find an entire philosophy that develops the
description of anxiety, suffering, and so on, as a very long and
important part of the philosophical disposition as such. And so
to return to our question the choice between the two possible
beginnings, the two necessary and possible sites of philosophy
the site of being and the site of existence is really of
biographical nature. It really is a purely subjective choice. As
you all know, Nietzsche has written that philosophy is the
biography of the philosopher: it is a philosophy, with concepts
and so on, but, ultimately, its also the story of the life of the
philosopher. As so often in Nietzsche, its not absolutely true but
its not absolutely false either. Its not absolutely false
because there really are some subjective, some biographical
elements in conceptual philosophy, and we must accept that sort
of immersion.

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And so it is impossible to reduce the figure of the philosopher to

the figure of the scientist, for example. Certainly the goal in each
case is to find something universal, but in a scientific result the
life of the scientist disappears. We can know that Einstein did
this and that, but, finally, the lives of great scientists are not in
the result: the result is the book, the theorem, the laws of physics
and so on, and all biographical elements disappear. The figure of
the scientist is the figure of the disparition of subjectivity. It is
not wanting of subjectivity there is a concrete situation and a
concrete scientist but the work itself organizes the disparition
of subjectivity. In philosophy, on the other hand, this is
impossible. In philosophy the subjectivity of the philosopher
cannot completely disappear. And so in some sense it is true
that there is always something biographical in a philosophy.
And, I propose the most important symptom of this is the choice
of the beginning the choice of beginning on the side of
existence, or beginning on the side of being. This choice is the
most important symptom of the very subjective nature of
philosophy.
Now, maybe, I can return to my case.... As you know, I have
written two big books of philosophy: the first is Being and
Event, and the second is Logics of Worlds. You can see by their
titles that the first one is on the side of being and the second on
the side of appearance, or existence. I can say something about
how from my proper experience I see the difference, the
difference between the two books. After all, if there is always
something biographical in a philosophy, allow me to expose
some biographical remarks concerning the difference of the two
books, by some subjective indications. The first book is really
under the question of what exactly is the possible understanding
of the being of truths, the question is: what is the being of truth,
if a truth is something like an immanent exception? Being and
Event is clearly the question of what is a truth from the position
of being. And so, when I was writing this book the great

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question was the order of concepts, it was a question of what I

can name constructive subjectivity. And why? Why is the
question of the order of concepts the first question? Because
truth comes at the end of the process of being-event-fidelitysubject-truth, and so, to understand what is the being of truth
you most to go from a conception of being to a conception of
truth with the same question, that is, with the question of being
itself. And so, it was necessary to explore the question of being
as such: it was necessary to ask what the being of an event is,
what the being of fidelity is, what the being of a subject is, and,
finally, what the being of truth is. The question of order was
absolutely essential. It was absolutely essential because if we do
not respect the order of concepts, then something of the very
nature of the question disappears, and what disappears, in fact, is
precisely the question of being! If we do not respect the order,
then we find ourselves not in the question of being but in the
question of the existence of truth the historical existence of a
truth by a subject, after a fidelity, in consequence of event, and
so on. And it was a very complex question, because, in general,
the question of the being of truth is not an immanent question.
In classical metaphysics and in a big part of the history of
philosophy in general, and in Heidegger too the question of the
being of truth is not exactly the question of its being, but very
often the question of its existence. For example, it is clear that
the great debate between skepticism and dogmatism in
philosophy has been over the existence of truth is it possible to
know something like a truth, or is it possible to know the truth,
and so on. In such a debate we have a certain conception of
truth, but the question is not over its being, but over our capacity
to know it it is a debate over the possibility and impossibility of
knowing the truth, and not over what it is. And such a discussion
concerns the existence of a truth it is not a discussion of its
being. Again, we find here another example of the distance
between to be and to exist.

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There is another side to this choice, which is in relation to the

context of the 1980's this book was written in '88: in the
context of the 80's the question of truth was always reduced to a
linguistic question. This was the dominant current. The question
was: is it possible for a proposition of a language to be true? Or:
what is the correct language to produce sentences which are
true? And so on. And so the question of truth was the question of
the truth of a proposition, of the truth of a judgment. My vision
of what a truth is, on the other hand, was not at all that sort of
vision. For me a truth can be a work of art, a political revolution,
a scientific theory, and so on, and a great love too, and its not
reducible to the strict question of the truth of a judgment. My
question is not: what am I saying when I say the snow is white?
That is an analytic question, a typical analytic question. Nor is
my question: why the judgment the snow is white is true? Nor
even: what I am saying when I say that the judgment, or
sentence, the snow is white is true? And so on. But this was
absolutely the context it was the dominant philosophical
disposition of that time. The dominant context was the reduction
of the question of truth not to the question what is a universal
creation in culture, but to the question of judgment, the question
of the sentence, of the proposition. At this time, truth was a
linguistic question, absolutely, and not at all an ontological one
the question of truth was not at all the question of the being of a
truth, but the question of what is a correct proposition, a correct
sentence. And so, I wrote Being and Event in a completely
different position than the dominant one.
In that sort of context it was an obligation for me to be
extremely strict in the order of the book, and so in its
construction, and to give the book the form of something like a
big proof, a big proof. It was necessary to give a big proof, a big
demonstration first of my definition of truth, and then a proof of
this conception. Given the dominant context, the book was also
in opposition to in a fight against the reduction of truth to

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purely linguistic criteria. And this is why this book has two
subjective characteristics: first, it is a book where the order is a
constructive order, and second, it is also a book that fights
against the dominant position, against the position that was
victorious in France during those years. The academy was
absolutely dominated by the analytic point of view. It was if
you like the Americanization of France. You know France is
always 20 years behind America? Even in this sense, because in
America purely analytic philosophy was largely finished when it
was victorious in France. It was paradoxical situation, and so
in some sense I was like Don Quixote, fighting against the
windmill. But that was the situation my situation and so
Being and Event is a book of a very strict nature, and a book in
which I was also saying to my enemies that on the side of logic
and mathematics I was perfect. And this was absolutely a part of
the demonstration, because, in general, they were saying wait,
wait, wait, you dont know anything about mathematics, and this
is why you dont adopt the analytic point of view. Logic and the
mathematics of logic were absolutely on the side of the
analytical point of view in the field of philosophy. And so Being
and Event was a demonstration to say that we could know logic,
mathematics, mathematizable logic perfectly and still affirm
something completely contradictory to the analytic position!
This book, in this way, posed a great problem for many years for
the analytic point of view, because generally speaking before
it, it was possible to say okay, okay, but French philosophy is
something on the side of literature, interpretations, hermeneutics,
it is something aesthetic, and so on, but it does not know the
serious questions, the questions of science, of mathematics, the
questions of logic, and so on, but after it, this was no longer
possible.
So you see philosophy is also always in a context, and its
always in a context of contradiction, in a fight, in a difficulty,
and the subjectivity, the philosophical subjectivity, is also a

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fighting subjectivity, and not at all a peaceful one. And so, Kant
was right: philosophy is a battlefield! We are beginning to see
why! It is because there are tendencies, positions, dialectical
constructions, oppositions, and so on. It is a necessity! The
subjectivity of Being and Event, then, was a contradictory
subjectivity: on one hand it was order, mathematics, pure
construction, demonstration, and all that, and on the other hand
it was a fighting subjectivity against the apparent victory of the
analytic tendency in the academic context of France in the
1980s. Naturally, the result is a book that is cold, very cold it
is a book in the form of a perfect construction with mathematics,
exactly in the place where mathematics must be.
And you know the book was completely ignored when it was
finished it was a complete failure, a complete failure in France,
but also in other countries. The first recognition of the book was
in the States I must say this. And this was a strange situation
for me, because it then became necessary for me to love
America. And so I recognize my debt to you, and to others,
because in France it was a real failure. But it was a failure for
one simple reason: it was a failure because it was impossible for
the enemies to say anything concerning this book it was
impossible because the book was perfect, in some sense. It was
perfect not because it was true, but because it was formally
perfect it was impossible to say Badiou does not know
anything concerning logic, mathematics, this was impossible.
And, in general, I know much more than the enemies concerning
that sort of thing. The good solution, the only possible solution,
was to say nothing. And this was precisely the result: there was a
complete silence concerning the book. And maybe this result
was the mark of a strategic failure, because in philosophy too
there is strategy, after all. And so the first book was in
something like a strange time, a strange time for it, naturally.

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The second book is completely different. The second book was

written after the first had been recognized, and so it was not
written within the failure of the first appearance of Being and
Event. It was a completely different context, and so I could write
Logics of Worlds in a completely different subjectivity, a
subjectivity which was much more free, much more anarchic.
I want to tell you now a short story. At the beginning of the new
century ten years after the first book I had, naturally, the
idea, the general idea, of the second book. I perfectly knew that
the second book had to be a book from the point of view of
existence, and not from the point of view of being. It was not my
Logic like Being and Event but my Phenomenology to be
Hegelian. And it is a book from the point of view of existence.
And so, the question was not the being of truth, but how a truth
appears in a world: Logics of Worlds assumes the problem of the
concrete appearance of a truth in a world. This is why one of its
main concepts is the body, the body of a truth, the material
existence of a truth in a concrete world. If in a world all is
bodies, we must, then, have something like the concrete body of
a truth. The truth must also be in a form of objectivity, not by
itself, naturally, but if a truth exists in a world of objects, then it
must have a body. Truth does not exist in some other,
transcendental world in the sky, and so on truth must exist
here, concretely, in this world. This was my question, and so
in some sense it was a completely different question than the
question of Being and Event.
When I began Logics of Worlds I had a strict order in mind, but
it was completely false I was trying to repeat Being and Event
and so it was impossible to write the book. The order was the
same existence, event, fidelity, subject, truth. And I was in
complete despair because it was impossible to write the book,
because the book was not good, and so on. During practically an
entire year while I was trying to write the book I was in a crisis,

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a real crisis. And it was a philosophical crisis, because I was

confronting the idea that maybe it was impossible to write
concerning truth from the point of view of existence. It was a
great difficulty, and a great problem, because if it is impossible
to write concerning truth from the point of view of existence,
then truth is something that does not exist, that cannot exist. And
so, if truth is it could only exist in another world, and so, by
necessity, we would have something like a religious solution, a
transcendent solution, a solution where truth is outside of the
world. And so, it was a crisis of my fundamental materialism,
because if truth cannot exist in a world and if I am materialist,
then I must conclude that truth does not exist at all or I must
conclude that truth exists in the sky of idealism, and so I would
be a dualist, and must recognize the existence of something like
a God. It was a profound crisis: it was a crisis between my
materialist subjectivity and the serious question of truth from the
double point of view of the being of truth and the existence of
truth.
And, now finally my little story. The possibility of going
beyond this crisis of passing through it was made possible by
a pure experience. I think, in fact, by something that is near a
mystic experience. I was in New York, and New York was
absolutely white, it was completely under snow, and there was a
complete silence in the city. The city was all white and in
complete silence, and I was alone, absolutely alone. And, finally,
I was also in complete despair because it was impossible to write
the second book. And then, suddenly, I had the vision of the
book its true, its really true, I had a vision of the book. And
at once I understood that the construction of the book cannot at
all be the construction of Being and Event, and that I had been in
a false subjectivity, and that I must transform my subjectivity.
For example, in order to explain the possibility of the existence
of a truth of the appearance of a truth in a world I had to be
much more in different examples, much more in a sort of

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153

disorder or in an appearance of disorder and, finally and

much more importantly I had to begin with the question of the
subject, and not finish with the question of the subject, like in
Being and Event. It was suddenly clear that the existence of the
subject must be affirmed at the beginning of the book and not at
the end. And, naturally so, since, if the point of departure is
existence then it must be a subjective point of departure. It was
sudden, and it was obvious I had to begin with the subject. I
had been in a false subjectivity, and only in the snow and silence
of New York, did I finally have the appropriate vision of the
book. After this I wrote the book in a few months, really it was
no problem at all. The book was practically finished before I had
written one line, because the vision of the book was the solution
to the problem. And finally maybe this is why I am not
against mysticism, after all, I have had my mystic experience in
the snow of New York. Its another American story. And so, not
only was the first book saved by American appreciation, but the
second exists because of a mystic experience in New York.
I want to now give you some experience of the difference
between the two books, because, after all, it is an exercise
concerning what I have been speaking about the first
beginning, and the second beginning. I will read to you two
lectures: the first is from just after Being and Event not just
after but from 1994 and the second is from just after Logics of
the Worlds it is from 2007. So I will read the first, and after
that I will give you the text. And tomorrow, I shall read you the
second lecture. Ultimately, all of this is just so you have a
perception, an idea, of the difference, and so a perception of the
two styles of philosophy. I will read the first lecture of 1994, the
title is: The Ethic of Truths: Construction and Potency. I will not
read the beginning to you you will have the text.
Modern philosophy is a criticism of truth as
adequation. Truth is not adequation rei et

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intellectus. Truth is not limited to the form of
judgment. Hegel shows that truth is a path.
Heidegger suggests that it is a historic destiny.
I will start from the following idea: a truth is, first
of all, something new. What transmits, what
repeats, we shall call knowledge. Distinguishing
truth from knowledge is essential. It is a
distinction which is already made in the work of
Kant: the distinction between reason and
understanding. It is a capital distinction for
Heidegger: the distinction between truth, aletheia,
and cognition or science, techne.
If all truth is something new, what is the essential
philosophical problem pertaining to truth? It is the
problem of its appearance and its "becoming". A
truth must be submitted to thought, not as a
judgement, but as a process in the real.
[]
For the process of a truth to begin, something must
happen. What there already is, the situation of
knowledge as such, only gives us repetition. For a
truth to affirm its newness, there must be a
supplement.

Just as a commentary: in Being and Event the event is conceived

not only as a cut in the situation but as a supplement of the
situation it is something which is near Derrida, by some
aspects and so for a truth to appear in its newness there must
be a supplement.

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This supplement is committed to chance. It is

unpredictable, uncalculable. It is beyond what is. I
call it an event.
A truth appears, in its newness, because an
eventful supplement interrupts repetition.
Examples: the appearance, with Aeschylus, of
theatrical tragedy; the irruption, with Galileo, of
mathematical physics; an amorous encounter
which changes a whole life; or the French
Revolution of 1792.
An event is linked to the notion of the
undecidable. Take the utterance: "This event
belongs to the situation". If you can, using the
rules of established knowledge, decide that this
utterance is true or false, the event would not be
an event. It would be calculable within the
situation. Nothing permits us to say: here begins a
truth. A wager will have to be made. This is why a
truth begins with an axiom of truth. It begins with
a decision. The decision to say that the event has
taken place.
The fact that the event is undecidable imposes the
constraint that a subject of the event must appear.
Such a subject is constituted by an utterance in the
form of a wager. This utterance is as follows:
"This has taken place, which I can neither
calculate, nor demonstrate, but to which I shall be
faithful".
So the question of the event in Being and Event is directly in
correlation with the subject. The event exists, naturally, but we

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have no proof, and no demonstration of that sort of existence.

The only attestation, the only proof of the event, is the decision
of the subject, the decision of this new subject. The decision of
the subject says: This has taken place, the event is real, I can
neither calculate, nor demonstrate this point, but I shall be
faithful to my decision.
A subject is, to begin with, what fixes an
undecidable event, because he takes the chance of
deciding it.
This engages the infinite procedure of the
verification of the true.
So you see: the beginning of a truth is a decision and the process
of the truth is the verification of this decision. We cannot have
any guarantee at the beginning the guarantee is retroactive.
The guarantee is the retroactive verification that my decision
was a true decision, and so it is in the consequences of the
decision and not in the decision itself, and that is why we have
this infinite procedure of the verification of the true.
It's the examination, within the situation, of the
consequences of the axiom which decided the
event. It's the exercise of fidelity. Nothing
regulates its course, since the axiom which
supports it has arbitrated outside any rule of
established knowledge.
All this is outside of any rule, any fixed rule, of the situation
itself. We have no knowledge which could be the orientation of
the process. We have it only in the consequences of the first and
pure decision.

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It is then a hazardous course, or a course without

a concept.
So the process of a truth is a process without concept.
But what is a pure choice, a choice without a
concept? It's obviously a choice confronted by two
indiscernible terms. Two terms are indiscernible if
no effect of language permits their distinction. But
if no formula of language distinguishes two terms
of the situation, it is certain that the choice of
having the verification pass by one rather than the
other can find no support in the objectivity of their
difference. It is then an absolutely pure choice,
free from any presupposition other than that of
having to choose, with no indication marking the
proposed terms; the choice by which the
verification of the consequences of the axiom will
first pass.
All that is very important. The event happens, but in some sense
it is only the subject who confirms that the event happened, and
so its a decision. After the decision we have a process of
verification term by term of the decision, but there is no
objective, that is, no existing knowledge of the situation, which
can orient the choice, because if you were to have some such
knowledge then the event would not be an event, but something
that is a part of the situation. And so we are confronted after an
event with a succession of pure choices pure choices that are
not irrational, but are not included in the knowledge inside the
situation, and so are not inside the world. There is, then,
something that must be decided on without any guarantee for
that sort of decision, and such a succession of choices is the
process of a truth a process without any guarantee in the given,
existent knowledge of the situation.

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This means that the subject of a truth demands

the indiscernible. The indiscernible organizes the
pure point of the subject in the process of
verification. A subject is what disappears between
two indiscernibles.
This is a definition of the subject: a subject makes pure choices,
and so it is a series of choices between indiscernible terms. And,
in fact, the subject is something like a disparition between these
choices of one term over another. Finally, we can say that a
subject disappears between two indiscernibles.
A subject is the throw of the dice which does not
abolish chance, but accomplishes it as a
verification of the axiom which founds it. What
was decided concerning the undecidable event
must pass by this term, indiscernible from its
other.
So we must decide, but we must decide between two
indiscernible terms, and we decide in the form of our conviction
that the consequences of the indiscernible event must pass by
this term.
Such is the local act of a truth. It consists in a
pure choice between two indiscernibles. It is then
absolutely finite.

For example, the world of Sophocles is a subject

for the artistic truth that Greek tragedy is, a truth
initiated by the event of Aeschylus. This work is
creation: pure choice in what, before it, was
indiscernible. And it is a finite work. However,

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159

tragedy itself, as artistic truth, continues unto

infinity. The work of Sophocles is a finite subject
of this infinite truth.
In the same way, the scientific truth decided by
Galileo is pursued unto infinity. But the laws of
physics which have been successively invented are
finite subjects of this truth.
We continue with the process of a truth. It began
with an undecidable event. It finds its act in a
finite subject confronted by the indiscernible. The
course of verification continues; it invests the
situation with successive choices.
That is the point, and we can experiment all of that. For
example, in the course of a love, a true love, we have successive
choices. The construction of a truth is always in the form of
successive choices, and there is no determination in the
succession of choices. If you have a determination by
knowledge, then there is no construction of something new. I
return to the beginning of the text: a truth is fundamentally
something new, something not reducible to the pure context of
the situation. And why is such a construction the construction of
something new? Precisely because it is not determined by the
situation if it was determined by the situation it would not be
something new. And so we must include in the definition of
truth that truth is constructed by a succession of choices that are
not simply the execution of determination inside the situation.
This finally is why the progressive construction of a truth is
something in relationship with pure chance: the chance of the
event and the successive chances of pure choices, without any
complete determination. And I think you can refer to your
experiences of participation in a truth in your life in political
engagement, in an acceptation of a great love, in the effect of a

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work of art, and so on to understand this point.

