Digester: Ernesto C.

Herrera III
CASE TITLE: MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN V. DIR. OF LANDS
Date of Case: October 17, 1910
DOCTRINE: For the purpose of the establishment of new pueblos in this Archipelago, at the beginning of its occupation by the Spaniards, an endeavor
was always made to find, in favorable places, a nucleus of inhabitants and, later, near the pueblos already established, barrios, which ordinarily served
as a basis for the formation of other new pueblos that became a populated as the centers on which they were dependent. The Laws of the Indies was
followed in the establishment and laying out of new towns.
Petitioner: Municipality of Catbalogan represented by its President
Respondent: Director of Lands represented by the Attorney-General
FACTS:
1. The Municipal President of Catbalogan wanted to register a parcel of land where its courthouse was located.
2. On June 19, 1908, He filed an application with the Court of Land Registration in which he asked for registration in conformity with the Land Registration
Act.
3. The Director of Lands through the Attorney-General opposed the application and claimed that the property belonged to the United States and was under
the control of the Government of the Philippine Islands.
4. The Court of Land Registration ordered that the land in question be awarded and registered in the name of the municipality of Catbalogan.
Issue(s)
1. WON the lot
belongs to the
municipality of
Catbalogan

Municipality of Catbalogan
1.
that the said land was acquired by
possession and material occupation for a large
number of years and is at present occupied by
the applicant as a municipal corporation duly
organized (acquisitive prescription).
2.
The land in dispute is a building lot of
which the pueblo of Catbalogan had absolute
need at the beginning of its organization for the
erection thereon of its court-house.

Director of Lands

Supreme Court

1. The lot in dispute is

a state land under
the control of the
Insular Government.

1. Since Spanish occupation, the policy of the state has

been to form new pueblos and seek out the nucleus of
inhabitants. The Laws of the Indies was followed in layouting new towns.

2. The land in dispute is

common.

2.
While viceroys had the power to designate
common lands, they could not assign the location of
courthouses and churches because only the Provincial
government could do so.
3.
Catbalogan was the provincial seat of Samar
and as such had designated the land where its
courthouse would be erected hence, the land in dispute
has been considered as bien propio patrimonial
property of the municipality.
4. Catbalogan has been in possession and has been
exercising ownership of the land for 40 to 45 years. The
presumption therefore is that it is the owner of the land.

Dispositive Portion: Judgment of the Court of Land Registration is Affirmed declaring that the municipality of Catbalogan is the owner of the land occupied by its
court-house and that it is entitled to have the said property registered in its name in the Court of Land Registration.

Digester: Ansis V. Pornillos

CASE TITLE: MONDANO vs. SILVOSA
Date of Case: May 30, 1955
DOCTRINE: In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to Mondanos office. If the issue is not related to his office but
involves a crime of moral turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in this case), there must first be a final conviction before a
suspension may be issued.
Petitioner: Jose Mondano Mayor of Mainit, Surigao
Respondent: Fernando Silvosa, Provincial Governor of Surigao, JOSE ARREZA and OLIMPIO EPIS, Members of the Provincial Board,
FACTS:
Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for (1) rape committed on his daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2)
concubinage for cohabiting with his daughter in a place other than the conjugal dwelling.
The information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate the matter. Consequently, Governor Fernando Silvosa
then summoned Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining
the governor from further proceeding.
Issue 1
Whether or not the
Governor, as agent of the
Executive, can exercise
the power of control over
a mayor.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
Gov. Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which provided
that he, as part of the executive and by virtue of the order given by the
Assistant Executive Secretary, is with direct control, direction, and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . . and
to that end may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any
person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and
in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an
official or person who shall conduct such investigations.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
Governor has no power to
suspend a mayor since it
presupposes that the governor
has control over a mayor.

Supreme Court: NO.

Governor only has
supervision over
city/municipal officers and
has no control over
them

RATIO:
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter
fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to
receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. And if the charges are serious, he shall submit written
charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may
in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official
integrity of the officer in question. Sec 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department
Head over the administration of municipalities.
Dispositive Portion: The writ of prohibition prayed for is granted, without pronouncement as to costs.

Digester: Renz Ruiz

CASE TITLE: Ganzon v. CA

Date of Case: August 5, 1991
DOCTRINE: The 1987 Constitution has not repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. Supervision" and "Removal" are not incompatible
terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter.
Petitioner: RODOLFO T. GANZON, Mayor of Iloilo City
Respondent: LUIS SANTOS, Secretary of the Department of Local Government
FACTS:
This petition originated from 10 administrative complaints filed against Mayor Ganzon by various city officials in 1988, on various charges of abuse of authority,
oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.
Among others, Mayor Ganzon is claimed to have:
1) Removed a clerk assigned to the City Health from her position for allegedly supporting the rival candidate during the elections
2) Padlocking the office of an Assistant Health Officer and withholding her salary without explanation or justification
3) Padlocking the office of a Councilor without notice and harassing the latter with armed men when the latter held office in the town plaza
2

Finding probable grounds, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.
Later, another 60-day preventive suspension arising from the arbitrary detention case was issued.
Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent in the RTC where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Meanwhile,
rd
the respondent issued a 3 60-day preventive suspension against Mayor Ganzon and designating Vice-Mayor Malabor as acting mayor. The cases filed in the CA
were consolidated by the SC.
ISSUES
WON the 1987 Constitution, in
1

PETITIONERS CONTENTION
According to petitioner, the Constitution is

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION
No discussion

Supreme Court
NO, the Constitution does not divest President of the

Since my topic is under B. Brief History... of the Syllabus, let me quote here the relevant provision in the 1987 & 1935 Constitution (These were also quoted in the case):
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities
and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions
(1987 Consitution)
Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments as may be provided
by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. (1935 Constitution)

...in meting out the suspensions, the Secretary acted in consonance with the provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code,
Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall
require the respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten
days after receipt of such answer of the respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior to an election, and no preventive suspension shall
be imposed with the said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted.
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the
provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.

deleting the phrase "as may be

provided by law" intend to divest
the President of the power to
investigate, suspend, discipline,
and/or remove local officials

meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by

local government units and second, by
deleting the phrase as may be provided
by law to strip the President of the power
of control over local governments.

power to discipline local officials.

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of

"as may be provided by law") is significant
since: (1) the power of the President is
"provided by law" and (2) hence, no law
may provide for it any longer.

The omission merely underscores local governments'

autonomy from congress.

Notwithstanding the omission, the charter did not divest the

legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative to
provide administrative sanctions against local officials.

Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the

guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the
legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the
"supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean local
government units from over-dependence on the central
government.
Also, in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local
government under the general supervision of the Executive.
Finally, the Charter allows Congress to include in the local
government code provisions for removal of local officials,
which suggest that Congress may exercise removal
powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has
done, delegate its exercise to the President.
The petitioners are under the impression that the
Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly
embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression
because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority.
"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for test of the
latter."Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing
or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. However,
"investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing",
although it is a lesser power than "altering".

WON third suspension valid

None

None

Hence, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect.

VALID, but succeeding suspensions precluded.

A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance,

however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due
process question.
The sole objective of a suspension is "to prevent the
accused from hampering the normal cause of the
investigation with his influence and authority over possible
witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and other
evidence.
Imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote
possibility Mayor Ganzon is to make his suspension
permanent.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Ganzon to suffer the
duration of his third suspension...We are precluding the
Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on
those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of
prima facie evidence.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Ganzon, may not be made to
serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The
Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.

Digester: M. Espinal
Vilas v. City of Manila
April 3, 1911
DOCTRINE: A change in sovereignty does not operate to destroy the municipal laws of the affected territory and they continue in force until altered or
repealed by the new government or sovereign.

Petitioner: Verisimo Vasquez Vilas, Esperanza Otero Trigas, Ricardo Aguado (whose cases were all elevated to the US Supreme Court upon consolidation)
Respondent: City of Manila
FACTS:
The petitioners were creditors of the City of Manila when it was still under Spanish sovereignty. They are now trying to collect on their claims from the city which
has since been reincorporated (in 1901), following the cession of the Philippines to the United States under the Treaty of Paris. [During this era, decisions by the
Philippine Supreme Court were reviewable by the US Supreme Court if the dispute involved a United States Treaty.]
Issue: What was the legal consequence of the cession upon the property rights and civil obligations of the city incurred before the cession?
Petitioners Contention: That the obligations of the former municipal corporation passed on to the city as now incorporated
Respondents Contention: That the liability of the city was effectively extinguished by the change of sovereignty. Such stance is anchored on the analogous
relationship between principal and agent, whereby the agency is destroyed upon the death of the principal. The supposed death/annihilation of the municipal
entity was deemed so complete that, in one of the opinions in the court a quo, it was even held that since the United States had already paid the consideration for
the cession, the new municipal entity created thus became free of any obligation to the creditors of the former entity and the suggestion was that the petitioners
claim may be pursued more properly against the Spanish Crown which has received payment from the United States.
SC:
The respondents contention fails to convince. Their argument loses sight of the dual nature of municipal corporations, which is both governmental and
proprietary. In the latter character, the corporation is deemed a corporate legal individual existing for private purposes. In view of the dual character of municipal
corporations, there is no reason for presuming their total dissolution as a mere consequence of military occupation or territorial cession. True, there arises a total
abrogation of the political relations with the former sovereign, but that body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force until
abrogated or changed by the new ruler.
The Charter of the City itself provides that the new entity shall possess all the rights of property enjoyed by the City of Manila as organized under Spanish
sovereignty and adds that all ordinances/orders in force and not inconsistent thereto were to be preserved until modified or repealed. There is not the slightest
suggestion that the new corporation shall not succeed to the contracts and obligations of the old and no reason for supposing that the reincorporation of the old
municipality is intended to permit an escape from the obligations of the old.
The US Supreme Court, in Shapleigh v. San Angelo, has earlier held: An absolute repeal of a municipal charter is effectual so far as it abolishes the old corporate
organization; but when the same or substantially the same inhabitants are erected into a new corporation, whether with extended or restricted territorial limits, such
new corporation is treated as the successor of the old one, entitled to its property rights, and subject to its liabilities.

Dispositive: Cases reversed and remanded. (Special mention was made of the Aguado case. Aguado became a creditor by virtue of a contract for the supply of
coal intended for the citys waterworks. A special fund known as the Carriedo fund had been put up for the purpose of establishing the waterworks project and
for which the city had been the trustee. The case states that no evidence was established whether the credit for the supply of coal had been given to the Carriedo
fund or to the general credit of the city. Nevertheless, the debt having been incurred by the city, it also must be regarded as a city liability.)

Digester: Jel Gallego

LIDASAN v. COMELEC
October 25, 1967; G.R. No. L-28089
DOCTRINE: Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of
government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate
entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.
Several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality:
population, territory, and income.
Petitioner: Bara Lidasan resident & taxpayer from Parang Cotabato, a qualified voter for 1967 elections
Respondent: Commission on Elections- description
FACTS:
1. 18 June 1966: Republic Act 4790, entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur" was enacted into law.
2. It was later found that barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong,
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of the municipality of Parang, also in
theProvince of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
3. 15 Aug 1967: COMELEC adopted a resolution which resolved that these 12 barrios, situated in 2 municipalities in the province of Cotabato, will be
transferred to the province of Lanao Del Sur to form part of the new municipality of Dianaton.
4. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to the COMELEC that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by
correcting legislation.
5. 20 Sept 1967: COMELEC, by resolution, stood by its own interpretation and declared that the statute "should be implemented unless declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."
6. Hence, this original action for certiorari and prohibition by Lidasan, praying that RA 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that COMELECs resolutions be
nullified.
ISSUE
WON RA 4790 is unconstitutional

PETITIONER
YES
RA 4790 is entitled "An Act
Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton in the Province of
Lanao del Sur", but includes
barrios located in Cotabato.
It is unconstitutional for
embracing more than one
subject in the title.

RESPONDENT
NO

SUPREME COURT
YES
Constitutional provision contains dual limitations
upon legislative power. First. Congress is to
refrain from conglomeration, under one statute,
of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of
the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient
to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject
thereof. Compliance of the latter is imperative,
given the fact that the Constitution does not exact
of Congress the obligation to read during its
deliberations the entire text of the bill.

It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of

the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject
of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into
the body of the bill, study and discuss the same,
take appropriate action thereon, and, thus,
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether
or not it is misleading; technical accuracy is not
essential; the subject need not be stated in
express terms where it is clearly inferable from
the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain
that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put
on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one
subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or
scope of the act, is bad.
Title projects the impression that only the
province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the
creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation
is there that communities in the adjacent
province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new
Lanao del Sur town. It is misleading and
deceptive for legislation has a two-pronged
purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates
the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from
twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and
Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del
Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two
municipalities in Cotabato, a province different
from Lanao del Sur.

Change in boundaries of the two

provinces resulting in "the substantial

Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from

one province to another of necessity involves
reduction of area, population and income of
the first and the corresponding increase of
those of the other. This is as important as the
creation of a municipality. And yet, the title

WON RA 4790 may still be

salvaged with reference to the nine
barrios in the municipalities of
Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del
Sur (with the nullification of the
portion which took away the 12
barrios in the municipalities of
Buldon and Parang in the other
province of Cotabato)

diminution of territorial limits" of

Cotabato province is "merely the
incidental legal results of the definition
of the boundary" of the municipality of
Dianaton and that, therefore, reference
to the fact that portions in Cotabato are
taken away "need not be expressed in
the title of the law."
YES
Rule is that where a portion of a statute
is rendered unconstitutional and the
remainder valid, the parts will be
separated, and the constitutional portion
upheld

did not reflect this fact.

NO, RA 4790 is indivisible & null and void in its

totality.
The general rule is that where part of a statute is
void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while
another part is valid, the valid portion if
separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced. But, the valid portion must be so far
independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to
presume that the Legislature would have enacted
it by itself if they had supposed that they could
not constitutionally enact the other. . . Enough
must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and
valid statute, which carries out the legislative
intent. . . . The language used in the invalid part
of the statute can have no legal force or efficacy
for any purpose whatever, and what remains
must express the legislative will independently of
the void part, since the court has no power to
legislate.
Municipal corporations perform twin
functions. Firstly. They serve as an
instrumentality of the State in carrying out the
functions of government. Secondly. They act
as an agency of the community in the
administration of local affairs. It is in the latter
character that they are a separate entity
acting for their own purposes and not a
subdivision of the State.
Several factors come to the fore in the
consideration of whether a group of barrios is
capable of maintaining itself as an
independent municipality. Amongst these are

population, territory, and income.

3

WON petitioner has legal standing

to bring this suit

Petitioner is not a real party in interest.

He has no substantial legal interest
adversely affected by the
implementation of RA 4790.

It is clear from the explanatory note of the

House Bill 1247, creating the town of Dianaton
that these factors were considered and they were
considering the original 21 barrios which
comprise the new municipality and not simply the
9 remaining barrios.
YES, Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to
vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his
own barrio before it was annexed to a new town
is affected. Since constitutional direction, the
purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the
benefit, amongst others, of the community
16
affected thereby, it stands to reason to say that
when the constitutional right to vote on the part of
any citizen of that community is affected, he may
become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality
of the Act as passed by Congress.

Dispositive Portion: We vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit respondent Commission from implementing the same for electoral
purposes.

FERNANDO, J., dissenting:

Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation of the municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur. Fact that barrios found
in 2 other municipalities of another province were included does not of itself suffice for a finding of nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision invoked.
What Consti precludes is the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.
To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must be construed as to exclude from Dianaton all of such barrios mentioned in Republic Act No.
4790 found in municipalities outside Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can meet the test of the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to
the legislative intent. What was created was a new municipality from barrios named as found in Lanao del Sur. This construction assures precisely that.
The Consti provision must be construed liberally as this has been the general disposition in Courts as opposed to the strict and technical interpretation
given the Court herein. For instance, in Radiowealth v. Agregado, he noted that certain provisions of the Admin Code were interpreted and given a
"construction which would be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law. In re Guaria: "In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine
Commission we deem it our duty not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly
susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the higher law

The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality.
This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy.

Digester: Roddel Paraos

CASE TITLE: Republic v City of Davao
Date of Case: September 12, 2002
DOCTRINE:
Sec 15 of the LGC defines an LGU as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. It performs dual
functionsgovernmental and proprietary. Governmental functions are those that concern the health, safety and advancement of public good/welfare
as affecting the public generally. Here, the LGU acts as an agency of the national government. Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain
special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and benefit. Here, the LGU acts as an agent of the community in
administration of local affairs.
Civil Code of the Philippines, Book 1, Chapter 3, Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions; x x x

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines, represented by DENR Sec Heherson Alvarez et al.
Respondent: City of Davao, represented by Mayor Benjamin De Guzman
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari assailing RTC Davaos decision which granted the writ of mandamus and injunction in favour of respondent City of Davao, against
petitioner Republic. The court also directed petitioner to issue a Certificate of Non-Coverage in favour of respondent.
Respondent filed an application for Cert of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, Davao city Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB), Region XI. Attached were the following: a) detailed location map of the project site; b) brief project description; and c) a certification from the City
Planning and Development Office that the project is not located in an environmentally critical area (ECA). The EMB denied the application after finding that the
proposed project was within an environmentally critical area, and pursuant to sec 2, PD 1586, in relation to Sec 4 of PD 1151, the City of Davao must undergo
the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) before it can proceed with the project.
Respondent filed a petition for mandamus, and alleged that the project was neither an environmentally critical project nor within an environmentally critical area,
hence out of scope of the EIS system. Hence, it was DENRs ministerial duty to issue a CNC upon submission of the required documents.
The RTC said that there is nothing in PD 1586 in relation to PD 1151 and LOI 1179 that requires LGUs to comply with the EIS. Only agencies and instrumentalities
of the national govt, including GOCCs, as well as private corporations, firms and entities are mandated to go through the EIA process. Since the LGU is not an
agency or instrumentality of the national govt, it is deemed excludedexpresio unius est exclusion alterius.
The RTC also agreed with respondent that the site for the Artica Sports Dome was not within an environmentally critical area. Neither was the project an
environmentally critical one. Hence, it was mandatory for DENR to approve respondents application for CNC.
Supervening event: change of administration, respondent agreed with petitioner that it needs to secure an ECC, rendering the petition moot and academic, but the
SC still addressed the issue in the case.

WON LGUs are part of the

EIS system

N/A

N/A

Yes, LGUs are part of the EIS system.

Sec 15 of the LGC defines an LGU as a body politic and corporate

endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. It

performs dual functionsgovernmental and proprietary. Governmental
functions are those that concern the health, safety and advancement of
public good/welfare as affecting the public generally. Here, the LGU acts as
an agency of the national government. Proprietary functions are those that
seek to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit and
intended for private advantage and benefit. Here, the LGU acts as an agent
of the community in administration of local affairs.
Sec 16 of the LGC shows the duty of the LGU to promote the peoples right
to a balance ecology. Hence, an LGU, like the City of Davao, cannot claim
exemption from coverage of PD 1586. An LGU has the duty to ensure
quality of the environment, which is the objective of PD 1586.
The law must be interpreted in its entirety, and the RTC failed to take into
4
account other parts of PD 1586 .
Sec 4 of PD 1586 states that no person, partnership or corporation shall
undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or
area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued
by the President or his duly authorized representative. A person is either
natural or juridical. The State and its political subdivisions (LGUs) are
juridical persons, hence not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586.

WON the project involved is

environmentally critical or
within an environmentally
critical area

Yes it is within an
environmentally
critical area

No it is not within an
environmentally critical area,
nor is it an environmentally
critical project

Sec 1 of the same law shows that it intends to implement the policy of the
state to achieve a balance between socio-economic development and
environmental protection (sustainable development), and that this can only
be possible if we adopt a comprehensive and integrated environmental
protection program where all sectors of the community are involved. LGUs
as part of the machinery of the govt cannot be deemed outside the scope of
EIS system.
The arguments above presuppose that the project is environmentally
critical, or within an environmentally critical area. But respondent City of
Davao has sufficiently shown that the said project is not.

4
WHEREAS, the pursuit of a comprehensive and integrated environmental protection program necessitates the establishment and institutionalization of a system whereby the exigencies of socio-economic undertakings can be reconciled with the
requirements of environmental quality; x x x.

Section 1. Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to attain and maintain a rational and orderly balance between socio-economic growth and environmental protection.
xxxxxxxxx
Section 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. The President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the National Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation declare
certain projects, undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative. For the proper management of said critical project or area, the President may by his proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies, institutions,
corporations or instrumentalities including the realignment of government personnel, and their specific functions and responsibilities.

RTC found that the Artica Sports Dome is not within an environmentally
critical area, nor is it an environmentally critical project after considering the
5
evidence . The SC said that none of the exceptional circumstances when
the court may disregard findings of the RTC is present.
Under Art II, sec 1 of the IRR of PD 1586, the declaration of certain projects
or areas as environmentally critical, and which shall fall within the scope of
the Environmental Impact Statement System, shall be by Presidential
Proclamation, in accordance with Section 4 of PD 1586. Pursuant to this,
Proclamation No. 2146 was issued proclaiming certain areas and types of
projects as environmentally critical and within the scope of the
Environmental Impact Statement System.
The SC said that the Artica Sports Dome does not come close to any of the
projects or areas enumerated in such Proclamation. Neither is it analogous
to any of them. The project then is not environmentally critical, or within an
environmentally critical area. Hence, DENR has no choice but to issue a
CNC, a ministerial duty which can be compelled via mandamus.
Dispositive Portion: Petition DENIED. RTC decision granting the writ of mandamus and directing the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to issue in
favor of the City of Davao a Certificate of Non-Coverage, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586 and related laws, in connection with the construction of the
Artica Sports Dome, is AFFIRMED.
No separate opinions.

Evidence submitted by the respondent:

1. Certification from the City Planning and Development Office that the project is not located in an environmentally critical area;
2. Certification from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO-West) that the project area is within the 18-30% slope, is outside the scope of the NIPAS (R.A. 7586), and not within a declared watershed area; and
3. Certification from PHILVOCS that the project site is thirty-seven (37) kilometers southeast of the southernmost extension of the Davao River Fault and forty-five (45) kilometers west of the Eastern Mindanao Fault; and is outside the required minimum
buffer zone of five (5) meters from a fault zone.

Digester: JFD MADARANG

PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL vs. COMMISSIONERS, COA et al
28 September 2010 : J. CARPIO
DOCTRINE: An LGU is under the Presidents general supervision pursuant to Section 4, Article X of the Constitution. Under said general supervision,
the Presidents authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully executed. He does not have the discretion to modify or
replace the rules.
Petitioner: Negros Occidental is represented by Gov. Isidro Zayco
Respondent: Commission on Audit officers and employees: Commissioners, Director, Cluster IV-Visayas, Regional Cluster Diirectors, Provincial Auditor
FACTS:
In 1994, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed Resolution No. 720-A allocating P4M of its retained earnings for the hospitalization
and health care insurance benefits of 1,949 officials and employees of the province. Philcam Care won the bidding for the insurance coverage.
Then-Gov. Coscolluela and Philam Care entered into a Group Health Care Agreement. The total premium amount was paid on 25 January 1996.
In 1997, after a post-audit investigation, the Provincial Auditor issued Notice of Suspension suspending the premium payment because of lack of approval
from the Office of the President as provided under AO 103, and for violating RA 6758 or the Salary Standardization Law.
In a Memorandum, then Pres. Estrada directed the COA to lift the suspension but only in the amount of P100K. Provincial Auditor ignored the directive of
the President and instead issued Notice of Disallowance.
Upon appeal, the COA affirmed the Provincial Auditor's disallowance.
Issue
WON COA committed grave
abuse of discretion in affirming
the disallowance of P3,760,000
for premium paid for the
hospitalization and health care
insurance benefits granted by
the Province of Negros
Occidental to its 1,949 officials
and employees

PETITIONERS CONTENTION
Payment of the insurance premium for
the health benefits of its officers and
employees was not unlawful and
improper since it was paid from an
allocation of its retained earnings
pursuant to a valid appropriation
ordinance. Such enactment was a clear
exercise of its express powers under the
principle of local fiscal autonomy.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION
Although LGUs are afforded local
fiscal autonomy, LGUs are still
bound by RA 6758 (SSL) and their
actions are subject to the scrutiny of
the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) and applicable
auditing rules and regulations
enforced by the COA.

LGUs are only agents of the national

government and local autonomy simply
means decentralization. An LGU has
fiscal control over its own revenues
derived solely from its own tax base.

Grant of additional compensation,

like the hospitalization and health
care insurance benefits, must have
prior Presidential approval to
conform with the state policy on
salary standardization for
government workers.

Supreme Court
Being an LGU, petitioner is merely under
the Presidents general supervision
pursuant to Section 4, Article X of the
Constitution. The Presidents authority is
limited to seeing to it that rules are
followed and laws are faithfully executed.
The President may only point out that rules
have not been followed but he cannot lay
down the rules, neither does he have the
discretion to modify or replace the rules.
Thus, the grant of additional compensation
like hospitalization and health care
insurance benefits does not need the
approval of the President to be valid.
AO 103, which required prior approval
from the President before granting
additional benefits to government
personnel, only applies to government
offices/agencies, including governmentowned and/or controlled corporations, as
well as their respective governing boards
under the Executive branch, as stated in
its Sec. 2. LGUs are not included. This is

consistent with Section 17, Article VII of

the Constitution.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE AND SET ASIDE (the) Decision(s) of the Commission on Audit.

Digester: Romero
CASE TITLE: Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc.
Date of Case: March 16, 2011
DOCTRINE: It cannot be said that the power to reclassify agricultural land was first delegated to the city and municipal legislative bodies under LGC
Sec. 20. Said section only articulates a power of local legislatures, which previously had only been implied or inferred.

Petitioner:

Department of Agrarian Reform

Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. on behalf of alleged 300 farmer-beneficiaries of subject property; intervened only in the
proceedings in the CA.

Respondent:

E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc (EMRAS) owner of disputed properties

FACTS:
1965: EMRAS bought 372 hectares of unirrigated land in Dasmarinas, Cavite to develop it into a residential subdivision.
1972: EMRAS applied for authority to convert and develop 372 hectare property into a residential subdivision.
1972: Municipal Council of Dasmarinas, Cavite passed Municipal Ordinance No. 29-A approving EMRAS application.
1988: RA 6657 (CARP Law) took effect. Note: To be exempt from the CARP, the subject property should have already been reclassified as residential prior to date
of effectivity. [Sec 3(c) of CARP Law]
1990: DAR Secretary sent out notices of acquisition covering 303 hectares of EMRAS property for acquisition under CARP Law.
EMRAS filed petition to nullify notices of acquisition with DARAB.
DARAB: Notices of acquisition null and void. EMRAS property is exempt from CARP because subject lands already converted to non-agricultural uses before
1988, therefore no longer convered by CARP.
DAR SECRETARY: Affirmed notices of acquisition.
OFFICE OF tHE PRESIDENT: EMRAS property remained agricultural. Subject of CARP acquisition.
CA: In favor of EMRAS. Subject property already converted as residential by the Municipality of Dasmarinas prior to effectivity of CARP Law. Notices of
acquisition declared void.
Issue 1

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:

Whether the
subject
property could
be placed

Municipal Ordinance 29-A did not reclassify

subject property from agri to non-agri. The
power to reclassify lands is an inherent power
of the Legislature under the Public Land Act,
which, absent a specific delegation, could not

Cites jurisprudence (Ortigas & Co v

Feati Bank) wherein SC rued that a
municipal council is empowered to
adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations under Sec. 3

Supreme Court

No, subject property could not be placed under the

CARP.
Zoning classification is an exercise by the local govt

under the
CARP.

be exercised by an LGU.

of the Local Autonomy Act.

The Local Autonomy Act of 1959 (in effect

when Municipality of Dasmarinas approved
Ordinance 29-A) merely delegated to cities
and municipalities zoning authority. It was only
Sec. 20 of LGC of 1991 that extended to cities
and municipalities limited authority to
reclassify lands.

The Municipality could validly zone and

reclassify the subject property in the
exercise of its police power in order to
safeguard health, safety, peace, good
order, and general welfare of the people
in the locality.
EMRAS mentioned that residential
subdivisions and industrial estatesthe
surround the area of their property.

of police power, not the power of eminent domain. A

Zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or
municipal legislation which logincally arranges,
prescribes, defines, and apportions a given political
subdivision into specific land uses as present and
future projection of needs.
Reclassification is the act of specifying how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agri uses,
embodied in the land use plan.
The land use plan is enacted through a zoning
ordinance. Thus, zoning ordinances take
precedence over reclassification.
When city or municipal boards and councils
approved ordinance delineating an area as
residential pursuant to power under the Local
Autonomy Act, they were at the same time
reclassifying any agricultural lands within the zone
for non-agri use. Hence, ensuring compliance and
implementation of their zoning ordinance.
Therefore, the approval by municipal concils of an
application for subdivision through an ordinance
should already be understood to include approval of
the reclassification of the land, covered by said
application, from agri to non-agri.
Liberal application of zoning power of city and
municipal councils, as to include the power to
accordingly reclassify lands within their zones, is in
accord with legislative intent behind the Local
Autonomy Act to increase the autonomy of local
governments.
It cannot be said that the power to reclassify
agricultural land was first delegated to the city and
municipal legislative bodies under LGC Sec. 20.
Said section only articulates a power of local
legislatures, which previously had only been implied.

Dispositive Portion: Petitions for Review filed by the Buklod Nang Magbubukid Sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. and the Department of Agrarian Reformare DENIED. The
CA Decision is AFFIRMED.

Digester: Stan Geronimo

CASE TITLE: CSC vs. Yu
Date of Case: 2012
DOCTRINE: devolution
Petitioner: (name and short description)
Respondent: (name and short description)
FACTS:

Castillo occupied the position of Provincial Health Officer II (PHO II) in the DOH regional office in Zamboanga.
Yu occupied PHO I position in the same office.
LGC 1991 came into effect.
DOH regional offices were devolved to the LGUs (specifically, Basilan).
Devolution carried with it the TRANSFER of the plantilla items PHO II and PHO I to the devolved units.
Devolution obliges the Governor to re-appoint the incumbents of the plantilla items that were devolved from DOH to Basilan.
Governor did not re-appoint Castillo, despite the automatic transfer rule during devolution.
As a consequence of non-reappointment, Castillo remained working at DOH.
Governor later on appointed Yu to occupy the devolved PHO II position in the Basilan hospital, the one previously occupied by Castillo.
A law was passed re-nationalizing the hospitals in Basilan.
The PHO II position occupied by Yu was transferred back to DOH.
The PHO II position was also converted to Chief of Hospital II position.
The DOH Secretary did not re-appoint Yu to the Chief of Hospital II position.
The DOH Secretary compelled Yu to continue occupying the PHO II position.
The DOH Secretary appointed another person to occupy the Chief of Hospital II position.
Yu questioned her non-reappointment, saying that she has a vested right to the Chief of Hospital II position.
CSC said that she has no vested right to the Chief of Hospital II position.
CSC's theory: the PHO II position was NEVER devolved to the Basilan hospital.
CSC's theory: that because Castillo remained in the DOH during the devolution, PHO II position was retained in DOH.
CSC's theory: when Yu was appointed to a PHO II position in Basilan hospital, it was a different position.
CSC's theory: the Chief of Hospital II position which was a conversion from the PHO II position in the DOH was the plantilla item of Castillo.
Castillo had already retired by the time of the re-nationalization.

WON the PHO II position

occupied by Yu was a
devolved position.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:

The PHO II position was never devolved to LGU Basilan.

The PHO II position was devolved to LGU Basilan.

The PHO II position remained with the DOH, along with

Dr. Castillo.

Said position became VACANT when Dr. Castillo was

not re-appointed by the Governor.

The PHO II position that Dr. Yu occupied in the LGU of

Basilan was a newly created position.

When Dr. Yu occupied the PHO II position, she acquired

vested right in the re-classified PHO II position, as Chief
of Hospital II.

Hence, Dr. Yu has no vested right in the re-classified

PHO II position in the DOH, which was converted to a

DOH Secretarys appointment to the Chief of Hospital II

Supreme
Court
(see
below)

Chief of Hospital II position.

position is invalid.

SUPREME COURT

What is the policy of LGC on devolution/decentralization?

Provide a responsive and accountable LOCGOV structure through system of decentralization.
NG agencies, including DOH, are mandated to devolve LGUs: provision of basic services & facilities
What is devolution?
the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.
What is the manner of devolution prescribed by the LGC? (Sec. 17)

transfer of records, equipment, and other assets to LGUs

transfer of personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and responsibilities
NG personnel to be absorbed by LGUs to which they belong or in whose areas they were assigned
Collatilla: That regional directors who are career executive service officers and other officers of similar rank in the said regional offices who
cannot be absorbed by the local government unit shall be retained by the national government, without any diminution of rank, salary or
tenure

How does EO No. 503 ensure the implementation of devolution?

1. Mandatory absorption of NGA personnel by LGU
2. LGUs shall create equivalent positions of affected personnel, except when not administratively viable
3. Absorption is not administratively viable when there is a duplication of functions unless the LGU opts to absorb the personnel concerned.
4. NG personnel not absorbed are retained by NGA, subject to civil service law
5. Devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer
What is the mandatory duty of the Governor in the devolution?
Mandatory to absorb the PHO II position
Mandatory to reappointment Castillo, the incumbent to the PHO II position
What is the only instance when LGU may choose not to absorb the NGA personnel?
When absorption is not administratively viable, such as when it will result to duplication of functions.

In such a case, the NGA personnel will be retained by the NGA.

What is the evidence showing that PHO II position was devolved to the LGU?
Certification by Governor: said position was included in 1992 OSCAS received from DBM with budget appropriation
Declaration by Governor during formal turn over program: the item position of PHO II was among the positions turned over to the Provincial
Government of Basilan
What is the argument of CSC in support of Governor?
Only 53 plantilla positions, not 54, were devolved.
PHO II position was devolved.
Why was Governor's refusal to reappoint Dr. Castillo whimsical?
No showing that absorption was not administratively viable.
What was the effect of Governor's refusal to reappoint?
did not prevent the devolution of Dr. Castillo which, together with that of the PHO II position, took effect by operation of law.
How was the dilemma resolved?
Governor requested that Dr. Castillo be DETAILED to DOH
Detail was confirmed by Sec. of Health Juan Flavier through Department Order
Dr. Castillo drew salary from the devolved position
What is the rule on compensation of DETAILED officers/employees?
Officials and employees on detail with other offices shall be paid their salaries, emoluments, allowances, fringe benefits and other personal services
costs from the appropriations of their parent agencies and in no case shall such be charged against the appropriations of the agencies where they
are assigned or detailed, except when authorized by law.
What is a detail?
Executive Order 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6):
(6) Detail. A detail is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed, only
for a limited period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If the employee believes that there is no
justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be executory unless
otherwise ordered by the Commission.

What was Dr. Castillo's recourse if she felt aggrieved by the detail?
Right to appeal to CSC
Why did Dr. Castillo not appeal?
We could only surmise that, since Dr. Castillo was looking at only three more years from the time of her detail until her retirement in 1996
considering that she obviously would not suffer any diminution in salary and rank, she found it pointless to pursue the matter
Neither did Dr. Castillo find need to raise a howl when, at the behest of Governor Salapuddin who was determined to replace her, DOH officials
categorized her as a devolution non-viable employee, along with 216 others nationwide, by the mere fact that she was not accepted by the LGU of
Basilan and not because of an actual non-viability
When did Dr. Castillo cease to be a detailed employee?
in 1994, when Governor Salapuddin formally manifested his intention to stop the drawing of Dr. Castillo's salary from the LGU in anticipation of his
appointment of Dr. Yu to the PHO II position, Dr. Castillo ceased to be a detailed employee at the DOH Regional Office but was re-absorbed by the
DOH as a devolution non-viable employee
What is the consequence of re-absorption?
consequently, paid salaries and benefits from the Miscellaneous Personnel Benefits Fund that had been set aside under the Office of the Secretary
of Health precisely for such employees.
Was the PHO II position devolved?
While Dr. Castillo was retained by the DOH, the PHO II position was devolved to the LGU.
Hence, the appointment of Dr. Yu to the position PHO II.

Edward Dayog
PIMENTEL v. AGUIRRE
July 19, 2000
The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision, not control, over local government units (LGUs). Such power enables him to see to
it that LGUs and their officials execute their tasks in accordance with law. While he may issue advisories and seek their cooperation in solving
economic difficulties, he cannot prevent them from performing their tasks and using available resources to achieve their goals.
Petitioner: 1. Aquilino Pimentel; 2. Roberto Pagdanganan, Intervenor (provincial governor of Bulacan, national president of the League of Provinces of the
Philippines, and chairman of the League of Leagues of Local Governments)
Respondent: 1. Alexander Aguirre, Executive Secretary; 2. Emilia Boncodin, Secretary of Budget and Management
FACTS:
- 12/27/1997: The President of the Philippines, in light of the impending economic crisis (Asian Financial Crisis of 1997), issued Admin Order 372, sections 1 and
4 of which provide:
SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations and local
governments units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services items, along the following suggested areas:
1. Continued implementation of the streamlining policy on organization and staffing by deferring action on the following:
a. Operationalization of new agencies;
b. Expansion of organizational units and/or creation of positions;
c. Filling of positions; and
d. Hiring of additional/new consultants, contractual and casual personnel, regardless of funding source.
2. Suspension of the following activities:
a. Implementation of new capital/infrastructure projects, except those which have already been contracted out;
b. Acquisition of new equipment and motor vehicles;
c. All foreign travels of government personnel, except those associated with scholarships and trainings funded by grants;
d. Attendance in conferences abroad where the cost is charged to the government except those clearly essential to Philippine commitments in the international
field as may be determined by the Cabinet;
e. Conduct of trainings/workshops/seminars, except those conducted by government training institutions and agencies in the performance of their regular functions
and those that are funded by grants;
f. Conduct of cultural and social celebrations and sports activities, except those associated with the Philippine Centennial celebration and those involving regular
competitions/events;
g. Grant of honoraria, except in cases where it constitutes the only source of compensation from government received by the person concerned;
h. Publications, media advertisements and related items, except those required by law or those already being undertaken on a regular basis;
i. Grant of new/additional benefits to employees, except those expressly and specifically authorized by law; and
j. Donations, contributions, grants and gifts, except those given by institutions to victims of calamities.

3. Suspension of all tax expenditure subsidies to all GOCCs and LGUs

4. Reduction in the volume of consumption of fuel, water, office supplies, electricity and other utilities
5. Deferment of projects that are encountering significant implementation problems
6. Suspension of all realignment of funds and the use of savings and reserves
SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount
equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld.
- This petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was brought to annul Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by
25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services; and enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4.
Issue 1:

Petitioner's Contention: No.

Respondent's Contention: Yes.

Supreme Court: Yes.

W/N Sec. 1, AO
372 is a valid
exercise of the
President's power
of general
supervision over
LGUs.

1. The President, in issuing AO 372, was

in effect exercising the power of control
over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the
President, however, only the power of
generalsupervision over LGUs,
consistent with the principle of local
autonomy.

Sec. 1, AO 372 is merely advisory in

character, and does not constitute a
mandatory or binding order that interferes with
local autonomy. The language used, while
authoritative, does not amount to a command
that emanates from a boss to a subaltern.

Issue 2:

2. The government failed to satisfy the

requisites before it can intervene in LGU
fiscal matters as provided for in LGC
284.
Petitioner's Contention: No.

AO 372 was issued to alleviate the "economic

difficulties brought about by the peso
devaluation" and constituted merely an exercise
of the President's power of supervision over
LGUs. It does not violate local fiscal autonomy,
because it merely directs local governments to
identify measures that will reduce their total
expenditures for non-personal services by at
least 25%.

Respondent's Contention: Yes.

Supreme Court: No.

W/N Sec. 4, AO
372 is a valid
exercise of the
President's power
of general
supervision over
LGUs.

The directive to withhold 10% of the

LGUs' IRA is in contravention of Sec.
286 of the Local Government Code and
of Sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution,
providing for the automatic release to
each of these units its share in the
national internal revenue.

The withholding of 10% of the LGUs IRA does

not violate the statutory prohibition on the
imposition of any lien or holdback on their
revenue shares, because such withholding is
"temporary in nature pending the assessment
and evaluation by the Development
Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal
situation."

A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the

automatic release of the shares of LGUs in
the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by no less than the Constitution.
LGC 286 specifies further that the release
shall be made directly to the LGU concerned
within five (5) days after every quarter of the
year and "shall not be subject to any lien or
holdback that may be imposed by the national
government for whatever purpose."

OBITER (But important to the topic)

1. Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local governments to one of general supervision. This provision has been
interpreted to exclude the power of control.

2. Mondano v. Silvosa: In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
3. Taule v. Santos: He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted
with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body,"
4. Limbona v. Mangelin: "Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when
the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
local governments 'more responsive and accountable Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities.
5. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., municipal
governments are still agents of the national government.
6. Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal
autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released
by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule
out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national
goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government.
7. LGC 284 provides for requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2)
consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding
recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in
the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition partially granted.
J. Kapunan's Dissent:
1. Section 4 of AO No. 372 does not present a case ripe for adjudication. The language of Section 4 does not conclusively show that, on its face, the
constitutional provision on the automatic release of the IRA shares of the LGUs has been violated. Section 4, as worded, expresses the idea that the withholding is
merely temporary which fact alone would not merit an outright conclusion of its unconstitutionality, especially in light of the reasonable presumption that
administrative agencies act in conformity with the law and the Constitution. Where the conduct has not yet occurred and the challenged construction has not yet
been adopted by the agency charged with administering the administrative order, the determination of the scope and constitutionality of the executive action in
advance of its immediate adverse effect involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function.
2. As chief fiscal officer of the country, the President supervises fiscal development in the local government units and ensures that laws are faithfully
executed. The goal of local economy is not to "end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and local government
units," but to make local governments "more responsive and accountable" to "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." Section 4 of AO No. 372 was issued in the exercise by the President not only
of his power of general supervision, but also in conformity with his role as chief fiscal officer of the country in the discharge of which he is clothed by law
with certain powers to ensure the observance of safeguards and auditing requirements, as well as the legal prerequisites in the release and use of IRAs, taking
into account the constitutional and statutory mandates.

3. The phrase "automatic release" of the LGUs' shares does not mean that the release of the funds is mechanical, spontaneous, self-operating or reflex. IRAs must
first be determined, and the money for their payment collected. (J. Kapunan refers to LGC 284 which empowers the President to adjust IRAs, subject to several
requisites.)

Majority's Refutation

1. RE Prematurity: This is a rather novel theory -- that people should await the implementing evil to befall on them before they can question acts that are illegal or
unconstitutional. Be it remembered that the real issue here is whether the Constitution and the law are contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are
violated by the acts implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case Taada v. Angara, this Court held that when an act of the legislative department is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

2. RE President's power as CFO: Precisely, such powers referred to in the Dissent have specifically been authorized by law and have not been challenged as
violative of the Constitution. On the other hand, Section 4 of AO 372, as explained earlier, contravenes explicit provisions of the Local Government Code
(LGC) and the Constitution. In other words, the acts alluded to in the Dissent are indeed authorized by law; but, quite the opposite, Section 4 of AO 372 is bereft
of any legal or constitutional basis.

3. RE Release and adjustment of IRA: It must be emphasized that in striking down Section 4 of AO 372, this Court is not ruling out any form of reduction in the
IRAs of LGUs. Indeed, as the President may make necessary adjustments in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit, as stated in the main part of this
Decision, and in line with Section 284 of the LGC, which Justice Kapunan cites. He, however, merely glances over a specific requirement in the same provision -that such reduction is subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and, more importantly, with the presidents of the leagues of
local governments. Notably, Justice Kapunan recognizes the need for "interaction between the national government and the LGUs at the planning level," in order
to ensure that "local development plans x x x hew to national policies and standards." The problem is that no such interaction or consultation was ever held
prior to the issuance of AO 372.

Digester: Krissy Flores

CASE TITLE: TAN v. PERENA
Date of Case: Feb. 18, 2005
DOCTRINE: Sec. 5(d) of the Cockfighting Law arises from a valid exercise of police power by the national government. Of course, local governments
are similarly empowered under Sec. 16 of the LGC. The national government ought to be attuned to the sensitivities of devolution and strive to be
sparing in usurping the prerogatives of local governments to regulate the welfare of their constituents. However, the national government undoubtedly
has the ability to implement police power measures that affect the subjects of municipal government, especially if the subject of regulation is a
condition of universal character irrespective of territorial jurisdiction.
A municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, otherwise it is void.
Petitioners:
1. Leonardo Tan defendant; applied on Nov. 8, 1995 with the Municipal Gamefowl Commission for the issuance of a permit/license to establish and operate
a cockpit in Sitio Combado, Bagay, Daanbantayan
2. Robert Uy an agent of Tan
3. Lamberto Te Mayor of Daanbantayan
Respondent:
1. Socorro Y. Perena plaintiff; a duly franchised and licensed cockpit operator in Daanbantayan since the 1970s and whose franchise was valid until 2002

FACTS:
1974 Presidential Decree 449 (PD 449) or the Cockfighting Law of 1974 was enacted. Sec. 5(b) thereof limits the number of cockpits that may be established in
cities and municipalities: Only one cockpit shall be allowed in each city or municipality, except that in cities or municipalities with a population of over 100,000, two
cockpits may be established, maintained and operated.
1991 The LGC was enacted, where the municipal sangguniang bayan were empowered, any law to the contrary not withstanding, to authorize and license the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breding of gamecocks.
1993 The Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of Daanbantayan, Cebu enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 6 (MO6), which served as the Revised Omnibus
Ordinance prescribing and promulgating the rules and regulations governing cockpit operations in Daanbantayan. Sec. 5: There shall be allowed to operate in the
Municipality of Daanbantayan, Cebu, not more than its equal number of cockpits based upon the population provided for in PD 449, provided, however, that this
specific section can be amended for purposes of establishing additional cockpits, if the Municipal population so warrants.
Shortly thereafter, the Sangguniang Bayan passed an amendatory ordinance, Municipal Ordinance No. 7 (MO7), which amended Sec. 5 (above): There shall be
allowed to operate in the Municipality of Daanbantayan not more than three cockpits.
Nov. 8, 1995 Tan applied with the Municipal Gamefowl Commission (MGC) for the issuance of a permit/license to establish a cockpit in Sitio Combado, Bagay,
Daanbantayan. The MGC favorably reccomended to Mayor Te that a permit be issued to Tan.
Jan. 20, 1996 Mayor Te issued a Mayors Permit allowing Tan to establish/operate/conduct the business of a cockpit in Combado for the period of Jan. 20, 1996
to Dec. 31, 1996.
Perena, a duly franchised and licensed cockpit operator in Daanbantayan since the 1970s, filed a Complaint for Damages with a Prayer for Injunction against
petitioners:
1. There was no lawful basis for the establishment of a second cockpit;

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Tan conducted his cockpit fights not in Combado but in Malingin, less than 5km away form her own cockpit.
The unlawful operation of Tans cockpit caused injury to her own legitimate business
Demanded actual, moral and exemplary damages
Prayed that the Mayors Permit be declared null and void
Prayed that a permanent writ of injunction be issued against petitioners, preventing Tan from conducting cockfights within the municipality and Te from
issuing any authority for Tan to pursue such activity.

RTC: initially granted a writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioners: Under the LGC, the sangguniang bayan of each municipality now had the power and authority to grant franchises and enact ordinances authorizing the
establishment, licensing, operation and maintenance of cockpits.
Respondent: The amendment in MO7 violated Sec. 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law of 1974.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint. MO6, prior to its amendment was, by specific provision, an implementation of the Cockfighting Law. Yet, questions could be raised
as to the efficacy of the subsequent amendment under MO7, since under MO6, an amendment allowing additional cockpits could be had only if the municipal
population so warrants. Since the case was only for damages, the RTC cannot grant more relief than that prayed for. There was no evidence to show that
respondent had actually suffered damages and no bad faith in the issuance of the permit to Tan as it was pursuant to MOs that nonetheless remained in force.
In denying Respondents MR, the RTC stated that MOs 6 and 7 were valid and legal for all intents and purposes. Also valid is the Sangguniang Bayans Resolution
No. 78-96, conferring on Tan a franchise to operate a cockpit for 10 years. While the ordinances seemed to be in conflict with the Cockfighting Law, any doubt in
interpretation should be resolved in favor of the grant of more power to the LGU, following the principles of devolution under the LGC.
CA: Sec. 447(a)(3)(V) of the LGC vesting unto the Sangguniang Bayan the power to authorize and license the establishment of cockpits did not do away with the
Cockfighting Law, as these two laws are not necessarily inconcistent with each other. The LGC merely transferred to the Sangguniang Bayan powers that were
previously conferred on the MGC. MO7 should be held invalid for allowing, in unconditional terms, the operation of not more than three cockpits in the municipality,
clearly dispensing with the standard set forth in PD 449 (but this issue is mooted by the expiration and non-renewal of the Mayors Permit). Respondent is not
entitled to damages. Tan enjoined form operating a cockpit and conducitng any cockfights within the municipality.

Issue 1:
Whether the validity of a
municipal ordinance may be
determined in an action for
damages which does not even
contain a prayer to declare the
ordinance valid.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
The CA, in invalidating MO7, embarked on an
unwarranted collateral attack on the validity of
a muncipal ordinance. Perenas complaint did
not pray for the nullity of MO7.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

SUPREME COURT:
The CA did not expressly nullify MO7. However, it
enjoined Tan from operating a cockpit and conducting
cockfights in the municipality. Absent the invalidity of
MO7, there would be no basis for this injunction. So it
seems that the CA did deem MO7 a nullity.
The Complaint is not only an action for damages but
also one for injunction, which requires a judicial
determination whether there exists a right in esse
which is to be protected and if there is an act
consituting a violation of such right against which
injunction is sought. Also, to warrant the recovery of
damages, there must be both a right of action for a
legal wrong inflicted by the defendant and damage
resulting to the plaintiff therefrom (damnum et injuria).

Issue 2:
Whether the Cockfighting Law
was repealed by the LGC
(Whether a second cockpit may
be legally allowed in
Daanbantayan).

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
Yes, repealed. MO7 is valid. The Cockfighting
Law was repealed by the LGC (citing Sec. 5(b)
of LGC). Said provision vests on LGUs the
power and authority to issue franchises and
regulate the operation and establishment of
cockpits in their respecitve municipalities, any
law to the contrary withstanding.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
No, based on Sec.
5(b) of the
Cockfighting Law.

Petitioners averment in its Answer that MO7 is valid

can be considered as an affirmative defense, hence, it
became a justiciable matter for the RTC.
SUPREME COURT:
No. While the LGC expressly repealed several laws,
the Cockfighting Law was not among them. Sec. 534(f)
of the LGC is not an express repealing clause because
it fails to identify/designate the acts that are intended to
be repealed. Implied repeals are disfavored and will
not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is
manifest or unless the repugnancy between the two
laws is not only irreconcilable but also clear and
convincing.
The clear import of Sec. 447(a)(3)(v) is that it is the
Sangguniang Bayan which is empowered to authorize
and license the establshment, operation and
maintenance of cockpits and regulate cockfighting and
commercial breeding of gamecocks, notwithstanding
any law to the contrary.

Issue 3:
Meaning of the qualifier any

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

History of laws:
The power (generally unqualified by restrictions) of the
municipal council to authorize/license cockpits was
repeatedly recognized even after the establishment of
the Republic in 1946. However, in the 1970s, there
was a desire for stricter licensing requirements of
cockpits, hence the enactment of the Cockfighting Law
in 1974. In said law, it wa the city or municipal mayor
who was authorized to issue licenses for the opeartion
and maintenance of cockpits, subject to the approval of
the Chief of Constabulary or his authorized
representative. Thus, the sole discretion to authorize
the operation of cockpits was removed from the LGUs.
PD 1802 reestablished the Philippine Gamefowl
Commission and provided that city and municipal
mayors with the concurrence of their respective
sangguniang panglunsod/bayan were given the
authority to license and regulate cockfighting under the
supervision of the City Mayor or the Provincial
Governor. The latter was subsequently amended,
transferring the supervision from the mayor or governor
to the PGC.
SUPREME COURT:
PGC v. IAC (construing Sec. 4 of PD 1802): The

law to the contrary

notwithstanding provided in
Sec. 447(a)(3)(v).

Issue 4:
Does the qualifier in the LGC
similarly allow the Sangguniang
Bayan to authorize more
cockpits than allowed under the
Cockfighting Law?

conferment of the power to license and regulate

municipal cockpits in municipal authorities is in line
with the policy of local autonomy embodied in the
Constitution. The PGC did not possess the power to
issue cockpit licenses; it only had review and
supervision powers, as distinguished from control. The
regulation of cockpits was vested in the municipal
authorities, subject only to the guidelines laid down by
the PGC.
The qualifier serves notice that it is the sangguniang
bayan concerned alone which has the power to
authorize and license the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and
commmercial breeding of gamecocks within its
territorial jurisdiction.
SUPREME COURT:
No. While the sanggunian retains the power to
authorize and license, its discretion is limited in that it
cannot authorize more than one cockpit per city or
municipality, unless such cities or municipalities have a
population of more than 100,000, in which case two
cockpits may be established. Considering that Sec.
447(a)(3)(v) speaks essentially of the identity of the
wielder of the power of control and supervision over
cockpit operation, it is not inconsistent with previous
enactments that impose restricitons on how such
power may be exercised. There is no dichotomy
between affirming the power and subjecting it to
limitations at the same time.
Sec. 5(d) of the Cockfighting Law arises from a valid
exercise of police power by the national government.
Of course, local governments are similarly empowered
under Sec. 16 of the LGC. The national government
ought to be attuned to the sensitivities of devloution
and strive to be sparing in usurping the prerogatives of
local governments to regulate the welfare of their
constituents. However, the national government
undoubtedly has the ability to implement police power
measures that affect the subjects of municipal
government, especially if the subject of regulation is a
condition of universal character irrespective of
territorial jurisdiction (ex. Cockfighting is a traditionally
regulated activity due to the attendant gambling
involved, which is essentially antagonistic to the aims

of enhancing national productivity and self-reliance).

Sec. 447(a)(3)(v) cannot be construed as vesting an
unlimited discretion to the sanggunian to control all
aspects of cockpits and cockfighting in their respective
jurisdiction because then, the national government
would be effectively barred from imposing any future
regulatory enactments pertaining to cockpits and
cockfighting unless it were to repeal the Sec.
447(a)(3)(v).
A municipal ordinance must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute, otherwise it is void. MO7
contravenes the Cockfighting Law in allowing 3
cockpits in Daanbantayan. Thus, no rights can be
asserted by petitioners arising from the ordinance.
Dispositive Portion: Petition denied. Injunction proper.

BATANGAS CATV, INC., vs. CA, BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD & BATANGAS CITY MAYOR
September 29, 2004 | Sandoval Gutierrez, J
Digest by: Monica G.
An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid Why? Magtajas v. Pryce:
Municipal government are only agents of the national government. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal.
Petitioner: Batangas CATV, Inc. - cable service provider in Batangas
Respondent: Batangas Sangguniang Panlungsod & Batangas City Mayor original respondents, CA since CA decision subj to R45.
FACTS:
On July 28, 1986, the Batangas City Sangguniang Panlungsod (Panlungsod) enacted Resolution No. 210 granting Batangas CATV permit to construct,
install and operate a CATV in Batangas City. Sec. 8 of the said resolution authorizes petitioner to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified
therein. However, any increase of rates would be subject to the approval of the Panlungsod.
In 1993 petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month without approval of the Panlungsod. The Batangas City mayor wrote
petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit if it doesnt secure the approval of the Panlungsod for the rate increase.
Petitioner filed for injunction assailing the Panlungsods authority to regulate rates charged by CATV operators because under EO 205, it was the National
Telecommunications Commission which had the sole authority to regulate CATV operation in the Philippines. The trial court GRANTED the petition
holding that the sole agency which can regulate CATV operations was the NTC and that LGUs cannot exercise regulatory powers over it without
appropriate legislation.
The CA REVERSED: The Certificate of Authority to operate a CATV system is granted by the NTC, but this does not preclude the Panlungsod from
regulating the operation of the CATV in their locality under the powers vested upon it by the LGC of 1983. Sec. 177 (now 457 in RA 7160) provides:
Section 177. Powers and Duties The Sangguniang Panlungsod shall:
a) Enact such ordinances as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall
be necessary and proper topromote the prosperity and general welfare of the community and the inhabitants thereof, and the protection of
property therein;
d) Regulate, fix the license fee for, and tax any business or profession being carried on and exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the city
Under cover of the General Welfare Clause as provided in this section, LGUs can perform just about any power that will benefit their
constituencies. Thus, local government units can exercise powers that are: (1) expressly granted; (2) necessarily implied from the power that is
expressly granted; (3) necessary, appropriate or incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and (4) essential to the promotion of the
general welfare of their inhabitants.
Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue 1
W/N a LGU can
regulate the
subscriber rates
charged by CATV
(cable tv) operators
within its territorial
jurisdiction

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
NO
While the LGC of 1991 extends to
LGUs to perform any act that will
benefit their constituents, it does
not authorize them to regulate
CATV operations since pursuant
to EO 205, only NTC has that
authority.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
YES
> Resolution No. 210 was enacted
pursuant to Sec. 177(c)&(d) of the LGC of
1983 which authorizes LGUs to regulate
businesses, including the CATV industry.

SUPREME COURT
NO
1. For more than two decades the NTC has assumed
regulatory power over the CATV industry. Presidential
issuances have reinforced the NTCs powers:
> Pres. Marcos issued PD 1512 which granted Sining
Makulay the exclusive franchise to operate CATV
system in any place within the Philippines. It
terminated all franchises, permits, or certificated for
CATV systems previously granted by local
governments and national government

instrumentalities. Pres. Marcos subsequently issued

letter of instruction 894 vesting upon the Chairman of
the Board of Communications direct supervision over
Sining Makulay. Thereafter he issued EO 546
integrating the Board of Communications and the
Telecommunications Control Bureau to form the NTC.
>Sining Makulays franchise was cut short by the
People Power Revolution. Pres. Aquino issued EO
205 opening the CATV industry to all. It mandated the
NTC to grant Certificates of Authority to CATV
operators and to issue the necessary IRRs.
>Pres. Ramos issued EO 436 restating NTCs
regulatory powers over the CATV operations:
Sec. 2 The regulation and supervision of the cable
television industry in the Philippines shall remain
vested solely with the NTC.
2. Note, however, that this does not mean LGUs are
stripped of their general power to prescribe
regulations under the general welfare clause of the
LGC.
>When EO 436 decrees that the "regulatory power"
shall be vested "solely" in the NTC, it pertains to the
"regulatory power" over those matters which are
peculiarly within the NTCs competence, such as, the
determination of rates, issuance of certificates of
authority, etc.
>There is no dispute that the Panlungsod has been
empowered to enact ordinances and approve
resolutions under the general welfare clause of the
LGC of 1983. It continues to posses such power is
clear under Sec. 16 & 458 of RA 7160 (LGC of
1991).
>The general welfare clause is the delegation in
statutory form of the police power of the State to
LGUs. Through this, LGUs may prescribe regulations
to protect the lives, health, and property of their
constituents and maintain peace and order within
their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe
regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause,

Sub-issue 1
W/N Resolution 210
was a valid enactment

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
YES
> On the premise that RA 7160 repealed
EO 205 (regulatory power of NTC)

primarily because the CATV system uses public

properties. The physical realities of constructing
CATV system allow an LGU a certain degree of
regulation over CATV operators.
SUPREME COURT

NO
In enacting Resolution No. 210, the respondents
strayed from the well recognized limits of its power
because:
1. It violates the mandate of existing laws.
Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU
acting as an agent of the national legislature.
Necessarily, its act must reflect and conform to
the will of its principal.
US v. Abendan: An ordinance enacted by virtue
of the general welfare clause is valid, unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the
Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine
Legislature, or unless it is against public policy,
or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating, or in derogation of common right.
De la Cruz v. Paraz: Ordinances passed by
virtue of the implied power found in the general
welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant
with the general powers and purposes of the
corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws
or policy of the State.
Resolution No. 210 contravenes EO 205 and
EO 436 insofar as it permits respondent
Panlungsod to usurp a power exclusively vested
in the NTC, i.e., the power to fix the subscriber
rates charged by CATV operators.
Where the state legislature has made provision
for the regulation of conduct, it has manifested
its intention that the subject matter shall be fully
covered by the statute, and that a municipality,
under its general powers, cannot regulate the
same conduct.
o Keller v. State: Where there is no express
power in the charter of a municipality
authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating
certain matters which are specifically covered
by a general statute, a municipal ordinance,
insofar as it attempts to regulate the subject

which is completely covered by a general

statute of the legislature, may be rendered
invalid. x x x Where the subject is of statewide
concern, and the legislature has appropriated
the field and declared the rule, its declaration
is binding throughout the State.
EO 205, a general law, mandates that the
regulation of CATV operations shall be
exercised by the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an
ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of
the said law. Municipal ordinances are inferior in
status and subordinate to the laws of the state.
An ordinance in conflict with a state law of
general character and statewide application is
universally held to be invalid
Why? Magtajas v. Pryce: Municipal government
are only agents of the national government. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal.
Contrary to respondents assertions, RA 7160
did not repeal EO 205, impliedly or expressedly.
o It was not included in Sec. 534 of RA 7160 as
one of the laws repealed by the RA.
o It was not impliedly repealed as the RA and
EO may be harmonized. The NTC, under EO
205, has exclusive jurisdiction over matters
affecting CATV operation, including
specifically the fixing of subscriber rates, but
does not preclude LGUs from exercising its
general power, under RA 7160, to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of their constituents. In effect,
both laws become equally effective and
mutually complementary.
As a specialized agency, the NTC is in a better
position than the LGU to regulate given the
complexities that characterize the CATV
industry.
2. It violates the States deregulation policy over the
CATV industry.
When the State declared a policy of
deregulation, the LGUs are bound to follow. To
rule otherwise is to render the States policy
ineffective. Being mere creatures of the State,
LGUs cannot defeat national policies through

enactments of contrary measures. In the case at

bar, petitioner may increase its subscriber rates
without respondents approval.
Sub-issue 2
W/N EO 205 violated
the constitutional
prohibition against
impairment of
contracts

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
YES
> Resolution No. 210 is in the nature of a
contract between petitioner and
respondents, it being a grant to the former
of a franchise to operate a CATV system.
To hold that E.O. No. 205 amended its
terms would violate the constitutional
prohibition against impairment of contracts.

SUPREME COURT

NO
>
There is no law specifically authorizing the
LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV system.
Whatever authority the LGUs had before had been
withdrawn when Pres. Marcos issued PD 1512
"terminating all franchises, permits or certificates for
the operation of CATV system previously granted by
local governments."
>
The protection of the constitutional provision as
to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not
extend to privileges, franchises and grants given by a
municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 12, 1999 as well as its Resolution
dated May 26, 1999 in CA-GR CV No. 52461, are hereby REVERSED. The RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 4254 is AFFIRMED.

Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary

13 December 2005
(Digest adopted from ustlawreview.com; Important points underlined by K. Guangko)
DOCTRINE: Under the LGC, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities and prior approval of the project by the appropriate
sanggunian. Lack of either requisite makes the projects implementation illegal.
Petitioner: Province of Rizal, Municipality of San Mateo, et. al. (the local governments want the subject dump located in San Mateo to be closed)
Respondent: Executive Secretary, Secretary of Environment & Natural Resources, Laguna Lake Development Authority, Secretary of Public Works and Highways
et. al. (Executive Department wants to keep the dump open)
FACTS:
This case sprouted from the Memorandum of Agreement dated 17 November 1988 signed by Secretaries of DPWH and DENR together with the Metropolitan
Manila Commission (MMC) Governor. The same provided that DENR allowed the utilization of its land in Pintong, Bocaue, Rizal as a sanitary landfill by MMC.
However, on 7, 8 and 10 February 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo wrote to Gov. Cruz of MMC, the DPWH, the Executive Secretary, and the DENR,
informing them of the SB resolution banning creation of dumpsites for Metro Manila within its jurisdiction. The letter also asked that addressee's side be heard, and
that the addressees suspend and temporarily hold in abeyance all and any part of your operations with respect to the San Mateo Landfill Dumpsite. No action
was taken on these letters.
It was also found that the land subject of the MOA was part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area. Thus, in a memorandum (31 May 1989) and two reports
(19 June 1989 and 22 January 1990) submitted by the forest officers of the Forest Engineering and Infrastructure Unit of the Community Environment and Natural
Resource Office (CENRO), DENR-IV, Rizal Province, showed that there was no permit issued to MMC to utilize these portions of land for dumping purposes, that
the use of the areas greatly affected 1192 families residing and cultivating areas surrounding the dumping site. Respondents LLDA informed the MMA that the
heavy pollution and risk of disease generated by dumpsites rendered the location of a dumpsite within the Marikina Watershed Reservation incompatible with its
program of upgrading the water quality of Laguna Lake. Another report by the Regional Technical Director to the DENR found respiratory illnesses among pupils of
a primary school located approximately 100 meters from the site, as well as the constant presence of large flies and windblown debris all over the schools
playground.
In February 1990, DENR granted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (formerly MMC) an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) for the operation of the
garbage dumpsite. On 31 July 1990, less than six months after the issuance of the ECC, DENR suspended the ECC in a letter addressed to the respondent
Secretary of DPWH, stating that it was ascertained that ground slumping and erosion have resulted from improper development of the site. On November 1993,
the DENR Secretary sent a letter to MMA recommending that the all facilities and infrastructure in the garbage dumpsite in Pintong Bocaue be dismantled. Despite
the various objections and recommendations raised by the government agencies, the Office of the President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, signed
and issued Proclamation No. 635, Excluding from the Marikina Watershed Reservation Certain Parcels of Land Embraced Therein for Use as Sanitary Landfill
Sites and Similar Waste Disposal Under the Administration of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.
On 22 July 1996, the petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining
order/writ of preliminary injunction. CA denied the petition for lack of cause of action. On 05 January 1998, while the appeal was pending, the petitioners filed a
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, pointing out that the effects of the El Nio phenomenon would be aggravated by the relentless destruction of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation. On 28 January 1999, the petitioners filed a Motion for Early Resolution, calling attention to the continued expansion of the dumpsite. As a
result, MMDA officials agreed to abandon the dumpsite after six months. The municipal mayors allowed the use of the dumpsites until 20 July 1999. On 20 July
`999, the Presidential Committee on Flagship Programs and Projects and the MMDA entered into a MOA with the Provincial Government of Rizal, the Municipality

of San Mateo, and the City of Antipolo allowing the use of the dumpsite until 31 December 2000. However, on 11 January 2001, President Estrada directed DILG
Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite in view of the emergency situation of uncollected garbage in Metro Manila,
resulting in a critical and imminent health and sanitation epidemic. Claiming the above events constituted a clear and present danger of violence erupting in the
affected areas, the petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Restraining Order on 19 January 2001. On 24 January 2001, SC issued the Temporary Restraining
Order prayed for, effective immediately and until further orders. Meanwhile, on 26 January 2001, Republic Act No. 9003, otherwise known as The Ecological
Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, was signed into law by President Estrada.

Issues

PETITIONER:

RESPONDENT:

Supreme Court:

W the San Mateo

Landfill will remain
permanently closed

Various reports of the

effects of the dump on the
environment and on the
residents (polluted sources
of potable water;
respiratory illnesses, etc.)

Declared that the reason for the

creation of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation to
protect the Marikina River as
source of supply of the City of
Manila no longer exists

Two self-evident truths: (a) the San Mateo site has adversely affected
its environments; (b) sources of water should always be protected.
Before Proclamation 635, Congress enacted the National Water
Crisis Act that sought to address the protection and conservation of
watersheds. Respondents actions defy all logic.

W the local
governments have the
power to control or
regulate the use natural
resources located in the
public domain

Legality of Proclamation
635

Marikina Watershed Reservation

and thus the San Mateo Site are
located in the public domain and
the power to control or regulate
its use is national and not local
government.

Proclamation 635 violates

the LGC.

Proclamation 635 is not subject

to the provisions of LGC.

San Mateo Dump CLOSED.

The Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and Executive
Order No. 192 (Charter of DENR) entrust the DENR with
the guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation and our other natural treasures. However, although the
DENR, an agency of the government, owns the Marikina Reserve and
has jurisdiction over the same, this power is not absolute, but is
defined by the declared policies of the state, and is subject to the law
and higher authority They have ignored their responsibility as
guardians and protectors of this tormented piece of land.
Under the LGC, two requisites must be met before a national project
that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected
local communities and prior approval of the project by the appropriate
sanggunian. Lack of either requisite makes the projects
implementation illegal.
*Full discussion below.

*The Local Government Code gives to local government units all the necessary powers to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants. The municipal mayors
acted within the scope of their powers, and were in fact fulfilling their mandate. Section 16 allows every local government unit to exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare, which involve promoting health and safety, enhancing the right of the people to a balanced ecology and
preserving the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Under the LGC, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Lack of either requisite makes
the projects implementation illegal.

Approved on 26 January 2001, The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000 was enacted pursuant to the declared policy of the state to adopt a
systematic, comprehensive and ecological solid waste management system which shall ensure the protection of public health and environment, and utilize
environmentally sound methods that maximize the utilization of valuable resources and encourage resource conservation and recovery. It requires the adherence
to a Local Government Solid Waste Management Plan with regard to the collection and transfer, processing, source reduction, recycling, composting and final
disposal of solid wastes, the handling and disposal of special wastes, education and public information, and the funding of solid waste management projects.
The said law mandates the formulation of a National Solid Waste Management Framework, which should include, among other things, the method and procedure
for the phaseout and the eventual closure within eighteen months from effectivity of the Act in case of existing open dumps and/or sanitary landfills located within
an aquifer, groundwater reservoir or watershed area. Any landfills subsequently developed must comply with the minimum requirements laid down in Section 40,
specifically that the site selected must be consistent with the overall land use plan of the local government unit, and that the site must be located in an area where
the landfills operation will not detrimentally affect environmentally sensitive resources such as aquifers, groundwater reservoirs or watershed areas.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41330, dated 13 June 1997, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on 24 January 2001 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED

Digester: Justin Batocabe

CASE TITLE: Veloso v. COA
Date of Case: September 6, 2001

DOCTRINE: LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA.

Petitioner: Luciano Velosos et. Al. three term councilors of Manila

Respondent: COA

FACTS:
1) City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of Exemplary Public Service Award (EPSA) to Elective
Local Officials of Manila Who Have Been Elected for Three (3) Consecutive Terms in the Same Position. It gave gratuity the equivalent of the salary for 3 terms to
the Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Councilor if they were able to serve 3 consecutive terms at the end of their terms.
2) Atty. Espina, Supervising Auditor of the City of Manila, issued Audit Observation Memorandum stating the ff:
a) the reward was without legal basis
b) it was excessive and constituted double compensation
c) appropriations for retirement gratuity to implement EPSA ordinance was classified as Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses instead of Personal Services
3) After evaluation of the AOM, the Director, Legal and Adjudication Office the ordinance was upheld, finding that there is no double compensation.
4) Upon review of the COA it opined that the monetary reward under the EPSA is covered by the term compensation. Though it recognizes the local autonomy of
LGUs, it emphasized the limitations thereof set forth in the Salary Standardization Law (SSL). It explained that the SSL does not authorize the grant of such
monetary reward or gratuity. It also stressed the absence of a specific law passed by Congress which ordains the conferment of such monetary reward or gratuity
to the former councilors
5) Petitioners now go to the SC

Issue 1

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS

Supreme Court

whether the COA has the

authority to disallow the
disbursement of local
government funds

*the power and authority of the COA to

audit government funds and accounts
does not carry with it in all instances the
power to disallow a particular
disbursement.

*Citing Guevara v. Gimenez, petitioners

claim that the COA has no discretion or
authority to disapprove payments on the
ground that the same was unwise or
that the amount is unreasonable. The
COA's remedy, according to petitioners,
is to bring to the attention of the proper
administrative officer such expenditures
that, in its opinion, are irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant.

* While admitting that the cited case was

decided by the Court under the 1935
Constitution, petitioners submit that the
same principle applies in the present
case.

CONTENTION:
COA held that it is vested by
the Constitution the power to
determine whether
government entities comply
with laws and regulations in
disbursing government funds
and to disallow irregular
disbursements

YES COA had authority

As held in National Electrification Administration v.

Commission on Audit, the ruling in Guevara cited by
petitioners has already been overturned by the
Court in Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on
Audit. The Court explainedthat under the 1935
Constitution, the Auditor General could not correct
irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenditures of public funds, but could only bring
the matter to the attention of the proper
administrative officer. Under the 1987 Constitution,
however, the COA is vested with the authority to
determine whether government entities, including
LGUs, comply with laws and regulations in
disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal
or irregular disbursements of these funds.

*Under the Constitution and the Admin Code the

COA's audit jurisdiction extends to the
government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters. Its jurisdiction likewise covers,
albeit on a post-audit basis, the constitutional
bodies, commissions and offices that have been
granted fiscal autonomy, autonomous state
colleges and universities, other government-owned
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
and such non-governmental entities receiving
subsidy or equity from or through the government.

* Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public

funds, the COA is vested with broad powers over all
accounts pertaining to government revenue and
expenditures and the uses of public funds and

property. This includes the exclusive authority to

define the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods for such
review, and promulgate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations. The COA is endowed with
enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds.
It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the government's,
and ultimately the people's, property.
*LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are
still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA.

Issue 2 whether the COA

committed grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the
disallowance of P9,923,257.00
covering the EPSA of former
three-term councilors of the
City of Manila authorized by
Ordinance No. 8040

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
COA acted out of bounds when it
declared the EPSA as it effectively
nullified a duly-enacted ordinance which
is essentially a judicial function.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court

(same contention as above)

NO GADALEJ by COA

SC found that Ordinance No 8040 amounted to

double compensation

*the COA's assailed decisions were made in faithful

compliance with its mandate and in judicious
exercise of its general audit power as conferred on
it by the Constitution. The COA adheres to the
policy that government funds and property should
be fully protected and conserved and that irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenditures or uses of such funds and property
should be prevented

Dispositive Portion:

Petition DISMISSED. Commission on Audit decision AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The recipients need not refund
the retirement and gratuity pay remuneration that they already received, as the parties acted in good faith.

Digester: Arnel Abeleda

CASE TITLE: Aldaba v. COMELEC
Date of Case: January 25, 2010
DOCTRINE: A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the immediately following election. In short, a city
must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative.

Petitioner: Victorino Aldaba, Carlo Fajardo, Julio Morada and Minerva Morada (Taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City)
Respondent: Commission on Elections

FACTS:

1. Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four (4 legislative districts). The 1st Legislative District comprised of the ff.:
a. City of Malolos
b. Municipalities of (1) Hagonoy, (2) Calumpit, (3) Pulilan, (4) Bulacan, and (5) Paombong.
2. 1 May 2009, R.A. 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter, by creating a separate legislative district for the city.
3. At the time the legislative bills for R.A. 9591 (HB 3693 and SB 1986) were filed in Congress in 2007, the population of Malolos City was 223,069.
4. The population of Malolos City on May 1, 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that HB 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional
Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the
population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.
5. Petitioners filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit
representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
Issue

Aldaba

WON the Congress use of

projected population is nonjusticiable as it involves a
determination on the "wisdom
of the standard adopted by the
legislature to determine
compliance with a constitutional
requirement."

Whether or not the City of

Comelec

Supreme Court

There exists a
justiciable issue.

Congress use of projected population is non-justiciable

as it involves a determination on the "wisdom of the
standard adopted by the legislature to determine
compliance with a constitutional requirement."

Questions calling for judicial determination

of compliance with constitutional standards
by other branches of the government are
fundamentally justiciable. The resolution of
such questions falls within the checking
function of this Court under the 1987
Constitution to determine whether there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The City of

The City of Malolos failed to meet the minimum

The Certification of Regional Director

Malolos has a population of at

least 250,000, whether actual or
projected, for the purpose of
creating a legislative district for
the City of Malolos in time for
the 10 May 2010 elections

Malolos failed to
meet the
minimum
population
threshold of
250,000.

population threshold of 250,000.D14:D23Undated

Certification of Regional Director Alberto Miranda of
Region III of the NSO serves as the authority that the
population of the City of Malolos will be 254,030 by
the year 2010. It was "issued upon the request of
Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in
connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City
as a lone congressional district of the Province of
Bulacan."

Miranda, which is based on demographic

projections, is without legal effect because
Regional Director Miranda has no basis and
no authority to issue the Certification. The
Certification is also void on its face because
based on its own growth rate assumption, the
population of Malolos will be less than
250,000 in the year 2010. In addition,
intercensal demographic projections cannot
be made for the entire year. In any event, a
city whose population has increased to
250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district
only in the "immediately following election"
after the attainment of the 250,000
population.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE Republic Act No. 9591 UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 5(3),

Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
Dissenting Opinion (Abad):
1. Nothing in Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution prohibits the use of estimates or population projections in the creation of legislative districts. The
standard to be adopted in determining compliance with the population requirement involves a political question. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion or
patent violation of established legal parameters, the Court cannot intrude into the wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature.
2. EO 135 cannot apply to this case for the following reasons:
a. The President issued EO 135 specifically to provide guidelines on the issuance of Certification of Population sizes pursuant to the following provisions of the
Local Government Code: Section 7 (the creation and conversion of local government units); Section 386 (the creation of a barangay), Section 442 (the creation of
a municipality); Section 450 (the conversion of a municipality or a cluster of barangay into a component city); Section 452 (the creation of highly urbanized cities);
and Section 461 (the creation of urbanized cities). Since R.A. 9591 is not concerned with the creation or conversion of a local government unit but with the
establishment of a new legislative district, which is by no means a local government unit, the same is not governed by the requirements of EO 135.
b. RA 9591 is based on a "legislative" finding of fact that Malolos will have a population of over 250,000 by the year 2010. The rules of legislative inquiry or
investigation are unique to each house of Congress. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Executive Department can dictate on Congress the kind of evidence that
will satisfy its law-making requirement
c. Certification issued by the NSO Region III Director, whose office has jurisdiction over Malolos City, partakes of official information based on official data.
The Regional Director did not make the projection by counting the trees from the mountaintops. The data are based on evidence that is admissible even in a court
of law.

i. The majority opinion uses the following formula: 175,291 x 37.80% (arrived at by multiplying the 3.78 annual growth rate by 10 for the 10 years
between 2000 and 2010) = 241,550. It uses a growth rate of 37.80% per 10 years to substitute for the stated official growth rate of 3.78% per year. It ignores logic
and the natural cumulative growth of population.
ii. In contrast, the NSO Regional Directors computation applies the growth rate of 3.78% per year, which is more logical in that the base is adjusted
annually to reflect the year to year growth. Thus:
Base
Rate
Growth
Year
175,291
x 3.78% =
181,917
2001
181,917
x 3.78% =
188,793
2002
188,793
x 3.78% =
195,929
2003
195,929
x 3.78% =
203,335
2004
203,335
x 3.78% =
211,021
2005
211,021
x 3.78% =
218,998
2006
218,998
x 3.78% =
227,276
2007
227,276
x 3.78% =
235,867
2008
235,867
x 3.78% =
244,783
2009
244,783
x 3.78% =
254,036
2010
3. There is no showing that Congress enacted RA 9591 to favor the interest of any candidate. A city can aspire to have one representative who will represent its
interest in Congress.
4. Contrary to petitioners claim, RA 9591 is a reapportionment bill. It does not require the conduct of a plebiscite for its validity. As the Court held in Bagabuyo
v. Commission on Elections, the holding of a plebiscite is not a requirement in legislative apportionment or reapportionment. A plebiscite is necessary only in the
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of local government units, which is not the case here.

NAVARRO V. ERMITA GR No. 180050

10 February 2010
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. R65 Certiorari.
Digester: Joeyboy Lacas
DOCTRINE: The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code. Any
derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10 Art X of the Constitution.

PETITIONERS:
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA
They are taxpayers and residents of Surigao del Norte
They have served the Province of Surigao del Norte once as Vice-Governor and members of Provincial Board, respectively.
RESPONDENTS:
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines;
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Senate President;
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by the House Speaker;
GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte;
GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new province of Dinagat Islands.
FACTS:
1. Mother province of Surigao del Norte was created via RA 2786 in 1960.
2. Surigao del Norte is composed of 3 groups of islands: (a) Mainland & Surigao City, (b) Siargao Island & Bucas Grande, and (c) Dinagat Island, which is
composed of seven municipalities.
3. Under Section 461 of RA 7160 (Local Government Code), a province may be created if:
a. Income: at least 20M based on 1991 constant prices certified by Department of Finance;
b. And EITHER of the following:
Territory: a contiguous** territory of at least 2000 sq km, certified by the Lands Management
Bureau, OR
Population: not less than 250,000 inhabitants, certified by the NSO
** Territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city
or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
4. Dinagat Islands Statistics (as of 2000)
Income
82.69 M

5. 2006

Territory
802.12 sq km
composed of Hibuson Islands
and 47 other islets

Population
106,951
based on the NSO 2000
Census of Population

Congress enacted RA 9355, creating the Province of Dinagat Islands.

6. 02 Dec. 2006
Plebiscite held to determine whether the LGUs directly affected approved of the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands into a distinct and
independent province: 69T++ affirmative votes, 63T++ negative votes.
7. A new set of provincial officials were appointed by PGMA. Another set of provincial officials was elected in May 2007.
8. Petitioners prayed that RA 9355 be declared unconstitutional, and that all subsequent appointments and elections to the new vacant positions in the newly
created Province of Dinagat Islands be declared null and void.
Other pertinent laws:
Section 10, Article X
Constitution

Article 9, IRR of
1991 LGC

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,

merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Article 9. Provinces .(a) Requisites for creationA province shall not be created
unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are
present:
(1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty
Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding two
(2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified
by DOF. The average annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special
accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and
(2) Population or land area - Population which shall not be less
than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certified
by National Statistics Office; or land area which must be
contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated
by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income
of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.
The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall
be properly identified by metes and bounds.

Issue 1
W/N the creation
of the Province of
Dinagat Islands
violates Sec. 10
Article X
Constitution?

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
Yes. Creation of the
Province of Dinagat
Islands is both invalid
and unconstitutional.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
Creation of the Province of
Dinagat Islands met all the
statutory requirements.

Supreme Court
Creation did not meet the requirements
provided by law.

Dissent, Nachura
Economic viability is the primordial
consideration in the constitution of
provinces, not population or territory

a) Failure to comply

a) Population of Dinagat

a) Did not meet minimum population

a) Agrees that population requirement

with the minimum

population
requirement

Islands is 371T++
such data
was obtained from Special
Census of 2003, which even
though not certified by NSO,
was conducted with the aid of
NSO representative

requirement
Special Census of 2003
NOT certified by the NSO as required by
LGC, and respondents failed to prove
that with the population count of
371T++, the population of the mother
province would not be reduced to less
than the minimum requirement
prescribed by law

was not met

b) Failure to comply
with the minimum
land area
requirement

b) According to Art. 9 of the

IRR, land area requirement of
2000 sq km need not be
complied with if territory is
composed of more than one
island.

b) Art. 9 of the IRR went beyond the

criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the
Local Government Code when it added
the italicized portion above stating that
"[t] he land area requirement shall not
apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands."
Nowhere in the Local Government Code
is the said provision stated or implied.
Under Section 461 of the Local
Government Code, the only instance
when the territorial or land area
requirement need not be complied with
is when there is already compliance with
the population requirement. The
Constitution requires that the criteria for
the creation of a province, including any
exemption from such criteria, must all be
written in the Local Government
21
Code. There is no dispute that in case
of discrepancy between the basic law
and the rules and regulations
implementing the said law, the basic law
prevails, because the rules and
regulations cannot go beyond the terms
and provisions of the basic law.

b) IRR is valid. The stipulation in

paragraph (b), however, qualifies not
merely the word contiguous in
paragraph (a)(i) in the same provision,
but rather the entirety of the latter
paragraph. Paragraph (a)(i) of the
provision, for ready reference, reads:
a contiguous territory of at least two
thousand (2,000) square (i)
kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau.

cral aw

Hence, the Court holds that the

provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR
stating that "[t] he land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more
islands" is null and void.

This whole paragraph on contiguity and

land area, I repeat for emphasis, is the
one being referred to in the exemption
from the territorial requirement in
paragraph (b). Thus, if the province to
be created is composed of islands, like
the one in this case, then, its territory
need not be contiguous and need not
have an area of at least 2,000 sq km.
This is because, as the law is worded,
contiguity and land area are not two
distinct and separate requirements. the
law, by providing in paragraph (b) of
Section 461 that the territory need not
be contiguous if the same is comprised
of islands, must be interpreted as
intended to exempt such territory from
the land area component requirement of
2,000 sq km. Because the two
component requirements are
inseparable, the elimination of contiguity
from the territorial criterion has the
effect of a coexistent eradication of the
land area component. The territory of
the province of Dinagat Islands,

therefore, comprising the major islands

of Dinagat and Hibuson, and
approximately 47 islets, need not be
contiguous and need not have an area
of at least 2,000 sq km following
Section 461 of the LGC.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as [An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands],
is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared NULL and VOID. The
provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where
the
proposed
province
is
composed
of
one
(1)
or
more
islands,"
is
declared
NULL
and
VOID.

Digester: Ivan Galura

CASE TITLE: Navarro v. Ermita
Date of Case: April 12, 2011
DOCTRINE: It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are economic viability, efficient

administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents, and the criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code (LGC), i.e.,
income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the
relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration. Without doubt, the
primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers
of the LGC.
Petitioner: RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA (Taxpayers and Residents of Surigao del Norte (Vice Gov, and Members

of Provincial Board)
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the
SENATE PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother
province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands
Respondent:

Movants-Intervenors: CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS, HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON
VICENTE G. CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and HON. CESAR M. BAGUNDOL (Elected officials of
Surigao de Norte province in the last election)
FACTS:

1. Please see facts in Navarro v. Ermita (2010) digest

2. Decision on 2010 case declared Final and Executory on 18 May 2010
3. This Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors, not on the second motions for
reconsideration of the original parties.
4. COMELEC Resolution 8790 declared that if the decision on the 2010 case was declared final and executory, the Dinagat Islands would revert to its
former status as a non-province. Consequently, the results of the May 2010 elections would have to be nullified, and a special election would have
to be conducted for various positions (Governor, Vice-Governor, etc) for Surigao del Norte. Hence the intervenors became real parties in interest
with the declaration finality of the 2010 case decision. Hence, the imperative to grant this Urgent Motion.
Issue
1

Navarro

Intervenors

Supreme Court

1. Creation of Province of
Dinagat Isalnds is Invalid
and Unconstitutional (RA
9355)

1. Met the requirements

With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive

and legislative construction of the LGC, the many details to implement the
LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood to be
impractical and not too urgent to immediately translate into direct
amendments to the LGC. But Congress, recognizing the capacity and
viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No.
9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which,
with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express
provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative
powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article
9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No.
9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat. The acts of Congress, in
passing RA 9355, definitively show the clear legislative intent to
incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area requirement

- Failed to comply with min

Land Area Requirement

The passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an

act of Congress amending Section 461 of the
LGC

Please see Pertinent Laws. It bears scrupulous notice that from the above
cited provisions, with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not
a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of
municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of
viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income,
population, and land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be
created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area
requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the
LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a
component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration
of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the
LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply
to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the
physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater
likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area
of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities.

The exemption from territorial contiguity,

when the intended province consists of two
or more islands, includes the exemption
from the application of the minimum land
area requirement

It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision
was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for
component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section
461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the
congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGCand to reflect the true
legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the
validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

Dispositive Portion:

The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands, is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act
Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and
the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID; and 4. The petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

III. CREATION & ABOLITION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

Digester: John Michael Gabriel Vida
CASE TITLE: League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), et al.
(G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499 and 178056)
Date of Case: November 18, 2008
DOCTRINES:
As provided by Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution, Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city (or any other political units)
in the Local Government Code (LGC) and not in any other law, including Cityhood Laws.
The clear intent of the Constitution is to ensure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory
criteria found solely in the LGC. In short, the criteria for creation of cities and other political units must follow the guidelines provided by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution.
Petitioners:
League of Cities of the Phils. (LCP)
Jerry P. Treas (LCP President)
Cities of Iloilo (represented by Mayor Jerry Treas) and Calbayog (represented by Mayor Mel Senen Sarmiento)
Cities of Tarlac, Santiago, Iriga, Ligao, et al (petitioners-in-intervention)
Respondents:
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) due to involvement in conducting of plebiscites
Municipalities of Baybay (Leyte), Bogo (Cebu), Catbalogan (Western Samar), Tandag (Surigao del Sur), Borongan (Eastern Samar), Tayabas (Quezon),
Lamitan (Basilan), Tabuk (Kalinga), Bayugan (Agusan del Sur), Batac (Ilocos Norte), Mati (Davao Oriental), Guihulngan (Negros Oriental), Cabadbaran
(Agusan del Norte), Carcar (Cebu), and El Salvador (Misamis Oriental).
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Note: the 16 municipality, Naga (Cebu) was not impleaded in the case as a respondent.
FACTS:
The case involves consolidated petitions for prohibition from the petitioners LCP et al, assailing the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws and enjoining COMELEC
and the respondent municipalities from holding any plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws in question.
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During the 11 Congress, Congress enacted 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities.
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During the 12 Congress, Congress then enacted into law RA 9009, which amended Sec. 450 of the LGC and in effect, increasing the annual income requirement
for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million, with the view of restraining a mad rush for municipalities to convert into cities to
secure larger Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs). However, the House of Representatives (HOR) adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt the 24
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municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11 Congress from the increased income requirements of RA 9009. However, the 12 Congress
ended without acquiring the Senates approval of Joint Resolution No. 29.
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During the 13 Congress, however, the HOR re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 into Joint Resolution No. 1, and forwarded the same to the Senate for approval.
The Senate, however, failed to approve the new Joint Resolution. With the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 of the municipalities filed individual cityhood
bills which contained a common provision which exempted them from the income requirements of RA 9009. These Cityhood Bills were approved by the HOR on

December 2006 and the Senate on February 2007 (except for Naga, Cebu which was passed on June 2007). These Cityhood Bills lapsed into law from March
July 2007 without the Presidents signature.
The Cityhood Laws directed the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine WON the voters in each of the respondent municipalities approve of the conversion of
their municipality into a city.
Issue 1:

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:

SUPREME COURT:

WON the Cityhood

Laws
violate
Section 10, Article
X
of
the
Constitution.

The Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional for

violation of Section 10 of Article X of the
1987 Constitution by unlawfully exempting
the
respondent
municipalities
from
compliance with the new minimum income
requirements provided by the LGC.

The Cityhood Laws do not violate

Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.

The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article

X of the Constitution. First, the application of the P100
million requirement of RA 9009 for municipalities
should be applied prospectively and not retroactively
as RA 9009 took effect in 2001, while the Cityhood
Bills became law more than 5 years later in 2007.
(other reasons provided below)

Issue 2:
WON the Cityhood
Laws violate the
equal
protection
clause.

Furthermore, the wholesale conversion of

municipalities into cities will reduce the IRA
share of other existing cities as more cities
are going to share in the same amount of
internal revenue set aside by Sec. 285 of the
LGC.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
The Cityhood Laws in question are violative
of the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987
Constitution, as it unreasonably provides
special treatment to the respondents by
exempting them from compliance with the
minimum income requirement imposed by
the LGC.

Furthermore,
the
respondents
invoke the principle of nonretroactivity of laws to prevent
application of RA 9009 on the 16
Cityhood Bills that stood to be
affected by RA 9009.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:

SUPREME COURT:

The Cityhood Laws are not violative

of the Equal Protection Clause,
asserting the validity of the common
exemption provision from RA 9009
provided in the Cityhood Bills.

Even if Congress wrote the exemption in the Cityhood

Laws into the amendments introduced in Sec. 450 of
the LGC, the exemption would still be unconstitutional
for violation of the Equal Protection Clause. (reasons
provided below).

On Issue 1:
The Supreme Court stated that:
1. The application of the P100 million requirement of RA 9009 for municipalities should be applied prospectively and not retroactively as RA 9009 took effect in
2001, while the Cityhood Bills became law more than 5 years later in 2007.
RA 9009 became effective on June 30, 2001, specifically amending Section 450 of the LGC by increasing the income requirement for conversion of
municipalities into cities to P100 million. There was no written exemption from this new income requirement. Furthermore, prior to the enactment of RA
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9009, from a total of 57 municipalities, 33 Cityhood Bills passed into law. However, Congress did not act on the remaining 24 Cityhood Bills during the 11
th
Congress. Furthermore, the 12 Congress adjourned without approving the Joint Resolution that was supposed to exempt the 24 municipalities whose
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Cityhood Bills were not acted upon during the 11 Congress. During the 13 Congress, however, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed individual Cityhood Bills
with a common provision, stating that these municipalities-turned-cities shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act
No. 9009. The fact still remains, however, that Congress passed on these Cityhood Laws way after RA 9009 has been passed, and therefore the
respondents cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of laws.
2. The Constitution requires Congress to prescribe all criteria for the creation of a city in the LGC and NOT in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution clearly states that the creation of local government units (LGUs) must follow established criteria in the LGC
and not in any other law. The intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, nondiscriminatory criteria found solely in the LGC. Any deviation from these criteria is a violation of Section 10, Article X. The amendments introduced by RA
9009 regarding the new income requirements took into effect on 2001, and therefore going forward, any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy
the new income requirements. No exceptions were provided in Sec. 450, as amended.
Also, the Cityhood Laws common exemption clause is unconstitutional as it clearly violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution as the constitutional
provision states that any exemption must be written in the LGC, and not in any other law, i.e. the Cityhood Laws.

3. The Cityhood Laws also violate Sec. 6, Art. X of the 1987 Constituion as these prevent a fair and just distribution of national taxes to local government units.
The Court also noted that a city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in national
taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in the LGC, must be strictly
followed because these criteria are material in determining the "just share" of local government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not
follow the income criterion in Sec. 450 of the LGC, they prevent a fair and just distribution of the IRA, effectively violating Sec. 6, Article X of the
Constitution.
4. The criteria prescribed by Sec. 450 of the LGC (as amended by RA 9009) is described as clear, plain and unambiguous, and therefore there was no need to
th
resort to any statutory construction. Furthermore, the intent of the 11 Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained only
as intent and was not written into the amendments introduced into Sec. 450 of the LGC.
Congress, in enacting RA 9009 did not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to the respondent municipalities whose
th
cityhood bills were then pending when the 11 Congress passed RA 9009. Since Sec. 450 of the LGC (as amended by RA 9009) is clear, plain and
unambiguous regarding the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond verba legis in applying the provision.
The Court also stated that even though Congress did discuss exempting the respondent municipalities from RA 9009, Congress did not write this intended
exemption into RA 9009, which it could have easily done, but it did not do so, passing the bill into law as RA 9009 without such exemption given to the 24
municipalities.
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5. The deliberations of the 11 or 12 Congress on unapproved bills are not considered as extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13 Congress.
The Court also stated that since Congress is not a continuing body, any unapproved cityhood bills are considered as mere scraps of paper, with any
hearings and deliberations becoming worthless upon adjournment of Congress. Therefore, such hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret
bills that are enacted into law in subsequent Congresses. As provided by Sec. 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of Senate and Sec. 78 of the Rules of the
House of Representatives regarding Unfinished Business, all unfinished business at the end of the term of a Congress are deemed terminated.
Therefore, any deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved Cityhood Bills, as well as the deliberations during the 12th and 13th Congresses
on the unapproved resolution exempting the municipalities, have no legal significance and do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by
subsequent Congresses.
On Issue 2:
1. Even if Congress wrote the exemption in the Cityhood Laws into the amendments introduced in Sec. 450 of the LGC, the exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The exemption provisions provided in the Cityhood Laws contain no classifications or guidelines to differentiate the supposedly exempted municipalities
from other municipalities in general. The exemption, therefore, would be based solely on the fact that 16 of the municipalities had Cityhood Bills pending in
th
the 11 Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. The Court states that this is not a valid classification to entitle an exemption from the increased income
requirement.
According to the Court, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctionsm rationally related to a legitimate government
objective which is the purpose of the law, not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable to all similarly situated. Furthermore, as ruled by the Court
in the earlier cases of De Guzman, Jr. vs COMELEC, and Tiu vs. Court of Tax Appeals, the Equal Protection Clause stated in Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987
Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions based on what is considered as a reasonable classification:
a. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions,

b. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law,

c. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
d. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.
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The Court found that there is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending Cityhood Bills in the 11 Congress and those that did not have
th
pending bills, Furthermore, municipalities that did not have pending Cityhood Bills were not informed that a pending Cityhood Bill in the 11 Congress
would be a condition to exempt them from the P100 million income requirement, therefore depriving them of a supposed chance to avail of the
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exemption. Also, the fact of a pendency of a Cityhood Bill in the 11 Congress violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to
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existing conditions only, as the fact itself is a specific condition that will never happen again (with the 11 Congress already over). The exemption is
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basically a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date (which was the filing of a Cityhood Bill within the 11 Congress, which was basically over)
against other municipalities that may want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009. Finally, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities
violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all parties similarly situated.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions and declares UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392,
9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.

DISSENTING OPINION (J. REYES)

1. The Cityhood Laws do not violate Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution.
Justice Reyes argues that the intent of RA 9009 is to exempt the respondent municipalities from the new income requirement, as the Cityhood Laws
provide a uniformly worded exemption clause, which states: Exemption from R.A. 9009. Furthermore, it was pointed out that Congress intended that
the then pending cityhood bills would not be covered by the income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. It was made clear by the
Legislature that R.A. No. 9009 would not have any retroactive effect. The inclusion of the exemption clause was therefore cited as the clear-cut intent of
the Legislature of not giving retroactive effect to R.A. No. 9009, with Congress making its intent express through the Cityhood Laws. Justice Reyes
furthermore points out that the Legislatives intent (based from the interpellations of Senators Pimentel and Drilon) should be the controlling factor.
Further to this, J. Reyes also points out that the petitioners were not able to discharge their onus probandi of overcoming the presumption of
constitutionality accorded to the Cityhood Laws, stating that laws will only be declared invalid if the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable
doubt, and such declaration is unconstitutionality is done: a) as a last resort, b) when absolutely necessary, c) when the statute is in palpable conflict with
a plain provision of the Constitution, and (d) when the invalidity is beyond reasonable doubt.
J. Reyes then points to the arguments of the majority opinions first ground, stating that Congress was aware that the 16 Cityhood Bills were pending prior
to the passage of RA 9009, and therefore Congress intended the higher income requirement not to apply to the respondents. Anent the second point, J.
Reyes states that the Cityhood Laws merely carry out the supposed intent of RA 9009 to exempt the respondent municipalities. Regarding the third point,
J. Reyes then argues that, while it is true that LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes, it is qualified by the phrase as determined by law.
Regarding the fourth point, J. Reyes argues that Congress meant not to incorporate its intent in the bill that would become RA 9009, since according to
Senator Pimentel, it was notnecessary to put that provision because what we are saying here will form part of the interpretation of this bill.
Furthermore, J. Reyes states that courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law if the literal application of
th
the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice. Finally, J. Reyes argues on the last point that hearings and deliberations conducted during the 11 or
th
12 Congress may still be used as extrinsic aids or reference because the same cityhood bills, which were filed before the passage of RA 9009, were
th
being considered during the 13 Congress.
2. The Cityhood Laws do not violate the Equal Protection Clause under Sec. 1, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution by granting special treatment to respondents in
exempting them from the imposed minimum income requirements imposed by RA 9009.

Justice Reyes states that the equal protection guarantee does not take away from Congress the power to classify, as long as such classification is based
on reasonable classification. For the classification to be reasonable:
a. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions,
b. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law,
c. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
d. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.
However, Justice Reyes rules that, based on the parameters, the Cityhood Laws do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
First, J. Reyes argues that the respondent municipalities had pending Cityhood Bills before the passage of RA 9009, and that the peculiar conditions of the
respondents are considered sufficient grounds for legislative classification, as (according to a cited sponsorship speech by then-Senator Lim) fairness
dictates that the respondents be given a legal remedy to allow them to prove that they fulfill the requirements of the LGC for city status prior to the
amendments brought forth by RA 9009. Furthermore, J. Reyes states that courts cannot question the wisdom of classifications made by Congress as it is
a prerogative of the Legislature.
Next, J. Reyes argues that the exemption of the respondents from the increased income requirement was desiged to ensure that fairness and justice were
given to the respondents, as their cityhood bills were not enacted by Congress due to intervening events and reasons beyon their control. Therefore, J.
Reyes states that these Cityhood Laws promote equality and reduce the existing inequality between the respondents and the "other thirty-two (32)
municipalities" whose cityhood bills were enacted during the 11th Congress.
Next, J. Reyes argues that the Cityhood Laws are curative or remedial statutes, as they seek to prevent an apparent injustice which would be committed
to respondents. J. Reyes states that the cityhood laws are not contrary to the spirit and intent of RA 9009 because Congress intended said law to be
prospective, not retroactive, in application. Furthermore, J. Reyes states that to deny respondents the same rights and privileges accorded to the other
thirty-two (32) municipalities when they are under the same circumstances, is tantamount to denying respondent municipalities the protective mantle of the
equal protection clause, and in effect, the petitioners themselves are pushing for another violation of the equal protection clause.
Finally, J. Reyes argues that the Cityhood Laws, in carrying out the clear intent of RA 9009, apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before
the passage of RA 9009 and were compliant with the prior form of Section 450 of the Local Government Code that prescribed an income requirement of
P20 million. In short, J. Reyes argues that there exists a separate class of municipalities those who have applied for cityhood prior to RA 9009s
enactment (which basically covers the 57 applicants for cityhood).
Justice Reyes then points out in his dissenting opinion the argument that the Cityhood Laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality, and that the petitioners bear
the burden of overcoming the presumption. It was also pointed out that the onus probandi, however, was shifted by the majority to the respondents in asking them
to prove the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws, in violation of the basic rules of evidence.

Digester: (Dave Cagashatian)

CASE TITLE: League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC
Date of Case: Dec. 21, 2009

Before a law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.
DOCTRINE:

Petitioner: League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, Jerry Trenas (Iloilo City Mayor in his personal capacity as tazpayer)
Respondent: (Municipality of Baybay, Leyte, Municipality of Bogo, Cebu, Municipality of Catbalogan, Western Samar, Municipality of Tandag, Surigao del Sur,
Municipality of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Municipality of Tayabas, Quezon, Municipality of Lamitan, Basilan, Municipality of Tabuk, Kalinga, Municipality of
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Municipality of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Municipality of Mati, Davao Oriental, Municipality of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, Municipality of
Carcar, Cebu, Municipality of El Salvador, Misamis Oriental

FACTS:

1. On November 18, 2008, by a 6-5 vote, the SC declared the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.
2. The respondent LGUs filed a motion for reconsideration which the SC also denied in a resolution dated March 31, 2009, stating that the basic
issues have already been passed upon.
3. The LGUs filed a second motion for reconsideration on the ground of new and meritorious arguments.
4. The SC, voting 6-6, again denied the second MR in a resolution dated April 28, 2009, ordering that "No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let
entry of judgment be made in due course."
5. Still, the LGUs filed another motion on May 14, 2009: "Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents'
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 and Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon."
6. In a Resolution dated June 2, 2009, the SC declared the LGUs' latest Motion expunged in light of the entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009.
7. Justices De Castro and Bersamin wanted to recall the entry of judgment and grant the LGUs' MR of the April 28, 2009 Resolution as the entry
was effected before the Court could act on the LGUs' May 14, 2009 Motion.
8. The LGUs filed this present Motion (Motion for Reconsideration of June 2, 2009 resolution).
Issue

League of Cities

COMELEC

Supreme Court

issue 1: Whether or not the

Cityhood Laws violated Sec.
10 of Art X, Constitution
(LGUs shall be created, etc
according to criteria set in
the LGC subject to approval

1. YES. The Constitution, in clear and

unambiguous language, requires
that all the criteria for the creation
of a city shall be embodied and
written in the LGC, and not in any
other law.

1. NO.

1. NO. The power to create political subdivisions

or LGUs is essentially legislative in character.
2. Since Congress wields the vast poser of
creating political subdivisions, surely it can
exercise the lesser authority of requiring a set of
criteria, standards, or ascertainable indicators of

in a plebiscite)

viability for their creation. Thus, the only

conceivable reason why the Constitution
employs the clause "in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government
code" is to lay stress that it is Congress alone,
and no other, which can impose the
3. When the 1987 Constitution speaks of the
LGC, the reference cannot be to any specific
statute or codification of laws, let alone the LGC
of 1991. At the time of the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, BP 337, the then LGC, was still in
effect. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution
intended to isolate the embodiment of the
criteria only in the LGC, then they would have
actually referred to BP 337. Also, they would
then not have provided for the enactment by
Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Art. X, Sec.
335 of the Constitution.
4. Consistent with its plenary legislative power,
Congress can, impose the criteria of viability
which don't need to be embodied in the LGC,
though it is the ideal repository to ensure, as
much as possible, the element of uniformity.
Congress can even, after making a codification,
enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing
layers of indicators earlier codified, just as it may
reduce the same. Here, the amendatory RA 9009
increased the already codified income
requirement from P20M to P100M.
5. The passage of amendatory laws is no
different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the
cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular

political subdivision from the criteria earlier

mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting
law/s, effectively decreased the already codified
indicators.
6. Following the LCP's argument, RA 9009, which
increased the income requirement, would also
be unconstitutional.
7. Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than
the letter of the law. RA 9009 really intended
that the LGUs covered by the Cityhood Laws be
exempted from the new income requirement, as
borne by the statements by sponsor Sen.
Pimentel during Senate deliberations on the
then bill. Even though these deliberations were
in the 11th and 12th Congresses, they can still be
considered even if Congress is not a continuing
body because they are part of RA 9009 legislative
history and thus can be consulted in interpreting
the law.
issue 2: Whether or not the
Cityhood Laws violated Sec.
6 of Art X, Constitution (LGUs
shall have a just share in the
national taxes automatically
released to them)

1. YES. The wholesale conversion of

the municipalities into cities will
reduce the share of existing cities in
the Internal Revenue Allotment as
more cities in effect will share the
same amount of internal revenue set
aside for all cities under Sec. 285 of
the LGC.

1. NO. (No arguments stated in the

decision)

NO. No deprivation of property results by virtue

of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCPs
claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be
substantially reduced on account of the
conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs
would not suffice to bring it within the ambit of
the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is
presumptuous on the part of the LCP membercities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it
were their property, as the IRA is yet to be
allocated. For the same reason, the
municipalities that are not covered by the
uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws

cannot validly invoke equal protection. For, at

this point, the conversion of a municipality into a
city will only affect its status as a political unit,
but not its property as such.

issue 3: Whether the

Cityhood Laws violate the
equal protection clause

1. YES. (No arguments stated in the

decision.)

1. NO. (No arguments stated in the

decision but this is an implied
argument: Distinction between
municipalities with pending cityhood
bills when RA 9009 was enacted and
municipalities that did not have
pending cityhood bills at the time is a
valid classification.)

1. NO. Right of equal protection does not

require absolute equality. It is enough that all
persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights or privileges
conferred and responsibilities or obligations
imposed. It does not preclude the state from
recognizing and acting upon factual differences
between individuals and classes. It recognizes
that inherent in the right to legislate is the right
to classify, implying that the equality guaranteed
is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification.
2. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all
members of the same class. Here, all these
requisites have been met by the laws challenged
as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal
protection clause.
3. The respondent LGUs, subjected only to the
P20M income criterion instead of the new
income requirement in RA 9009, are
substantially different from other municipalities
desirous to be cities. These LGUs had pending
cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009.
And years before RA 9009, respondents LGUs

had already met the income criterion exacted for

cityhood under the LGC of 1991. Due to
extraneous circumstances, however, the bills for
their conversion remained unacted upon by
Congress.
4. Respondent LGUs saw themselves confronted
with the "changing of the rules in the middle of
the game." They were qualified cityhood
applicants before the enactment of RA 9009.
Because of events they had absolutely nothing to
do with, a spoiler in the form of RA 9009
supervened. To impose on them the much
higher income requirement after what they have
gone through would appear to be indeed
"unfair." Fairness dictateS that they should be
given a legal remedy by which they would be
allowed to prove that they have all the necessary
qualifications for city status, using the criteria set
forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its
amendment by RA 9009.
5. The power of the Legislature to make
distinctions and classifications among persons is
neither curtailed nor denied by the equal
protection clause. A law can be violative of the
constitutional limitation only when the
classification is without reasonable basis.
6. Cityhood Laws ws an attempt on the part of
Congress to address the inequity dealt the
respondent LGUs. These laws positively
promoted the equality and eliminated the
inequality, doubtless unintended, between
respondent municipalities and the thirty-three

(33) other municipalities whose cityhood bills

were enacted during the 11th Congress.
7. The common exemption clause in the cityhood
laws is an application of the non-retroactive
effect of RA 9009 on the cityhood bills. It is not a
declaration of certain rights, but a mere
declaration of prior qualification and/or
compliance with the non-retroactive effect of RA
9009.
Note: Another reason to uphold Cityhood Laws:
operative fact doctrine: there are already new
cities organized after the cityhood laws were
enacted, with new sets of officials and
employees.

Dispositive Portion:

Respondent LGUs' motions granted; Cityhood Laws declared constitutional.

JANINE BAREO
LCP v COMELEC
Feb. 15, 2011
DOCTRINE: The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of
amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. The Cityhood laws are declared constitutional.
Petitioner: League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP)
Respondent: COMELEC and various Municipalities
FACTS
These consolidated cases were filed by the LCP for prohibition assailing the constitutionality of 16 laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood
Laws), and seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites pursuant to such laws.
The court had several decisions on this case:
1. November 18, 2008 Decision Cityhood laws are unconstitutional for violating sections 6 and 10, Article X, and the equal protection clause
2. March 31, 2009 Resolution First MR denied
3. April 28, 2009 Resolution denied the 2nd MR because it is a prohibited pleading
4. June 2, 2009 Resolution- clarified the April Resolution and said that the 2nd MR was no longer a prohibited pleading because the court allowed it.
5. Dec 21, 2009 Decision declared the Cityhood laws as constitutional
Thus, the petitioner (LCP) filed an MR to annul the Dec 2009 decision.
Article X, Section 10 provides
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the
following requisites:
xxxx
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
Prior to the amendment, Sec 450 only required an average annual income of P20million. Also, there were 57 bills filed for conversion of 57 municipalities into component cities. 33 bills
were enacted into law while 24 were pending. Among these 24 were the 16 municipalities converted into component cities through the Cityhood Laws.
ISSUE 1: WON the Cityhood Laws violate sec 10, Art X - NO
Nov 2008 decision (Cityhood laws violate sec 10,
Article X)
The exemption clauses in the 16 Cityhood laws are
unconstitutional because they are not written in Sec 450
of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009

SC Decision (No violation of Sec 10, Article X)

Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills
would not be covered by the P100 million imposed by RA
9009.
The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood

Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt

respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No.
9009.

The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment
of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the
creation of local government unitsincome, population, and land area. Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect to the conversion of municipalities into
component cities when it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million. However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedly
imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and
autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective provinces.
Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood
Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself.
ISSUE 2: WON the Cityhood laws violate sec 6, Art X and the equal protection clause - NO
Nov 2008 decision (Cityhood laws violate sec 6,
Article X and the equal protection clause)
The Cityhood Laws infringed on the "just share" that
petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention shall receive
from the national taxes (IRA) to be automatically
released to them.

SC Decision (No violation)

After the implementation of the Cityhood Laws, their
respective shares increased, not decreased.
There was valid classification, and the Cityhood Laws do
not violate the equal protection clause.

PETITIONER

SC

There is no substantial distinction between

municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th
Congress and municipalities that did not have pending
bills, such that the mere pendency of a cityhood bill in
the 11th Congress is not a material difference to
distinguish one municipality from another for the
purpose of the income requirement

33 municipalities were converted into component cities

almost immediately prior to the enactment of R.A. No.
9009. In the enactment of the Cityhood Laws, Congress
merely took the 16 municipalities covered thereby from
the disadvantaged position brought about by the abrupt
increase in the income requirement of R.A. No. 9009,
acknowledging the "privilege" that they have already
given to those newly-converted component cities, which
prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably
in the same footing or "class" as the respondent
municipalities. Congress merely recognized the capacity
and readiness of respondent municipalities to become
component cities of their respective provinces.

Dispositive:
The Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" dated August 24, 2010, dated and filed on September 14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al. is GRANTED. The
Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws are declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO
1.

The 16 Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law,
like the Cityhood Laws. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This
took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million
income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement.
The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional.
2.

The 16 Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in
the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality.
The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never
happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only.

League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC

2011 April 12
Motion for Reconsideration

While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it
cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment
imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside
development, and the concomitant national growth.

Facts:
1.

At the 12th Congress, RA 9009 was enacted which amended Sec 450 of the LGC by increasing the annual income requirement for

the conversion of a municipality into a city from P20M to P100M. The law did not provide any exemption from the increased income
requirement.

2.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives (HOR) adopted a joint resolution exempting 24 municipalities whose

cityhood bills were pending when RA 9009 was enacted (These cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress). The joint
resolution, however, was not approved by the Senate.

3.

At the 13th Congress, HOR re-adopted the said joint resolution but the Senate again failed to approve it.

4.

Upon the advice of Sen. Pimentel, 16 municipalities instead filed individual cityhood bills which had a provision exempting all the

16 municipalities from the new P100M income requirement under RA 9009.

5.

All the cityhood bills were enacted and later lapsed into law without the Presidents signature (various dates from March to July

2007)

6.

These Cityhood Laws also directed COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the affected constituents approved of the

conversion.

7.

League of Cities, et al filed petitions with the SC for prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and TRO assailing

the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws and enjoining the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscites. The petitioners main
contention is that the 16 municipalities should not be exempt from the new income requirement under RA 9009.

8. 1. On February 15, 2011, the SC issued a resolution declaring the Cityhood Laws constitutional.

9. LCP et al filed present motion for reconsideration challenging the February 15, 2011 SC resolution.

Issues:

Issue Petitioner's Contention Respondent's Contention Supreme Court  Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violated Sec. 10 of Art X,

Constitution (LGUs shall be created, etc according to criteria set in the LGC subject to approval in a plebiscite).
Petitioner's Contention Respondent's Contention Supreme Court  Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violated Sec. 10 of Art X,
Constitution (LGUs shall be created, etc according to criteria set in the LGC subject to approval in a plebiscite).
Respondent's Contention Supreme Court  Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violated Sec. 10 of Art X, Constitution (LGUs shall be
created, etc according to criteria set in the LGC subject to approval in a plebiscite).
Supreme Court  Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violated Sec. 10 of Art X, Constitution (LGUs shall be created, etc according to
criteria set in the LGC subject to approval in a plebiscite).
Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violated Sec. 10 of Art X, Constitution (LGUs shall be created, etc according to criteria set in the

LGC subject to approval in a plebiscite).

Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violated Sec. 10 of Art X, Constitution (LGUs shall be created, etc according to criteria set in the LGC
subject to approval in a plebiscite).

 YES. The Constitution, in clear and unambiguous language, requires that all the criteria for the creation of a city shall be embodied
and written in the LGC, and not in any other law.
YES. The Constitution, in clear and unambiguous language, requires that all the criteria for the creation of a city shall be embodied and
written in the LGC, and not in any other law.

 NO.
NO.

 NO. Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of R.A.
No. 9009.

NO. Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of R.A.
No. 9009.

The responses of Senator Pimentel who sponsored the then Senate bill made it obvious that RA 9009 would not apply to the conversion
bills then pending deliberation in the Senate during the 11th Congress.

The exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to
exempt the respondent LGUs, without exception, from the coverage of RA 9009. Thus RA 9009 and LGC were amended, not by repeal
but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses.Whether the P100M income requirement is
arbitrary. NO. it is not difficult to comply with; that there are several municipalities that have already complied with the requirement
and have, in fact, been converted into cities, such as Sta. Rosa, Laguna, Navotas, San Juan, Dasmarias, Cavite, and Bian, Laguna; and
that several other municipalities have supposedly reached the income of P100m from locally generated sources, such as Bauan in
Batangas, Mabalacat in Pampanga, and Bacoor in Cavite. YES.
Whether the P100M income requirement is arbitrary. NO. it is not difficult to comply with; that there are several municipalities that

have already complied with the requirement and have, in fact, been converted into cities, such as Sta. Rosa, Laguna, Navotas, San Juan,
Dasmarias, Cavite, and Bian, Laguna; and that several other municipalities have supposedly reached the income of P100m from
locally generated sources, such as Bauan in Batangas, Mabalacat in Pampanga, and Bacoor in Cavite. YES.
Whether the P100M income requirement is arbitrary. NO. it is not difficult to comply with; that there are several municipalities that
have already complied with the requirement and have, in fact, been converted into cities, such as Sta. Rosa, Laguna, Navotas, San Juan,
Dasmarias, Cavite, and Bian, Laguna; and that several other municipalities have supposedly reached the income of P100m from
locally generated sources, such as Bauan in Batangas, Mabalacat in Pampanga, and Bacoor in Cavite. YES.
NO. it is not difficult to comply with; that there are several municipalities that have already complied with the requirement and have, in
fact, been converted into cities, such as Sta. Rosa, Laguna, Navotas, San Juan, Dasmarias, Cavite, and Bian, Laguna; and that several

other municipalities have supposedly reached the income of P100m from locally generated sources, such as Bauan in Batangas,
Mabalacat in Pampanga, and Bacoor in Cavite. YES.
YES.

 YES. 59 existing cities had failed as of 2006 to post an average annual income of P100M. The large number of existing cities, virtually
50% of them, still unable to comply with the P100M threshold income 5 years after RA 9009 took effect renders it fallacious and
probably unwarranted for the petitioners to claim that the P100M income requirement is not difficult to comply with.
YES. 59 existing cities had failed as of 2006 to post an average annual income of P100M. The large number of existing cities, virtually
50% of them, still unable to comply with the P100M threshold income 5 years after RA 9009 took effect renders it fallacious and
probably unwarranted for the petitioners to claim that the P100M income requirement is not difficult to comply with.

The municipalities cited by the petitioners as having generated the threshold income of P100M from local sources, including those
already converted into cities, are either in Metro Manila or in provinces close to Metro Manila. While the municipalities covered by the
Cityhood Laws are spread out in the different provinces of the Philippines, including the Cordillera and Mindanao regions, and are
considerably very distant from Metro Manila. This underscores the danger RA 9009 sought to prevent, i.e., that "the metropolis-located
local governments would have more priority in terms of funding because they would have more qualifications to become a city
compared to the far-flung areas in Mindanao or in the Cordilleras, or whatever," actually resulting from the abrupt increase in the
income requirement.

No research or empirical data was buttressed to support the P100M figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into account the
after-effects that were likely to arise. While the Constitution mandates that the creation of LGUs must comply with the criteria laid
down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such
amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization,
countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.

The increased income requirement ofP100M was not the only conclusive indicator for any municipality to survive and remain viable as
a component city. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause. YES.
Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause. YES.

Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause. YES.
YES.

 NO.
NO.

 NO. LGUs covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of their own. They have proven themselves viable and capable to become
component cities of their respective provinces. They are and have been centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of
transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots.
NO. LGUs covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of their own. They have proven themselves viable and capable to become
component cities of their respective provinces. They are and have been centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of
transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots.

Except for Tandag and Lamitan, which are both 2nd-class municipalities in terms of income, all the rest are categorized by the DOF as
1st-class municipalities with gross income of at least P70M as of 2005. Moreover, Tandag and Lamitan, and Borongan, Catbalogan, and
Tabuk, are all provincial capitals.

The more recent income figures of the 12 municipalities, which would have increased further by this time, indicate their readiness to
take on the responsibilities of cityhood. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violated Sec. 6 of Art X, Constitution (LGUs shall have a
just share in the national taxes automatically released to them)
Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violated Sec. 6 of Art X, Constitution (LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes

automatically released to them)

Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violated Sec. 6 of Art X, Constitution (LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes
automatically released to them)

 YES.
YES.

 NO.
NO.

 NO. The share of LGUs is a matter of percentage under Sec 285 of the LGC, not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is
23%, determined on the basis of population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the
number of existing cities, such that when the number of cities increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for cities.
NO. The share of LGUs is a matter of percentage under Sec 285 of the LGC, not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is
23%, determined on the basis of population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the
number of existing cities, such that when the number of cities increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for cities.

The allocation by the National Government is not a constant, and can either increase or decrease. With every newly converted city
becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the percentage of IRA entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual

amount received may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of Sec 285 and Sec 286 of the
LGC.

Respondent LGUs are entitled to their just share in the IRA allocation for cities. They have demonstrated their viability as component
cities of their respective provinces and are developing continuously, albeit slowly, because they had previously to share the IRA with
about 1,500 municipalities. With their conversion into component cities, they will have to share with only around 120 cities.

LGUs do not subsist only on locally generated income, but also depend on the IRA to support their development. They can spur their
own developments and thereby realize their great potential of encouraging trade and commerce in the far-flung regions of the country.
Yet their potential will effectively be stunted if those already earning more will still receive a bigger share from the national coffers, and
if commercial activity will be more or less concentrated only in and near Metro Manila.


Dispositive Portion:

LCP's motion denied with finality; Cityhood Laws constitutional.

RZ Zamora
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, Petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO
N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
(April 7, 2010)
Doctrine: Section 5(3) of Article VI of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province.
Population is just one of several other factors to be determined to compose a legislative district in a province.
Facts: Senator Benigno Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act
No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" via petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. There were originally four legislative
districts in Camarines Sur each with a population exceeding 250,000. RA 9716 reapportioned the composition of the first and second legislative district of the
province of Camarines Sur thereby creating an additional legislative district. This left the first legislative district with a population of only 176,383 from its
original 417,304.

Issue 1
(Substantive):
W/N RA 9716 is
unconstitutional
for creating a
legislative district
in a province with
a population less
than 250,000.

Petitioner
Save in the case of a newly created
province, the constitution requires
that each legislative district created
by Congress must be supported by a
minimum population of at least
250,000 in order to be valid. Under
this view, existing legislative districts
may be reapportioned and severed to
form new districts, provided each
resulting district will represent a
population of at least 250,000.
Article VI Sec. 5 (3) Each legislative
district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.

Respondent

here is an apparent
distinction between
cities and provinces
drawn by Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. The
existence of a 250,000
population condition but
only as to the creation of
a legislative district in a
city and not to a
province.

Supreme Court
Section 5(3) of Article VI of the Constitution requires
a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the
presumption of constitutionality. There must be a clear
showing that a specific provision of the constitution has
been violated to be declared unconstitutional. There is no
provision requiring a 250,000 minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district.
The use of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the
phrase "or each province" means that the 250,000
minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a
province.
Mariano Jr. Vs Comelec: Issue was the constitutionality of a
law converting the Municipality of Makati to a Highly
Urbanized City. Said law also created an additional
legislative district. The Mariano case limited the application

 Intent of the framers of the 1987

constitution was to create a
population minimum of 250,000 per
legislative district. When the
Constitutional Commission fixed the
original number of district seats in the
House of Representatives to 200, they
took into account the projected
national population of 55,000,000 in
1986. 55 million people represented
by 200 district representatives
translates to roughly 250,000 people
for every one (1) representative.

RA 9716 violates the principle of

proportional representation provided
in Article VI, Sec 5 par (1), (3) and (4)
of the Constitution.6

of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities

only to its initial legislative district. While Section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a
minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population
by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
Sec.461 of LGC Requisites for Creation. (a) A province
may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)
square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; OR
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
The requirement of population is not an indispensable
requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement.
Records of the Constitutional Commission show population
was not the sole determinant of the creation of a legislative
district. Other factors were considered.
The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House
Bill No. 4264 to be considered in the creation of legislative
districts:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;

Article VI Sec 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of

the regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject
of the discussion from there configured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts
resulting from the redistricting of Districts

Issue 2
(Procedural):
W/N a petition
for declaratory
relief was the
proper action in
court and W/N
petitioners have
locus standi.

The petitioners should

not have availed of
Certiorari and Prohibition
as a remedy but should
have filed a petition for
Declaratory Relief
because it was to declare
a law unconstitutional.
Petitioners have no locus
standi as they have not
proven that they will
incur any substantial
injury by the
implementation of the
law.

The Constitution, does not require mathematical exactitude

or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation
through commonality of interests and ease of access by the
representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution
requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as
far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory. (Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC)
The issue is of transcendental importance, the rules of
procedure must be set aside. (Jaworski vs PAGCOR)

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.

Dissenting opinion: Carpio J,

RA 9716 is unconstitutional for going against Sec. 5 Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution for the creation of legislative districts.
o Section 5(4) of Article VI mandates that "Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards" fixed in Section
5. These constitutional standards, as far as population is concerned, are: (1) proportional representation; (2) minimum population of 250,000 per
legislative district; (3) progressive ratio in the increase of legislative districts as the population base increases; and (4) uniformity in
apportionment of legislative districts "in provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area."
o The constitutional standard of proportional representation is rooted in equality in voting power -- that each vote is worth the same as any other
vote,
o In terms of legislative redistricting, this means equal representation for equal numbers of people or equal voting weight per legislative district.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provided that Members of the House "shall be elected from legislative districts in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x."
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" - the rule on proportional representation shall apply uniformly in the apportionment of every legislative
district.
"on the basis of a uniform x x x ratio"- means that the ratio of one legislative district for every given number of people shall be applied uniformly in all
apportionments, whether in provinces or cities or in metro manila.
The law goes against democracy and the republican system of government.
That the Constitution never meant to exclude provinces from the requirement of proportional representation is evident in the opening provision of
Section 5(1), which states:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x x, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio x x x."
Mariano vs. Comelec and Bagabuyo vs. Comelec is inapplicable because when it was acting as a constitutional commission it exercised absolute power to
relax the standards in Section 5, Article VI.
The Court in Mariano v. COMELEC took note of the certification by the NSO that at the time of the enactment of RA 7854, the population of Makati City
was 508,174, entitling it to two representatives
Concurring and Dissenting: Carpio-Morales, J.
Concurs with the ponencia as to the transcendental issue
Substantive portion petitioners rely on both Article VI, Section 5 (3) but also on Section 5 (1) of the same Article. Both provisions must be read together
in light of the constitutional requirements of population and contiguity.
Section 5 (3) of Article VI disregards the 250,000 population requirement only with respect to existing provinces whose population does not exceed
250,000 or to newly created provinces under the Local Government Code (as long as the income and territory requirements are met).
Nothing in Mariano reflects that the Court disregarded the 250,000 population requirement as it merely stated that Makatis legislative district may still
be increased as long as the minimum population requirement is met.
Bagabuyo vs. Comelec and Mariano vs. Comelec were both wrongly interpreted as the population of the legislative districts at the time were above
250,000

The Local Government Code likewise is not in point since Section 461 thereof tackles the creation of a province and not the reapportioning of a
legislative district based on increasing population.

Digester: Marynette M. Gravador

CASE TITLE: MMDA vs. Garin (Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Dante O. Garin
Date of Case: April 15, 2005
DOCTRINE: MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and
regulations in the implementation of MMDAs functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
the metropolis.
Petitioner: MMDA, created under RA 7924, represented by OSG.
Respondent: Dante O. Garin, a lawyer.
FACTS:
Dante O. Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license was confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara St., Binondo, Manila. Before the
expiration of the TVR (7 days), he wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed an original complaint with application for preliminary injunction RTC Paraaque. Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort issued a TRO,
extending the validity of the TVR as a temporary drivers license for 20 more days. A preliminary mandatory injunction was granted, and the MMDA was directed to return Garins
drivers license.
Issue 1
WON the implementation of Sec.
5(f) of RA 7924 creating MMDA.
which authorizes it to confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers license in
the enforcement of traffic laws and
regulations is valid.

Issue 2
WON the IRR for the provision is
valid.

Issue 3
WON a writ of preliminary injunction
should be issued

RTC (14 Aug 1997)

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
The powers granted in the
provision are limited to fixing,
collection & imposition of fines
and
penalties
for
traffic
violations.
Such powers are legislative and
executive
in
nature;
the
judiciary retains the right to
determine the validity of the
penalty imposed.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
In the absence of IRR, Sec. 5(f) of RA
7924 grants MMDA unbridled discretion
to deprive erring motorists of their
licenses,
pre-empting
judicial
determination of the validity of the
deprivation, thereby violating the due
process clause.
The provision violates prohibition
against
undue
delegation
of
legislative authority, as it allows
MMDA to fix & impose unspecified
and unlimited - fines and other penalties
on erring motorists.

Metro Manila Council, the

governing board and policy
making body of MMDA, has
formulated the IRR for the
provision In MMDA Memo
Circular TT-95-001 dated 15
April 1995.

MMDA Memo Circular TT-95-001 is not

valid, as it was passed by the Council in
the absence of a quorum.

There was no quorum in ths 1st Regular

Meeting of the MMDA Council, hence the
Circular, authorizing confiscation of licenses
upon issuance of a TVR, is void ab initio.

The doctrine of separation of

powers does not preclude
admixture of the 3 powers of
government in admin agencies.

For the writ: He suffered and continues

to suffer great and irreparable damage
because of the deprivation of his license
and the TVR and the confiscation of his
license have no legal basis.

Temporary writ is made permanent; MMDA to

return his license; MMDA to desist from
confiscating license without giving driver the
opportunity to be heard in appropriate
proceeding.

Summary confiscation of a drivers license

without giving the driver an opportunity to be
heard; depriving him of a property right
(license) without due process; not filing in Court
the complaint of supposed traffic infraction,
cannot be justified by any legislation and is
hence unconstitutional.

Additional Facts:
MMDA filed a petition in SC. During the pendency of the case, MMDA, through Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented Memo Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining
the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. (Erring motorists are issued an MTT, may be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no

longer confiscate licenses. All motorists with unredeemed TVRs were given 7 days from date of implementation of the new system to pay their fines and redeem their license or
vehicle plates.)
Issue 1

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

WON the issue has become

moot and academic due to
the implementation of a new
circuar
Issue 2
WON the State may withhold
licenses thru its exercise of its
police power and WON MMDA
can exercise that police power.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
A license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a
contract nor a property right, but is a privilege
subject to reasonable regulation under police
power in the interest of public safety and
welfare.
Revocation or suspension of this privilege does
not constitute a taking without due process as
long as the licensee is given the right to appeal
the revocation.
Memo Circular TT-95-001 was validly passed in
the presence of a quorum.
Though the circular is the basis for the issuance
of TVRs, the basis for the summary
confiscation of licenses is Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924
itself, and that such power is self-executory and
does not require the issuance of any
implementing regulation or circular.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court
Case, has been rendered moot and academic by the
implementation of Memo Circular 04-2004.
MMDA, however, is not precluded from re-implementing Memo
Circular TT-95-001, or any other scheme that would entail
confiscating licenses.
Supreme Court
A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the
state may withhold in the exercise of its police power (through
the legislature).
MMDA is not vested with police power. RA 7924 does not
grant MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power,
and that its functions are admin in nature.
Sec. 5(f) grants MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic
rules and regulations.
MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide
impact that transcend local political boundaries or would
entail huge expenditures if provided by individual LGUs,
especially with regard to transport and traffic management.
But these are limited by MMDAs enabling law, other laws or
ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate source.

Digester: Rachel Tacason

CASE TITLE: MMDA v. Viron Transpo Co
Date of Case: August 15, 2007
DOCTRINE: (MMDA has no police power)
It is the DOTC as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate
networks of transportation and communications which has the power to establish and administer a transportation project like the Project subject of the case at
bar.
No matter how noble the intentions of the MMDA may be then, any plan, strategy or project which it is not authorized to implement cannot pass muster.
Petitioner: MMDA (Metropolitan Manila Development Authority)
Respondent: Viron Transportation Corp, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of transportation with a provincial operation and which has a bus terminal
in Sampaloc, Manila and two more in Quezon City.
FACTS:
PGMA issued EO 179, which provided for the establishment of a Mass Transport System for Greater Manila (the Project).
Pursuant to this EO, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous number of buses plying the streets and the inefficient
connectivity of the different transport mode.
The Metro manila Council of the MMDA cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
Thus, the EO designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the project
Viron filed a petition for declaratory relief questioning the authority of the MMDA.
The other petitioner, Mencorp, also filed a Petition for Dec Relief praying that the Court declare the EO unconstitutional.
The RTC initially sustained the constitutionality and legality of the EO pursuant to RA No. 7942 but on separate MR of Viron and Mencorp, the RTC
reversed its decision.

Issue 1:
WON EO 179 is
unconstitutional?

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
The Presidents authority to
undertake or to cause the
implementation of the Project is
7
derived from EO No. 125 and
8
EO No. 292 .

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
MMDA is devioid of authority
to order the elimination of
their bus terminals under the
EO.

The EO is a valid exercise of

police power

The EO violates both the

constitution and the Public
Service Act.
Neither is the MMDA clothed
with such authority under RA
7924.

7
8

Supreme Court:
Under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC,
and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a
project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the
President, although authorized to establish or cause the
implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the
instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary
implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development
and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so
authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in
question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project,
the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred

Reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communication Defining its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes
Administrative Code of 1987

by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.

In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the
absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924.

Issue 2:
WON the MMDA has
police power

In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the

MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by
the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the
President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot
validly order the elimination of respondents terminals.
The MMDA is not vested with police power.
Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the
MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two tests of a
valid police power measure, viz: (1) the interest of the public generally,
as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise;
and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded
on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes and the means.
As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic
congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern. But are the
means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive?
The Court fails to see how the prohibition against the existence of
respondents terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to
ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the
elimination of respondents bus terminals brings forth the distinct
possibility and the equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the
common parking areas, a case of transference from one site to
another.
Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of "colorum"
buses, vans and taxis entering Metro Manila and using the streets for
parking and passenger pick-up points, as respondents suggest, might
even be more effective in easing the traffic situation. So would the
strict enforcement of traffic rules and the removal of obstructions from
major thoroughfares.
The MMDA cannot order the closure of respondents terminals not
only because no authority to implement the Project has been granted
nor legislative or police power been delegated to it, but also because

WON EO 179
violates the Public
Service Act

the elimination of the terminals does not satisfy the standards of a

valid police power measure.
The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking
areas or passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary
service to be provided by provincial bus operators like respondents,
hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease
of suitable terminal sites. Eliminating the terminals would thus run
counter to the provisions of the Public Service Act.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition, DENIED. E.O. No. 179 is declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 174588

December 11, 2013

DAV AO NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES GLORIA ESPINO SALIGA and CESAR SALIGA, and SPOUSES DEMETRIO EHARA and ROBERTA SUGUE
EHARA, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We pass upon the petition for review on certiorari, 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the March 28, 2006 decision2 and
the September 5, 2006 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79377. This CA ruling affirmed the January 12, 2001
decision4 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board(DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 7775. The DARAB set aside the July
6, 1998 decision5 of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) that ruled in favor of petitioner Davao New Town
Development Corporation (DNTDC).
The Factual Antecedents
At the root of the present controversy are two parcels of land 4.9964 hectares6 and 2.5574 hectares7 (subject property) - situated in
Catalunan Pequeo, Davao City and originally registered in the name of Atty. Eugenio Mendiola (deceased).
On February 5, 1998,8 the respondents - spouses Gloria Espino Saliga and Cesar Saliga (spouses Saliga) and spouses Demetrio
Ehara and Roberta Sugue Ehara (spouses Ehara), (collectively referred to as respondents) - filed before the Office of the PARAD in
Davao City a complaint for injunction, cancellation of titles and damages against DNTDC. They amended this complaint on February
13, 1998.
In their complaint and amended complaint, the respondents claimed that they and their parents, from whom they took over the
cultivation of the landholding, had been tenants of the property as early as 1965. On August 12, 1981, the respondents and Eugenio
executed a five-year lease contract.9 While they made stipulations regarding their respective rights and obligations over the landholding,
the respondents claimed that the instrument was actually a device Eugenio used to evade the land reform law.