In any case we have to make choices precisely there where they
are not determined by the terms of the choice, and so there is
something like a pure or instinctive choice which is in the
dependency of an event and which is a choice to be faithful to
the event by the choices themselves. And maybe it is a correct
choice, and maybe it is not that is the point. We cannot have a
primitive certainty concerning the correctness of such choices,
but we must make them. It is these types of choices and their
deployment within the situation which constitute the
construction of a truth.
Little by little the contour of a subset of the
situation is outlined, in which the eventful axiom
verifies its effects. It is clear that this subset is
infinite, that it remains interminable. Yet it can be
stated that if we suppose it to be ended, it will
ineluctably be a subset that no predicate unifies.
An untotalizable subset.
This is the most difficult point. The idea is that by successive
choices we construct something new in the situation, the name
of which is truth. We are in the situation, and so this
construction is not something in the sky the construction of a
truth is a terrestrial process, a human process. We are in a
situation, always, and we construct by successive choices
something new. And this something new is from an
ontological point of view purely and simply a subset of the
situation, it is a singular collection of elements of the situation.
Again, because we are inside and not outside of the situation, a
truth cannot but be a subset of the situation. But this subset
cannot be made by the world as it is, by the situation as it is,
simply because if this was the case this subset would not be
something new. If, for example, the subset is a subset of cars

What is Philosophy?

161

within the situation, or a subset of tables, and so on, naturally it

is not something new. If we have a name within the situation to
designate the new subset, then the subset is not new, because it
would be a subset that is recognizable in the situation and before
the event, by some existing name. A subset is new only if it is
without name, that is, only if it is unrecognizable in the situation
from the point of view of knowledge.
It is not easy either to understand how, or even to accept that,
there can be a constructed subset in the situation that cannot be
recognizable by the knowledge of the situation. But if it is a
subset constructed by pure-choices, then there is no
determination of it, and so there cannot be any recognition by
the knowledge of the situation. And so, such a subset cannot
have a name, it must be as we have said anonymous. There
is, then, a relationship between a succession of free choices
constitutive of a subset of a situation but without any reference
in the situation and the construction of a truth. And, finally,
this is why a truth cannot be part of knowledge and the two, in
fact, are distinct.
Maybe, the simplest example of all of this is the case of love.
The event is a pure encounter between somebody and somebody
else, and the decision that it is an event is a declaration, for
example, the declaration I love you. And what is the
signification of something like that? It is exactly the decision
that such an encounter with somebody is an event and not
something within the law of the situation it is something
absolutely new in your life, and the translation of that is always
a declaration. And a declaration cannot be but a decision. We
are, of course, in the hypothesis that it is a true decision and not
a false decision, that is, that you are not saying I love you for
sexual reasons and so on. But after that we must construct
something which is the real of that love, and we perfectly know

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by our experience that for that we have to make some free

choices, a succession of free choices concerning sexuality,
organization, a child, and so on. All of that must be decided,
and, naturally, there is nothing in the situation no knowledge,
no law which authorizes that sort of choice, which determines
it for you. Ultimately, you must invent the law of the choice,
because the law of that choice does not exist it does not preexist the choice and so every love is singular, every love is a
creation. Finally through this succession of choices you
construct a subset of the situation, which is the real of your love,
and it is a subset without any name in the situation. Certainly
you can have an abstract name it is a love but the name of
this concrete love does not exist, naturally. Maybe you also
invent a name our love is named.
All of that, finally, is a truth it is the process of a truth. A truth
is a construction: a truth is under this paradigm of an event, a
decision concerning this event, a succession of free choices, the
construction of a subset, and this subset is a subset without
name, a subset which is not included within the knowledge of
the situation, finally, a truth is not only not named in the
situation and not in its knowledge, but it cannot be in the
knowledge, because it is the result of successive free choices
without any existent law in the situation itself. And this sort of
subset is a generic subset. And it is, maybe, the central concept
of Being and Event: a generic set is a set which is not included in
the knowledge of the situation, and, in this sense, it is really a
new subset, a new subset within the situation, and a subset
which is without name, without place in knowledge, and which
is something like a supplement to the situation. And that, finally,
is the solution to the problem of what is the being of a truth the
being of a truth is a generic set. So Being and Event was a
response to a problem, and this is the solution of this problem.

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163

So we stop here. I have read only a part of the text, but I give the
text to my savior who is without name okay, my savior is
here. You take the text and you give a copy to everybody.

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4.2 Discussion I



We can begin. Lionel is here because, like Wallace Stevens, he
speaks both languages completely. And so in case of an oral
discussion which is a possibility Lionel can explain to me the
point if it is obscure for reasons of hearing or understanding. So,
today we will discuss not the questions of today which we
will, instead, discuss tomorrow but the questions of yesterday.
I propose a classification of the questions: some questions on the
anthropological nature of philosophy, then some concerning the
dialectical nature of philosophy, and dialectics more generally,
and finally specific questions concerning the concept of
immanent exception.
Lionel will read the questions. The first question on the
anthropological nature of philosophy is a question of Cecilia.
And, what is the question?
Question 1: If indigenous societies are incapable of
philosophical investigation within their own traditions and in
their own languages, how can they participate as individuals
and as societies in the production of a future, without
abandoning their cultures and becoming westernized? Is
philosophy necessary or desirable in such a case? Is it possible
that western philosophy lags behind indigenous traditions
regarding the interrelatedness of living beings and natural
phenomena?
[Badiou]: Thank you for this question which is, in some sense,
a central question today: it is the question of the relationship

What is Philosophy?

165

between dominant societies and poor societies, or weak

societies, in the contemporary world. I want to explain that the
question of universality is not first a question of philosophy. The
question of universality is in my language the question of the
existence of truths. But, finally, the question is of the existence
and the creation of something that is of universal value. That sort
of creation is not primitively in the field of philosophy it is an
artistic creation, a scientific creation, a political creation, a
human creation in general, they are creations concerning the
signification of life, and so on. And we must affirm that the
possibility of that sort of creation exists in all societies. And so
we are not at all saying that the possibility of universal truth is a
possibility exclusively inside the western world, not at all.
Philosophy is something particular, and, in some sense, not
universal across the western world itself. Philosophy is what is
possible after something else, it is a thought, a form of thought,
that is possible only in a second moment, because the condition
for the existence of philosophy is the existence of some truths
artistic creations, for example, or mathematical inventions, great
loves, some great poems, and so on. All of this must exist before
philosophy, and independently of philosophy. It is the case that
in some circumstances philosophy does not exist, but there are
also cases where philosophy exists. Philosophy comes after,
after the real processes of truths. And I have given some
examples of truths which certainly are the creations of societies
which are not inside the western world, like African sculpture,
various visions of our relationship to nature, and so on, and so
on. And so, for philosophy it is a question, a duty, an obligation,
of taking into account all creations the value of which is or can
be universal, and not at all only creations from the western
world. Philosophy must think all creations that can be
understood universally, all creations that can come back to life,
if you want, in any country, in another world. That is the first
point.

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The second point is that while philosophy was a local creation it

was and it is addressed to everybody. And so, where philosophy
does not exist the task of the philosopher is first to understand
that in that sort of society without philosophy truths exist
original creation exists and to take account of this in the field
of philosophy, and secondly, to explain why philosophy does not
exist in all cultural contexts. But, after that, philosophy must
also account for why by way of contact with new truths
philosophy is possible in that particular determinate culture.
And so, there is no contradiction between the local existence of
philosophy and the existence of societies and cultures that are
not historically enclosed in the western world. There would be a
contradiction only if philosophy was the affirmation that truths
exist or that they can be created only in the western world and
this would be, in fact, an imperialist position. But, on the
contrary, we must affirm especially today, and philosophy is no
exception here that the existence of truths, of the existence of
creativity concerning universal truths, is not at all limited to the
western world, but and as the evidence suggests that there
exist many things outside the western world, which are of
universal value. And, finally, the task of philosophy in
particular of the political part of philosophy is to fight against
the idea that the western world is a good world. It is not at all the
case that because philosophy is a creation of the western world
that it must confirm that it is a good world. In fact, by the
creation of philosophy the western world created something that
is largely the place of the critique of the western world itself.
And it is across the history of philosophy the great tradition
of philosophy to be the strong critic of its proper world, that is,
to fight against the monopolization of the human destiny by the
western world.
And so the question was absolutely a good question. And,
finally, it points to why it is so important in my conviction to

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say that philosophy is under conditions. There is no pure

autonomy of philosophy, it is under conditions, it is under the
condition of the existence of truths. And so, if the existence of
truths is not by necessity inside this world but exists in all forms
of worlds, then the consequence is that philosophy is under the
condition of the existence of the multiplicity of cultures, and not
one culture.
There is now an anonymous question.
Question 2: You spoke yesterday about the effect of
demonstrative mathematics in philosophy, in Greece. Do you
believe that quantum physics has had, or will have, an effect on
contemporary philosophy? Has it influenced your thinking in
any way?
[Badiou]: This is an example of the question of the conditions of
philosophy. And I absolutely affirm that developments in
science, or by science, are always important conditions for the
development of philosophy.
You perfectly know, for example, that the beginning of
philosophy would be impossible without the birth of
mathematics, more specifically, of demonstrative mathematics in
Greece. And so, it is a good question to ask whether this sort of
revolution in the field of physics like the creation of quantum
mechanics, for example has effects in the field of philosophy.
And my response, naturally, is yes. And, certainly, the most
important consequence of this development is that by the
mediation of quantum mechanics we have the eruption of
probability into the vision of the natural world, we have as a
result of quantum mechanics a not-completely deterministic
vision of physics.
During the first part of the last century there were two
revolutions in the field of physics: first, relativity, and second,

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quantum mechanics. The problem, as you know, is that these

two revolutions are not exactly in accord, the problem is that
there is a great tension between them. But, certainly, relativity
has changed the philosophical conception of time. After the
purely linear conception of time in Newtonian physics, we have
a new conception of time, which is in close relationship to space.
And space and time, as you all know, are, in some sense, the true
framework for the description of nature. And so we are in a
universe with four dimensions, and not only three. In the same
direction, quantum mechanics has informed philosophy of the
relation of determination and chance, or determination and
contingency. And this inclusion of contingency, of chance, in
fact, shows a sense in which my conception is opposed to that of
classical metaphysics, where truth is always in a close
relationship with determination, with necessity. The only
exception to this relationship was sometimes the grace of
God. But in the field of sciences proper, truth was always
associated with a deterministic vision of nature. With quantum
mechanics we have something different.
We could say that my inclusion of the event into the definition
of truth has a certain correspondence with the idea of
indetermination in quantum mechanics. In fact my master
Althusser many years ago also proposed a materialism that
included some effect of chance, he called it aleatory materialism.
And so, once again, my answer to the question is yes yes the
existence of quantum mechanics has had an effect on
philosophy.
I think that today it is impossible to say, to maintain, that the
fundamental and unique relation in nature is the relation between
cause and effect. If you read Spinoza or Descartes, for example,
for them it is evident that all relationships in nature are of the
form of the relationship of cause and effect, and their vision,
naturally, was a deterministic vision of nature as a system of

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necessities. I think that under the condition of modern science it

is impossible to maintain this point of view, precisely because
we must understand that in nature itself not only human nature,
but nature itself there is a part of un-determination.
These two questions were questions concerning the context of
philosophy, the anthropological nature of philosophy. And now
we have a question concerning the dialectical nature of
philosophy it is a technical question, but a historical and
philosophical question too. It is a question from Jake.
Question 3: Hegel distinguishes the particular from the singular
as the description of the object, or subject, and the object, or
subject in itself. The singular in its uniqueness has a universal
quality. Does your relation between the particular and universal
ignore this third term singularity? If so, why?
[Badiou]: Naturally, if we have to think something that is, in
some sense, in a particular context, and, in another sense,
universal, certainly we must say like Hegel that there is a
singularity of that sort of thing, that that sort of thing is singular.
Singularity, in Hegel, is something like a synthesis of
particularity and universality. And we must assume this point: a
truth is a singularity, absolutely. And it is very important to say
that a truth is not a generality but a singularity. For example, a
truth is a sequence of works of art, a scientific theory, a specific
love, and so on. A truth exists as a singularity, and there is a
uniqueness to each truth a truth is singular, always. And so it is
completely opposed to the vision of truth as a judgment.
When we think of truth as the truth of a judgment, universality is
the universality of the proposition. But what is the universality
of a proposition? It is always to say that for every x this property
is true. And so there is always something like a universal
quantifier, and so it is always in the form of a generality. We

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again find a contradiction between our vision and the analytic

point of view, in that the dialectical vision affirms that truth
cannot be reduced to the generality of a proposition or judgment.
A truth is a creation, a production, and there is always a unicity
to a truth, a truth is always singular, it is always a singularity, in
its existence.
Naturally, there are different forms: it can be the singularity of a
collective action, a revolutionary collective action, and so the
singularity of a political event, or it can be the singularity of a
sequence of works of art, and so on. And so there are different
forms of singularity, but I can say and the question is a very
good question that, naturally, a truth is a singularity, since
there is no possibility of thinking something that is particular
and universal without that thing being singular, precisely
because it is not the generality of a judgment but the absolute
singularity of the existence of something. And this, in fact, is
why the possibility of resurrection exists for that sort of thing: it
can come back to life in another world, precisely because it is
not an abstract generality but a concrete existence of a
singularity.
[Student]: Is singularity the marriage of the universal and the
particular?
[Badiou]: From a strictly logical point of view and this is the
case in Hegel, in some sense we can define the singularity as
the synthesis of universality and particularity. But, naturally, this
synthesis is a little more complex it is more complex precisely
because singularity is always a process of creation and not a just
a mechanical synthesis, a mechanical conjunction. To use your
metaphor: the synthesis of universality and particularity is much
more a birth it is a construction of something universal out of
particularity, by particular material. And so logically
speaking yes: something singular is in the form of a result of

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particularity and universality, but it is not so abstract, because

that sort of thing is not directly inside the particular. A properly
universal singularity is something created out of particularity but
which attains a universal value, and so it is not an abstract
synthesis of the particular and the universal, since, in fact, the
universal does not exist before the creation of the singularity.
If you were to say that the universal existed before, then you
would have to admit that there is another world where that
universal exists already, and where it has always existed. But it
does not: universality is the disposition of the singularity with
its uniqueness, its origin, and its creation. We can give many
examples it is not at all very difficult. For example, a new
invention in the field of artistic creation is certainly at the very
beginning purely particular, it is from within a concrete situation
of painting, of music, and so on, and so you create something in
a field which is particular, with some historical state and so on,
but the result may be singular. And so universal value is a
possibility, and not a mechanical result, it is a possibility for a
creation that originates in particularity. After all, it is possible
and in fact most creations are of this sort that a creation
remains in particularity and nothing more. We cannot say that
such a creation is always universal, certainly. And so, a creation
is first by necessity something made of particular means, inside a
particular world, and so on, and after that it is possible that its
destiny is universality a destiny that has to be verified, verified
by resurrection.
[Student]: If the verification of an event is constructed out of a
sequence of free choices, how can this be distinguished from
personal biography?
[Badiou]: There is no general law concerning this point. For
example, if we have something like a political event it is
localized, always it is the revolt of students or workers in some

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particular country, at some particular time, like May 68, for

example. And the individual position concerning this event is in
the form of a declaration: if you engage your personal existence
in the fight, in the revolt, in the movement, its a decision its
a decision. That it is a decision is clear because we know that
some people make this decision and others do not. The
verification of this decision is possible only through the
successive consequences of that sort of decision. And there is
always a mixture between something that is, in some sense,
purely collective the existence of the revolt, for instance, the
objective of the revolt, and so on and something purely
individual the decision. And so we have something like a
conjunction between something collective, a collective event
which is political precisely because it is collective and what I
can name the atomic choices of individuals. But the collective is
ultimately composed of individual choices, but without complete
determination between the two. It is not because an event is
collective that individuals are determined to be inside the event.
And this is, in fact, why the consequences of an event in a
situation cannot be as a pure collective necessity. Certainly there
is something like that something like a collective necessity
but it is, finally, also composed of what you call biographical
decisions. And why? Why is some individual completely
engaged in a situation and another is not? There is, naturally,
some determination he is a student, he is in some university
where the revolt is strong, he is a worker, he has leftist parents,
and so on and so on but there is always a point where we
cannot inscribe the incorporation purely by determination. Why?
Precisely because empirically speaking we can always find
someone who has the same determinations but who is not in the
revolt. Determination plays a big part, certainly, but there is
always a point, maybe a very small point, which is not reducible
to the determination. And this part, this small part, is, after all,
what can be named freedom. There is something of freedom in

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the atomic decisions constitutive of the consequences of an

event.
And so we can examine a collective event from two completely
different perspectives, from two different points of view: from
the massive determinations, which is also correct in the
situation there are important places, important conjunctions, like
the conjunction of workers and students, there are important
contradictions, and so on but we must also describe all that
from the point of view of the atomic decisions of somebody, and
this is, finally, inside all of this. And it is, finally, always
something like the crossing of the two that constitutes the
possibility of a new truth. And, in Logics of Worlds, I name this
incorporation, the process of the incorporation of individuals
into the body of a truth. But incorporation is only a possibility, it
is a necessity for the process of a truth, but it is only a
possibility, a possibility, naturally, open to everyone. All that
there is, after an event, after some interruption, is, in fact, just a
new possibility. Naturally, if there is no revolt at all the
possibility of being inscribed in the revolt does not exist, but, in
reverse, it is not because there is a collective event, a revolt
which is localized somewhere that there is complete
determination to be inside the collective revolt. And so, maybe it
is like quantum mechanics after all: there is a collective result
which at the macroscopic level is like determination, but if you
focus on what is inside, on the atomic decisions, you find
something which is not determined.
[Student]: What is the distinction between a decision and a
judgment?
[Badiou]: A decision can be without judgment: a decision is
when you personally decide to be engaged in a process, and it is
not reducible to a judgment. Naturally, if you are or become
engaged in some truth-process you are saying that it is a good

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process, and you have your reasons and so on, but all that, in the
end, is a justification. But the act of decision itself is an act, it is
an act and not a judgment. A judgment can be a justification of
an act, and it can be among the reasons for the act, but, finally,
to decide something is to do something and not only to say that
something is good. And, in fact, in a political situation, or an
existential situation in general, we can make a clear distinction
between a positive judgment concerning a process and an
affective participation in the process they are not at all the
same thing. This is why there is always the possibility of making
a judgment but to not be inside of a movement. And this, in fact,
is where I oppose Hannah Ardent, for example for her the
political is the place of judgment, but I think that this is not
completely the case. We have, for example, the question not
only of the political judgment but also of political action, and we
know perfectly even through experience that it is not the
same thing. There is, for one, no pure determination from a
judgment to an action, and the central part of political activity is
action, collective action, absolutely. And we can see this
perfectly in concrete politics today: we can have a judgment
concerning the government, or concerning some decision of the
government, but without any change in the situation, precisely
because a change of the situation is an active change not a pure
question of opinion. In my country, for example, we know that
the opinion, the majority of opinion, is against the government
of Sarkozy, but Sarkozy continues to do the job. There is
something in pure opinion which is an impotency it is without
organization, without mobilization, without action, and so on.
And this, finally, is proof that the political field is not reducible
to the question of opinions, but to the question of the existence
of a real process, to the construction of a new political truth.

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Next there is a question from Laura.