The respondents also argued that pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, they, as tenants, were deemed
owners of the property beginning October 21, 1972 (the Acts effectivity date); thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to DNTDC
was not valid. The respondents added that DNTDC could not have been a buyer in good faith as it did not verify the status of the
property whether tenanted or not tenanted - prior to its purchase. The respondents submitted, among others, the pertinent tax
declarations showing that the property was agricultural as of 1985.
In its answer, DNTDC alleged in defense that it purchased the property in good faith from the previous owners (Paz M. Flores and
Elizabeth M. Nepumuceno)10 in 1995. At that time, the alleged tenancy relationship between the respondents and Eugenio had already
expired following the expiration of their lease contracts in 1986. DNTDC also claimed that prior to the sale, the Davao City Office of the
Zoning Administrator confirmed that the property was not classified as agricultural; it pointed out that the affidavit of non-tenancy
executed by the vendors affirmed the absence of any recognized agricultural lessees on the property. DNTDC added that the property
had already been classified to be within an "urban/urbanizing zone" in the "1979-2000 Comprehensive Land Use Plan for Davao
City"that was duly adopted by the City Council of Davao City and approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory
Commission (HSRC) (now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB]).
In its decision of July 6, 1998, the PARAD ordered the DNTDC to pay the spouses Saliga the sum of 20,000.00 and the spouses
Ehara the sum of 15,000.00 as disturbance compensation, and to allocate to each of the respondent spouses a 150-square meter
homelot. While the PARAD conceded that the respondents were tenants of the property, it nevertheless ruled that the property had
already been reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural uses prior to June 15, 1988, the date when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657
(the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) took effect. Thus, since R.A. No. 6657 covers only agricultural lands, the property
fell outside its coverage.
The respondents appealed the case to the DARAB.
The ejectment case before the MTCC
Pending resolution of the appeal before the DARAB, DNTDC filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)of Davao City a
complaint for unlawful detainer11 against Demetrio Ehara, Jr., Reynaldo Saliga and Liza Saliga, the children of respondent spouses
Ehara and spouses Saliga. DNTDC claimed that it owned the 2.5574-hectare portion of the property which the respondents children
had been occupying by its mere tolerance. Despite its repeated demands, the respondents children refused to vacate and continued to
illegally occupy it.
In their answer, the respondents children raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the case involved an agrarian dispute.
They contended that the law considers them immediate members of the farm household, to whom R.A. No. 3844 and R.A. No. 6657
extend tenurial security. Thus, they claimed that they, as tenants, were entitled to continue occupying the disputed portion.
On December 20, 2000, the MTCC rendered its decision12 granting the DNTDCs complaint and ordering the respondents children to
vacate the 2.5574-hectare portion of the property. The MTCC ruled that the respondents children were not tenants of the property
because they failed to prove that their stay on the premises was by virtue of a tenancy agreement and because they had been

occupying portions different from their parents landholding. The MTCC also ruled that the 2.5574-hectare portion was no longer
agricultural and was thus removed from the coverage of R.A. No. 6657.
The prohibition case before the RTC
The respondents children did not appeal the MTCC decision. Instead, on June 1, 2001, they filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 17, Davao City a petition for Prohibition13 against DNTDC to enjoin the execution of the MTCC decision. They
repeated the defenses and allegations in their pleading before the MTCC. The children of the spouses Saliga Liza and Reynaldo however added that Cesar had already died; hence, they were filing the prohibition case in their own right as heirs/successors-ininterest of Cesar.
On November 29, 2001, the respondents children and DNTDC entered into a compromise agreement.14 The respondents children
undertook to voluntarily and peacefully vacate the 2.5574-hectare portion of the property and to remove and demolish their respective
houses built on its premises, while DNTDC agreed to give each of them the amount of 20,000.00 as financial assistance. The RTC
approved the compromise agreement in its December 7, 2001 decision.15
The Ruling of the DARAB
In its decision16 of January 12, 2001, the DARAB reversed and set aside the PARADs ruling. The DARAB ordered DNTDC and all
persons acting in its behalf to respect and maintain the respondents in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the property, and the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) to enjoin the DNTDC from disturbing and/or molesting the respondents in their peaceful
possession and cultivation of it.
As the PARAD did, the DARAB declared that a tenancy relationship existed between Eugenio and the respondents, which was not
extinguished by the expiration of the five-year term stated in their lease contracts. Thus, when DNTDC purchased the property, it had
been subrogated to the rights and obligations of the previous landowner pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 3844.17
Unlike the PARAD, however, the DARAB was not convinced that the property had already been reclassified to non-agricultural uses so
as to remove it from the coverage of R.A. No. 6657. With Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1994 as basis, the DARAB held that the
alleged reclassification of the property did not and could not have divested the respondents of their rights as "deemed owners" under
P.D. No. 27. The DARAB also pointed out that while Davao City Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 (adopting the Comprehensive
Development Plan of Davao City), reclassified the property to be within the "urban/urbanizing zone," the DNTDC did not submit the
required certifications from the HLURB, adopting the zoning ordinance, and from the DAR, approving the conversion to make the
reclassification valid.
When the DARAB denied the DNTDCs motion for reconsideration in its August 28, 2003 resolution,18 the DNTDC elevated the case to
the CA via a petition for review.19
The Ruling of the CA

In its March 28, 2006 decision,20 the CA affirmed in toto the January 12, 2001 decision of the DARAB. The CA similarly declared that the
tenancy relationship established between the respondents and Eugenio was not extinguished by the expiration of the five-year term of
their lease contracts or by the subsequent transfer of the property to DNTDC. The CA noted that both the DARAB and the PARAD
arrived at the same findings and that the DNTDC impliedly admitted in its pleadings the existence of the tenancy relationship.
The CA was also convinced that the property was still agricultural and was, therefore, covered by R.A. No. 6657. While the CA
conceded that the conversion of the use of lands that had been reclassified as residential, commercial or industrial, prior to the
effectivity of R.A. No. 6657, no longer requires the DARs approval, the CA pointed out that the landowner must first comply with certain
pre-conditions for exemption and/or conversion. Among other requirements, the landowner must secure an exemption clearance from
the DAR. This exemption clearance shall be issued after the landowner files the certifications issued by the deputized zoning
administrator, stating that the land had been reclassified, and by the HLURB, stating that it had approved the pertinent zoning
ordinance, with both the reclassification and the approval carried out prior to June 15, 1988.
In this case, the CA held that DNTDC failed to secure and present any exemption clearance. The CA also pointed out that: (1) Davao
City Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982, adopting the Comprehensive Development Plan of Davao City did not substantially show that it
had reclassified the property from agricultural to non-agricultural uses; (2) DNTDC failed to submit during the proceedings before the
PARAD and the DARAB the HLURB certification allegedly approving Davao City Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982; (3) while DNTDC
attached to its motion for reconsideration of the DARABs decision a certification from the HLURB stating that by resolution (Resolution
No. R-39-4) dated July 31, 1980, it approved the Comprehensive Development Plan, yet at the time of the alleged HLURB approval, the
pertinent zoning ordinance - Davao City Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 - adopting such plan had not yet been enacted; and (4) the
HLURB certification that DNTDC presented referred to a parcel of land subject of another case.
DNTDC filed the present petition after the CA denied its motion for reconsideration21 in the CAs September 5, 2006 resolution.22
The Petition
In its present petition,23 DNTDC argues that the CA seriously erred when it: (1) failed to consider the fact that the respondents violated
the compromise agreement; (2) ruled that a tenancy relationship exists between it and the respondents; and (3) declared that the
subject property is agricultural.24
Directly addressing the CAs ruling, DNTDC argues that: first, the respondents, in the compromise agreement, categorically agreed to
voluntarily vacate the property upon receipt of the stated financial assistance. Since the RTC approved the compromise agreement and
the respondents had already received the agreed financial assistance, the CA should have considered these incidents that immediately
bound the respondents to comply with their undertaking to vacate.
Second, no tenancy relationship exists between DNTDC and the respondents. DNTDC maintains that while a tenancy relationship
existed between the respondents and Eugenio, this relationship was terminated when the MTCC ordered the respondents to vacate the
property. It emphasizes that this MTCC decision that ordered the respondents to vacate the property had already become final and
executory upon the respondents failure to seasonably appeal. DNTDC adds that after the respondents lease contract with Eugenio

expired and the latter simply allowed the former to continue occupying the property, the respondents became bound by an implied
promise to vacate its premises upon demand. Thus, when, as the new owner, it demanded the return of the property, the respondents
were obligated to comply with their implied promise to vacate.
Finally, the property is no longer agricultural, contrary to the findings of the DARAB and the CA. DNTDC points out that the proceedings
before the PARAD had sufficiently addressed this issue, which the CA recognized in the assailed decision. Thus, DNTDC contends that
the findings of the PARAD should prevail over those of the DARAB.
In its reply25 to the respondents comment, DNTDC additionally argues that the MTCC and the RTC cases are closely intertwined with
and relevant to the present case. It points out that Reynaldo and Liza categorically stated in their petition in the RTC case that they
were suing in their own right as heirs/successors-in-interest of Cesar. Consequently, the spouses Saliga, as represented and
succeeded by Reynaldo and Liza, are bound by the compromise agreement that the latter signed in the RTC case.
The Case for the Respondents
In their comment,26 the respondents argue that the MTCC and the RTC cases do not bear any significance to the present controversy.
They point out that the parties in the MTCC and the RTC cases, aside from DNTDC, were Demetrio Ehara, Jr., Reynaldo and Liza who
are undeniably different from them.
Relying on the ruling of the CA, the respondents also argue that a tenancy relationship exists between them and DNTDC and that the
property is still agricultural. The respondents quoted in toto the CAs discussions on these issues to support their position.
The Issues
In sum, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether the property had been reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural uses prior
to June 15, 1988 so as to remove it from the coverage of R.A. No. 6657; (2) whether an agricultural leasehold or tenancy relationship
exists between DNTDC and the respondents; and (3) whether the compromise agreement signed by the respondents children in the
RTC case binds the respondents.
The Courts Ruling
We resolve to GRANT the petition.
Preliminary considerations
At the outset, we reiterate the settled rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review oncertiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.27 Questions of facts are not allowed in a Rule 45 petition because this Court is not a trier of facts.28 The Court
generally accords respect, if not finality, to the factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies, among them is the DARAB, as these bodies are

deemed experts in their respective fields.29 The question of the existence of a tenancy relationship intertwined with the question of
reclassification requires for its resolution a review of the factual findings of the agricultural tribunals and of the CA. These are questions
we cannot generally touch in a Rule 45 petition.
Nevertheless, the case also presents a legal question as the issue of tenancy relationship is both factual and legal. Moreover, the
findings of the PARAD conflict with those of the DARAB. These circumstances impel us to disregard the above general rule and to
address both the presented factual and legal issues in view of their social justice implications and the duty to do justice that this Court
has sworn to uphold.
We now resolve the merits of the petition.
The subject property had been
reclassified as non-agricultural prior
to June 15, 1988; hence, they are no
longer covered by R.A. No. 6657
At the core of the controversy is the questioned reclassification of the property to non-agricultural uses. This issue is intertwined with
and on which depends the resolution of the issue concerning the claimed agricultural leasehold relationship.
In reversing the PARAD and holding that the property was still agricultural, the DARAB considered the Comprehensive Development
Plan (approved by the HSRC through Board Resolution R-39-4 dated July 31, 1980) and Davao City Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982
(adopting the Comprehensive Development Plan) as invalid reclassification measures. It gave as reason the absence of the requisite
certification from the HLURB and the approval of the DAR. In the alternative, and citing P.D. No. 27, in relation with R.A. No. 6657, as
basis, the DARAB considered the alleged reclassification ineffective so as to free the property from the legal effects of P.D. No. 27 that
deemed it taken under the governments operation land transfer (OLT) program as of October 21, 1972.
We differ from, and cannot accept, the DARABs position.
We hold that the property had been reclassified to non-agricultural uses and was, therefore, already outside the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) after it took effect on July 15, 1988.
1. Power of the local government units to
reclassify lands from agricultural to nonagricultural

uses; the DAR approval is not

required
Indubitably, the City Council of Davao City has the authority to adopt zoning resolutions and ordinances. Under Section 3 of R.A. No.
226430 (the then governing Local Government Code), municipal and/or city officials are specifically empowered to "adopt zoning
and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission."31
In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court held that this power of the local government units to reclassify
or convert lands to non-agricultural uses is not subject to the approval of the DAR.33 There, the Court affirmed the authority of the
Municipal Council of Carmona to issue a zoning classification and to reclassify the property in dispute from agricultural to residential
through the Councils Kapasiyahang Bilang 30, as approved by the HSRC.
In the subsequent case of Junio v. Secretary Garilao,34 this Court clarified, once and for all, that "with respect to areas classified and
identified as zonal areas not for agricultural uses, like those approved by the HSRC before the effectivity of RA 6657 on June 15, 1988,
the DARs clearance is no longer necessary for conversion."35 The Court in that case declared the disputed landholding as validly
reclassified from agricultural to residential pursuant to Resolution No. 5153-A of the City Council of Bacolod.
Citing the cases of Pasong Bayabas Farmers Asso., Inc. and Junio, this Court arrived at significantly similar ruling in the case
of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association (ARBA) v. Nicolas.36
Based on these considerations, we hold that the property had been validly reclassified as non-agricultural land prior to June 15, 1988.
We note the following facts established in the records that support this conclusion: (1) the Davao City Planning and Development Board
prepared the Comprehensive Development Plan for the year 1979-2000 in order to provide for a comprehensive zoning plan for Davao
City; (2) the HSRC approved this Comprehensive Development Plan through Board Resolution R-39-4 dated July 31, 1980; (3) the
HLURB confirmed the approval per the certification issued on April 26, 2006;37 (4) the City Council of Davao City adopted the
Comprehensive Development Plan through its Resolution No. 894 and City Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982;38 (5) the Office of the
City Planning and Development Coordinator, Office of the Zoning Administrator expressly certified on June 15, 1995 that per City
Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 as amended by S.P. Resolution No. 2843, Ordinance No. 561, series of 1992, the property (located
in barangay Catalunan Pequeo) is within an "urban/urbanizing" zone;39 (6) the Office of the City Agriculturist confirmed the above
classification and further stated that the property is not classified as prime agricultural land and is not irrigated nor covered by an
irrigation project as certified by the National Irrigation Administration, per the certification issued on December 4, 1998;40 and (7) the
HLURB, per certification dated May 2, 1996,41 quoted the April 8, 1996 certification issued by the Office of the City Planning and
Development Coordinator stating that "the Mintal District which includes barangay Catalunan Pequeo, is identified as one of the
urbaning [sic] district centers and priority areas and for development and investments in Davao City."
We note that while the DNTDC attached, to its motion for reconsideration of the DARABs decision, the May 2, 1996 certification of the
HLURB, both the DARAB and the CA simply brushed this aside on technicality. The CA reasoned that the certificate was belatedly

presented and that it referred to a parcel of lot subject of another case, albeit, similarly involving DNTDC, as one of the parties, and
property located within the same district.
We cannot support this position of the CA for the following reasons: first, while, generally, evidence submitted past the presentation-ofevidence stage is no longer admissible and should be disregarded for reasons of fairness, strict application of this general rule may be
relaxed. By way of exception, we relax the application of the rules when, as here, the merits of the case call for, and the governing rules
of procedure explicitly command, a relaxation. Under Section 3, Rule I of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure (the governing
DARAB rules), the DARAB shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence provided under the Rules of Court, which
shall not apply even in a suppletory character, and shall employ all reasonable means to ascertain facts of every case.
Time and again, this Court has held that "rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are
adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice."42 Thus, while DNTDC, in this case, attached the May 2, 1996 HLURB
certification only in its motion for reconsideration, the DARAB should have considered it, especially in the light of the various documents
that DNTDC presented to support its position that the property had already been reclassified as non-agricultural land prior to June 15,
1988.
And second, granting arguendo that the May 2, 1996 HLURB certification was issued in relation to another case that involved a different
parcel of land, it is not without value. The clear-cut declarations of the HLURB in the certification, which the DARAB and the CA should
have considered and which we find sufficiently convincing, show that Catalunan Pequeo (where the property lies) is classified as
within the urbanizing district centers of Davao City. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the May 2, 1996 HLURB certification satisfied the
purpose of this requirement, which is to establish by sufficient evidence the propertys reclassification as non-agricultural land prior to
June 15, 1988.
Considering that the property is no longer agricultural as of June 15, 1988, it is removed from the operation of R.A. No. 6657. By
express provision, the CARL covers only those public or private lands devoted or suitable for agriculture,43 the operative word being
agricultural. Under Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 6657, agricultural lands refer to lands devoted to agricultural activity and not otherwise
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land.44 In its Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1990,45 the DAR
further explained the term "agricultural lands" as referring to "those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and x x x not
classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its
preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use." If only to emphasize, we
reiterate only those parcels of land specifically classified as agricultural are covered by the CARL; any parcel of land otherwise
classified is beyond its ambit.
2. No vested rights over the
property accrued to the
respondents under P.D. No. 27

Under P.D. No. 27, tenant-farmers of rice and corn agricultural lands are "deemed owners" of the land that they till as of October 21,
1972. Under these terms, vested rights cannot simply be taken away by the expedience of adopting zoning plans and ordinances
reclassifying an agricultural land to an "urban/urbanizing" area.
We need to clarify, however, that while tenant farmers of rice and corn lands are "deemed owners" as of October 21, 1972 following the
provisions of P.D. No. 27, this policy should not be interpreted as automatically vesting in them absolute ownership over their respective
tillage. The tenant-farmers must still first comply with the requisite preconditions, i.e., payment of just compensation and perfection of
title before acquisition of full ownership.46
In Del Castillo v. Orciga,47 the Court explained that land transfer under P.D. No. 27 is effected in two (2) stages: first,the issuance of a
certificate of land transfer (CLT); and second, the issuance of an emancipation patent (EP). The first stage - issuance of the CLT serves as the governments recognition of the tenant farmers inchoate right as "deemed owners" of the land that they till.48 The second
stage issuance of the EP perfects the title of the tenant farmers and vests in them absolute ownership upon full compliance with the
prescribed requirements.49 As a preliminary step, therefore, the CLT immediately serves as the tangible evidence of the governments
recognition of the tenant farmers inchoate right and of the subjection of the particular landholding to the governments OLT program.
In this case, the record does not show that the respondents had been issued CLTs. The CLT could have been their best evidence of
the governments recognition of their inchoate right as "deemed owners" of the property. Similarly, the record does not show that the
government had placed the property under its OLT program or that the government, through the MARO, recognized the respondents as
the actual tenants of the property on the relevant date, thereby sufficiently vesting in them such inchoate right.
Consequently, this Court can safely conclude that no CLTs had ever been issued to the respondents and that the government never
recognized any inchoate right on the part of the respondents as "deemed owners" of the property. In effect, therefore, no vested rights
under P.D. No. 27, in relation to R.A. No. 6657, accrued to the respondents such that when the property was reclassified prior to June
15, 1988, it did not fall, by clear legal recognition within the coverage of R.A. No. 6657.
Interestingly, the contract of lease executed between Eugenio and the respondents shows that the property was primarily planted with
coconut and coffee trees and, secondarily with several fruit-bearing trees. By its explicit terms, P.D. No. 27 applies only to private
agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn production. Thus, the property could never have been covered by P.D. No. 27 as it
was not classified as rice and corn land.
For these reasons, we hold that the property is no longer agricultural and that the CA erred when it affirmed the DARABs ruling that the
property notwithstanding the various documents that unquestionably established the contrary was agricultural .
No tenancy relationship exists between
DNTDC and the respondents; the
tenancy relationship between the

respondents and Eugenio ceased

when the property was reclassified
In Solmayor v. Arroyo,50 the Court outlined the essential requisites of a tenancy relationship, all of which must concur for the relationship
to exist, namely:
1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.
The absence of any of these requisites does not make an occupant a cultivator, or a planter, a de jure tenant.51Consequently, a person
who is not a de jure tenant is not entitled to security of tenure nor covered by the land reform program of the government under any
existing tenancy laws.52
In this case, we hold that no tenancy relationship exists between DNTDC, as the owner of the property, and the respondents, as the
purported tenants; the second essential requisite as outlined above the subject is agricultural land is lacking. To recall, the property
had already been reclassified as non-agricultural land. Accordingly, the respondents are not de jure tenants and are, therefore, not
entitled to the benefits granted to agricultural lessees under the provisions of P.D. No. 27, in relation to R.A. No. 6657.
We note that the respondents, through their predecessors-in-interest, had been tenants of Eugenio as early as 1965. Under Section 7
of R.A. No. 3844, once the leasehold relation is established, the agricultural lessee is entitled to security of tenure and acquires the right
to continue working on the landholding. Section 10 of this Act further strengthens such tenurial security by declaring that the mere
expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract, or the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding shall
not extinguish the leasehold relation; and in case of sale or transfer, the purchaser or transferee is subrogated to the rights and
obligations of the landowner/lessor. By the provisions of Section 10, mere expiration of the five-year term on the respondents lease
contract could not have caused the termination of any tenancy relationship that may have existed between the respondents and
Eugenio.

Still, however, we cannot agree with the position that the respondents are the tenants of DNTDC. This is because, despite the guaranty,
R.A. No. 3844 also enumerates the instances that put an end to the lessees protected tenurial rights. Under Section 7 of R.A. No.
3844, the right of the agricultural lessee to continue working on the landholding ceases when the leasehold relation is extinguished or
when the lessee is lawfully ejected from the landholding. Section 853 enumerates the causes that terminate a relationship, while Section
36 enumerates the grounds for dispossessing the agricultural lessee of the landholding.54
Notably, under Section 36(1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended by Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389,55 declaration by the department head, upon
recommendation of the National Planning Commission, to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban
purposes, terminates the right of the agricultural lessee to continue in its possession and enjoyment. The approval of the conversion,
however, is not limited to the authority of the DAR or the courts. In the case of Pasong Bayabas Farmers Asso., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,56 and again in Junio v. Secretary Garilao,57 the Court essentially explained that the reclassification and conversion of
agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657, on June 15, 1988, was a coordinated effort of several
government agencies, such as local government units and the HSRC.
In effect, therefore, whether the leasehold relationship between the respondents and Eugenio had been established by virtue of the
provisions of R.A. No. 3844 or of the five-year lease contract executed in 1981, this leasehold relationship had been terminated with the
reclassification of the property as non-agricultural land in 1982. The expiration the five-year lease contract in 1986 could not have done
more than simply finally terminate any leasehold relationship that may have prevailed under the terms of that contract.
Consequently, when the DNTDC purchased the property in 1995, there was no longer any tenancy relationship that could have
subrogated the DNTDC to the rights and obligations of the previous owner. We, therefore, disagree with the findings of the CA, as it
affirmed the DARAB that a tenancy relationship exists between DNTDC and the respondents.
The respondents are not bound by
the November 29, 2001 compromise
agreement before the RTC
The respondents argue that the compromise agreement of Demetrio Ehara, Jr., Reynaldo and Liza entered into with DNTDC on
November 29, 2001 and approved by the RTC on December 7, 2001 does not and cannot bind them as they are different from the
former.
We agree for two plain reasons.
First, the respondents position on this matter finds support in logic. Indeed, as the respondents have well pointed out and contrary to
DNTDCs position, this similarity in their last names or familial relationship cannot automatically bind the respondents to any
undertaking that their children in the RTC case had agreed to. This is because DNTDC has not shown that the respondents had
expressly or impliedly acquiesced to their children's undertaking; that the respondents had authorized the latter to bind them in the

compromise agreement; or that the respondents' cause of action in the instant case arose from or depended on those of their children
in the cases before the MTCC and the RTC. Moreover, the respondents' children and DNTDC executed the compromise agreement in
the RTC case with the view of settling the controversy concerning only the issue of physical possession over the disputed 2.5574hectare portion subject of the ejectment case before the MTCC.
And second, the issues involved in the cases before the MTCC and the RTC are different from the issues involved in the present case.
In the ejectment case before the MTCC, the sole issue was possession de Jure, while in the prohibition case before the RTC, the issue
was the propriety of the execution of the decision of the MTCC in the ejectment case. In contrast, the issues in the present controversy
that originated from the PARAD boil down to the respondents' averred rights, as tenants of the property.
With these considerations, therefore, whatever decision that the MTCC in the ejectment case arrived at, which was limited to
possession de jure of the disputed 2.5574-hectare portion of the property, could not have affected any right that the respondents may
have had, as tenants, over the property. Consequently, any agreement that the respondents' children had entered into in the R TC case
could not have bound the respondents in the present controversy as the respondents' claim over the property and their alleged right to
continue in its possession clearly go beyond mere possession de Jure, whether of the 2.5574-hectare portion of the property that was
subject of the ejectment case before the MTCC or of the entire property in the present case.
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we hereby GRANT the petition, and accordingly REVERSE andSET ASIDE the
decision dated March 28, 2006 and the resolution dated September 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79377.
We REINSTATE the decision dated July 6, 1998 and the resolution dated September 8, 1998 of the PARAD in DARAB Case No. XI1418-DC-98.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, per Raffle dated December 6, 2013.
** Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose P. Perez, per Special Order No. 1627 dated December
6, 2013.
1

Dated October 22, 2006 and filed on October 30, 2006, rollo, pp. 9-27.

Penned by .Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and
Ricardo R. Rosario, id. at 32-46.
2

Id. at 48-50.

Penned by Assistant Secretary Lorenzo R. Reyes, and concurred in by Assistant Secretary Augusto P. Quijano, Edwin
C. Sales and Assistant Secretary Wilfredo M. Peftaflor; CA rol/o, pp. 43-53. The August 28, 2003 resolution of the
DARAB denied DNTDC's motion for reconsideration dated August 7, 2001; id. at 29-34.
4

Penned by Regional Adjudicator Norberto Sinsona; id. at 264-270.

Known as Lot 850-C and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8929.

Known as Lot 850-B-3-D and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8930.

Filed on February 6, 1998 per the DARABs January 12, 2001 decision; supra note 4.

CA rollo, pp. 36-40.

10

Respectively, the sister-in-law and the daughter of Eugenio.

11

Dated March 30, 2000; rollo, pp. 51-54.

12

Penned by Judge Antonina B. Escovilla; id. at 55-63.

Petition for Prohibition with TRO, Preliminary Injunction, Damages and Attorneys Fees dated March 15, 2001; id. at
64-71.
13

14

Id. at 73-74.

15

Penned by Judge Renato A. Fuentes; id. at 75-76.

16

Supra note 4.

17

The Agricultural Land Reform Code.

18

Supra note 4.

19

Dated September 19, 2003; CA rollo, pp. 2-23.

20

Supra note 2.

21

Dated April 17, 2006; CA rollo, pp. 295-306.

22

Supra note 3.

23

See also DNTDCs memorandum dated October 27, 2007; rollo, pp. 132-149.

24

Id. at 20.

25

Dated June 20, 2007; id. at 109-112.

26

Dated January 28, 2007, id. at 90-100. See also the respondents memorandum dated November 5, 2007; id. at 154-168.

27

Pasong Bayabas Farmers Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 473 Phil. 64, 90 (2004).

28

Heirs of Luis A. Luna and Remegio A. Luna v. Afable, G.R. No. 188299, January 23, 2013, 689 SCRA 207, 223.

Pasong Bayabas Farmers Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27, at 90; and Heirs of Luis A. Luna and Remegio
A. Luna v. Afable, supra note 28, at 223.
29

"AN ACT AMENDING THE LAWS GOVERNING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BY INCREASING THEIR AUTONOMY AND
REORGANIZING PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS." Enacted on June 15, 1959.
30

See also Memorandum Circular No. 74-20 dated March 11, 1974 issued by the Secretary of the Department of Local
Government and Community Development authorizing the local legislative bodies to create and organize their
respective City Planning and Development Boards.
Pasong Bayabas Farmers Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27, at 94; and Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP), G.R. No. 169913, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 352, 376 (emphasis and underscore ours).
31

32

Supra note 27.

33

Id. at 95. See also Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), supra note 31, at 376.

34

503 Phil. 154 (2005).

35

Id. at 167.

36

G.R. No. 168394, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 540, 553-555.

37

Rollo, p. 85.

38

CA rollo, pp. 151-184.

39

Issued by then Zoning Administrator Hector L. Esguerra; id. at 185-186.

40

Issued by City Agriculturist Dionisio A. Bangkas; id. at 187.

41

Id. at 61-64.

Solmayor v. Arroyo, 520 Phil. 854, 870 (2006). See also Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP),
supra note 31, at 373.
42

43

See Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657.

44

See Pasong Bayabas Farmers Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27, at 92.

Entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Land to Non-Agricultural
Uses."
45

46

See Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), supra note 31, at 381.

47

532 Phil. 204, 214 (2006).

48

Ibid.

See Dela Cruz v. Quiazon, G.R. No. 171961, November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA 681, 693; and Del Castillo v. Orciga,
supra note 48, at 214.
49

Supra note 42, at 875-876 citing Caballes v. Department of Agrarian Reform, 250 Phil. 255, 261 (1988). See
also Esquivel v. Atty. Reyes, 457 Phil. 509, 515-516 (2003).
50

51

Solmayor v. Arroyo, supra note 42, at 876; and Esquivel v. Atty. Reyes, supra, at 517.

52

Solmayor v. Arroyo, supra note 42, at 876; and Esquivel v. Atty. Reyes, supra, at 520.

53

Section 8 of R.A. No. 3844 reads:

"Section 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The agricultural leasehold relation established under
this Code shall be extinguished by:
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor;

(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served three
months in advance; or
(3) Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to the lessee, in the event of death or permanent incapacity
of the lessee." (italics supplied)
54

Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended by R.A. No. 6389, reads:

"Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions - Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except
when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing
it is shown that:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to
be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee
shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on his
landholding during the last five preceding calendar years;
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of
the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other than what had been previously
agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of Section twentynine;
(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed or has
unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the
rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the nonpayment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is
not thereby extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twentyseven." (italics supplied)

"AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY-EIGHT HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOUR, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
55

56

Supra note 27, at 92-95.

57

Supra note 34, at 165-166.

Digester: JFD MADARANG

ARSADI DISOMANGCOP and RAMIR DIMALOTANG vs. SECRETARY OF DPWH SIMEON DATUMANONG and SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT EMILIA BONCODIN
25 November 2004 : J. TINGA
DOCTRINE: Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its subordinates, whether geographically or
functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain areas. Decentralization comes in two formsdeconcentration and devolution.
Deconcentration is administrative in nature; it involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of authority and responsibility from
the national office to the regional and local offices. Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political decentralization, or the transfer of
powers, responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain functions from the central government to local government units.
To this end, Art. X.Sec. 16 of the Constitution limits the power of the President over autonomous regions. In essence, the provision also
curtails the power of Congress over autonomous regions.
Petitioners:
Disomangcop is the OIC, Office of the District Engineer of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM, Lanao del Sur (DPWH-ARMMFED, hereafter)
Dimalotang is the Engineer II of the DPWH-ARMM-FED, and President of the rank and file employyes of the DPWH-ARMM-FED.
Respondents:
DBM Secretary, pettitioners wanted to compel her to release funds appropriated for public works projects in Marawi City and Lanao del Sur
to the DPWH-ARMM-FED; and
DPWH Secretary, to compel him to allow the DPWH-ARMM-FED to implement all public works projects within its jurisdictional area
FACTS:
In 1989, RA 6734 (ARMM Organic Act) was passed by Congress, and ratified in a plebiscite by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and
Tawi-Tawi. Pres. Cory Aquino passed EO 426 to place the control and supervision of the DPWH withn the ARMM under the Autonomous
Regional Government.
In 1999, then DPWH Sec. Gregorio Vigilar issued DO 119 creating the DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have
jurisdiction over national infrastructure projects under the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur.
In 2001, Pres. Estrada signed into law RA 8999 establishing the First Engineering District of Lanao del Sur, which includes the City of
Marawi and the municipalities in the First District of Lanao del Sur.
Also in 2001, RA 9054 amending RA 6734 lapsed into law. RA 9054 contained detailed provisions on the powers of the Regional
Government and the retained areas of governance of the National Government. Basilan and the City of Marawi voted to join the ARMM.
Thereafter, RA 6734 and RA 9054 are collectively referred to as the ARMM Organic Acts.
Petitioners filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the SC seeking to annul and set aside DO 119, and prohibit the
DPWH Sec from implementing DO 119 and RA 8999.
Issue
WON DO 119 is

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION
DO 119 is

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION
DO 119 is

Supreme Court
DO 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office

unconstitutional

unconstitutional. It was
issued with grave
abuse of discretion. It
also violates the
autonomy of the
ARMM for it tasked the
Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office
with functions that
have already been
devolved to the
DPWH-ARMM-FED

constitutional. It was
issued in accordance
with Executive Order
No. 124, reorganizing
the then-Ministry of
Public Works and
Highways.

WON RA 8999
is
unconstitutional

RA 8999 is a piece of
legislation that was not
intelligently and
thoroughly studied. No
public hearing nor
consultation with the
DPWH-ARMM was
made. The House
Committee on Public
Works and Highways
failed to invite a single
official from the
affected agency. It
was skillfully timed for
signature by former
President Estrada
during the pendency
of the impeachment
proceedings.

RA 8999 is
constitutional. The
powers of the
autonomous regions
did not diminish the
legislative power of
Congress.

which has jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi

City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of EO 426.
The office created under DO 119, having essentially the same
powers, is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM-FED formed under
the aegis of EO 426.
EO 124, upon which DO 119 is based, is a general law
reorganizing the Ministry of Public Works and Highways while EO
426 is a special law transferring the control and supervision of the
DPWH offices within ARMM to the Autonomous Regional
Government. The latter statute specifically applies to DPWHARMM offices. E.O. 124 should therefore give way to E.O. 426
in the instant case.
In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a
plebiscite in effect superseded EO 124. With the repeal of EO
124 which is the basis of DO 119, it necessarily follows that DO
119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
It is not necessary to declare RA 8999 unconstitutional because it
never became operative and was superseded or repealed by
subsequent enactment.
The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional
autonomy scheme. While they are classified as statutes, the
Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy
affirmation by a plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof cannot
be amended by an ordinary statute, such as RA 8999 (which was
never submitted in a plebiscite) in this case. The amendatory
law has to be submitted to a plebiscite.
RA 8999 was repealed and superseded by RA 9054. RA 9054 is
anchored on the 1987 Constitution. It advances the constitutional
grant of autonomy. RA 8999, however, ventures to reestablish the
National Governments jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in
Lanao del Sur. RA 8999 is patently inconsistent with RA 9054,
and it destroys the latter laws objective. RA 8999 contravenes
true decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, considering that RA 9054 repealed RA 8999 and rendered DPWH DO 119 functus officio, the petition insofar
as it seeks the writs of certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED.

Digest by: Arnel Abeleda

CASE TITLE: Bai Sandra S. Sema v COMELEC and Didagen P. Dilangalen
Date of Case: July 16, 2008
DOCTRINE: ARMM Regional Assembly has no power to create provinces and cities because their creation necessarily includes the
creation of legislative assemblies, which only Congress can exercise.

Petitioners:

1. Bai Sandra S. Sema (Candidate in May 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City)
2. Perfecto F. Marquez (separate case consolidated with the first)

Respondents:

1. COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution No. 7902

2. Didagen P. Dilangalen (elected Representative of the newly created province Shariff Kabunsuan)

Consolidated Petitions for (1) writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and (2) declaratory relief and for the writs of prohibition and
mandamus
FACTS:
1. The first legislative district of Maguindanao Province originally consisted of Cotabato City and eight municipalities. Maguindanao Province
is part of ARMM, but Cotabato City is not (because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in a plebiscite held in 1989).
2. A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and
barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created the province of Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy
st
Act [MMA] 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1 district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
3. Thus, only Cotabato City was left of the original district. The voters ratified the province's creation.
4. The Sanggunian Panglungsod of Cotabato City asked COMELEC to clarify its status, and after 2 amendments, COMELEC issued a
Resolution in preparation of the May 2007 elections maintaining the status quo before MMA 201 and renamed the district "Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City."
st
5. Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1 district). Later, Sema was contending
that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because
her rival Dilangalen was from there and in fact he won). Sema prays for the nullification of this COMELEC Resolution and for the exclusion
from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City. SC denied the petition.

Issue 1

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
1. Certiorari is
wrong remedy

Preliminary
Matters

Supreme Court

the

2. Proclamation of
Dilangalen as winner in
the elections mooted
the petition

WON Sec 19
Art
VI of RA 9054
delegating
to
the
ARMM Regional
Assembly the

Unconstitutional

Constitutional

1. True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise
of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Nor is there a law which
specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the votes
cast in Cotabato City for representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City. These, however, do not justify the outright dismissal of
the petition because Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of
Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the
constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations
2. Petition is not moot because this case doesnt concern Dilangalens
election. This case will affect all the other succeeding elections for the
office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly
to create in the
future additional provinces.

Unconstitutional

power to create
provinces is
constitutional?
1. It is a valid
delegation
by
Congress to ARMM
of the power to create
provinces.
Art X Sec 20 grants
to autonomous
regions through their
organic acts, the
legislative power to
promote
general
welfare.
2. It is a valid
amendment to Sec 6
of RA
7160

The grant of power to

propose
standards lower than
RA 7160 in creating
provinces shouldnt
be taken too literally.
It
should
be
construed
as
prohibiting the
Regional
assembly
from prescribing
standards that dont
comply
with
the
minimum
criteria
under RA 7160

1. Autonomous regions
dont have the power to
create provinces under
Art X Sec 20 of Consti.
Provinces must be
created by Congress.

A. Although the Constitution doesnt

prohibit regional legislative bodies from creating municipalities and
barangays,
these bodies cannot create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces or cities requires also the creation of a legislative district.
(Every province must have a representative; once a citys popn
reaches 250K, it is automatically entitled to representation)

2. The power granted

to
the
Regional
Assembly to prescribe
standards lower
than Sec 461 of LGC is
contrary to Art X Sec
10
and
equal
protection clause

1. Under Art VI Sec 6 of the Constitution, the power to increase

membership in the
House of Reps and to reapportion
legislative districts is vested exclusively in Congress.

2. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its membership

must be through a national law. An inferior legislative body cannot change
membership of the superior legislative body.

3. Nothing in Art X Sec 20 of Consti (legislative power of autonomous

regions) authorizes the autonomous regions to create or reapportion

WON Sec 19
Art the majority
in the House
VI of RA 9054
created a new
legislative
district?

Yes.

1. The Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan is
automatically entitled
to one member in the
House of Reps in
May 2007 elections
2. Felwa v Salas:
When a province is
created,
the
corresponding
representative
district comes into
existence

legislative districts
4. Under RA 9054, the ARMM Organic Act, the Regional Assembly cannot
exercise legislative power over national
elections.
5. ARMM would be exercising legislative powers outside its territorial
jurisidiction
B. Sec 19, Article VI of RA 9054 allowing the ARMM Regional Assembly to
create provinces and cities without regard to the criteria fixed in Section
461 of RA 7160 will undermine the composition and independence of the
House of Reps. The ff scenarios will be possible: a) It can increase the
membership of the House of Reps beyond 250 limit b) Proportional
representation based on 1 rep for every 250,000 people will be negated
c)Representatives from ARMM can become WON Sec 19 Art the majority
in the House
No, the provision is unconstitutional.

1. Felwa doesnt apply because in that case, the new provinces were
created by Congress. It only teaches that the creation of a legislative
district doesnt emanate from the power to reapportion alone but also from
the power to create provinces

2. Sustaining Semas theory will leave Cotabato City as the lone

component of the first legislative district. It has a population of 163,849. Art
VI Sec 5(3) of
the Consti requires a city to have a population of 250,000 to be a district

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the
Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is
VALID.

Digester: Geronimo, Stan

CASE TITLE: Kida vs. Senate (Decision)
Date of Case: 2011 October
DOCTRINE: Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate the synchronization of national and local
elections when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this task nor can the
Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should address what is essentially a legislative problem.
Petitioner:
Datu Michael Abas Kida

in his personal capacity and in

representation of Maguindanao
Federation of Autonomous Irrigators
Association, etc.
Other petitioners include Rep. Edcel Lagman and Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of Representatives, Atty. Romulo
Macalintal as a taxpayer, Louis Barok Biraogo
Respondent:
Senate of the Philippines, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, COMELEC

FACTS:
1. On June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the
second Monday of May 2013 and every 3 years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national and local elections. The law as well granted the
President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office.

*History and Trivia: On August 1, 1989 Congress acted through RA No. 6734 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the ARMM.
RA No. 9054 (Expanded Organic Act) was the subsequently passed which, among others, reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the
second Monday of September 2001.
2. A No. 9140 was passed in 2001. This law reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001.
3. RA No. 9333 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3
years thereafter. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations
for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted,
resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. Thus, the COMELEC stopped its
preparations for the ARMM elections.

I.
On the issue
of synchronization

Petitioner

Respondent

SC

the synchronization mandated by the

Constitution does not include the regional
elections of the ARMM.

Synchronization as a recognized
constitutional mandate. The
Constitution mandates
synchronization, and in support of this
position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5,
Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions)
of the 1987 Constitution

1. While the Constitution does not expressly

state that Congress has to synchronize national
and local elections, the clear intent towards this
objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which show the extent to which
the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.

2. The objective behind setting a common

termination date for all elective officials is to
synchronize the holding of all future elections
whether national or local to once every three
years. This intention finds full support in the
discussions during the Constitutional
Commission deliberations.
3. Although called regional elections, the
ARMM elections should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a local
election based on the wording and structure of
the Constitution. A basic rule in constitutional
construction is that the words used should be
understood in the sense that they have in
common use and given their ordinary meaning,
except when technical terms are
employed. Understood in its ordinary sense, the
word local refers to something that primarily
serves the needs of a particular limited district,
ARMM officials will serve within the limited
region of ARMM.

II. On ths issue

of Presidents
Certification on
the Urgency of
RA No. 10153

RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional for

its failure to comply with the three-reading
requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of
the Constitution.

The phrase "except when the

President certifies to the necessity of
its immediate enactment, etc." in Art.
VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two
stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: [i] the bill has passed
three readings on separate days and
[ii] it has been printed in its final form
and distributed three days before it is
finally approved.

1. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the

court held that the phrase "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section
26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before
a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed
three readings on separate days and [ii] it has
been printed in its final form and distributed
three days before it is finally approved.

2. In the present case, the records show that the

President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing
the ARMM elections with the national and
local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling,
the Presidents certification exempted both the
House and the Senate from having to comply
with the three separate readings requirement.

RA No. 10153 fails to comply with Section

26(2), Article VI of the Constitution which
provides that before bills passed by either
the House or the Senate can become laws,
they must pass through three readings on
separate days. The exception is when the
President certifies to the necessity of the
bills immediate enactment

III. On the issue of

RA 10153 being
amendments to RA
No. 9054

RA 9150, 9333 and 10153 amend RA

No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1
and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in
order to become effective.

The postponement of the ARMM

regular elections does not constitute
an amendment to Section 7, Article
XVIII of RA No. 9054. Adoption of
supermajority voting requirement
unconstitutional for giving RA No.
9054 the character of an irrepealable
law

3. In any case, despite the Presidents

certification, the two-fold purpose that
underlies the requirement for three readings on
separate days of every bill must always be
observed to enable our legislators and other
parties interested in pending bills to
intelligently respond to them. We find that
both advocates and the opponents of the
proposed measure had sufficient opportunities
to present their views. In this light, no reason
exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited
ground.
1. Neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153
amends RA No. 9054. RA No. 9054 only
provides for the schedule of the first ARMM
elections and does not fix the date of the regular
elections. A need therefore existed for the
Congress to fix the date of
the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which
it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter,
RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent
laws cannot be considered amendments to RA
No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any
provision in the latter law; they merely filled in
a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law
by providing the date of the subsequent regular
elections.

 The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA

No. 10153 has also been challenged
because they did not comply with Sections
1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in
amending this law. (Act may only be
reamended or revised by the Congress of
the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds
(2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate voting
separately and approved by a majority of
the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose xxx)

It also does not require a

plebiscite as such requirement applies
only in the creation of autonomous
regions under paragraph 2, Section 18,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution.

2. This view that Congress thought it best to

leave the determination of the date of
succeeding ARMM elections to legislative
discretion finds support in ARMMs recent
history. The First Organic Act (RA No. 6734)
left the date to be fixed in another legislative
enactment. RA No. 9054 then provided that the
first elections would be held on the second
Monday of September 2001 but Congress
passed RA No. 9140 and 9333 to reset the date
of the ARMM elections. From these legislative
actions, we see the clear intention of Congress
to treat the laws which fix the date of the
subsequent ARMM elections as separate and
distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only
acted consistently with this intent when it
passed RA No. 10153 without requiring
compliance with the amendment prerequisites
embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article
XVII of RA No. 9054.

3. Re: supermajority voting: Even assuming

that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact
amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3)
voting requirement required under Section 1,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be struck
down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of
an irrepealable law by requiring more than what
the Constitution demands. Section 16(2),
Article VI of the Constitution provides that a
majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum to do business. In contrast, Section 1,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of
no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of
the House of Representatives and of the Senate,
voting separately, in order to effectively amend
RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting
requirement is higher than what the
Constitution requires for the passage of bills,
and served to restrain the plenary powers of
Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it
had passed.
4. Re: plebiscite requirement: the
enlargement of the plebiscite requirement
required under Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution to be excessive to point of
absurdity and, hence, a violation of the
Constitution. Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution states that the plebiscite is required
only for the creation of autonomous regions and
for determining which provinces, cities and
geographic areas will be included in the
autonomous regions. With these wordings as
standard, we interpret the requirement to mean
that only amendments to, or revisions of, the
Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the
creation of autonomous regions. The date of the
ARMM elections does not fall under any of the
matters that the Constitution specifically
mandated Congress to provide for in the
Organic Act.

IV.
On the
issue of local
autonomy
granted to the
ARMM

alleged violations of the right of

suffrage of the people of ARMM

failure to adhere to the elective and

representative character of the executive
and legislative departments of the ARMM.

Faced with the problem of how to provide

the ARMM with governance in the intervening
period between the expiration of the term of
those elected in August 2008 and the
assumption to office 21 months away of
those who will win in the synchronized
elections on May 13, 2013, the Court identified
the three options open to Congress in order to
resolve this problem.
o (1) to allow the elective officials in the
ARMM to remain in office in a hold over
capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII
of RA 9054, until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office
o (2) to hold special elections in the ARMM,
with the terms of those elected to expire when
those elected in the synchronized elections
assume office; or
o (3) to authorize the President to appoint
OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153,
also until those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office.

The Court ruled:

1st ruled out. Holdover for those

who were elected in executive and
legislative positions in the ARMM
during the 2008-2011 term as an
option that Congress could have
chosen because a holdover violates
Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution.[1]

 2nd - COMELEC has no authority to order

special elections. The power to fix the date of
elections is essentially legislative in nature.
After Congress has so acted, neither the
Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the
contrary by ordering special elections instead at
the call of the COMELEC.
3rd- The Court has no power to shorten the
terms of elective officials, the Court is not
empowered to adjust the terms of elective
officials. Based on the Constitution, the power
to fix the term of office of elective officials,
which can be exercised only in the case
of barangay officials, is specifically given to
Congress.

[1] Section 8. The term of office of

elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms.
V. On the issue
of appointment of
OICs

petitioners challenged the grant to the

President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective
ARMM officials until the officials elected
under the May 2013 regular elections shall
have assumed office. Corrolarily,

The President can appoint those whom the

President may be authorized by law to
appoint; and since the Presidents authority to
appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it
falls under the third group of officials that the
President can appoint pursuant to Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the
assailed law facially rests on clear
constitutional basis.

 the power of appointment also gave the

President the power of control over the
ARMM, in complete violation of Section
16, Article X of the Constitution.

Admittedly, the grant of the power to the

President under other situations or where the
power of appointment would extend beyond the
adjustment period for synchronization would be
to foster a government that is not democratic
and republican. But this conclusion would not
be true under the very limited circumstances
contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the
period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms
of governance both under Section 18, Article
X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 will
not systemically be touched nor affected at
all. To repeat what has previously been said,
RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and
continuously, with full effect in accordance
with the Constitution, save only for the interim
and temporary measures that synchronization of
elections requires.

Dispositive Portion:

Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHELD the
constitutionality of this law.

Digester: Ernesto Herrera III

CASE TITLE: Kida vs. Senate (Motion for Reconsideration)
Date of Case: 2012 February 28

DOCTRINE: In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these
laws do not change or revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, the laws merely
filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.

Petitioner: Datu Michael Abas Kida (in

his personal capacity and in representation of Maguindanao Federation of Autonomous

Irrigators Association, etc.)

Other petitioners include Rep. Edcel Lagman and Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of Representatives, Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a
taxpayer, Louis Barok Biraogo

Respondent: Senate of the Philippines, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, COMELEC

FACTS: (See 2011 Case)

This is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners which assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we upheld the
constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153
postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the
second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the Presidents power to appoint officers-incharge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.

Dispositive Portion:
Court DENIED with FINALITY the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

Digested by: Dorothy Puguon

Case Title:
ORDILLO vs. COMELEC
December 4, 1990
Petitioners:
Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, (Banaue), Ifugao Provincial Board Member CORAZON MONTINIG,
(Mayoyao), Former Vice-Mayor MARTIN UDAN (Banaue), Municipal Councilors MARTIN GANO, (Lagawe), and TEODORO HEWE, (Hingyon),
Barangay Councilman PEDRO W. DULAG (Lamut); Aguinaldo residents SANDY B. CHANGIWAN, and DONATO TIMAGO; Lamut resident REY
ANTONIO; Kiangan residents ORLANDO PUGUON, and REYNAND DULDULAO; Lagawe residents TOMAS KIMAYONG, GREGORIO DANGO,
GEORGE B. BAYWONG, and VICENTE LUNAG; Hingyon residents PABLO M. DULNUAN and CONSTANCIO GANO; Mayoyao residents
PEDRO M. BAOANG, LEONARDO IGADNA, and MAXIMO IGADNA; and Banaue residents PUMA-A CULHI, LATAYON BUTTIG, MIGUEL
PUMELBAN, ANDRES ORDILLO, FEDERICO MARIANO, SANDY BINOMNGA, GABRIEL LIMMANG, ROMEO TONGALI, RUBEN BAHATAN,
MHOMDY GABRIEL, and NADRES GHAMANG,
Respondents:
COMELEC; The Honorable FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Secretary of Justice; Hon. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive Secretary; The Cabinet Officer
for Regional Development; Hon. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management; and Hon. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC,
National Treasurer,

Doctrine:
A REGION is made up of more than one constituent unit - province.

Facts:

January 30, 1990, the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio held a plebiscite
pursuant to RA 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."

COMELEC showed that the creation of CAR was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes from the Ifugao Province only and rejected by
148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city.

February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified
by majority of the votes cast in the province of Ifugao only.

Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President stating that "considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces
and city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably then,
alone, legally and validly constitutes the CAR."

March 9, 1990, Petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region.

Issue:

Whether or not
the province of
Ifugao, being the
only province
which voted
favorably for the
creation of the
CAR can, alone,
legally and validly
constitute such
Region.

Petitioners:

There can be no
valid CAR in only
one province as
the Constitution
and RA 6766
require that the
said Region be
composed of
more than one
constituent unit.

Respondents:

The creation of the CAR became

effective upon its approval by
the majority of the votes cast in
the province of Ifugao. And
pursuant to Section 13 (a) that
only the provinces and city voting
favorably shall be included in the
CAR, the province of Ifugao being
the only province which voted
favorably can, alone, legally
and validly constitute the CAR."

This is supported by the

pronouncement in Abbas v
COMELEC, which states that:

Supreme Court:

The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the

CAR.
Bases:

1. Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution

"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common
and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics xxx"

Provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote

" what is required by the

Constitution is simple
majority of votes
approving the Organic Act
in individual constituent
units and not a double
majority of the votes in all
constituent units put
together, as well as in the
individual constituent
units."

that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent

unit, which in the ordinary sense means two or more provinces.
This is supported by the fact that the 13 regions into which the
Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings
of contiguous provinces.

Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must

join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas.
2. RA 6766 Article III

Section 1 provides that the CAR is to be administered by the

Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government
and local government units.
"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers
and functions necessary for the proper governance and
development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . ."
Congress never intended that a single province may constitute
the autonomous region.
3. Analysis of the following Sections prove that RA 6766 never
intended CAR to be composed of only one province.

A. Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of RA 6766 vest the legislative

power in the Cordillera Assembly whose members shall be
elected from regional assembly districts apportioned

among provinces and the cities composing the

Autonomous Region.

If CAR is composed of Ifugao alone, then the province is in

an awkward predicament of having two legislative bodies
the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
exercising their legislative powers over the province of
Ifugao.

B. Article XII, Section 10 creating a Regional Planning and

Development Board composed of the Cordillera Governor,
all the provincial governors and city mayors or their
representatives, two members of the Cordillera Assembly,
and members representing the private sector. The Board
has a counterpart in the provincial level called the Provincial
Planning and Development Coordinator.

If it takes only one person in the provincial level to

perform such functions while on the other hand it takes an
entire Board to perform almost the same tasks in the
regional level, it could only mean that a larger area must
be covered at the regional level.

C.

Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) allotting P10M to the

Regional Government for its initial organizational
requirements cannot be construed as funding only a
lone and small province.
The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total

population of the areas covered by RA 6766. It has the

second smallest number of inhabitants from among the
provinces and city above mentioned.

D.

Section 16 of Article V calls for a Regional Commission on

Appointments with the Speaker as Chairman and are (6)
members coming from different provinces and cities in
the Region.

Under the respondents' view, the Commission would have a

Chairman and only one member. It would never have a
quorum.

E. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet members, as far as

practicable, to come from various provinces and cities of
the Region.

F.

Section 1 of Article VII creates a system of tribal courts for

the various indigenous cultural communities of the
Region.

G. Section 9 of Article XV requires the development of a

common regional language based upon the various
languages and dialects in the region which regional
language in turn is expected to enrich the national
language.

4. The decision in Abbas v. COMELEC is not applicable in the

case.

The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces

and cities shall comprise the autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao which is the same rule to be followed in the Cordillera.

There is nothing in the Abbas decision which deals with the issue
on whether an autonomous region, in either Muslim Mindanao or
Cordillera could exist despite the fact that only one province or
one city is to constitute it.

Edward Dayog
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V. COA
January 29, 1990
The CAR created under E.O. 220, which was issued by the President using her legislative powers, is not the autonomous region
envisioned in Article X of the Constitution. It was merely a region an aggrupation of LGUs within a certain territorial subdivision of the
country and exercises no power other than the powers already given to those LGUs and in connection with the coordination of
programs by the National Government.
Petitioners: 1. Cordillera Broad Coalition; 2. Lilia Yaranon; 3. Bona Bautista; 4. James Brett; 5. Sinai Hamada
Respondents: 1. Commission on Audit; 2. Catalino Macaraig, Executive Secretary; 3. Vicente Jayme, Secretary of Finance, et al.

FACTS:
- Article X of the Constitution provides for the establishment of autonomous regions in the Cordilleras and in Muslim Mindanao. Such autonomous
regions will exercise not just administrative, but devolved political powers. It likewise provides that these regions will be created via organic acts
passed by Congress and ratified via plebiscites.
- July 15, 1987: The President, in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, issued Executive Order
No. 220 (EO 220) which created the Cordillera ADMINISTRATIVE Region (CAR). It covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, KalingaApayao, and Mountain Province, and the City of Baguio.
- The rationale for EO 220 as stated in its Whereas clause is the urgent need to reorganize the existing administrative structure in the Cordilleras
PENDING the convening of the first Congress and the enactment of the organic act for a Cordillera AUTONOMOUS Region.
- The main function of CAR is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the region with the local government
units and the executive departments of the National Government. It shalle have a Cordillera Regional Assembly (policy-formulating body) and a
Cordillera Executive Board (implementing arm) until such time as the autonomous regional government is established.

Issue 1:

W/N the issuance of EO

220 pre-empted the

Petitioner's
Contention: Yes.

By issuing EO 220, the

Respondent's
Contention: No.

Supreme Court: No.

What it actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination of

the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the

enactment of an organic
act by Congress.

National Government in the areas covered by the administrative

region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the
Cordilleras.

President has virtually

pre-empted Congress
from its mandated task
of enacting an organic
act and created an
autonomous region in
the Cordilleras.

It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the

Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in
anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an
autonomous region. It created a region, covering a specified area,
for administrative purposes with the main objective of
coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and
services. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy.
Such a step is necessary because the Constitution outlines a
complex procedure for the creation of such an autonomous region
which will certainly take time.

Issue 2:

W/N CAR under EO 220

is a territorial and
political subdivision.

Petitioner's
Contention: Yes.

Respondent's
Contention: No.

Supreme Court: No.

Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and

political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical
personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it
vested with the powers that are normally granted to public
corporations.

We can readily see that the CAR is in the same genre as the
administrative regions created under the Reorganization Plan of
1972 which created 11 (later 12) regions throughout the country.
Considering the control and supervision exercised by the President
over the CAR and the offices created under EO 220, and considering
further the indispensable participation of the line departments of the
National Government, the CAR may be considered more than
anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National
Government.

Issue 2:

W/N the creation of the

CAR contravened the
constitutional guarantee
of the local autonomy
for the provinces of
Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao, and
Maountain Province,
and the City of Baguio
as LGUs.

Petitioner's
Contention: Yes.

Respondent's
Contention: No.

Supreme Court: No.

It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local

autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, Sec. 2] refers to the
administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more
technical language, the decentralization of government authority.
This administrative autonomy is guaranteed for ALL LGUs
EXCEPT the future autonomous regions of the Cordilleras and
Muslim Mindanao which contemplate the grant of political, not
just administrative, autonomy.

PETITION DENIED.

Obiter
1. During the pendency of this case, RA 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted
and signed into law. The Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under EO 220 and its transitory nature is reinforced in Art.
XXI of RA 6766.
2. From what the author of the digest knows, the plebiscite for the creation of the Autonomous Region of the Cordilleras has not yet been
conducted.

CASE TITLE: Bagabuyo vs. Commission on Elections

Allen B. Barrientos
Date of Case: 8 December 2008

Digester: Jasper

DOCTRINE: Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out
any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement
exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner: Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo (no background in the case)
Respondent: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
FACTS:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371 was enacted, increasing Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two.
On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 7837 implementing R.A. No. 9371, providing for additional
Sangguniang Panglunsod seats to be voted for along the lines of the new congressional district.
On 27 March 2007, Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9371 and
Resolution No. 7837.

ISSUE

PETITIONERS CONTENTION

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION

Whether or not the principle of

hierarchy of courts was violated.

In the Reply: Pursuant to the

case of Del Mar vs. PAGCOR, the
Supreme
Court
may
take
cognizance of the case if
compelling reasons, or the nature
and importance of the issues
raised, warrant the immediate
exercise of its jurisdiction.

In the Comment: Bagabuyo did

not respect the hierarchy of courts,
as the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
is
vested
with
concurrent
jurisdiction over cases assailing
the constitutionality of a statute.

THE SUPREME COURTS

RULING
The principle of hierarchy of courts
states that recourse must first be
made to the lower-ranked court
exercising concurrent jurisdiction
with a higher court. Among the
cases
considered
sufficiently
special and important to be
exceptions to the rule, are
petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and quo warranto
against involving the validity of
statutes. The present petition is of
this nature

Whether or not a plebiscite is

required R.A. No. 9371 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 7837
are unconstitutional.

In the Petition: R.A. No. 9371

and Resolution No. 7837 are
unconstitutional
because
the
COMELEC cannot implement R.A.
No. 9371 without providing for the
rules, regulations and guidelines
for the conduct of a plebiscite
which is indispensable for the
division or conversion of a local
government unit.

In the Reply:
Cagayan
de
Oro
City's
reapportionment under R.A.
No. 9371 falls within the
meaning of creation, division,
merger,
abolition
or
substantial
alteration
of
boundaries of cities under
Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution;
The creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration
of
boundaries
of
local
government units involve a
common
denominator
the
material change in the political
and economic rights of the local
government
units
directly
affected, as well as of the people
therein;
A voter's sovereign power to
1

2
3

In the Comment:
R.A. No. 9371 merely increased
the representation of Cagayan
de Oro City in the House of
Representatives
and
Sangguniang
Panglungsod
pursuant to Section 5, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution;
The criteria established under
Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution only apply when
there is a creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of a
province, city, municipality, or
barangay; in this case, no such
creation,
division,
merger,
abolition
or
alteration
of
boundaries
of
a
local
government unit took place; and
R.A. No. 9371 did not bring
about any change in Cagayan
de Oro's territory, population and
income classification; hence, no
plebiscite is required.

The creation, division, merger,

abolishment,
or
substantial
alteration of borders of local
1
government units governed by
Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution
should
be
distinguished from the concepts of
2
legislative apportionment
and
3
reapportionment .
Legislative
reapportionment is governed by
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
Under both Article VI, Section 5,
and Article X, Section 10 of the
Constitution, the authority to act
has
been
vested
in
the
Legislature. Other than this, not
much commonality exists between
the two provisions since they are
inherently different although they
interface and relate with one
another.
The
aim
of
legislative
apportionment under Section 5,
Article VI is to equalize population
and voting power among districts.
In contrast, Section 10, Article X,
of the 1987 Constitution is
concerned with how a local
government unit may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered. It

A municipality has been defined as "a body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local
government thereof (Martin, Public Corporations, Revised 1983 Edition, p. 5.).
The determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body (Blacks Law Dictionary).
The realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation (Blacks Law Dictionary).

decide on who should be elected

as the entire city's Congressman
was arbitrarily reduced by at
least one half because the
questioned law and resolution
only allowed him to vote and be
voted for in the
district
designated by the COMELEC;
A voter was also arbitrarily
denied his right to elect the
Congressman and the members
of the city council for the other
legislative district; and
Government funds were illegally
disbursed without prior approval
by the sovereign electorate of
Cagayan De Oro City.

speaks of two specific standards

that must be observed in
implementing
this
concern,
namely, the criteria established in
the local government code and the
approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected. Under the
Local Government Code (R.A. No.
7160) passed in 1991, the criteria
of income, population and land
area are specified as verifiable
indicators of viability and capacity
to provide services. The division or
merger of existing units must
comply
with
the
same
requirements, provided that a
division shall not reduce the
income, population, or land area of
the unit affected to less than the
minimum requirement prescribed
in the Code.
A pronounced distinction between
Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X,
Section 10 is on the requirement
of a plebiscite. The Constitution
and the Local Government Code
expressly require a plebiscite to
carry out any creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of
boundary of a local government
unit. In contrast, no plebiscite
requirement exists under the
apportionment or reapportionment
provision.
R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face,
purely
and
simply
a
reapportionment
legislation

passed in accordance with the

authority granted to Congress
under Article VI, Section 5(4) of
the Constitution.
Under Section 1 of the said law,
no division of Cagayan de Oro
City as a political and corporate
entity takes place or is mandated.
Admittedly,
the
legislative
reapportionment carries effects
beyond the creation of another
congressional district in the city by
providing,
as
reflected
in
COMELEC Resolution No. 7837,
for
additional
Sangguniang
Panglunsod seats to be voted for
along
the
lines
of
the
congressional
apportionment
made. The effect on the
Sangguniang
Panglunsod,
however, is not directly traceable
to R.A. No. 9371, but to another
law R.A. No. 6636. However,
neither does this law have the
effect of dividing the City of
Cagayan de Oro into two political
and corporate units and territories.
Rather than divide the city either
territorially or as a corporate entity,
the effect is merely to enhance
voter representation by giving
each city voter more and greater
say, both in Congress and in the
Sangguniang Panglunsod.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

Digester: Jel Gallego

SAMSON v. AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133076. September 22, 1999
DOCTRINE: Plebiscite is required in creation, division, merger and abolition of an LGU. Affected LGUs vote in the plebiscite, it
contemplates that all persons concerned will have the opportunity to raise those issues even before they vote on the principal question of

the creation (abolition, merger, division) of a city.

Petitioner: Moises S. Samson - incumbent councilor of the first district of Quezon City
Respondents: Alexander Aguirre Executive Secretary
COMELEC
Department of Budget
FACTS:
1. Feb 23, 1998: Pres. Ramos signed into law RA No. 8535, creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of QC.
2. Petitioner Samson is challenging the constitutionality of RA No. 8535 and is seeking to enjoin the Exec Sec from implementing the law,
the COMELEC from holding a plebiscite for the creation of Novaliches City, and the DBM from disbursing funds for the plebiscite. He
prays for a prelim. injunction or a TRO.
ISSUE: WON RA 8535 is unconstitutional
PETITIONER
YES
R.A. No. 8535 failed to
conform to the criteria
established by the Local
Government Code
particularly, Sections 7,
11(a) and 450(a), and its
Implementing Rules as
provided in Article 11(b)(1)
and (2)

RESPONDENT through OSG

NO
Petitioner
failed
to
substantiate allegations with
convincing proof. Petition has
no document supporting that
R.A.
8535
is
unconstitutional.
Petitioner has the burden of
proof to overcome the legal
presumption that Congress
considered all the legal
requirements under the Local
Government Code of 1991 in
passing R.A. 8535.
We pray that the case be
dismissed for lack of merit

SUPREME COURT
NO
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union: All presumptions are indulged in
favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality
must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work
hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be
conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must
negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the
constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.
Issue therefore is WON petitioner was able to successfully overcome the
presumption of validity accorded R.A. No. 8535.
Bill originated in the House of Representatives. Samson did not present any
proof, but only allegations, that no certifications were submitted to the House.
Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands
that the law passed by Congress, based on the bill of Cong. Liban, had
complied with all the requisites therefor.

Certifications as to income,
population, and land area
were not
presented
to
Congress
during
the
deliberations that led to the
passage
of
R.A.
No.
8535. This is clear from the
minutes of the public hearings
(Oct 3 & 7, 1997) conducted
by the Senate Committee on
Local Government on the
proposed charter of the City
of Novaliches.