Question 4: If knowledge can be dialectical, then how and
where, can it, or does it, rupture?
[Badiou]: The dialectical vision of knowledge is a vision of
knowledge that includes the existence of ruptures inside the
development of knowledge itself. It is only in the analytical
vision of knowledge that we assume the continuity of the
development of knowledge. In the dialectical vision of
knowledge we have an affirmation of the existence of ruptures.
And, in fact, we can see that in the history of the sciences. In the
history of sciences we have definite ruptures at some points. It is
not only in the political process or the artistic process, but in the
scientific process too that we have very important ruptures. For
example, in the passage of the conception of time in Newtonian
physics to the conception of time in the physics of Einstein there
is a real revolution. It is not a revolution outside of knowledge,
but a revolution inside the development of knowledge itself, it is
a revolution in physics. The dialectical vision recognizes that
there exist ruptures in the development of knowledge, and so,
knowledge is not a pure accumulation, or a pure continuity.
There is really a discontinuity, an objective discontinuity in the
development of knowledge, and so there is an immanent
negation because, in some sense, the physics of Einstein is the
negation of Newtonian physics, but in another sense it is a
development and continuation of physics itself there is a level
where Newtonian physics is true, and there is another level, a
more cosmic level if you want, where only relativity is true. And
so it is really dialectical in the sense that in the passage from
Newtonian physics to Einsteinian physics there is a synthesis of
negation and construction. There is negativity inside of scientific
development, absolutely. And this, finally, is why we cannot
stay in the purely analytical vision of science.

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[Student]: The dialectical movement of knowledge also has a

practical side. How is the relationship that physics has to
knowledge different from other dialectical knowledges in so
far as in physics you can observe but not interrupt the object you
are observing, that is, you can be just testing a hypothesis?
[Lionel]: So you are saying is there a difference between
[Student]: Between dialectical knowledge in physics and
dialectical knowledge in social fields?
[Badiou]: I think that there is a difference because the two
determinations are not the same, and also because social
contradictions have a dimension which is subjective. And so we
have to take into account the negativity of consciousness, and
the negativity of practical action and so on. The forms of
negativity are probably not the same. Maybe in social
contradictions there is something destructive there is some
conflict between enemies, there is class struggle, there are wars
and so there is a place for violence and destruction. In the
development of science there is negation, there is revolution,
there is brutal transformation, but it is not properly violence and
destruction, because it is not in concrete reference to the notion
of subjectivity, and subjectivity is there also in relation to others,
and maybe, sometimes, to enemies. And so we can have a form
of contradiction named antagonistic contradiction. Maybe,
finally, the difference between dialectics in the social question
and dialectics in the scientific question is the fact that in the
social question contradiction can be an antagonistic
contradiction, and so a contradiction without synthesis.
Question 5: Ruptures have been referred to as violent ruptures.
Are there non-violent ruptures? What is the definition of
violence? And what is the difference between rupture and
interruption?

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[Badiou]: We are, in some sense, in the same field as the last

question. Violent ruptures was a metaphor, it was not the idea of
violence in the precise sense of violence concerning bodies,
concerning life and death and so on. When I said that ruptures
are violent it was only in the sense that a rupture is really a
rupture its a metaphor. It was to say that a rupture is a
surprising transformation, something that is not in a peaceful
continuation. In this sense the passage from Newtonian physics
to Einsteinian physics is a violent passage and, in fact, there
exist resistances, oppositions, conflicts, and so on it was not a
peaceful passage with a global consensus concerning the
passage. This was the signification, the metaphorical
signification of violence.
If we take violence in the sense of antagonistic contradiction
with the possibility of destruction, war, death, and so on then
my answer is that there exist non-violent ruptures. If violence is
not the metaphorical designation of true change, with opposition,
resistance, and so on, but something where there is a will to
destroy somebody or something, to destroy completely, and to
be victorious, and so on, then the rupture between the two forms
of physics is non-violent. And so, for the first question my
answer is connected immediately to the second question the
definition of violence since the second is the key to the first.
Violence is not a simple notion, because violence has a weak
signification and a strong signification. The weak signification
of violence is precisely that something happens which is like a
choice, which is surprising, which is not in the quiet continuity
of life, of existence, and so on, something happens, but in the
radical sense, something happens which is not reducible to the
state of affairs. And in this weak sense this metaphorical sense
we can say that some experience was a violent experience
and it does not mean there was death, war, bodies suffering, and
so on. Rather, all we are saying in such a case is that there is
some experience of newness. In this sense an amorous

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encounter, for example, can be violent as can the effect of a

very impressive work of art, or the effect of a very extraordinary
film, book, and so on. In this case we define violence as a big
disruption to existence. But in its strong sense violence is really
in relationship to antagonistic contradiction, that is, to a situation
where it is impossible to find a way without the destruction of
one of the two terms of the contradiction. For example, if you
are on a real battlefield, then defeat or victory is a radical
question and we must destroy the forces of the enemy. And
violence, true violence, is under something like a law of death, it
is a question of death, in fact. And this is why we generally
name something where the question of death is present, or where
the question of suffering is present, violent. And so violence in
the strong sense - in our world is very often the question of the
bodies of human beings, it is a corporeal question, it is a
question of torture, death, suffering, and also moral suffering.
For example, an amorous rupture which can be a traumatic
rupture can be very violent, and, as you know, there are
amorous murders, they exist, but it is not violent in the strong
sense of the word. Love has many truths, certainly, and it is also
dangerous, and because of this it is something violent. If we take
the weak sense, then we can say that there is violence in every
truth: a new truth, or even a resurrected truth, always has a
violent beginning, a violent newness, it is surprising, it is
something that is not really in the situation, and it is something
of universal value, something that is beyond the world as it is,
beyond the situation, and so its a violence against that situation,
certainly, because if it becomes a truth its proper world cannot
remain the same. But, strictly speaking I return to the point
violence in the strong sense is in play only in antagonistic
contradiction between two persons, to classes, and so on.
And now the difference between rupture and interruption.
Concerning violence the question is, probably: what is the rule
concerning violence, that is, is there a moral rule over violence

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in the context of a truth? And, naturally, this is also the question

of non-violence. This is an important question today, absolutely.
For example: is there a possibility of revolutionary politics
today, in the context of non-violence? It is a very difficult
question because what is to be done in a situation where you are
non-violent but the enemy is violent? It is always a problem.
And I think I cannot develop this point because it is a very
complex one, but I think that we cannot completely eliminate
the possibility of defensive violence. Aggressive violence is
generally a bad thing, but the contemporary complete
suppression of even defensive violence is for me a real
difficulty. Precisely because you can have a situation where the
very essence of the enemy is to be violent the most famous
example is fascism: fascism assumed absolutely that violence is
right, and the will to destroy all of its enemies is a characteristic
of that sort of politics. Suppose that you construct something
which is popular, peaceful, and so on, and then you have a
fascism with the will to destroy all of that, to kill everybody, and
so on here, concretely, non-violence is very difficult! And so
the dialectic between non-violence and violence is a complex
dialectic, concretely. And I think that today we dont completely
have the measure of the problem, and it is a problem. You know
the experience of non-violence in India, for example, but at the
end of that there was extraordinary violence between Muslims
and Hindus. The question is really an open question.
[Student]: To continue with this discussion on rupture. It seems
that this idea of rupture as in May 68 is no longer possible,
because in our advanced capitalist society all chances for
rupture are automatically absorbed or mediated, and so the
chance for rupture is removed. And I am thinking of September
11th in the United States, the Banlieue Riots of 2005, the antiwar protests or even the Tarmac 9. All that was absorbed or
mediated and the chance for rupture never occurred. May 68

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all of the thought that led to it, the actions, the people coming
together never has the chance to occur in our society now.
[Badiou]: I understand the question but, finally, you know,
when I was in France in 1967 the situation was completely quiet,
the system was excellent, there was no revolt at all, de Gaulle
was celebrated by everybody. And so the interruption, the
rupture of May 68, was certainly impossible. And an event, a
true event, is always the apparition of something that is
impossible that was impossible this is a characteristic of an
event. If something is the creation of a possibility inside the
situation, then it is not an event, then it is only a possibility of
the situation, a rational possibility. And there are, certainly,
some politicians who are saying that this position is possible:
they say precisely that we can have a rational possibility inside
the situation which would be a true change. But an event is
precisely the making possible of something that was impossible,
it is precisely the possibilization of an impossibility that is, in
fact, a possible definition of an event. And its true, in 1966,
1967 France was a quiet country. There was intellectual activity,
very dense intellectual activity, okay, but on the side of the large
masses of students, workers, and so on, it was a stable situation.
And nobody was speaking of revolution, abstractly yes but as
a fact it was absolutely not a possibility. And so we return with
your question to the definition of the real by Lacan: the
definition of the real is the impossible, the real of the event is its
impossibility from the point of view of the situation, from the
point of view of being and existence. And so it is rupture that is
at question a rupture is always when something that everybody
thinks is impossible takes place. And what is the difference
between rupture and interruption? If an interruption is only the
end of a part of the situation, and if that is the end of the process
then there is no rupture. For example, the interruption of
somebodys life is not by necessity a rupture we all know this
very well. And so if there is a rupture then there is an

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interruption, an interruption of repetition, but the reverse is not

the case some interruptions are not ruptures. The question of
rupture is always the question of something new, and not only of
the end of something. We can return to our arithmetical image.
0 | 1, 2, 3, 4, ... n, n+1, |
There is repetition the creation of some differences by
repetition and there is rupture. You cannot define the rupture
merely by the fact that the repetition is interrupted, for rupture
there must also be something new, which is on the other side.
And so a rupture, and finally an event, is not only negation that
is, the interruption of repetition but also an affirmation,
something new is here! And this is why there is a decision, the
decision to say: there is something new here.
And there has been, and there still is, a discussion concerning
May 68 on this point: many people say that 68 was not at all
the beginning of something new but only the end of something
the last revolution, the last revolt, the last and it was a
discussion at that moment too. And if May 68 was a rupture
then it must be the opening of a new possibility, and not only the
interruption of the old possibility.
The other questions, tomorrow? Okay.

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5. Day Five

5.1 Lecture VIII

This morning I shall speak about the third great question
concerning the relationship between philosophy and the general
context of its existence: first we had the question of philosophys
anthropological determination, and second, its dialectical
determination, and now, finally, we have the question of its
relationship to time.
Philosophys relationship to time has across the history of
philosophy been the question of its goal, the question of the
precise goal of philosophy itself. And this is a difficult question,
this question of determining the precise relationship that
philosophy has to time, to its time, finally. We must explain this
point.
Historically we can see that sometimes philosophy is, in some
sense, absolutely in its time, that it is in its moment, and that it
assumes this particularity. But philosophy is also apart from its
time, since it is, in some sense, the proposition to be outside of
the world, outside of the contemporary world. Naturally we find
these two determinations at the very beginning of philosophy,
for example, in the case of Socrates. We can say that Socrates
was absolutely a figure of the Greek present: he spoke to
everybody in the street or the terrace, he participated in the
political life of the city he had been a director at a city council
he was also a soldier is some Athenian wars and battles, and so
on and so on. He was really a citizen of his city, and he was
certainly something like a public man, and not at all a secluded
or retired figure. He was exposed, fully exposed to the present.

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But, in another sense, he was not really inscribed in the

determination of his time, in the determination of his city, and,
naturally, this was interpreted by many of the citizens as a
situation of absence, of contradiction, and, certainly, as
something abnormal, something very abnormal. And we can see
all of this in Les Nues, the play of Aristophanes: Socrates is the
central character in this play, but he is presented as completely
abnormal, as a madman, in fact. And this representation of
Socrates, of the first philosopher, is very contradictory to the
idea we have of this man, who, for us, is the figure of morality,
the figure of rationality, and so on. And the play of Aristophanes
is a very violent play against Socrates: he is presented as
something of a madman, as a purely comic character, who is not
inside of the laws of the city, who is not inside of the normal
practices and customs of the city, who has strange ideas, strange
thoughts, strange relationships to money, to institutions, and so
on and so on. And this figure of Socrates is for us strange, very
strange. Between these two figures of Socrates the Socrates in
Aristophanes play and Socrates as a man of his time, as a man
inside of and participating in the city there is a great tension, a
great contradiction. And it is an example, an example of the
relationship that philosophy has to its present, a relationship that
is very paradoxical.
I think that this paradoxical relationship is at the very core of
philosophy for abstract but fundamental reasons. The first point
is that the goal of philosophy and the precisely the goal of
classical philosophy is that every individual, every person, can
find an orientation for his or her life. That is the goal, the
concrete goal of philosophy. The theoretical goal, on the other
hand, is to solve the problem of the relationship between
particularity and universality, or more generally to construct a
new concept of truth. We can say something like this: all
philosophers construct or compose a new concept of truth, that
is, a new concept of what is on the side of universality but in

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relationship to particularity. In fact we could say that this is a

general, or minimal, definition of philosophy. But, finally, when
the philosopher addresses someone, when he transmits this
construction, he speaks about concrete life and not only of
abstract concepts. And so there is a very concrete goal to
philosophy: philosophy tries to cause a transformation of
subjectivity.
There is a general idea in philosophy that in ordinary life there is
no true orientation of life. That life, in fact, is a passive action,
that it is determined by the laws of the situation, by ones family,
by ones work, and so on, and so on. But all of these
determination are, finally, at the level of necessity: they are the
necessities of survival, the necessities for the continuation of
life, for the continuation of a nice life, a comfortable life.
Ordinary, everyday life is, finally, a life organized by the norms
of the world as it is, it is life according to a correct inscription in
the world as it is. But it is also a life without any consideration
of the meaning of the world as it is, or of the meaning of life
within that world. From this position, the world is the world
because, finally, it is the world where we are, the world in which
we live, and we must be inscribed in the world as it is. This is
the primary injunction we must be inscribed in the world as it
is. The exception is, maybe, suicide and it is really a
philosophical question the question of life is the question of
death, certainly. But generally, we have the continuation of
ordinary life, we have a complete inscription within the world as
it is, and such determination by itself creates no real meaning for
life, but only a concrete context of life. And philosophy, but also
religion and some forms of wisdom and so on, its not an
exclusively philosophical point first explains that the world as
it is cannot produce meaning for life, and so its in part a critique
of the world, a critique of ordinary life, a the critique of
irreflexive life, something like that, and second, it proposes a

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possible meaning for life, or what I prefer to name orientation of

life.
The philosophical conviction is that in its ordinary signification
individual life is something disoriented, something which is a
succession of decisions concerning our inscription in the world
as it is, and the result is some form of organization of life, with
many differences, social differences, professional differences,
sexual differences and so on, but that all of that comes from
outside. Life is, in fact, largely the appropriation of subjectivity
to the world as it is. And so, life is a question of the relationship
between inside and outside, between interiority and exteriority,
between subject and the world, where the final law is on the side
of the world. Why? Precisely because we must as a sort of
necessity be inscribed in the world, we must be inscribed in
the world because it is a condition of life itself. And such
inscription is in a relationship to the present, and so it is, finally,
a disoriented life. And why? Why is complete inscription in the
world as it is a life without true orientation? Because the law of
such life is also the law of the world as it is, and the world as it
is has no reason to propose a true orientation of life. Finally, the
law of the world as it is is the perpetuation of the world as it is.
We can, and we must, think our singularity much more, we must
think our subjective interiority in such a way that our identity is
in a profound sense indifferent to the world. Indifferent in
the same way that the state, the government, the power, is
indifferent to the life of the ordinary citizen. For the state we
have a name, we are a number, but we are, finally, something
not very important. Naturally, if we are great business men, or
generals of an army, we are important, but, generally, as pure
human singularities the state is completely indifferent over us. It
is not our existence that is important for the state, but purely our
place we are identified with our place, in fact. If we are
workers coming from some strange country, if we are

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immigrants, workers, poor men, and so on, from the point of

view of the state we are really reduced to a number, a strict
number on pages, on papers.... And, if we have no papers we
are good to be expelled. The state does not take into
consideration our true interiority, we do not exist for it as
subjects but only as a social places. And so, while the world is
fundamentally indifferent to our existence, we cannot be
indifferent to the world. There is, then, a dis-symmetric
relationship between individual and world: the individual must
be inscribed in the world as it is, but the world as it is is, finally,
completely indifferent to this problem in the case of ordinary
existence, ordinary individuals, at least.
And so philosophy exists its one of the many reasons for
existence of philosophy, but also of religion, and of different
forms of wisdom, myth, and so on for a very profound reason,
which is to ask: what can we do to really go beyond the pure
inscription of subjectivity in the world as it is? Or: what can we
do to create a relationship between subjectivity and the world,
which is not under the law of the world? Or, even: whether its
possible to reverse the relationship between subjectivity and the
world? But for all of that we must propose a meaning for life,
and not only the material means of life. And so, philosophy must
propose something else than the pure material and concrete
inscription of the individual inside the world as it is, it must
propose some other possibility, it must open the possibility for
an individual to give to his proper life real meaning, real
orientation. And to not be completely determined by the outside
is possible only by a subjective movement, a subjective
transformation. But this would not be the end of determination
by the outside, because if you have an orientation for life this
does not mean that the laws of the world disappear. It is just the
possibility to determine some orientation of life which it s not
reducible to the laws of the world as it is. And so, finally,
philosophy exists in order to create a new dialectics, a new

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dialectics between subjectivity and the world, or between inside

and outside its only an image, but a correct image of this
contradiction.
We can also say that the point is to not be reduced to your
place the point is to not be reduced to your place. And this is
why philosophy always proposes another term than place for the
life of individuals. But it is not only philosophy that does this, it
is religion too, certainly. And this is the true sense of the
religious concept of soul, because soul is precisely a definition
of individuality that is not reducible to the world, to the outside.
The soul is, in fact, the pure concept of the interiority, and it is a
proposition with two significations. It is the religious proposition
that every man or woman is identified not as a citizen, not by a
place, but as a soul. And the soul is precisely the name of pure
interiority, and pure interiority is not under the law of outside,
but under the law of God, finally which is maybe another form
of outside, but it is not exactly the world as it is, it is something
different, after all. And so we can define the signification of
existence from the point of view of the soul, which is in excess
to the determination by the world, by the concrete world as it is.
This is the first signification of the proposition of the existence
of the soul. And the second is that, in some sense, we have
complete equality, because the soul of the king is not by itself
better than the soul of the poor worker.
And maybe this is a fable. But you understand the very profound
function of this fable? And this is, certainly, why this fable was
for centuries and centuries very popular and very powerful. Why
was this fable if it is a fable I wont answer this question...
this proposition of the existence of the soul, so very popular?
Because it was the proposition of a solution, a sort of solution of
the concrete contradiction between individual and society,
between inside and outside, and also of the terrible contradiction
between the different places of the world between the poor and

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the rich, between the man with no power and the man with great
power, between the slave and the free man, and so on. And so,
all the terrible concrete experiences of inequality of radical
inequality were in some sense reduced. As you know the
position of this signification of individual life is outside the
world, and so it did not reduce these inequalities on the level of
concrete life, naturally, but at the level of the possible
signification of individual life.
Once more, maybe it is a fable but there is a rational
construction of this fable from the point of view of the question
of the present: from the point of view of the question of what we
can do, of what can be the meaning of life, if life is constantly
terrible, unjust, and so on. If the contradiction of my individual
life and the world as it is is constantly in a very oppressive form,
then the proposition that the pure inside of individuality is not
reducible to the law of the world is very powerful. It is powerful
because it says that it is not in this world in this world of
suffering that the meaning of existence is decided. We know,
of course, that its not a negation of suffering, there is suffering,
and the suffering continues, but it is still a powerful idea. And,
maybe, if there is suffering, maybe the signification of your life
is by itself more positive, more positive from the point of view
of the soul, from the point of view of the destiny, from the point
of view of the final destiny of the individuality as such.
I say all of this all of which you perfectly know already
because it is, maybe, the most important problem of concrete life
after all. And I insist on the point that we must explain all of that
the soul, the other world, the signification of the pure
interiority against the determination of the world as it is, and so
on because all that is so important, and not only in the past, not
only in the past, but also today, and to millions of people. And
so it is not such a strange fable after all. It is something the
function of which is of capital importance in the history of

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humanity. What we must understand is that its because it is

really a proposition concerning the present, a proposition
concerning the present life, concerning the problem of why the
present life is what it is. Generally speaking, we can say that the
present life is what it is because it is determined by the laws
the social laws, the political laws, the economic laws, and so on
of the world as it is. And if philosophy does not propose
something for the orientation of life, we can always propose that
the pure interiority is not at the level of the world as it is, but at
some other level. This interiority I repeat is not reducible to
the world as it is, to determination by outside, but the soul as
irreducible to the world as it is, and our particular places in it,
also depends on the idea of another world, which is the world of
justice.
But what is justice? What is justice, finally? And why is the idea
of justice so important in philosophy, in religion, in the politic
field, but also for the state? We love to say that it is just, after
all. Justice is precisely the idea of a sort of harmony between the
determination by outside and the will or desire of subjectivity.
Justice is the idea that it is universally possible to create a world
that is not a pure contradiction between the orientation of
individual life and determination by the world as it is. And we
find this sort of idea in many, many forms in the intellectual and
creative productions of humanity in the religious field, in the
intellectual field, in the political field, and so on.
The idea of justice is, probably, as old as humanity itself it is
not a philosophical creation, not at all. And this idea of the
possibility that determination by the outside not be so
completely in contradiction with subjective will, with subjective
desire, is, finally, a very simple idea, but it is also maybe the
most important idea. The idea of the soul is related to another
world, but it is also in a relationship to the idea of justice
because this other world the world of the soul is the world of

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justice. And so, if your soul is a good one or maybe even if its
not, but this point is very complex if your interiority is in
creative and good desire, then justice awaits, it awaits in this
other world. In the world of justice, finally, the man of power in
this world can be absolutely punished because he has been
unjust.
And so the question of the present is largely the question of
justice, because we can define the present from the point of view
of this subjective contradiction between the idea of a proper
orientation to life and the determination of life by the laws of the
world as it is, by its places, and, finally, also by the demand for
its continuation. Justice, then whether in the present or in the
future, in this world or another, whether by the idea of the soul
or in some other way can give meaning to the present precisely
by orienting life in some other direction than the continuation of
the world as it is.
The idea of the soul as a proposition of the resolution of the
injustice of the present is also a complete subversion of the
idea of the place, if place is what we are reduced to by the world
as it is. It is a subversion of this idea precisely because the
verdict of the world it to remain in your place, to stay in your
place. And this is a very strong verdict, certainly. And it is, in
fact, very difficult to not be in your place, and it is also
something that very quickly becomes dangerous, very
dangerous. And, generally speaking, we all stay in our place, all
of us. The question of justice is, naturally, linked to that sort of
determination, whether in the Marxist context, where place is
defined in terms of social class, or in some different context.
And so, we can say a number of things. First, the present can be
defined by the form of the relationship between external
determination and interiority. This contradiction generally takes
the form of the reduction of you identity to your place in the
world as it is, the consequence of which is that life and existence

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are disoriented, that they cannot have a true meaning, because

the reduction of existence to a place is also the complete absence
of significance for that sort of existence. And the fact is that the
world as it is is indifferent to the singularity of individuals, in
general in general. Secondly, we can say that we have a
different proposition concerning this point, the name of which is
justice. The proposition of justice has for a long time been
principally a religious proposition, absolutely fable or not a
fable, that is another question. And there is a function to this
religion determination, a very clear function, and it is why this
proposition has been so popular. And we can say, finally, that
philosophy too is that sort of proposition, but it is a proposition
of justice not immediately reducible to the religious proposition.
But the two are not by necessity in contradiction in fact,
whether they are is a philosophical question! In fact, more
broadly, there exist many philosophical propositions that are not
at all in contradiction with religious propositions, in their
context. Generally, for example, classical metaphysics in the 17th
century is not in contradiction at least not in an explicit
contradiction with the religious proposition. But philosophy is,
finally, another proposition.
The difference is that philosophy is, first of all, purely rational,
in principle. This is the first point of difference: philosophy is
purely rational, it is absolutely exposed to public discussion, its
means are rational means, and there is the supposition of a
logical framework common to all men and women. This is the
first difference: there is no revelation, no sacred book, no fable
of origins, there is nothing which is constitutive of the religious
disposition in philosophy, there are only the laws of thinking,
which are supposed universal. And, as a consequence not
always but very often the proposition of justice in the
philosophical framework is not the proposition of another world,
but a proposition of justice that is, in some sense, inside this
world, or by the means of a transformation of this world, and by

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means which are of this world. And so the orientation of

philosophy is towards the possibility of something else inside of
the world as it is, and not towards some pure existence
completely outside of this world.
We can certainly define philosophy as a proposition of justice,
but this definition does not create a difference between
philosophy and religion, because religion too is a proposition of
justice. And so if we only define philosophy as a proposition of
justice, then we define philosophy as a sort of religion.
Therefore, we must say something else. And this something else
is precisely that philosophy is a proposition of justice, but a
proposition of justice by the means of rationality alone.
Rationality is not a precise word. It is the proposition of just
by purely human reason, by purely human means, by purely
human means without any sublime power from some other
world.
The absence of a fundamental fable is crucial to the definition of
philosophy: in philosophy there is no elementary fable, there is
no sacred book, there is no mythology, and so on. If you want:
there is no story of justice, no novel of justice, but only a
conceptual proposition of justice. The difference between
philosophy and religion at this point is not over the goal, for
the goal is the same. The difference is that the philosophical
proposition is without any guarantee: there is no guarantee of
justice by the potency of God, there is only the possibility of a
purely terrestrial proposition and its realization by human
means. And so, in the philosophical proposition the possibility
of justice is a purely immanent possibility of the world itself.
That there is this difference and this common between religion
and philosophy allows us to understand why the interplay
between the two has been so important across centuries.
Naturally, this possibility is not exactly a possibility of the world
as it is, because the world as it is is not a world of justice. But

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we can open the possibility of this possibility of the possibility

of something else, finally from within the world itself. And so
there is a very important relationship between philosophy and
the pure present: philosophy first proposes a new concept of
justice, that is, a meaning for the present, a new way to solve the
contradiction between the determination from the outside and
the existence of subjectivity, and then philosophy affirms that
the means of this proposition are in some way in the present in
the form of a possibility and not in some other world. And this
is exactly like it is in Marxism, where the proposition of justice
is possible inside of the world as it is because inside of the world
there is a collectivity, and the possible organization of this
fighting collectivity, which is the means of creating the world of
justice. Marxisms name for this collectivity is as you all know
the proletariat. Marxism certainly does not say that the world
as it is is the world of justice, it says, on the contrary, that its an
absolutely unjust world, but that inside of this world we can find
the resources to create justice in the future. In this sense the path
of Marx is of a philosophical nature, absolutely. In fact Marx
thought of himself as a philosopher, a philosopher of political
nature. And he is a philosopher in this sense, because the
proposition of justice in Marxism is without constitutive fable
and the means of its realization lie inside the world as it is, in the
form of a possibility, a creative possibility. And that, finally, is
the first point: philosophys relation to time is a relation to the
present by way of a proposition of a new orientation for the
present, an orientation that is in relationship to the possibility of
a new future. In this respect, philosophy is not distinct from
religion, which, after all, also proposed a new future a new
future after death or after the end of the world. And so it is a
proposition of a future, but a proposition that immediately gives
an orientation to the present. It is, then, what can cause
immediately the possibility of life that is not disoriented, a life
that is not without true significance, a life that is inscribed not

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only in the necessities of survival, comfort, and so on, but a life

with a proper freedom.
The second point is, in some sense, opposed to the first:
philosophy affirms the existence of eternal truths again, just
like religion. Eternal truths exist for philosophy in the form of
universal truths, where universal means universal not only in
space but also in time. And so, if a truth is really universal it can
be understood not only in another world today, but also in the
future, in exactly the same way that many centuries after their
invention Greek mathematics can still be understood, or how we
can still understand some ancient paintings, sculptures, and so
on. A truth, then, is universal in both space and time, and so we
can say that the universality of truth is a form of eternity. A truth
is eternal precisely because although it exists in a particular
world, although it is created in a particular world, in fact, it can
be addressed to and resurrected in a world the time of which is
unknown. Maybe it is a metaphor, but its a strong metaphor to
say that a truth is eternal in this sense, that it is not reducible to
any time, to any particular time, even the time of its proper
origin.
Skepticism poses an objection to this eternity, because it denies
that we can know truth. But, skepticism is, ultimately, a
philosophy because it holds its claim that we cannot know truth
to be a truth, an absolute truth, in fact to say that we absolutely
cannot know any truth, is an absolute truth. And so, we can
affirm that skepticism too affirms eternal truths it holds the
truth, the absolute truth, of the impossibility of human beings
knowing some truth of the world, of life, and so on. There is no
exception: every philosophy skeptic, critical, dogmatic, and so
on affirms the existence of some truth, which is posited now
and forever. But this eternity is an eternity in time, an eternity

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created in time. It is a paradoxical relationship eternity in

time.
This too is something that is common to philosophy and
religion: both recognize something which is not reducible to
time, to its time, something which disposes an orientation for
life which is not only for today but also for tomorrow. And this,
finally, is the idea of resurrection: it is the possibility that
something which was dead, which was forgotten, can return to
life, can come back to life. This is the case with the soul in
religion, but it is also the case with truths in philosophy. And so,
philosophy is in relation to the present by the idea of justice, and
in relationship to eternity by the idea of truth.
Truth, justice, all that is very general for both and it is what
philosophy has in common with religion, because we could
define religion as a proposition of a relation between truth and
justice. Clearly, this is a very abstract definition, but it is also a
very operative definition of religion: religion is a proposition
concerning a specific relation between truth and justice. The
difference is that in religion we have the truth, and that is not
generally the case in philosophy. And this truth is, finally, the
truth identified with God. And this truth is the guarantee of
justice there is no religion without this conviction.
There are, as you know, different religions, and each is,
ultimately, specified by the form of the relationship between
truth and justice that it proposes. The particularities of religions
and their histories are very complex and sometimes obscure, but,
in my conviction, each is a particular possible concrete form of
the relationship between truth and justice. Certainly in each
religion we have many details you cannot eat pork, we must
stop working on Sunday, you must do this, and you must not do
that, and so on and so on but, finally, what is the signification
of these details? They are proofs, concrete proofs that you are in
a particular religion. In themselves they are not so important,

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they are important in so far as observing these details is a proof

of your religiosity. If you are in some religion, then you must
follow its rituals, but you must follow them, ultimately, as a
proof of your conviction, as a proof of your faith, in everyday
life. For the philosopher such things are not so important.
And, finally, it is absolutely reasonable that those in a religion
must observe its particular rituals, because without them the
conviction is too abstract, without them it is too outside of
everyday life. In Islam, for example, you must pray to God five
times a day, and so the presence of religion is in everyday life in
the form of this obligation. But religion is not reducible to that
sort of thing. And these details, which are different across
religions, are, finally, very small, and depend on the specificity
of particular religions, their culture, their time, their origin, and
so on. Fundamentally religion is a proposition concerning the
relationship between truth and justice a truth which is a
promise, a guarantee of justice. And this is the reason why there
are so many religious people: it is not because of the details, but
exactly the reverse, it is because their conviction which gives
an orientation to their lives is in a relation to a fundamental
truth, the name of which is God, and which is the promise and
guarantee of justice. The rituals, the details, and so on, must be
followed because of your conviction, and because of the
promise, they must be followed because they are material proofs
of your religious disposition.
The most important commonality between philosophy and
religion is precisely this relationship between truth and justice, a
relationship which is, finally, one between time and eternity.
And in both cases this relationship is as I have said the
existence of something eternal in time. But what is the
difference? What is the difference between philosophy and
religion since philosophy is not a form of religion? The
difference is that religious truth is outside of the world and not a

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creation of humanity, as it is in philosophy. In fact, we could say

that religion and philosophy propose opposite relationships
between truth and humanity: for religion humanity is the
creation of truth, and so a creation of God, finally, while in
philosophy is it humanity, which creates truth.
In religion, therefore, the question of justice is the question of
another world, but a world which exists. There are two levels:
the world as it is, and the other world, which is also the world of
truth. Religion is the story of the existence of two levels for
existence, two levels for the human destiny. The possibility of
justice the possibility of harmony between interiority and
exteriority, between the will of the subject and the law of the
world is a promise of the second level, but a promise that
depends on what we do on the first. Philosophy, on the other
hand, is the attempt to propose the possibility of justice without
the idea of two different levels of existence. Philosophy
proposes the existence of truths and justice in this world, on this
level. Truths are eternal for philosophy, but it is an eternity
inside a world truths are eternal because they can be
resurrected inside another world in the future. And so there is a
fundamental distinction between religion and philosophy, but
not in the form of an explicit opposition, but in the form of the
idea that philosophy is something like the attempt to realize the
religious promise here, now, and not in some other,
transcendental world philosophy is something like the
realization of the religious promise in the world of human life.
Therefore, it is not what is said in some philosophies, but that
philosophy and I insist on this point is the will to realize
religion here, that is the fundamental ground of their distinction.
This is the destiny of philosophy, and it is its destiny because
philosophy decided at the very beginning to be only inside the
means of human thought and human practice, without any help
from God and His words. There is no sacred book in philosophy,

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there are no fables, no mythologies, and so on, there are only

arguments, definitions, propositions, and so on. This is common
to all philosophies, insofar as they are philosophies. And if you
have only human means, finally, then the proposition of justice
is purely human, and if the proposition of justice is purely
human, then maybe justice itself can be realized in human
history. And this, finally, is why there is always something
subversive to philosophy, and why it is not reducible either to
the world as it is or to the religious promise. Philosophy, then, is
in contradiction with the state and the church.
Philosophy is not religion and it is not the state, but it is also not
scholasticism, because philosophy does not build for itself a
closed institution. In the case of medieval philosophy this
institution was the Church, and today it is the university the
university is the church of today, in some sense. And, in fact, the
campus the campus is very often exactly in the place of big
monasteries, they are the big secular institutions of the church.
Scholasticism is precisely the attempt to transform something
subversive into something that is inside, that is at home in the
disposition of the world as it is.
I insist on the point that philosophy and religion are important
for humanity primarily because they propose the possibility of
some relationship, some interdependency between truth and
justice. But this relationship is not the same in both the fact of
a relationship is common, but the relationship itself is not the
same. For religion the relation between justice and truth is the
relation between two levels of existence: the promise is the
relation between the two levels, and truth is by itself the promise
of justice, and God is the name of the guarantee of that sort of
promise. And so, in religion all of this circulates between the
two levels. The genius of Christianity is to have a magnificent
fable concerning the relation between the two levels, which is
that God himself has gone from one level to the other by his

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sacrifice. As a fable it is magnificent! From a theoretical point of

view its very complex ... the father and the son,... and the
identity of the father and the son... for instance, its not so
simple to say that the first level has a concrete, or fetal relation
to the second. The conception in Islam, for instance, is
completely different. Finally as I have said already there are
many possible relations between the two levels, and we find
them in the particular religions, but what is constant across all of
them is the existence of two levels.
And philosophy too is a proposition of a relation between truth
and justice, and again as with religion this is why philosophy
is important. But the destiny of philosophy is to affirm the
existence of one level. That is the destiny, but it is not always
the result in concrete philosophy, philosophy is not always
successful, after all. For example, we can say that in Plato we
have two levels too: the sensible world and the intelligible
world. But if we read Plato precisely, if we read him closely, if
we try to really understand what Plato is proposing, we find that
for Plato there is only one level, finally. And, in fact, that the
distinction between the two levels is just a means for
understanding the relationship between truth and justice. In
philosophy there is really only one level, finally, which is the
level where humanity can create some truths by rational means
and by the potency of its own creativity.
In both philosophy and religion we have the idea of some
relationship of truth and justice, and that this relationship can
provide an orientation to life in the present. In the religious
vision it is because the soul is promised a second existence, and
in philosophy it is because there exists in time itself something
which is in some sense an exception to determination by time,
something which can exist in a different world. And that sort of
thing which is precisely truth is also a promise of justice,
because everybody is equal in front of a truth! And if the truth is

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a social truth, a political truth, then everybody is equal in the

world as it is. Maybe not immediately, but as a project, as a
possibility. And so, we can say that philosophy is oriented by
the idea that eternity can exist in time, and that eternity is
created in time, and, finally, even the very idea that humanity
can create truths is, in some sense, already a form of justice. And
so, for philosophy meaning in the present, meaning in our
individual and collective lives, is possible by its orientation by
some truth. And to orient our lives in the present by something
like a fidelity to a future is precisely the point, to orient our lives
by some truth is precisely the Idea.
And so the question of philosophys relation to time is also the
question of the relationship between truth and justice, and so it is
also a solution of the contradiction between time and eternity. I
insist on the fact that this relation is the philosophical solution of
the religious promise. In philosophy there is no other level, no
promise to lead us there, and no guarantee that we will enter, but
there is the existence of truths in time. And so there is a concrete
relation between the eternity of truths and the orientation of the
present. This relation has had many names in philosophy the
Sartrean name is engagement, and so true life was a question of
being engaged but in all cases what is at stake is the same: we
must engage our lives not only around our immediate interests,
but also in the destiny of some truth.
To engage with a truth is to go beyond our place, and so we
return to the first problem: to go beyond our place is the same as
to support the creation of some relation between truth and
justice.
Very often I accept to use religious vocabulary and why not?
They are good metaphors, after all. And so, we can say that a
truth is like a grace, because it is the possibility to change your
life, it is the possibility of passing from a meaningless and
disoriented life to a life with an orientation, a life with real

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meaning. And we can also be saved, we can be saved without

soul, without God, without heaven, we can save ourselves by
going beyond our place by moving collectively beyond our
social determinations, by going beyond our fate. And that sort of
movement is very much a redemption, after all.
And why should we not appropriate this vocabulary? Why
should we not appropriate a vocabulary which has been so
important and so powerful for centuries? Why not use it again in
this new situation, in our situation, in a situation where we can
be saved by the activity of humanity itself?
We stop.