Plus, present in the hearings were resource persons from diff govt offices like
NSO, Bureau of Loc Gov Finance, Land Management Bureau and DBM, aside
from officials of QC itself. In their official capacity, they spoke and shed light on
population, land area and income of the proposed city. Their official statements
could serve the same purpose contemplated by law requiring certificates. Their
affirmation as well as their oath as witnesses in open session of either the
Senate or the House of Representatives gives even greater solemnity than a
certification submitted to either chamber routinely.
Petitioner failed to show that, aside from the oral declarations during the public
hearings, the representatives present did not also submit written certifications.
Petitioner, however, did not even bother to present a copy of said petition if only
to prove that it was without the written certifications attached as required by
law. We are thus constrained to presume, as respondents urge, that these
requirements were met appropriately in the passage of the assailed legislative
act.
This omission is not fatal to the validity of RA 8535. While Section 12 speaks of
the site of government centers, such site can very well also be the seat of
government, from where governmental and corporate service shall be
delivered.
Petitioner failed to present any concrete evidence on this point. QC Mayor
Mathay was present during the deliberations and made no mention of anything
concerning such adverse effects. As chief executive of QC, he would be the
first person to protest any development that might prove detrimental to
QC. Lack of objections and a mere stressing that QC voters be included in
plebiscite indicates non-existence of negative issues. Plus, in the plebiscite as
contemplated on R.A. 8535, all persons concerned will obviously have the
opportunity to raise those issues even before they vote on the principal question
of the cityhood of Novaliches.
Even if true, this wont invalidate R.A. No. 8535. Purpose is to inform the City
Council of the move to create another city and to enable it to formulate its
comments and recommendations on said petition. The Quezon City Council
members are obviously aware of the petition. The matter has been widely
publicized in the mass media so they could not claim not knowing contents of
the barangays petition to create the City of Novaliches.
Creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a prohibited
amendment of the Constitution. The ordinance appended to the Constitution

merely apportions the seats of the House of Representatives to the different

legislative districts in the country. Nowhere does it provide that Metro Manila
shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and municipalities as claimed by
petitioner.
R.A. No. 8535 failed to
specify
the
seat
of
government of the proposed
City of Novaliches as required
under Section 11(a) LGC.

Under Section 12 LGC,

Novaliches can still establish
a seat of government after its
creation.

There is no certification
attesting to the fact that QC,
the mother LGU, would not
be adversely affected by the
creation of the Novaliches
City in terms of income,
population, and land area.

QC Council was not furnished

a copy of the petition of
concerned barangays calling
for the creation of the City of
Novaliches.

The said law will in effect

amend the Constitution.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Digester: Daven Mendoza

CASE TITLE: Tobias v. Abalos
Date of Case: 1994 December 08

DOCTRINE: A plebisicite is valid as long as it includes people who affected by the principal subject of such plebiscite; the exclusion of
people, who are affected not by the principal subject but one ancillary thereto, does not operate to invalidate the plebiscite.

Petitioner: Robert V. Tobias, Ramon M. Guman, Terry T. Lim, Gregorio D. Gabriel and Roberto R. Tobias Jr.
(Taxpayers and residents of Mandaluyong)
Respondent: City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, City Treasurer William Marcelino and the Sangguniang Panlungsod
All from Mandaluyong. Impleaded as public respondents.

FACTS:
1. The municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.
2 R.A. No. 7675 was signed into law on February 9, 1994. The origin bill was sponsored by Ronaldo Zamora, representative of the abovementioned legislative district.
3. A plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994 (per LGC), where the people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of
the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city.
4. The turnout rate was only 14.41% of the voting population. Of the votes case, 18,621 voted "yes" while 7,911 voted "no." R.A. No. 7675 was
deemed ratified and in effect.
5. Petitioners assail Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675, which set a legislative district for Mandaluyong and the remaining portion of the
previous district was considered to be the new legislative district of San Juan.
TOBIAS et al
ABALOS
SUPREME COURT
1. The creation of a separate district
1. There is no violation of the rule. The
1. It contravenes the one subject, one
bill rule (Article VI, Section 26(1) of the
for Mandaluyong is not distinct from
creation of the district is part of the
Constitution). They contend that the
the subject of its conversion into a
conversion. The conversion into a
law actually has two subjects: creation
highly urbanized city. It is a natural
highly urbanized city with a population
and logical consequence of such
of not less than 250,000 must be
of the city and the division of the
conversion because the Constitution
district. The latter subject is not
related to the "one city-one
germane to the first (this was reflected
itself provides that cities with a
representative" proviso in the
in the title) , hence, non-compliance
popolation of at least 250,000 must be
Constitution (Article VI, Sec. 5(3)). The
with the one subject, one bill rule.
set up as legislative districts. (Article
creation of a separte district is
VI, Sec. 5(3)). Moreover, the one title,
mandated by this Constitutional
requirement of setting up a district for

one bill must be construed liberally.

a city with at least 250,000 residents.

The district was actually required.
Even if there is doubt, jurisprudence
has laid down the principle that the
one subject, one rule should be
construed liberrally. From this it is
determinable that the creation of the
district is, at least, germane to the
subject matter of the law.

2. The division of San Juan and

Mandaluyong into separate districts
has resulted in an increase in the
composition of the HoR beyond that
provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the
Constitution.

2. The Constitution clearly provides

that the HoR shall be composed of not
more than 250 members, but it is
qualified by the clause "unless
otherwise provided by law."

2. The import of the last clause is that

the present composition of Congress
may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative
enactment. The increase in
congressional representation under
the assailed law is, therefore, valid.

3. The division was not made pursuant

to any census showing that the subject
municipalities have attained the
minimum population requirements.

3. The law enjoys the presumption of

having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including
due consideration of the minimum
requirements for the establishment of
separate legislative districts.

3. The fact that there is no mention of

any census to is insufficient to strike
down the law. It is presumed that
Congress put in the required work and
the requirements have been met. It is
not required that all laws emanating
from the legislature must contain all
relevant data considered by Congress
in the enactment of said laws.

4. It preempted the right of Congress

to reapportion legislative districts
pursuant to Article VI, Sec. 5(4) of the
Constitution.

4. Congress itself passed the law. It

could not pre-empt itself.

4. It was Congress itself which drafted,

deliberated upon and enacted the
assailed law, including Section 49
thereof. Congress cannot possibly
preempt itself on a right which pertains
to itself.

5. The people of San Juan should

have been included in the plebiscite as
it involved a change in their legislative
district.

Dispositive Portion:

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

5. The principal subject involved in the

plebiscite was the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city, not about the legislative district.

5. The district representation was only

ancillary to the principal subject of the
plebiscite. Thus, the inhabitants of San
Juan were properly excluded from the
said plebiscite as they had nothing to
do with the change to cityhood of
Mandaluyong. There is also no
"gerrymandering" here. As noted by
the OSG, the author of the law
consistently won in San
Juan/Mandaluyong, so he would in
fact be diminishing his constituency.

Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon et al v. Hon. Mendez et al

Digester: Romero

December 6, 1994

DOCTRINE: Where a municipality is defective in some essential features of its organization, it may, nevertheless, be recognized as an
existing corporation de facto.

Petitioner: Municipality of San Narciso (MSN) and MSN public officials (mayor & councilors)

Respondent: Municipality of San Andres (MSA) and MSA public officials (mayor & councilors)

FACTS:

1959: President CP. Garcia, issued EO 353, creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon .

Important: EO 353 was issued upon the request of the petitioner itself the Municipal Council of San Narciso, Quezon.

1965: Pres. CP. Garcia issued EO 174 which classified the MSA as a 5th class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement lad
5
out in RA 1515 .

by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios

Sec. 2 thereof states that "any first class municipal district the annual receipts of which shall average more than four thousand pesos for four consecutive fiscal years shall ipso
facto be classified as a fifth class municipality and shall thereafter be governed by the provisions of Articles one to five, Chapter 64 of the same Code."

1989 (30 YEARS LATER): Petitioner MSN filed a petition for Quo Warranto before the RTC against the officials of the MSA.

Petitioner MSN sought to nullify EO 353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of the MSA be permanently ordered to refrain from
performing the duties and functions of their respective offices.

Petitioner MSN Argument: EO 353, a presidential act, was a usurpation of powers of legislature and a clear violation of the principle of separation
of powers.

Respondent MSA filed MTD on the following grounds:

1. Petitioners are estopped from questioning EO 353 because it was at their instance that EO 353 was issued.
2. MSA has been in existence since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer be assailed.
3. Petitoner is not the proper party to bring action for Quo Warranto, it should be the State acting through the SolGen.

RTC: resolved to defer action on the MTD.

1991: Respondent MSA filed another MTD alleging that case is now moot and academic with enactment of LGC, citing Sec. 442(d):

Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. . . .

(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal
districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective

municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities.

RTC: Dismissed the petition for Quo Warranto for lack of cause of action (matter belonged to the State) and whatever defect in the creation of
MSA was cured by LGC.

Petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari. (but the SC considered it as Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 because issue on grave abuse
of discretion was raised)

ISSUE

PETITONER ARG

(MINOR
ISSUE)

RESPONDENT ARG
State is the proper
party, acting through
the SolGen.

WON
Petitioner is
the proper
party to
bring this
action

SUPREME COURT
No, petitioner is not the proper party to bring this action.

When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic,

the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for QW or any other
direct proceeding.

But in the interest of resolving any further doubt on the legal status of
the Municipality of San Andres, the court shall delve into the merits of
the petition.

(MINOR
ISSUE)
WON
Petitioner is

While enactment of LGC

may have converted MSA
into a DE FACTO
municipality, the petition for
QW had been filed before

Petitioners are
estopped from
questioning EO 353
because it was at their
instance that EO 353

Yes, petitioners are estopped from questioning EO353.

EO 353 was issued in 1959, but it was only after 30 years that

estopped
from
questioning
validity of
EO 353

LGC was enacted,

therefore, petitioner
municipality had acquired a
vested right to seek
nullification of EO353.

was issued.

MAIN
ISSUE:

EO 353, a presidential act,

was a usurpation of powers
of legislature and a clear
violation of the principle of
separation of powers.

Municipality of San
Andres has been in
existence since 1959,
its corporate personality
could no longer be
assailed.

What is the
legal status
of the
Municipality
of San
Andres?

Therefore, EO 353, creating

the Municipality of San
Andres, is a nullity.
Therefore, officials of San
Andres had no right to
exercise the duties and
functions of their respective
offices that rightfully
belonged to the
corresponding officials of
San Narcisio.

*Remember that San

Andres was created by
segregating 6 barrios from

Adopted on 15 October 1986

petitioners decided to challenge legality of the EO.

A QW proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political

subdivision must be timely raised. Public interest demands it.

Also, enactment of LGC

rendered case moot
and academic because
it effectively cured
whatever defect there
was in creation of San
Andres, via Sec 442(d).

Granting that EO 353 was a nullity, the MSA attained the status of a
DE FACTO municipal corporation because certain governmental acts
all pointed to the States recognition of the continued existence of the
MSA:

1. After more than 5 years as a municipal district, EO 174 classified

th
the MSA as a 5 class municipality.
2. Under Administrative Order No. 33, issued in 1978 by the SC
th
pursuant to PD 537, the MSA had been covered by the 10
Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the
province of Quezon.

At present time, all doubts of the DE JURE status of MSA must be

dispelled.

Under the Ordinance apportioning seats of the House of

Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the MSA has
rd
been considered to be 1 of 12 municipalities composing the 3 District
of the province of Quezon.

San Narciso

Significant also is Sec. 442(d) of the LGC: municipal districts

organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities."

The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the

legislature. Congress did just that when it incorporated Sec. 442(d) in
the LGC. Curative laws aimed at giving "validity to acts done that
would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have
been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to
the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.

The de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of

Quezon must now be conceded.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

GUANGKO
Calanza v. PICOP
24 April 2009
DOCTRINE: RTC erred in passing upon the issue of the boundary dispute between the provinces of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur since
the resolution of the boundary dispute primarily resides with the sangguniang panlalawigans of the two provinces and the RTC has only appellate
jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991.
Petitioner: Miners
Respondent: Loggers -- Paper Industries Corporation Of The Philippines (PICOP); Good Earth Mineral Corp. (GEMCOR)
FACTS:
1.

Petitioners filed with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Development Service, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region
XI, of Davao City, applications for small-scale mining permits for the purpose of extracting gold.

2.

On 22 December 1992, the governor of Davao Oriental, Rosalind Y. Lopez, approved the applications and issued six small-scale mining
permits in favor of the petitioners.

3.

Since the mining areas applied for by petitioners were within the respondent PICOPs logging concession area under Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) that covered large tracts of forest lands of the Provinces of Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Sur, Davao Oriental and Davao
del Norte, petitioners negotiated with PICOP for their entry into the mining site at Barangay Catihan, Municipality of Boston, Davao Oriental.

4.

PICOP refused petitioners entry into the mining area .

5.

On 7 May 1993, petitioners filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Restraining Order against PICOP and its officers
before the RTC of Banganga, Davao Oriental.

Grounds:

1.
2.
3.

that it has the exclusive right of occupation, possession and control over the area being a logging concessionaire thereof;
that petitioners mining permits are defective since they were issued by the governor of Davao Oriental when in fact the mining area is situated in Barangay
Pagtilaan, Municipality of Lingig, Surigao del Sur;
and that mining permits cannot be issued over areas covered by forest rights such as TLAs or forest reservations unless their status as such is withdrawn by
competent authority.

6.

RTC granted but on appeal, the CA reversed.

Issues:
Jurisdiction of RTC

PETITIONER:

RESPONDENT:
RTC of Davao
Oriental has no
jurisdiction over the
complaint of
petitioners since the
disputed area is
situated in the
Province of Surigao
del Sur.

Supreme Court:
There is boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the territorial
area of a Local Government Unit (LGU) is claimed by two or more LGUs.
8

Under paragraph (c) of Section 118 of LGC, the settlement of a

boundary dispute involving municipalities or component cities of different
provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective
sanggunians or the provincial boards of the different provinces involved.
9
Section 119 of the Local Government Code gives a dissatisfied party an
avenue to question the decision of the sanggunian to the RTC having

Sec. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute. Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as
possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.
(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned.
(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the
provinces concerned.
(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly
urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.
(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a
certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days
from the date of the certification referred to above.1avvphi1
9

Section 119. Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the
proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute x x x

jurisdiction over the area.

Article 17, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing The Local
Government Code of 1991 outlines the procedures governing boundary
disputes, which succinctly includes the filing of the proper petition, and in
case of failure to amicably settle, a formal trial will be conducted and a
decision will be rendered thereafter. An aggrieved party can appeal the
decision of the sanggunian to the appropriate RTC.
Clearly, the RTC cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over the case
since there was no petition that was filed and decided by the
sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur.
Neither can the RTC assume original jurisdiction over the boundary
dispute since the Local Government Code allocates such power to the
sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur. Since
the RTC has no original jurisdiction on the boundary dispute between
Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur, its decision is a total nullity.
Validity of permits

The issuance of
petitioners permits
were void ab initio
since the same
violated Section 5 of
Republic Act No.
7076, otherwise
known as the
Peoples Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991,
which allegedly
prohibits the
issuance of mining
permits over areas
covered by forest
rights such as TLAs
or forest reservations
unless their status as
such is withdrawn by
the competent
authority.

Petitioners small-scale mining permits are legally questionable. Under

Presidential Decree No. 1899, applications of small-scale miners are
processed with the Director of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7076, which took effect on 18 July 1991,
approval of the applications for mining permits and for mining contracts
are vested in the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. Composed of
the DENR representative, a representative from the small-scale mining
sector, a representative from the big-scale mining industry and a
representative from an environmental group, this body is tasked to
approve small-scale mining permits and contracts.
Instead of processing and obtaining their permits from the Provincial
Mining Regulatory Board, petitioners were able to get the same from the
governor of Davao del Norte. Considering that the governor is without
legal authority to issue said mining permits, the same permits are null and
void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 June 2000 and its Resolution dated 10 November 2000
reversing the 26 November 1993 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Banganga, Davao Oriental, Branch 7, are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Digester: Ivan Galura

CITY OF PASIG v. COMELEC

1999 September 10
Petitioner: Municipality of Pasig, Municipality of Cainta
Respondents:

COMELEC

FACTS:

3. 1. 2 petitions questioning the propriety of the suspension of plebiscite proceedings (creation of Brgy Karangalan and Brgy
Napico) pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig
4. 2. City Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City.
Plebiscite was set for June 22, 1996.
5. 3. City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite was set
for March 15, 1997.
6. Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with COMELEC;
called attention to a pending case before RTC for settlement of boundary dispute which includes areas involved in creation of
new barangays.
7. COMELEC ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until after the court has
settled with finality the boundary dispute involving the two municipalities
8. COMELEC dismissed other Petition for being moot in view of the holding of the plebiscite as scheduled on March 15, 1997
where the creation of Barangay Napico was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast
ISSUE
1. KARANGALAN

PASIG/CAINTA

1.
Pasig: No prejudicial
question;
such
rule
contemplates a civil and
criminal action and does
not come into play where
both cases are civil

COMELEC

SUPREME COURT

1. boundary
dispute between
the Municipality
of Cainta and the
City of Pasig
presents a

1. Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental: in the

interest of good order, we can very well
suspend action on one case pending the final
outcome of another case closely interrelated
or linked to the first

prejudicial
question which
must first be
decided before
plebiscites for the
creation of the
proposed
barangays may be
held
2.

NAPICO

2. Moot and
academic because
a plebiscite had
already been held
in the case of the
proposed Brgy
Napico.

2. Tan v. COMELEC: "[C]ommission of that

error should not provide the very excuse for
perpetration of such wrong... Should this Court
decline now to perform its duty of interpreting
and indicating what the law is and should be,
this might tempt again those who strut about
in the corridors of power to recklessly and with
ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or
alter the boundaries of political subdivisions,
either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this
Court will abstain from entertaining future
challenges to their acts if they manage to bring
about a fait accompli."

Plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending final resolution of the
boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same
vein, the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside.
Dispositive Portion:

Digester: Ernesto C. Herrera III

CASE TITLE: MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA V. MADRONA
Date of Case: April 30, 2003
DOCTRINE: Regional Trial Courts exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction over boundary disputes involving a Municipality and an
independent component city.
Petitioner:
MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, Represented by its Mayor, Hon. GIOVANNI M. NAPARI
(Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act No. 542 by virtue of Section 442(d) of the LGC)
Respondent:
1. Hon. FORTUNITO L. MADRONA (Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch 35))
2. CITY OF ORMOC, Represented by its Mayor, Hon. EUFROCINO M. CODILLA SR (Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent
component, city created under Republic Act No. 179)
FACTS:
1. A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc.
2. By agreement, the parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement by a joint session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City
and the Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga.
3. No amicable settlement was reached.
4. To settle the boundary dispute, the City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City.
5. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss.
6. RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. It further ruled that Section 118 of the Local
Government Code had been substantially complied with, because both parties already had the occasion to meet and thresh out their
differences.
Issue(s)

Municipality of Kananga

WON respondent court

may exercise original
jurisdiction over the
settlement of a boundary
dispute between a
municipality and an
independent component

RTC had jurisdiction

1.
That the RTC of Ormoc 1.
has no jurisdiction over the under BP 129.
subject matter of the claim;
.

Madrona and Municipality

of Ormoc

Supreme Court

2.
Both parties aver that the governing law
at the time of the filing of the Complaint is
Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government
Code (LGC), Under this provision, the
settlement of a boundary dispute between a
component city or a municipality on the one
hand and a highly urbanized city on the other -or between two or more highly urbanized cities

city.

-- shall be jointly referred for settlement to the

respective
sanggunians
of
the
local
government units involved.

2. There is no question that Kananga is a

municipality constituted under Republic Act No.
542. However, Ormoc is not a highly
urbanized, but an independent component, city
created under Republic Act No. 179.

3. Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation

in which a component city or a municipality
seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly
urbanized city, not with an independent
component city. While Kananga is a
municipality, Ormoc is an independent
component city. Clearly then, the procedure
referred to in Section 118 does not apply to
them.

4. Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no

application to the instant case, the general rules
governing jurisdiction should then be used. The
applicable provision is found in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691.

5. Since there is no law providing for the

exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency
over the settlement of boundary disputes

between a municipality and an independent

component city of the same province,
respondent court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss.
RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all
controversies except those expressly withheld
from their plenary powers. They have the power
not only to take judicial cognizance of a case
instituted for judicial action for the first time, but
also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts
at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only
original,
but
also
exclusive.

2.
That
a
precedent
for
complaint
has
complied with.

condition 3.
Section 118 of the
filing
the Local Government Code had
not
been been substantially complied
with, because both parties
already had the occasion to
meet and thresh out their
differences

Nevertheless, a joint session was indeed held,

but no amicable settlement was reached. A
resolution Resolution No. 97-01 to that effect
was issued, and the sanggunians of both local
government units mutually agreed to bring the
dispute to the RTC for adjudication.

Dispositive Portion: the Petition is DENIED and the challenged Order AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. .

Digester: John Michael Vida

CASE TITLE: ABRAHAM RIMANDO vs. NAGUILIAN EMISSION TESTING CENTER, INC. and COURT OF APPEALS
Date of Case: July 23, 2012
DOCTRINE: (bold)
Petitioner: Abraham Rimando former Mayor of Municipality of Naguilian, La Union
Respondent: Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc. (represented by Rosemarie Llarenas)
FACTS:
This case involves a petition for mandamus and damages filed by NETC against Mayor Rimando to compel him to issue a business permit for
NETC.
In support of its plea, NETC claimed that its business was being conducted on a parcel of land which formerly belonged to the National
Government but was later certified by the DENR as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
NETC then had operated its business of emission testing on the land from 2005 to 2007.
On January 18, 2008, NETC filed an application for the renewal of its business permit and paid the corresponding fees. However, Rimando
refused to issue a business permit unless and until Llarenas executed a contract of lease with the Municipality of Naguilian. NETC was amenable
to signing the contract subject to some proposed revisions (which were, however, unacceptable to Rimando). The parties did not reach an
agreement, hence the petition for mandamus filed in the RTC of Bauang, La Union.
RTC: Denied petition for lack of merit for the following reasons:
(a) The Municipality of Naguilian is the declared owner of the subject parcel of land by virtue of Tax Declaration No. 002-01197,
(b) Under Section 6A.01 of the Revenue Code of the Municipality of Naguilian, the municipality has the right to require the petitioner to sign a
contract of lease because its business operation is being conducted on a real property owned by the municipality, and
(c) A mayors duty to issue business permits is discretionary in nature which may not be enforced by a mandamus writ.
CA: Appeal was dismissible as on the ground of mootness, but nevertheless ruled on the same for academic purposes. However, CA disposed of
the case, stating that the factual milieu of the case justified the issuance of a writ of mandamus. CA disagreed with RTC on the following grounds:
(a) The tax declaration in the name of the municipality was insufficient basis to require the execution of a contract of lease as a condition sine
qua non for the renewal of a business permit,
(b) Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, upon which the municipality anchored its imposition of rental fees, was void because it failed
to comply with the requirements of the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations,

However, Rimando may not be held liable for damages since his inaction was done in the performance of official duties that are legally protected
by the presumption of good faith. Furthermore, the civil action filed against the petitioner had already become moot and academic upon the
expiration of his term as the mayor of Naguilian, La Union.
Surprisingly, despite its previous pronouncement that the issue has become moot and academic, the CA nevertheless disposed of the appeal by
reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC.
Hence the petition by Rimando.
Issue 1:
WON
a
mayor may
be
compelled
by
mandamus
to issue a
business
permit.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
Rimando argues that
a mayors duty to
issue
business
permits
is
discretionary in nature
which may not be
enforced
by
a
mandamus writ.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
NETC argues that the
parties did not reach a
common
ground
hence, the need to file
a
petition
for
mandamus to compel
Rimando to renew
NETCs
business
license. Furthermore,
the
business has
been operating on the
DENRs land since
2005.

SUPREME COURT:
A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the
exercise of the same is a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature.
Citing Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor, the Court stated that the Local Govt
Code Section 444(b)(3)(iv) states that the power of the municipal mayor to issue
licenses is pursuant to the General Welfare Clause (GWC) under Section 16 of the
Local Govt Code.
The GWC encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments. Local
government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.
Evidently, the LGC is unequivocal that the municipal mayor has the power to issue
licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the
conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law
or ordinance.
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC, whereby the power of the respondent mayor to
issue license and permits is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated
police power of a municipal corporation.
Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the question
of whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is within the province of a writ
of certiorari, but definitely not of mandamus.
Therefore, the RTC correctly ruled that the petition for mandamus is incompetent
to compel the exercise of a mayors discretionary duty to issue business permits.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112152 is hereby SET
ASIDE.

The

Decision

dated

May

26,

2009

of

the

Regional

Trial

Court

of

Bauang,

La

Union

is

REINSTATED.

RZ Zamora
Retired Justice EMILIO GANCAYCO, Petitioner, vs. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and MMDA, Respondents.
(October 11, 2011)
Sereno, J
Doctrine: The National Legislature may delegate police power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them
by the national lawmaking body.
Facts:

In the 1950s retired Justice Gancayco bought a parcel of land along EDSA.
In 1956, the QC council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial
Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of QC, and providing Penalties in Violation
thereof.
o An Arcade is any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as
protection for pedestrians against rain or sun.
o Under the Ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the ground floor facing
the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge
of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the
space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.
o At this time, there was yet no building code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings
was left to the discretion of local government units.
The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco.
o Sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the
application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.
o City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos request and issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66, subject to the condition that
upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own
expense when public interest so demands.
Decades after, in March 2003, the MMDA conducted operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in QC pursuant to Metro
Manila Councils (MMC) Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002 which authorized the MMDA and local government units to clear the
sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions.
o MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code
of the Philippines (Building Code) in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. The MMDA gave him 15 days to clear the portion of the
building that was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA.

Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. After the lapse of the 15 days, the MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall,
or what was referred to as the wing walls, of the ground floor structure. At the time of the demolition, the affected portion of the
building was being used as a restaurant.
Justice Gancayco filed a petition for TRO/Preliminary Injunction seeking to prohibit the MMDA and City Government of QC from
demolishing his property. RTC held for Gancayco. The CA upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 2904 and lifted the injunction against the
enforcement and implementation of the ordinance. Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished
the subject property.
o

Petitioner
Issue 1: W/N
Gancayco
was estopped
from assailing
the validity of
Ordinance
No. 2904.

Respondent

ustice Gancayco was estopped

from challenging the ordinance,
because, in 1965, he asked for an
exemption from the application of
the ordinance. Justice Gancayco
thereby recognized the power of the
city government to regulate the
construction of buildings.

Supreme Court
Justice Gancayco questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance on two
grounds: (1) whether the ordinance takes private property without due
process of law and just compensation; and (2) whether the ordinance violates
the equal protection of rights because it allowed exemptions from its
application.
On the first ground, Gancayco may still question the constitutionality of the
ordinance. It was only in 2003 when he was allegedly deprived of his property
when the MMDA demolished a portion of the building. Because he was
granted an exemption in 1966, there was no taking yet to speak of.
Ultra vires acts or acts which are clearly beyond the scope of one's authority
are null and void and cannot be given any effect. The doctrine of estoppel
cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void or ultra
vires. (Acebedo Optical vs CA)
The mere fact that a law has been relied upon in the past and all that time
has not been attacked as unconstitutional is not a ground for considering
petitioner estopped from assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a
constitutional question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for
determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not
a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. (British American
Tobacco vs Camacho)
On the second ground, Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the
ground of equal protection when he also benefited from the exemption. It
bears emphasis that Gancayco himself requested for an exemption from the
application of the ordinance in 1965 and was eventually granted one.
Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the demolition as
there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer.

Issue 2: W/N
Ordinance
No. 2904 is
constitutional.
YES

10

The ordinance
authorized the
taking of
private property
without due
process of law
and just
compensation,
because the
construction of
an arcade will
require 67.5
square meters
from the 375
square meter
property.
The ordinance
was selective
and
discriminatory
in its scope and
application
when it allowed
the owners of
the buildings
located in the
Quezon CitySan Juan
boundary to
Cubao
Rotonda, and
Balete to
Seattle Streets
to construct
arcades at their

The City Government of Quezon

City claimed that the ordinance was
a valid exercise of police power,
regulating the use of property in a
business zone.
MMDA alleged that Gancayco could
not seek the nullification of an
ordinance that he had already
violated, and that the ordinance
enjoyed the presumption of
constitutionality.

Zoning and the regulation of the construction of buildings are valid

exercises of police power
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as
the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and
for the subjects of the same. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature,
however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards
as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
(MMDA vs Bel-air)
To resolve the issue on the constitutionality of the ordinance, we must first
determine whether there was a valid delegation of police power. Then we can
determine whether the City Government of Quezon City acted within the limits
of the delegation.
It is clear that Congress expressly granted the city government, through the
city council, police power by virtue of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 537, or
10
the Revised Charter of Quezon City.
Specifically, on the powers of the city government to regulate the construction
of buildings, the Charter also expressly provided that the city government had
the power to regulate the kinds of buildings and structures that may be
erected within fire limits and the manner of constructing and repairing them.
With regard meanwhile to the power of the local government units to issue
zoning ordinances, we apply Social Justice Society v. Atienza: A zoning
ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically
arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into
specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. The power to
establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from
the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the
residents of a locality.
It is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of QC when it issued
the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the

To make such further ordinances and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for
the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.

option.

health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their
prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort,
and the convenience. These arcades provide safe and convenient passage
along the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents
of QC. More especially so because the contested portion of the building is
located on a busy segment of the city, in a business zone along EDSA.
Corollarily, the policy of the Building Code, which was passed after the
Quezon City Ordinance, supports the purpose for the enactment of Ordinance
11
No. 2904.
Section 1004 likewise requires the construction of arcades whenever existing
or zoning ordinances require it. Apparently, the law allows the local
government units to determine whether arcades are necessary within their
respective jurisdictions.

Issue 3: W/N
the wing wall
of
Gancaycos
building is a
public
nuisance. NO

The questioned property was a

public nuisance impeding the safe
passage of pedestrians.

Issue 4: W/N
the MMDA
legally
demolished
the property
of Gancayco.
No

MMDA alleges that by virtue of

MMDA Resolution No. 02-28,
Series of 2002, it is empowered to
demolish Gancaycos property. It
insists that the Metro Manila
Council authorized the MMDA and
the local government units to clear
the sidewalks, streets, avenues,
alleys, bridges, parks and other
public places in Metro Manila of all
illegal structures and obstructions. It
further alleges that it demolished
the property pursuant to the

11

The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption
from constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building
are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and
adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an
ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that
structure a nuisance.
Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only
courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance.
The Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building may be
demolished. The authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with
the Building Official.
The penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include the
demolition of illegally constructed buildings in case of violations. Instead, it
merely prescribes a punishment of a fine of not more than two hundred
pesos (P200.00) or by imprisonment of not more than thirty (30) days, or by
both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court.
The MMDA does not have the power to enact ordinances. Thus, it cannot
supplement the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. 2904 merely
through its Resolution No. 02-28.
There was no valid delegation of powers to the MMDA. Contrary to the claim

Section 102. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental
management and control; and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control
their location, site, design quality of materials, construction, occupancy, and maintenance.

Building Code in relation to

Ordinance No. 2904 as amended.
MMDA claims that the City
Government of Quezon City may be
considered to have approved the
demolition of the structure, simply
because then QC Mayor
Belmonte signed MMDA Resolution
No. 02-28. In effect, the city
government delegated these
powers to the MMDA. The powers
referred to are those that include
the power to declare, prevent and
abate a nuisance and to further
impose the penalty of removal or
demolition of the building or
structure by the owner or by the city
at the expense of the owner.

of the MMDA, the City Government of Quezon City washed its hands off the
acts of the former. In its Answer, the city government stated that the
demolition was undertaken by the MMDA only, without the participation
and/or consent of Quezon City. Therefore, the MMDA acted on its own and
should be held solely liable for the destruction of the portion of Gancaycos
building.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84648 is AFFIRMED.

Digester: Jam Marfil

CASE TITLE: The Learning Child, Inc. v. Ayala Alabang Village Association
July 7, 2010, First Division, J. Leonardo-de Castro
DOCTRINES:
1. A mere corrective issuance is not invalidated by the lack of notice and hearing.
2. It is always a wise policy to reconcile apparently conflicting rights under the Constitution and to preserve both instead of nullifying one
against the other. (Citing the case of Co v. IAC)
*The case is comprised of three consolidated cases involving Petitions for Review on Certiorari regarding the operation of The Learning Child,
Inc.a preparatory and grade school located in Ayala Alabang Village. The first two Petitions, with the owners of the school and disabled students
as petitioners respectively, assail the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals which enjoined the schools continued operation for violating
the Deed of Restrictions annotated on the title where the school stands. The Deed of Restrictions limits the use of the lot to merely setting up a
preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school.
On the other hand, the last Petition, with the homeowners association and owners of properties near the school as petitioners, challenges the
Court of Appeals Decision, which upheld the validity of a Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution correcting an alleged typographical error in a zoning
ordinance. The zoning ordinance, as corrected by the challenged Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution, classifies the subject property as institutional
where the operation of a grade school is allowed.
Petitioners for G.R. No. 134269:
The Learning Child, Inc. and Sps. Felipe and Mary Anne Alfonso (owners of school)
Respondents for G.R. No. 134269:
Ayala Alabang Village Association, Sps. Ernesto and Alma Arzaga, Maria Luisa Quisumbing, Arturo Sena, KSL Corporation, SLV Management
Corporation and Lawphil, Inc (owners of properties within the vicinity of the school)
Petitioners for G.R. No. 134440:
Jose Marie V. Aquino and four other minors represented by their parents and attorneys (minor children who suffered from various learning
disabilities and behavioral disorders benefiting from schools full-inclusion program)
Respondents for G.R. No. 134440:
Ayala Alabang Village Association, Sps. Ernesto and Alma Arzaga, Maria Luisa Quisumbing, Arturo Sena, KSL Corporation and Lawphil, Inc.
(owners of properties within the vicinity of the school)
Petitioners for G.R. No. 144518:
Ayala Alabang Village Association, Sps. Ernesto and Alma Arzaga, Maria Luisa Quisumbing, Arturo Sena, KSL Corporation, SLV Management
Corporation and Lawphil, Inc (owners of properties within the vicinity of the school)
Respondents for G.R. No. 144518:

Municipality (now City) Of Muntinlupa, The Learning Child, Inc., Spouses Felipe and Mary Anne Alfonso, and the Hon. Court of Appeals (Special
Fifteenth Division)
FACTS:
In 1989, the spouses Mary Ann and Felipe Alfonso opened The Learning Child Center Pre-school (TLC), a preparatory school which initially
consisted of nursery and kindergarten classes. In 1991, TLC was further expanded to include a grade school programthat is, the School of the
Holy Cross, which provided additional grade levels for pupils who initially enrolled advanced. However, a Deed of Restrictions was annotated on
the title where the school stands indicating that: The property shall be used exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a
preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school, which may include such installations as an office for school administration, playground and garage
for school vehicles. This restriction was set by Ayala Land, Inc., the original owner of the lot.
It was the association of homeowners of Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA) who had the right and power to enforce the restrictions on the
subject property. Thus, AAVA wrote several letters to TLC and the spouses Alfonso, essentially (1) protesting the TLCs and the spouses Alfonsos
violation of the Deed of Restrictions, (2) requesting them to comply with the same, and (3) ordering them to desist from operating the grade school
and from operating the nursery and kindergarten classes in excess of the two classrooms allowed by the ordinance.
In 1992, AAVA, together with complainants-in-intervention who were owners of properties near the schools vicinity, filed an action for injunction
against TLC and the spouses Alfonso, alleging breach of contract, particularly of the Deed of Restrictions. In 1994, the RTC ordered the school to
cease and desist from operating beyond nursery and kindergarten classes at the end of the school year 1994-95. However, this decision was set
aside by the RTC upon the Motion for Reconsideration of the Alfonso spouses who alleged that with the passage of Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance
No. 91-39 reclassifying the subject property as institutional, there ceased to be a legal basis for the RTC to uphold the Deed of Restrictions on
the title of the spouses Alfonso. This was because the Municipality of Muntinlupa, through its Sangguniang Bayan, passed Resolution No. 94-179
correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of the schools lot in Appendix B in Ordinance No. 91-39.*****NOTE: The Zoning
Ordinance case has its own issues with regard to notice and hearing. This has its own case which will be discussed below****
Yet, in another twist of events, the Court of Appeals set aside the RTC Resolution and reinstated the original RTC Decision enjoining TLC and the
spouses Alfonso from the operation of the school beyond nursery and kindergarten classes with a maximum of two classrooms. The Court of
Appeals held that there is no conflict between the Deed of Restrictions, which limited the use of the property for the establishment of a preparatory
school, and the provisions of the Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39, which reclassified the subject property as institutional. The Court of
Appeals continued that there are valid grounds for it not to apply the Ortigas case cited by the RTC Resolution, holding that while the subject
property in said case was found in an area classified as industrial and commercial, a study of the location of defendants school would clearly
reveal that the same is situated within a residential area the exclusive Ayala Alabang Village.
***On the Zoning Ordinance Case
According to the HLURB, Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is not a case of a mere correction of an error but an actual rezoning of the property
into an institutional area, and therefore remanded the same to the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa for the conduct of the required public
hearings. The Municipality of Muntinlupa, TLC and the spouses Alfonso appealed the HLURB Resolution to the Office of the President. On July
27, 1999, the Office of the President rendered its Decision, which held that Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is a mere rectifying issuance to an

alleged typographical error in Ordinance No. 91-39, and therefore does not need for its validity compliance with the mandatory requirements of
notice and hearing pursuant to Resolution No. 12, series of 1991 of the Metropolitan Manila Council.
The AAVA appealed the decision of the Office of the President to the CA. However, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Office of the President
that being merely a rectifying issuance and not a rezoning enactment, the questioned Resolution did not have to comply with the mandatory
requirements of notice and hearing.
ISSUES AND HOLDING:
G.R. No. 144518 (This is the third petition, but Court decided to focus on this first since the validity of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 impinges
on the issue of the legality of operating a grade school in the subject property, which is the main issue in G.R. Nos. 134440 and 134269.)
1. W/N the CA was
correct in upholding
the validity of
Muntinlupa
Resolution No. 94179;

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
AAVA claims that notice and hearing are required
under the Uniform Guidelines for the Rezoning of
the Metropolitan Manila Area, contained in
Resolution No. 12, series of 1991, of the then
Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC).

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
Not discussed.

SUPREME COURT:
We are not persuaded (by the petitioners
contention). Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179,
being a mere corrective issuance, is not
invalidated by the lack of notice and hearing as
AAVA contends.
The purpose of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94179 is clearly set forth in its whereas clauses.
Even more telling that there was indeed a
typographical error in Appendix B of Ordinance
No. 91-39 is the fact that both the Official Zoning
Map of Muntinlupa and that of the Ayala
Alabang Village show that the subject property,
described as Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V of Ayala
Alabang is classified as institutional. On the
other hand, neither the Official Zoning Map of
Muntinlupa nor that of the Ayala Alabang Village
classify Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V of Ayala
Alabang as institutional. The official zoning
map is an indispensable and integral part of a
zoning ordinance, without which said ordinance
would be considered void.
Indeed, Section 3 of Ordinance No. 91-39
expressly provides that the Official Zoning Map
of Muntinlupa shall be made an integral part of
said ordinance. Both the MMC and the HLURB

2. W/N there was a

need to legislate a
new zoning
ordinance to correct
the typographical
error.

3. W/N the courts

may disturb the
findings of an
administrative

AAVA claims that even assuming arguendo that

there was a typographical error in the said zoning
ordinance, the proper remedy is to legislate a new
zoning ordinance, following all the formalities
therefor, citing the leading case of Resins,
Incorporated v. Auditor General.

AAVA claims that the power to evaluate, approve

or disapprove zoning ordinances lies with the
HLURB under Article IV, Section 5(b) of Executive
Order No. 648. AAVA claims that the decisions of

Not discussed.

Not discussed.

Board of Commissioners approved the Official

Zoning Map of Muntinlupa. Furthermore, the
very reason for the enactment of Muntinlupa
Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39 is the need to
accomplish an updated zoning map.
Again, we disagree (with petitioners). Resins
was decided on the principle of separation of
powers, that the judiciary should not interfere
with the workings of the executive and
legislative branches of government: If there has
been any mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive on
which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing
the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by
judicial decree.
In Resins, it was a taxpayer who alleged that
there was an error in the printing of the statute,
unlike in the case at bar where it is the
Municipality (now City) of Muntinlupa itself which
seeks to correct its own error in the printing of
the ordinance. While it would be a violation of
the principle of separation of powers for the
courts to interfere with the wordings of a statute,
there would be no violation of said principle for
the court to merely affirm the correction made
by the same entity which committed the error.
In Resins, there is a presumption of regularity in
favor of the enrolled bill, which the courts should
not speculate on. In the case at bar, it is the
curative Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179
which is entitled to a presumption of regularity.
We should remind AAVA that the Court of
Appeals, the court that was first to reexamine
the case at bar, affirmed the Decision of the
Office of the President, which had set aside the

agency.

administrative agencies on matters pertaining to

their jurisdiction will generally not be disturbed by
the courts.

HLURB ruling. The authority of the HLURB is

certainly subordinate to that of the Office of the
President and the acts of the former may be set
aside by the latter. Furthermore, while it is true
that courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such
agencies, it should be noted that the HLURB
and the then MMC were both tasked to regulate
the rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila area.
The then Municipality of Muntinlupa submitted
Resolution No. 94-179 to both the HLURB and
the MMC for their appropriate action. The MMC
approved Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179,
and this approval should be given more weight
than the disapproval of the HLURB since it was
the MMC itself which issued the Uniform
Guidelines for the Rezoning of the Metropolitan
Manila Area (MMC Resolution No. 12, Series of
1991), the issuance alleged by AAVA to have
been violated by the Municipality of Muntinlupa.

G.R. No. 134440 (This is the second petition.)

1. W/N the CA was
correct in denying
Aquino, et al.s
Motion to Intervene

Aquino, et al., premised their

intervention on their being grade
school students in the School of the
Holy Cross, wherein they allegedly
benefit from the full-inclusion
program of said school. Under said
full-inclusion program, Aquino, et
al., who claim to suffer from various
learning disabilities and behavioral
disorders, are enrolled full-time in
educational settings enjoyed by
regular,
typically
developing

Considering the date of the Motion for Leave to

Intervene, February 5, 1998, it is apparent that
Aquino, et al., would not still be in grade school
at this time, thus rendering their alleged interest
in this case moot. Neither could Aquino, et al.,
claim to represent other special children since
the Motion for Reconsideration filed with the
Motion for Leave to Intervene bore no indication
that it was intended as a class action; they
merely sought to represent themselves. Since
the interest of Aquino, et al., in the instant case
is already moot, it is but proper for us to affirm

the denial of their Motion for Leave to Intervene

before the trial court.

children. Aquino, et al., alleges that

TLC is the only educational
institution in the Philippines that
offers a full-inclusion program,
adding that other schools offer only
partial integration programs wherein
children with special needs join their
typically developing classmates
only in certain classes.

While we sympathize with the plight of the minor

intervenors, we cannot allow that a program
commenced by the defendants (AAVA) way
beyond the institution of the case in 1992 could
be considered as a valid defense. To do so
would put into the hands of the defendant in a
case the power to introduce new issues to a
litigation on appeal with the assistance of
intervenors.

G.R. No. 134269 (This is the first petition.)

1. W/N Muntinlupa
Municipal
Ordinance No. 9139, as allegedly
corrected by
Muntinlupa
Resolution No. 91179, has the effect
of nullifying the
provisions of the
Deed of
Restrictions on the
subject property;

TLC and the spouses Alfonso insist

on the applicability of the case of
Ortigas and likewise cited Presley v.
Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. in
order to drive home its point that
reclassification of properties is a
valid exercise of the states police
power, with which contractual
obligations should be reconciled.

AAVA counters that even where

the exercise of police power is
valid, the same does not operate
to automatically negate all other
legal relationships in existence
since the better policy is to
reconcile the conflicting rights and
to preserve both instead of
nullifying one against the other,
citing the case of Co v.
Intermediate Appellate Court.
AAVA thus adopt the finding of
the Court of Appeals that even
assuming that the subject
property has been validly
reclassified as an institutional
zone, there is no real conflict
between the Deed of Restrictions
and said reclassification.

Court rules in favor of respondents.

A careful study of the pertinent documents
yields the conclusion that there is indeed a way
to harmonize the seemingly opposing provisions
in the Deed of Restrictions and the assailed
zoning ordinance. It is noted that the restriction
in the title limits the use of the subject property
for preparatory (nursery and kindergarten)
school, without regard to the number of
classrooms. The two-classroom limit is actually
imposed, not by the Deed of Restrictions, but by
MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the
National Capital Region, which classified Ayala
Alabang Village as a low density residential area
or an R-1 zone. The principal permitted uses
of a low-density residential area or R-1 zone,
the classification of the subject property as listed
in Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01,
includes: 4. Nursery and kindergarten schools,
provided that they do not exceed two (2)
classrooms.
On the other hand, one of the principal uses of

an institutional site, as per the classification of

the subject property by virtue of Ordinance No.
91-39 as corrected by Muntinlupa Municipal
Resolution No. 94-179 includes: Nursery and
kindergarten schools
The jurisprudence cited by TLC and the
spouses Alfonso requires a meticulous review.
We find that a clarification of the doctrines laid
down in the aforestated cases of Co, Ortigas,
and Presley is in order.
In the Ortigas case which had been interpreted
differently by the RTC and the Court of Appeals,
this Court, in upholding the exercise of police
power attendant in the reclassification of the
subject property therein over the Deed of
Restrictions over the same property, took into
consideration the prevailing conditions in the
area.
Near the end of the Ortigas Decision, this Court
added: Applying the principle just stated to the
present controversy, We can say that since it is
now unprofitable, nay a hazard to the health and
comfort, to use Lots Nos. 5 and 6 for strictly
residential purposes, defendants-appellees
should be permitted, on the strength of the
resolution promulgated under the police power
of the municipality, to use the same for
commercial purposes. In Burgess v. Magarian,
et al., it was held that "restrictive covenants
running with the land are binding on all
subsequent purchasers x x x." However,
Section 23 of the zoning ordinance involved
therein contained a proviso expressly declaring
that the ordinance was not intended "to interfere
with or abrogate or annul any easements,
covenants or other agreement between parties."
In the case at bar, no such proviso is found in

the subject resolution

In the case at bar, as observed by the Court of
Appeals, the subject property, though declared
as an institutional lot, nevertheless lies within a
residential subdivision and is surrounded by
residential lots. Verily, the area surrounding
TLC did not undergo a radical change similar to
that in Ortigas but rather remained purely
residential to this day. Significantly, the lot
occupied by TLC is located along one of the
smaller roads (less than eight meters in width)
within the subdivision. It is understandable why
ALI, as the developer, restricted use of the
subject lot to a smaller, preparatory school that
will generate less traffic than bigger schools.
With its operation of both a preparatory and
grade school, TLCs student population had
already swelled to around 350 students at the
time of the filing of this case. Foreseeably, the
greater traffic generated by TLCs expanded
operations will affect the adjacent property
owners enjoyment and use of their own
properties. AAVAs and ALIs insistence on (1)
the enforcement of the Deed of Restrictions or
(2) the obtainment of the approval of the
affected residents for any modification of the
Deed of Restrictions is reasonable. On the
other hand, the then Municipality of Muntinlupa
did not appear to have any special justification
for declaring the subject lot as an institutional
property. On the contrary, Engr. Hector S.
Baltazar, the Municipal Planning and
Development Officer of Muntilupa, testified that
in declaring the subject property as institutional
the municipality simply adopted the
classification used in a zoning map purportedly
submitted by ALI itself. In other words, the
municipality was not asserting any interest or
zoning purpose contrary to that of the

subdivision developer in declaring the subject

property as institutional.
It is therefore proper to reconcile the apparently
conflicting rights of the parties herein pursuant
to the aforementioned Co case. In Co,
agricultural tenant Roaring, facing a demolition
order, filed a complaint for maintenance of
possession with the Court of Agrarian Relations
of Quezon City. The landowner challenged the
jurisdiction of the court arguing that the
classification of the subject property therein from
agricultural to a light industrial zone. This Court
denied the applicability of the reclassification,
and clarified Ortigas:
This is not to suggest that a zoning ordinance
cannot affect existing legal relationships for it is
settled that it can legally do so, being an
exercise of the police power. As such, it is
superior to the impairment clause. In the case
of Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank, for example, we
held that a municipal ordinance establishing a
commercial zone could validly revoke an earlier
stipulation in a contract of sale of land located in
the area that it could be used for residential
purposes only. In the case at bar, fortunately for
the private respondent, no similar intention is
clearly manifested. Accordingly, we affirm the
view that the zoning ordinance in question, while
valid as a police measure, was not intended to
affect existing rights protected by the
impairment clause.
It is always a wise policy to reconcile apparently
conflicting rights under the Constitution and to
preserve both instead of nullifying one against
the other.
In Presley, the Deed of Restrictions of Bel-Air

subdivision likewise restricted its use for a

residential purpose. However, the area (Jupiter
Street) where the lot was located was later
reclassified into a high density commercial (C-3)
zone. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA)
sought to enjoin petitioner therein from
operating its Hot Pan de Sal Store, citing the
Deed of Restrictions. We allowed the operation
of the Hot Pan de Sal Store despite the Deed of
Restrictions, but not without examining the
surrounding area like what we did in Ortigas:
Jupiter Street has been highly commercialized
since the passage of Ordinance No. 81-01. The
records indicate that commercial buildings,
offices, restaurants, and stores have already
sprouted in this area. We, therefore, see no
reason why the petitioner should be singled out
and prohibited from putting up her hot pan de
sal store. Thus, in accordance with the ruling in
the Sangalang case, the respondent court's
decision has to be reversed.

2. W/N AAVA is
estopped from
enforcing the Deed
of Restrictions.

TLC and the spouses Alfonsos

main argument against the
enforcement of the Deed of
Restrictions on their property is that
AAVA had allegedly abrogated said
restrictions by its own acts.

Not discussed.

Furthermore, we should also take note that in

the case of Presley, there can be no
reconciliation between the restriction to use of
the property as a residential area and its
reclassification as a high density commercial (C3) zone wherein the use of the property for
residential purposes is not one of the allowable
uses.
We are not convinced.
Estoppel by deed is a bar which precludes one
party from asserting as against the other party
and his privies any right or title in derogation of
the deed, or from denying the truth of any
material facts asserted in it.
TLC and the spouses Alfonso failed to prove by

clear and convincing evidence the gravity of

AAVAs acts so as to bar the latter from insisting
compliance with the Deed of Restrictions. It
cannot be said that AAVA abrogated the Deed
of Restrictions. Neither could it be deemed
estopped from seeking the enforcement of said
restrictions.

Dispositive Portion (This is really long):

This Court hereby resolves to affirm with modification the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 insofar as
they reinstated the July 22, 1994 RTC Decision ordering the defendants in Civil Case No. 92-2950 to cease and desist from the operation of the
Learning Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes. Pursuant to Muntinlupa Ordinance No. 91-39, as corrected under Muntinlupa
Municipal Resolution No. 94-179, we therefore delete the two-classroom restriction from said Decision.
This Court, however, understands the attendant difficulties this Decision could cause to the current students of the School of the Holy Cross, who
are innocent spectators to the litigation in the case at bar. We therefore resolve that the current students of the School of the Holy Cross be
allowed to finish their elementary studies in said school up to their graduation in their Grade 7. The school, however, shall no longer be permitted
to accept new students to the grade school.
WHEREFORE, the Court rules on the consolidated Petitions as follows:
1. The Petition in G.R. No. 134269 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096
dated November 11, 1997 and July 2, 1998, respectively, insofar as they reinstated the July 22, 1994 RTC Decision ordering the defendants in
Civil Case No. 92-2950 to cease and desist from the operation of the Learning Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes with a
maximum of two classrooms, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the two-classroom restriction is deleted, and (2) the current
students of the School of the Holy Cross, the Learning Child Schools grade school department, be allowed to finish their elementary studies in
said school up to their graduation in their Grade 7. The enrollment of new students to the grade school shall no longer be permitted.
2. The Petition in G.R. No. 134440 is DISMISSED on the ground of mootness. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096
dated July 2, 1998, insofar as it dismissed the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Jose Marie V. Aquino, Lorenzo Maria E. Veloso, Christopher
E. Walmsley, Joanna Marie S. Sison, and Matthew Raphael C. Arce is hereby AFFIRMED.
3. The Petition in G.R. No. 144518 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54438, dated August 15, 2000, which
upheld the validity of a Mandaluyong Municipal Resolution correcting an alleged typographical error in a zoning ordinance is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Digester: Renz
CASE TITLE: ORTIGAS & CO. vs. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO.
Date: December 14, 1979
Doctrine: Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act," empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning
and subdivision ordinances or regulations"; for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an
ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or
ambit of the word "regulation" under the provision. As a matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists "(A)ny provision
of law to the contrary notwithstanding ... "
FACTS:
Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA,
Mandaluyong, Rizal. On March 1952, plaintiff entered into two separate agreement of installment sale over two parcels of land (Lot 5 & 6) in favor
of Augusto Angeles. On July 1962, the vendees transferred their rights over the lots in favor of Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment, the
plaintiff executed the deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of sale contained the
stipulations that
1. The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall be used the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes
The above restrictions were later annotated in TCT and issued in the name of Emma Chavez. Eventually, defendant acquired the lots and the
building restrictions were also annotated in the TCT. Defendant bought Lot No. 5 directly from Emma Chavez, "free from all liens and
encumbrances while Lot No. 6 was acquired from Republic Flour Mills who purchased the said Lot No. 6 free from all liens and encumbrances,"
as stated in the Deed of Sale between it and Emma Chavez.
Plaintiff-appellant claims that the restrictions were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development
of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of the big landed estate of plaintiff-appellant where commercial and industrial sites are also
designated.
Defendant-appellee maintains that the area along the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River, has been declared a
commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27, dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal.
On May 1963, defendant-appellee began the construction of a building to be devoted to banking purposes. The following day, plaintiff-appellant
demanded in writing that defendant-appellee stop the construction. The latter refused to comply. Hence, plaintiff filed a complaint to enjoin
defendant from continuing the construction of the building.

TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION

The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the subject restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. 27. It predicated its
conclusion on the exercise of police power of the said municipality, and stressed that private interest should "bow down to general interest and
welfare. The trial court decision further emphasized that it "assumes said resolution to be valid, considering that there is no issue raised by either
of the parties as to whether the same is null and void.
ISSUE
WON
Resolution No.
27 s-1960 is a
valid exercise
of police power

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION
No discussion

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION
No discussion

SUPREME COURT
The contention that the trial court erred in sustaining the validity of Resolution No. 27 as
an exercise of police power is without merit. In the first place, the validity of the said
resolution was never questioned before it.
But, assuming arguendo that it is not yet too late to raise the issue, we are of the
opinion that its posture is unsustainable.
12

Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act," empowers
a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations"; for the
municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an
ordinance.
Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a
regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under the
provision. As a matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists "(A)ny
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding ... "

12

Sec. 3. Additional powers of provincial boards, municipal boards or city councils and municipal and regularly organized municipal district councils.
xxx xxx xxx

Power to adopt zoning and planning ordinances. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding Municipal Boards or City Councils in cities, and Municipal
Councils in municipalities are hereby authorized to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for their respective cities and municipalities subject
to the approval of the City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the case may be. Cities and municipalities may, however, consult the National Planning Commission
on matters pertaining to planning and zoning.

13

An examination of Section 12 of the same law which prescribes the rules for its
interpretation likewise reveals that the implied power of a municipality should be
"liberally construed in its favor" and that "(A)ny fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it
shall be presumed to exist." The same section further mandates that the general
welfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more power to
local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and material
progress of the people in the community.

WON the
Resolution can
nullify or
supersede the
contractual
obligations
assumed by
defendantappellee.

13

Said resolution
cannot nullify
the contractual
obligations
assumed by the
defendantappellee
referring to the
restrictions
incorporated in
the deeds of
sale and later in
the

Defendantappellee
maintains that the
area along the
western part of
EDSA from Shaw
Boulevard to
Pasig River, has
been declared a
commercial and
industrial zone,
per Resolution
No. 27, dated

The only exceptions under Section 12 are existing vested rights arising out of a contract
between "a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other," in
which case the original terms and provisions of the contract should govern. The
exceptions, clearly, do not apply in the case at bar.
While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not
absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e.,
"the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in
a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government, the exercise of the
power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, 'whimsical,
unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any
other applicable constitutional guarantee.
Police power "is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not,
confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it

SEC. 12. Rules for the Interpretation of the Local Autonomy Act.

1. Implied power of a province, a city or municipality shall be liberally construed in its favor. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power
should be interpreted infavor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist.
2. The general welfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of local governments in promoting the economic condition, social welfare and material progress of
the people in the community.
3. Vested rights existing at the time of the promulgation of this arising out of a contract between a province, city or municipality on one hand and third party
on the other, should be governed by the original terms and provisions of the same, and in no case would this act infringe existing right.

corresponding
Transfer
Certificates of
Title issued to
defendantappellee

February 4, 1960
of the Municipal
Council of
Mandaluyong,
Rizal

must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life."

Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to
the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or
promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the
locality.
Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where
lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial
and commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery
which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports
an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly
conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been
expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations,
the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal 'council, was reasonably, if not
perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.

Digester: Dave Cagahastian

Social Justice Society v. Atienza

2007 March 7
Doctrine: The City Mayor has a duty to enforce ordinances approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Petitioner: Social Justice Society (political party with offices in Manila and with "many members

who are Manila residents)

Cabigao and Tumbokon (taxpayers)

Respondents:

Lito Atienza, Jr. (Manila City Mayor)

FACTS:

9. 1. Manila City Council, invoking its police power under the general welfare provisions of the LGC, enacted Ordinance No.
8027 that:
a. reclassified from Industrial to Commercial an area described as "Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino
Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street".
b. ordered the owners of land performing Industrial activities to cease and desist from operations within 6 months. Among
those affected were the "Pandacan Terminals" of Petron, Caltex and Shell ("the Three").
10. Later, the City of Manila, the Pandacan Terminals and the DOE entered into a MOU for the "scaling down of operations":
a. immediate removal of 28 tanks and creation and maintenance of buffer zones around the Terminals.
b. limiting the Three's operations in the area to common facilities operated and managed jointly by the Three.
c. the Mayor to endorse the MOU to the City Council
d. the DOE and Mayor to monitor compliance by the Three and protect the buffer zones from illegal settlers.
3. The Manila City Council ratified the MOU, for a 6-month effectivity and later extended another 4 months.
4. Petitioners filed the instant petition after the grant of extension, to compel enforcement of Ordinance 8027 and the removal
of the terminals.
ISSUE

SJS et al

Atienza

SUPREME COURT

1. Petitioners have standing since mandamus concerns a

public right, people interested need not show specific

interest. Moreover, petitioners are Manila residents and
have specific interest.
1. on the application of
Ordinance 8027

Atienza has duty to

implement Ordinance "upon
approval thereof by the
sangguniang panglunsod"
under Sec. 455(b)(2), LGC.

Ordinance superseded by
the MOU and resolutions
ratifying MOU.

1. Mayor, as LCE, has ministerial duty to enforce the

Ordinance if the Council has not been repealed nor
annulled by the courts.

2. Dimaporo v. Mitra: Officers cannot refuse to perform

their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the
statute imposing the duty.

2. on the MOU
superseding Ordinance
8027

1. Issue need not be resolved, since the MOU was valid

only until 30 April 2003; no legal hindrance for Atienza
to enforce the Ordinance.
2. Ordinance 8027 was enacted after Sept. 11 to protect
Manila residents from "catastrophic devastation" in case
of a terrorist attack on the terminals, and is a valid
protective measure.

Dispositive Portion: Petition granted. Atienza to enforce Ordinance 8027.

Digester: Roddel Paraos

CASE TITLE: SJS v Atienza
Date of Case: February 13, 2008
DOCTRINE:
The power of municipal corporations to divide their territory into industrial, commercial and residential zones is recognized in almost all
jurisdictions inasmuch as it is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of their inhabitants.
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema
lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). Though police power rests with the legislature, this power may be delegated.
Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments.
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if the following requisites
are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there
must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

Petitioner: Social Justice Society

Intervenors: Chevron is engaged in business of importing, distributing, and marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines; Shell and Petron
are engaged in the business of manufacturing, refining, importing, distributing, and marketing petroleum products in the Philippines; DOE is a
governmental agency tasked to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the government
relative to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation.
Respondent: Jose L. Atienza, as Manila Mayor
FACTS:
SJS, in the original petition, sought to compel respondent Atienza to enforce Ordinance 8027, which became effective on Dec 28 2001. The said
ordinance reclassified the are described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed
under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their business within 6 months. Among the businesses are the Pandacan Terminals
of the oil companies.
June 26, 2002- City of Manila and DOE entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the oil companies, agreeing on the scaling
down of the terminals. Based on these facts, the SC ruled in its March 2007 decision that respondent had the ministerial duty under the LGC to
enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city, including Ordinance 8027.

In the motions for intervention, the oil companies said that Chevron filed a complaint for the annulment of Ordinance 8027 in the RTC Manila. Shell
also filed a case the same day, and the 2 cases were consolidated. While the cases were pending, city council of Manila enacted Ordinance 8119.
Again, the companies filed complaints to annul the new ordinance.
The parties filed a joint motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim on the first case, and this was granted.

WON the
intervention of
the oil
companies and
DOE should be
allowed

WON the
injunctive writs
are
impediments to
the
enforcement of
Ordinance 8027

Intervenors
N/A

Respondent
N/A

SC
Yes, the intervention should be allowed in the interest of
justice.
Though for the DOE and the oil companies the last requirement
14
is absent , the court has recognized exceptions in the interest of
substantial justice. The oil companies have a direct and
immediate interest in the implementation of Ordinance 8027.
Though their motion to intervene is late, the parties presented
novel issues and arguments which were not considered in the
March 2007 decision, hence this will be allowed.
No, said writs are not impediments to the enforcement of the
ordinance.

Respondent did not unlawfully

fail or neglect to enforce
Ordinance 8027 since he was
lawfully prevented by the
injunctive writs issued by the
Manila RTCs
Says he informed the
court of the pendency of
the civil cases and that a
TRO was issued by the
RTC in the consolidated
cases

Though Chevron and Shell have in their favor the writs of

injunction, the status quo order in favor of Petron is no longer in
effect since the court granted the motion to withdraw.
The parties failed to inform the Court about the injunctive writs.
Respondent should have updated the court via manifestation.
The fact that in his memorandum, respondent mentioned the
issuance of a TRO does not change the facts. Under the Rules of
Court, this TRO is valid only for 20 days, hence the Court
presumed that this had already lapsed.
Though the injunctive writs were mentioned in respondents
rejoinder, this was expunged for being a prohibited pleading.
2 requisites for issuance of preliminary injunction: (1) the right to
be protected exists prima facie and (2) the acts sought to be
enjoined are violative of that right.

14

(g)The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.

It is a settled rule that an ordinance enjoys the presumption of

validity and, as such, cannot be restrained by injunction. The
Court said that the issuance of said writ is proper only when:
... the petitioner assailing the ordinance has made out a case of
unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind
of the judge, the presumption of validity, in addition to a
showing of a clear legal right to the remedy sought
The Court said: Nowhere in the judges discussion can we
see that, in addition to a showing of a clear legal right of
Chevron and Shell to the remedy sought, he was convinced
that they had made out a case of unconstitutionality or
invalidity strong enough to overcome the presumption of
validity of the ordinance.
The ordinance, on its face, does not at all appear to be
unconstitutional. It reclassified the subject area from industrial to
commercial. Prima facie, this power is within the power of
municipal corporations:

This presumption of validity

must be set aside when the
invalidity or unreasonableness
appears on the face of the
ordinance itself.

The power of municipal corporations to divide their territory into

industrial, commercial and residential zones is recognized in
almost all jurisdictions inasmuch as it is derived from the police
power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of their
inhabitants.
There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to
divide its territory into residential and industrial zones, and to
prescribe that offensive and unwholesome trades and
occupations are to be established exclusively in the latter zone.

WON
Ordinance 8027
was
superseded by
Ordinance 8119

Respondent alleged that

he did not inform the
Court of the said
ordinance because he
thought it was different

Likewise, it cannot be denied that the City of Manila has the

authority, derived from the police power, of forbidding the
appellant to continue the manufacture of toyo in the zone where
it is now situated, which has been declared residential.
The Court was not informed of the Ordinance 8119. While courts
are required to take judicial notice of laws, ordinances are not
one of those enumerated in the Rules of Court for the court to
take mandatory judicial notice.

Respondent judicially admitted

that Ordinance 8027 was
repealed by Ordinance 8119 in
the earlier case when the
parties in the joint motion to
withdraw stated that the issue
was rendered moot and
academic by virtue of passage
of Ordinance 8119.
Also, respondent in his answer
expressly stated that
Ordinance No. 8119, which
in effect, replaced Ordinance
[No.] 8027
Oil companies and DOE argue
that Ordinance No. 8119
repealed Ordinance No. 8027.
They assert that although there
was no express repeal of
Ordinance No. 8027,
Ordinance No. 8119 impliedly
repealed it.
According to the oil companies,
Ordinance No. 8119
reclassified the area covering
the Pandacan Terminals to
High Density
Residential/Mixed Use Zone
(R-3/MXD) whereas Ordinance
No. 8027 reclassified the same
area from Industrial II to
Commercial I

from Ordinance 8027

and that the 2 were not
inconsistent.
The stipulation in said
joint motion to withdraw
simply meant that
Petron was recognizing
the validity of Ordinance
8027, and that it had
conceded the issue of
constitutionality of
Ordinance 8027

In passing Ordinance
No. 8119, the
Sanggunian did not
intend to repeal
Ordinance No. 8027 but
meant instead to carry
over 8027s provisions
to 8119 for the purpose
of making Ordinance
No. 8027 applicable to
the oil companies even
after the passage of
Ordinance No. 8119.
He quoted an excerpt
from the minutes of the
July 27, 2004 session of
the Sanggunian during
the first reading of
Ordinance No. 8119.

While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot

subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent to that
which was pleaded, the rule is not applicable here. To constitute
a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same
case in which it is offered. Respondent made the statement in
the earlier case for annulment of the ordinance, and not this case
before the SC.
The oil companies should be considered estopped by first relying
on the argument that Ordinance 8119 superseded 8027, and
then also impugning 8119s validity.

There was no implied repeal.

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a
statute of later date clearly reveals the intention of the legislature
to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be
given effect.
There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the
provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are
irreconcilably contradictory, the latter act, to the extent of the
conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The
second is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier
one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to
repeal the earlier law. The oil companies argue that the
situation here falls under the first category.
The Court said that the excerpt quoted by respondent show that
there was never an intent to repeal Ordinance 8027. There was
also no conflict between the 2 ordinances, since both ordinances
actually have a common objective, i.e., to shift the zoning
classification from industrial to commercial (Ordinance No. 8027)
or mixed residential/commercial (Ordinance No. 8119).

WON
Mandamus lies
to compel
respondent
Mayor to
enforce
Ordinance 8027

WON
Ordinance 8027
is
Unconstitutional

Mandamus does not lie against

respondent in consideration of
the separation of powers of the
executive and judiciary.
Petitioners had a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy to
compel respondent to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 which was
to seek relief from the
President of the Philippines
through the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) by
virtue of the Presidents power
of supervision over local
government units.

Also, it is a rule in statutory construction that a general law does

not repeal a specific law. Ordinance 8027 deals with a specific
area in Manila, while Ordinance 8119 deals with the whole City of
Manila.
[the] Courts will not interfere by mandamus proceedings with the
legislative [or executive departments] of the government in the
legitimate exercise of its powers, except to enforce mere
ministerial acts required by law to be performed by some
officer thereof.
The function of mandamus is the power to compel the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from office, trust or station.
A party need not go first to the DILG in order to compel the
enforcement of an ordinance. This suggested process would be
unreasonably long, tedious and consequently injurious to the
interests of the local government unit (LGU) and its constituents
whose welfare is sought to be protected.

Ordinance 8027 is not unconstitutional, and it is valid.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be passed according
to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The City of Manila has the power to enact Ordinance 8027.
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police power. Police
power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make
statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. This power flows from the recognition that salus populi

est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law).
Though police power rests with the legislature, this power may
be delegated.
Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause,
encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments:
Section 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit
shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those
which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and selfreliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their residents, maintain peace and
order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.
LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies, in this case, the Sangguniang
15
Panlungsod or the city council, specifically enact ordinances .
This power was also provided for in the Revised Charter of
16
Manila (RA 409) .
The enactment of Ordinance 8027 is a legitimate exercise of
police power.
As with the State, local governments may be considered as
15

Section. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panglungsod, as the legislative branch of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare
of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code xxxx
16

Section 18. Legislative powers. The [City Council] shall have the following legislative powers:

(g) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of
the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this chapter xxxx

having properly exercised their police power only if the following

requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise
and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method.
The ordinance in question was enacted for the purpose of
promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety
and general welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian
was forced to take measures against devastation of possible
terrorist attacks, hence the reclassification of the area.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life,
security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of
a particular class. The Sanggunian was in the best position to
determine the needs of its constituents.
In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may
be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government. The government may enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property,
lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general
welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not
arbitrary.
The Sanggunian resorted to a zoning ordinance, which is defined
as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges,
prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision
into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs.
The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and
residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is
exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a
locality. Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is
within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Manila.
Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair
and oppressive as it does not

This is not accurate

since the ordinance

Ordinance 8027 is not unfair or oppressive, or confiscatory.

only regulate but also

absolutely prohibits them from
conducting operations in the
City of Manila.
The ordinance is unfair and
oppressive because they have
invested billions of pesos in the
depot. Its forced closure will
result in huge losses in income
and tremendous costs in
constructing new facilities.

ordinance has discriminated

against and singled out the
Pandacan Terminals despite
the fact that the Pandacan area
is congested with buildings and
residences that do not comply
with the National Building
Code, Fire Code and Health
and Sanitation Code.

Through RA 7638, the national

merely prohibits the oil

companies from
operating their
businesses in the
Pandacan area.

The oil companies are not prohibited from doing business in

other appropriate zones in Manila. The City of Manila merely
exercised its power to regulate the businesses and industries in
the zones it established.
In the exercise of police power, there is a limitation on or
restriction of property interests to promote public welfare which
involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary
only when the states power of eminent domain is exercised. In
eminent domain, property is appropriated and applied to some
public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of police
power, on the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious or
forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not compensable. The
restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from
danger is not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of
a noxious use which interferes with paramount rights of the
public.
Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of
property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title,
holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right
to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the right of the
community.
Ordinance 8027 is not partial and discriminatory.
An ordinance based on a reasonable classification does not
violate constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the law. The
requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it
must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only and (4) it must apply equally to all members of
the same class.
Unlike the depot, the surrounding community is not a high-value
terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire or explosion
occurring in those areas would be nothing compared to the
damage caused by a fire or explosion in the depot itself.
Accordingly, there is a substantial distinction.
The ordinance is not inconsistent with RA 7638 and RA 8479.

legislature declared it a policy

of the state to ensure a
continuous, adequate, and
economic supply of energy
and created the DOE to
implement this policy. DOE is
empowered to establish and
administer programs for the
exploration, transportation,
marketing, distribution,
utilization, conservation,
stockpiling, and storage of
energy resources. Considering
that the petroleum products
contained in the Pandacan
Terminals are major and critical
energy resources, they
conclude that their
administration, storage,
distribution and transport are of
national interest and fall under
DOEs primary and exclusive
jurisdiction.
They further assert that the
terminals are necessary for the
delivery of immediate and
adequate supply of oil to its
recipients in the most
economical way. Ordinance
No. 8027 frustrates the state
policy of ensuring a continuous,
adequate, and economic
supply of energy expressed in
RA 7638, a national law.
DOEs supervision over the oil
17

Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

Nothing in these statutes prohibits the City of Manila from

enacting ordinances in the exercise of its police power.
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously
17
protected under the Constitution in Article II, Section 25 . Article
X of the Constitution also promotes local autonomy.
The laws cited merely gave DOE general powers to establish
and administer programs for the exploration, transportation,
marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and
storage of energy resources and to encourage certain practices
in the [oil] industry which serve the public interest and are
intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure
continuous supply of petroleum products. These powers can be
exercised without emasculating the LGUs of the powers granted
them.
To rule against the power of LGUs to reclassify areas within their
jurisdiction will subvert the principle of local autonomy
guaranteed by the Constitution.

industry under RA 7638 was

subsequently underscored by
RA 8479.
DOE cannot exercise the power of control over LGUs.
18

Section 4 of Art X of the Constitution confines the power of the

president to that of supervision. Hence, the alter egos of the
president cannot exercise the power of control over them.

Zoning ordinances of LGUs are

required to be submitted to the
Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority
(MMDA) for review and if found
to be in compliance with its
metropolitan physical
framework plan and
regulations, it shall endorse the
same to the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB).

Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of

mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any
restraining authority over such body. It does not allow the
supervisor to annul the acts of the subordinate. Here, what the
DOE seeks to do is to set aside an ordinance enacted by local
officials, a power that not even its principal, the President, has.
Ordinance 8027 is not invalid for failure to comply with RA 7924
and EO 72.
RA 7942 does not give MMDA the authority to review land use
plans and zoning ordinances of cities and municipalities. This
was only found in its implementing rules which made a reference
to EO 72. EO 72 expressly refers to comprehensive land use
plans (CLUPs) only. Ordinance No. 8027 is admittedly not a
CLUP nor intended to be one. Instead, it is a very specific
ordinance which reclassified the land use of a defined area in
order to prevent the massive effects of a possible terrorist attack.
Moreover, even assuming that the MMDA review and HLURB
ratification are necessary, the oil companies did not present any
evidence to show that these were not complied with. Hence, the
presumption of validity will come into play.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the motions for leave to intervene of Chevron Philippines Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation, and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Energy, are hereby GRANTED. Their respective
motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 39 is ORDERED to DISMISS the consolidated cases of
Civil Case No. 03-106377 and Civil Case No. 03-106380.

18

SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Xxxx

We reiterate our order to respondent Mayor of the City of Manila to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. In coordination with the appropriate agencies and
other parties involved, respondent Mayor is hereby ordered to oversee the relocation and transfer of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present
site.
No separate opinions.

Digester: Justin Batocabe

CASE TITLE: Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC Liner
Date of Case: September 6, 2001

DOCTRINE:

Petitioner: Lucena Grand Terminal

Respondent: JAC Liner, a common carrier which ply various routes to and from Lucena

FACTS:
1) Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena issued City Ordinance Nos. 1631

19

19

and 1778

20

to alleviate traffic conditions in the city

Ordinance No. 1631

AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL
FACILITY IN THE CITY OF LUCENA
xxx
SECTION 1. There is hereby granted to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., its successors or assigns, hereinafter referred to as the "grantee", a franchise to construct, finance, establish, operate,
and maintain a common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena.
SECTION 2. This franchise shall continue for a period of twenty-five years, counted from the approval of this Ordinance, and renewable at the option of the grantee for another period of twenty-five
(25) years upon such expiration.
xxx
SECTION 4. Responsibilities and Obligations of the City Government of Lucena. During the existence of the franchise, the City Government of Lucena shall have the following responsibilities and
obligations:

xxx
(c) It shall not grant any third party any privilege and/or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus and/or jeepney terminal.
xxx

20

Ordinance No. 1778

AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA OF ALL BUSES, MINI-BUSES AND OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS AND FOR THIS PURPOSE, AMENDING ORDINACE NO.
1420, SERIES OF 1993, AND ORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES OF 1995
xxx
SECTION 1. The entrance to the City of Lucena of all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys is hereby regulated as follows:
(a) All buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the cityand are hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of
their passengers.
(b) All temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance.
xxx
SECTION 3. a) Section 1 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses from other municipalities and/or local government units going to Lucena City are directed to proceed to the Common Terminal located at Diversion
Road, Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, to unload and load passengers.
xxx
c) Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other municipalities and/or local government units shall utilize the facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal at Diversion
Road, Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, this City, and no other terminals shall be situated inside or within the City of Lucena;
d) Section 4 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other municipalities and/or local government units shall avail of the facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal which is
hereby designated as the officially sanctioned common terminal for the City of Lucena;

2) These assailed COs provide that busses and jeepneys are directed to proceed to Lucena Grand Terminal, prohibiting them from entering the
city, and declaring other terminals inoperable
3) JAC Liner maintained a terminal in the city and was affected by the COs. They filed a petition for prohibition and injuction with the RTC
4) RTC rendered judgment:
a) CO 1631 is valid insofar insofar as the grant of franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.
b) Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631
c) Declared illegal sections 1(b), 3(c) and 3(e) of CO No. 1778
d) Issuance of a Writ of Prohibition and/or Injunction directing the respondents public officials, the City Mayor and the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Lucena, to cease and desist from implementing Ordinance No. 1778 insofar as said ordinance prohibits or curtails petitioner from
maintaining and operating its own bus terminal.
5) MR denied. Petitioner went directly to the SC, but the petition was referred to the CA since there was no reasons cited on why it the SC may
st
take cognizance on 1 instance. CA affirmed RTC

Issue 1
whether the trial court
has jurisdiction over
the case, it not having
furnished the Office of
the Solicitor General

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court
YES as there is no procedural defect

Petitioner argues that

since the trial court failed
to serve a copy of its
assailed orders upon the

None stated
Respondent actually served a copy of its petition upon the Office of

e) Section 5 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
The Lucena Grand Central Terminal is the permanent common terminal as this is the entity which wasgiven the exclusive franchise by the Sangguniang Panglungsod under Ordinance No. 1631; (E
mphasis and underscoring supplied)

copy of the orders it

issued therein

Office of the Solicitor

General, it never
acquired jurisdiction over
the case

Issue 2

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

whether the City of

Lucena properly
exercised its police
power when it enacted
the subject
ordinances.

They are constitutional

ursuant to the power of
the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to
"[r]egulate traffic on all
streets and
bridges; prohibit encroac
hments or obstacles
thereon and, when
necessary in the interest
of public welfare,
authorize the removal of
encroachments and
illegal constructions in
public places"

The terminals are public

nuisances

the Solicitor General on October 1, 1998, two days after it was

filed. The Solicitor General has issued a Certification to that
effect. There was thus compliance with above-quoted rules.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
COs are
unconstitutional on
the ground
that, inter alia, the
same constituted
an invalid exercise
of police power, an
undue taking of
private property,
and a violation of
the constitutional
prohibition against
monopolies.

Supreme Court

NO, it did not

See below for space saving concerns

Respecting the issue of whether police power was properly exercised when the subject ordinances were enacted: As with the State, the
local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated,
there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public
interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present.

However as to lawful method SC says:

The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem.
Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such
measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the
problem lies and then to stop it right there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the
law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.
A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals,
apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been
enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside
the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are
unable to meet the specifications.

Absent any showing, nay allegation, that the terminals are encroaching upon public roads, they are not obstacles. The buses which
indiscriminately load and unload passengers on the city streets are. The power then of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to prohibit encroachments
and obstacles does not extend to terminals.1a\^/phi1.net

Neither are terminals public nuisances. For their operation is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the
rights of property, health, or comfort of the community.

Dispositive Portion:

Petition DENIED

Digester: Justin Batocabe

CASE TITLE: Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC Liner
Date of Case: September 6, 2001

DOCTRINE:

Petitioner: Lucena Grand Terminal

Respondent: JAC Liner, a common carrier which ply various routes to and from Lucena

FACTS:
1) Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena issued City Ordinance Nos. 1631

21

21

and 1778

22

to alleviate traffic conditions in the city

Ordinance No. 1631

AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL
FACILITY IN THE CITY OF LUCENA
xxx
SECTION 1. There is hereby granted to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., its successors or assigns, hereinafter referred to as the "grantee", a franchise to construct, finance, establish, operate,
and maintain a common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena.
SECTION 2. This franchise shall continue for a period of twenty-five years, counted from the approval of this Ordinance, and renewable at the option of the grantee for another period of twenty-five
(25) years upon such expiration.
xxx
SECTION 4. Responsibilities and Obligations of the City Government of Lucena. During the existence of the franchise, the City Government of Lucena shall have the following responsibilities and
obligations:

xxx
(c) It shall not grant any third party any privilege and/or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus and/or jeepney terminal.
xxx

22

Ordinance No. 1778

AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA OF ALL BUSES, MINI-BUSES AND OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS AND FOR THIS PURPOSE, AMENDING ORDINACE NO.
1420, SERIES OF 1993, AND ORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES OF 1995
xxx
SECTION 1. The entrance to the City of Lucena of all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys is hereby regulated as follows:
(a) All buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the cityand are hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of
their passengers.
(b) All temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance.
xxx
SECTION 3. a) Section 1 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses from other municipalities and/or local government units going to Lucena City are directed to proceed to the Common Terminal located at Diversion
Road, Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, to unload and load passengers.
xxx
c) Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other municipalities and/or local government units shall utilize the facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal at Diversion
Road, Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, this City, and no other terminals shall be situated inside or within the City of Lucena;
d) Section 4 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other municipalities and/or local government units shall avail of the facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal which is
hereby designated as the officially sanctioned common terminal for the City of Lucena;

2) These assailed COs provide that busses and jeepneys are directed to proceed to Lucena Grand Terminal, prohibiting them from entering the
city, and declaring other terminals inoperable
3) JAC Liner maintained a terminal in the city and was affected by the COs. They filed a petition for prohibition and injuction with the RTC
4) RTC rendered judgment:
a) CO 1631 is valid insofar insofar as the grant of franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.
b) Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631
c) Declared illegal sections 1(b), 3(c) and 3(e) of CO No. 1778
d) Issuance of a Writ of Prohibition and/or Injunction directing the respondents public officials, the City Mayor and the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Lucena, to cease and desist from implementing Ordinance No. 1778 insofar as said ordinance prohibits or curtails petitioner from
maintaining and operating its own bus terminal.
5) MR denied. Petitioner went directly to the SC, but the petition was referred to the CA since there was no reasons cited on why it the SC may
st
take cognizance on 1 instance. CA affirmed RTC

Issue 1
whether the trial court
has jurisdiction over
the case, it not having
furnished the Office of
the Solicitor General
copy of the orders it

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court
YES as there is no procedural defect

Petitioner argues that

since the trial court failed
to serve a copy of its
assailed orders upon the
Office of the Solicitor
General, it never

None stated
Respondent actually served a copy of its petition upon the Office of
the Solicitor General on October 1, 1998, two days after it was
filed. The Solicitor General has issued a Certification to that

e) Section 5 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
The Lucena Grand Central Terminal is the permanent common terminal as this is the entity which wasgiven the exclusive franchise by the Sangguniang Panglungsod under Ordinance No. 1631; (E
mphasis and underscoring supplied)

issued therein

acquired jurisdiction over

the case

Issue 2

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

whether the City of

Lucena properly
exercised its police
power when it enacted
the subject
ordinances.

They are constitutional

ursuant to the power of
the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to
"[r]egulate traffic on all
streets and
bridges; prohibit encroac
hments or obstacles
thereon and, when
necessary in the interest
of public welfare,
authorize the removal of
encroachments and
illegal constructions in
public places"

The terminals are public

nuisances

effect. There was thus compliance with above-quoted rules.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
COs are
unconstitutional on
the ground
that, inter alia, the
same constituted
an invalid exercise
of police power, an
undue taking of
private property,
and a violation of
the constitutional
prohibition against
monopolies.

Supreme Court

NO, it did not

See below for space saving concerns

Respecting the issue of whether police power was properly exercised when the subject ordinances were enacted: As with the State, the
local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated,
there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public
interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present.

However as to lawful method SC says:

The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem.
Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such
measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the
problem lies and then to stop it right there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the
law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.
A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals,
apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been
enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside
the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are
unable to meet the specifications.

Absent any showing, nay allegation, that the terminals are encroaching upon public roads, they are not obstacles. The buses which
indiscriminately load and unload passengers on the city streets are. The power then of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to prohibit encroachments
and obstacles does not extend to terminals.1a\^/phi1.net

Neither are terminals public nuisances. For their operation is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the
rights of property, health, or comfort of the community.

Dispositive Portion:

Petition DENIED

PARAYNO V. JOVELLANOS
2006 July 14
Digest by Joeyboy Lacas
Doctrine: A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites
are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference
of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonable necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive.
Petitioner:
Concepcion Parayno
- Owner of a gasoline station in Calasiao, Pangasinan
Respondents:
Jose Jovellanos
- He filed a case is the HLURB against petitioners predecessor (Dennis Parayno), opposing the establishment of the gasoline station
on the grounds that: (a) it was within the 100-meter prohibited radius and (b) it posed a pernicious effect on the health and safety of
the people in Calasiao
Municipality of Calasiao, Pangasinan
- The Sangguniang Bayan of Calasiao recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of petitioners gasoline station based on
the same grounds cited by co-respondent Jose Jovellanos
Facts:
1. Dennis Parayno was the previous owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasio, Pangasinan.
2. Jose Jovellanos filed a case in the HLURB against Dennis Parayno, praying for the closure or transfer of the said gasoline to
another location on the grounds that: (a) it was within the 100-meter prohibited radius under the zoning ordinance of the Municipality
of Calasiao and (b) it allegedly posed a pernicious effect on the health and safety of the people in Calasiao.
3. HLURB rendered a decision in favour of Dennis Parayno, such decision became final and executory.
4. Ownership over the gasoline filling station was transferred to petitioner Concepcion Parayno.

5. Subsequently, some residents of Calasiao petitioned their Sangguniang Bayan (SB) for the closure or transfer of the said gasoline
filling station to another location. The SB then issued Resolution No. 50, recommending to the Mayor the closure of transfer of
location of petitioners gasoline filling station. The said resolution hinged on the same grounds cited by Jose Jovellanos in his petition
before the HLURB.
Procedural facts:
6. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the SB resolution but it was denied. She filed an action for prohibition and mandamus
with the RTC but the trial court did not see the propriety of issuing a writ of prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Petition moved for
reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court.
7. Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. After the CA dismissed the petition,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal before the SC.
Issue 1

PETITIONER

RESPONDENTS

SUPREME COURT

Whether or not the

Municipality validly
exercised its police
power in ordering the
closure/transfer of
petitioners gasoline
filling station?

The closure/transfer
of her gasoline filling
by respondent
municipality was an
invalid exercise of the
latters police power

Reiterates grounds
cited in Resolution
No. 50

Respondent municipality invalidly used its police power in

ordering the closure/transfer of petitioners gasoline filling
station.

SC Ratio: While respondent municipality had, under RA 7160, the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the health
and general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner.
A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.
The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution.
Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it maintained that
the gasoline filling station of petitioner was within the 100-meter prohibited radius, the records do not show that it even attempted to
measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of the
zoning ordinance of the municipality. The different local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation
never conducted such measurement either.
Moreover, petitioner's business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could summarily abate in the
guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a
nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property; hence, it
cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location.

Issue 2

PETITIONER

RESPONDENTS

Supreme Court

Whether or not the

principle of res
judicata applies in this
case?

The decision of the

HLURB, in a previous
case filed by
Jovellanos, barred the
grounds invoked by
respondent
municipality
Resolution No. 50.

Res judicata does not

apply. Respondent
municipality claims
that it was not a party
to the HLURB case
but only its corespondent
Jovellanos. Hence,
there was no identity

Respondents argument is untenable. Res judicata

applies.

of parties between the

first and second
actions.
SC Ratio: For res judicata to apply, the following elements must be present: (1) the judgment or order must be final; (2) the
judgment must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.
Respondent municipality does not contest the first, second and third requisites. However, it claims that it was not a party to the
HLURB case but only its co-respondent Jovellanos. Hence, the fourth requisite was not met.
The absolute identity of parties is not required for the principle of res judicata to apply. A shared identity of interests is sufficient to
invoke the application of this principle. The proscription may not be evaded by the mere expedient of including an additional party.
Res judicata may lie as long as there is a community of interests between a party in the first case and a party in the second case
although the latter may not have been impleaded in the first.
In the assailed resolution of respondent municipality, it raised the same grounds invoked by its co-respondent in the HLURB: (1)
that the resolution aimed to close down or transfer the gasoline station to another location due to the alleged violation of the zoning
ordinance and (2) that the hazards of said gasoline station threatened the health and safety of the public. The HLURB had already
settled these concerns and its adjudication had long attained finality.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from enforcing Resolution
No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to another location.

Digester: Janine Bareo

CITY OF MANILA vs. LAGUIO, Jr.
April 12, 2005
TOPIC: Police Power; General Welfare Clause and limitations on the exercise thereof
DOCTRINE: The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection. The only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The LGC still
withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.
Petitioner: City of Manila, Mayor Lim, VM Atienza, City Council
Respondent: Judge Laguio, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC)
FACTS:
MTDC is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate. It
petitioned the RTC to declare Ordinance no 7783 of the City of Manila as invalid and unconstitutional.
The ordinance prohibits the establishment or operation of businesses providing certain forms of entertainment, amusement, services and facilities in
the Ermita-Malate area. It included motels as one of the prohibited establishment. The ordinance gives the owners and operators 3 months from the
date of approval to wind up business, transfer outside the Ermita-Malate area or convert it to business allowed. The establishment will be padlocked
and permanently closed if the ordinance is violated.
The RTC enjoined the petitioners from implementing the ordinance and declared it null and void.
ISSUE: WON the Ordinance was valid NO! The ordinance is ultra vires and unconstitutional.
Petitioner City of Manila
The city council had the power to
prohibit certain forms of entertainment
in order to protect the social and moral
welfare of the community as provided
for in LGC Sec. 458 (a) 4 (vii).
The power of regulation included the
power to control, to govern and to
restrain places of exhibition and
amusement

Respondent MTDC
The ordinance was invalid and
unconstitutional for the following
reasons:
1. The city council has no power to
prohibit the operation of motels
as LGC Sec. 458(a) 4(iv) grants
the city council only the power to
regulate
the establishment,
operation, and maintenance of
hotels, motels etc.

SC
The ordinance is in contravention of the LGC as the latter
merely empowers LGUs to regulate, and not prohibit the
establishments enumerated in the ordinance
The only power of the City Council to legislate relative
thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare.
The LGC still withholds from cities the power to suppress
and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and
maintenance of such establishments.
- The rule is that the City Council has only such powers
as are expressly granted to it and those which are

There is no inconsistency between PD

499 and the ordinance because it only
unauthorized
certain
forms
of
businesses and allowed the area to
remain a commercial zone.
The ordinance was enacted to protect
the social and moral welfare of the
community in conjunction with its
police power found in the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila.

2.

The ordinance is violative of PD

499 which specifically declared
portions of the Ermita- Malate
area as a commercial zone

3.

The
ordinance
does
not
constitute a proper exercise of
police power as the compulsory
closure of the motel business has
no reasonable relation to the
legitimate municipal interests
sought to be protected.

It enjoys the presumption of validity.

4.

The ordinance violates MTDCs

constitutional rights

It is a valid exercise of police power.

It did not infringe the equal protection
clause as there existed substantial and
real differences between the ErmitaMalate area and other places in the city

a) It is confiscatory and
constitutes an invasion of
property rights
b) It constitutes a denial of
equal protection as there is
no reasonable basis for
prohibiting the operation of
motels but not pension
houses in the Ermita- Malate
area but not outside of the
area

necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise

thereof.
The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all
kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or
open storage depot...
- The ordinance must not be in conflict with or
repugnant to the general law
The LGC is a later expression of the legislative will, which
must prevail over the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
LGC Sec, 534(f) states that all general and special laws, city
charters which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of
this code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The charter which empowers the city council to
prohibit motels must be considered repealed by the
LGC
a) The ordinance infringes the Due Process Clause
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised
with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due
process and equal protection.
Individual right may be adversely affected only to the extent
that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of the
public interest or public welfare.
- The means employed for the accomplishment of the
objective of the ordinance were unreasonable and
unduly oppressive. It infringes on the constitutional
guarantees of a persons fundamental right to liberty
and property
The directive to wind up business operations amounts to a
closure of the establishment.
- It substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial
use of its property and goes beyond regulation and
must be recognized as a taking without just
compensation.
The ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to close down establishments.
b) The ordinance violates the equal protection clause

There are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns,

pension houses, hotels and other similar establishments. No
reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension
houses, hotels and others.
There is no logic for prohibiting the businesses of motels in
the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area

Dispositive Portion:
Petition Denied. The decision of the RTC declaring the Ordinance void is affirmed.

CASE TITLE: White Light Corporation v. City Of Manila

Date of Case: January 20, 2009
Ponente: TINGA, J p
Digester: Annie Ballesteros

DOCTRINE: For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed
by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Petitioner: White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist & Development Corporation
Respondents: City Of Manila, Represented By Mayor Alfredo S. Lim
FACTS:
Petition based on Rule 45, assailing a city ordinance (Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and
Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila) that prohibited establishments from offering
short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for abbreviated stays.
Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
(TRO) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation
(STDC) filed a motion to intervene. The RTC granted the motion to intervene.
The City filed an Answer alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. The case was submitted for decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal
question. The RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The City filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. The SC treated the
petition as a petition for certiorari and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of
the Ordinance.
Issue

Petitioners
Contention

Whether
Ordinance 1774 is
CONSTITUTIONAL
as a legitimate
exercise of police
power.

1. The Ordinance
is an invalid
exercise of police
power; and it is
an unreasonable
and oppressive
interference in

Respondents Contention
1.

The Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power

pursuant to Section 458 (4) (iv) of the Local
Government Code which confers on cities, among
other local government units, the power: [To]
regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beer houses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses

Supreme Court Holding

No. The police measure is an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.

and other similar establishments, including tourist

guides and transports.

their business.
2. It is
unconstitutional
and void since it
violates the right
to privacy and
the freedom of
movement.

The Ordinance is also a valid exercise of the power of

the City under Article III, Section 18 (kk) of the
Revised Manila Charter, thus: "To enact all
ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace,
good order, comfort, convenience and general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants.
The subject establishments "have gained notoriety as
venue of 'prostitution, adultery and fornications' in
Manila since they provide the necessary atmosphere
for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus
became the 'ideal haven for prostitutes and thrillseekers.'
2.

RATIO:

The Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or

the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the
owners or operators of establishments that admit
individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually
limitless reach of police power is only constrained by
having a lawful object obtained through a lawful
method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is
satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities.
There is a lawful method since the establishments
are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect
on the establishments is justified by the well-being of
its constituents in general. Finally, as held in ErmitaMalate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of
Manila, liberty is regulated by law.

The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash up rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is sought to be
rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by
themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. The means must align with the Constitution. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be
evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between
the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is already prohibited and could be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the
proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and
regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, the
Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes
can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. However wellintentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly
restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification.
Test of a valid ordinance. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
Due process. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar
as their property is concerned. Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.
Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Substantive due process
completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.
Dispositive Portion: Ordinance is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Digester: Ansis V. Pornillos

CASE TITLE: ALBON vs. FERNANDO
Date of Case: June 30, 2006
DOCTRINE: No public money or property shall be appropriated or applied for private purposes. This is in consonance with the
fundamental principle in local fiscal administration that local government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public
purposes.
Petitioner: Aniano A. Albon ordinary citizen?
Respondent: Bayani F. Fernando City Mayor of Marikina
FACTS:
In May 1999, the City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen, clear and repair the existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights
Subdivision. It was undertaken by the city government pursuant to Ordinance No. 59, s. 1993 like other infrastructure projects relating to roads,
streets and sidewalks previously undertaken by the city.
On June 14, 1999, petitioner Aniano A. Albon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 73, a taxpayers suit for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction with damages against respondents (who were at that time officials of Marikina), namely, City Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, City
Engineer Alfonso Espirito, Assistant City Engineer Anaki Maderal and City Treasurer Natividad Cabalquinto
RTC & CA: denied the petition
The City of Marikina was authorized to carry out the contested undertaking pursuant to its inherent police power.
The sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision were public in nature and ownership thereof belonged to the City of Marikina or the Republic
of the Philippines following the 1991 White Plains Association decision. Thus, the improvement and widening of the sidewalks pursuant to
Ordinance No. 59, s. 1993 was well within the LGUs powers.
Issue 1
W/N Ordinance No. 59,
s. 1993 is a valid
exercise of Marikina
City's police power

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

He alleged that the

sidewalks were private
property because
Marikina Greenheights
Subdivision was owned
by V.V. Soliven, Inc.
Hence, the city
government could not

Like all LGUs, the City

of Marikina is
empowered to enact
ordinances for the
purposes set forth in the
Local Government Code
(RA 7160). It is
expressly vested with

Supreme Court: YES.

Cities and municipalities also have the power to exercise such
powers and discharge such functions and responsibilities as may
be necessary, appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective
provisions of the basic services and facilities, including
infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of
their residents and which are financed by their own funds. These
infrastructure facilities include municipal or city roads and bridges
and similar facilities.

use public resources on

them.
This was done in
violation of the
proscription against the
use of public funds for
private purposes as well
as Sections 335 and
336 of RA 71605 and
the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

police powers delegated

to LGUs under the
general welfare clause
of RA 7160. With this
power, LGUs may
prescribe reasonable
regulations to protect
the lives, health, and
property of their
constituents and
maintain peace and
order within their
respective territorial
jurisdictions.

There is no question about the public nature and use of the

sidewalks in the Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. One of the
"whereas clauses" of PD 1216 (which amended PD 957)
declares that open spaces, roads, alleys and sidewalks in a
residential subdivision are for public use and beyond the
commerce of man. In conjunction herewith, PD 957, as amended
by PD 1216, mandates subdivision owners to set aside open
spaces which shall be devoted exclusively for the use of the
general public.
Thus, the trial and appellate courts were correct in upholding the
validity of Ordinance No. 59, s. 1993. It was enacted in the
exercise of the City of Marikinas police powers to regulate the
use of sidewalks.

Cities and municipalities

also have the power to
exercise such powers
and discharge such
functions and
responsibilities as may
be necessary,
appropriate or incidental
to efficient and effective
provisions of the basic
services and facilities,
including infrastructure
facilities intended
primarily to service the
needs of their residents
and which are financed
by their own funds.
These infrastructure
facilities include
municipal or city roads
and bridges and similar
facilities.
Issue 2

Supreme Court: NO.

W/N a local government

No public money or property shall be appropriated or applied for private purposes. This is in consonance with the

unit (LGU) validly use

public funds to
undertake the widening,
repair and improvement
of the sidewalks of a
privately-owned
subdivision?

fundamental principle in local fiscal administration that local government funds and monies shall be spent solely for
public purposes.
Case was remanded to the lower court to determine ownership of open spaces (including the sidewalks) in Marikina
Greenheights

Note:
SC ruled however that both the trial and appellate courts erred when they invoked our 1991 decision in White Plains Association and automatically
applied it in this case.
The ruling in the 1991 White Plains Association decision relied on by both the trial and appellate courts was modified by this Court in 1998 in
White Plains Association v. Court of Appeals. Citing Young v. City of Manila, this Court held in its 1998 decision that subdivision streets belonged
to the owner until donated to the government or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation.
The word "street," in its correct and ordinary usage, includes not only the roadway used for carriages and vehicular traffic generally but also the
portion used for pedestrian travel. The part of the street set aside for the use of pedestrians is known as a sidewalk.
Moreover, under subdivision laws, lots allotted by subdivision developers as road lots include roads, sidewalks, alleys and planting strips. Thus,
what is true for subdivision roads or streets applies to subdivision sidewalks as well. Ownership of the sidewalks in a private subdivision belongs to
the subdivision owner/developer until it is either transferred to the government by way of donation or acquired by the government through
expropriation.
Section 335 of RA 7160 is clear and specific that no public money or property shall be appropriated or applied for private purposes. This is in
consonance with the fundamental principle in local fiscal administration that local government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public
purposes.
In Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, the Court laid down the test of validity of a public expenditure: it is the essential character of the direct
object of the expenditure which must determine its validity and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to which the
general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental advantage to the
public or to the State resulting from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity of private enterprises or business does not justify their aid
by the use of public money.
Moreover, the implementing rules of PD 957, as amended by PD 1216, provide that it is the registered owner or developer of a subdivision who
has the responsibility for the maintenance, repair and improvement of road lots and open spaces of the subdivision prior to their donation to the
concerned LGU. The owner or developer shall be deemed relieved of the responsibility of maintaining the road lots and open space only upon
securing a certificate of completion and executing a deed of donation of these road lots and open spaces to the LGU.

Therefore, the use of LGU funds for the widening and improvement of privately-owned sidewalks is unlawful as it directly contravenes Section 335
of RA 7160. This conclusion finds further support from the language of Section 17 of RA 7160 which mandates LGUs to efficiently and effectively
provide basic services and facilities. The law speaks of infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of the residents of the LGU
and "which are funded out of municipal funds." It particularly refers to "municipal roads and bridges" and "similar facilities."
Applying the rules of ejusdem generis, the phrase "similar facilities" refers to or includes infrastructure facilities like sidewalks owned by the LGU.
Thus, RA 7160 contemplates that only the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of infrastructure facilities owned by the LGU may
be bankrolled with local government funds.
Clearly, the question of ownership of the open spaces (including the sidewalks) in Marikina Greenheights Subdivision is material to the
determination of the validity of the challenged appropriation and disbursement made by the City of Marikina. Similarly significant is the character of
the direct object of the expenditure, that is, the sidewalks.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby ordered REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City for the reception of evidence to determine (1)
whether V.V. Soliven, Inc. has retained ownership of the open spaces and sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision or has donated them to
the City of Marikina and (2) whether the public has full and unimpeded access to, and use of, the roads and sidewalks of the subdivision. The
Marikina City Regional Trial Court is directed to decide the case with dispatch.

Digester: (Rachel Kate Tacason)

CASE TITLE: CITY OF MANILA v. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA
Date of Case: October 31, 1919
DOCTRINE: The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law
must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority
exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the
law.
Petitioner: City of Manila
Respondent: Chinese Community of Manila, a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands, having
for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the City of Manila
FACTS:

This is an action by the city of Manila for the expropriation of land for an extension of Rizal Avenue north. The petition for condemnation
was opposed by the "Comunidad de Chinos de Manila" (Chinese Community of Manila) and Ildefonso Tambunting and various others who
obtained permission of the trial court to intervene in the case.

All of the defendants allege in their opposition that the proposed extension of Rizal Avenue cuts through a part of the Chinese Cemetery,
North of Manila, and necessitates the destruction of many monuments and the removal of many graves.

CFI RULING:
NO NECESSITY for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question. Petition dismissed.
ISSUE:

WON, in expropriation proceedings, the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation?
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

NO.

Supreme Court
YES

YES.
Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the
city of Manila) provides that "the city (Manila)
. . . may condemn private property for public
use."
Once it has established the fact, under the
law, that it has authority to expropriate land,
the city of Manila may expropriate any land it
may desire; that the only function of the court

Plaintiff is without right or

authority to expropriate the
cemetery or any portion thereof.
The expropriation was not a
public improvement.
It was not either necessary nor

It cannot be denied, if the legislature under proper authority

should grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel
of land for some specified public purpose, that the courts
would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the purpose of
that legislation.
If, upon the other hand, however, the Legislature should grant
general authority to a municipal corporation to expropriate

in such proceedings is to ascertain the value

of the land in question; that neither the court
nor the owners of the land can inquire into
the advisible purpose of purpose of the
expropriation or ask any questions
concerning the necessities therefor; that the
courts are mere appraisers of the land
involved in expropriation proceedings, and,
when the value of the land is fixed by the
method adopted by the law, to render a
judgment in favor of the defendant for its
value.

If the court finds that there is some law

authorizing the plaintiff to expropriate, then
the courts have no other function than to
authorize the expropriation and to proceed
to ascertain the value of the land involved;
that the necessity for the expropriation is a
legislative and not a judicial question.
Inasmuch as the legislature has given it
general authority to take private property
for public use, that the legislature has,
therefore, settled the question of the
necessity in every case and that the courts
are closed to the owners of the property
upon that question.
23

expedient that subject

properties be expropriated for
street purposes.
Existing street and roads
furnished ample means of
communication for the public in
the district covered by such
proposed expropriation.

Other routes were available,

which would fully satisfy the
plaintiff's purposes, at much
less expense and without
disturbing the resting places of
the dead.
Respondent Tambunting:
Because of the nature of the
purpose for which the land was
being used (as cemetery) it has
become quasi-public.

private land for public purposes, the courts have ample

authority in this jurisdiction, under the provisions23 above
quoted, to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue
properly presented, concerning whether or not the lands were
private and whether the purpose was, in fact, public.
The power of the court is not limited to that question, whether
the plaintiff has a right. The right of expropriation is not an
inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it
can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the
power upon it. When the courts come to determine the
question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority exists
for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that
the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the
law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon
the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land
must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If
the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists
or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended
that the right is being exercised in accordance with law.
Whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain is public, is a question of fact. Whether the land is
public, is a question of fact; and, in our opinion, when the
legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands
the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the
exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should
inquire into, and hear proof upon, those questions.

Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure).

Section 242 provides that a complaint in expropriation proceeding shall be presented; that the complaint shall state with certainty the right of condemnation, with a description
of the property sought to be condemned together with the interest of each defendant separately.
Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upon trial that the right to expropriate the land in question exists, it shall then appoint commissioners.
Sections 244, 245 and 246 provide the method of procedure and duty of the commissioners. Section 248 provides for an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
to the Supreme Court. Said section 248 gives the Supreme Court authority to inquire into the right of expropriation on the part of the plaintiff. If the Supreme Court on appeal
shall determine that no right of expropriation existed, it shall remand the cause to the Court of First Instance with a mandate that the defendant be replaced in the possession of
the property and that he recover whatever damages he may have sustained by reason of the possession of the plaintiff.

More from the Court.. (to save space, wont tabulate it)

Whether it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon a municipality the power to exercise the right of eminent domain, is a question with
which the courts are not concerned. But when that right or authority is exercised for the purpose of depriving citizens of their property, the
courts are authorized, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry and to hear proof upon the necessity in the particular case, and not the general
authority.
As long as there is a constitutional or statutory provision denying the right to take land for any use other than a public use, it occurs to us that
the question whether any particular use is a public one or not is ultimately, at least, a judicial question. The legislative may, it is true, in effect
declare certain uses to be public, and, under the operation of the well-known rule that a statute will not be declared to be unconstitutional
except in a case free, or comparatively free, from doubt, the courts will certainly sustain the action of the legislature unless it appears that the
particular use is clearly not of a public nature. The decisions must be understood with this limitation; for, certainly, no court of last resort will be
willing to declare that any and every purpose which the legislative might happen to designate as a public use shall be conclusively held to be so,
irrespective of the purpose in question and of its manifestly private character
Re: Cemetery WON public or private
It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general
acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course, the
petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public
property.

Dispositive Portion: In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record contains no

proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the
city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff.
For all of the foregoing, we are fully persuaded that the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
CONCURRING:
MALCOLM, J.
The Code of Civil Procedure, in prescribing how the right of eminent domain may be exercised limits the condemnation to "private property for
public use." (Sec. 241.)

The Chinese Cemetery of Manila was established during the Spanish administration in the Philippines by public spirited Chinese. Sometimes after
the inauguration of the new regime in the Philippines, a corporation was organized to control the cemetery, and a Torrens title for the lands in
question was obtained. From the time of its creation until the present the cemetery has been used by the Chinese community for the burial of
their dead. The facts presented lead us straight to the conclusion that the Chinese Cemetery is not used by a family or a small portion of a
community but by a particular race long existing in the country and of considerable numbers. The case, then, is one of where the city of Manila,
under a general authority permitting it to condemn private property for public use, is attempting to convert a property already dedicated to a
public use to an entirely different public use; and this, not directly pursuant to legislative authority, but primarily through the sole advice of the
consulting architect.
DISSENTS:
STREET, J. Concurred with Justice Moir in the view that the authorities of the city of Manila are the proper judges of the propriety of the
condemnation and that this Court should have nothing to do with the question of the necessity of the taking.
MOIR, J. It is a right of the city government to determine whether or not it will construct streets and where, and the court's sole duty was to see that
the value of the property was paid the owners after proper legal proceedings ascertaining the value. It is argued that plaintiff must show that it is
necessary to take this land for a public improvement. The law does not so read. Necessity for taking is not a judicial question.
Re: the discussion of the court that the Chinese cemetery is public property: In its answer the "Comunidad de Chinos de Manila" says it is "a
corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands," and that it owns the land which plaintiff seeks to
acquire. The facts that it is private corporation owning land would seem of necessity to make the land it owns private land. The fact that it belongs
to the Chinese community deprives it of any public character.
The decision should be reversed and the record returned to the Court of First Instance with instructions to proceed with the case in accordance
with this decision.

Trina Fernandez
SANGALANG vs. IAC and Ayala Corp.
December 22, 1988
DOCTRINE: The reclassification of the subject area into a Commercial Zone is a legitimate exercise of police power of the State which
cannot be deterred by the terms of the contract between the petitioners and the private respondents.
Mother Case:
Petitioners: Sanggalang Spouses--Residents of Jupiter St. claiming that Ayala Corp. is liable for the maintenance of the perimeter wall
Respondent: Ayala Corp., developer of Bel-Air Village
**BAVA CASES:
(These cases are the important ones to the topic)
Petitioner: Bel-Air Homeowners Association--Complaining about respondents use of their properties along Jupiter St. for commercial purposes
when their Deed of Restrictions specifically state that they should be used for residential purposes only
Respondents: 4 different cases with residents with properties along Jupiter St. and one in Reposo St. who converted their residences into
commercial establishments
1)
2)
3)
4)

Tenorio -- Restaurant
Romualdezes -- Bakeshop and Cafe
Filley -- Leased to an advertising firm
Moncal -- Leased to Majal Development Corporation

FACTS:
The Municipal Council of Makati enacted Ordinance No. 81 in 1975 providing for the Zonification of Makati wherein Bel-Air Village was classified
as a Class A Residential Zone with boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter St. This was followed by Comprehensive Zoning
Ordinance for the NCR adopted by the Metro Manila Commission as Ordinance No. 81-01 in 1981. the boundary was determined as Jupiter St.
and the area of buendia Extension from Reposo St. to EDSA was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone
The Makati Government advised BAVA that in the interest of public welfare and for the purpose of easing traffic congestion, that they should open
certain roads to the public.
BAVA expressed their residents concerns but voluntarily opened all the roads required by the government except Jupiter St.
After 2 more unheeded advisories, the municipal officials allegedly opened, destroyed and removed the gates at the corner of Reposa St. and
Jupiter St. and Jupiter St. and Makati Ave., forcibly opening them to traffic.

With the opening of these roads to the public, there was a tremendous increase in the volume of traffic passing through the area.
Purchasers of the commercial lots as referred to above, began construction of their establishments thereby demolishing parts of the wall which
stood within the boundary of their lots.
With the opening of the entire length of Jupiter St. to public traffic, the different residential lots ceased to be used for purely residential purposes.
They became for all purposes, commercial in character.
BAVA Cases:
(The order is the same as above)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Dismissed on procedural grounds

CFI found for BAVA but the CA reversed, citing Ordinance No. 81 and 81-01
CFI found for BAVA but it was reversed by the CA on similar grounds as in #2
According to the CFI, the commercialization of Makati and the opening of jupiter St. to human and vehicular traffic were circumstances that
made compliance with the Deed of Restrictions extremely difficult and unreasonable
Supreme Court: The National Government itself, through the Metro Manila
WON the Private
BAVAs Contention: The Private Respondents
Contention: Ordinance 80 Commission had reclassified Jupiter St. into a high density commercial zone,
Respondents are liable to Deed of Restrictions
pursuant to Ordinance 81-01. Petitioners therefore have no cause of action on
BAVA for going against specifically limit the use of and 80-1 have already
changed the character of the strength alone of the Deed of Restrictions.
the Deed of Restrictions the subject lots for
and building commercial residential purpose only their properties
POLICE POWER:
enterprises on their
The restrictive easements of Bel-Air are, like all contracts, subject to the overproperties in Jupiter St.
riding demands, needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may
determine in the legitimate exercise of police power.
While our jurisdiction guarantees the sanctity of contract, it cannot contravene
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Above all, it cannot be
raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health,
safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual
rights, whenever necessary.
Undoubtedly, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police
power. The petitioners have not shown why we should hold otherwise apart
from the Non-Impairment guarantee of the Constitution, which is secondary to
the compelling interests of general welfare.

Dispositive: PETITIONS are denied. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant a reversal of the
judgments.

Digest by: Monica G.

FIGURACION vs LIBI
November 28, 2007
The Resolutions issued by Cebu City,in exercise of its regular and official functions, constitute clear and positive evidence of the
intention of Cebu City to return or reconvey to the former owner, by way of sale, the portion of the expropriated property.
Petitioners: Natividad Figuracion, Filma Rabor and Catherine Manalastas successors in interest of Isagani who was the successor of the original
owner of land expropriated by the city
Respondents: SPOUSES CRESENCIANO and AMELITA LIBI users of subject land who refuse to vacate
Facts:
Galileo Figuracion was the owner of Lot No. 899-D-2 in Cebu City. In 1948, the local government of Cebu City expropriated the said lot,
consisting of 474 sq. m., to be part of N. Escario Street. Cebu City paid P23,700 for this lot.
The Cebu City Resolution No. 330 was passed, approving the reconveyance to IsaganiFiguracion, successor-in-interest of Galileo
Figuracion, of the unused portion of Lot 899-D-2. This unused portion was designated as Lot 899-D-2-A, consisting of 84 sq. m.
2 years later, a resurvey was conducted and it was found out that Lot 899-D-2-A actually measures 130 sq. m. Therefore, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod issued Resolution No. 2345 approving the reconveyance of 130 sq. m. of Lot 899-D-2.
[First Case]The respondents were using Lot 899-D-2-A and refused to vacate the same despite demand. Petitioners filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer in the MTC.
o MTC declared petitioners entitled to the possession of said lot and ordered respondents to remove the fence they had constructed
therein. RTC and the CA affirmed.

[Second Case] Respondents filed a complaint for easement, asking that they be granted a right of way over the said lot. However,
respondents amended their complaint twice, resulting in a different cause of action. The amended complaint prayed for the annulment of
Resolutions No. 330 and 2345, the deed of sale in favor of IsaganiFiguracion and the TCT.
o

Issue
W/N
Respondents
have legal
standing

RTC decided in favor of respondents, nullifying Resolutions No. 330 and 2345, the Deed of Sale and the TCT. CA affirmed.
Petitioner
Petitioners also
challenge the legal
standing of
respondents to
question the
Sangguniang
Panlungsod
resolutions.

Respondent

SC
No

Respondents have no interest in the title or possession of Lot No 899-D-2-A.

They are not the proper parties to file for annulment of petitioners title.

The case filed by respondents is for reversion of the subject lot. Reversion is a
proceeding by which the State seeks the return of lands of the public domain or
the improvements thereon through the cancellation of private title erroneously
or fraudulently issued over it.

The complaint
filed by the
respondents is
barred by the MTC
decision in the first
case, as affirmed
by the RTC and
CA.

W/N The
reconveyance
of the subject
lot by Cebu
City to the
petitioners is
valid

Lot 899-D-2, being

a road lot, cannot
be the subject of
sale since it is
outside the
commerce of man.
When they bought
Lot No. 899-D-1,
they did so in the
belief that they had
an outlet to Escario
Street through Lot
No. 899-D-2, then
owned by the local
government of
Cebu City

Yes

Section 101 of the Public Land Act states: All actions for the reversion to the
government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be
instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper
courts, in the name of the Commonwealth [now Republic] of the Philippines.

The sole interest of the respondents is in the use of the property as access to
Escario Street. Such interest is merely tangential to any issue regarding the
ownership and possession of the property. It is not sufficient to vest legal
standing to respondents to sue for the reversion of the property.

The general rule is local roads used for public service are considered public
property under the absolute control of Congress. However, under Section 10,
Chapter II of the Local Government Code, the Congress delegated to political
subdivisions some control of local roads.
Section 21 of the LGC provides: Closure and Opening of Roads-(a) A local
government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily
close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction:
Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be
approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and
when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to
closure is provided.

Through RA 3857, the Revised Charter of Cebu City, the Congress delegated
to said political subdivision the following authority to regulate its city streets:
Section 31. Legislative powers. Any provision of law and executive orders to
the contrary notwithstanding, the City Council shall have the following
legislative powers:xx to close any city road, street, alley, boulevard, avenue,
park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or
conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the city
may be lawfully used or conveyed.

The other requirement for a valid reconveyance is establishing that the former
owner or his successors-in-interest have the right to repurchase said property.
o

As held by the Court in Fery v Municipality of Cabanatuan: When

private land is expropriated for a particular public use, and that
particular public use is abandoned, does the land so expropriated
return to its former owner?The answer to that question depends upon

the character of the title acquired by the expropriator, whether it be the

State, a province, a municipality, or a corporation which has the right to
acquire property under the power of eminent domain. If, for example,
land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that
when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to
its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or
abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated.
If, for example, land is expropriated for a public street and the
expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it for
a public street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a
public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some
statutory provisions to the contrary. If, upon the contrary, however, the
decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of
course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator,
whether it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the
non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the
expropriation proceedings.

The Court also held in Moreno v Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority

that where there is preponderant evidence of the existence of a right to
repurchase, the former owner of an expropriated property is entitled to exercise
such option once the public purpose for which the local government initially
intended the expropriated property is abandoned or not pursued.

It was also held in the cases Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v CA,
Reyes v National Housing Authority and Air Transportation Office v Gopuco, Jr.
that where there is insufficient evidence that the former owners of expropriated
properties were granted the right to repurchase the same, the latter may not
insist on recovering their properties even when the public purpose for which
said properties were expropriated is abandoned.

There can be no doubt that Cebu City repudiated its right to use the subject lot
for other public purpose. Instead, it recognized the right of the former owner or
his successor-in-interest to repurchase the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The March 20, 2002 Decision and August 20, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as
the February 23, 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-21193
is DISMISSED.

Digester: Marynette M. Gravador

CASE TITLE: Sps. Yusay v. CA (SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG
CITY)
Date of Case: April 6, 2011
DOCTRINE:
A. Certiorari and prohibition does not lie against expropriation, especially since only a Resolution has been made in this case.
B.

The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9 Article III of the Constitution and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

Petitioner: Spouses Antonio and Fe Yusay, landowners.

Respondent: CA, City Mayor and City Council of Mandaluyong City.
FACTS:
Spouses Yusay owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 sqm situated between Nueve de Febrero St. and Fernandez St. in Brgy Mauway,
Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to 9 other families. Allegedly, the land was their only property and
only source of income.
On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Reso No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin
S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the Spouses to develop it for low cost housing for the less privileged but
deserving city inhabitants.
The Spouses became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in RTC, praying for the annulment of the Reso due to its being
unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect. The City countered that the Reso was a mere authorization given to the City Mayor to initiate
the legal steps towards expropriation, which included making a definite offer to purchase the property; hence, the suit was premature.
RTC: (Jan 31, 2001) ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition for lack of merit
1. Certiorari did not lie against a legislative act of the City Govt, because the special civil action of certiorari was only available to assail judicial or quasijudicial acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
2. Special civil action of prohibition did not also lie under the circumstances considering that the act of passing the resolution was not a judicial, or quasijudicial, or ministerial act; and that notwithstanding the issuance of the Reso, the City had yet to commit acts of encroachment, excess, or usurpation, or
had yet to act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
MR: (Feb 19, 2002) RTC set aside its decision and declared that the Reso was null and void.
1. Petition was not premature because the passage of the Reso would already pave the way for the City to deprive the Spouses and their heirs of their only
property;
2. There was no due process in the passage of the Reso because the Spouses had not been invited to the subsequent hearings on the reso to enable them
to ventilate their opposition; and
3. Purpose for the expropriation was not for public use and the expropriation would not benefit the greater number of inhabitants.
CA: (Oct 18, 2002) Reversal by RTC was not justified because the Reso deserved to be accorded the benefit of the presumption of regularity and validity
absent any sufficient showing to the contrary;
1. Notice to the Spouses of the succeeding hearings conducted by the City was not a part of due process, for it was enough that their views had been

consulted and that they had been given the full opportunity to voice their protest;
2. To rule otherwise would be to give every affected resident effective veto powers in law-making by a local government unit; and
3. A public hearing, although necessary at times, was not indispensable and merely aided in law-making.
MR: Denied.
Issue 1

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

WON
the
action
for
certiorari commenced in the
RTC was a proper recourse
of the Spouses..

Issue 2
Can the validity of
Resolution No. 552 be
assailed even before its
implementation?

Cites Camarines Sur vs. CA

to show that a resolution
may suffice to support the
exercise of eminent domain
by an LGU.

The terms resolution and

ordinance
are
synonymous.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court
Certiorari does not lie to assail the issuance of a resolution by
the Sanggunian Panglungsod
For certiorari to prosper, the petitioner must allege and establish
the concurrence of the following requisites:
1. The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
2. Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
3. There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.6
A petition for certiorari seeks solely to correct defects in
jurisdiction, and does not correct just any error or mistake
committed by a court, board, etc. exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions unless such court, board, etc. acts without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.8
Certiorari did not lie against the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, which was not a part of the Judiciary settling
an actual controversy involving legally demandable and
enforceable rights when it adopted the Reso, but a
legislative and policy-making body declaring its sentiment
or opinion.
Cam Sur v. CA is not in point because the applicable law at that
time was BP 337, the previous LGC, which had provided that a
mere resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent
domain. In contrast, RA 7160, the present Local Government
Code which was already in force when the Complaint for
expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for this
purpose.
The Sangguniang Panglungsod did not abuse its discretion
in adopting the Reso.
Resolution
Upon a specific matter of a
temporary nature

Law that
character.

Ordinance
is permanent in

No rights can be conferred by

and be inferred from it, which
is nothing but an embodiment
of what the lawmaking body
has to say in the light of
attendant circumstances.
Merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of a
lawmaking body on a specific
matter.
Temporary in nature.
rd

No
3
readimg,
unless
decided otherwise by a
majority of all the Sanggunian
members.

A law

General
and
permanent
character,
rd
A 3 reading is necessary

In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion through the

resolution, the Sangguniang Panglungsod in no way abused its
discretion for its expression of sentiment or opinion was a
constitutionally protected right.
24
RA 7160 (LGC) required the City to pass an ordinance, not
adopt a resolution, for the purpose of initiating an expropriation
proceeding. A resolution is not sufficient to initiate an
expropriation proceeding.
Municipality of Paraaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation: The
power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of
government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs,
other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore
exercise the power to expropriate private property only when
authorized by Congress and subject to the latters control and
restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in
other legislations.
The local chief executive sought to exercise the power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal
council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first

24
Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use,
or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided,
however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided,
further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper
court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount
to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain
through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the
language of the previous LGC.
The power of eminent domain necessarily involves a
derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people.
The manifest change in the legislative language from
resolution under BP 337 to ordinance under RA 7160
demands a strict construction.

(In its Brief filed before CA):

Sangguniang Bayan passed
an ordinance on Oct 11,
1994 which reiterated its
Reso No. 93-35, Series of
1993, and ratified all the acts
of its mayor regarding the
subject expropriation.

Issue 3
WON the action for
prohibition commenced in
the RTC was a proper
recourse of the Spouses..

Merely alleged the existence of an ordinance, but Spouses did

not present any certified true copy thereof. Spouses did not
raise this point before. It was mentioned by the Sanggunian,
and only in passing. In any event, this allegation does not cure
the inherent defect of the Complaint for expropriation
The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face
of the Complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere
resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same
is equivalent to lack of cause of action.
In view of the absence of the proper expropriation ordinance
authorizing and providing for the expropriation, the petition for
certiorari filed in RTC was dismissible for lack of cause of
action.
Prohibition does not lie against expropriation
The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and
oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair
and orderly administration of justice.
The writ is directed against proceedings that are done without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
there being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Grave abuse of discretion: The petitioner must first
demonstrate that the tribunal, corporation, etc, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, has
exercised its or his power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by
reason of passion or personal hostility, which must be so patent
and gross as would amount to an evasion, or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
Excess of jurisdiction: The court, board, etc. has jurisdiction
over a case but has transcended such jurisdiction or acted
without any authority.
Prohibition was not available to the Spouses as a remedy
against the adoption of the Reso, for the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, by such adoption, was not exercising judicial,

Issue 4
Must a citizen await the
takeover and possession of
his property by the local
government before he can
go to court to nullify an
unjust expropriation?

quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but only expressing its

collective sentiment or opinion.
There can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the
immediate possession of the land under expropriation
proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision
is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just
compensation to the owner.
This bar against prohibition comes from the nature of the power
of eminent domain as necessitating the taking of private land
intended for public use, and the interest of the affected
landowner is thus made subordinate to the power of the State.
Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent
domain, the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope,
and the courts will be left to determine the appropriate amount
of just compensation to be paid to the affected landowners.
Only when the landowners are not given their just
compensation for the taking of their property or when there has
been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may
the remedy of prohibition become available.
Remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering that
only a resolution expressing the desire of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners property was
issued.
As of then, it was premature for the Spouses to mount any
judicial challenge, for the power of eminent domain could be
exercised by the City only through the filing of a verified
complaint in the proper court.
Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such verified
complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist.
Until then, the petitioners as the owners could not also be
deprived of their property under the power of eminent domain.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70618. Costs to be paid by the petitioners.

CASE TITLE: Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA

Allen B. Barrientos
DATE OF CASE: 17 May 1993

DIGESTER: Jasper

DOCTRINE: Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by
implication.
Petitioner: The Province of Camarines Sur, represented by its governor, Luis R. Villafuerte (Villafuerte), and Benjamin V. Panga, the presiding
judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 33.
Respondent: The Court of Appeals (Third Division) and Ernesto and Efren San Joaquin (the San Joaquins), owners of the parcel of land
expropriated by the Province of Camarines Sur.
FACTS:
On 22 December 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the governor
to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional
agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.
Pursuant to Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, the Province of Camarines Sur, through Villafuerte, filed two cases for expropriation against the
San Joaquins, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur.
Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession, which was granted on the condition that a deposit
be made with the Clerk of Court of a bond amounting to Php 5,714.00.
The San Joaquins filed a petition before the Court of Appeals (CA) praying that: (a) Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 be declared null and
void; (b) the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the orders of the RTC allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of the property subject of the expropriation be set aside.
The CA granted the petition by the San Joaquins and also ordered the RTC to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to convert the classification of the
subject property from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
The Province of Camarines Sur filed an appeal by certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

PETITIONERS CONTENTION

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION

THE SUPREME COURTS

RULING

Whether or not the Province of

Camarines Sur need to first
secure the approval of the DAR
before it can expropriate the
subject land.

Province of Camarines Sur: Its

exercise of the power of eminent
domain cannot be restricted by
25
Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law), which requires the approval
of the DAR before a parcel of land
can be reclassified from an
agricultural to a non-agricultural
land.

Court of Appeals: The Province

of Camarines Sur must comply
with the provision of Section 65 of
the
Comprehensive
Agrarian
Reform Law and must first secure
the approval of the DAR of the
plan to expropriate the lands of the
San Joaquins.

A fair and reasonable reading of

the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case Heirs of Juancho
Ardana vs. Reyes shows that the
power of expropriation is
deemed superior to the power
to distribute lands under the
land reform program. Resolution
No. 129, Series of 1988, was
promulgated pursuant to Section
26
9 of B.P. Blg. 337 (the Local
Government Code), which does
not intimate in the least that local
government units must first secure
the approval of the DAR for the
conversion
of
lands
from
agricultural to non-agricultural use,
before they can institute the
necessary
expropriation
proceedings. Likewise, there is no
provision in R.A. No. 6657 which
expressly
subjects
the
expropriation of agricultural lands
by local government units to the
control of the DAR.
The opening, adverbial phrase of
27
Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657

25

Section 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for,
agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize
the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
26
A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute
condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
27
Section 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for,
agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial

signals that it applies to lands

previously placed under the
agrarian reform program.
Statutes conferring the power
of eminent domain to political
subdivisions
cannot
be
broadened or constricted by
implication. To sustain the CA
would mean that the local
government units can no longer
expropriate
agricultural
lands
needed for the construction of
roads, bridges, schools, hospitals,
etc., without first applying for
conversion of the use of the lands
with the DAR, because all of these
projects would naturally involve a
change in the land use. In effect, it
would then be the DAR to
scrutinize
whether
the
expropriation is for a public
purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative
branch of the local government
unit that shall determine whether
the use of the property sought to
be expropriated shall be public,
and the courts defer to such
legislative determination and will
intervene only when a particular
undertaking has no real or
substantial relation to the public
use.
There is also an ancient rule that
restrictive statutes, no matter how
purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize
the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.

broad their terms are, do not

embrace the sovereign unless the
sovereign is specially mentioned
as subject thereto. The Republic
of the Philippines, as sovereign, or
its political subdivisions, as
holders of delegated sovereign
powers, cannot be bound by
provisions of law couched in
general terms.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's
order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert
or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of
the private respondents.

Digester: Flores
CASE TITLE: MASIKIP v. PASIG CITY
Date of Case: Jan. 23, 2006
DOCTRINE: US v. Toribio: The power of eminent domain is the right of the government to take and appropriate private property to
public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on the condition of providing a reasonable compensation
therefor.
Eminent Domain is the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseperable from
sovereignty and inherent in government. It is lodged in the legislative branch of the government, which delegates the exercise thereof to
LGUs, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. LGs have no inherent power of
eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute.
Sec. 19, LGC 1991 prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to LGUs and lays down the
parameters for its exercise.
Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) adequacy of compensation; (b)
necessity of the taking; (c) public use character of the purpose of the taking.
Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only
a reasonable/practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least convenience and expense to
the condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit.
Petitioner: Lourdes De La Paz Masikip registered owner of a parcel of land (4521 sq. m.) in Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City which was sought to
be expropriated by the then Municipality of Pasig
Respondent:
1. City of Pasig then Municipality of Pasig
2. Hon. Marietta A. Legaspi Presiding Judge of RTC Pasig
3. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Letter of Jan. 6, 1994 Municipality of Pasig notified Masikip of its intention to expropriate 1500 sq. m. of her property to be used for the sports
development and recreational activities of the residents of Brgy. Caniogan pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enated by the then
Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.
Letter of March 23, 1994 Respondent wrote another letter, but this time the purpose was allegedly in line with the program of the Municipal
Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.
Masikips Reply The intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient
nd
nor suitable for the 2 purpose offered by respondent.
Letter of Dec. 20, 1994 Respondent reiterated that the purpose of expropriation is to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor
residents.

Respondent then filed with the RTC a Complaint for Expropriation, praying that it issue an order for the condemnation of the property and that
commissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining just compensation.
Masikip filed a Motion to Dismiss (MTD) on the following grounds:
1. No cause of action for the exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain:
a. No genuine necessity for the taking of the property
b. Plaintiff arbitrarily and capriciously chosen the property
c. Even granting that the property may be expropriated, the FMV far exceeds P78,000
2. Complaint is defective in form and substance
a. Plaintiff failed to allege with certainty the purpose of expropriation
b. Failed to comply with the requisites under Sec. 34, Rule VI of the IRR of the LGC, hence this proceeding is premature
3. Granting of the expropriation would violate Sec. 261(V) of the Omnibus Election Code
4. Plaintiff cannot take possession by merely depositing 15% of the value of the property based on its current tax declaration.
RTC: Denied Masikips MTD. There is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and recretational activities of the residents of
Pasig. Further denied Masikips MR. Appointed the City Assessor and City Treasurer of Pasig City to ascertain the just compensation in
accordance with the ROC.
CA: Dismissed Masikips Special Civil Action for Certiorari for lack of merit and also her MR.
Issue 1:
Whether petitioners
MTD constitutes the
responsive pleading
required by the Rules
of Court.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:

SUPREME COURT:
YES, under Sec. 3, Rule 67 of the then Revised ROC.
The MTD is a responsive pleading joining the issues. It
puts in issue the right of plaintiff to expropriate
defendants property for the use specified in the
complaint. All that is required that a copy of the MTD be
served on plaintiffs atty of record. CA erred in holding
that the MTD hypothetically admitted the truth of the
facts alleged in the complaint (that there is a genuine
necessity to expropriate). The RTC should have set the
case for reception of evidence to determine whether
there is indeed a genuine necessity for the taking
instead of summarily making a finding that the taking is
for public use, because the purpose of expropriation
was squarely challenged and put in issue by Masikip.
Although the Rule has been amended by the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which expressly mandates
that any objection/defense to the taking of the property

Issue 2:
Whether there is a
genuine necessity for
the expropriation of
Masikips property.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
YES. It is provide
sports and
recreational facilities
to its poor residents.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
NO. (see arguments in MTD) There is
already an established sports
development and recreational activity
center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City,
fully operational and being utilized by its
residents, including those from Brgy.
Caniogan.

of a defendant must be set forth in an Answer, it is only

fair that the Rule at the time Masikip filed her MTD
should govern. The new provision cannot be applied
retroactively to her prejudice.
SUPREME COURT:
NO. The City of Pasig has failed to establish that there
is a genuine necessity to expropriate Masikips
property. The Certification Issued by the Caniogan
Barangay Council, the basis for the passage of
Ordinance No. 42 authorizing the expropriation,
indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendrez
Compound Homeowners Association, a private, nonprofit organiation, not the residents of Caniogan.
Members of said Assocaiation are desirous having their
own private playground and recreational faicility and
Masikips lot is the nearest vacant space available. The
purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically
public. Furthermore, there exists an alternative facility
for sports development and community recreation in
the area available to all residents of Pasig, including
those of Caniogan.
Right to take private property for public purposes
necessarily originates from the necessity and the
taking must be limited to such necessity. The very
foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a
genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a
public character (City of Manila v. Chinese Community
of Manila). The ascertainment of necessity must
precede/accompany (not follow) the taking of the land.
The right to own and possess proeprty is one of the
most cherished rights of men. Unless the requisite of
genuine necessity for the expropriation of ones
property is clearly established, it shall be the duty of the
courts to protect the rights of individuals to their private
property. Important as the power of eminent domain
may be, the inviolable sanctity which the Constitution
attaches to the property of the individual requires not
only that the purpose for the taking of private property

be specified. The genuine necessity for the taking,

which must be of a public character, must also be
shown to exist.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED. The complaint for expropriation filed before the trial court by respondent City of Pasig is ordered DISMISSED.