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5.2 Lecture IX



I shall stop in a half an hour, because I must do a few technical
things to prepare tomorrow evenings lecture.
A concrete philosophy is always the organization of the
contradiction between time and eternity. And this is, in fact,
another manner by which to read philosophers: we can always
ask what sort of proposition is the proposition concerning the
relationship of truth and justice in a concrete philosophy. And
why? Because the relationship between truth and justice is the
real goal of the conceptual organization of the relationship
between time and eternity, which itself is, finally, the question of
truth. And so, if the most important goal of philosophy is always
to propose some new meaning or some new orientation to life,
this is not really different from saying that philosophy thinks the
relationship between time and eternity, or even particularity and
universality. But there are many possible forms of organizing
this tension, this tension between inside and outside, between
time and eternity, and between truth and justice. There are many
possibilities, and this is why there are many philosophies.
Philosophy too is determined by the world in some sense, at
least. And so, if philosophy makes propositions against the
world as it is, it makes them from within the world as it is. But if
philosophers and philosophies are, in some sense, inside the
world as it is, then there is a pressure, a very strong pressure, for
them to assume some strict place, some strict place determined
by the world as it is. And as we have said if philosophy
assumes such a place it transforms itself into scholasticism. And

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such a transformation is, in fact, a form, the fundamental form,

of the oppression of philosophy by the world as it is. Today,
however, we have a further possible form of the oppression of
philosophy: the mediatic form, which is, for example, the
philosopher on television. And this new form does not transform
philosophy into scholasticism, but into something like
propaganda. This is very important, and there are many details
of which we could speak, but what is most important for us to
understand is that these forms of oppression, transformation and
disfiguration of philosophy are immanent possibilities of the fact
that philosophy is, in some sense, inside the world.
The determination of philosophy by the world can be both
negative and positive. Negative determination is the prescription
of a place: if you are a philosopher you must be in the university,
and you must be quiet. And as you know, we can do many
things in the university it is a sort of zoo for young men and
women: you can think many things, you can ask many questions,
and so on and the young beast is very dangerous. The
problem is precisely that the university has a very poor
relationship to the outside. And so, while many things can be
done and many things can be thought, many questions can be
asked, and so on, by this young beast and by philosophy in the
university, all of this remains completely within the laws of the
world. And why? Precisely because the world, naturally, does
not permit violent organizations against power, and so
philosophy is permitted only so long as it remains in its place, it
is permitted only so long as it is without relation to what is
outside of its place. And when philosophy is strictly in this place
when philosophy accepts this place then philosophy
progressively becomes scholasticism. It's really very simple.
All of this poses a problem, a real problem, for philosophy. And
why? Because philosophy is not scholasticism, and so it must
resists the logic of places, and yet we also cannot completely

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escape the logic of places. And so philosophy must be both

inside and outside, it must be inside the university but not
completely.
All of this is the negative determination, the oppressive
determination of philosophy by the world. But there also exists a
form of positive determination of philosophy, which is its
relationship to the new truths of the contemporary world. And
this determination places philosophy not into a relation with the
world as it is, but precisely into a relation with things that are
beyond the laws of the world. In fact, it is this determination that
makes philosophy contemporary.
Philosophy, therefore, is determined by the world in two distinct
ways. The first determination is by its place. As you know, there
is always a place for philosophy, but this place is not always the
same: the place of philosophy in Ancient Greece and the place
of philosophy in Medieval times, or in 17th century Germany are
not the same as the place assigned to philosophy today. This
determination must be resisted because philosophy, finally, does
not have a place. In fact, it was Socrates who first said that
philosophy has no specific place, and it is why he was
everywhere, and why he spoke to everyone. And, finally, it was
also because of this that he was killed he was killed, its a fact.
And so there is a contradiction between the state and philosophy,
between a world and something that is without place. The
complete freedom of Socrates, the complete freedom of
philosophical thinking is something dangerous it is dangerous
to the stability of a world, to the stability of any strict logic of
places. And this is a very important story the first philosopher
was killed, we killed him because he refused a specific place, he
was killed because something of philosophy opposes the logic of
places. After this, philosophers had to consider the question of
places as a real problem.

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I know this problem personally. After all I have been in my

place I have been inside the university but I have also been
outside of this place: I have been outside of the political
determination, I have been involved in political action, I have
been in contact with theatre, and so on. And, in fact, my life, the
orientation of my personal life, has been organized around this
contradiction of place and the outside-of-the-place. And this
tension is not at all simple, it is not at all easy, and it is also very
complex, because sometimes the two are really in tension,
sometimes there is no way of resolving that sort of dialectics.
But my situation is only an example, a concrete example, of this
problem of the determination of philosophy by the world.
The positive determination I repeat is to be in a relationship
to new truths outside of philosophy, new truths in the world, and
not only to be in your place. And so, as philosophers we must be
in a relationship to new attempts to create something new in
politics, for example. Not because we are but because as
philosophers we must, necessarily, be in a relationship to new
truths. In fact, it is only if we are in such a relationship and not
only to politics, but also to new creations in science, in
mathematics, in art, in love, and so on that philosophy is
contemporary, that philosophy is of its time.
This is the first consideration: philosophys relationship to the
present is across the dialectic of its negative and positive
determination. The negative determination, which is the
oppressive determination, must be resisted we must resist the
solitary place of philosophy and the positive determination
which is the relationship philosophy must have to truths outside
of itself must be pursued. Philosophy philosophers must be
in a relationship to new forms of creativity and new methods of
engaging in the process of truth, absolutely absolutely.
The next problem is the dialectic between the present and
eternity. I propose to give you a few examples of the possible

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ways of organizing this dialectic. The first possibility is not

exactly philosophical, but it is very interesting: it is the idea that
we can have something like a pure present, a pure present in the
strong sense, that is, we can have eternity itself in the experience
of the present. You can recognize that this is the mystic position.
In the mystic organization of the relation between the present
and eternity it is a question of an immediate experience: in the
mystical experience we have an indiscernibility between the
pure present and eternity, because in mysticism the experience
of the pure present is the experience of nothingness, and it is the
access to the experience of the presence of God. And God,
finally, is eternity in its most radical form, in its greatest form,
and so His pure presence is something like the intervention of
eternity in the present. But this is not a philosophical possibility
because, finally, it is not a conceptual organization of thought.
As you know Deleuze has defined philosophy as the creation of
concepts, and here, certainly, we have creation but no concepts.
And, naturally, in the mystical experience there is no creation of
concepts, there is only the proposition of the possibility of an
immediate relationship between these two levels, between the
present and eternity. Finally, in the mystical possibility we have
a fusion of the two levels the level of the present, the level of
time, and concrete life, and the level of eternity, the level of the
soul, the level of God and so on in a single point. And this
point is something exceptional, it not at all a constant
experience, but something mysterious, something ephemeral,
something like a miracle the mystical experience is something
like a miracle in life itself, not a miracle which comes from
outside, but a miracle inside of life, it is the point of the miracle
inside of life itself.
Maybe philosophy can be oriented in the same direction as
mysticism, but it cannot be mysticism. At most, maybe
philosophy can be considered as a preparation for that sort of
experience maybe, its a possibility. And we have something

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like that in Kierkegaard, for example, and probably, also in Plato

in Plato we find everything, because its in a sense the
beginning, and the beginning is something where everything is
present. We find something like this in Plato because when Plato
explains the experience of the Idea, of the Idea of the Good, of
the supreme Idea, there is something which is not of a purely
conceptual nature. Plato does not completely explain what
happens here, he says something, but he does not explain it
completely in fact very often Plato does not explain fully, he
says something but does not completely explain the
consequences. But we can understand something like that,
because complete rational knowledge, the achievement of
rational knowledge, is beyond rational knowledge, the
philosophical achievement of knowledge and so the fundamental
orientation of life goes beyond the concept. Somewhere there
Plato writes that the Idea of the Good is beyond the Idea, that its
not reducible to the Idea, that the Ideality of the Idea is beyond
the Idea something like that.
And this sort of vision is linked to the first possibility for
treating the dialectic of time and eternity, that is, it is a vision
not completely separate from something like mystical
experience, where we have the proposition of a point of
indiscernibility between time and eternity. In fact, when a mystic
writes a poem or prose about his experience there is no question
of time, there is no question of time because time dissipates into
eternity itself. The pure present is the presence of eternity,
certainly. And so, finally, it is not a philosophical possibility
philosophy can be in this direction, but it cannot be mysticism.
As a commentary a biographical commentary I can
understand such a moment in another sense, I can understand it
in the context of an experience of an event. The experience of an
event is a historical experience, and so it is not a mystical
experience, but when you are completely absorbed in an event,

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when you are of the conviction that a new world is really

possible, and maybe even that the new world is here, that it is
beginning, and that you are participating in the beginning of a
world, there is something like a disparition of time, because it
becomes a pure present. But it is not a pure present in the form
of an instant cut between past and future, but a pure present in
the form of a big present, a dilation of the present, a present
which is not just a present. Maybe we can name that sort of
experience an experience where truth and justice are the same
thing, where history and orientation of life are the same thing.
And there was such an opening in May 68, in fact, at the
beginning there was something like that in May 68, and it is
not just my conviction. There is something like abstention in the
tension of an event, in the form of an indiscernibility between
past, present and future. There is something different,
something like a new time, in fact. And this new time is for
everybody a time of truth, a moment where the dictatorship of
outside is interrupted, a moment where the dictatorship of the
world as it is is interrupted. And so there is a space of freedom
opened, which is very near, very near a mystical experience,
maybe it is a historical mysticism, if you want something like
that. There is a subjective tension in such a moment, and a
subjective transformation, and so in such a moment something
that was impossible before, something that was absolutely
impossible becomes possible. And so in the midst of an event
you are not in the constraints of time, and, in fact, there is
something like an opening of time itself for the production or the
invention of a new time. And so, we can say that mystical
experience is the image of the experience of an event.
Certainly in a true event we have the beginning of a new time,
and this new time is in some sense the time of truth. And so, it is
not really an ordinary time, under the constraint and the
oppression of the law of the world. It is a radical experience of
freedom, if you want. Not freedom in the ordinary sense of the

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word 'I can do what I want', 'I am free to say all that I want to
say', and so on it is not the freedom of any right, but an
absolute freedom, it is the freedom to create a new world.
All of this is just to say that that sort of possibility is not solely a
mystical invention, or a religious vision, but something common
to experiences of some new relation between time and eternity.
I can give three other examples. Another possibility is to think
that time is the realization of eternity. In this case, eternity is
related to time in the form of becoming, so that time is the
immanent realization of something of eternal nature. There are
two versions of this conception. The Hegelian conception is that
time is the realization of the Absolute. And so historical time
itself is not in contradiction or in tension with eternity, but is
itself its realization. And so history, the history of thought, the
history of art, the history of religion, and so on, all of these, in
the end, are steps in the direction of the complete realization of
the Idea, the Absolute Idea. And the Absolute Idea is something
like the recapitulation of all of becoming. Hegels is another
possibility to realize the conjunction of time and eternity. It is
the opposite of mysticism, because mysticism is a point, a point
of time where there is an indiscernibility of time and eternity,
and it on the contrary is a conception where the totality of
time is the creation of the Absolute Idea. The other possibility of
time as the realization of eternity is the idea that it is not history
but life, the potency of life, which is the realization of eternity.
This is not Hegel, but Bergson, Nietzsche and, finally, Deleuze.
It is the idea that the tension between truth and justice, between
time and eternity, is resolved in the constant creative capacity of
life itself. It is life which goes beyond time, life is what from
within time can go beyond time. And in Deleuze we can find
clear considerations concerning the immanence of eternity, and,
certainly, life is the name of the immanent potency.

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There is a third possibility, which is of a much more

metaphysical nature, which proposes that the present is largely a
delusion. In this conception the idea is that the world as it is is
only an illusion with no real being, and that real being is outside
of the world. And so eternity is itself the truth of the world, but
to this real being we have no access, and so even our conception
of it is an illusion, an illusion created by some projections from
within our existence. This is a metaphysical idea that there is
something like God, and that this something is not only on
another level, but that it is the true real. And so, the world is
pure illusion, and above this illusion we find, finally, the true
real and the true real is eternal. And this is, once again, the
formula of Plato, because for Plato time is an image of eternity.
And if time is just an image of eternity, then the radical solution
to the problem is that time does not exist, that it does not really
exist. Time, then, is a sort of veil and behind the veil we have
the real, but the real is not in time. And so, at the very beginning
of philosophy we have the question of the relation between time
and eternity, a question resolved by the idea that time is but an
image of eternity. Today, naturally, we can find many versions
of this conviction that the relationship between eternity and time
is that eternity is the very essence of time, and that time, finally,
is nothing, and so the relation between eternity and time is the
relationship between being and nothingness. And this can be a
purely philosophical vision because if you read Sartre Being
and Nothingness being and nothingness you see that for
Sartre being as such is eternal, purely eternal. Being being qua
being is for him something indifferent, something eternal,
something without form, without signification, and, finally, pure
being is without any time. Its something like a massive
indistinctness of all that is. And time, for Sartre, is on the side of
nothingness. But this nothingness is for Sartre human freedom, it
is consciousness. And consciousness is negativity, absolutely, it
is negativity and freedom, and it is this negativity, it is

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consciousness, which introduces something like distance, time,

signification, and so on, into this closed and indiscernible mass.
And so within the conception that eternity is on the side of being
and time on the side of consciousness, human existence, and so
on, there are two possibilities: the Platonic version is that the
real is eternity and time an illusion, but the Sartrean version of
the same idea is the reverse, it is precisely that nothingness is
creative, that this nothingness is the human destiny, and that
being as such is pure stupidity. And you must understand that
the same idea can in philosophy have two opposed meanings: for
Sartre time is on the side of nothingness and eternity on the side
of being, and it is the same for Plato, but for Plato and for a
great tradition, including Schopenhauer and many others this
signified that our life in time has no value and no effect, and that
the truth is only on the side of eternity. But for Sartre? The exact
opposite! For Sartre it is exactly the opposite: true life is on the
side of nothingness and freedom, and on the side of being we
find stupidity, reaction, political reaction and so on, because
freedom is always negativity. And so, if you are a Sartrean and
you are on the side of freedom, then you are on the side of
nothingness, and not on the side of being.
Another possibility is that eternity is created in time it is my
position. It is the paradoxical idea and it is, in some sense,
absolutely paradoxical that eternity is a form of truth, but that
it is also a result, a creation, a human creation. And so, it is the
idea that the eternal is created in time, and that it can be
understood and can come back to life in other worlds, in time.
The eternal is created in time but can be resurrected in another
time, in another world, and so it is also somehow beyond time,
beyond the time of its creation, but also beyond any particular
time. And so the dialectics of this conception is not that eternity
is a result of time, or time the manifestation of the eternal, as in
Hegel, nor that eternity is another level of existence, like in

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religion, nor that the eternity is the same as time, as in

mysticism, nor, finally, that time is an illusion, a veil, and that
eternity is on the side of being. Rather, the idea is that eternity is
the qualification of something that is created in some particular
world, of something that is a generic part of the world, but also
of something that is absolutely the result of human labour, of
human thought.
To complete all of this we must examine the signification of this
paradox of something eternal being created in time. We must
explain this because in religion eternity is not on the side of the
creation but on the side of the Creator, it is on the side of God,
who as infinite and eternal creates the world as it is. But in the
vision that I have proposed it is, in some sense, the reverse: it is
inside of worlds as they are as they are, that there exists the
possibility of creating something eternal, maybe even God, for
example.
Naturally, there are many objections to such a proposition after
all, if something is created, how can it be eternal? The first
philosopher who said that something could be eternal and
created was Descartes. In the theory of Descartes in the
strange theory of Descartes we find the idea of the creation of
eternal truths. And, in fact, creation of eternal truths is an
expression of Descartes. In the case of Descartes they are
creations of God, but they are created, that is the point there is
a creation of eternal truths. Descartes explains that something
like 2 + 2 = 4 is created, that such elementary truths truths for
whose eternity we have evidence and proof are created. They
are created because for God it was a possibility to create
something different. This argument is very difficult to
understand, it is very difficult to understand, but the idea is
absolutely fundamental for Descartes. And, in this sense I am
Cartesian: I affirm the possibility that something eternal can be

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created, but not by God, as with Descartes, but by a concrete

human process in history.
And so we must define eternal exactly as Descartes had to define
it. It is very important to understand that in Descartes it is
eternal truths that are created. And so we have to propose a
definition of truth that allows the possibility that truths
specifically truths, not anything else, but truths can be eternal
and created. For me, naturally, it is very important that a
complete metaphysician like Descartes proposes such a vision.
Descartes proposition is from within a different context,
certainly, but he proposes and it is a fully rational proposition
the existence of something both created and eternal, in the
form of truth, naturally. And so we have something that is
eternal in existence, something that once it exists is eternal.
Before? No, naturally. Before it is created it does not exist, and
so is not eternal, but after once it is created, it is eternal.
Something cannot be eternal or not-eternal if the thing does not
exist but the moment it is created, the moment that it is born,
it is the birth of something eternal! This is the vision of
Descartes, and it is also mine. When the Greek mathematician
to take a simple example, the simplest example when the
Greek mathematician demonstrated some properties of numbers,
the infinity of prime numbers, for example, when he proposed
this he proposed something that did not exist before but that is
eternal. It did not exists because before this demonstration no
one even knew what a prime number was, and nobody knew
what was the infinite, and so on. What is important to
understand is that what we have here is an affirmation of some
creation, some creation that once it is created is eternal after
this moment of time it is forever it is forever, it is until the end
of time, if you want.
This is the last possibility of the relationship of time and
eternity. And it is a possibility with a long history we find

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something like this in Plato as well, after all. It is, finally, the
possibility of the existence of something eternal in time in
time, but not in the mystic form. Mysticism is a form of this
possibility, but in its form this existence is a point, only a point,
and it is a point that is not conceptual, not transmissible, not
collective, finally. Philosophy, on the other hand, proposes that
we have the possibility of creating something eternal, of creating
a truth and a truth which is rational, which is for all, and
maybe a truth which is collective.
We stop here. Thank you.

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6. Day Six

6.1 Lecture X



To finish with this question of the relationship between
philosophy and time, I want to describe what must be the work
of the philosopher, from the point of view of time. What is the
concrete activity of thinking? Not the activity of writing a book,
exams and so on, but the subjective activity inside the world as it
is, in the direction of some effect of philosophy, other than
knowledge. We have said that philosophy is not reducible to
knowledge, and if philosophy is not reducible to knowledge,
then the effect of philosophy cannot be reducible to the
production of knowledge. It must be something like a challenge
for humanity, a challenge of humanity. Maybe by the means of
some knowledge, but that is not the goal.
So, what is the action of the philosopher in the direction of the
present? I think that there is, first, a negative action, which is to
resist the logic of places. Philosophy must resist the logic of
places, which is as I have explained the fundamental logic of
the world. And in every world there is always a tendency to
construct some place for the philosopher, and this is particularly
true in modern societies. And, certainly, there is pleasure and
comfort in accepting such a place. And so the question of places
is also a subjective question: on what condition can we accept to
be in such a place as a philosopher? Concretely, today, this is
the question of the relation that philosophy and so
philosophers must maintain to the university, but not only to
the university, there is also the relation to the media, and,
sometimes, to even stranger places. For example, after my book

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Ethics was published, I was invited by some bank to give a talk

concerning the ethics of money you can see now that it was
not such a bad idea. I refused, naturally. I refused because as
you know it is always a process: first you give one lecture in a
bank concerning abstract considerations about the ethics of
money, and they give you a lot of money, and after that. To
refuse is generally to refuse the first step, because if you accept
the first step, then, it is easier to accept the second, and the third,
and so on and slowly, step by step, you become more and
more corrupted. But you are not corrupted only by the money!
Nor even by the fact that it is a bank! You become corrupted
also by the very question of place, you become corrupted by the
logic of places! This question of place, of a new place, of a good
place, and so on, is a very important question.
It is interesting to consider the accusation against Socrates
Socrates was accused of corruption, as you all know. But this
accusation is, in fact, a reversal of the truth. Why? Because it
was precisely Socrates actions which were directed against
corruption, against a certain subjective corruption. To examine
all things, to discuss the laws of the city, to have a new attitude,
a new subjective figure, and so on, all that was an action against
corruption by the world as it is. And so, the accusation of
Socrates was something like a reversal of the truth the truth is
that it was Socrates who was against corruption, because he
opposed a certain subjective corruption, which was the idea that
to have a place, a good place, in the world as it is is the first
imperative, the only imperative.
We have a very similar situation today, in fact: today too there
exists the idea that the first imperative is to have a good place in
this world. And to oppose this is the first action of the
philosopher, certainly the philosopher must reject this
imperative, and the philosopher must resist the corruptive logic
of places. And it is not easy, it is not at all easy. In fact, today it