CASE TITLE: BARANGAY SINDALAN v. CA

Date of Case: March 22, 2007

Digester: Romero

DOCTRINE: The public nature of the prospective exercise of expropriation cannot depend on the numerical count of those to be served
or the smallness or largeness of the community to be benefited. The number of people is not determinative of whether or not it
constitutes public use, provided the use is exercisable in common and is not limited to particular individuals.
SC also reiterated this: The power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and with just compensation. Taking an
individuals private property is a deprivation which can only be justified by a higher goodwhich is public useand can only be
counterbalanced by just compensation. Without these safeguards, the taking of property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null
and void, but would also constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an individuals basic right to property as well.
Petitioner: Brgy. Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga represented by Brgy. Captain Ismael Gutierrez
Respondent: Spouses Jose Magtoto and Patricia Sindayan the registered owners of the subject land in this case
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain against respondent spouses. Petitioner sought to convert a portion of respondents land into Brgy.
Sindalans feeder road (aka access road) for the benefit of the residents of Sitio Paraiso. The alleged public purposes sought to be served by the
expropriation were stated in Brgy. Resolution No. 6:
Land shall be used as a brgy feeder road for the agricultural and other products of the residents
Presently, residents have to take a long detour on dirt road before they can reach the concrete provincial road
The road shall contribute greatly to the general welfare of the people residing therein.
Respondent spouses owned a 27,000 sq. meter property, a portion of which is subject of this case. The lot is adjacent to Davsan II Subdivision,
which is privately owned. Prior to the complaint, subdivision residents pass through a pathway on the private property of a sertain Torres family.
Respondent spouses argue that the expropriation of their property was for private use for the benefit of the subdivision homeowners.
RTC: Ruled in favor of Brgy. Sindalan. Expropriate!
CA: Ruled in favor of respondent spouses. CA found that Purok Paraiso is in reality Davsan II Subdivision! It is the duty of the subdivision owner
to provide the right of way needed by residents of Davsan II Subdivision.

Issue 1

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court:

Whether taking of
land in this case
was for a public

The taking of land was

for a public purpose.

The taking of land was for

a private purpose.

The taking of land was not for public use!!!

[Type text]

It is settled that the public nature of the prospective exercise of

purpose or use.
NO. It wasnt for
a public purpose.

Sitio Paraiso and

Brgy. Sindalan
residents will be
benefited by the
intended access road.
(NOTE: Sitio Paraiso
is within Brgy.
Sindalan)

Their lot is adjacent to

Davsan II Subdivision,
which had no access
road to the main highway.
The intended access road
sought to serve the
residents of the
subdivision only.

There are at least 80

houses in the area
and about 400
persons will be
benefited with the use
of a barangay road.

Petitioners deliberately
omitted the name of
Davsan II Subdivision in
their complaint and
instead stated it was for
the benefit of Sitio
Paraisos residents to
conceal the fact that the
proposed access road
was to serve the privately
owned subdivision and
subdivision homeowners.
RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Issue 2

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

Whether the
private property
can be taken by
law from one
person and given
to another in the
guise of public
purpose.

It is for the benefit of

the public!

NO.

[Type text]

(same arguments
above)

Before the complaint, the

sales agents of the
subdivision proposed to
buy a portion of their
propertyt o serve as
access road for the
subdivision.
However, the prospective
buyers never returned
after they learned of the
selling price offered by
the spouses. (namahalan
masyado!)
It is the subdivision owner

expropriation cannot depend on the numerical count of those to be

served or the smallness or largeness of the community to be
benefited. (but SC cited American Jurisprudence!!!)
The number of people is not determinative of whether or not it
constitutes public use, provided the use is exercisable in common
and is not limited to particular individuals.
The SC found that:
- Sitio Paraiso is WITHIN Davsan II Subdivision
- The Subdivision did not provide for an access road form the
subdivision to the main barrio road
- There is no portion of the subdivision which is devoted to the
production of agricultural products (NOTE: in Brgy. Reso 6,
petitioners mentioned brgy feeder road will be used for
transfer of the agricultural products of the residents)
Based on these factual findings, the intended use of respondents lot
is confined solely to the Davsan II Subdivision resident and is not
exercisable in common!!!
Supreme Court:

The expropriation will actually benefit the subdivisions owner, who

will be relieved of spending his own funds for a right-of-way! The
owner will be able to circumvent his commitment to provide road
access as stated in his Development Permit and License to Sell from
the HLURB.
The expropriation of respondets lot is for the actual benefit of the
Subdivision Owner, with incidental benefit to the subdivision
homeowners.
The intended expropriation of private property for the benefit os a
private indiviual is proscribed by the Constitution Art. III Sec. 9:
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.

who is obliged to provide

an access road to
subdivision residents.

The limitation on expropriation was underscored in Charles River

Bridge v. Warren (American Jurisprudence again, but cited in Fr.
Bernas Commentary on Constitution):
- It has never been understood, at least never in our republic,
that the sovereign power can take the private property of A
and give it to B by right of eminent domain.

Other reasons of SC for ruling against the petitioners:

- PD 957 Sec. 29: The owner or developer of a subdivision without access to any existing public road must secure a right of way to a public
road.
- To deprive respondents of their property instead of compelling the subdivision owner to comply with his obligation under the law is an
ABUSE OF POWER of EMINENT DOMAIN and is patently illegal!
- Public funds can be used only for a public purpose. If not, malversation yan!
- Petitioners proper remedy is to require the subdivision owner to file a complaint for establishemnt of the easement of right-of-way under
NCC 649-656. Respondents must be granted opportunity to show that their lot is not a servient estate.
Dispositive Portion: CA Decision affirmed!

[Type text]

Digester: Flores
CASE TITLE: HENRY L. SY v. QC
Date of Case: June 5, 2013
DOCTRINE: The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual
taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction
over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the
time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. Case law dictates that there is "taking" when the owner is actually
deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction or a material impairment of the value of his property or
when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof.
Petitioner: Henry L. Sy owner of a parcel of land sought to be expropriated by Quezon City through then Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr.
Respondent: Local Government of Quezon City
FACTS:
Nov. 7, 1996 Quezon City, through then Mayor Mathay, Jr., filed a Complaint for Expropriation with the RTC to acquire a 1000 sq. m. parcel of
landowned and registered under the name of Sy, intended to be used as a site for a multi-purpose barangay hall, day-care center, playground and
community activity center for the benefit of the residents of Brgy. Balingasa, Balintawak, QC, pursuant to Ordinance No. Sp-181, s-94, enacted on
April 12, 1994.
Pursuant to Sec. 19, LGC, QC deposited P241,090 (15% of the propertys FMV based on its tax declaration) with the Office of the Clerk of Court.
During the preliminary conference, Sy did not question QCs right to expropriate his property, thus, only the amount of just compensation remained
at issue.
The RTC appointed Edgardo Ostaco, Engr. Victor Salinas and Atty. Carlo Alcantara as commissioners to determine the proper amount of just
compensation. Commissioners Ostaco and Alcantara recommended P5500 per sq. m. to be computed from the date of the filing of the
expropriation complaint. Commissioner Salinas recommended P13,500 per sq. m.
RTC: The just compensation should be set at P5500 per sq. m. Just compensation must be fair not only to the owner but to the expropriator as
well. No basis for the award of damages and back rentals in favor of Sy. Awarded 6% legal interest computed from Nov. 7, 1996 until full payment
of just compensation.
CA: Modified RTC ruling by ordering QC to pay P200,000 as exemplary damages and attys fees (1% of the total amount due) because of QCs
taking of the property without even initiating expropriation proceedings. Denied back rentals considering that the RTC granted him legal interest.
Appraisal of Commissioners Ostaco and Alcantara found more believable, fair and reasonable, as it took into account: (a) FMV of the lot (P4000
per sq. m.); (b) Market value of the lot (P2000 per sq. m. based on several sworn statements made by Sy); (c) Sys tax declaration for 1996 stating
that the lot has a total market value of P2,272,050). Sy not entitled to damages on account of the purported shelving of his housing project (not

[Type text]

proved). The expropriation would not leave the rest of Sys properties useless as they would still be accessible through Lot 8 based on the
Property Identification Map. Further denied Sys MR for being filed out of time and QCs MR for lack of merit.
Issue 1:
Whether the CA
correctly dismissed
Sys MR for being filed
out of time.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
NO. Sys counsel, Atty.
Tranquilino Meris claims that
his secretary inadvertently
placed the date Jan. 27 instead
of Jan. 26 on the Notice of
Decision. It constitutes
excusable negligence which
should justify a relaxation of
the rules.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
YES. The CAs Jan. 20, 2012 decision
was received by Sy on Jan. 26. As such,
his MR should have been filed not later
than 15 days from receipt. Sy filed his MR
day late, which renders the CA Decision
final and executory.

Issue 2:
Whether CA correctly
upheld the amount of
just compensation as
determined by the
RTC as well as its
grant of 6% legal
interest.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
NO. Sy is entitled to damages
on account of the shelving of
his housing project and the
expropriation would leave the
rest of his properties useless
and inaccessible.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
YES.
QC: Deposited P241,090 (15% of the
propertys FMV based on its tax
declaration) with the Office of the Clerk of
Court, pursuant to Sec. 19 of the LGC.

[Type text]

CA: Appraisal of Commissioners Ostaco

and Alcantara found more believable, fair
and reasonable, as it took into account: (a)
FMV of the lot (P4000 per sq. m.); (b)
Market value of the lot (P2000 per sq. m.
based on several sworn statements made
by Sy); (c) Sys tax declaration for 1996
stating that the lot has a total market value
of P2,272,050). Sy is not entitled to

SUPREME COURT:
NO. The Court cannot excuse Atty. Meris
misstep based on his proffered reasons.
The error could have been averted if only
he had instituted a credible filing system
in his office to account for oversights such
as that committed by his secretary.
Ordinary prudence could have prevented
such mistake. However, the procedural
consequence of the one-day delay in the
filing of the MR is incommensurate to the
injustice which Sy may suffer.
Furthermore, the amount of just
compensation, the rate of legal interest,
as well as the time of its accrual, were
incorrectly adjudged by both the RTC and
the CA.In this respect, the Court deems it
proper to relax the rules of procedure and
thus, proceed to resolve these
substantive issues.
SUPREME COURT:
NO.
1. As to the rate of legal interest - The
correct rate of legal interest is 12% per
annum, owing to the nature of QCs
obligation as an effective forbearance.
The constitutional limitation of "just
compensation" is considered to be the
sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described as the price
fixed by the seller in open market in the
usual and ordinary course of legal action
and competition or the fair value of the
property as between one who receives,
and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the
time of the actual taking by the

damages on account of the purported

shelving of his housing project (not
proved). The expropriation would not leave
the rest of Sys properties useless as they
would still be accessible through Lot 8
based on the Property Identification Map.
Also denied back rentals considering that
the RTC granted him legal interest.

government. Thus, if property is taken for

public use before compensation is
deposited with the court having
jurisdiction over the case, the final
compensation must include interests on
its just value to be computed from the
time the property is taken to the time
when compensation is actually paid or
deposited with the court. In fine, between
the taking of the property and the actual
payment, legal interests accrue in order to
place the owner in a position as good as
(but not better than) the position he was
in before the taking occurred (to ensure
prompt payment of the value of the land
and eliminate the issue of constant
fluctuation and inflation of the value of the
currency over time).
Interest must run from the time of the
taking of the property in 1986 up to the
time when compensation is actually paid
or deposited with the court,
notwithstanding the Ordinance of April 12,
1994 and the expropriation complaint filed
on Nov. 7, 1996. QC admitted that, as
early as 1986, a burden was already
imposed upon Sy as his property was
already being used as a baragay day care
and office. The lack of proper
authorization, i.e., resolution to effect
expropriation, did not affect the character
of the Citys taking of the subject property
in 1986. Case law dictates that there is
"taking" when the owner is actually
deprived or dispossessed of his property;
when there is a practical destruction or a
material impairment of the value of his
property or when he is deprived of the

[Type text]

ordinary use thereof.

Issue 3:
Whether the CA
correctly awarded
exemplary damages
and attys fees.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
YES. CA ordered QC to pay P200,000 as
exemplary damages and attys fees (1% of
the total amount due) because of QCs
taking of the property without even
initiating expropriation proceedings.

2. As to the amount of just compensation

The amount of P5500/sq. m. cannot be
sustained as it was actually arrived at
after considering: (a) the Sept. 4, 1996
recommendation of the City Appraisal
Commity; (b) sworn statements made by
Sy; and (c) Sys own tax declaration for
1996. The amount of just compensation is
to be ascertained as of the time of the
taking. However, the said documents do
not reflect the value of the property at the
time of its taking in 1986. Hence, the case
must be remanded to the RTC to properly
determine the amoung of just
compensation during 1986.
SUPREME COURT:
YES. The consequence of the
aforementioned irregularity is that
exemplary damages and attorneys fees
should be awarded to the landowner if the
government takes possession of the
property for a prolonged period of time
without properly initiating expropriation
proceedings. This is based on the
principle that interest "runs as a matter of
law and follows from the right of the
landowner to be placed in as good
position as money can accomplish, as of
the date of the taking.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 20, 2012 Decision and July 16, 2012 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED to the trial court for the proper determination of the amount of just
compensation in accordance with this Decision. To forestall any further delay in the resolution of this case, the trial court is hereby ordered to fix
the just compensation for petitioner Henry L. Sy's property with dispatch and report to the Court its compliance. Finally, respondent Local
Government of Quezon City is ordered to PAY exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and attorney's fees equivalent to one percent
(1%) of the amount due, after final determination of the amount of just compensation. SO ORDERED.

[Type text]

Digester: Ernesto C. Herrera III

CASE TITLE: SPS ORTEGA V. CITY OF CEBU
Date of Case: October 2, 2009
Consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari of a CA Decision
DOCTRINE: An expropriation suit cannot be withdrawn after the completion of the first stage (determination of propriety of the
expropriation), even if the just compensation fixed by the Court (second stage) is high.
Petitioner:
Spouses Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega
Owners of the land subject of the case (Original RTC Case: Expropriation)
Respondent:
City of Cebu
Local Government Unit
FACTS:
1. Spouses Ortega (Ortegas) are the owners of a 5,712 sqm piece of land. They filed an ejectment suit against squatters who occupied onehalf of the land. They won this case, which went up to the SC. Writ of execution issued on Feb. 1, 1994.
2. On May 23, 1994, Sangguniang Panglungsod of City of Cebu (Cebu) issued Ordinance 1519, which authorized the Mayor to expropriate
the squatter occupied. Appropriated budget was P3,284,000 (P1,150/sqm), chargeable against Account No. 8-93-310 (Continuing
Appropriation), Account No. 101-8918-334, (repurchase of lots for various projects). Amount was determined by Cebu City Appraisal
Committee. Commissioners were appointed (one of whom was Cebu City assessor), who, on May 21, 1999, fixed the value of the land at
P31, 416,000 (P11,000/sqm).
3. Cebu then filed a complaint for eminent domain [Note: should be complaint for expropriation] against Ortegas in Cebu City RTC. On
March 13, 1998, RTC found meritorious the claim of Cebu, subject to payment of just compensation. Cebu failed to appeal, so this
became executory.
4. Ortegas asked for writ of garnishment, which was granted by the RTC, as it found that the ordinance enacted allowed execution on the
government funds.
5. Cebu filed omnibus motion for stay of execution, judgment modification and recall of complaint, contending that the price set by the RTC
was too high. The motion was denied; MR denied. Cebu filed first CA pet cert.
6. Sheriff tried to execute on Phil. Postal Bank; Cebu filed motion to quash writ of garnishment, saying the account number mentioned in the
ordinance (see 2) did not exist and that govt fund cannot be levied. The motion was denied, MR denied. Ortegas moved to have the Bank
nd
manager turn over money. Motion was granted, Cebu MR denied. Cebu then filed its 2 CA pet cert.
7. CA ruled on the two petitions by: reversing RTC on denial of stay of execution, affirming RTC in denying judgment modification and
withdrawal from the case (see 5), and reversing RTC in denial of motion to quash garnishment (see 6).
8. Both parties appealed to the SC

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Issue(s)

Ortegas

WON Cebu may withdraw

the expropriation suit at
this stage because the
amount set by the RTC is
too high.

Cebu can no longer

withdraw at this
stage.

WON the deposit of Cebu

with the bank,
appropriated for a different
purpose by its
Sangguniang
Panglungsod, can be
subject to garnishment as
payment for the
expropriated lot covered
by the ordinance.

The account of
Cebu in the bank
can be garnished;
the ordinance
effectively allotted
money for payment.
The deficiency can
be recovered from
Cebus other bank
accounts.

Cebu
Cebu says that it should be allowed
to withdraw its complaint as the just
compensation fixed by the RTC is
too high, and the intended
expropriation of Ortegas property is
dependent on whether Cebu City
would have sufficient funds to pay.

Cebus bank account with the Bank

cannot be garnished, saying the
account mentioned in the ordinance
is not existent with said Bank.

Dispositive Portion: Petitions DENIED. CA rulings affirmed.

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Supreme Court
(1) After the first stage of the expropriation
proceedings, Cebu may no longer withdraw its
complaint. An expropriation proceeding has two
stages. After an order of expropriation is issued
(which means the public purpose is satisfied), the
case moves on to the second stage, which entails
determination of just compensation. (Rule 67, sec.
4). The fixing of the just compensation does not
affect the order of expropriation. Modification of
judgment and withdrawal cannot be done, as Cebu
st
failed to appeal the order of expropriation (1
stage).
(2) Determination of just compensation is a judicial
function; Cebus argument undermines the Courts
power to fix the just compensation. The Court is
capable of appointing commissioners but it is not
bound by the findings of the commissioners.
The bank accounts of Cebu cannot be levied. The
account mentioned in the ordinance does not exist;
the bank certified this fact. The general and other
funds of Cebu cannot be garnished, too, as they
are appropriated for different purposes; to allow
garnishment would be to re-allocate the funds of
government without due appropriation. The remedy
of the Ortegas is to file a mandamus suit to compel
the Sangguniang Panglungsod to pass an
ordinance specifically to pay the amount in the
expropriation suit (Municipality of Makati v. CA)

Digester: Justin Batocabe

CASE TITLE: Smart Communications v Municipality of Malvar, Batangas
Date of Case: February 18, 2014
DOCTRINE:
Petitioner: Smart Communications
Respondent: Municipality of Malvar

FACTS:
1) Smart constructed a telecommunications tower within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality.
2) On 30 July 2003, the Municipality passed Ordinance No. 18, series of 2003, entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the Establishment of Special
Projects. SMART received an assessment letter with a schedule of payment for the total amount of P389,950.00 for Smarts telecommunications
tower.
3) Due to the alleged arrears in the payment of the assessment, the Municipality also caused the posting of a closure notice on the
telecommunications tower.
4) Smart filed a protest which was denied by the Municipality.
5) Smart filed with RTC of Tananuan an "Appeal/Petition" assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 18. RTC confined its resolution of the case to the
validity of the assessment, and did not rule on the legality of Ordinance No. 18 held that the assessment covering the period from 2001 to July
2003 was void since Ordinance No. 18 was approved only on 30 July 2003. However, the trial court declared valid the assessment starting 1
October 2003, citing Article 4 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, in relation to the provisions of Ordinance No. 18 and Section 166 of the LGC.
RTC denied MR.
st

6) CTA 1 Div. denied petition for review, it subsequently denied MR. CTA En Banc denied MR

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Issue 1

WON CTA En Banc

should have exercised
its jurisdiction and
denied Ordinance as
illegal

a) WON RTC resolved a

local tax case which
makes it fall under CTA
Jurisdiction
a) WON fees imposed
by Ordinance 18 are
taxes

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court
NO CTA had no authority
consequently the RTC did not resolve a local tax case
and Ordinace 18 was not a Tax

CTA erred in dismissing the

case for lack of jurisdiction.
Smart maintains that the CTA
has jurisdiction over the
present case considering the
"unique" factual circumstances
involved.

Smart argues that the "fees" in

Ordinance No. 18 are actually
taxes since they are not
regulatory, but revenue-raising.
Citing Philippine Airlines, Inc.
v. Edu, Smart contends that
the designation of "fees" in
Ordinance No. 18 is not
controlling.

Municipality exceeded its

power to impose taxes and
fees as provided in Book II,
Title One, Chapter 2, Article II

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RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Undiscussed

See explanation below

of the LGC.

Issue 2

WON the doctrine of

exhaustion of
administrative remedies
apply

Issue 3

WON Ordinance 18 is
valid or not

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

The doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies does
not apply

Ordinance No. 18 violates

Sections 130(b)(3) and 186 of
the LGC since the fees are
unjust, excessive, oppressive
and confiscatory.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Likewise,
undiscussed

Supreme Court

Considering that the fees in Ordinance No. 18 are not

in the nature of local taxes, and Smart is questioning
the constitutionality of the ordinance, the CTA
correctly dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Likewise, Section 187 of the LGC, which outlines the
procedure for questioning the constitutionality of a tax
ordinance, is inapplicable, rendering unnecessary the
resolution of the issue on non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

Smart did not present any evidence substantiating its

claims.
Courts will go slow in writing off an ordinance as
unreasonable unless the amount is so excessive as to
be prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or
confiscatory. A rule which has gained acceptance is
that factors relevant to such an inquiry are the
municipal conditions as a whole and the nature of the
business made subject to imposition.
Plaintiff, has however not sufficiently proven that,
taking these factors together, the license taxes are

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unreasonable. The presumption of validity subsists

Discussion by the SC of Issue # 1

SC finds that the fees imposed under Ordinance No. 18 are not taxes.
Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that "each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues
and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government."
Consistent with this constitutional mandate, the LGC grants the taxing powers to each local government unit. Specifically, Section 142 of the LGC
grants municipalities the power to levy taxes, fees, and charges not otherwise levied by provinces. Section 143 of the LGC provides for the scale
of taxes on business that may be imposed by municipalitieswhile Section 147of the same law provides for the fees and charges that may be
imposed by municipalities on business and occupation.
The LGC defines the term "charges" as referring to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property, while the term "fee"
means "a charge fixed by law or ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business or activity."
In its whereas clauses, the primary purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate the "placing, stringing, attaching, installing, repair and
construction of all gas mains, electric, telegraph and telephone wires, conduits, meters and other apparatus" listed therein, which included Smarts
telecommunications tower. Clearly, the purpose of the assailed Ordinance is to regulate the enumerated activities particularly related to the
construction and maintenance of various structures. The fees in Ordinance No. 18 are not impositions on the building or structure itself; rather,
they are impositions on the activity subject of government regulation, such as the installation and construction of the structures. the fees imposed
in Ordinance No. 18 are primarily regulatory in nature, and not primarily revenue-raising. Thus, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are not
taxes..
We accordingly say that the designation given by the municipal authorities does not decide whether the imposition is properly a license tax
or a license fee. The determining factors are the purpose and effect of the imposition as may be apparent from the provisions of the ordinance.
Thus, "[w]hen no police inspection, supervision, or regulation is provided, nor any standard set for the applicant to establish, or that he agrees to
attain or maintain, but any and all persons engaged in the business designated, without qualification or hindrance, may come, and a license on
payment of the stipulated sum will issue, to do business, subject to no prescribed rule of conduct and under no guardian eye, but according to the

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unrestrained judgment or fancy of the applicant and licensee, the presumption is strong that the power of taxation, and not the police power, is
being exercised."
Contrary to Smarts contention, Ordinance No. 18 expressly provides for the standards which Smart must satisfy prior to the issuance of
the specified permits, clearly indicating that the fees are regulatory in nature.
These requirements are as follows:

SECTION 5. Requirements and Procedures in Securing Preliminary Development Permit.

The following documents shall be submitted to the SB Secretary in triplicate:
a) zoning clearance
b) Vicinity Map
c) Site Plan
d) Evidence of ownership
e) Certificate true copy of NTC Provisional Authority in case of Cellsites, telephone or telegraph line, ERB in case of gasoline station, power plant,
and other concerned national agencies
f) Conversion order from DAR is located within agricultural zone.
g) Radiation Protection Evaluation.
h) Written consent from subdivision association or the residence of the area concerned if the special projects is located within the residential zone.
i) Barangay Council Resolution endorsing the special projects.

SECTION 6. Requirement for Final Development Permit Upon the expiration of 180 days and the proponents of special projects shall apply for
final [development permit] and they are require[d] to submit the following:

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a) evaluation from the committee where the Vice Mayor refers the special project
b) Certification that all local fees have been paid.

Dispositive Portion:

Petition DENIED.

[Type text]

Digester: Romero
*Although this case is under Local Taxation in the Syllabus, I also included a discussion of Real Property Tax issue, which comes after Local Taxation in the Syllabus.

CASE TITLE: GSIS v. City Treasurer

Date of Case: December 23, 2009
DOCTRINE: GSIS is an instrumentality of the national government, and, hence, it is outside the purview of local taxation by force of Sec.
133(o) of the LGC, which says that the taxing power of LGUs shall not extend to the levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the
National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities and LGUs.
Petitioner: GSIS (Govt Service Insurance System)
Respondent: City Treasurer and City Assessor of Manila
FACTS:
1
GSIS owned 2 parcels of land: Katigbak property and Concepcion-Arroceros property. GSIS accupies the Concepcion-Arroceros property, while
the Katigbak property was leased to Manila Hotel Corporation.
City Treasurer of Manila addressed a letter to GSIS President informing him of the unpaid real property taxes due on the aforementioned
properties (P 54,826,599.37 for the Katigbak property and P 48,498,917.01 for the Concepcion-Arroceros property). The letter warned of the
inclusion of the subject properties in the scheduled October 30, 2002 public auction of all delinquent properties in Manila should the unpaid taxes
remain unsettled before that date.
City Treasurer of Manila issued separate Notices of Realty Tax Delinquency for the 2 properties with warning of seizure/sale.
GSIS filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC, prayed for nullification of the assessments made.
RTC: dismissed the petition for lack of merit and declared the assessment as valid.
RTC denied MR, hence this Petition for Review on pure questions of law.
MAIN ISSUE on
LOCAL TAXATION

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court:

WON GSIS is an
instrumentality of the

GSIS is an
instrumentality of the

GSIS is a GOCC
,
because under CA 186,

GSIS is an instrumentality of the national government, and,

hence, it is outside the purview of local taxation by force of

one located at Katigbak 25th St., Bonifacio Drive, Manila (Katigbak property), and the other, at Concepcion cor. Arroceros Sts., also in Manila

[Type text]

National Govt, and

therefore not subject to
the taxing powers of
LGUs.

National Govt. Under

Sec. 133 (o), an
instrumentality of the
National Govt is not
subject of the taxing
power of LGUs.
Sec. 133(o) of the LGC
provides that the taxing
power of LGUs shall not
extend to the levy of
taxes, fees or charges
of any kind on the
National Government,
its agencies and
instrumentalities and
LGUs.

which established the

GSIS, GSIS was set up
as a non-stock
corporation managed by
a board of trustees.
(This argument was not
expressly mentioned in
the case)
LGC effectively
withdrew GSIS tax
exemption privileges, it
being a GOCC, whose
tax exemptions are
expressly withdrawn by
the LGC Sec. 193 &
Sec. 234. (cited below)

Sec. 133(o) of the LGC, which says that unless otherwise

provided, LGUs cannot tax national govt instrumentalities.
(1) While created as a non-stock corporation, GSIS is not a
GOCC following the teaching of Manila International
Airport Authority2, for GSIS' capital is not divided into unit
shares and GSIS has no members to speak of. (the
members reference is to those who, under Sec. 87 of
the Corporation Code, make up the non-stock
corporation, and not to the compulsory members of the
system who are government employees.
(2) The subject properties under GSIS' name are owned by
the Republic. The GSIS is but a mere trustee of the
subject properties, which have either been ceded to it by
the Government or acquired for the enhancement of the
system.
(3) GSIS manages the funds for the life insurance,
retirement, survivorship, and disability benefits of all
government employees and their beneficiaries. It is an
essential and vital function, which the government,
through one of its agencies or instrumentalities, ought to
perform if social security services to civil service
employees are to be delivered with reasonable dispatch.

ISSUE on REAL
PROPERTY TAXATION
WON GSIS is exempt
from Real Property Tax

Both its old charter, PD

1146, and present
charter, RA 8291,
exempt the agency and
its properties from all
forms of taxes and
assessments, inclusive
of realty tax.

GSIS may not

successfully resist the
city's notices and
warrants of levy on the
basis of its exemption
under RA 8291, real
property taxation being
governed by RA 7160 or

GSIS enjoys under its charter full tax exemption.

(1) Pursuant to Sec. 33 of PD 1146, GSIS enjoyed tax
exemption from real estate taxes, among other tax burdens,
until January 1, 1992 when the LGC took effect and withdrew
exemptions from payment of real estate taxes privileges
granted under PD 1146;

2
In Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals the Court held that MIAA does not qualify as a GOCC, not having been organized either as a stock corporation, its capital
not being divided into shares, or as a non-stock corporation because it has no members. MIAA is rather an instrumentality of the National Government and, hence, outside the
purview of local taxation by force of Sec. 133 of the LGC providing in context that "unless otherwise provided," local governments cannot tax national government instrumentalities.
And as the Court pronounced in Manila International Airport Authority, the airport lands and buildings MIAA administers belong to the Republic of the Philippines, which makes MIAA a
mere trustee of such assets.

[Type text]

(Please see pertinent

laws below)

the LGC of 1991, which

clearly provided for
withdrawal of
exemptions.
(Please see pertinent
laws below)

(2) RA 8291 restored in 1997 the tax exempt status of GSIS

by reenacting under its Sec. 39 what was once Sec. 33 of
P.D. 1146;
(3) If any real estate tax is due to the City of Manila, it is, only
for the interim period, or from 1992 to 1996, to be precise.
(Please see full discussion below)
However, following the "beneficial use" rule, accrued real
property taxes are due from the Katigbak property, leased as
it is to a taxable entity (MHC). But the corresponding liability
for the payment thereof devolves on the taxable beneficial
user.
The Katigbak property cannot in any event be subject of a
public auction sale, notwithstanding its realty tax delinquency.
The City of Manila has to satisfy its tax claim by serving the
accrued realty tax assessment on MHC, as the taxable
beneficial user of the Katigbak property and, in case of
nonpayment, through means other than the sale at public
auction of the leased property.

ON ISSUE OF REAL PROPERTY TAXATION:

Petitioners ARG: Full tax exemption granted through PD 1146 (Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977) and RA 8291 (GSIS Act
of 1997)
1936: Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 186 was enacted and established the GSIS to manage the pension system, life and retirement insurance, and
other benefits of all government employees. GSIS was set up as a non-stock corporation managed by a board of trustees.
1977: PD 1146 was issued, providing for an expanded insurance system for government employees. Sec. 33 of PD 1146 provided for a new tax
treatment for GSIS, thus:
Section 33. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the
System shall be preserved and maintained at all times and that the contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low
as possible in order not to burden the members of the System and/or their employees. Taxes imposed on the System tend to impair the actuarial
solvency of its funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the

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contrary, the System, its assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees,
charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment against the System as
of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid.
XXX

1997: RA 8291 took effect. Under it, the full tax exemption privilege of GSIS was restored.
Sec. 39 of RA 8291 is a virtual replication of Sec. 33 of PD 1146.
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. - It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the
GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times and that contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as
possible in order not to burden the members of the GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its
funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding, any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its
assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all
kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of
this Act are hereby considered paid. Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation
of this provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect.
Moreover, these exemptions shall not be affected by subsequent laws to the contrary unless this section is expressly, specifically and
categorically revoked or repealed by law and a provision is enacted to substitute or replace the exemption referred to herein as an essential
factor to maintain or protect the solvency of the fund, notwithstanding and independently of the guaranty of the national government to secure such
solvency or liability.
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall
be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative
bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including his pecuniary accountability
arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his
position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.

Respondents ARG: RA 7160 lifted GSIS tax exemption

The enactment in 1991 of the LGC provided the exercise of LGUs of their power to tax.
Pertinent provisions are:
Sec. 193: general provision on withdrawal of tax exemption privileges
Sec. 234: special provision on withdrawal of exemption from payment of real property taxes
SEC. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. - Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently
enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including GOCCs, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938, non-stock
and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.

[Type text]

SEC. 234. Exemption from Real Property Tax. - x x x Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to,
or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including all GOCCs are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.

Congress' intention is to withdraw, subject to certain defined exceptions, tax exemptions granted prior to the passage of RA 7160.
SUPREME COURT:
The full tax exemption granted to GSIS under PD 1146 was deemed withdrawn by the LGC. The express withdrawal by the LGC of previously
granted exemptions from realty taxes applied to instrumentalities and GOCCs.
However, the GSIS' tax-exempt status was restored in 1997 by RA 8291.
Full tax exemption reenacted through RA 8291
Sec. 39 of RA 8291 restored full tax exemption privilege of GSIS through Sec. 39 thereof. GSIS is exempt from all forms of taxes.
Note that prominently added in GSIS' present charter is a paragraph precluding any implied repeal of the tax-exempt clause so as to protect the
solvency of GSIS funds (Sec. 39 of RA 8291, par. 2).
Moreover, an express repeal by a subsequent law would not affect the full exemption benefits granted the GSIS, unless the following conditions
are met:
(1) The repealing clause must expressly, specifically, and categorically revoke or repeal Sec. 39; and
(2) a provision is enacted to substitute or replace the exemption.
There conditions are in place to maintain or protect the solvency of the GSIS fund.
Dispositive Portion: Petition is GRANTED. Decision of the RTC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The real property tax assessments are
declared VOID, except that the real property tax assessment pertaining to the leased Katigbak property shall be valid if served on the Manila Hotel
Corporation, as lessee which has actual and beneficial use thereof. The City of Manila is permanently restrained from levying on or selling at
public auction the subject properties to satisfy the payment of the real property tax delinquency.

[Type text]

The City Government of Quezon City and the City Treasurer of Quezon City and Dr. Victoria Enriga
vs. Bayan Telecommunications Inc. GR No. 180050
06 March 2006, Appeal Rule 45
Digester: Joeyboy Lacas
DOCTRINE: The SC has upheld the power of Congress to grant exemptions over the power of local government units to impose taxes. The grant
of taxing powers to local government units under the Constitution and the LGC does not affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions to
certain persons, pursuant to a declared national policy.
PETITIONERS:
1. City Government of Quezon City
2. City Treasurer of Quezon City
3. Dr. Victoria Enriga
RESPONDENTS:
1. Bayan Telecommunications Inc.
franchise holder (RA 3259) to establish and operate radio stations for domestic telecommunications,
radiophone, broadcasting and telecasting
FACTS:
1. RA 3259 Section 14:
SECTION 14. (a) The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of the
franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. (b) The grantee shall further pay to the
Treasurer of the Philippines each year, within ten days after the audit and approval of the accounts as prescribed in this Act, one and one-half
per centum of all gross receipts from the business transacted under this franchise by the said grantee
2. LGC: SEC. 232. Power to Levy Real Property Tax. A province or city or a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an
annual ad valorem tax on real property such as land, building, machinery and other improvements not hereinafter specifically exempted.
SEC. 234 - Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax:
xxx xxx xxx
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural
or juridical, including government-owned-or-controlled corporations is hereby withdrawn upon effectivity of this Code
3. A few months after effectivity of LGC, RA 7633 amended charter of Bayantel
SEC. 11. The grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property,
exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. In addition thereto, the

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grantee, its successors or assigns shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross receipts of the telephone or other
telecommunications businesses transacted under this franchise by the grantee, its successors or assigns and the said percentage shall be in
lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof. Provided, That the grantee, its successors or assigns shall continue to be liable for
income taxes payable under Title II of the National Internal Revenue Code
4. Bayantel owns several real properties within QC (Head Office @ Roosevelt; Telecom facilities @ Maginhawa and network operation @ Bahay
Toro Project 8)
5. Quezon City Revenue Code was enacted with the following salient provisions:
o
o
o

Levied taxes on all real properties within QC

Withdrew all tax exemptions in LGC 234
SEC. 230. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or
presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government owned or controlled corporations, except local water
districts, cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, business enterprises
certified by the Board of Investments (BOI) as pioneer or non-pioneer for a period of six (6) and four (4) years, respectively, are hereby
withdrawn effective upon approval of this Code

6. City Assessor assessed tax liabilities of all the real properties of Bayantel within QC.
7. RA 7295: Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines was enacted:
o SEC. 23. Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications Industry. Any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted
under existing franchises, or may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto become part of previously granted telecommunications franchises
and shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such franchises: Provided, however, That the foregoing shall
neither apply to nor affect provisions of telecommunications franchises concerning territory covered by the franchise, the life span of the
franchise, or the type of service authorized by the franchise
8. Bayantel requested City Assessor to be exempt from real estate tax based on the recent law enacted but it was denied.
9. Appealed to Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA) and stopped paying taxes.
10. City Treasurer declared Bayantel delinquent (P43,878,208.18) and they levied on the properties of Bayantel.
11. Before foreclosure, Bayantel withdrew appeal at LBAA and filed prohibition @ RTC QC with prayer for preliminary injunction which the RTC
granted.
12. RTC: Bayantels properties by virtue of RA 7633 are exempt from taxes.
13. MR was denied so this was brought to SC since it involves pure questions of law.

[Type text]

Issue 1
W/N Bayantels real
properties in QC are
exempt from real property
taxes under its legislative
franchise RA7633,
notwithstanding the
enactment of Section 230
of QC local Revenue
Code?

PETITIONERS:
NO. Pursuant to Sec.5 Article X of the
Constitution, juxtaposed with Section 232
LGC, the QC government enacted its local
Revenue Code, which imposes real
property tax on all real properties found
within its territorial jurisdiction. Just like the
LGC, its local Revenue Code under Section
230 thereof, expressly withdrew all tax
exemption privileges in general.

RESPONDENT:
YES. Bayantel argues that under Section
11 of its amended franchise (RA7633) it is
only liable to pay the same taxes, as any
other persons or corporations on all its real
or personal properties, exclusive of its
franchise. In other words, Bayantel
claims that all its realties which are
actually, directly and exclusively used in
the operation of its franchise are exempted
from any property tax.

Supreme Court
YES. Bayantels
posture is well-taken.
The power of local
government units to
tax is still limited.

Ruling:
1. The General power to tax is lodged in Congress so the power of taxation granted to LGU is limited to what is imposed / granted to them by
Congress.
2. Section 5 of 1987 Constitution does not change the doctrine that municipal corporations do not possess inherent powers of taxation. What
it does is to confer municipal corporations a general power to levy taxes and otherwise create sources of revenue. The power of the
legislative authority relative to the fiscal powers of local governments has been reduced to the authority to impose limitations on municipal
powers. that taxes imposed by local government must be for a public purpose, uniform within a locality, must not be confiscatory, and
must be within the jurisdiction of the local unit to pass power of the Quezon City Government to tax is limited by Sec 232 of the LGC which
expressly provides that "a province or city or municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real
property such as land, building, machinery, and other improvement not hereinafter specifically exempted.
3. Rep. Act No. 7633 was enacted subsequent to the LGC. aware that the LGC has already withdrawn Bayantels former exemption from
realty taxes, Congress opted to pass RA No. 7633 using, under Sec 11 thereof, exactly the same defining phrase "exclusive of this
franchise" which was the basis for Bayantels exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC. Sec 11 of RA No. 7633 states that "the
grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of
this franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay." The Court views this subsequent
piece of legislation as an express and real intention on the part of Congress to once again remove from the LGCs delegated taxing
power, all of the franchisees (Bayantels) properties that are actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.
4. Sec 14 of RA No. 3259 effectively works to grant or delegate to local governments of Congress inherent power to tax the franchisees
properties belonging to the second group of properties indicated above, that is, all properties which, "exclusive of this franchise," are not
actually and directly used in the pursuit of its franchise. As may be recalled, the taxing power of local governments under both the 1935
and the 1973 Constitutions solely depended upon an enabling law. Absent such enabling law, local government units were without
authority to impose and collect taxes on real properties within their respective territorial jurisdictions. While Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
3259 may be validly viewed as an implied delegation of power to tax, the delegation under that provision, as couched, is limited to
impositions over properties of the franchisee which are not actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.

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DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

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(M. Espinal)
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF PARAAQUE, CITY MAYOR OF
PARAAQUE, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG PARAAQUE, CITY ASSESSOR OF PARAAQUE, and CITY TREASURER OF
PARAAQUE, respondents.
July 20, 2006
Doctrine: Government instrumentalities are exempt from paying real estate tax unless legislature clearly intended - under sound and
compelling policy considerations - that they be taxed for the delivery of essential public services or when beneficial use of real property
is granted to a taxable person.
FACTS:
MIAA is the operator of NAIA, as provided for in EO 903, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the Manila International
Airport Authority ("MIAA Charter"). As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and
equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land including the
runways and buildings ("Airport Lands and Buildings") then under the Bureau of Air Transportation. The MIAA Charter further
provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically
approved by the President of the Philippines.
(1997) OGCC rendered an opinion, holding that upon the effectivity of the LGC, there is a withdrawal of the exemption from real
estate tax granted to MIAA. MIAA thus negotiated with respondent City of Paraaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the
City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already due.
(2001) The City issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of
Paraaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax
delinquency. MIAA thus sought a clarification of OGCC Opinion No. 061. The OGCC pointed out that Section 206 of the Local
Government Code requires persons exempt from real estate tax to show proof of exemption. The OGCC opined that Section 21 of
the MIAA Charter is the proof that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax.
MIAA filed with CA a petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
The petition sought to restrain the City of Paraaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public
sale the Airport Lands and Buildings
CA dismissed because it was filed beyond reglementary period
hence, the present
petition for review filed by MIAA
Meantime, the auction proceeded and it was only three hours after the same was in fact concluded that the City came to receive
the Courts TRO.
ISSUE: WON the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax
Petitioners Contention
Respondents Contention
The real owner of the properties is the Republic of the Philippines even
Section 193 of the LGC expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges
though MIAAs Charter admittedly places in MIAA the title to the
granted to GOCCs. An international airport is not among the exceptions
property. Since the Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government Code. Thus,
and public service, the ownership of these properties remains with the
respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and
State. The Airport Lands and Buildings are thus inalienable and are not
Buildings are exempt from real estate tax. They also cite SCs ruling in
8
subject to real estate tax by local government.
Mactan International Airport v. Marcos where it was held that the
Section 21 of the MIAA Charter specifically exempts MIAA from the
Local Government Code has withdrawn the exemption from real estate

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payment of real estate tax. Moreover, it is also exempt from real estate
tax under Section 234 of the Local Government Code because the
Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic.

tax granted to international airports. Further, since MIAA already made

partial payment, it is now estopped from questioning the same.

HELD:
MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation
The Admin. Code of 1987 defines a GOCC as any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to
public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly,
or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. But, MIAA is not a stock
corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. MIAA is not a non-stock
corporation either since it does not have members and since non-stock corporations may not distribute any part of its income to its members.
Section 11 of the MIAA Charter mandates MIAA to remit 20% of its annual gross operating income to the National Treasury. This prevents MIAA
from qualifying as a non-stock corporation. Neither is MIAA organized for charitable, religious, educational, professional, cultural, recreational,
fraternal, literary, scientific, social, civil service, or similar purposes, as the Corporation Code requires of non-stock corporations. MIAA, a public
utility, is organized to operate an international and domestic airport for public use.
In this light, MIAA is thus a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. Again, the
Admin. Code definition sheds light: instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. Even though MIAA is not integrated within the Department framework, it remains
part of the national government machinery despite the fact that the said instrumentality is operationally autonomous. (Other examples of such
instrumentalities are the Mactan International Airport Authority, the Philippine Ports Authority, the University of the Philippines and Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas.)
Section 133(o) of the LGC itself recognizes the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national government, which historically
merely delegated to local governments the power to tax. While the 1987 Constitution now includes taxation as one of the powers of local
governments, local governments may only exercise such power "subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide.
Moreover, in terms of construction, 1) When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, such power is
construed strictly against local governments; and 2) when Congress grants an exemption to a national government instrumentality from local
taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in favor of the national government instrumentality. The reason for the foregoing is the absurdity of
the government taxing itself, i.e. putting funds from one pocket to another.
Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic
a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion

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Properties of public dominion are as those enumerated in the Civil Code (...intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State) Port includes airports and seaports. The fact that MIAA collects fees (terminal fees,
landing fees) does not discount from the fact that its operations are intended for a public purpose/public use. Hence, as properties of public
dominion, they indisputably belong to the State or the Republic of the Philippines.
b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man
Being of public dominion, the subject property is outside the commerce of man and may not be disposed of nor made subject to auction, levy or
any other encumbrance as this will be contrary to public policy. If disposition is allowed, then serious impediment to public service - as that
provided by MIAA - will result. Thus, unless the Airport Lands and Buildings are withdrawn by law or presidential proclamation from public use,
they are properties of public dominion, owned by the Republic and thus inalienable or outside the commerce of man.
c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic
Reference is again made to the Admin. Code which allows instrumentalities to hold title to real properties owned by the Republic. The MIAA
charter itself provides that no conveyance may be made by its executive head, and only the President of the Republic may do so. This
underscores MIAAs status as a mere trustee of the State.
d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a Reorganization
A look into MIAAs charter elucidates: The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transportation to MIAA was not
meant to transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely to reorganize a division in the
Bureau of Air Transportation into a separate and autonomous body. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the Airport Lands and
Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. The MIAA Charter also expressly provides that the Airport Lands and Buildings "shall not
be disposed through sale or through any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines." This only means
that the Republic retained the beneficial ownership of the Airport Lands and Buildings because under Article 428 of the Civil Code, only the "owner
has the right to x x x dispose of a thing." Since MIAA cannot dispose of the Airport Lands and Buildings, MIAA does not own the Airport Lands and
Buildings. At any time, the President can transfer back to the Republic title to the Airport Lands and Buildings without the Republic paying MIAA
any consideration. Under Section 3 of the MIAA Charter, the President is the only one who can authorize the sale or disposition of the Airport
Lands and Buildings. This only confirms that the Airport Lands and Buildings belong to the Republic.
e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable
LGC, Sec. 234 provides: The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has
been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person;

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Read in conjunction with Section 133(o) of the LGC, MIAA, as a government instrumentality, is not a taxable person. And even if it is assumed that
the Republic has granted to MIAA the beneficial use of the Airport Lands and Buildings, such fact does not make these real properties subject to
real estate tax. However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. For
example, the land area occupied by hangars that MIAA leases to private corporations is subject to real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has
granted the beneficial use of such land area for a consideration to a taxable person and therefore such land area is subject to real estate tax.
Minoritys Argumentation is Untenable
The argument is anchored on Sec. 193 of the LGC which provides: Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives
granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except
local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions are hereby
withdrawn upon effectivity of this Code. It is asserted that MIAA being a juridical person, then its exemption is deemed withdrawn by such
provision. It is to be noted, however, that the provision is qualified by the phrase unless otherwise provided by this Code, which means that - as
in fact provided in Sec. 133 - such exemption is still to be accorded MIAA, it being an instrumentality of the National Government. The statutory
construction giving precedence to a latter provision than to an earlier one cannot even apply because it may only be employed if there is
irreconcilable difference between such provisions which, in this case, there is none. No conflict exists because one refers to Common Limitations
on the Power to Tax while the other is a grant of the power; the former limits what is granted in the latter. A different denotation to the term
GOCC may not also be applied, as the minority would want, because unless there is specific language in the Local Government Code defining the
phrase "government-owned or controlled corporation" differs from the definition in the Administrative Code, the definition in the Administrative
Code prevails. The LGC is silent on the definition of the phrase "government-owned or controlled corporation, whereas the Administrative Code
expressly defines the phrase. The inescapable conclusion is that the Administrative Code definition of the phrase "government-owned or
controlled corporation" applies to the Local Government Code. Moreover, the Admin. Code does not distinguish between a GOCC incorporated
under the Corporation Code and one created under a special charter. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. As to the
assertion that MIAA is required to meet the test of economic viability, the Court holds that MIAA need not since the legislature did not create MIAA
to compete in the market place. MIAA does not compete in the market place because there is no competing international airport operated by the
private sector. MIAA performs an essential public service as the primary domestic and international airport of the Philippines.The test of economic
viability does not apply to government entities vested with corporate powers and performing essential public services. The State is obligated to
render essential public services regardless of the economic viability of providing such service.

Dispositive:
The Airport Lands and Buildings of the Manila International Airport Authority are declared EXEMPT from the real estate tax imposed by the City of
Paraaque. SC also declares VOID all the real estate tax assessments, including the final notices of real estate tax delinquencies, issued by the
City of Paraaque on the Airport Lands and Buildings of the Manila International Airport Authority, except for the portions that the Manila
International Airport Authority has leased to private parties. The assailed auction sale of the Airport Lands and Buildings of the Manila International
Airport Authority are similarly held void, together with all its effects.

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DISSENTING OPINION: J. Tinga

Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity of the LGC,
exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily
follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its Charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been withdrawn. Any claim to the
contrary can only be justified if the petitioner can seek refuge under any of the exceptions provided in Section 234, but not under Section
133, as it now asserts, since, as shown above, the said section is qualified by Sections 232 and 234. (Under this argument, since MIAA is
not one of the exceptions listed, e.g. cooperatives, local water districts, non-stock hospitals, educational institutions, then MIAA should be
taxed, inasmuch as instrumentalities or GOCCs do not fall within the exceptions under Section 234.)
The ruling in the Mactan case (Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos) has already
overturned the precedents relied upon in the Majority Opinion. As held by the SC in the said case, Nothing can prevent Congress from
decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies of the Government performing governmental functions may be subject to tax. Where it is
done precisely to fulfill a constitutional mandate and national policy, no one can doubt its wisdom." The fact that tax exemptions of
government-owned or controlled corporations have been expressly withdrawn by the present Local Government Code clearly attests
against petitioner's claim of absolute exemption of government instrumentalities from local taxation.
MIAA is a GOCC. Following the charters of government corporations, there are two kinds of GOCCs,
namely: GOCCs which are stock corporations and GOCCs which are no stock corporations (as distinguished from non-stock corporation).
Stock GOCCs are simply those which have capital stock while no stock GOCCs are those which have no capital stock. Obviously these
definitions are different from the definitions of the terms in the Corporation Code. Verily, GOCCs which are not incorporated with the
Securities and Exchange Commission are not governed by the Corporation Code but by their respective charters.
The subject properties are owned by MIAA, a GOCC, holding title in its own name. MIAA, a separate legal entity from the Republic of the
Philippines, is the legal owner of the properties, and is thus liable for real property taxes, as it does not fall within the exemptions under
Section 234 of the Local Government Code.
J. Tinga summarizes the majority opinions flaws as follows:
1) The majority deliberately ignores all precedents which run counter to its hypothesis, including Mactan. Instead, it relies and directly cites those
doctrines and precedents which were overturned by Mactan. By imposing a different result than that warranted by the precedents without
explaining why Mactan or the other precedents are wrong, the majority attempts to overturn all these ruling sub silencio and without legal
justification, in a manner that is not sanctioned by the practices and traditions of this Court.
2) The majority deliberately ignores the policy and philosophy of local fiscal autonomy, as mandated by the Constitution, enacted under the Local
Government Code, and affirmed by precedents. Instead, the majority asserts that there is no sound rationale for local governments to tax national
government instrumentalities, despite the blunt existence of such rationales in the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and precedents.

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3) The majority, in a needless effort to justify itself, adopts an extremely strained exaltation of the Administrative Code above and beyond the
Corporation Code and the various legislative charters, in order to impose a wholly absurd definition of GOCCs that effectively declassifies
innumerable existing GOCCs, to catastrophic legal consequences.
4) The majority asserts that by virtue of Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code, all national government agencies and instrumentalities are
exempt from any form of local taxation, in contravention of several precedents to the contrary and the proviso under Section 133, "unless
otherwise provided herein [the Local Government Code]."
5) The majority erroneously argues that MIAA holds its properties in trust for the Republic of the Philippines, and that such properties are
patrimonial in character. No express or implied trust has been created to benefit the national government. The legal distinction between sovereign
and proprietary functions, as affirmed by jurisprudence, likewise preclude the classification of MIAA properties as patrimonial.

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Digester: Ivan
CASE TITLE: Quezon City v ABSCBN
Date of Case: Oct 6, 2008
DOCTRINE:
The right to exemption from local franchise tax must be clearly established and cannot be made out of inference or implications but
must be laid beyond reasonable doubt. Verily, the uncertainty in the "in lieu of all taxes" provision should be construed against ABSCBN. ABS-CBN has the burden to prove that it is in fact covered by the exemption so claimed. ABS-CBN miserably failed in this regard.
Petitioner: Quezon City and the City Treasurer of Quezon City
Respondent: ABS CBN Broadcasting Corporation
FACTS:
The QC govt was chartered under RA 537. Sec 31, Art 13, QC Revenue Code of 1993 imposed upon businesses operating within its
jurisdiction a franchise tax.
The broadcasting corporation, ABS-CBN, headquartered in QC, was granted a congressional franchise to install and operate radio and TV
stations in the country under RA 7966. Sec 8, RA 7966 provides the tax liabilities of ABSCBN:
o In addition thereto, the grantee, its successors or assigns,shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross
receipts of the radio/television business transacted under this franchise by the grantee, its successors or assigns, and the said
percentage tax shall be in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof
In view of RA 9766, ABSCBN argued that it is not liable to pay local franchise tax since its franchise already exempts it from such tax.
ABSCBN filed for several refunds which went unanswered. ABSCBN then filed a complaint before the QC RTC seeking the declaration of
nullity of the imposition of local frachise tax by QC govt
TC: rendered judgment declaring as invalid the imposition on and collection from ABS-CBN of local franchise tax paid pursuant to Quezon
City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93, after the enactment of R.A. No. 7966.
CA: affirmed.
ISSUE
WON ABSCBN is still
liable for the local franchise
tax imposed by the
Quezon City govt,
notwithstanding Sec 8, of
its congressional franchise.

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PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

The "in lieu of all taxes"

provision in R.A. No. 9766
could not have been
intended to prevail over a
constitutional mandate
which ensures the viability
and self-sufficiency of local

In view of the above

provision in R.A. No. 9766
that it "shall pay a
franchise tax x x x in lieu of
all taxes," the corporation
developed the opinion that
it is not liable to pay the

SUPREME COURT:
The "in lieu of all taxes" provision in its
franchise does not exempt ABS-CBN from
payment of local franchise tax.
The power of the local government of Quezon
City to impose franchise tax is based on
Section 151 in relation to Section 137 of the
LGC. Such taxing power by the local
government, however, is limited in the sense

government units.
Further, taxes collectible
by and payable to the local
government were distinct
from taxes collectible by
and payable to the national
government, considering
that the Constitution
specifically declared that
the taxes imposed by local
government units "shall
accrue exclusively to the
local governments."
Lastly, the City contended
that the exemption claimed
by ABS-CBN under R.A.
No. 7966 was withdrawn
by Congress when the
Local Government Code
(LGC) was passed.

local franchise tax imposed

by Quezon City.

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that Congress can enact legislation granting

exemptions.
Philippine Congress enacted R.A. No. 7966 on
March 30, 1995, subsequent to the effectivity
of the LGC on January 1, 1992.
ABS-CBN was granted the franchise to install
and operate radio and television broadcasting
stations in the Philippines. Likewise, Section 8
imposed on ABS-CBN the duty of paying 3%
franchise tax.
It must be pointed out that taxation is the rule,
exemption is the exception. The burden of
proof rests upon the party claiming the
exemption to prove that it is in fact covered by
the exemption so claimed.
The "in lieu of all taxes" provision in the
franchise of ABS-CBN does not expressly
provide what kind of taxes ABS-CBN is
exempted from. It is not clear whether the
exemption would include both local, whether
municipal, city or provincial, and national tax.
What is clear is that ABS-CBN shall be liable to
pay three (3) percent franchise tax and income
taxes under Title II of the NIRC. But whether
the "in lieu of all taxes provision" would include
exemption from local tax is not unequivocal.
The right to exemption from local franchise tax
must be clearly established and cannot be
made out of inference or implications but must
be laid beyond reasonable doubt. Verily, the
uncertainty in the "in lieu of all taxes" provision
should be construed against ABS-CBN. ABSCBN has the burden to prove that it is in fact
covered by the exemption so claimed. ABSCBN miserably failed in this regard.
The franchise failed to specify the taxing
authority from whose jurisdiction the taxing
power is withheld, whether municipal,

provincial, or national. In fine, since ABS-CBN

failed to justify its claim for exemption from
local franchise tax, by a grant expressed in
terms "too plain to be mistaken" its claim for
exemption for local franchise tax must fail.
In keeping with the laws that have been
passed since the grant of ABS-CBN's
franchise, the corporation should now be
subject to VAT, instead of the 3% franchise
tax.
The clause "in lieu of all taxes" does not
pertain to VAT or any other tax. It cannot apply
when what is paid is a tax other than a
franchise tax. Since the franchise tax on the
broadcasting companies with yearly gross
receipts exceeding ten million pesos has been
abolished, the "in lieu of all taxes" clause has
now become functus officio, rendered
inoperative.
In sum, ABS-CBN's claims for exemption must
fail on twin grounds.
o First, the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in its
franchise failed to specify the taxes the
company is sought to be exempted from.
Neither did it particularize the jurisdiction
from which the taxing power is withheld.
o Second, the clause has become functus
officio because as the law now stands,
ABS-CBN is no longer subject to a
franchise tax. It is now liable for VAT.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Decision REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The petition in the trial court for refund of
local franchise tax is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

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Section 3A.02(f) of the Code, which levies a gross receipt tax :

(f) On contractors and other independent contractors defined in Sec. 3A.01(q) of Chapter III of this Code, and on owners or operators of
business establishments rendering or offering services such as: advertising agencies; animal hospitals; assaying laboratories; belt and
buckle shops; blacksmith shops; bookbinders; booking officers for film exchange; booking offices for transportation on commission basis;
breeding of game cocks and other sporting animals belonging to others; business management services; collecting agencies; escort
services; feasibility studies; consultancy services; garages; garbage disposal contractors; gold and silversmith shops; inspection services
for incoming and outgoing cargoes; interior decorating services; janitorial services; job placement or recruitment agencies; landscaping
contractors; lathe machine shops; management consultants not subject to professional tax; medical and dental laboratories; mercantile
agencies; messsengerial services; operators of shoe shine stands; painting shops; perma press establishments; rent-a-plant services; polo
players; school for and/or horse-back riding academy; real estate appraisers; real estate brokerages; photostatic, white/blue printing,
Xerox, typing, and mimeographing services; rental of bicycles and/or tricycles, furniture, shoes, watches, household appliances, boats,
typewriters, etc.; roasting of pigs, fowls, etc.; shipping agencies; shipyard for repairing ships for others; shops for shearing animals;
silkscreen or T-shirt printing shops; stables; travel agencies; vaciador shops; veterinary clinics; video rentals and/or coverage services;
dancing schools/speed reading/EDP; nursery, vocational and other schools not regulated by the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, (DECS), day care centers; etc.
1

Section 3A.02(m) of the Revenue Code, which provides:

(m) On owners or operators of any business not specified above shall pay the tax at the rate of two percent (2%) for 1993, two and onehalf percent (2 %) for 1994 and 1995, and three percent (3%) for 1996 and the years thereafter of the gross receipts during the
preceding year.
Articles of Incorporation, the Corporations corporate purposes are limited to: (a) owning and holding title to the common and limited
common areas in the Condominium Project; (b) adopting such necessary measures for the protection and safeguard of the unit owners
and their property, including the power to contract for security services and for insurance coverage on the entire project; (c) making and
adopting needful rules and regulations concerning the use, enjoyment and occupancy of the units and common areas, including the power
to fix penalties and assessments for violation of such rules; (d) to provide for the maintenance, repair, sanitation, and cleanliness of the
common and limited common areas; (e) to provide and contract for public utilities and other services to the common areas; (f) to contract
for the services of persons or firms to assist in the management and operation of the Condominium Project; (g) to discharge any lien or
encumbrances upon the Condominium Project; (h) to enforce the terms contained in the Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of
the Project; (i) to levy and
1

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collect those assessments as provided in the Master Deed, in order to defray the costs, expenses and losses of the condominium; (j) to
acquire, own, hold, enjoy, lease operate and maintain, and to convey, sell transfer, mortgage or otherwise dispose of real or personal
property in connection with the purposes and activities of the corporation; and (k) to exercise and perform such other powers reasonably
necessary, incidental or convenient to accomplish the foregoing purposes.

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Digester: Ansis V. Pornillos

CASE TITLE: SECRETARY OF FINANCE vs. ILARDE
Date of Case: May 9, 2005
DOCTRINE: The power delegated to the executive branch, in this case the Ministry of Finance, to lay down implementing rules must,
nevertheless, be germane to the general law it seeks to apply. The implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the
provisions of the law it is designed to implement.
Petitioner: Secretary of Finance
Respondent: Judge Ilarde of RTC IloIlo City,
Cipriano P. Cabaluna, Jr. tax payer assessed with exorbitant real property tax liabilities
FACTS:
Private respondent Cipriano P. Cabaluna, Jr failed to pay the land taxes on Lot No. 12 (4491-E and F) and Lot No. 14 (4495-E and F) for the years
1986 to 1992. For the years 1991 to 1992, taxes were also unpaid on Lot No. 941-D-2, on the residential house, and on Lot No. 941-D-1.
A breakdown of the computation of the delinquent taxes and penalties, both Basic and Special Education Fund (SEF), for private respondents lots
and residential house as of May 1993 as reflected in the various receipts issued by the City Treasurers Office of Iloilo City, shows that more than
twenty-four percent (24%) of the delinquent taxes were charged and collected from private respondent by way of penalties. On the 6th and 7th of
May 1993, private respondent paid his land taxes and the corresponding receipts were issued to him by the City Treasurers Office with the
notation paid under protest.
After respondent retires from service, he files a petition with the City Treasurer of Iloilo City contending that the City Treasurers computation of
penalties was erroneous since the rate of penalty applied exceeded twenty-four percent (24%) in contravention of Section 66 of P.D. No. 464,
otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code, as amended.
In response, however, respondent Assistant City Treasurer, Rizalina F. Tulio, for and in behalf of the City Treasurer of Iloilo City, turned down
private respondents protest, citing Sec. 4(c) of Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 of the then
Ministry (now Department) of Finance which reads:
xxx
(c)

xxx

xxx

The penalty of two percent (2%) per month of delinquency, or twenty-four percent (24%) per annum, as the case may be, shall continue to be
imposed on the unpaid tax from the time the delinquency was incurred up to the time that it is paid for in full
xxx

xxx

xxx

Despite his labors to exhaust all administrative remedies, the denial of his protest and his motion for reconsideration compelled private respondent
to file a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Damages on 06 July 1993 before the sala of respondent Judge

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RTC ruling
Declared null and void the Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 of the Ministry (now Department) of
Finance for being contrary to Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code, which pegged the maximum penalty for delinquency in
the payment of real estate taxes at 24% of the delinquent tax.
Issue 1

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court. NO.

Whether or not Joint

Assessment
Regulations No. 1-85
and Local Treasury
Regulations No. 2-85
are valid

Ministry of Finance has the

power to legally promulgate
Regulations prescribing a rate
of penalty on delinquent taxes
by virtue of EO 73.

City Treasurers
computation of
penalties was
erroneous since the
rate of penalty applied
exceeded twenty-four
percent (24%) in
contravention of
Section 66 of P.D. No.
464, otherwise known
as the Real Property
Tax Code, as
amended.

The subject Regulations must be struck down for being

repugnant to Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 or the Real
Property Tax Code, which is the law prevailing at the time
material to this case.

EO 73 (Collection of Real
Property Taxes), provides in
Section 2 thereof that: The
Minister of Finance shall
promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to
implement this Executive
Order, has the effect of a
blanket authority to tinker with
the rates of penalty on
delinquency taxes as provided
for in P.D. No. 464, the
general law on real property
taxation

Under Sec. 66 of PD 464, the maximum penalty for

delinquency in the payment of real property tax shall in no
case exceed twenty-four per centum of the delinquent
tax. However, under the challenged Joint Assessment
Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No.
2-85 issued by respondent Secretary (formerly Minister) of
Finance, it provides that the penalty of two percent (2%)
per month of delinquency or twenty-four percent
(24%) per annum as the case may be, shall continue to
be imposed on the unpaid tax from the time the
delinquency was incurred up to the time that the
delinquency is paid for in full. As adeptly observed by the
trial court, the penalty imposed under the assailed
Regulations has no limit inasmuch as the 24% penalty per
annum shall be continuously imposed on the unpaid tax
until it is paid

Continued Ratio:
Assuming argumenti that E.O. No. 73 has authorized the petitioner to issue the objected Regulations, such conferment of powers is void for being
repugnant to the well-encrusted doctrine in political law that the power of taxation is generally vested with the legislature. Yes, President Corazon
Aquino, at that time, was exercising both executive and legislative powers. But, the power delegated to the executive branch, in this case the
Ministry of Finance, to lay down implementing rules must, nevertheless, be germane to the general law it seeks to apply. The implementing rules
cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is designed to implement.

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Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law they
are intended to carry into effect, which in this case is merely to antedate the effectivity of the 1984 Real Property Tax values inasmuch as this is
the raison dtre of E.O. No. 73.
Notes:
Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code reads:
Section 66. Penalty for delinquency. - Failure to pay the real property tax before the expiration of the period for the payment without penalty of
the quarterly installments thereof shall subject the taxpayer to the payment of a penalty of two per centum on the amount of the delinquent tax for
each month of delinquency or fraction thereof, until the delinquent tax shall be fully paid: Provided, That in no case shall the total penalty exceed
twenty-four per centum of the delinquent tax. The rate of penalty for tax delinquency fixed herein shall be uniformly applied in all provinces and
cities. (Underlining supplied)
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the order dated 28 August 1995 in Civil Case No. 21207 rendered by respondent Judge
Ricardo M. Ilarde of the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 26, Iloilo City, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the real
property tax payable by private respondent Cipriano P. Cabaluna, Jr., for the year 1992 shall be based on the Local Government Code of 1991.
No costs.

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Digest by: Arnel Abeleda

CASE TITLE: SMART Communications vs City of Davao represented by Mayor Rodrigo Duterte and the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Davao
Date of Case: September 16, 2008
PETITIONER:

SMART Telecom

RESPONDENTS:

City of Davao (rep by Mayor Badass Duterte)

City Council of Davao

NATURE: Constitutionality of franchise tax imposed by City of Davao. Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
DOCTRINE: Exemption in Section 23 of RA 7925 refers or pertains merely to an exemption from regulatory or reporting requirements of the
Department of Transportation and Communication or the National Transmission Corporation and not to an exemption from the grantees tax
liability.
The imposition of local franchise tax is not inconsistent with the advent of the VAT. VAT inures to the benefit of the national government,
while a local franchise tax is a revenue of the local government unit.
FACTS:
1. On February 2002, SMART filed a special civil action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, for the ascertainment of its
rights and obligations under the Tax Code of the City of Davao, particularly Section 1, Article 10 thereof, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law, there is hereby imposed a tax on businesses enjoying a
franchise, at a rate of seventy-five percent (75%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year based
on the income or receipts realized within the territorial jurisdiction of Davao City.
2. Smart contends that its telecenter in Davao City is exempt from payment of franchise tax to the City, on the following grounds:
(a) the issuance of its franchise under R.A. No. 7294 subsequent to R.A. No. 7160 shows the clear legislative intent to exempt it from the
provisions of R.A. 7160;
(b) Section 137 of R.A. No. 7160 can only apply to exemptions already existing at the time of its effectivity and not to future exemptions;
(c) the power of the City of Davao to impose a franchise tax is subject to statutory limitations such as the "in lieu of all taxes" clause found
in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7294; and
(d) the imposition of franchise tax by the City of Davao would amount to a violation of the constitutional provision against impairment of
contracts.

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3. Respondents contested the tax exemption claimed by Smart. They invoked the power granted by the Constitution to local government
units to create their own sources of revenue.
4. RTC: On July 19, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition. The RTC noted that the ambiguity of the "in lieu of all taxes"
provision in R.A. No. 7294, on whether it covers both national and local taxes, must be resolved against the taxpayer. The RTC
ratiocinated that tax exemptions are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority and,
thus, those who assert a tax exemption must justify it with words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical not to be misinterpreted.
5. On the issue of violation of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution, the trial court cited Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
v. Marcos, and declared that the city's power to tax is based not merely on a valid delegation of legislative power but on the direct
authority granted to it by the fundamental law. It added that while such power may be subject to restrictions or conditions imposed by
Congress, any such legislated limitation must be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
6. MR by SMART was denied. Thus, the instant case.
PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court

Smart
avers
that
its
telecenter in Davao City is
exempt from payment of
franchise tax to the City.

The power to tax by

local
government
units emanates from
Section 5, Article X
of the Constitution
which
empowers
them to create their
own
sources
of
revenues and to levy
taxes,
fees
and
charges subject to
such guidelines and
limitations as the
Congress
may
provide.

Section 23 of RA 7925, otherwise known as the most favored treatment clause or

equality clause, contains the word exemption,

Section
9
of
Smarts
legislative franchise contains
the contentious in lieu of all
taxes clause. The Section
reads:
Section 9. Tax provisions.
The grantee, its successors
or assigns shall be liable to
pay the same taxes on their
real estate buildings and
personal property, exclusive
of this franchise, as other
persons
or
corporations
which are now or hereafter
may be required by law to
pay. In addition thereto, the
grantee, its successors or

[Type text]

The
imposed
franchise tax is one
that falls within the
power of the LGU.

SEC. 23.
Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications Industry Any
advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted under existing franchises, or
may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto become part of previously granted
telecommunications franchises and shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to
the grantees of such franchises xxx
ON ISSUE OF EXEMPTION
SC cited: Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Province of Pangasinan,
1. the Court denied Digitels claim for exemption from provincial franchise tax. Citing
PLDT v. City of Davao, which held that in approving Section 23 of RA No. 7925,
Congress did not intend it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all
telecommunications entities.
2. Tax exemptions are highly disfavored and that a tax exemption must be expressed in
the statute in clear language that leaves no doubt of the intention of the legislature to
grant such exemption.
3. In the instances when it is granted, the exemption must be interpreted in strictissimi

assigns shall pay a franchise

tax equivalent to three
percent (3%) of all gross
receipts of the business
transacted
under
this
franchise by the grantee, its
successors or assigns and
the said percentage shall
be in lieu of all taxes on this
franchise
or
earnings
thereof: Provided, That the
grantee, its successors or
assigns shall continue to be
liable for income taxes
payable under Title II of the
National Internal Revenue
Code pursuant to Section 2
of Executive Order No. 72
unless the latter enactment
is amended or repealed, in
which case the amendment
or repeal shall be applicable
thereto.
3. Smart alleges that the "in
lieu of all taxes" clause in
Section 9 of its franchise
exempts it from all taxes,
both local and national,
except
the
national
franchise tax (now VAT),
income tax, and real
property tax, hence the rule
of strict construction against
tax exemptions is not
applicable
4. the in lieu of all taxes
clause is not rendered

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juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.
4. The term "exemption" in Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925 does not mean tax exemption.
The term refers to exemption from certain regulations and requirements imposed by the
National Telecommunications Commission
5. The grant of exemption from municipal, provincial, or national is clear and categorical
that aside from the franchise tax collected by virtue of the franchise granted to Globe
telecoms (R.A. No. 7229), no other franchise tax may be collected from Globe regardless
of who the taxing power is. No such provision is found in the franchise of Smart.
6. Smart's theory would require that, to level the playing field, any "advantage, favor,
privilege, exemption, or immunity" granted to Globe must be extended to all
telecommunications companies, including Smart. If, later, Congress again grants a
franchise to another telecommunications company imposing, say, one percent (1%)
franchise tax, then all other telecommunications franchises will have to be adjusted to
"level the playing field" so to speak. SMART's theory will leave the Government with the
burden of having to keep track of all granted telecommunications franchises, lest some
companies be treated unequally.
ON CONSTRUCTION OF THE IN LIEU OF ALL TAXES CLAUSE
1. The Court also clarified the meaning of the word exemption in Section 23 of RA
7925: that the word exemption as used in the statute refers or pertains merely to an
exemption from regulatory or reporting requirements of the Department of Transportation
and Communication or the National Transmission Corporation and not to an exemption
from the grantees tax liability.
2. The in lieu of all taxes clause in a legislative franchise should categorically state that
the exemption applies to both local and national taxes; otherwise, the exemption claimed
should be strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority.
3. The only interpretation, under the rule on strict construction of tax exemptions, is that
the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Smart's franchise refers only to national and not to local
taxes
ON THE E-VAT LAW

ineffective by the Expanded

VAT Law;
5. Section 23 of RA 7925
includes a tax exemption;
6. the imposition of a local
franchise tax on Smart would
violate the constitutional
prohibition
against
impairment of the obligation
of contracts

Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded VAT Law, did not remove or
abolish the payment of local franchise tax.
1. VAT replaced the national franchise tax, but it did not prohibit nor abolish the
imposition of local franchise tax by cities or municipalities.
2. The imposition of local franchise tax is not inconsistent with the advent of the VAT.
VAT inures to the benefit of the national government, while a local franchise tax is a
revenue of the local government unit.
ON NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
1. No violation of Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. As previously
discussed, the franchise of Smart does not expressly provide for exemption from local
taxes.
2. Smart's franchise was granted with the express condition that it is subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal. parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of
prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
Additional: MR filed by SMART is also denied by the Court in 2009,reiterating their earlier ruling. Thru J. Nachura: The power to tax by local
government units emanates from Section 5, Article X of the Constitution which empowers them to create their own sources of revenues and to
levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide. The imposition of local franchise tax is not
inconsistent with the advent of the VAT, which renders functus officio the franchise tax paid to the national government. VAT inures to the benefit
of the national government, while a local franchise tax is a revenue of the local government unit.

[Type text]

CASE TITLE: Vergara vs. Ombudsman

Allen B. Barrientos
Date of Case: 12 March 2009

Digester: Jasper

DOCTRINE: Clearly, when the local chief executive enters into contracts, the law speaks of prior authorization or authority from the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and not ratification.
Petitioner: Severino B. Vergara (Vergara, no background in the case)
Respondent: The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon (Ombudsman), Severino J. Lajara (Lajara, City Mayor of Calamba, Laguna), and Virginia G.
Baroro (Baroro, City Treasurer of Calamba, Laguna)
FACTS:
On 29 October 2001, the City Council of Calamba, Laguna passed Resolution No. 280, Series of 2001, authorizing Lajara to purchase several
lots owned by Pamana, Inc. with a total area of 55,190 square meters for the price of Php 129,017,600, as well as to execute, sign and deliver
the required documents.
On 13 November 2001, the City Government of Calamba, through Lajara, entered into the following agreements: (1) Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA); (2) Deed of Sale, (3) Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, and (4) Deed of Assignment of Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA).
On 19 November 2001, the above documents were endorsed to the City Council.
Vergara and Edgardo H. Catindig instituted an action against against Lajara; Baroro; Razul Requesto (Requesto), president of Pamana, Inc.;
3
and Lauro Jocson (Jocson), Vice-President and Trust Officer of the Prudential Bank and Trust Company for violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
On 17 March 2004, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding no probable cause to hold Lajara, Baroro, Requesto, and Jocson liable for
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, stating that the actions of Lajara in connection with the purchase of the lots were all authorized by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod as manifested in numerous resolutions and that the lack of ratification alone does not characterize the purchase of the
properties as one that gave unwarranted benefits.
In an Order dated 22 August 2005, the Ombudsman denied Vergaras Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Vergara filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 March 2004 Resolution and 22 August 2005
Order of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE

PETITIONERS CONTENTION

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION

THE SUPREME COURTS

RULING

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. x x x

[Type text]

Whether or not the Ombudsman

committed
grave
abuse
of
discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in (1)
dismissing the case against
Lajara, Baroro, Requesto, and
Jocson for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for lack of
probable cause, and (2) failing to
consider the issue that Calamba
City had acquired road lots which
should not have been paid at the
same price as the other lots.

The 17 March 2004 Resolution of

the Ombudsman dwelt only on the
alleged reasonableness of the
price of the property and did not
pass upon the more serious issue
that Calamba City had paid for
several lots that the City should
not have paid for because they
were road lots.

The mandate of the Office of the

Ombudsman is expressed in
4
Section 12 , Article XI of the
Constitution and invested with
investigatory powers by Section
5
13 , Article XI of the Constitution.
6
Section13 R.A. No. 6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989) granted
the Office of the Ombudsman full
administrative authority. Section
7
15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 reiterates
the investigatory powers of the
Ombudsman.
Jurisprudence
explains that the Ombudsman has
the sole power to investigate and
prosecute, motu proprio or on
complaint of any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or
employee, office, or agency when
such act or omission appears to

Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: (1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. x x x
Section 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
officers or employees of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the
Government to the people.
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of his primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases; x x x

[Type text]

be illegal, unjust, improper, or

8
inefficient. The Ombudsmans
power to investigate and to
prosecute is plenary
and
9
unqualified. The present case
does not involve any of the
10
exceptions that would justify
the Courts interference with the
Ombudsmans
investigatory
powers. The Ombudsman, in
issuing the assailed Resolution,
found no probable cause to hold
any of the respondents liable for
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019 since the lots involved were
bought at Php 3,800 per square
meter, an amount lower than their
zonal valuation of Php 6,000 per
square meter. Based on this
computation, Calamba City paid
for a total area of 33,952 square
meters instead of the original
55,000
square
meters
as
authorized in the City Councils
Resolution No. 280, Series of
2001. Contrary to Vergaras
allegation that Lot 5 with an area
of 3,062 square meters and Lot 8
with an area of 3,327 square
8

Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 166038, 4 December 2007.

Schroeder v. Saldevar, G.R. No. 163656, 27 April 2007.
10
(a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions; (c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; (d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (e)
Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) Where the court has no jurisdiction
over the offense; (h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; and (i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance.
9

[Type text]

Whether or not all the documents

pertaining to the purchase of the
lots should bear the ratification by
the City Council of Calamba.

11

All the documents pertaining to the

purchase of the landholdings of
Pamana,
Inc.,
like
the
Memorandum of Agreement, Deed
of Sale, Deed of Mortgage, and
Deed of Assignment, do not bear
the ratification by the City Council.

Ombudsman: The ratification by

the City Council is not a condition
sine qua non for the local chief
executive to enter into contracts on
behalf of the city. The law requires
prior authorization from the City
Council and in this case,
Resolution No. 280 is the City

meters are easement / creeks and

road lot respectively, the sketch
plan submitted by Vergara as
Annex L in his Affidavit-Complaint
and the certificates of title of the
properties indicate that these are
parcels of land. A perusal of the
records shows that the findings
of fact by the Ombudsman are
supported
by
substantial
evidence.
As
long
as
substantial evidence supports
it, the Ombudsmans ruling will
not be overturned. Vergara, in
arguing that the Ombudsman
committed
grave
abuse
of
discretion, raises questions of fact.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts, more so in the extraordinary
writ of certiorari where neither
questions of fact nor even of law
are entertained, but only questions
of lack of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion can be raised.
11
Section 22 (c) , Title I of R.A. No.
7160 (The Local Government
Code of 1991) speaks of prior
authorization or authority from the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and not
ratification, when the local chief
executive enters into contracts.
12
Section 455 , Title III of RA 7160

Section 22. Corporate Powers. - x x x (c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the
local government unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the
provincial capitol or the city, municipal or barangay hall. x x x
12
Section 455. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties and Compensation. - x x x (b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the city mayor shall: x x x (vi) Represent the city in all its business

[Type text]

Councils stamp of approval and

authority for Lajara to purchase the
subject lots.

enumerates the powers, duties,

and compensation of the local
chief
executive,
including
representing the city in all its
business transactions and sign in
its behalf all bonds, contracts, and
obligations, and such other
documents upon authority of the
sangguniang
panlungsod
or
pursuant to law or ordinance.
Clearly, when the local chief
executive enters into contracts,
the law speaks of prior
authorization or authority from
the Sangguniang Panlungsod
and not ratification. It cannot be
denied that the City Council issued
Resolution No. 280 authorizing.
Lajara to purchase the subject
lots.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution and Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-L-C-02-1205-L
dated 17 March 2004 and 22 August 2005, respectively.

transactions and sign in its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other documents upon authority of the sangguniang panlungsod or
pursuant to law or ordinance; x x x

[Type text]

Dave Cagahastian
CALOOCAN V. CA
2006 May 3

The mayor has the authority to file suits "for the recovery of funds and property" on behalf of the city,
even without the prior authorization from the Sanggunian Panglungsod

petitioner:

City of Caloocan
represented by REYNALDO O. MALONZO, in his capacity as City Mayor

respondent

GOTESCO INVESTMENTS, INC., JOSE GO

buyer in the contract

YOLANDA O. ALFONSO
in her capacity as Register of Deeds of Caloocan City

1. In 1990, when Asistio was mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City passed Ordinance No. 068 s. 1990 authorizing then
Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr. to negotiate and enter into a contract of sale of the patrimonial property of the city comprising of 22,685.82
square meters covered by TCT No. 5432.
2. A deed of absolute sale was made selling the property to Ever Gostesco for P136,114,800.00
3. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved of the sale because the selling price was too low.
4. Sanggunian passed another ordinance amending the first one, increasing the price of the property to P182 million, pursuant to the COA
decision. The Sanggunian also directed that an amended deed of absolute sale be executed between the City and Gotesco.

[Type text]

5. Malonzo vetoed the (latest) ordinance on the ground that since the deed of sale earlier executed was valid and subsisting because
according to him, it was not incumbent upon him to execute an amended deed of conveyance over the same property
6. The Sanggunian still passed Resolution No. 0609 overriding the veto
7. Gotesco executed an "Express Consent to the Novation of the Deed of Absolute Sale" with an "Amended Deed of Absolute Sale"
embodying the amendments prescribed by the latest ordinance wherein it agreed to buy the subject property for P182,085,078.30.
Malonzo received the documents but refused to sign the amended deed of sale.
8. Despite Malonzos refusal to sign the amended deed of sale and the refusal of the mayor to accept the P182 million as payment for the
property, the DILG opined that the deed of absolute sale may be registered with the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City, the registration
being a mere ministerial act on the part of the latter.
9. Thus Malonzo filed two cases, a case for injunction to prevent the registration of the sale (C-18308), and a civil case for the annulment of
the sale (C-18337).
10. Gotesco, on the other hand, filed to consign the amount in court to effect payment on the transaction.
11. The CA, however, dismissed Malonzos Civil case with number C-18337, prompting him to file the present petition.

Malonzo

Gotesco

SC

1. I vetoed the (latest) ordinance on

the ground that since the deed of
sale earlier executed was valid and
subsisting it was not incumbent
upon me to execute an amended
deed of conveyance over the same
property.

1. Wants to consign the amount before

the court to effect payment.

1. The consignment is not an issue in this case, since it is

another civil case still pending with the RTC. The main issue in
this case is whether the CA correctly dismissed C-18337 on
the ground of forum shopping.

2. On forum shopping, Malonzo

says that C-18337 should not have
been dismissed because it has a
different cause of action than that of
C-18308. Thus, any judgment on
either of the two cases will not result
in res judicata in the other case.

2. C-18337 should be dismissed

because it has the same causes of
action with C-18308. Also, Malonzo
does not have the authority from the
Sanggunian to prosecute the two
cases that he filed.

2. SC first resolved the issue on whether Malonzo had the right

to prosecute the case even without the authorization from the
Sanggunian. SC cited Sec. 445 of the LGC. And ruled that it is
clear that the mayor has the authority to file suits for the
recovery of funds and property on behalf of the city, even
without the prior authorization from the Sanggunian.

However, SC upheld the CA ruling dismissing the case on the

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ground of forum shopping because the certificate on non-forum

shopping was signed not by Malonzo but by the City Legal
Officer; and the SC found that C-18337 is dismissible on the
ground of litis pendentia. The aforesaid cases are intimately
related and/or intertwined with one another such that the
judgment that may be rendered in one would amount to res
judicata in the other.

The Court finds that the cases involve the same principal
parties, while the others were merely impleaded as nominal
parties. As this court has previously held, absolute identity of
parties is not required. It is enough that there is substantial
identity of parties.

Held: that there was forum shopping, and CA was correct in

dismissing C-18337.

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Digester: Renz Ruiz

CASE TITLE: DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICES LABOR UNIONS vs. CIR, LACSON and THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF OF MANILA
Date of Case: January 28, 1961
DOCTRINE: The rule is settled that in the performance of its governmental functions, a municipal corporation, like the City of Manila,
acts as an agent of the State, and as such, is immune from suit unless consent thereto has been given. Such consent must be
expressed in unequivocal language and here no consent of the Government has been shown.
FACTS:
This is a petition for the enforcement of RA 1880, which amended section 562 of the Revised Administrative Code, fixing the legal number of
hours of labor in every branch of the Government service at 8 hours a day, for five days a week, or a total of 40 hours a week. The petition also
prays for the recovery of overtime compensation.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter
of the case and that the petition states no cause of action. The trial Judge sustained the motion and dismissed the petition.
ISSUE
WON dismissal
proper

PETITIONER

RESPONDENT

SUPREME COURT
Dismissal is proper.
The petitioner is composed of employees of the Department of Public Services of
Manila. The principal duties and functions of said department as defined in the city's
Revised Charter are as follows:
"(a) . . care, custody and cleaning of all public buildings including, markets and
slaughterhouses and buildings rented for city purposes; public toilets; collection
and disposal garbage, refuse, contents of toilets and cesspools and all her
offensive and dangerous substances within the city."
It is obvious from the nature of the duties performed by the Department of Public
Services that the City of Manila, through that department, is not functioning in its
proprietary or private capacity, but rather in its governmental or public Character.
As was held in the case of Curry vs. City of Highland Park, "The collection and disposal
of garbage and acting in conserving the public health is governmental wherein the
municipality acts for the state." In the collection and disposal of garbage, the City of
Manila does not obtain any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit, but acts in the
interest of health, safety and the advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting

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the public generally.

WON 5 day work

week applicable to
petitioners

The rule is settled that in the performance of its governmental functions, a

municipal corporation, like the City of Manila, acts as an agent of the State, and as
such, is immune from suit unless consent thereto has been given. Such consent
must be expressed in unequivocal language and here no consent of the
Government has been shown.
NO
Section 562 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that the legal number of hours
in every branch of the Government service shall be 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or
a total of 40 hours a week, except those "for school, courts, hospitals and health clinics
or where the exigencies of the service so require."
The law gives to the respondent ample authority and discretion to extend their work
schedule beyond the prescribed number of days and hours of labor.

WON petitioners
entitled to overtime
compensation

Indeed, if the number of their work days is reduced, or if they are given days-off on
Saturdays and Sundays, including holidays, public health and sanitation would be
undermined and endangered by the non-collection of garbage and other refuse matters,
not to mention the foul odor that would fill the city atmosphere in those two or more
days.
NO
Section 259 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
"SEC. 259. Inhibition against payment of extra compensation. In the absence
of special provision, persons regularly and permanently appointed under the
Civil Service Law or whose salary, wages, or emoluments are fixed by law or
regulation shall not, for any service rendered or labor done by them on holidays
or for other overtime work, receive or be paid any additional compensation; nor,
in the absence of special provision, shall any officer or employee in any branch
of the Government Service receive additional compensation on account of the
discharge of duties pertaining to the position of another or for the performance
of any public service whatever, whether such service is rendered voluntarily or is
exacted of him under authority."
Since the members of the petitioner are government employees appointed under the
Civil Service Law and their salaries, wages, or emoluments are fixed by law or
ordinance, they have no right to overtime compensation for work required of them in the

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interest of the service beyond the number of days and hours prescribed by Republic Act
No. 1880.

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RZ Zamora
MUNICIPAL BOARD, in representation of the City of Cebu, petitioner, vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS, BOARD OF ASSESSMENT
APPEALS, Cebu City and AGUSTIN JEREZA, for and in behalf of the University of Southern Philippines Foundation, respondents.
(December 26,1964)
Doctrine: Municipal Corporations posses the power to sue and be sued.
Facts:
Private respondent University of Southern Philippines Foundation applied with the City Assessor of Cebu an application for exemption
from real estate tax of several parcels of land which it leased from various persons for school purposes.
The City Assessor disallowed the exemption of some of the lots.
The University then appealed the finding of the City Assessor to the Board of Assessment Appeals of Cebu who decided in favor of the
University.
The City Assessor, represented by the Municipal Board then appealed the decision to the Court of Tax Appeals who dismissed the case.

Issue 1: WON the City

of Cebu can appeal
from the decision of
the Board of
Assessment Appeals
under Sec. 11 of
Republic Act No. 1125
which provides:
SEC 11. Who may
appeal; effect of
appeal. Any
person, association or
corporation adversely
affected by a decision
or ruling of the
Collector of Internal
Revenue, the
Collector of Customs
or any provincial or

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Petitioner
Not
stated in
the case

Respondent

he Board of Assessment Appeals is

merely the instrumentality of the City
of Cebu and the latter being a
governmental agency is not among
those who may appeal to the Court of
Tax Appeals enumerated in Section
11 of Republic Act No. 1125.

Supreme Court
The City of Cebu constitutes a political body corporate
created by a special charter (Commonwealth Act No. 58),
endowed with the powers which pertain to a municipal
corporation. As such, it possesses the capacity to sue and
be sued. It is authorized to levy real estate taxes for its
support.
In the decision of the Board of Assessment Appeals of
Cebu City exempting the lots in question from the payment
of real property tax, no entity is more adversely affected
than the City of Cebu, for it stands to lose a yearly income
equivalent to the realty tax.
In the case of City of Manila and the City Assessor of
Manila vs. The Board of Assessment Appeals, et al., the
SC ruled that the City of Manila is a corporation adversely
affected by the decision of the Board of Assessment
Appeals. The city charters of Manila and Cebu have similar
provisions in respect to benefits derived from the collection
and levy of real property taxes and thus, there was no
reason to deviate from such finding. We hold that the City
of Cebu may validly appeal from the decision of the City

city Board of
Assessment Appeals
may file an appeal in
the Court of Tax
Appeals within thirty
days after the receipt
of such decision or
ruling.

Board of Assessment Appeals.

As to the personality of the Municipal Board to represent
the City of Cebu in this suit, Sec. 58 of Commonwealth Act
No. 58 expressly vests in the Municipal Board the authority
to appeal from the decision of the City Assessor to the
Board of Assessment Appeals. This indicates legislative
intent to lodge in the Municipal Board the right to represent
the City in an appeal from an adverse decision of the
Board of Assessment Appeals.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the Court of Tax Appeals for further proceedings. No
costs.

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CALLEJA V. COURT OF APPEALS

13 July 1962
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
Ratio Decidendi: Both the Provincial Fiscal and the Municipal Attorney shall have authority to represent a municipality in all cases wherein the
municipality, or any officer thereof in his official capacity, is a party. The work of a Municipal Attorney as legal counsel of the municipality
necessarily carries with it the duty of appearing in court in behalf of the municipality.
Petitioners:
Mariano Calleja
Respondents:
Court of Appeals (on certiorari)
Municipality of Iriga
Jose Villanueva, in capacity as Mayor
Marciano Tinio, in capacity as Municipal Treasurer
FACTS:
Nineteen civil service eligible employees of the Municipality of Iriga were separated from the service when their positions were abolished
by the municipal council for lack of funds. Calleja, in his behalf and in behalf of the other dismissed employees, filed an action for mandamus
against the Municipality of Iriga, the Members of the Municipal Council, and the Municipal Treasurer, praying for their reinstatement and payment
of their back salaries.
During the trial, respondents (aside from CA) were represented by the Provincial Fiscal of the Province of Camarines Sur, collaborated by
Atty. Felix, the Municipal Attorney of the Municipality of Iriga. A decision was rendered by the lower court ordering the reinstatement of the
dismissed employees and the payment of their back salaries. The Provincial Fiscal did not file a notice of appeal from this decision. But on March
23, 1963, the last day for perfecting the appeal, Municipal Atty. Felix, in behalf of the respondents, filed a notice of appeal and an appeal bond.
The respondent municipal officials also signed the notice of appeal, with the statement, "With our authority and consent:" over their signatures.
Before the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed a motion objecting to the approval of the appeal. The
CFI overruled the objection in an order, to which petitioner filed a motion to set aside the order. This motion was denied, and the case was duly
elevated to the CA. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, on the same grounds provided in the objection previously overruled by the CFI.
He CA denied the motion, hence this petition.
Petitioners:
Petitioner argue that the appeal was never perfected, on the theory that only the Provincial Fiscal can legally represent the Municipality of
Iriga and its officers. Petitioner cites Section 1681 and 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, and argues that Republic Act 2264 (An Act
Amending the Laws Governing Local Governments by Increasing their Autonomy and Reorganizing Provincial Governments) had not repealed or
modified said provisions. He also contends that the resolution of the Municipal Council of Iriga authorizing Municipal Atty. Silvestre Felix to

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represent the municipality in all cases wherein the municipality, or any officer thereof in his official capacity, is a party, was ultra vires. Petitioner
further contends that granting that said attorney may be allowed to appear in the case his appearance should be with the consent, control and
under the direction of the Provincial Fiscal. As the Provincial Fiscal did not sign the notice of appeal along with Atty. Felix, the appeal was not
properly brought to the Court of Appeals.
Respondents:
The Municipal Council of Iriga, Camarines Sur, approved Resolution No. 36, series of 1961, creating the office of Municipal Attorney for
the Municipality of Iriga, pursuant to the provisions of Section 3, paragraph 3 (a) of Republic Act 2264. The pertinent provision of this law reads:
Municipal councils of municipalities and regularly organized municipal districts shall have authority:
(a) To create a legal division or office in their respective municipalities to be headed by an attorney-at-law appointed by the mayor
with the approval of the council and whose compensation shall be fixed by such council. Such head of office shall be known as the
municipal attorney and shall act as legal counsel of the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be
assigned to him by the council. A member of the council who is an attorney-at-law may be appointed as such municipal attorney without
any further compensation."
Resolution No. 36 also provides:
Sec. 2. The Municipal Attorney shall be the chief legal adviser of the municipality. He shall have the following duties:
(a) He shall represent the municipality in all cases wherein the municipality, or any officer thereof, in his official capacity, is a party.
Thus, when Atty. Felix filed the notice of appeal and the appeal bond, it was pursuant to the power and authority granted to him by R.A.
2264, as made operable by MC Resolution No. 36.
ISSUE: Was the appeal filed on time?
HELD: YES
Although Sec. 1681 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "the provincial fiscal shall be the law officer of the province and as
such shall therein discharge the duties x x x it shall also be his duty, consistently with other provisions of the law, to represent in (the) courts the
Government of the Philippines and the officers and branches thereof in all civil actions and special proceedings and generally to act in such
province in all matters wherein said Government, or any branch or officers thereof, shall require the service of a lawyer;" and Sec. 1683 of the
same Code provides that the "provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court," the Court
ruled that this be harmonized with R.A. 2264, a later piece of legislation, that grants municipalities the power to create the office of Municipal
Attorney who shall act as the legal counsel of the municipality. This is pursuant to the objective of R.A. 2264 to expand the autonomy of local
government units.
Although R.A. 2264 does not have a provision similar to Sec. 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, such duty to represent the
municipality in any court may be inferred from R.A. 2264 that provides for the creation of the said office, "who shall act as legal counsel of the
municipality." The work of a legal counsel necessarily carries with it the duty of appearing in court in behalf of the municipality.
Dispositive: Petition is DISMISSED.

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Digester: Jam Marfil

CASE TITLE: Province of Cebu v. IAC
January 29, 2987, Second Division, J.Gutierrez, Jr.
DOCTRINE:
1. A private lawyer may be validly hired by the local government in the instant case, as an exception to the general rule that collaboration of
a private law firm with the fiscal and the municipal attorney is not allowed. A strict application of the provisions of the Revise Administrative
Code on the matter would deprive the plaintiffs in the court below of redress for a valid grievance. The provincial board authorization
required by law to secure the services of special counsel becomes an impossibility.
Petitioner:
Province of Cebu
Respondents:
Intermediate Appellate Court and private respondent Atty. Pablo P. Garcia
FACTS:
On February 4, 1964, while then Cebu City Governor Rene Espina was on official business in Manila, his Vice-Governor, Priscillano Almendras
and 3 members of the Provincial Board enacted Resolution No. 188 in Cebu City, donating to the City of Cebu 210 province-owned lots all located
in the City of Cebu. The deed of donation was immediately executed in behalf of the Province of Cebu by Vice-Governor Almendras, as authorized
by the Resolution, and accepted by Mayor Sergio Osmea, Jr in behalf of the City of Cebu. The document of donation was prepared and notarized
by a private lawyer. The donation was later approved by the Office of the President through Executive Secretary Juan Cancio.According to the
questioned deed of donation the lots donated were to be sold by the City of Cebu to raise funds that would be used to finance its public
improvement projects
Governor Espina denounced as illegal and immoral the action of his colleagues in donating practically all the patrimonial property of the province
of Cebu, considering that the provinces income was less than 1/4 of that of the City of Cebu.
To prevent the sale or disposition of the lots, the officers and members of the Cebu Mayor's League (in behalf of their respective municipalities)
along with some taxpayers, including Atty. Garcia, filed a case seeking to have the donation declared illegal, null and void. The CFI dismissed the
Case on the ground that plaintiffs were not the real parties in interest in the case.
Subsequently, after the city announced that the lots in question will be sold, Governor Espina, engaged the services of respondent Atty. Garcia, a
private lawyer, for the annulment of the deed of donation in 1965. Governor Espina ended his term on September 13, 1969.
After several years have elapsed, or on 1972, the Provincial Board passed a resolution authorizing the Provincial Attorney Baguia, to enter his
appearance for the Province of Cebu and for the new Governor, Vice-Governor and members of the Provincial Board in this case. However, on

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June 25, 1974, a compromise agreement was reached between the province of Cebu and the city of Cebu. On July 15, 1974, the court approved
the compromise agreement and a decision was rendered on its basis.
For his services rendered in the case, respondent Atty. Pablo P. Garcia filed through his counsel a Notice of Attorney's Lien, dated April 14, 1975,
praying that his statement of claim of attorney's lien in the case be entered upon the records thereof, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court.
To said notice, petitioner Province of Cebu filed through counsel, its opposition dated April 23, 1975, stating that the payment of attorney's fees
and reimbursement of incidental expenses are not allowed by law and settled jurisprudence to be paid by the Province. A rejoinder to this
opposition was filed by private respondent Garcia.
CFI: After hearing, the CFI of Cebu rendered judgment in favor of private respondent and against petitioner Province of Cebu, declaring that the
former is entitled to recover attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit and fixing the amount thereof at P30,000.00.
Both parties appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. In the case of private respondent, however, he appealed only from that portion of
the decision which fixed his attorney's fees at P30,000.00 instead of at 30% of the value of the properties involved in the litigation as stated in his
original claim
IAC: The IAC rendered a decision affirming the findings and conclusions of the trial court that the private respondent is entitled to recover
attorney's fees but fixing the amount of such fees at 5% of the market value of the properties involved in the litigation as of the date of the filing of
the claim in 1975.
Both parties went to the Supreme Court with private respondent questioning the fixing of his attorney's fees at 5% instead of 30% of the value of
the properties in litigations as prayed for in his claims. However, the private respondent later withdrew his petition. Hence, only the petition of
the Province of Cebu is pending before this Court.
ISSUE AND HOLDING:
1. W/N a private
lawyer
may be
hired the governor
to represent the
local government?

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PETITIONERS CONTENTION
The petitioner anchors its opposition to private
respondent's claim for compensation on the
grounds that the employment of claimant as
counsel for the Province of Cebu by then Governor
Rene Espina was unauthorized and violative of
Section 1681 to 1683 in relation to Section 1679 of
the Revised Administrative Code and that the claim
for attorney's fees is beyond the purview of Section

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
Not discussed.

SC:
Yes.
As a general rule, collaboration of a private law
firm with the fiscal and the municipal attorney is
not allowed.
Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative
Code, complemented by Section 3 of the Local
Autonomy Law, is clear in providing that only the
provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can

37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

It is also argued that Governor Espina was not
authorized by the Provincial Board, through a
board resolution, to employ Atty. Pablo P. Garcia
as counsel of the Province of Cebu.

represent a province or municipality in its

lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The
municipality's authority to employ a private
lawyer is expressly limited only to situations
where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to
represent it, as when he represents the province
against a municipality.
HOWEVER, every rule is not without an
exception, Ibi quid generaliter conceditur; inest
haec exceptio, si non aliquid sit contra jus
fasque (Where anything is granted generally,
this exception is implied; that nothing shall be
contrary to law and right). Indeed, equity, as
well as the exceptional situation facing us in
the case at bar, require a departure from the
established rule.
A situation obtains where the Provincial
Governor, in behalf of the Province of Cebu,
seeks redress against the very members of the
body, that is, the Provincial Board, which, under
the law, is to provide it with legal assistance. A
strict application of the provisions of the
Revise Administrative Code on the matter
would deprive the plaintiffs in the court
below of redress for a valid grievance. The
provincial board authorization required by
law to secure the services of special counsel
becomes an impossibility. The decision of the
respondent court is grounded in equity a
correction applied to law, where on account of
the general comprehensiveness of the law,
particular exceptions not being provided against,
something is wanting to render it perfect.
Respondent counsel's representation of the
Province of Cebu became necessary
because of the Provincial Board's failure or

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refusal to direct the bringing of the action to

recover the properties it had donated to the
City of Cebu. The Board more effectively
disqualified
the
Provincial
Fiscal
from
representing the Province of Cebu when it
directed the Fiscal to appear for its members in
Civil Case No. R-8669 filed by Atty. Garcia, and
others, to defend its actuation in passing and
approving Provincial Board Resolution No. 186.
The answer of the Provincial Fiscal on behalf of
the Vice-Governor and the Provincial Board
members filed in Civil Case No. R-8669; (Exhibit
"K") upholds the validity and legality of the
donation. How then could the Provincial Fiscal
represent the Province of Cebu in the suit to
recover the properties in question? How could
Governor Espina be represented by the
Provincial Fiscal or seek authorization from the
Provincial Board to employ special counsel?
Nemo tenetur ad impossibile (The law obliges
no one to perform an impossibility).lwphl@it
Neither could a prosecutor be designated by the
Department of Justice. Malacaang had already
approved the questioned donation

2. W/N Atty.
Garcia
should be
compensat
ed for the
services he
rendered.

Same arguments as above, plus: the contract of

service with Atty. Garcia was ultra vires.

Not discussed.

Yes.
The general rule that an attorney cannot recover
his fees from one who did not employ him or
authorize his employment, is subject to its own
exception.
We apply a rule in the law of municipal
corporations: "that a municipality may become
obligated upon an implied contract to pay the
reasonable value of the benefits accepted or
appropriated by it as to which it has the general
power to contract. The doctrine of implied

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municipal liability has been said to apply to all

cases where money or other property of a party
is received under such circumstances that the
general law, independent of express contract
implies an obligation upon the municipality to do
justice with respect to the same."
The petitioner cannot set up the plea that the
contract was ultra vires and still retain benefits
thereunder. Having regarded the contract as
valid for purposes of reaping some benefits, the
petitioner is estopped to question its validity for
the purposes of denying answerability.
To deny private respondent compensation for
his professional services would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process of
law
We agree with the determination of reasonable
fees for the private lawyer on the basis of
quantum meruit. The trial court fixed the
compensation at P30,000.00 and ordered
reimbursement of actual expenses in the
amount of P289.43.
[Note that the Court said that the initial claim of
Atty. Garcia of 5% or 30% of the properties
already worth (P120,000,000) in 1979 as
compensation for the private respondent's
services is simply out of the question. Maybe
that is why he no longer pursued his petition.]

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Digester: John Michael Vida

CASE TITLE: MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A. MARAVE, and PHILIPPINE
PETROLEUM CORPORATION
Date of Case: June 28, 1994
DOCTRINE:
Petitioner:
The Municipality of Pililia, Rizal
Respondents:
Philippine Petroleum Corporation
Hon. Arturo Marave Presiding Judge of Branch 78 of RTC Morong, Rizal
FACTS:
On March 17, 1989, the RTC Branch 80 rendered judgment in a civil case in favor of Pililla and against Phil. Petroleum Corp. (PPC), ordering PPC
to pay the following:
a) P 5.3 million in taxes due from PPC under Section 9(A) of Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 of Pililla from 1979 1983,
b) P 3.3 million in storage permit fees under Section 10, Paragraph Z(13)(b-1-c) of the same municipal tax ordinance from 1975 1986,
c) Mayors permit fee due from the same tax ordinance amounting to P 12,120.00,
d) Sanitary inspection fee amounting to P 1,010.00, and
e) Costs of suit.
On June 3, 1991, the SC affirmed the judgment of the RTC, with some modification rearding business taxes accruing prior to 1976 to not be paid
by PPC. The judgment became final and executory on July 13, 1991, with the records remanded to the RTC for execution.
On October 14, 1991, in connection with the execution of the judgment of the SC, Atty. Felix Mendiola filed a motion on behalf of Pililla with the
RTC Branch 78 of Morong, Rizal for the examination of PPCs gross sales for the years 1976 1978 and 1984 1991 for the purpose of
computing taxes on businesses as imposes under the Local Tax Code. Meanwhile, on October 21, 1991, PPC filed a manifestation that it had
already paid the sum of P11.45 million to Pilillas mayor in full satisfaction of the judgment of the SC. As evidence, it presented release and
quitclaim documents signed by the mayor. Accordingly, the RTC denied Atty. Mendiolas motion.
Atty. Mendiola filed an MR to the RTC, stating that total liability of PPC actually amounted to P24.2 million, while the amount paid to the
Municipality was less than half of that, and that the mayor could not waive the balance which represents taxes due under the judgment of the
muncipality. It must be noted that the law firm of Atty. Mendiola had registered two liens over the judgment of the municipality for alleged
consultancy services of 25% and attorneys' fees of 25% which, when quantified and added, amount to more than P12 million. The RTC Branch 78,
however, denied the MR.

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Atty. Mendiola then filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, which was remanded to the CA for disposition. The PPC afterwards filed a motion
questioning Atty. Mendiolas authority to represent the Municipality. The CA subsequently dismissed the petition of Atty. Mendiola for having been
filed by a private counsel in violation of law and jurisprudence, but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the Municipality of Pililla
through the proper provincial or municipal legal officer. A subsequent MR was similarly denied.
Issue 1:
WON Atty.
Mendiola
has
any
authority to
represent
Pililla

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
Yes.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
No.

While Section 1683 of

the Revised Admin
Code provides that
only the provincial
fiscal
and
the
municipal
attorney
can
represent
a
province/municipality,
the
provided
exception is broad
enough to include
situations wherein the
provincial
fiscal
refuses to handle the
case.

As
provided
by
Section 1683 of the
RAC,
only
the
provincial fiscal and
the municipal attorney
can
represent
a
province
or
municipality in their
lawsuits.

Furthermore,
PPC
cannot raise for the
first time on appeal
his lack of authority to
represent
the
municipality.

Furthermore, a line of
cases have already
shown that private
attorneys
cannot
represent a province
or
municipality
in
lawsuits.

SUPREME COURT:
Petition of Atty. Mendiola is devoid of merit.
The CA is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file a petition
in behalf of and in the name of the Municipality of Pililla. The matter of
representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled in Ramos
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., where the SC ruled that private attorneys cannot represent
a province or municipality in lawsuits.
Section 1683 of the RAC, complemented by Section 3 of RA 2264 (Local
Autonomy Law) provides that only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney
can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is
mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly
limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it.
For the aforementioned exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was
disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear on record.
As applied to the case at hand, there is nothing in the records to show that the
provincial fiscal was disqualified to act as counsel for Pililla on appeal, therefore
the appearance of Atty. Mendiola was without authority of law.
The SC did not sustain Atty. Mendiolas argument that the exception is broad
enough to include situations wherein the provincial fiscal refuses to handle the
case. A fiscal's refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal justification for
employing the services of private counsel. A fiscal cannot refuse to perform his
functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office.
Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council
should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in
place of the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in
court, pursuant to Section 1679 of the RAC.
Atty. Mendiolas argument that PPC cannot raise for the first time on appeal his
lack of authority to represent the municipality was also held as untenable. The

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legality of his representation can be questioned at any stage of the proceedings,

as provided in the aforementioned jurisprudence.
It should also be noted that the lack of authority of Atty. Mendiola was even raised
by the municipality itself. Furthermore, even assuming that the representation of
the municipality by Atty. Mendiola was duly authorized, said authority is deemed
to have been revoked by the municipality when Pililla, through the mayor and
without Atty. Mendiolas participation, entered into a compromise agreement with
herein private respondent with regard to the execution of the judgment in its favor
and thereafter filed personally with the court two pleadings
constitutive of a
"Satisfaction of Judgment" and a "Release and Quitclaim".
A client, by appearing personally and presenting a motion by himself, is
considered to have impliedly dismissed his lawyer. Counsel cannot pretend to be
authorized to continue representing the municipality since the latter is entitled to
dispense with his services at any time. Under Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, a client may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the
proceedings, and there is nothing to prevent a litigant from appearing before the
court to conduct his own litigation.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED for lack of merit and the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

[Type text]

Digester: Roddel Paraos

CASE TITLE: Teotico v City of Manila
Date of Case: January 29, 1968
DOCTRINE:
Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons
or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the
other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for
damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" specifically "of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision." In other words, RA 409 refers to negligence in
general, while Art 2189 governs liability due to defective streets in particular.
Under Art 2189, it is not necessary for the liability therein to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either control or supervision over the road or
street.
Petitioner: City of Manila
Respondent: Genaro Teotico, the one injured because of the open manhole, and the Court of Appeals
FACTS:
27 Jan 1958- Teotico was at the corner of Old Luneta and P. Burgos Ave. Manila, waiting for a jeepney in the loading and unloading zone. When
he hailed a jeepney, he stepped down from the curb to board it, but he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P.
Burgos Ave. His head hit the rim of the manhole, breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces to pierce his eyelid. He also suffered
contusions on the left thigh, upper left arm, right leg and upper lip, and abrasion on the right infra-patella region. The injuries required medical
treatment costing P1,400.
Teotico filed a case with CFI Manila for damages against City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of
police. CFI dismissed the complaint, CA affirmed but ordered the City of Manila was sentenced to pay damages of P6,750.

Whether Sec
13
4 of RA 409
13

Petitioners
Sec 4 of RA 409 should
apply since it is a

Respondent
Art 2189 should
apply.

SC
Art. 2189 should apply to this case.

The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or
any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or
other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.

[Type text]

(charter of
Manila) or Art
14
2189 should
apply to this
case

special law, intended

exclusively for Manila,
whereas the Civil Code
is a general law,
applicable to the entire
Philippines

WON the City

of Manila is
liable for
damages to
Teotico

No, because the

accident involving him
took place in a national
highway

Yes, because P.
Burgos Ave. is
under the
control or
supervision of
City of Manila

Although in so far as territorial application is concerned, RA 409 is a special law

and Civil Code a general law, but as regards subject matter, Section 4 of Republic
Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for:
"damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to
enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the
Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any
person by reason" specifically "of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision."
In other words, RA 409 refers to negligence in general, while Art 2189 governs
liability due to defective streets in particular.
Yes, the City of Manila should be liable for damages.
The first allegation that the accident took place in a national highway was not made
by the City of Manila in its answer. Teotico alleged in his complaint that his injuries
were due to the defective condition of a street which is under the supervision and
control of the City. The City of Manila in its answer said that "the streets
aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and
regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the
defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and
zealous in the performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed
upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue
was and is under its control and supervision.
The allegation that the accident happened in a national highway was made only in
the MR to the decision of the CA for the first time. It raised a question of fact, which
cannot be set up for the first time on appeal.
In any case, under Art 2189, it is not necessary for the liability therein to attach that
the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality. What said
article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either control or
supervision over the road or street.

14

Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective
conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.

[Type text]

Sec 18 (x) of RA 409 provides: Sec. 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal
Board shall have the following legislative powers:
xxxxxxxxx
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out,
construction and improvement, and to regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys,
sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for
lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . to provide for the
inspection of, fix the license fees for and regulate the openings in the same for the
laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the building and repair of tunnels,
sewers, and drains, and all structures in and under the same and the erecting of
poles and the stringing of wires therein; to provide for and regulate cross-works,
curbs, and gutters therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the streets and
other public places; to provide for the abatement of nuisances in the same and
punish the authors or owners thereof; to provide for the construction and
maintenance, and regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts and culverts; to prohibit
and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, hoop rolling, and other amusements which
may annoy persons using the streets and public places, or frighten horses or other
animals; to regulate the speed of horses and other animals, motor and other
vehicles, cars, and locomotives within the limits of the city; to regulate the lights
used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to provide for and change the
location, grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any such railroad to raise or
lower its tracks to conform to such provisions or changes; and to require railroad
companies to fence their property, or any part thereof, to provide suitable protection
against injury to persons or property, and to construct and repair ditches, drains,
sewers, and culverts along and under their tracks, so that the natural drainage of
the streets and adjacent property shall not be obstructed.

No, because the City of

Manila has not been
negligent in connection
therewith

[Type text]

It was negligent
in its
maintenance of
the road

The authority has not been withdrawn nor restricted by RA 917 and EO 113, upon
which the City of Manila relies. Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation of
the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and
municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within their respective
boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said
Republic Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway
funds.
Yes, it is liable because it was negligent in the maintenance of said road, as found
by the CA.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of Manila. It is so
ordered.

[Type text]

FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN and COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 61516
March 21, 1989
J. Sarmiento

Digester: Daven Mendoza

QUICK SUMMARY:
On 1978, while about to board a tricycle in the National Road (under the jurisdiction of Dagupan City), Guilatco fell into an open manhole and
fractured her right leg. She had to be hospitalized, operated on, and confined on two (2) different hospitals. She incurred about P8,000-P10,000
hospital bills and was not able to work for one (1) year.

There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over the public works in question. Hence, the liability of the
city to the petitioner under article 2198 of the Civil Code is clear.

PETITIONERS:
FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO

RESPONDENTS:
CITY OF DAGUPAN
COURT OF APPEALS

[Type text]

FACT S:
1. On July 25, 1978, Florentina Guilatco, a Court Interpreter of Branch III, CFI--Dagupan City, while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at
a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the control and supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally fell into a manhole
located on said sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg to be fractured.
2. As a result thereof, Guilatco had to be hospitalized, operated on, confined at 2 different hospitals for a period of 16 days. She also incurred
hospitalization, medication and other expenses to the tune of P8,053.65 or as she claims, a total of P 10,000.00 in all, but other receipts were
either lost or misplaced.
3. During period of Guilatcos confinement in said 2 hospitals, she suffered severe or excruciating pain not only on her right leg which was
fractured but also on all parts of her body; the pain has persisted even after her discharge from the hospitals.
4. Guilatco had to wear crutches and she has difficulty in locomotion. She was not able to report to work due to her difficulty of locomotion in going
up the stairs of her office, located near the city hall in Dagupan City.
5. Guilatco earned at least P 720.00 a month consisting of her monthly salary and other means of income, but she was not able to report to work
for 1 year.
6. The City Engineer of Dagupan City, admitted the existence of said manhole along the sidewalk in Perez Blvd., a National Road in front of the
Luzon Colleges. He also admitted that said manhole (there are at least 11 in all in Perez Blvd.) is owned by the National Government and the
sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the National Government. But as City Engineer of Dagupan City, he
supervises the maintenance of said manholes or drainage system and sees to it that they are properly covered.
7. Lower Court ruled in favor of Guilatco. Court of Appeals reversed the ruling on the ground that no evidence was presented to prove that the City
of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over Perez Boulevard.

Issue
Whether or not control or supervision
over a national road by the City of
Dagupan exists, in effect binding the

[Type text]

Petitioner
The drainage hole is
under the control and
supervision of Dagupan

Respondent
Dagupan City
contends that Perez
Boulevard, where the

Supreme Court
The liability is with Dagupan City.

city to answer for damages in

accordance with article 2189 of the
Civil Code.

Article 2189. Provinces, cities and

municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of
the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control
or supervision.

City, therefore, Dagupan

City is liable.

fatal drainage hole is

located, is a national
road that is not under
the control or
supervision of the
City of Dagupan.
Hence, no liability
should attach to the
city. It submits that it
is actually the
Ministry of Public
Highways that has
control or supervision
through the Highway
Engineer which, by
mere coincidence, is
held concurrently by
the same person who
is also the City
Engineer of
Dagupan.

It is not even necessary for the defective

road or street to belong to the province,
city or municipality for liability to attach.
The article only requires that either
control or supervision is exercised over
the defective road or street.

In the case at bar, this control or supervision

is provided for in the charter of Dagupan
and is exercised through the City Engineer
who has the following duties:

Sec. 22. The City Engineer--His powers,

duties and compensation-There shall be a
city engineer, who shall be in charge of the
department of Engineering and Public
Works. He shall receive a salary of not
exceeding three thousand pesos per
annum. He shall have the following duties:
xxx
(j) He shall have the care and custody of the
public system of waterworks and sewers,
and all sources of water supply, and shall
control, maintain and regulate the use of the
same, in accordance with the ordinance
relating thereto; shall inspect and regulate
the use of all private systems for supplying
water to the city and its inhabitants, and all
private sewers, and their connection with the

[Type text]

public sewer system.

xxx

The express provision in the charter

holding the city not liable for damages or
injuries sustained by persons or property
due to the failure of any city officer to
enforce the provisions of the charter,
cannot be used to exempt the city, as in
the case at bar.

The charter only lays down general rules

regulating the liability of the city. On the
other hand article 2189 applies in
particular to the liability arising from
"defective streets, public buildings and
other public works."

The City Engineer, Mr.

Alfredo G. Tangco,
admits that he exercises
control or supervision
over the said road. But
the city can not be
excused from liability by
the argument that the
duty of the City Engineer

[Type text]

Alfredo G. Tangco "(i)n his official capacity

as City Engineer of Dagupan, as Ex- Officio
Highway Engineer, as Ex-Officio City
Engineer of the Bureau of Public Works,
and, last but not the least, as Building
Official for Dagupan City, receives the
following monthly compensation: P 1,810.66
from Dagupan City; P 200.00 from the
Ministry of Public Highways; P 100.00 from

to supervise or control
the said provincial road
belongs more to his
functions as an ex-officio
Highway Engineer of the
Ministry of Public
Highway than as a city
officer. This is because
while he is entitled to an
honorarium from the
Ministry of Public
Highways, his salary
from the city government
substantially exceeds
the honorarium.

the Bureau of Public Works and P 500.00 by

virtue of P.D. 1096, respectively." This
function of supervision over streets, public
buildings, and other public works pertaining
to the City Engineer is coursed through a
Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance
Engineer. Although these last two officials
are employees of the National Government,
they are detailed with the City of Dagupan
and hence receive instruction and
supervision from the city through the City
Engineer.

There is, therefore, no doubt that the City

Engineer exercises control or
supervision over the public works in
question. Hence, the liability of the city to
the petitioner under article 2198 of the
Civil Code is clear.

DISPOSITION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court, dated March 12, 1979 and amended on March 13, 1979, is hereby REINSTATED with
modifications.

[Type text]

Digester: Marynette M. Gravador

CASE TITLE: Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte
Date of Case: January 31, 1958
DOCTRINE: Art. 1903 NCC applies only to special agent of the Insular Government, and as a general rule, LGUs are not liable if the
negligent employee was in the performance of governmental functions or duties.
Petitioner: Heirs of Proceto Palafox.
Respondent: The Province of Ilocos Norte, District Engineer, Provincial Treasurer, and Sabas Torralba.
FACTS:
Sabas Torralba was employed as the driver of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte detailed to the Office of the District Engineer.
While driving his freight truck, he ran over Proceto Palafox who died thereafter. Torralba was prosecuted for homicide through reckless
imprudence to which he pleaded guilty.
The heirs of Palafox instituted a civil case against the Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, the Provincial Treasurer, and Sabas
Torralba.
RTC: Dismissed the case.
Issue 1
WON the province of
Ilocos Norte is liable

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
They reserved their right
to file a civil action.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
To attach liability to
the
state,
a
declaration must be
made that Torralba
was a special agent
within the scope of
15
Art. 1903, par. 5 .
The driver was not a
special agent within
the scope of said
article

Supreme Court
No. The driver was not a special agent of the
government within the scope of Art 1903.
The principle only applies to the Insular
Government as distinguished from provincial or
municipal governments.

15
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions but also for those persons for whom another is responsible.
...
Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:

"The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act
performed, in which cast the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable."

[Type text]

 Doctrine of respondent
superior (the master
shall
answer
for
negligent acts of its
employees, illustrated in
Mendoza case regarding
liability
of
municipal
corporations)

Dispositive Portion:
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; province not liable.

[Type text]

As for the doctrine of respondent superior, if the

negligent employee was in the performance of
governmental functions or duties, as distinguished
from corporate or proprietary or business functions,
the government is not liable.
The driver, Torralba, was involved in the
construction or maintenance of roads which was a
governmental duty.
Therefore, the province cannot be held liable for his
negligent act.

Digester: Janine Bareo

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA vs. CA
Aug 9, 2005
DOCTRINE: For liability to arise under CC 2189, ownership of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not a
controlling factor, it being sufficient that a province, city or municipality has control or supervision thereof.
Petitioner: Municipality of San Juan
Respondent: Court of Appeals, Laura Biglang-awa, MWSS and Kwok Cheung
FACTS:
- MWSS and Kwok Cheung of KC Waterworks system (contractor) entered into a contract to install water service connections. On May 20,
1988, KC was given a job order by MWSS to conduct and effect excavations at the corner of M Paterno and Santolan road, San Juan,
MM (national road) for the laying of water pipes and tapping of water to the houses of water concessionaires.
- KC dispatched 5 workers to conduct the digging operations. The workers installed 4 barricades made up of GI pipes. The digging started
at 9AM and ended at 3PM. The workers dug a hole 1 meter wide and 1.5 meters deep, after which, they refilled the excavated portion but
only of the job was finished because they still need to re-excavate for the tapping of the pipes.
- May 31, 1988 between 10 and 11PM, Priscilla Chan was driving her Toyota at a speed of 30 kph on the right side of Santolan road
towards the direction of Pinaglabanan. With her on board the car and seated in front was Asst City Prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa. The
road was flooded as it was raining hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car fell on a manhole where KC had earlier made
excavations. The humerus on the right arm of Biglang- awa was fractured.
- Felix Ramos of the Traffic Division of the San Juan police saw the car already extracted and according to him, he did not see any
barricades at the scene when he arrived less than an hour later
- Biglang-awa filed a complaint for damages against MWSS, KC and the Municipality of San Juan. RTC held the MWSS, KC and the
Municipality jointly and severally liable. CA affirmed.
- Only the Municipality appealed.
Issue: WON the Municipality of San Juan is liable to Biglang- awa -- YES

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN

Under sec. 149, (1)(z) of the LGC of
1983, it is obliged to provide for the
construction, improvement, repair and
maintenance of only municipal streets,
avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges,
parks and other public places. Since
Santolan Road is a national and not a

[Type text]

CA decision
The DPWH may have issued the requisite
permit to KC for the excavation but the
municipality is not relieved of liability for its own
gross negligence. The municipality was
mandated to undertake necessary
precautionary measures to avert accidents and
insure the safety of pedestrians and

SC
Petitioner failed to take not of other provisions of
Sec 149 of the same code.
The municipality can regulate the drilling and
excavation of the ground for the laying of gas,
water, sewer, and other pipes within its territorial
jurisdiction. The term regulate found in Sec 149
can only mean that petitioner exercises the power

municipal road, it cannot be held liable

for the injuries suffered by Biglang-awa.

commuters.
The obligation of petitioner to maintain the safe
condition of the road within its territory is a
continuing one which is not suspended while a
street is being repaired. Knowledge of the
condition of the road may be actual or
constructive. It is enough that the authorities
should have known of the circumstances in the
exercise of ordinary care.
- Santolan road and the Greenhills area
is a busy thoroughfare

Under Sec. 8, Ordinance 82-01of the

Metropolitan Manila Commission, only
the project engineer of KC and MWSS
can be held liable.

Dispositive Portion:
Petition is denied. CA affirmed.

[Type text]

to control, or at the very least, supervision over all

excavations for the laying of gas, water, sewer and
other pipes within its territory
The municipalitys liability for injuries caused
by its failure to regulate the drilling and
excavation of the ground for the laying of gas,
water, sewer and other pipes, attaches
regardless of whether the drilling or excavation
is made on a national or municipal road for as
long as it is within its territorial jurisdiction.
Concededly, Sec 8 makes the permittee/excavator
liable for death, injury and/or damages caused by
its failure to adopt required precautionary
measures for the protection of the public. However,
nowhere can it be found in said ordinance any
provision exempting municipalities in MM from
liabilities caused by their own negligent acts.
Nothing prevents the court from applying other
relevant laws concerning petitioners liability for the
injuries sustained by Biglang-awa.

Edward Dayog
VICENCIO v. VILLAR
July 3, 2012
The Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Malabon (SPM) passed an ordinance in 2003 (City Ordinance 15-2003) which authorized then ViceMayor Jay Jay Yambao to enter into contracts for consultancy services for consultants in the SPM Secretariat. Petitioner Vicencio,
having been elected Vice-Mayor, entered into consultancy services with several people under said ordinance. The SC held that such the
contracts entered into by Vicencio and the appropriations therefor were illegal since the ordinance cannot be construed to grant a
continuing authority to the new Vice-Mayor.
Petitioners: Arnold Vicencio, Vice-Mayor of Malabon
Respondents: 1. Reynaldo Villar, Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA); 2. Juanito Espino, Commissioner of the COA; 3. Elizabeth
Zosa
FACTS:
- Oct. 30, 2003: The SPM approved CO 15-2003 which granted then Vice-Mayor Yambao the authority to enter into consultancy services for
certain positions in the SPM Secretariat.
- May 2004: Petitioner Vicencio was elected as Vice-Mayor of Malabon.
- To augment the manpower requirements of the existing SPM Secretariat, Vicencio deemed it necessary to enter into consultancy services.
- July 19, 2004: Vicencio addressed a letter to Atty. Danilo T. Diaz, the City Legal Officer, asking the latter whether it was necessary for the
incumbent SPM to ratify the newly entered contract of consultancy services. Atty. Diaz opined that such ratification was no longer necessary.
- Jan. 21, 2005: SPM adopted CO 01-2005 which appropriated funds for the expenditures of the city government of Malabon for the year 2005.
Included in the appropriations were P792,000 earmarked for the consultancy services.
- Feb. 1, 2005: Vicencio, representing the city government of Malabon, and under the authority of CO 15-2003, entered into contracts for
consultancy services with three people which indeed rendered said services.
- Dec. 19, 2005: Atenie Padilla, Supervising Auditor of the City Auditor's Office, issued Audit Obersvation Memorandum 2005-12-01911 which
disallowed the amount of P384,980 (in relation to the consultancy services rendered) for being an improper disbursement, reasoning that the
authority granted by CO 15-2003 specifically pertained to then Vice-Mayor Yambao and the period of 2003 only, it cannot be made to extend to
Vice-Mayor Vicencio.

[Type text]

- May 12, 2006: Respondent Zosa, agreeing Padilla's explanation in the AOM, issued Notice of Disallowance 06-009-101. Aggrieved by the
disallowance, Vicencio appealed it to the Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB) of the COA which denied the appeal in a decision dated June
12, 2007.
Issue 1:

Petitioner's Contention: Yes.

Respondent's Contention: No.

Supreme Court: No.

W/N the the authority

granted by CO 15-2003
to Vice-Mayor Yambao
to contract for
consultancy services
can be extended to
Vice-Mayor Vicencio.

The ordinance was ambiguous.

Therefore, there was a need to
interpret its provisions by looking into
the legislative intent.

The ordinance is clear and

unambiguous in mentioning that
the authority was granted only to
the then Vice-Mayor and covers
only a the period from June to
December 2003. The provision
regarding appropriations for
consultancy services also refers
to this period.

The powers of the Vice-Mayor are provided

for in Sec. 456 of RA 7160 (LGC). Under said
provision, there is no inherent authority on
the part of the City Vice-Mayor to enter into
contracts on behalf of the City Government.
Therefore, CO 15-2003 cannot be construed
as a continuing authority for any person who
enters the Office of the Vice-Mayor.

The Ombudsman had previously

dismissed the administrative and
criminal complaints for violation of RA
6713 and Usurpation of Authority. In
the decision, the Ombudsman held
that it was the intention of the SPM to
grant the authority to the Office of the
Vice-Mayor, regardless of who was
performing its duties.

CO 15-2003 is clear and precise and leaves no

room for interpretation.
It pertained only to: 1) consultancy contracts in
the specific areas of concern; 2) Vice-Mayor
Yambao; and 3) the period of June
December 2003.

PETITION DENIED.
Minor Issues
1. The petition is procedurally infirm because the Verification and Certification stated only that the matters contained in the petition come from the
petitioner's knowledge and belief whereas Sec. 4, Rule 7 of the ROC provide that if the contents of a pleading is not certified as true and correct
of [petitioner's] own personal knowledge and belief and based on authentic records and/or documents, then it would produce no legal effect.
2. Section 103 of P.D. 1445 declares that expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall
be a personal liability of the of1icial or employee found to be directly responsible therefor. The public official's personal liability arises only if the
expenditure of government funds was made in violation of law. In this case, petitioner's act of entering into a contract on behalf of the local
government unit without the requisite authority therefor was in violation of the Local Government Code. While petitioner may have relied on the
opinion of the City Legal Officer, such reliance only serves to buttress his good faith. It does not, however, exculpate him from his personal liability
under P.D. 1445.

[Type text]

Digest by: Monica G.

MUNICIPALITY OF TIWI vs BETITO
July 9, 2010
The law speaks of prior authorization and not ratification with respect to the power of the local chief executive to enter into a contract
on behalf of the local government unit. This authority was granted by the Sangguniang Bayan to Mayor Corral as per Resolution No. 1592.
Petitioners: Municipality of Tiwi represented by Hon. Mayor JAIME C. VILLANUEVA and the SANGGUNIANG BAYAN of TIWI
Respondent: Atty. Antonio Betito counsel hired by prior Tiwi Mayor Corral for the recovery of rightful share in realty taxes
Facts:
Present case, sprung from prior cases NPC vs Province of Albay and Salalima vs Guingona, Jr.
In NPC vs Province of Albay, the court found NPC liable for unpaid real estate taxes for properties located in Albay particularly geothermal
plants in the Municipality of Tiwi and Daraga. The properties were sold and Albay was the sole bidder.
NPC and the Governor Salalima of Albay entered into a MOA for the settlement of tax liabilities.
Mayor Corral of Tiwi formally requested the Governor to remit the rightful tax shares of Tiwi for payments made by NPC. The Governor
denied the request alleging the initial payments were only earnest money and the total amount will still be validated.
NPC requested a clarification from the Office of the President as to the extent of the shares of the local government units in the real estate
tax collections.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. 15-92 authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer to represent Tiwi and its
barangays in the recovery of their rightful share in the aforesaid realty taxes. Thereafter, Mayor Corral sought the services of respondent
Atty. Antonio B. Betito (respondent) and Atty. Alberto Lawenko (Atty. Lawenko). As a result, on January 25, 1993, Mayor Corral,
representing Tiwi, and respondent and Atty. Lawenko entered into a Contract of Legal Services (subject contract). The subject contract
provided, among others, that respondent and Atty. Lawenko would receive a 10% contingent fee on whatever amount of realty taxes that
would be recovered by Tiwi through their efforts.
Office of the President opined that Tiwi is entitled to a share in the realty taxes and that NPC may remit such share directly to them. NPC
informed the province of Albay that it will remit to Tiwi its share of the taxes.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay authorized the Provincial Treasurer to sell the subject properties and declared all payments
already made to them forfeited in favor of Albay.
Because of the continued refusal to remit Tiwis share of the initial payments, several cases were filed, one of which is the Salalima vs
Guingona Jr case.
The present controversy arose when Atty. Betito sought to enforce the Contract for Legal Services claiming his right to 10% of the benefit
to Tiwi.
ISSUE

[Type text]

Petitioner (Municipality of
Tiwi)

Respondent (Betito)

Supreme Court

WON Mayor was

authorized to enter
into the Contract

Petitioners argue that

Resolution No. 15-92 did not
authorize Mayor Corral to
enter into the subject
contract, hence, the contract
must first be ratified to
become binding on Tiwi.

They also alleged

that she exceeded
her authority when
she bound the
Municipality to a
10% contingent fee.

The law does not require that

the subject contract be ratified
by the Sangguniang Bayan in
order to become enforceable.
What the law requires is an
authorization which in this
case as in the form of the
Resolution 15-92.

Mayor was authorized to enter into the Contract;

Prior authorization not ratification
o Sec 444 of the LGC: The Chief Executive:
Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.
xxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical
governance the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code, the municipal mayor shall: x x x
(1) Exercise general supervision and control
over all programs, projects, services, and
activities of the municipal government, and in
this connection, shall: x x x
(vi) Upon authorization by the sangguniang
bayan, represent the municipality in all its
business transactions and sign on its behalf
all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such
other documents made pursuant to law or
ordinance; xxx
o

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Pursuant to this provision, the municipal

mayor is required to secure the prior
authorization of the Sangguniang
Bayan before entering into a contract on
behalf of the municipality. In the instant case,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi unanimously
passed Resolution No. 15-92 authorizing
Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer of her choice to
represent the interest of Tiwi in the execution
of this Courts Decision in NPC v Albay.
The law speaks of prior authorization and not
ratification with respect to the power of the
local chief executive to enter into a contract on
behalf of the local government unit. This

authority, as discussed above, was granted by

the Sangguniang Bayanto Mayor Corral as
per Resolution No. 15-92.

WON all services

rendered by Betito
was covered by the
Contract of Legal
Services

Petitioners alleged that the

contract should have been
limited to the execution of
the decision in NPC vs
Albay.

Respondent alledged that

Contract of Legal Services
was not limited to the
execution of the NPC vs Albay
Case but to other services
done pursuant to the Contract.

The resolution states that

the Mayor is authorized to
hire the services of a
lawyer to represent the
interest of the Municipality
of Tiwi and its barangays.

The scope of the service is limited to the

execution to the NPC vs Albay case

The resolution was clear in its whereas clause that the

purpose for the grant of authority was for the
execution of the NPC case. Any service not related to
it is beyond the scope of the authority of the lawyer
and therefore cannot hold the Municipality liable for
the contingent fee.

Procedural issue: WON judgement on the pleadings was proper NO

SC ruling: In the instant case, a review of the records reveal that respondent (as plaintiff) and petitioners (as defendants) set-up multiple levels of
claims and defenses, respectively, with some failing to tender an issue while others requiring the presentation of evidence for resolution. The
generalized conclusion of both the trial and appellate courts that petitioners answer admits all the material averments of the complaint is, thus,
without basis. For this reason, a remand of this case is unavoidable. However, in the interest of justice and in order to expedite the disposition of
this case which was filed with the trial court way back in 1999, we shall settle the issues that can be resolved based on the pleadings and remand
only those issues that require a trial on merits as hereunder discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 19, 2005 Decision and March 10, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV
No. 79057 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the reasonable
amount of attorneys fees which respondent is entitled to in accordance with the guidelines set in this Decision.