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is maybe even more difficult because today there is also the

temptation of the media it is very tempting to be in the media,
everyone likes to be in the media, after all, but it is a corruption.
And, certainly, if you have written a book, and if you think that
this book is important, that this book can have some real effects,
you could say that it is important to be in the media, because
without something like that the book will be ignored. And so it
is not only a difficulty, but also a necessity, a necessity for the
action of the philosophy at another level. This necessity makes
the temptation constant, and so the possibility of corruption is
constant.
But if you promote the book in the media, then the media will
construct a figure of you. My figure, for example, is that of the
extreme revolutionary philosopher. In the media there is the
right, the center, the left, and then something beyond the left,
something much more left than the left, and this position is my
place. And when there is some question of politics, it is, in some
sense, good if such a position exists, naturally. But, finally, we
cannot accept this figure, we cannot accept to be a figure
determined not by us but by the media. And so, it is a constant
negotiation, and, finally, it is a constant negotiation with
yourself, it is an intimate negotiation. For example, I have
proposed to the media my conditions: I accept to be in the media
if I am alone with the interviewer, face to face, and so no
collective debates collective debates on television are a
spectacle and something very negative and I want as a
minimum 20 minutes and 20 minutes in television is, as you
know, an eternity. But when you say to them Okay, you want
me? Perfect. Alone, on my own and for 20 minutes, the offer is
no longer the same. But sometimes an offer exists under these
conditions, and in such a case I accept. It is a simple example,
but, certainly, the life of a philosopher today involves something
like this: we must negotiate, we must calculate, we must think
the relationship between freedom and constraint, we must think

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what exactly is the place of corruption, when corruption begins,

we must think the relation, the balance, the strategy of how to
approach the contradiction of the necessity of collective life and
the beginning of corruption all of that requires constant
attention, constant thought.
All of this is a part of the general activity of the philosopher,
because philosophy is not possible as a corrupted philosophy, it
is not possible inside of the logic of place. It is not possible
because the destiny of philosophy, if the philosopher accepts that
sort of place, is to become a propagandist of power. And
philosophy, finally, can assist the subjective transformation of
some young philosophers into this figure, which is, in my
conviction, not philosophical at all, but a destruction by
corruption of the philosophical subjectivity. And so, in the
direction of the present we have a negative action which is a
resistance, a resistance to the logic of places and not only
abstractly. And, finally, you must, in some sense, accept
something like a place, but you must refuse. It is a subjective
problem.
In the direction of the present there is also a second action,
which is to be in a relationship with new truth-processes. On this
point I am classical, I am classical because the classical
philosophers were of the idea that they must be connected to
what exists in the form of newness in knowledge in artistic
creation, in politics, and so on. And philosophy, as you all know,
must also refuse specialization, because it cannot be in just some
narrow vision, in some small dimension of the contemporary
world. And this too, finally, is a difficulty, because today
specialization is a sort of law of activity, of thought, in all fields
we know that there is scientific specialization, technical
specialization, but, finally, this law exists in all fields. The rule
is that the relationship between philosophy and everything that
has the possibility of creating something new, some new truth,

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must be as large as possible. It is my rule: you must have

relation to political experience, to artistic creations, to new
scientific theories, and so on. And why? Because the great task
of philosophy is to create a new concept of Truth, a Truth
adequate to the contemporary truths. And so, naturally, if you
are absolutely outside of these creations this task is impossible.
There is something like an encyclopedic desire of the
philosopher the philosopher must know everything.
This was the case for classical philosophers until Hegel,
probably. Maybe Hegel was the last to know everything. It is
why he has written an Aesthetics, a Logic, a Phenomenology, a
Philosophy of Right, a Philosophy of Nature, and so on.
Probably it is impossible to know everything, but to know the
sites where the possibility of something new exists is an
imperative. Maybe it is not completely possible, but its a rule,
its a rule. Philosophy is without specialization it must be
without specialization. I am absolutely opposed to some
academic definitions like philosophy of mathematics,
philosophy of algebra, philosophy of music, philosophy of
cinema, philosophy of politics, and so on. All of these are
disciplines, but none are philosophy, they are all different parts
of scholasticism.
Philosophy can exist! But the existence of philosophy has
conditions, and these conditions are precisely the living
processes of truths. Maybe we do not yet know where these
living processes of truth are in our present. In the 17th century,
for example, certainly the most important living process of truth
was science, but that is not always the case. For example, at the
core of the 19th century the fields for the creation of new truths
were art and politics. We cannot decide in advance where these
places of real creation, these places where something new may
emerge, will be in our time. And so, we must have a sort of
general experience, a general knowledge, a general awareness of

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all of the conditions, and we must search. But to search we have

to know something. After all, we wouldnt even understand what
is a new creation in the field of mathematics, for example, if we
knew nothing of mathematics if we knew nothing of
mathematics we wouldnt even be able to see the truth, the
process of a truth. The philosopher himself does not create truths
he is not a scientist, ne is not an artist, and so on but he must
be in a relationship with these conditions, he must know them,
he must know the places where the possibility of some new truth
exists. And so, when I propose that philosophy is conditioned
by science, art, love, and politics, it is a minimal list this is also
a proposition about the activity of the philosopher in the
direction of the present. This determination, this sort of
geography of truth, if you want, is necessarily a condition for
being a philosopher.
So we have two actions in the direction of the present: first, the
philosopher must resist corruption, and second, the philosopher
must have a minimal knowledge concerning the different fields
of thought. And both of these very difficult tasks, certainly
it is very difficult to be a philosopher. One day, in fact, I would
like to write a small book under the title The Conditions for
Being a Philosopher. And why? Why is this important? Why
must we clarify these conditions? Because, today, everybody is a
philosopher, and so there is even something like the corruption
of the name itself. Naturally my vision is that one day everyone
will be a philosopher, certainly it is my vision of communism,
if you want: everybody is a philosopher! But to create the
conditions for that sort of collective organization we must first
refuse the corruption of this name, and so we must clarify the
conditions. If there are no conditions for being a philosopher,
then, certainly, everybody is already a philosopher. We must
clarify what is philosophy, and we must resurrect the idea of
philosophy, and we must, finally, oppose the corruption of
philosophy by the world as it is. And so, I repeat: philosophy

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must resist corruption and it must desire knowledge of all the

different possibilities concerning new truths. These are the
actions of the philosopher in the direction of the present.
In the direction of the past there are also two different actions.
The first is that we must assume the complete history of
philosophy I have already proposed the proposition. The
philosophical present is as big as all of its past, and it is because
philosophy assumes all of the past that philosophy can propose a
real future a future which is as great as the past, and not only a
tomorrow. We must assume the complete history of philosophy,
but not strictly in the form of an analytical knowledge of this
history.
But how can we assume the complete history of philosophy? We
can assume it by the proposition of a new interpretation of this
past. And so, this assumption is not purely a question of a
historical knowledge of philosophy. Rather, we must resurrect
the great philosophers in our present. And this is very
problematic, because, naturally, the history of philosophy is a
matter for scholasticism the reduction of philosophy to the
history of philosophy is scholasticism, in fact. If we reduce
philosophy to the history of philosophy, then we have reduced
philosophy to a knowledge, and so the condition for being a
philosopher is just a knowledge of the history philosophy. And,
in fact, this is precisely the definition of the philosopher within
the field of academic studies: the philosopher is the one who
knows philosophy, the one who knows the history of
philosophy. But what is philosophy if the philosopher is reduced
to merely knowing the history of philosophy? And if the
conditions for being a philosopher are not reduced to this
scholastic knowledge, then what is it that a philosopher does?
The philosopher creates philosophy! And so, if you wish to
preserve the creative dimension of philosophy, then you must
assume the complete history of philosophy, but assume it in the

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name of the present and, finally, in the name of the future! And
what is this assumption? It is precisely a new interpretation of
the past!
This is the first action of the philosopher in the direction of the
past: the philosopher must propose new interpretations of Plato,
Hegel, of Wittgenstein, and so on. The second is a relationship
to the truths of the past. And so, philosophy must engage with
the complete history of artistic creation, the complete history of
mathematics, and so on. Why? Because to be in a relationship
with new truths as we have already said implies that you
know something concerning old truths. After all, in every field
invention there is some relation between the old and the new.
And so a philosopher must be in a relationship with the truths of
the past, precisely because this is the condition for engaging new
interpretations in the present. We return, therefore, to the
encyclopedic question: is it possible to know, or to be in
relationship with, so many truths, the truths of all the ancient
worlds, and so on?
Certainly this is an enormous task, and maybe an impossible
task, and so every philosopher must make choices: he must
choose to be more in Greek tragedy than Japanese theatre, for
example, or more in algebra than topology, and so on. This
action, therefore, always has a biographical dimension there is
some choice, some subjective choice, and this choice is
ultimately biographical. We can name this the culture of the
philosopher. And so, of each philosopher we can ask what is his
culture, what conditions his thought, and so on. And this
resurrection of past truths with its subjective element has
great consequences, consequences that orient the philosophical
conception of Truth. We cannot escape this point. And so, for
the second time we must affirm the particular subjective
existence of a philosopher, because there is a culture, a specific
culture of a philosopher what he has read, what he has loved,

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what sorts of truths are in his subjectivity, and so on. That is the
activity of the philosopher in the direction of the past.
Finally, in the direction of the future the action of the
philosopher is to propose a new concept of Truth. The
philosopher proposes this concept for the future, in the present,
and on the basis of a new interpretation of the past. But why
must we propose a new concept of Truth? After all, can we not
simply affirm that the old ideas are good? And if we can, then
why work to create a new conception of Truth? Is this not the
task of philosophy from the beginning? And has philosophy not
been successful? Finally, why is it that we must do something
like this after Plato, after Descartes, after Hegel, and so on? We
must because philosophy is conditioned! Philosophy is not
reducible to its proper history! And philosophy always begins
philosophy always begins because it is conditioned, and these
conditions change. They change because over time we create
new truths in art, in science, in politics, in love. And so
philosophy must continually examine new truths, it must
examine them to see whether they introduce or do not introduce
something new into the concept of Truth.
You cannot explain what is a Truth in a void, and you cannot
explain it only in reference to the history of philosophy, and,
finally, you cannot construct Truth in such conditions either! A
new Truth is possible only if there exist new truths! And the
history of truths is a living history, and not a pure repetition. We
can take a very simple example. During many centuries the idea
of truth in the field of painting was imitation the imitation of
nature, for example and so the question of art was always
something like what is the proper from of imitation, what to
imitate, what is the essence of something, and so on. And,
naturally, over the course of this great history we have many
different propositions, different philosophical propositions, in
the field of aesthetics. But from Plato until the middle of the 19th

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century there was a common affirmation that the goal of painting

is some form of mimesis, some form of imitation. And from this
affirmation we have derived many question, many very
interesting questions, many concepts and so on: what is
imitation, is imitation transformation, must imitation be
transformation, what is to be imitated, what is the essence, and
so on. Out of this, out of this entire history of propositions,
considerations, concepts and so on, we have constituted a very
complex, and very subtle field of aesthetics.
But across this entire history at least until the 19th century the
common idea is that an artistic truth in painting, for instance, is a
question of imitation, and after that a question of the elaboration
or transformation of some form of this idea. Today we cannot
say the same. A philosopher today cannot say that the very
essence of painting or artistic creation, more generally is
imitation. We know that there exist artistic possibilities which
are not only not imitation, but the explicit goal of which is to
destroy imitation itself, to create something which is not under
the law of imitation, something that cannot be under the law of
imitation.
From the end of the 19th century it has become completely clear
that the history of the plastic arts of painting first, but after
painting other forms as well is not in the field of imitation.
And philosophy, as a result of this change, must begin
constructing a new concept of Truth it must construct a new
concept of Truth because the truth of one field can no longer be
what it was.
After the 19th century, therefore, we had to begin thinking about
what is art and this is still a fundamental problem in the field
of contemporary aesthetics. And you must understand that this
problem concern things beyond artistic production it concerns
art, naturally, but it also concerns some things which are outside

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of art. It is not only a technical problem, but also, finally, an

ontological problem what is the being of art? And this question
is still very much open. Naturally, if the philosophy speaks about
art only across the history of philosophy and so, only across
various forms of imitation then philosophy cannot possibly
produce a complete conception of Truth, which would be
appropriate to our present. It is clear: philosophy must begin
again, it must again construct a new concept of Truth it must,
because the old concept is now necessarily incomplete. We must
understand that such a passage a passage from one conception
of truth in art to another is not a passage from a falsity to a
truth, but the passage from a truth under some conditions to a
truth under other conditions. And, generally, it is like this across
all creation in the philosophical field.
And so, in the direction of the future we maintain that the
philosophical action is to propose a new concept of Truth. In
fact, we can justify this point. Philosophy is conditioned, and so
if there is a change in these conditions then philosophy must
react. And, as we all perfectly know, across history there are
new truths in all fields. I took the example of art, and the
function of imitation in painting, but we could just as well have
taken the example of politics. We know that during the 19th
century there was a great transformation in the very idea of what
is politics it is not the same after the French Revolution, after
the Paris Commune, after Marxism, and so on, as it was before.
For long sequences of history politics was reduced to the
questions of what is a good state, what is a good power, or what
is the best power. And the philosophical question of political
truth was to find, or to propose, a new concept of truth in the
field of politics, its task was to prescribe the conditions and the
very nature of good power, of good government. Today we
cannot say something like that, since today the question of
politics is much more radical. For example, a new politics
cannot be completely in the economy of the present world, since

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we must destroy some parts of capitalism, we must organize the

power of collectivity in a new manner, and so on. Political truth
today cannot be reduced to the classical question of what is good
power. Maybe, for example, the true idea of politics today is an
orientation of history in the direction of the abolition of the
question of power, or the end of the state. In fact, this was
Marxs idea: Marxs question was not what is a good power, but
precisely whether something like a separate state is really
necessary. This is just an example, a very brief example. The
point that we must understand is that if there is change in the
conditions, a change in the situation, then the proposition of a
Truth adequate to out time cannot be a pure repetition.
A particularly important question has been the transformation of
the question of the truth concerning the infinite. For many
centuries the question of the infinite was the question of God
there was no distinction between the question of the infinite and
the question of God. And it is only by the immanent
transformation of mathematics that the question of the infinite
becomes a question completely separate from the theological
question of God. We could examine this transformation in great
detail, but what is important for us to understand is that today if
we speak of the infinite, of the truth of the infinite, we are not
restricted to the theological field, and, in consequence, to its
conception of the infinite. But this was the case for Descartes,
and even for Leibniz, both of whom were great mathematicians.
And so, if there is some relationship between truth and infinite,
the philosopher today can and must examine this question in
many fields, and not only in relation to the potency of God. And,
it is clear that with this possibility philosophy can arrive at
different conclusions, at different conceptions of Truth. And
why is this possible? It is possible solely because of advances in
mathematics!

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And so we must resist and we must know many things, we must

propose a new interpretation of the complete history of
philosophy and we must be in relationship to new truths, and,
finally, we must propose a new conception of what is a Truth.
And a new conception of Truth is also a new conception of
being, a new conception of existence, a new conception of event
and subject, and so on. That is the landscape of the life of the
philosopher that is the final landscape of our lives.
We can now return to the idea of the difference between two
possible orientations of philosophy - beginning in being and
beginning in existence. We have this difference in the difference
between my two books: Being and Event and Logics of Worlds.
The difference between them functions for us here only as an
example of the very general difference which we can observe in
books of many philosophers, across its entire history.
As I have already said, the fundamental question of Being and
Event was to find an answer to the question of the being of a
truth, and so its logic is the logic of being. And I have explained
and you have a text concerning this that my answer to this
question is that the being of truth is a generic subset of the
situation. That is, the being of a truth is a part of the situation not
reducible to a name or predicate that exists in the situation. And
so the being of a truth has no identity in the situation, no name,
no knowledge, it is outside the language of the situation in the
language of the situation we have no name for that sort of
generic subset. And so a generic subset is inside of the situation
it is not outside but, in some sense, it is not inside the
situation, because it is not identifiable by the state of the
situation itself. The generic subset, then, is present in the
situation, but it is also absent it is a presence in the form of
absence.

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This was, in fact, Marxs conception of the working class, of the

proletariat: the proletariat is a subset of the society, but a subset
which has no right to exist in the society as it is in the 19th
century. And so, its a subset of political existence but without
any right, without any name, without any knowledge or
recognition. And so the proletariat is, in some sense, nothing, but
this nothing is not non-being, this nothing is, in some sense,
something we return to the beginning with Socrates, we return
to the point where thing and nothing are the same. In some sense
the generic subset is something like that: a generic subset is a
reality, you can observe that sort of existence, but there is no
identity, no knowledge, no representation, and so its a mixture
of presence and absence.
And you understand why something like that can be of universal
value? It can be of universal value precisely because it is
something that is within a situation but not completely
prescribed by the situation, it is the unknown of the situation it
is without name, and so on and so it is also a possibility for
another world. For Marx, for example, it is clear: for Marx the
working class exists, but has no place in the society, no
representation, no specific representation, it has nothing, finally,
it is something like pure existence with no place. And you know
it is interesting that Marx named the proletariat the generic form
of humanity the name generic is here in the texts of Marx.
And Marxs idea his idea of universality is that the working
class, since it has no place, can create a world without place.
This passage involved the destruction of the world of different
classes, of different places, and so on, and it is the possibility of
a world of complete equality, which is precisely a world without
strict determination by social place. And for Marx, the
proletariat are the agents of this passage, they are the agents
precisely because they are the generic subset of society, and
their political organization would be in the direction of a society

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without places, a society without distinctions or differentiations,

a society of equality. The most important point is that Marxism
made it possible to hope for and to think a society without place,
society of justice, precisely because in our society there exists
something generic in an oppressed form, naturally, but it
exists.
That was my fundamental question in Being and Event to
identify the being of a truth as a generic subset. And the generic
set is not limited to the political field, not at all. We can
absolutely give examples of what is a generic subset in all fields
of creativity. For example, in artistic creation, the point is
always that the new truth is possible because you displace or you
modify the distinction between what is form and what is not a
from between what is accepted as a form, and what is not
accepted, what is considered un-formed. And the displacement
of this limit is always the possibility of a new artistic field
wherein the notion of form is completely altered. In fact between
the 19th century and the last century we have a revolution, an
artistic revolution in music, in painting, and so on, which were
brutal displacements of what is accepted as a form and what is
not. Today this situation is much more complex, naturally. And
we can identify such a shift the moment that we have a generic
set, which is to say, the moment we have something which is not
recognized as an aesthetic form by the knowledge of the
situation but which is functioning as an aesthetic form. In this
sense it is the same as with the proletariat, who cannot be
recognized but can become a political agent.
Finally, my goal was to propose that the being of truth is a
generic subset, and after that to give a proof that generic subsets
exist. There were, of course, objections to this proposition, and
so I had to prove the generic subset, I had to prove that it is
something coherent, that it has being, and that it can exist. First I
gave a mathematical proof: at this completely abstract level we

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can prove that there is a generic subset, because we can

construct and understand the subset of a set which is generic
which has no name, no predicate, no specific properties, which
is, if you want, anonymous, in a sense. Naturally, this was only
possible because the notion of generic set had been introduced
into the field of mathematics. And so the generic is also an
example of the possibility of a modification in one condition
effecting another field of creativity. The technicalities of
Cohens theorem are not important for us here, what is important
is the simple fact that the creation of the notion of generic set in
the beginning of the 60s of the last century is the strict
condition for me to propose a new conception of the being of
truth. And so it is also an absolutely clear proof of the
relationship between the conditions and the conceptual world of
philosophy.
So that was my work in Being and Event. What was my work in
Logics of Worlds? The question this time was not the being of
truth, but its form of existence. We had the generic set, but that
is only the ontological form of truth, and so the question that
remained was whether that sort of thing can exist in a real world
we know that to exist is not the same as to be. The proof that
something has being is, naturally, not at all already the proof that
it exists. In fact this has been at the heart of all the problems of
proving Gods existence: the proof of the existence of God was
primarily under the law of the determination of his being His
being was the proof of His existence. Again we have here the
problem of the relationship between being and existence.
Naturally, to prove the existence of God you must first define
God how can you prove the existence of something without a
prior definition? Its impossible, clearly. And so, first you must
define God and after that there follows a definition of the
existence of such a Being. But the entire problem was that this
existence was an existence not of this world, and the
demonstration of the existence of God could not be the

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demonstration of the existence of God in a world. And the

problem, then, was what sort of sort of existence is it if it is not
in a world? Or: what do we really prove when we prove the
existence of God? Or even: if God does not exist in a world,
where then is the existence of God? You understand of course
that God is the point where being and existence do not differ.
Finally, the poofs of Gods existence even Descartes are
ontological proofs, they are proofs which affirm that God is a
being which necessarily exists, and so He exists! But that is not
a proof! And there is a very strong critique of Descartes
argument in Kant, because, as he says, we cannot define
existence in the case of God in another manner than to define
His being the definition of the being of God is clearly the
definition of the existence of God and so there can be no proof
of existence. If you assume the being of God, if you assume that
God is, you assume that God exists God is not an object of this
world, and to exist is to be an object of a concrete world. This,
finally, was a purely philosophical question.
And so the difficulty with truth is that when we define its being
for example, as a generic subset this cannot give us direct
proof of its existence in a world. And so we need a second
process, a second argument, which demonstrates that this sort of
being can exist in a world. There is no direct passage from being
to existence proof of existence is not an ontological proof
because truth is not God, after all. And so we must demonstrate
that truths exist, that they exist in concrete worlds, we must
demonstrate that something like an immanent exception to the
laws of a world can exist in the world.
The difficulty in Being and Event was at the end the difficulty
was to demonstrate that truths can be conceived in the form of a
generic subset. The difficulty of Logics of World was at the
beginning the difficulty was to show how a truth can exist in a
world. And so, it was first necessary to define a world after all,

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how could you give a proof of the possibility of somethings

existence in a world, before you define existence? And if
existence is existence in a world, and not in general, you must
define what a world is, what a place where some being exists is.
With such a problem, we are really in philosophy.
And you must see now why it is impossible to give a proof of
the existence of God? It is impossible because there is no place
for that sort of existence, there is no place for God other than
God Himself of Herself, or Itself maybe God is a Woman,
maybe He is a man, but He is not an object, He cannot be an
object of a world. God is beyond every world we cannot
conceive of a world for God. And so existence in a world cannot
be existence in general, because existence in general cannot be
properly distinguished from being this is the point, and so we
need to prove the existence of truths in a concrete world, and not
in general!
And so to have a real difference between being and existence
you need a concept of world, a world defined as a space where
some things can exist. And so in Logics of Worlds the most
important concept was not directly involved with the question of
truth, but with the question of world: it is was absolutely
necessary to define a world, because otherwise it would be
impossible to have a rigorous distinction between being and
existence.
We can propose that a possible definition of God is precisely
that God is a being in which we cannot distinguish being and
existence we cannot distinguish them because God has no
place to exist. Finally, God exists because God is. We return
always to this point, because it is the definition of God. It is the
definition of the metaphysical God, not of the Greek Gods the
Greek Gods have a place, they are on Mount Olympus, in the
mountains, or here, for example, in Saas-Fee, in the snow, and

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they exist, they are men or women, and they have many strange
stories, monsters, and so on. The Greek gods, finally, are not at
all metaphysical Gods, they are the gods of stories, of
mythology, and they are, in some sense, good gods. The
metaphysical God, on the other hand, is fundamentally the
question of the One, He is the emergence of the question of the
One: the One who is infinite, the One the nature of whose being
is to exist, and the One who is alone, utterly alone. The Greek
gods, on the other hand are not infinite, but absolute finite, and
they exists in a world, and, finally, they are certainly not alone.
With the invention of the metaphysical God of the being which
is One and infinite, and which exists by necessity what is
interesting it to give a proof that with the metaphysical God we
abolish the distinction between being and existence. And,
probably, the progressive failure of classical metaphysics begins
when it becomes impossible to fuse, or to put into one, being and
existence. And this became impossible because of the
transformation of the concept of the infinite, absolutely: the God
of metaphysics is dead because the infinite itself cannot unify
being and existence. The classical conception was that being and
existence are the same in God because God is infinite this was
the solution. In the theological infinite the One of God is also
His existence, but with the transformation of the infinite this was
no longer possible.
With this problem we are at what Heidegger and many others
have called the end of classical metaphysics, which is precisely
the end of the possibility of that sort of God. Maybe it is possible
to create another God, or to prove the existence of another God
in some place, but the metaphysical God after the transformation
of the infinite which made impossible the fusion of being and
existence Himself became impossible. And so we must affirm
the distinction between being and existence, and this distinction
is, naturally, possible only if we have a place for existence. And

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so we must define what a world is. And this, finally, is why the
title of the second book which assumes the problem of the
existence of truths is not Being and Event, but Logics of
Worlds. As a closure to all this, I shall read to you a second text.
This text is also a lecture, and it is, I believe, a clear presentation
of the question of what is a world and what is existence. The title
of the text is Towards a New Concept of Existence it is a clear
title. I will read to you a small part of the text, and after that you
shall have the text.
What is a thing? It is the title of a famous
Heidegger essay. What is a thing as some thing
which is without any determination of its being,
except precisely being as such? We can speak of
an object of the world. We can distinguish it in the
world by its properties or predicates. In fact, we
can experience the complex network of identities
and differences by which this object is clearly not
identical to another object of the same world. But
a thing is not an object.
Just as a commentary: I propose to inscribe the distinction
between being and existence in the distinction between a thing, a
pure thing, and an object.
A thing is not yet an object. Like the hero of the
great novel by Robert Musil, a thing is something
without qualities. We must think of the thing
before its objectivation in a precise world.
The Thing is... . That is this form of being which
certainly is after the indifference of nothingness,
but also before the qualitative difference of
object. We must formalize the concept of thing
between, on the one hand, the absolute priority of

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nothingness and, on the other hand, the

complexity of objects. A thing is always the preobjective basis of objectivity. And that is the
reason for which a thing is nothing other than a
multiplicity. Not a multiplicity of objects, not a
system of qualities, a network of differences, but a
multiplicity of multiplicities, and a multiplicity of
multiplicities of multiplicities. And so on. Is there
an end to that sort of dissemination, to speak
like Jacques Derrida? Yes, there is an end point.
But this end point is not a primitive object, or an
atomic component, it is not a form of the One. The
end point is of necessity also a multiplicity. The
multiplicity which is the multiplicity of no
multiplicity at all, the thing which is also no-thing:
the void, the empty multiplicity, the empty set. If a
thing is between indifference and difference,
nothingness and objectivity, it is because a pure
multiplicity is composed of the void. The multiple
as such has to do with difference and preobjectivity. The void has to do with indifference
and complete lack of object.
All that was a summary of the fundamental ontology of Being
and Event: under the name of thing I presented the name of
being, which is just after nothingness, in the form of the void,
and which is just before existence, in the form of objectivity.
The determination of the thing is the determination of being, and
it is a determination without qualities, because it is not in a
concrete world. And so it is something between the pure
indifference of nothingness in nothingness we cannot find a
difference, naturally, because there is nothing and objectivity,
in which we have differences, which are the differences of
objects. A thing, therefore, is something between nothingness
and objectivity, and it is something that, in some sense, is

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composed of nothing, because it is composed of the void, which

is the first set, the empty set. After this, the compositions of the
empty set, the primitive set, create all possible forms of being.
Now I will go to the question of the world.
Let us suppose now that we have a pure
multiplicity, a thing, which can be formalized as a
set. We want to understand what is exactly the
appearing, or being-there, of this thing, in a
determinate world. The idea is that when the thing,
or the set, is localized in a world, it is because the
elements of the set are inscribed in a completely
new evaluation of their identities. It becomes
possible to say that this element, for instance x, is
more or less identical to another element, for
instance y. In classical ontology, there are only
two possibilities: either x is the same as y, or x is
not at all identical to y. You have either strict
identity, or difference. By contrast, in a concrete
world as a place for being-there of multiplicities,
we have a great variety of possibilities. A thing
can be very similar to another, or similar in some
ways and different in others, or a little identical to,
or very identical but not really the same, and so
on. So every element of a thing can be related to
others by what we shall name: a degree of
identity. The fundamental characteristic of a world
is the distribution of that sort of degrees to all
multiplicities which appear in this world.
So, in the very concept of appearing, or of beingthere, or of a world, we have two things. We have
first a system of degrees, with an elementary
structure which authorizes the comparison of

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degrees. We must be able to observe that this thing

is more identical to this other thing than to that
third thing. So the degrees certainly have the
formal structure of an order. They admit, maybe
within certain limits, the more and the less.
So you see, the world is the introduction of the qualitative
dimension, of the possible qualitative dimension of the thing.
And this qualitative dimension progressively determines the
thing through differences, identities, nuances and so on, in short,
through the deployment of qualitative determination, and
transforms the pure thing into an object of the world. And an
object is precisely the appearance of a thing in the form of some
qualitative determination, which is always a comparison
between that form of quality and another quality in the same
world.
This structure is the rational disposition of the
infinite shades of a concrete world. I name the
ordinal organization of the degrees of identities:
the transcendental of the world.
This is another important concept. The transcendental of the
world is the structure which creates the possibility of the world
to be a place where we have qualitative differences between
different things. And so it is the condition of possibility for the
properties of things, and when things come to have properties
then they are something more than things, they become objects.
They are not objects by themselves, they are objects because
they appear the thing appears in a world with a determinate
transcendental.
Second of all, we have a relationship between the
things (the multiplicities) and the degrees of
identities. That is precisely the meaning of being-

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in-a-world for a thing. With these two

determinations we have the meaning of the
becoming object of the thing.
After that there is a clear explanation and an example of how
this machinery works. And so I will conclude with existence.
We have here a profound and difficult
understanding of what happens to a multiplicity
when it really appears in a world, or when it is not
merely reducible to its pure immanent
composition. The appearing multiplicity must be
understood as a very complex network of degrees
of identity between its elements, parts and atoms.
We have to take care of the logic of its qualities,
and not only the mathematics of its extension. We
must think, beyond its pure being, of something
like an existential intensity.
There I have said it: existence, existential. I am
finally under the title of my lecture. What is the
process of definition of existence, in the
transcendental framework of appearing, or beingthere?
So, how can we define existence in a world, under all of these
conditions?
I give you immediately my conclusion: Existence
is the name for the value of the identity function
when it is applied to one and the same element. It
is, so to speak, the measure of the identity of a
thing to itself.
Given a world and an identity function having its
values in the transcendental of this world, we will

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call existence of a being that appears in this

world, the transcendental degree assigned to the
identity of this being to itself. Thus defined,
existence is not a category of being (in
mathematics), it is a category of appearing (in
logic). In particular, to exist has no sense in
itself.
This is precisely the difference between an object and a God.
According to an intuition of Sartres, to exist
can only be said relatively to a world. In effect,
existence is a transcendental degree which
indicates the intensity of appearance of a
multiplicity in a determined world, and this
intensity is in no way prescribed by the pure
multiple composition of the being in
consideration.
We can apply to existence the formal remarks of
the previous part of my lecture. If, for instance, the
degree of identity of a thing to itself is the
maximal degree, we can say that the thing exists in
the world without any limitation. The multiplicity,
in this world, completely affirms its own identity.
Symmetrically, if the degree of identity of a thing
to itself is the minimal degree, we can say that this
thing does not exist in this world. The thing is in
the world, but with an intensity which is equal to
zero. So we can say that its existence is a nonexistence. We have here a striking example of the
distinction between being and existence. The thing
is in the world, but its appearance in the world is
the destruction of its identity. So the being-there
of this being is to be the inexistent of the world.

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The theory of the inexistent of a world is very

important. I have shown that the situation of the
inexistent is fundamental in Jacques Derridas
work.
To conclude all of this, I will make one just a final comment. All
of the details of this structure can be very complex, certainly, but
the general idea is very simple, in some sense. The world is a
place, which, as a place, is also a distribution of differences,
differences concerning the composition of objects, differences
with other objects, detailed differences. We are here not in a
logic where there is a strict opposition between difference and
identity, but one where there are degrees of intensities of
difference things can be identical, they can be very different,
not very different, and so on.
We can apply this to the object itself: an object can be different
not only from another object, but also from itself. This is the
most important point to understand. In being we have the
principle of identity: a thing is identical to itself this is the law
of being, it is the oldest law of being, it is the law we find in
Parmenides: being is identical to being. And so the thing is
identical to itself. But in appearance this is not the case, because
a being affirms its identity as an object in a different manner.
Naturally something can appear brilliantly in a world, or appear
weakly, and so we have many degrees of appearance for the
same thing, and if the thing appears completely then it
completely affirms its identity in the world. In such a case we
can say that the thing is completely here, completely in the
world. But if a thing is in the world very differently from itself,
if its identity with itself is not strong in this world, then it has a
weak existence. And so we have two possibilities: the thing is in
the world but does not really appear in the world because it is
completely different from itself, or a thing appears in the world

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completely, and so it is completely identical to itself, in which

case its difference with itself is negative.
And this, finally, is why a world is always a distribution of
places: the dominant places are those where identities are
completely affirmed, and the dominated are places where the
thing is reduced to a very poor appearance, a very poor identity
with itself. Every world is a distribution of places the places
can be very different or the places can be very similar. It
depends on what? It depends only on the distribution of the
transcendental degrees to the thing, and so its a dependence on
the transcendental of the world.
And so, if you want to change the distribution of places, what
you want, finally, is to destroy the world. Why? Because if the
world is the transcendental of the distribution of degrees of
identity, then to change the place is to change the degrees of
identity. More fundamentally, it is for something to pass from a
poor identity to itself to a strong degree of identity to itself. And
this is why the question of the inexistent is so important in an
event: we can define an event in a world as a brutal change of
the degree of appearance of some part of the world. This was
also the fundamental idea of Marx: the working class was
nothing, but it can become everything, it can be everything. In
our terminology: the appearance of the working class has a very
low degree of existence in one world, but thought political
action we can force a very strong degree of identity to itself.
And how? Precisely by the mediation of its proper organization.
There is, then, a strong relationship between the idea of the
refusal of places and the idea of something like the destruction
of the world itself, the name of which in Marxism is revolution.
Revolution is precisely the passage from one transcendental of
the world to another transcendental of the world, a passage by
which the distribution of differences and so the distribution of

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places is completely changed. But all of this is not in the law of

being, because across all of that multiplicities are multiplicities,
and things are things. It is a change at the level of appearance, it
is a complete transformation of appearance, that is, it is a change
in the manner in which something is or exists in the world. This
is why the question of an event is not only an ontological
question a question of the rupture of repetition but also an
existential question, because it is a change of the transcendental
of the world.
Okay, my slaveI give you the text you have a bad place.

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6.2 Discussion II



There are many questions, and so it will be difficult to answer all
of them in the short time that we have. First, two questions
concerning the notion of exception, immanent exception. The
first question is a question from Nico.
Question 1: When you discussed great exceptions in our lives
experiences which are not reducible how is this different from
19th century visions of the sublime? Specifically in the
metaphysical sense.
[Badiou]: The notion of the sublime is introduced by Kant, and
some others, at the beginning of the 19th century, to describe a
specific affect. The sublime is a form, a subjective form, of the
effect on consciousness of the presence of some aspects, some
dimensions or facts in the world. And so, certainly there is a
relation between the sublime in this sense and the event, as a
form of exception, because the affect of the sublime is in
relationship to some transformations, some extraordinary fact of
nature disaster, catastrophe, for example and also
revolutions. There is for Kant something sublime in the French
Revolution. By some aspects the French Revolution was horrible
for Kant, but it was sublime. And so a horrible thing can also be
sublime. And so, I agree with you, the sublime is really a part of
the slow construction of the concept of the event during all of
the 19th century and after. And the concept of event is not at all
mine: many philosophers, many contemporary philosophers
Deleuze, for example have spoken about and proposed some
concept of event. And, certainly, the description by Kant and

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others of the sublime is something on the way to the conception

of what is a rupture, and the implications of this for a
subjectivity in front of a rupture, in front of a revolution, a
disaster, a natural phenomenon, and so on.
The second question is a question of this man [Lionel, the
translator].
Question 2: What are the possible concrete ethical implications
of your concept of immanent exception?
[Badiou]: For me the fundamental subjective dimension of an
immanent exception is the possibility to participate in its
construction, because that sort of exception is always a
possibility, a subjective possibility. An event is not by itself the
birth of a truth, the truth must be constructed in a long process,
and an event is, finally, just the creation of a possibility. We
must understand this point: an event is not the creation of a new
thing, but the creation of a new possibility, it is something like
the opening of a new possibility, a possibility not visible in the
situation becomes visible by the event. And this is very clear in a
political event: it opens the possibility of a new sequence of
history because it opens the possibility of something that was
impossible, something that was not presented as a possibility.
For example, in France before 1789 there was no one speaking
about power without a king, or something like that this
possibility, in fact, does not exist before 1789. And even during
the beginning of the revolutionary sequence this possibility does
not exist! At the beginning of the revolution Robespierre himself
is not a republican but a monarchist. An event its minimal, but
true definition is the production of a possibility.
And after an event, or because of an event, we have the
possibility to realize a new possibility. And this is, finally, why
being inside the realization of a new possibility is always a

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subjective possibility. And this is the beginning of the ethical

question.
The ethical question is the question of participation, of the
decision to participate, in the realization of a new possibility,
and to continue, to continue. Participation is not only a
question of being in the great moment, in the great evental
moment, with passion and so on, but of continuing, of
continuing! And so there are two ethical commitments: first, to
be engaged by the event, but after that there is fidelity, which is
something else, which is something else. Everybody knows
the passion of many people for the event in 68, or in the
beginning of the French Revolution, but to continue is
something else, it is really something else and something
difficult.
The definition of what is the fidelity to some event is step by
step, it is step by step, and it becomes more complex, more
difficult. At the beginning it is simple, it is enthusiasm, but with
time it is much more difficult. And so we have two ethical
questions: first the question of engagement and after that the
question of continuation.
Now there is a group of questions concerning event, fidelity and
truth, in sequence. First, a question of Alejandro.
Question 3: If truth is the result of successive choices that
produce something new other than knowledge. How is this
related to and different from Lacans analysts discourse?
[Badiou]: There is naturally and this is why the question is a
good question something similar between my description of
the process of a truth and the position of analytic discourse, in
fact, in the very description of the cure. Lacan explained that the
analytical process is a process in which successive
determinations, successive choices, create a situation in which

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something like a truth of the subject appears, the truth of the

subject in the sense of something of the real of the subject. And
it is by means that are symbolic means, and by imaginary means
as well, that we proceed if the analytical process is effective
in the direction of something which is the point of the real, the
real of the subject. All that is similar. But the analytic discourse
is about the real of an individual subject and so it is much more
the revelation of something like the truth of the subject, than the
creation of a new truth. And there is always something from the
past which determines this truth do not forget that
psychoanalysis is a theory of the origin of subjectivity. And so,
when we have to confront our real in the psychoanalytic cure
it is always, in some sense, that we have to confront something
real of our profound past. There is a formal identity between the
two processes, but I think that, finally it is not exactly a
contradiction, but it is not the same thing because the position
of truth is not the same, the position of truth is not the same.
Maybe maybe the analytic process is a process of something
like revelation, of something that was there already it is the
concept of the unconscious, after all, and my vision of the
subject is not that the subject is unconscious. But I do not speak
of individual subjects, I speak of the anonymous subject, the
collective subject, of artistic subjectivity, and so on.
The next question is from Josephine.
Question 4: What is the ontology of the event, the ontology of the
cut? A decision? Or is an event an imposition? If its a decision,
then the pre-subject already desires the event itself, perhaps?
[Badiou]: I think that we must assume that an event is something
like an imposition, and not the result of a desire, or of a decision.
As such an event is of objective nature, its not an object but it is
something objective, because it is the point of the real of the
situation. My demonstration was, precisely, that an event is,

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finally, something composed with elements of the situation it

is not like a miracle, which comes from outside, but an
immanent exception. An event is composed of elements of the
situation, but is not the result of the situation, because if it were
the result of a situation it would not be an event but an
extension, and there would be no decision, finally. And so, in
some sense there is something to the event which comes from
outside, for us its true, in some sense.
And an event is, in some sense, an imposition, but it is the
imposition of a new possibility, and its not an imposition in the
sense of something oppressive, something which would force us
to do something. Its a proposition, a proposition an event is
the proposition of a new possibility. And we can refuse this
possibility, naturally we can refuse it, we can say no. It is
exactly as when you encounter somebody and there is something
very important, something new, and so on, but, finally, you to
decide not to change your life, you can decide to stay in the past.
An event can be a temptation and an event is a temptation, in
fact: it is a temptation to be engaged, to be transformed, to do
something new. But a temptation is also a temptation to refuse
the temptation. Generally ethics is said to be a refusal of
temptation, but my ethics is to accept the temptation, and not to
refuse it the temptation of the event must be accepted. But
there is a risk, there is always a risk. And maybe there are
good reasons to refuse to refuse the evental proposition. There
are good reasons: its not practical, its not useful, its not
possible, things are good, things are okay, and so on and so on.
And these good reasons are from inside of the world as it is,
from inside the objective knowledge of the situation. And in this
sense it always the same problem: you can demonstrate by good
reason in the situation that this event is risky, that we dont
really know the consequences, that even if the situation must
change this change is not immediately good, that it is difficult,

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that it cannot be changed, that the situation cannot be different,

and so on and so on.
There is a form of imposition in the event, but it is not a
determination, it is the imposition of a new possibility, it is not
an oppression, it is a freedom, finally. The only necessity is the
necessity of a choice it is the imposition of a choice. If there is
an event we must accept or refuse the new possibility.
The question of Christof is next.
Question 4: What happens to the generic set of a localized event
as time passes? Does it decay? Does it become untrue? Can its
original truth be retrospectively denied?
[Badiou]: It is a real question to ask: if a truth, if the being of a
truth is something like a subset of a world, of a situation, how
can this subset exist when the world is changed, when the
situation is another situation? The solution which is a difficult
one, but which is the solution is precisely that the subset is
generic, and a generic subset can be included in another world
precisely because it is generic. A generic subset is a subset that
is not really in the explicit composition of the situation itself
there is no name, there is no knowledge and so the subset is
quasi universal, in some sense: it is in the situation, but it is in
the situation without any positive determination linked with the
situation itself, it is the most anonymous part of the situation, or,
if you want, it is inside the situation the most universal part of
the situation. And so the possibility of finding it in another and
completely other situation is a real possibility. In fact, when
there is an event, or a new truth process, which encounters a
generic subset of the past, we have precisely the subset itself
returning to life, it is a resurrection, really. Ontologically, the
signification is that the generic subset can be the subset of
another set then the primitive set. And so we have reason to say

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that very determined sets, like a concrete situation or some part

of it with very precise sets, with names, which is in
knowledge, which is completely linked to a particular culture,
and so on, generally will not be included in another world, in
another set, in another culture, but if a subset is generic the
situation is not the same, a generic subset can be a subset of
many different sets.
The next question is of Michail Tegos.
Question 5: Situation and event are more clear cut in Theory of
the Subject, where you use the double articulation of place and
force and splace and outplace. Force seems like a more dynamic
and active concept compared to appearance in Logics of
Worlds, in which you say that the actions and passions of the
body cannot cause events. Is force not what interrupts
repetition? And is rupture not the exterior interiorized in a
decision than again projected to the outside? And, finally, can
we force the unnamable?
[Badiou]: Theory of the Subject, which is a book of 1982, was
written before the idea of the inclusion of the event in the
process of a truth, I was in a more structural position. In fact
Theory of the Subject is a book that is between my first
structuralism and something different. I can say that in this book
there is some dimension of the real it is distributed between
place, which is on the side of the state, on the side of power, and
the excess of the place, which is on the side of resistance, fight,
contradiction and so on and that its dialectic is sufficient to
explain the birth of some truths, some new political process, for
example. But after that there is a change. Today I no longer
think that the real forces of a situation can by themselves
completely construct an event. There is a necessity for
something that would be the play of chance of a situation, of a

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moment of exceptional combination and antagonistic

contradiction.
I propose to you a new notion of force, because an event is
composed of elements of the world, and not a rupture in the
exterior. No, the rupture is not in the exterior, the rupture is
composed of things, of objects and so on it is inside the world!
And it is precisely modifications of the manner of these
elements appearance changes of the intensities of existence,
and so on which determine the event. This change is not the
result of pure rational reflection, there is something which
depends on circumstance and on chance. And such changes of
intensity are changes in the determination of force, naturally
something which was near inexistence in the world forces a
strong existence, that is the point of the event. And so we cannot
say that forces create the event, but rather, that an event changes
the forces. After that, the question of force is determinate, it
becomes the real determination, but before that we have the
problem of the elements of a new force. And in the field of
politics, we perfectly know the dialectical relationship between
event and the development of new forces.
Without an event there is a slow development of forces, there is
their construction and so on, but with an event we have a brutal
change of the entirety of the existence of something and the
transformation of some inexistent to something that exists
maximally, and after that the distribution between places and
forces is not the same.
This is from Anders.
Question 6: Dialectical thinking appears to be both a condition
and a limit of philosophical thinking. It is like an infinite spiral
caught in its two-dimensionality. Where does the third
dimension appear, or how to think of philosophy in 3-D, or

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multiple dimensions, if that is at all possible? The moment of the

cut before omega, is it a classical or a quantum moment? Could
truth and event be superimposed?
[Badiou]: This is not an easy question, but I can say something
concerning many points. The question of dimensions is very
interesting its a spatial image, but its very interesting
concerning specifically philosophy, because we can define
philosophy in terms of one-dimensional space, two-dimensional
space, three-dimensional or four-dimensional space, all of these
possibilities are open.
You can say that philosophy is in one-dimension if, finally,
philosophy is a mystical experience, because in mysticism we
have, in fact, only one dimension: the fusion of the limit point
omega and any number, a fusion between the finite and
infinite. If philosophy is oriented in the direction of mystic
experience, then we can say that the fundamental result is to be
in one-dimension, in one point. The most classical definition of
philosophy is in fact in two-dimensions: its something of a
dialectical definition. Philosophy here is positioned as something
between being and existence, between the analytical point of
view and the dialectical point of view, between opinion and
truth, and so on. In this conception philosophy is always in a
space where we have the play of two contradictory terms. But
we can also say that philosophy is, in fact, an operation in the
three-dimensions of time we have said this before: in the
present a new interpretation of the past for a new possibility in
the future. And, finally, we could also define philosophy with
four-dimensions. I have proposed that there are four conditions
of philosophy, and we could take these conditions as the
dimensions of philosophy. The becoming of philosophy, in this
case, takes place in the space of the four conditions. We have
explained that the necessity of beginning philosophy again is
produced by changes in the conditions of philosophy new

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ideas in science, new artistic creations, new revolutions, and so

on. And so philosophy is, in some sense, situated in a space with
four-dimensions. And so it is possible to propose different
determinations of philosophy in different dimensions.
The image of the spiral is, as we know, a Hegelian image,
because Hegel established the comparison, the exclusive
comparison, between the dialectical movement and the spiral.
And the spiral is in a three-dimensional space, and Hegel
explains its rhythm in three terms: affirmation, negation and the
negation of negation. But we could also say that there are four
moments in Hegel, after all. That is my response to the first part
of the question.
The last question can a truth and event be superimposed?
Truth and event are superimposed in mystical experience. And
that is, maybe, the minimal definition of mystical experience: in
that sort of experience there is no difference between the event
of the experience and the truth of the experience. And so, yes:
its a possibility that event and truth are superimposed not only
in strictly speaking mystical experience, but more generally, as I
have said, in the enthusiasm of political revolt, for example. In a
political revolt we often have something like the idea that the
event is the truth itself. But this in my conviction is false
its the effect of the sublime to return to the first question of
the sublime dimension of the event. And, certainly, in the effect,
in the greatness of the event, we can imagine that the truth is
created by the event itself, but its not true, its not true the
event is only the opening of a new possibility, and not in itself
the realization of this possibility. And so a great revolt, a great
event, and so on, is only the beginning of the process which is
a process of fidelity, and which is more and more complex, and
which demands another ethical point. The first ethical point is
the effect of the sublime, the engagement, the transformation,
the immediate subjective transformation, and after that fidelity,

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the prescription to continue. And so we cannot reduce the

question of truth to the mystical dimension.
The next question is from Aletheia.
Question 7: Who is the we that must propose the conditions of
a real future?
[Badiou]: I think that the proposition of the conditions of a real
future has two dimensions. First, as I have said, an event by
itself is, in some sense, a proposition of a real and new future it
is the creation of a new possibility. And so it is the creation of
the possibility of engagement in the construction of a new truth.
In that sort of situation there is no we, there is the event and
everybody must make a choice to take this chance or to refuse
this proposition. This is the first aspect of the question. The
second is the orientation of a people in the direction of a future,
from the point of view, from the conviction, in fact, that for
many empirical reasons the world as it is is not a good world.
And so the we is not constituted, but is something that is
always very spontaneous. The we is, ultimately, the we of
everybody who thinks that there is a desire for something else
than the world as it is. After that, it is a question of
circumstances, and not a general question. And it is, finally, a
question of organization, of organization and of organizing all
that has become possible in the direction of a real future.
The sense of the question in my opinion is the question of
the avant-garde: is there an avant-garde that would organize the
vision of the conditions of a real future? And so, the we is the
we of an avant-garde we surrealists, we will decide the
future of poetry, we communists will decide the future of
society, we scientists will decide the future of mathematics, and
so on. In all such cases we have the idea of a we which is
organized, which is a certain form of organization.

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We have a lot of experience concerning this point: we know the

results of such attempts to organize an avant-garde, as the point
which, in some sense, decides the direction of the future, and the
results have not always been good they have, generally
speaking, not been good. And so the question of the we, of
what is the we that we need is a good question. And we can
even ask: can it be in the form of the avant-garde of the last
century? And, if not, what must be the form of this we? It is a
good question, an important question.
In fact, we could even define the last century as the century of
the avant-garde. Across the 20th century the avant-garde was a
powerful idea: throughout the last century we have attempts to
create an avant-garde to determine the future, to provoke an
event, to create a rupture, and so on, and not just in politics, not
just in politics. Certainly we have the idea of the avant-garde in
politics in the form of the Party, but we also find it in art, and
also in science. For example, in France there was a group of
mathematicians under the name Bourbaki, whose precise project
was to organize the new destiny for mathematics. The idea of the
avant-garde did not exist only in politics, it was a general idea, a
general idea of the relationship of the present and the future, of
the passage from the present to the future, in fact. The avantgarde was something that organized the future in the present. All
of that was very important in the last century, and results,
finally, are confusing, in some sense.
I think that our problem today in our different engagements, in
politics, in art, in love, and so on is precisely this: do we
accept the classical form of the avant-garde as the operator for
changing the future? For me, it is an open question. In some
sense I think that we cannot completely refuse this idea
absolutely, since there is always a moment that requires
collective action, and so a collective organization. And so, some
organization, some grouping, some collectivity, finally, is

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necessary, absolutely, and not only in politics. And yet

organizations under the law of the avant-garde have had some
dangerous effects. The dangerous effects, I think, were often the
results of these attempts precisely because the future cannot be
prescribed the future is not merely development, it is not
merely a continuation of the world as it is because there cannot
be a full prescription, a full provision of something that is in part
composed by chance, there cannot be complete determinate
organization of something which is a mixture of prediction and
chance. After all if the future will be something new, how can
we, how could we, determine it in advance? There is risk
there is always risk. And so I accept that the question of Aletheia
who is the we is a very important question, a timely
question, but also an obscure question. Finally and we all
know this in all fields of creativity we can speak of a crisis of
the we, that is, of a crisis of subjectivity, of active subjectivity.
The question, finally, is of the form of organization: what is the
proper form of organization?
You know the 19th century was the century of promise, the
century of the idea of progress, of the birth of a new world, and
the last century was the century of realization, of the will to
effectively realize this promise, it was the century that attempted
to create the new world, and, naturally, also to create a new
humanity. And for this reason it was the century of the avantgarde avant-garde as the form of organization that would
create the future. But the consequences have been terrible
great destructions precisely because we had the idea that to
create the new world we must destroy all of the old world. We
can say that the maxim of the last century was: no construction
without destruction no construction without destruction. The
disposition was that we must accept violence, we must accept
destruction, and must accept war, and so on, because to create
the future we have to pay a price, the price of many millions of

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dead men and women but, if its a question of a completely

new world, the price is the price.
Many, many millions of people thought like this. It was not only
some individuals, some leaders, some thinkers, good or bad,
mad or great. No! It was a popular idea, it was the common idea.
And, naturally, there was also the idea that all sacrifices are
possible and, that they are necessary. It was not only a
readiness to kill the other, but also and maybe much more
the readiness to die, the readiness to expose oneself to death. It
was, finally, the extraordinary idea that to create the new world
we can do anything, after all. It was, maybe, the idea of by any
means necessary! But now we are after all of that since it was
largely a failure, we are after all that. And the temptation today,
and the situation in fact, the dominant situation, is to reject all
that: no violence, no destruction, no crime, no fight, no
possibility all of that was, finally, a sort of madness, a sort of
exaltation, which created many deaths and destruction, but no
new world. But we must understand that this negation of the past
is, finally, a resignation to accept peacefully the world as it is,
and so it is also a form of renunciation to create a new political
course. If we absolutely reject violence, destruction, fight, if we
reject the 20th century, and also the 19th, we must also say no
future, no future is possible!
And so we are largely between the two and this is also the
crisis of the we we are between the terrible experience of
radical destruction to create something new, with a strong avantgarde organized for that, and a resignation to accept the world as
it is, because to really change and destroy this world we must
pay a price which is unacceptable. This is our subjectivity, this is
the subjectivity of our world. And so we must propose
something else, we must create something else, and probably
also a new we, in order to go beyond this fate, this fate tied to
the crisis of the we. This is our situation: we are between the

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old possibility, which is dead, and which we cannot repeat, and

an empty wait for a future, a future which, in some sense, is
impossible. And so we are between these two possibilities: we
cannot repeat, not exactly, but must we continue?
I am not saying that the last century was entirely crime,
destruction, and so on, it is much more complex, much more
complex. And we have to understand that the will and the
conviction of millions and millions of people around the idea of
a new world a conviction which made it possible, in some
sense was something with a terrible greatness, a terrible tragic
greatness, but it was not madness, it was not madness.
But we are after all of that, and yet we cannot continue the world
as it is, anymore than we can repeat. We cannot simply resign to
the state of affairs of the world as it is which is not a good
world, not at all. This is our situation today. And so we must
locally transform this situation by our means, we must construct
something in the situation, we must construct something, maybe
something very small and we must accept that new
experiences are small but also we must organize something at
the scale of the world, of the entire world. I think that today, if
we want to do something, this something is international by
necessity, that it is its very essence.
Such political experience is in the direction of the future, and the
future will be the construction of a new world in the radical
sense of a new totality of the world not socialism in one
country. It must begin small, with local experiences, but be
global in ideology, it must be international in its nature.
The next question is from Renata.
Question 8: What is the difference between particularity and
singularity in their relation to the universal?

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[Badiou]: A singularity is in the position of possibly being

universal, and reciprocally all that exists which is universal is
also singular. So a singularity is a creation in particularity, which
is possibly universal. And so the relationship between
singularity and universality can be a relationship of identity: you
can propose something like universal singularity. Particularity is
not necessarily closed on particularity, it is something in which
we can create a universal singularity, but particularity as such is
the term opposed to universality in the beginning of this
dialectic. We have, therefore, two terms which are in
contradiction particularity and universality and singularity is
the third term which is composed of particularity particularity
is what composes singularity but which can be universal, and
so there can be a universal singularity by a creation inside of
particularity. The relationship between particularity and
universality is a directly dialectical relationship they are two
contradictory terms but this relationship is also the opposite,
because there is always the possibility of the unity of the two by
the creation of something which is a universal singularity, or a
particularoty which is universal. Another name for this sort of
thing is truth.
The next question is from Magnolia.
Question 9: Can you please elaborate on your use of normal and
abnormal in the relation of law and subject, and in relation to
law and subject. The possibility of abnormality, or of producing
a rupture in normality, or in the world as it is appears, is
performative, that is, produced by the actions of the individual
subject. Is the relation between normality and abnormality a
rupture? Does, or can, the rupture undue the conformism of the
binary? Can we implement these concepts both or
simultaneously in relation to the constitution of individual
subjectivity and with regards to political existence?

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[Badiou]: Normal is strictly in relationship to a law. There is no

possibility of ontologically defining something as normal. And
so it is always just a prescription and not a state of affairs. And
this is very important because if you think that normal is an
ontological predicate then you are engaged in something very
reactionary, certainly. Why? Because we would then have the
right the ontological right to oppress, or to suppress all that is
abnormal. And so, we must accept that normal is a category of
the law in general, that it is a prescriptive category, and not
ontological. A law can say that something is not normal, that
something is abnormal, but there is no possibility to transform
this prescription into something of objective or ontological
nature. And so the predicates normal and abnormal depend on
the world as it is, on the prescriptions of the world as it is it is
not the description of something of objective or intemporal
nature.
Generally the law prescribes as normal something that is
adequate to the organization of the world, and so the prescription
is the prescription of the law of the world as it is. And to be
normal is to be inscribed, correctly, in the law of the world
there is no other definition of normal. And in the evolution of
society, the evolution of the world as it is which is not purely
static there is also a dynamic of the world as it is. For example,
the development of capitalism is a real development, and it is the
development of the world as it is. And in the becoming of
societies sometimes the law changes: there can be, and there in
fact is, modification of the law within a world, but such
modifications are not changes of the world, they are
modifications of the law, that is, something small, some small
things, can be modified and modified continually, this is certain,
and this modification will be the consequence of some
displacement of the separation of normality and abnormality
something which was abnormal becomes normal, and the
reverse, naturally. But this is not in itself a change of the world.

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And when something like a truth is constructed, many of the

components will, naturally, be abnormal. And why? Simply
because a truth is something absolutely new, and this newness
cannot be coded by the existing laws, and yet it is, in some
sense, from within the world. Very often, then if not almost
always there will be something abnormal in a new
universality. And this site, this abnormal site can sometimes
contribute to the change of the world itself, that is, it can
contribute to changing the law. And we must understand, then,
that an event and the consequences of an event are not by
themselves normal or abnormal those are just judgments, but
with no ontological ground.
I propose from a properly philosophical position that we
only make very small use of the categories of normality and
abnormality, and maybe no use at all, except in the biological or
medical fields, where we have a strict definition of the
difference between normality and pathology not abnormality
but pathology. And this definition in the work of Canguilhem,
for example to name a philosopher of this question, and who
wrote a very interesting book the title of which is The Normal
and the Pathological is a supposition defined inside the
science, and inside science it is the function of the organism
which grounds it. Maybe in this place and with many
precautions we can sometimes use the opposition between
normal and abnormal, but generally speaking I dont know how
it is possible to use that sort of opposition as, precisely, a
normative one. Normality is a norm, but we could have other
norms fidelity to an event, participation in a truth, a will to a
new future, engagement, and so on. And nothing here is normal
or abnormal. Nobody is normal, finally thats a better use of
normal, nobody is normal. We are all defined by our specific
abnormalities. Let that be the last word for today.

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Just one word more: It has really been a pleasure to be with you,
it was a pleasure to speak to you, and it was arduous because it
was work, but it was a pleasant work, and if I am tired it is
because I am also an old man, but I am principally very glad for
this moment with you, and so, thank you