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Digester: (Rachel Kate Tacason)

CASE TITLE: FAJARDO v. LIM
Date of Case: April 10, 2006
DOCTRINE: (issues in the supreme court were merely procedural. This is just an illustration, I think, of an LGUs liability under contracts)
Petitioner: RAFAEL M. FAJARDO and ROGELIO P. NOGALES, owners of lots in Tondo, Manila, collectively known as the Fajardo Estate
Respondent: ALFREDO S. LIM, Mayor of Manila during time of case, and RAMON V. MARZAN, new City Administrator appointed by Lim
FACTS:
During the incumbency of Mayor Gemiliano Lopez of Manila, the city government undertook a Land for the Landless Program.
The city government decided to purchase properties which were squatter-infested for the purpose of selling them to the occupants at cost.
Among the properties which the city government opted to buy were the lots in Tondo, Manila, owned by petitioners, collectively known as the
Fajardo Estate.
The City of Manila bought the Fajardo lots at P1,600/sqm. The Registry of Deeds issued the corresponding titles in the name of the City of
Manila.
Mayor Gemiliano Lopez then signed the disbursement voucher and PNB Check No. 906350 dated August 10, 1992 payable to petitioners
which was approved on pre-audit by the City Auditor. The City Cashier, the City Disbursing Officer, and the City Treasurer certified as to the
availability of funds.
On July 1, 1992, Lim was elected Mayor.His financial and budget consultant, Colonel Zosimo Balagtas, advised Marzan not to sign the check
as there seemed to be something suspicious about the transaction, given the large amount involved.
Mayor Lim instructed Marzan to withhold the check until the questionable purchase of the Fajardo Estate had been cleared. Marzan then
informed petitioners that per order of the Mayor, their check could not be released.
The City Legal Officer opined that there is no legal obstacle to release the check. Still, Mayor Lim reiterated his instruction to Marzan not to
release the check, explaining that he directed his aide, Genato Boy Herrera, to investigate the matter. Herrera, however, merely made
some mathematical computations showing the difference between the acquisition cost and the selling price of the lots.
When their demand to release the check was not heeded, petitioners filed with the RTC of Manila, a Petition for Mandamus with Damages
against the Mayor and Marzan.
RTC RULING:
1. Respondent Marzan is ordered to countersign immediately PNB Check No. 906350 and, thereafter, to deliver the same check to Fajardo
and Nogales; and if the same is not feasible, then should coordinate with the City Treasurer for the issuance of another check for the
same amount as replacement of the old check;
2. Respondent Marzan is likewise ordered to pay in his personal capacity Nogales and Fajardo damages.
3. Respondent Lim is absolved of any civil liability for the non-issuance of the check.

[Type text]

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners alleged that the award of damages should be increased and insisted that Mayor Lim
should be held solidarily liable with Marzan. For their part, Mayor Lim and Marzan claimed that mandamus is not the proper remedy and
maintained that the latter should not be held liable for damages. CA affirmed the RTC decision but deleted award for damages.
Facts for the Procedural Issues in the Supreme Court:
On July 21, 1995, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision insisting that the trial court should not have deleted the award of
damages. On August 21, 1995, both respondents Mayor Lim and Marzan filed with this Court their respective petitions for review on certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 120943. In its Resolution of petitioners MR, the CA said it has lost competence to act on the MR when respondents lodged
with this Court their Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether both respondents should be held liable jointly and severally for damages?
2. Whether the filing with this Court of a petition for review on certiorari by herein respondents divested the Court of Appeals of its
jurisdiction?
HELD:
1. This is a factual issue. It is a well-established rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals,
via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is limited to reviewing errors of law, for this Court is not a trier of facts.
2. Respondents seasonably filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 120943). Upon the filing of this petition, this
Court assumed jurisdiction over the case, regardless of whether or not the said petition would be given due course. Clearly then, the
Court of Appeals had no more jurisdiction over the case.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
34931 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

[Type text]

Digester: Trina Fernandez

CASE TITLE: BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. vs. PROVINCE OF AKLAN, et al

Date of Case: June 26, 2012

DOCTRINE: The LGC establishes the duties of national government agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance, and requires them to
secure the twin prior public consultation and approval of local government units before projects that affect such ecological balance can be
implemented. Absent these requirements the implementation is illegal.

Petitioner:
Boracay Foundation Inc. (BFI)Duly registered, non-stock domestic corporation with the primary purpose is to foster a united, concerted and environmentconscious development of Boracay Island, thereby preserving and maintaining its culture, natural beauty and ecological balance, marking the island as the crown
jewel of Philippine tourism, a prime tourist destination in Asia and the whole world. It consists of at least 60 owners and representatives of resorts, hotels,
restaurants, and similar institutions; at least 5 community organizations; and several environmentally-conscious residents and advocates.

Respondent:
1. Province of Aklan (POA) represented by Gov. Carlito Marquez
2. Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA)Government entity created by PD No. 1084, which states that one of the purposes for which respondent PRA was
created was to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, it eventually became the lead agency primarily responsible for all reclamation projects
in the country under EO No. 525, series of 1979.
EO No. 543, series of 2006 delegated the power to approve reclamation projects to PRA through its governing Board, subject to compliance with existing laws
and rules and further subject to the condition that reclamation contracts to be executed with any person or entity (must) go through public bidding.
3. Department of Environment and Natural Resources Environment Management Bureau Region VI (DENR-EMB RVI)Government agency in the
Western Visayas Region authorized to issue Environmental Compliance Certificates (ECCs) regarding projects that require the environments protection and
management in the region.

rd

NOTE: The relevant issue is listed as ISSUE 3, Issues 1 and 2 are provided to give more context to the case in general and to the discussion of the 3 issue.

[Type text]

FACTS:

1. POA planned to expand the port facilities at Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay, claiming that tourist arrivals to Boracay would reach 1 million in the
future.
2. And so on May 7, 2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of POA issued a resolution, authorizing Governor Carlito Marquez to file an application with PRA to
reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan.
3. In the same year, POA deliberated on the possible expansion from its original proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to 40 hectares in order to maximize
the utilization of its resources.
4. After PRAs approval, on April 27, 2010, DENR-EMB RVI issued to POA ECC-R6-1003-096-7100 (the questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of the Reclamation Project
to the extent of 2.64 hectares to be done along the Caticlan side beside the existing jetty port.
5. On May 17, 2010, POA finally entered into a MOA with PRA which stated that the land use development of the reclamation project shall be for
commercial, recreational and institutional and other applicable uses. It was at this point that POA deemed it necessary to conduct a series of public
consultation meetings.
6. The Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay (MM) and petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (BFI)
expressed their strong opposition to the reclamation project on environmental, socio-economic and legal grounds.
a) The Sangguniang Bayan of MM issued Resolution No. 044 2009, saying that POAs foreshore lease application was for business enterprise purposes for its
benefit, at the expense of the local government of Malay, which by statutory provisions was the rightful entity to develop, utilize and reap benefits from the
natural resources found within its jurisdiction.
b) In Resolution No. 046 2010, MM reiterated its strong opposition to respondent Provinces project and denied its request for afavorable endorsement of the
Marina Project.
c) In Resolution No. 016 2010 MM requested respondent PRA not to grant reclamation permit and notice to proceed to the Marina Project of the [respondent]
Provincial Government of Aklan located at Caticlan, Malay, Aklan.
d) BFI informed PRA of its opposition to the reclamation project, as based on the opinion of Dr. Alio, an expert from the UP Marine Science Institute,
rendered based on the documents submitted by POA to obtain the ECC, a full EIA study is required to assess the reclamation projects likelihood of
rendering critical and lasting effect on Boracay considering the proximity in distance, geographical location, current and wind direction, and many other
environmental considerations in the area. BFI noted that said documents had failed to deal with coastal erosion concerns in Boracay. It also noted that
POA failed to comply with certain mandatory provisions of the LGC, particularly, those requiring the project proponent to conduct consultations with
stakeholders.
7. Despite the opposition, POA merely noted their objections and issued a notice to the contractor on December 1, 2010 to commence with the
construction of the project.
8. Thus, on June 1,2011, BFI filed with the Supreme Court the instant Petition for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the Writ of Continuing Mandamus
under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
9. The Court issued a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and ordered the respondents to file their respective comments to the petition.

[Type text]

SUPREME COURT
BFIs CONTENTION: RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
No, it is not. The contents of the two resolutions submitted by respondent Province do not support its conclusion
WON the petition No discussion
should be
POA:
that the subsequent favorable endorsement of the LGUs had already addressed all the issues raised and rendered
dismissed for
the instant petition moot and academic as there are explicit conditions imposed that must be complied with by
being moot and
With the alleged
respondent Province.
academic
favorable
endorsement of the
- Reso No. 003, series of 2012, of the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan states that any vertical structures
reclamation project by to be constructed shall be subject for barangay endorsement.
the Sangguniang
- Clearly, what the barangay endorsed was the reclamation only, and not the entire project that includes the
Barangay of Caticlan construction of a commercial building and wellness center, and other tourism-related facilities. Petitioners
and the Sangguniang objections, as may be recalled, pertain not only to the reclamation per se, but also to the building to be constructed
Bayan of the
and the entire projects perceived ill effects to the surrounding environment
Municipality of Malay,
16
all the issues raised
- Reso No. 020, series of 2012, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay is even more specific.
by petitioner had
- The Sangguniang Bayan of Malay obviously imposed explicit conditions for POA to comply with on pain of
already been
revocation of its endorsement of the project, including the need to conduct a comprehensive study on the
addressed, and this
environmental impact of the reclamation project, which is the heart of the petition before us.
petition should be
dismissed for being
moot and academic.
ISSUE 1

16

WHEREAS, noble it seems the reclamation project to the effect that it will generate scores of benefits for the Local Government of Malay in terms of income and employment for its constituents,
but the fact cannot be denied that the project will take its toll on the environment especially on the nearby fragile island of Boracay and the fact also remains that the project will eventually
displace the local transportation operators/cooperatives;
WHEREAS, considering the sensitivity of the project, this Honorable Body through the Committee where this matter was referred conducted several consultations/committee hearings with concerned
departments and the private sector specifically Boracay Foundation, Inc. and they are one in its belief that this Local Government Unit has never been against development so long as compliance
with the law and proper procedures have been observed and that paramount consideration have been given to the environment lest we disturb the balance of nature to the end that progress will
be brought to naught;
WHEREAS, time and again, to ensure a healthy intergovernmental relations, this August Body requires no less than transparency and faithful commitment from the Provincial Government of Aklan in
the process of going through these improvements in the Municipality because it once fell prey to infidelities in matters of governance;

[Type text]

WHEREAS, as a condition for the grant of this endorsement and to address all issues and concerns, this Honorable Council necessitates a sincere commitment from the Provincial Government of Aklan
to the end that:
1.

To allocate an office space to LGU-Malay within the building in the reclaimed area;

2.

To convene the Cagban and Caticlan Jetty Port Management Board before the resumption of the reclamation project;

3.

That the reclamation project shall be limited only to 2.6 hectares in Barangay Caticlan and not beyond;

4.

That the local transportation operators/cooperatives will not be displaced; and

5. The Provincial Government of Aklan conduct a simultaneous comprehensive study on the environmental impact of the reclamation project especially during Habagat and Amihan seasons and
put in place as early as possible mitigating measures on the effect of the project to the environment.
WHEREAS, having presented these stipulations, failure to comply herewith will leave this August Body no choice but to revoke this endorsement, hence faithful compliance of the commitment of the
Provincial Government is highly appealed for

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ISSUE 2
The reclamation
POA:
WON POA failed project is
Filed a Manifestation An [EIA] is a process that involves predicting and evaluating the likely impacts of a project (including
to perform the full misclassified as a
single project when in and Motion stating
Environment
cumulative impacts) on the environment during construction, commissioning, operation and
fact it is co-located. that the ECC issued
Impact
abandonment. It also includes designing appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures
by the DENR-EMB
Assessment
RVI covered an area addressing these consequences to protect the environment and the communitys welfare.
(EIA) as required The classification
made by POA that the of 2,691 square
by laws and
regulations based reclamation project is meters in Caticlan,
on the scope and merely an expansion and its application for
reclamation of 40
classification of of the existing jetty
the project
port, when the project hectares with the PRA Thus, the EIA process must have been able to predict the likely impact of the reclamation project to the
descriptions
was conditioned on its
environment and to prevent any harm that may otherwise be caused. The project now before us
embodied in the
submission of specific
different documents it documents within 120 involves reclamation of land that is more than five times the size of the original reclaimed land. The
filed describe
days. Its failure to
area prior to construction merely contained a jetty port, whereas the proposed expansion involves so
commercial
comply with said
establishments to be condition indicated its much more. To be true to its definition, the EIA report submitted by POA should at the very least predict
built, among others, to waiver to pursue
the impact that the construction of the new buildings on the reclaimed land would have on the
raise revenues for the the succeeding
LGU; thus, it should phases of the
surrounding environment.
have been classified reclamation project
as a new project.
and that the subject
matter of this case
Province
had thus been limited
The duty of LGUs to ensure the quality of the environment under PD No. 1586 was emphasized in
circumvented the
to 2.64 hectares.
documentary
requirements of the PRA:
Republic of the Philippines v. The City of Davao:
DENR-EMB RVI by
the act of connecting The Aklan Beach
Sec. 15 of the LGC, defines an LGU as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such,
the reclamation
Zone Restoration and
it
performs dual functions, governmental and proprietary. Governmental functions are those that concern the health, safety and the
project with its
Protection Marine
previous project in
Development Project advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public generally. Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special
1999 and claiming
will now be confined corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and benefit. When exercising governmental powers and
that the new project is to the reclamation and performing governmental duties, an LGU is an agency of the national government. When engaged in corporate activities, it acts as an agent of
a mere expansion of development of the the community in the administration of local affairs.
the previous one.
2.64 hectares, more
or less.
Found in Sec. 16 of the LGC is the duty of the LGUs to promote the peoples right to a balanced ecology. Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the City
of Davao, can not claim exemption from the coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic endowed with governmental functions, an LGU has the
duty to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the very same objective of PD 1586. xxx

[Type text]

Sec. 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally
critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized
representative. The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state and its political subdivisions, i.e., the LGUs are juridical
persons. Undoubtedly therefore, LGUs are not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586.
Lastly, very clear in Sec. 1 of PD 1586 that said law intends to implement the policy of the state to achieve a balance between socio-economic
development and environmental protection, which are the twin goals of sustainable development. The above-quoted first paragraph of the
Whereas clause stresses that this can only be possible if we adopt a comprehensive
and integrated environmental protection program where all the sectors of the community are involved, i.e., the government and the

ISSUE 3
POA:
WON there was
proper, timely,
and sufficient
public
consultation for
the project
required by the
LGC

PRA had required

POA to obtain the
favorable
endorsement of
Barangay Caticlan
and Malay
Municipality
pursuant to the
consultation
procedures as
required by the
LGC. POA failed to
comply.

Consultation vis-- No, there was no timely consultation.

vis the favourable
endorsement from
Under Sec. 27 in connection with Sec. 26 of the LGC17, 2 requisites must be met before a national
the concerned
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented:
LGUs as
contemplated
(1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
under the LGC are
merely tools to
(2)prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
seek advice and not
Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.
a power clothed
upon the LGUs to
unilaterally
approve or
The LGC establishes the duties of national government agencies in the maintenance of ecological
disapprove any
balance, and requires them to secure prior public consultation and approval of local government units
government
for the projects described therein.
The reclamation
projects.
-The national agency involved is respondent PRA. Even if the project proponent is the local government
project is in
of Aklan, it is PRA which authorized the reclamation, being the exclusive agency of the government to
violation of the LGC
undertake reclamation nationwide. Hence, it was necessary for POA to go through respondent PRA and
as POA failed to
Consultative
to execute a MOA, wherein PRAs authority to reclaim was delegated to POA.
enter into proper
activities have been
consultations with
conducted with
-Respondent DENR-EMB RVI, regional office of the DENR, is also a national government institution which
the concerned
LGUs in connection is tasked with the issuance of the ECC that is a prerequisite to projects covered by environmental laws
LGUs. POA
with Secs. 26 and such as the one at bar.
belatedly called the
27 of the
public consultation
LGC. Their spirit
meeting and only
and intent is to
This project can be classified as a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance
then did it detail
17
create
aninavenue
Section 26. Duty of National Government
Agencies
the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. - It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled
the actions that it for parties, to come of local communities, and is covered by the requirements found in the LGC. It was established that this
[Type text]
project as described above falls under Sec. 26 because the commercial establishments to be built could
had already
up with a tool in
cause pollution as it could generate garbage, sewage, and possible toxic fuel discharge.
undertaken,
harmonizing its
particularly: the
views and concerns
issuance of the
about the project.
Caticlan Super
The information dissemination conducted months after the ECC had already been issued was

The Court went on to discuss both parties common goals of national significance and stated that the speedy and smooth resolution of these
issues would benefit all the parties. Therefore, respondent Provinces cooperation with respondent DENR-EMB RVI in the Court-mandated
review of the proper classification and environmental impact of the reclamation project is of utmost importance.

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The TEPO issued by this Court is hereby converted into a writ of
continuing mandamus specifically as follows:
1.

DENR-EMB RVI shall revisit and review the following matters:

a.

its classification of the reclamation project as a single instead of a co-located project;

corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop
land, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units, nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the
goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent
or minimize the adverse effects thereof.
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied
with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation
sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
18

5.3 Public Hearing / Consultation Requirements

For projects under Category A-1, the conduct of public hearing as part of the EIS review is mandatory unless otherwise determined by EMB. For all other undertakings, a
public hearing is not mandatory unless specifically required by EMB.
Proponents should initiate public consultations early in order to ensure that environmentally relevant concerns of stakeholders are taken into consideration
in the EIA study and the formulation of the management plan. All public consultations and public hearings conducted during the EIA process are to be
documented. The public hearing/consultation Process report shall be validated by the EMB/EMB RD and shall constitute part of the records of the EIA process. (Emphasis
supplied.)

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b. its approval of POAs classification of the project as a mere expansion of the existing jetty port in Caticlan, instead of classifying it as a new
project; and
c. the impact of the reclamation project to the environment based on new, updated, and comprehensive studies, which should forthwith be
ordered by respondent DENR-EMB RVI.
2.

POA shall perform the following:

a. fully cooperate with respondent DENR-EMB RVI in its review of the reclamation project proposal and submit to the latter the appropriate
report and study; and
b. secure approvals from local government units and hold proper consultations with non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders
and sectors concerned as required by Section 27 in relation to Section 26 of the Local Government Code.
3. PRA shall closely monitor the submission by respondent Province of the requirements to be issued by respondent DENR-EMB RVI in
connection to the environmental concerns raised by petitioner, and shall coordinate with respondent Province in modifying the MOA, if
necessary, based on the findings of respondent DENR-EMB RVI.
4. BFI and the respondents POA, represented by Governor Carlito S. Marquez, The PRA, and The DENR-EMB RVI are mandated to submit their
respective reports to this Court regarding their compliance with the requirements set forth in this Decision no later than three (3) months from
the date of promulgation of this Decision.
5.
In the meantime, the respondents, their concerned contractor/s, and/or their agents, representatives or persons acting in their place or
stead, shall immediately cease and desist from continuing the implementation of the project covered by ECC-R6-1003-096-7100 until further
orders from this Court. For this purpose, the respondents shall report within five (5) days to this Court the status of the project as of their
receipt of this Decision, copy furnished the petitioner.

This Decision is immediately executory.

[Type text]

Digester: Jel Gallego

FILINVEST LAND, INC. vs. FLOOD-AFFECTED HOMEOWNERS OF MERITVILLE ALLIANCE
August 10, 2007; G.R. No. 165955
DOCTRINE:
MMDA is a development authority whose services have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge
expenditures. Their powers are limited to laying down policies and coordination with other agencies relative to its primary functions.
Local government units functions and responsibilities include providing infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs
of the residents such as drainage and sewerage; and flood control.
Petitioner: Filinvest Land, Inc. - a domestic corporation engaged in realty development business, one of which is Meritville.
Respondenst: 54 residents of Meritville Townhouse Subdivision who purchased their housing units from Filinvest; they are represented by Gabrel
Delim and Victor Raquipiso
FACTS:
1. Meritville is Filinvests first low-cost townhouse in Pulang Lupa, Las Pias City. It is located near the heavily-silted Naga River. Later, new
subdivisions were built with elevations higher than that of Meritville. This development turned Meritville into a catch basin from rains and
from water overflowing from Naga River.
2. Due to perennial flood, respondents townhouses suffered severe damages. On three occasions, they sent letters to Filinvest demanding
to address the problem. Filinvest installed a pumping station and improved the drainage system but these were not enough to address the
problem.
3. The National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation has declared the affected townhouses unacceptable collaterals.
4. June 15, 1996: Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner with the HLURB and prayed that Filinvest be ordered to upgrade the
elevation of the affected areas and repair the units or in the alternative, to transfer them to other flood-free housing projects, allowing them
to sell-back their affected units.
5. Filinvests answer: Filinvest already took appropriate measures (installation of a pumping station & improvement of the drainage),
approved by local government of Las Pinas City
6. On ocular inspection the HLU Arbiter found that flooding recurs in the area with an ave. depth of 1.25 meters. Majority of the affected
houses have damaged appliances, furniture, wall partitioning, and panel doors. The pump provided cant accommodate the volume of
flood water and its operation creates disturbing loud noise despite an enclosed housing provided by the owner/developer. River remains to
be silted and undredged. Filinvest failed to secure the conformity of the affected homeowners before it installed its drainage system; and
that it did not observe honesty and good faith in solving the issue at bar.
7. Feb 19, 1997: HLU Arbiter issued a Decision for respondents. On appeal, this decision was affirmed with modifications providing for the
constitution of a Board of Appraisers to determine the present market value of the affected lots as well as the improvements thereon for
purposes of sell back.
a. Filinvest is enjoined from collecting the amortization payment from the complainants until such time that the flooding problem is rectified to the
satisfaction of the complainants

[Type text]

b. In the event of a sell-back of the 77 units, Filinvet must compensate the complainants for each unit based on the present market value, plus
expenses on improvements on the units, plus moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 for each complainant homeowner.
However, it is understood that to the extent that the complainants have not yet paid in full the agreed consideration, the corresponding
value thereof should be deducted from the foregoing.

8. Petitioner then interposed an appeal to the Office of the President, which affirmed the Decision of the HLURB. Petitioner then filed with the
CA a pet. for review under Rule 43; CA affirmed judgment of OP. Petitioner filed a motion for Recon which was denied. Hence this petition
for review on certiorari.
ISSUE 1: WON the flooding in Meritville has been caused by petitioners negligence
Petitioner: NO
Respondent: YES
SC: NO, negligence cannot be attributed to petitioner.
Negligence is defined as the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
19
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. It is never presumed and but
20
must be proven by whoever alleges it. Test is: Did the defendant in doing the negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
1) Meritville was the first subdivision to be developed in the locality. Later developments elevated the surrounding areas to be more than
1meter higher than Meritville. Prior to this, there was no flooding in the subdivision.
2) HLU Arbiter found that the Naga River has remained heavily silted and undredged. It is due to the heavy silting that the river could not
take the volume of water flowing into it and thus causing the flooding of the area.
ISSUE 2: WON petitioner is liable for failure to address the silting problem of the Naga River
Petitioner: NO, under RA No. 7924, it is the MMDA
who should be held responsible.
SEC. 3. Scope of MMDA Services. Metrowide services under the jurisdiction of the MMDA
are those services which have metro-wide
impact and transcend local political boundaries
or entail huge expenditures such that it would
not be viable for said services to be provided by
the individual local government units (LGUs)
comprising Metropolitan Manila. These services
shall include:
(a) Development planning
which includes the preparation of
medium and long-term development
19
20

Phil Natl Construction Corp. v. CA

BPI v. Casa Montessori Internationale

[Type text]

Respondent: YES

plans; the development, evaluation

and
packaging
of
projects;
investments
programming;
and
coordination and monitoring of plan,
program and project implementation.
xxx
(d) Flood
control
and
sewerage
management,
which
include
the
formulation
and
implementation of policies, standards,
programs and projects for an
integrated flood control, drainage and
sewerage system.
xxx

SC: NO, Art 502 of the Civil Code provides that rivers and their natural bed are of public dominion. As Naga River is a public property, hence, it
is the government which should address the problem.
In MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., metro-wide services was defined as those services which have metro-wide impact and
transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual
local government units comprising Metro Manila. These include:
1) development planning
2) transport and traffic management
3) solid waste disposal and management
4) flood control and sewerage management
5) urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter services
6) health and sanitation, urban protection, and pollution control; and
7) public safety
The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system, and administration.
Clearly, MMDA is a development authority. Filinvest cannot seek relief from the MMDA as its services only involve laying down policies and
coordination with other agencies relative to its primary functions.
What is pertinent to respondents cause is Section 17 LGC on Basic Services and Facilities, particularly, Sec. 17. (b) (viii) 4):
SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently
vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code.
Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate,
or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to the following:
For a Municipality:

[Type text]

xxx
(viii) Infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of the residents of the municipality and which are funded out of the municipal funds
including but not limited to municipal roads and bridges; school buildings and other facilities for public elementary and secondary schools; clinics, health
centers and other health facilities necessary to carry out health services; communal irrigation, small water impounding projects and other similar projects,
fish ports; artesian wells, spring development, rainwater collectors and water supply systems; seawalls, dikes, drainage and sewerage; and flood
control, traffic signals and road signs, and similar facilities.
xxx
4) For A City:
All the services and facilities of the municipality and province x x x

Based on this, it is clear that the city government of Las Pias City has the duty to control the flood in Meritville Townhouse Subdivision.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. Assailed Decision and Resolution of CA are REVERSED.

[Type text]

Digester: JFD MADARANG

ARSADI DISOMANGCOP and RAMIR DIMALOTANG vs. SECRETARY OF DPWH SIMEON DATUMANONG and SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT EMILIA BONCODIN
25 November 2004 : J. TINGA
DOCTRINE: Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its subordinates, whether geographically or
functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain areas. Decentralization comes in two formsdeconcentration and devolution.
Deconcentration is administrative in nature; it involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of authority and responsibility from
the national office to the regional and local offices. Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political decentralization, or the transfer of
powers, responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain functions from the central government to local government units.
To this end, Art. X.Sec. 16 of the Constitution limits the power of the President over autonomous regions. In essence, the provision also
curtails the power of Congress over autonomous regions.
Petitioners:
Disomangcop is the OIC, Office of the District Engineer of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM, Lanao del Sur (DPWH-ARMMFED, hereafter)
Dimalotang is the Engineer II of the DPWH-ARMM-FED, and President of the rank and file employyes of the DPWH-ARMM-FED.
Respondents:
DBM Secretary, pettitioners wanted to compel her to release funds appropriated for public works projects in Marawi City and Lanao del Sur
to the DPWH-ARMM-FED; and
DPWH Secretary, to compel him to allow the DPWH-ARMM-FED to implement all public works projects within its jurisdictional area
FACTS:
In 1989, RA 6734 (ARMM Organic Act) was passed by Congress, and ratified in a plebiscite by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and
Tawi-Tawi. Pres. Cory Aquino passed EO 426 to place the control and supervision of the DPWH withn the ARMM under the Autonomous
Regional Government.
In 1999, then DPWH Sec. Gregorio Vigilar issued DO 119 creating the DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have
jurisdiction over national infrastructure projects under the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur.
In 2001, Pres. Estrada signed into law RA 8999 establishing the First Engineering District of Lanao del Sur, which includes the City of
Marawi and the municipalities in the First District of Lanao del Sur.
Also in 2001, RA 9054 amending RA 6734 lapsed into law. RA 9054 contained detailed provisions on the powers of the Regional
Government and the retained areas of governance of the National Government. Basilan and the City of Marawi voted to join the ARMM.
Thereafter, RA 6734 and RA 9054 are collectively referred to as the ARMM Organic Acts.
Petitioners filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the SC seeking to annul and set aside DO 119, and prohibit the
DPWH Sec from implementing DO 119 and RA 8999.
Issue

[Type text]

PETITIONERS

RESPONDENTS

Supreme Court

WON DO 119 is
unconstitutional

WON RA 8999
is
unconstitutional

[Type text]

CONTENTION
DO 119 is
unconstitutional. It was
issued with grave
abuse of discretion. It
also violates the
autonomy of the
ARMM for it tasked the
Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office
with functions that
have already been
devolved to the
DPWH-ARMM-FED

CONTENTION
DO 119 is
constitutional. It was
issued in accordance
with Executive Order
No. 124, reorganizing
the then-Ministry of
Public Works and
Highways.

RA 8999 is a piece of
legislation that was not
intelligently and
thoroughly studied. No
public hearing nor
consultation with the
DPWH-ARMM was
made. The House
Committee on Public
Works and Highways
failed to invite a single
official from the
affected agency. It
was skillfully timed for
signature by former
President Estrada
during the pendency
of the impeachment
proceedings.

RA 8999 is
constitutional. The
powers of the
autonomous regions
did not diminish the
legislative power of
Congress.

DO 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office

which has jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi
City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of EO 426.
The office created under DO 119, having essentially the same
powers, is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM-FED formed under
the aegis of EO 426.
EO 124, upon which DO 119 is based, is a general law
reorganizing the Ministry of Public Works and Highways while EO
426 is a special law transferring the control and supervision of the
DPWH offices within ARMM to the Autonomous Regional
Government. The latter statute specifically applies to DPWHARMM offices. E.O. 124 should therefore give way to E.O. 426
in the instant case.
In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a
plebiscite in effect superseded EO 124. With the repeal of EO
124 which is the basis of DO 119, it necessarily follows that DO
119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
It is not necessary to declare RA 8999 unconstitutional because it
never became operative and was superseded or repealed by
subsequent enactment.
The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional
autonomy scheme. While they are classified as statutes, the
Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy
affirmation by a plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof cannot
be amended by an ordinary statute, such as RA 8999 (which was
never submitted in a plebiscite) in this case. The amendatory
law has to be submitted to a plebiscite.
RA 8999 was repealed and superseded by RA 9054. RA 9054 is
anchored on the 1987 Constitution. It advances the constitutional
grant of autonomy. RA 8999, however, ventures to reestablish the
National Governments jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in
Lanao del Sur. RA 8999 is patently inconsistent with RA 9054,
and it destroys the latter laws objective. RA 8999 contravenes
true decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, considering that RA 9054 repealed RA 8999 and rendered DPWH DO 119 functus officio, the petition insofar
as it seeks the writs of certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED.

[Type text]

Digester: Annie Ballesteros

CASE TITLE: Province of Batangas v Alberto Romulo
Date of Case: May 27, 2004
Ponente: CALLEJO, SR., J p
DOCTRINE: Local autonomy 'means a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization.' Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and
local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation,
however limited, and for no other purpose than to enhance self-government.
Petitioner: The Province Of Batangas, Represented By Its Governor, Hermilando I. Mandanas
Respondents: Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, in his capacity as Chairman of the Oversight Committee on Devolution, Secretary Emilia
Boncodin of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and Secretary Jose Lina of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG).
FACTS:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued E.O.48 entitled "ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT AND
EQUALIZATION." The program was established to "facilitate the process of enhancing the capacities of local government units (LGUs) in the
discharge of the functions and services devolved to them by the National Government Agencies pursuant to the Local Government Code." The
Oversight Committee constituted under Section 533(b) of RA 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991) was tasked to formulate and issue the
appropriate rules and regulations necessary for its effective implementation. To address the funding shortfalls of functions and services devolved
to the LGUs and other funding requirements of the program, the "Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund" was created. The initial fund was
to be sourced from the available savings of the national government for CY 1998. For 1999 and the succeeding years, the corresponding amount
required to sustain the program was to be incorporated in the annual GAA. The Oversight Committee has been authorized to issue the
implementing rules and regulations governing the equitable allocation and distribution of said fund to the LGUs. In RA 8745, aka GAA of 1999, the
program was renamed as the LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF).
P5 billion pesos of the IRA (Internal Revenue Allotment) was earmarked for the LGSEF in the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and reenacted budget for 2001. OCD resolutions were promulgated providing for the allocation schemes covering the P5 B and the implementing rules
and regulations. The LGSEF is released to the LGUs only upon their compliance with the implementing rules and regulations, including the
guidelines and mechanisms, prescribed by the Oversight Committee. The guidelines required (a) the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for
funding based on the criteria laid down by the Oversight Committee; (b) the LGUs to submit their project proposals to the DILG for appraisal; (c)
the project proposals that passed the appraisal of the DILG to be submitted to the Oversight Committee for review, evaluation and approval. It was
only upon approval that the Oversight Committee would direct the DBM to release the funds for the projects.

[Type text]

On December 5, 2001, Executive Secretary Romulo endorsed to Secretary Boncodin the release of funds to certain LGUs from the LGSEF in
accordance with handwritten instructions of President Arroyo.
Gov. Mandanas from Batangas assails as unconstitutional and void the provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, relating to the LGSEF.
Similarly assailed are the Oversight Committee's Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029 and
OCD-2002-001 issued pursuant to the GAAs. The petitioner submits that the assailed provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions, insofar as
they earmarked the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and 2001 for the LGSEF and imposed conditions for the
release, violate the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.

Issue

Petitioners Contention

Respondents Contention

Supreme Court Holding

Whether the
assailed provisos in
the GAAs of 1999,
2000 and 2001,
earmarking for each
corresponding year
the amount of five
billion pesos of the
IRA for the LGSEF
and the OCD
resolutions
promulgated
pursuant thereto,
transgress the
Constitution and the
Local Government
Code of 1991.

The assailed provisos constitute improper

amendments to Section 285 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 on the
percentage sharing of the IRA among the
LGUs, as they invariably provided for a
different sharing scheme.

The LGUs have no vested right in a permanent or fixed

percentage as Congress may increase or decrease the
"just share" of the LGUs in accordance with what it
believes is appropriate for their operation. There is
nothing in the Constitution which prohibits Congress
from making such determination through the
appropriations laws.

The assailed provisos in the

GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001
and the OCD resolutions violate
the constitutional precept on
local autonomy. (See Ratio
below)

[Type text]

The modifications constitute an illegal

amendment by the executive branch of a
substantive law. To vest the Oversight
Committee with the authority to determine
the distribution and release of the LGSEF,
which is a part of the IRA of the LGUs, is
an anathema to the principle of local
autonomy as embodied in the Constitution
and the Local Government Code of 1991.
The possible disapproval by the Oversight
Committee of the project proposals of the
LGUs would result in the diminution of the
latter's share in the IRA. The petitioner
cites as an example the experience in
2001 when the release of the LGSEF was
long delayed because the Oversight
Committee was not able to convene that
year and no guidelines were issued

The petition has already been rendered moot and

academic as it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy. The IRAs for the years 1999, 2000 and
2001, have already been released and the government
is now operating under the 2003 budget. The
respondents submitted certifications issued by officers
of the DBM attesting to the release of the allocation or
shares of the petitioner in the LGSEF for 1999, 2000
and 2001.

therefor.
RATIO:
Courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," for the GAAs in the coming years
may contain provisos similar to those being sought to be invalidated, and yet, the question may not be decided before another GAA is enacted.
Thus, the SC makes a categorical ruling on the substantive issue.
The entire process involving the distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible To subject its distribution and release to
the vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight
Committee from time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the
release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the "just share" of the LGUs "shall be automatically
released to them."
The Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even control, over the distribution and release of a portion of the IRA, the LGSEF, is subversive of
the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution. It finds no statutory basis at all as the Oversight Committee was created merely to
formulate the rules and regulations for the efficient and effective implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991 to ensure "compliance
with the principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution." The Oversight Committee's authority is limited to the implementation of
the Local Government Code of 1991, not to supplant or subvert the same. Neither can it exercise control over the IRA, or even a portion thereof, of
the LGUs.
Section 284 of the Local Government Code provides that, beginning the third year of its effectivity, the LGUs' share in the national internal
revenue taxes shall be 40%. This percentage is fixed and may not be reduced except "in the event the national government incurs an
unmanageable public sector deficit" and only upon compliance with stringent requirements set forth in:
Sec. 284. Provided, That in the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit, the President of the
Philippines is hereby authorized, upon recommendation of Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local Government and Secretary of
Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to
make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of the national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year; Provided, further That
in the first year of the effectivity of this Code, the local government units shall, in addition to the thirty percent (30%) internal revenue allotment
which shall include the cost of devolved functions for essential public services, be entitled to receive the amount equivalent to the cost of devolved
personnel services.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs' IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal
year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be automatically released shall be a
proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal yearThere is no allegation that the national internal revenue tax collections for the
fiscal years 1999, 2000 and 2001 have fallen compared to the preceding three fiscal years.

[Type text]

Local autonomy 'means a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization.' The
Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments
and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the
relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of
federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited,
and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
Decentralization of administration. Decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power to the local levels. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable' and 'ensure their fullest development
as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.' At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President
exercises 'general supervision' over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.' He has no control over their acts
in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the [sic] favor of local governments [sic] units declared to
be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.
Dispositive Portion: The petition is GRANTED. The assailed provisos in the General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the
assailed OCD Resolutions, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

[Type text]

Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary (for Part VI Linkages of LGU with Other Entities)
13 December 2005
(Digest adopted from ustlawreview.com; Important points underlined by K. Guangko)
DOCTRINE: The Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and Executive Order No. 192 (Charter of DENR) entrust the DENR with
the guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina Watershed Reservation and our other natural treasures. However, although the
DENR, an agency of the government, owns the Marikina Reserve and has jurisdiction over the same, this power is not absolute, but is
defined by the declared policies of the state, and is subject to the law and higher authority They have ignored their responsibility as
guardians and protectors of this tormented piece of land.
Petitioner: Province of Rizal, Municipality of San Mateo, et. al. (the local governments want the subject dump located in San Mateo to be closed)
Respondent: Executive Secretary, Secretary of Environment & Natural Resources, Laguna Lake Development Authority, Secretary of Public
Works and Highways et. al. (Executive Department wants to keep the dump open)
FACTS:
This case sprouted from the Memorandum of Agreement dated 17 November 1988 signed by Secretaries of DPWH and DENR together with the
Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) Governor. The same provided that DENR allowed the utilization of its land in Pintong, Bocaue, Rizal as a
sanitary landfill by MMC. However, on 7, 8 and 10 February 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo wrote to Gov. Cruz of MMC, the DPWH,
the Executive Secretary, and the DENR, informing them of the SB resolution banning creation of dumpsites for Metro Manila within its jurisdiction.
The letter also asked that addressee's side be heard, and that the addressees suspend and temporarily hold in abeyance all and any part of your
operations with respect to the San Mateo Landfill Dumpsite. No action was taken on these letters.
It was also found that the land subject of the MOA was part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area. Thus, in a memorandum (31 May 1989)
and two reports (19 June 1989 and 22 January 1990) submitted by the forest officers of the Forest Engineering and Infrastructure Unit of the
Community Environment and Natural Resource Office (CENRO), DENR-IV, Rizal Province, showed that there was no permit issued to MMC to
utilize these portions of land for dumping purposes, that the use of the areas greatly affected 1192 families residing and cultivating areas
surrounding the dumping site. Respondents LLDA informed the MMA that the heavy pollution and risk of disease generated by dumpsites
rendered the location of a dumpsite within the Marikina Watershed Reservation incompatible with its program of upgrading the water quality of
Laguna Lake. Another report by the Regional Technical Director to the DENR found respiratory illnesses among pupils of a primary school located
approximately 100 meters from the site, as well as the constant presence of large flies and windblown debris all over the schools playground.
In February 1990, DENR granted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (formerly MMC) an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) for the
operation of the garbage dumpsite. On 31 July 1990, less than six months after the issuance of the ECC, DENR suspended the ECC in a letter
addressed to the respondent Secretary of DPWH, stating that it was ascertained that ground slumping and erosion have resulted from improper
development of the site. On November 1993, the DENR Secretary sent a letter to MMA recommending that the all facilities and infrastructure in
the garbage dumpsite in Pintong Bocaue be dismantled. Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the government agencies,
the Office of the President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, signed and issued Proclamation No. 635, Excluding from the Marikina

[Type text]

Watershed Reservation Certain Parcels of Land Embraced Therein for Use as Sanitary Landfill Sites and Similar Waste Disposal Under the
Administration of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.
On 22 July 1996, the petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. CA denied the petition for lack of cause of action. On 05 January 1998, while the appeal
was pending, the petitioners filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, pointing out that the effects of the El Nio phenomenon would be
aggravated by the relentless destruction of the Marikina Watershed Reservation. On 28 January 1999, the petitioners filed a Motion for Early
Resolution, calling attention to the continued expansion of the dumpsite. As a result, MMDA officials agreed to abandon the dumpsite after six
months. The municipal mayors allowed the use of the dumpsites until 20 July 1999. On 20 July `999, the Presidential Committee on Flagship
Programs and Projects and the MMDA entered into a MOA with the Provincial Government of Rizal, the Municipality of San Mateo, and the City of
Antipolo allowing the use of the dumpsite until 31 December 2000. However, on 11 January 2001, President Estrada directed DILG Secretary
Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite in view of the emergency situation of uncollected garbage in Metro
Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent health and sanitation epidemic. Claiming the above events constituted a clear and present danger of
violence erupting in the affected areas, the petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Restraining Order on 19 January 2001. On 24 January 2001, SC
issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for, effective immediately and until further orders. Meanwhile, on 26 January 2001, Republic Act
No. 9003, otherwise known as The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, was signed into law by President Estrada.

Issues

PETITIONER:

RESPONDENT:

Supreme Court:

W the San Mateo

Landfill
will
remain
permanently
closed

Various reports of
the effects of the
dump
on
the
environment and on
the
residents
(polluted sources of
potable
water;
respiratory
illnesses, etc.)

Declared that the

reason
for
the
creation
of
the
Marikina Watershed
Reservation to
protect the Marikina
River as source of
supply of the City of
Manila no longer
exists
Marikina Watershed
Reservation
and
thus the San Mateo
Site are located in
the public domain
and the power to
control or regulate its
use is national and
not
local

Two self-evident truths: (a) the San Mateo site has adversely affected its
environments; (b) sources of water should always be protected. Before
Proclamation 635, Congress enacted the National Water Crisis Act that
sought to address the protection and conservation of watersheds.
Respondents actions defy all logic.

W
the
local
governments have
the power to control
or regulate the use
natural resources
located in the public
domain

[Type text]

San Mateo Dump CLOSED.

The Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and Executive Order No.
192
(Charter
of
DENR)
entrust
the
DENR
with
the guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina Watershed Reservation
and our other natural treasures. However, although the DENR, an agency
of the government, owns the Marikina Reserve and has jurisdiction over the
same, this power is not absolute, but is defined by the declared policies of
the state, and is subject to the law and higher authority They have
ignored their responsibility as guardians and protectors of this tormented
piece of land.

government.
Legality
of
Proclamation 635

Proclamation
635
violates the LGC.

Proclamation 635 is
not subject to the
provisions of LGC.

*Full discussion below.

Under the LGC, two requisites must be met before a national project that
affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can
be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities and
prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Lack of either
requisite makes the projects implementation illegal.

* The reorganization act of DENR defines and limits its powers over the countrys natural resources
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources: one of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention
was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the convention in
favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources
was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the states power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization.
The Regalian doctrine was embodied in the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on Conservation and Utilization of Natural
Resources. This was reiterated in the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV on the National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation, and
21
reaffirmed in the 1987 Constitution in Section 2 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony ,
Respondent DENR was mandated by then President Corazon C. Aquino, under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 otherwise known as
The Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, to be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development and proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing
lands, mineral resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain. It is also responsible for the
licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos.
Oposa v. Factoran: The right to a balanced and healthful ecology is a fundamental legal right that carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment. This right implies the judicious management and conservation of the countrys resources, which duty is
22
23
reposed in the DENR under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 . This policy is also restated in the Admin Code that stresses the
necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment.

21
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements
may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
22
Note also Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the
different segments of the population to the development and use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the

[Type text]

In sum, the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 192 entrust the DENR with the guardianship and safekeeping of the
Marikina Watershed Reservation and our other natural treasures. However, although the DENR, an agency of the government, owns the
Marikina Reserve and has jurisdiction over the same, this power is not absolute, but is defined by the declared policies of the state, and is
subject to the law and higher authority. Section 2, Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, while specifically referring to the
mandate of the DENR, makes particular reference to the agencys being subject to law and higher authority.
It is the height of irony that the public respondents have vigorously arrogated to themselves the power to control the San Mateo site, but have
deftly ignored their corresponding responsibility as guardians and protectors of this tormented piece of land.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41330, dated 13 June 1997, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on 24 January 2001 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED

policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization; development and conservation of our
natural resources.
23
SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. - (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such
natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.

[Type text]

[Type text]

Digester: Herrera
SAMPIAN vs. INDAR
December 21, 2009
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Nature: Administrative Case
Doctrine: The automatic release of the IRA from the national treasury does not prevent the proper court from deferring or suspending the
release thereof to particular local officials when there is a legal question presented in the court pertaining to the rights of the parties to receive the
IRA or to the propriety of the issuance of a TRO or a preliminary injunction while such rights are still being determined.
Petitioners:

Respondents:

Hadji Amer R. Sampiano, incumbent Mayor, and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Balabagan, Lanao del Sur
Judge Cader P. Indar of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Malabang, Lanao del Sur

FACTS:
1. Sampiano filed before the Commission on Elections (Comelec) a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction/TRO against his rival mayoralty candidate, his uncle Ogka, and the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur
composed of Vadria Pungginagina and Zenaida Mante.
2. Comelec issued the several orders/ First, ot authorized the vice-mayor to temporarily assume the duties and responsibilities as mayor due to
the double proclamation of Sampiano and Ogka for the position of mayor. Then, it ordered that status quo be maintained at the time of the
issuance of the said Order. Then, it clarified previous Orders, Sampiano was ordered to act, perform and discharge the duties, functions and
responsibilities as mayor to prevent paralysis to public service pending determination and final resolution of the controversy involving the
mayorship of the Municipality of Balabagan.
3. Ogka filed an Urgent MR. He also informed in writing, the Chief Legal Counsel of PNB, Atty. Alvin C. Go, and asked him not to release the IRA
(Internal Revenue Allotment which is the share of the local government unit in national internal revenue taxes) for the Municipality of Balabagan,
Lanao del Sur until the controversy involving the mayorship of the said municipality now pending with the Comelec shall have been finally
resolved. However, the IRA was still released pursuant to a COMELEC order.
4. Ogka filed a special civil action for Prohibition and Injunction with TRO and Preliminary Injunction. On the same day, respondent Judge issued
an Order setting the hearing of the petition on October 14, 2004. He likewise directed, pending resolution of the said petition, the PNB-Marawi

(represented by Disomangcop and Go) to hold or defer the release of the IRA for the Municipality of Balabagan unless ordered otherwise by the
court
5. Sampiano prodded Judge to lift said Order so as not to deprive the officials and employees of the Municipality of Balabagan from receiving their
hard earned salaries, but respondent Judge did not heed the said request
6. Petitioners filed administrative case charging said judge with gross and wanton ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, manifest
partiality and serious acts of impropriety in connection with the Injunction
7. OCA recommendation: Guilty of ignorance of the law for violating Section 5 of Rule 58, Revised Rules on Civil Procedure and that he be
imposed a penalty of FINE in the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) pesos.

WON respondent
judge is guilty of
gross and wanton
ignorance of the
law, grave abuse of
authority, manifest
partiality and
serious acts of
impropriety.

SAMPIAN et. al
Judge Indar is guilty
of gross and wanton
ignorance of the law,
grave abuse of
authority, manifest
partiality and serious
acts of impropriety for
the reasons set forth
below:
1. Court has no
jurisdiction over the
action. COMELEC is
vested under the
Constitution with the
enforcement of election
laws.

INDAR
Did not commit any
administrative lapses

SUPREME COURT
Respondent Judge failed to comply with the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court
in issuing October 11, 2004 Order, a preliminary
injunction order. However, petitioner failed to prove
that Respondent Judge acted with bad faith.

1. Court assumed jurisdiction

over [SCA] No. 12-173 as it is a
petition for prohibition and
injunction and not an
enforcement of election laws.

1. The RTC has jurisdiction over complaint for

injunction pursuant to Section 21 of BP 129. (The
complaint was not treated as an application or
enforcement of election law action).
SEC 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. - Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction
which may be enforced in any part of their respective
regions; xxx

2. The October 11, 2004

Order is a SUPER
ORDER. It was not only

2. Considering the urgency of

the petition and before granting
the prayer for the issuance of the

2. Order was not in contravention of Section 286 of the

LGC on the automatic release of the share of the local

issued ex-parte but also

it directed the PNBMarawi to hold or defer
the release of the IRA
until ordered otherwise
by [the] court.

3. TRO is like a writ of

preliminary injunction. In
both instances, prior
notice and hearing are
required.
- TRO has a limited life
of twenty (20) days
while
a
writ
of
preliminary injunction is
effective only during the
pendency of the case
and only after posting
the required injunction
bond.

TRO, he immediately issued an

order on October 11, 2004,
which defer or hold the release
of
the
Internal
Revenue
Allotment
(IRA)
pending
resolution of the petition by the
court and thereafter set the
hearing of the petition on
October 14, 2004. October 11,
2004 order DID NOT FREEZE
the IRA but merely HELD or
DEFERRED its release to any
person
including
petitioner
Sumulong Sampiano Ogka (who
is the complainants uncle), a
party to the election case who
also holds [a] COMELEC
proclamation as duly elected
mayor of Balabagan.

government unit.

3. Judge was also cautious in his

actions to avert the already
growing tension between the
warring families newly aroused
by the result of the May 10, 2004
election. Hence, he has to relax
the application of the rules and
harmonize
it
with
the
temperament of the protagonists
who are Maranaos belonging to
the same family clan.

3. Section 5, Rule 58 expressly prohibits the grant of

preliminary injunction without hearing and prior notice
to the party or person sought to be enjoined. However,
courts are authorized to issue ex parte a TRO effective
only for seventy-two (72) hours if it should appear
from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified
petition that great or irreparable injury would result to
the applicant before the matter could be heard on
notice.

- automatic release of the IRA under Section 286

is a mandate to the national government through the
Department of Budget and Management to effect
automatic release of the said funds from the treasury
directly to the local government unit, free from any
holdbacks or liens imposed by the national government.
- this automatic release of the IRA from the
national treasury does not prevent the proper court from
deferring or suspending the release thereof to particular
local officials when there is a legal question presented in
the court pertaining to the rights of the parties to receive
the IRA or to the propriety of the issuance of a TRO or a
preliminary injunction while such rights are still being
determined.

Within the aforesaid period of time, the Court should

conduct a summary hearing to determine if a TRO shall be
issued. The TRO, however, shall be effective only for a
period of twenty (20) days from notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined. During the 20-day period,

the judge must conduct a hearing to consider the propriety

of issuing a preliminary injunction. At the end of such
period, the TRO automatically terminates without need of
any judicial declaration to that effect, leaving the court no
discretion to extend the same.
- In this case, the TRO issued ex parte was
effective for eleven (11) days from October 11, 2004 until
October 22, 2004 in violation of the Rules. Only a TRO
issued after a summary hearing can last for a period of
twenty days.
4. Order was issued in
violation of Section 286
of
the
Local
Government
Code
(LGC), which provides
for
the
automatic
release of the share of
the local government
unit from the national
government.

4. The provision on the

automatic release of IRA is not a
shield or immunity to the
authority of the courts to
interfere, interrupt or suspend its
release when there is a legal
question presented before it in
order to determine the rights of
the parties concerned.

4. Sampiano adduced no evidence to prove that the

issuance of the October 11, 2004 Order was motivated
by bad faith. Since there is no showing that respondent
Judge was motivated by bad faith or ill motives in
rendering the assailed Order, and this is his first offense,
we sustain the penalty recommended by the OCA to be
imposed on respondent Judge for violating Section 5, Rule
58 of the Rules of Court.

Dispositive Portion: A penalty of a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) is imposed on respondent Judge for violation of the Rules of Court.

Digest by: Arnel Abeleda

CASE TITLE: De Villa v City of Bacolod
Date of Case: September 16, 2008
PETITIONERS:

Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Domingo Rio, Lt. Col. Miguel Coronal, and P/Maj. Nicolas Torres

RESPONDENTS:

City of Bacolod and Lt. Col. Herman S. Plotea

NATURE:

Petition for review on certiorari of the RTC decision (Note: no appeal was made to the Office of the President(OP), thus
the SC notes there was failure to exhaust admin remedies)

DOCTRINE:
The local executives have general and operational supervision over local police units, but no power of administrative supervision
or control over them; hence, absence of recommendation from the local chief executive does not invalidate the replacement of a Station
Commander made by the INP Director General. At best, the participation of the local chief executive is recommendatory but the power to relieve or
reassign a city INP Station Commander is lodged with the INP Director General under existing laws.
FACTS:
1. On September 1987, Lt. Gen. Renato de Villa, then Director General of the Integrated National Police (INP), relieved Lt. Col. Herman S.
Plotea as Bacolod City INP Station Commander allegedly because of the worsening peace and order and insurgency situation in
Bacolod City, and assigned him to the PC Provincial Headquarters in Bacolod City.
2. The city of Bacolod filed with the RTC of Bacolod a complaint for declaratory relief and/or injunction with prayer for issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction to declare the relief of Plotea as invalid and illegal.
3. The complaint was later amended to implead Plotea as an unwilling co-plaintiff (defendant)
4. Plotea filed an answer with crossclaim praying for dismissal of the complaint against him but asked for reinstatement with full backwages
and without loss of seniority rights.
5. SolGen files a motion to dismiss. After hearing on the MTD, case was submitted for resolution.
6. RTC: ifo of City of Bacolod. Plotea was summarily replaced without observance of due process, violative of Executive Order 1012 as
amended by Executive Order 1027 and the 1987 Constitution requiring as an essential condition for relief a prior recommendation of, or
consultation with the local chief executive(i.e., the City Mayor of Bacolod).
7. Thus, this appeal.
8. Note: City of Bacolod had a change of heart during the pendency of the case in the SC. After several extensions, it filed its one (1) page
comment praying for the dismissal of the petition as moot and academic, the City was satisfied with the performance of the new station
commander Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:

SUPREME COURT:

The INP Chief has the power to

replace, transfer or reassign local
Chiefs of Police even without the
approval of the local chief executive.

The replacement, transfer or

reassignment of the Chief of Police
may only be done upon approval of
the local chief executive.

The petition is granted (regardless whether the City had a

change of heart).

Executive Orders 1012 and 1027 did

not remove administrative supervision
and control over police units from the
INP chief, what is given to local
executives over local police units is
general and, at most, operational
supervision and direction.

Executive Orders 1012 and 1027

effectively removed administrative
supervision and control over local
police units from the INP chief in favor
of local executives.

Under Sec 7 of PD 765, the INP (now PNP) is subject to the

command and general supervision of the President of the
Philippines and shall function directly under the Department of
National Defense.
Power of Control - power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter

Power of Supervision - power of supervision means the power

of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates perform their
functions according to law.
a). General Supervision. It is the power to see to it that the
units or elements of the Integrated National Police perform their
duties properly according to existing laws and the rules,
regulations and policies.
b). Operational Supervision and Direction. It is the power to
see to it that the units or elements of the Integrated National
Police perform their duties properly according to existing laws
and the rules, regulations and policies promulgated by
competent authority, and the power to employ or deploy such
units or elements.
Administrative supervision and control is not the same as
general or operational supervision, and direction; but the
RTC ruling appears to interchange the two (2) things.

The local executives have general and operational

supervision over local police units, but no power of
administrative supervision or control over them; hence,
absence of recommendation from the local chief executive
does not invalidate the replacement of a Station Commander
made by the INP Director General.
At best, the participation of the local chief executive is
recommendatory but the power to relieve or reassign a city
INP Station Commander is lodged with the INP Director
General under existing laws.
Section 4 of Executive Order
1027 which is relied upon by the
Bacolod RTC states:
SEC. 4. Once the reassignments
herein required are in place, no
further reassignment or detail of
policemen outside their respective
towns or cities of residence shall be
made without the approval of the
Municipal or City Mayor concerned.
No appointment of new policemen in
any municipality or city shall be made,
except upon the recommendation of
the Municipal or City Mayor therein.
The new appointees shall, as a
general rule, be residents of the city or
municipality to where they are
assigned or stationed.

SolGen argues that Sec. 4 only

applies to ordinary policemen and

Section 4 of Executive Order

1027 applies. It refers to ordinary
policemen AND officers.

ON SEC. 4, EO 1027
a) Sec. 4 speaks only of recommendation;
b) It applies to rand-and file policemen and officers; and
c) even if the section were to apply to police officers only,
the situation contemplated in the section does not exist
in the case at bar for Plotea has been re-assigned to
the PC Provincial Headquarters also in Bacolod City.

OBITER: EO 1040 directly placed the National Police

Commission under the Office of the President. The
Commission exercises administrative control and supervision
over all units of the INP force throughout the country.
Questions therefore of propriety of a transfer or relief of
policemen have to be threshed out before said body whose
decisions are appealable to the office of the President
(which did not happen in this case).

NOT police officers, therefore it does

not apply in this case.

Dispositive Portion: Petition is GRANTED. The challenged RTC decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Digester: Annie Ballesteros

CASE TITLE: ROLANDO E. SISON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Date of Case: March 9, 2010
DOCTRINE: No regular members of the Committee on Awards may sit in a dual capacity. Where any of the regular members is the requisitioning
party, a special member from the Sanggunian is required. The prohibition is meant to check or prevent conflict of interest as well as to protect the
use of the procurement process and the public funds for irregular or unlawful purchases.
Ponente: J. Corona
Petitioner: Rolando E. Sison
Respondent: People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Rolando E. Sison was municipal mayor of Calintaan, Occidental Mindoro, a fourth-class municipality, from 1992 to 1995.
In 1994, state auditor Elsa E. Pajayon conducted a post-audit investigation which revealed that during petitioners incumbency, no public bidding
was done for the purchase of a Toyota Land Cruiser, 119 bags of Fortune cement, an electric generator set, certain construction materials, two
Desert Dueller tires, and a computer and its accessories.
In 1998, petitioner was indicted before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. He admitted that no public bidding was conducted for the purchases which were done through personal canvass. Sison was found
guilty as charged. Sison appealed to the SC alleging that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue

Petitioners Contention

Respondents Contention

Supreme Court Holding

Whether Sison complied with

the requirements of public
bidding or its exception/s
(personal canvass)

No public bidding could be conducted

because all the dealers of the items
were based in Manila. It was useless
to invite bidders since nobody would
bid anyway.

There was no public bidding

done for the purchases.
There were irregularities in
the documents supporting the
acquisitions.

Petitioner failed to establish that

his purchases fall under the
exception/s to the public bidding
(See Ratio below)

RATIO:
RA 7160 provides that, "acquisitions of supplies by local government units shall be through competitive bidding." By way of exception, no bidding
is required in the following instances: (1) personal canvass of responsible merchants; xxx

Limitations on this mode of procurement is provided in Sec. 367 of RA 7160. Procurement through Personal Canvass. Upon approval by the
Committee on Awards, procurement of supplies may be affected after personal canvass of at least three (3) responsible suppliers in the locality by
a committee of three (3) composed of the local general services officer or the municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, the local
accountant, and the head of office or department for whose use the supplies are being procured. The award shall be decided by the Committee on
Awards.
Purchases shall not exceed the amounts specified for all items in any one (1) month for each local government unit: Fourth Class (Municipality)
and below Twenty thousand pesos (P20, 000.00).
Section 364. The Committee on Awards.There shall be in every province, city or municipality a Committee on Awards to decide the winning bids
and questions of awards on procurement and disposal of property. The Committee on Awards shall be composed of the local chief executive as
chairman, the local treasurer, the local accountant, the local budget officer, the local general services officer, and the head of office or department
for whose use the supplies are being procured, as members. In case a head of office or department would sit in a dual capacity a member of the
sanggunian elected from among its members shall sit as a member. The Committee on Awards at the barangay level shall be the Sangguniang
Barangay. No national official shall sit as member of the Committee on Awards.
The Sandiganbayan found that, in the purchase of Toyota Land Cruiser, the personal canvass was effected solely by petitioner, without the
participation of the municipal accountant and the municipal treasurer. There was no showing that that the award was decided by the Committee on
Awards. Only an abstract of canvass supported the award, signed by petitioner and the municipal treasurer without the required signatures of the
municipal accountant and budget officer.
Where the head of the office or department requesting the requisition sits in a dual capacity, the participation of a Sanggunian member (elected
from among the members of the Sanggunian) is necessary (RA 7160). Petitioner disregarded this requirement because, in all the purchases
made, he signed in a dual capacityas chairman and member (representing the head of office for whose use the supplies were being procured).
That is strictly prohibited. None of the regular members of the Committee on Awards may sit in a dual capacity. Where any of the regular members
is the requisitioning party, a special member from the Sanggunian is required. The prohibition is meant to check or prevent conflict of interest as
well as to protect the use of the procurement process and the public funds for irregular or unlawful purchases.
The same flaws attended the procurement of the other items for which the petitioner clearly spent more than P20T - or beyond the threshold
amount per month allowed for purchases through personal canvass by fourth class municipalities.
Dispositive Portion: Petition is DENIED. Petitioner Rolando E. Sison is found guilty of seven counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Costs
against petitioner.

Digester: Trina Fernandez

CASE TITLE: YUJUICO v ATIENZA
Date of Case: October 12, 2005
DOCTRINE: The City School Board is not an entity separate and distinct from the City.
Petitioner:
Teresita Yujuicoowner of the parcel of land for which the City of Manila filed a case of eminent domain with the RTC. She is coming to court to
compel the City of Manila/City School Board of Manila to pay her just compensation for her properties which they expropriated 5 years before this
case was instituted.
Respondents:
The City School Board (CSB) of Manila and its Officers and MembersThey have not passed the resolution for the appropriation to pay Yujuico.
Manila RTC Judge Mercedes Posada-LacapAllowed CSBs Petition for Relief of Judgment
FACTS:
1. In 1995, the City Council of Manila enacted an Ordinance authorizing the City Mayor to acquire by negotiation or expropriation certain
parcels of land belonging to Yujuico for utilization as a site for the Francisco Benitez Elementary School. The Ordinance provides that an
amount not to exceed the fair market value of the land then prevailing in the area will be allocated out of the Special Education Fund
(SEF) of the City to defray the cost of the propertys acquisition.
2. In 1996, the City of Manila filed a case for eminent domain against Yujuico after failing to acquire her property through negotiations.
3. In 2000, the RTC found for the City and ordered it to pay the balance of P67,894,266.00 for the property acquired with interest at the rate
of 6% per annum.
4. The judgment became final and executory, no appeal having been interposed by either party.
5. In 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment which the trial court granted. Therefore the branch sheriff served
a Notice of Garnishment on the funds of the City deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines, to satisfy the judgment
amount
6. City filed a motion to quash the Notice of Garnishment invoking jurisprudence holding that public funds cannot be made subject to
garnishment.
7. The RTC issued an Order, recalling that during the hearing on the motion, the counsel for the City manifested that the amount
of P36,403,170.00 had been appropriated by the CSB under CSB Resolutions Nos. 613 and 623, of which P31,039,881.00 was available
for release. In line with the manifestation made by the counsel for the City, the trial court ordered the release to petitioner of the amount
of P31,039,881.00 deposited with the Land Bank, in partial payment of the just compensation in favor of petitioner.
8. Moreover, the RTC stated that upon manifestation of the counsel for the plaintiff that it is the CSB which has the authority to pass
a resolution allocating funds for the full satisfaction of the just compensation fixed, the said body was given 30 days from
receipt of the Order to pass the necessary resolution for the payments of the remaining balance due to defendant Teresita M. Yujuico.
9. Yujuicos inquiries as to whether the Resolution had been passed were left unanswered prompting her to file contempt charges against
the CSB members. The latter opposed stating that her remedy was that of Mandamus. The court dismissed the charges.
10. In 2002, Yujuico filed a Petition for Mandamus against the CSB members to compel them to pass the resolution for the
appropriation of the balance of the just compensation awarded to her in the expropriation case.

11. The RTC granted the petition. Specifically, it ordered respondents to immediately pass a resolution appropriating the necessary amount
and the corresponding disbursement for the full and complete payment of the balance of the court-adjudged compensation still due
Yujuico.
12. The RTC cited Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals: The States power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of
fair play and justice. In the case at bar, considering that valuable property has been taken, the compensation to be paid fixed and the
municipality is in full possession and utilizing the property for the public purpose, for three (3) years, the Court finds that the municipality
has had more than reasonable time to pay full compensation.
The arguments of the herein respondents that passing the ordinance or the act of appropriating special educational fund is a
discretionary act that could not be compelled by mandamus should be thrown overboard. It must be stressed that what we have here is a
final and executory judgment, establishing a legal right for the petitioner to demand fulfillment which on the other hand became an
imperative duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act required.
13. The RTC denied the MR and without an appeal, the Decision became final and executory in 2003 and the petitioners Motion for Execution
was granted.
14. The CSB members filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, citing excusable negligence, which the court granted. This had the effect of
giving due course to respondents appeal despite the fact that the decision of the trial court had already attained finality.
*Note Procedural Issues: Yujuico appealed via Rule 45 but the SC decided to rule on the case in the interest of justice and treated it as a Rule 65
Certiorari.
ISSUE 1
(Relevant Procedural
Issue)
WON the failure of
Petitioner to implead
the new CSB
members would
render any decision
on this matter
ineffective.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

No discussion

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
Yujuico failed to
implead the CSB or its
new members before
the trial court. The
former members of the
CSB could no longer
be compelled to act
according to the
orders of the Court
since they no longer
have the capacity to
do so. On the other
hand, the new
members cannot be
directed to comply
with the Courts
judgment either; they
have never been

Supreme Court
The SC Resolution dated 8 August 2005 already debunked these
arguments:
This Court is of the view that a substitution
of the original respondents by the members of the
CSB who replaced them is warranted. The phrase
or such time as may be granted by the Court in Sec.
17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
denotes that the Court before whom the motion for
substitution is filed may grant a period longer than
thirty (30) days for the purpose. In any event,
technical rules on substitution of a party should not be
so narrowly construed as to prevent this Court from
taking cognizance of a case and deciding it on the
merits. Moreover, petitioner did make an attempt to
implead the new members of the CSB by making the
CSB itself a respondent before this Court. There is
also no showing that the new members of the CSB
have deviated from the stand of their predecessors-in-

impleaded in the case;

thus, the Court never
acquired jurisdiction
over their persons.

interest; hence, there is a substantial need for

continuing or maintaining petitioners action against
them.
The proper substitutions of some party respondents have already taken
place in this case as further ordered in the above Resolution.

ISSUE 2

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

WON it is the CSB

that should pay for
the amounts due to
Yujuico

No discussion

CSB has a personality

separate and distinct
from the City such that
it should not be made
to pay for the Citys
obligations.

Supreme Court
CSB should pay. (1) The law does not make the CSB an
entity independent from the City of Manila.
(2)The particular circumstances of this case coupled with
the rule that an act performed by counsel within the scope of a
general or implied authority is regarded as an act of the
client, render the City and, through it, respondents in estoppel.

(1) Local Government Code of 1991, the law providing for the
creation of school boards states:
Section 98. Creation, Composition and
Compensation.(a) There shall be established in every province, city
or municipality a provincial, city, or municipal school
board, respectively.
(b) The composition of local school boards shall be as
follows:
...
(2) The city school board shall be composed of
the city mayor and the city superintendent of
schools as co-chairmen; the chairman of the
education committee of the sangguniang
panlungsod, the city treasurer, the
representative of the pederasyon ng mga
sangguniang kabataan in the sangguniang
panlungsod, the duly elected president of the
city federation of parents-teachers

associations, the duly elected representative of

the non-academic personnel of public schools
in the city, as members;
...
Section 101. Compensation and
Remuneration.The co-chairmen and members of the provincial, city
or municipal school board shall perform their duties as
such without compensation or remuneration. Members
thereof who are not government officials or employees
shall be entitled to traveling expenses and allowances
chargeable against the funds of the local school board
concerned, subject to existing accounting and auditing
rules and regulations.
The fact that the highest ranking official of an LGU is
designated as co-chairman of the school board negates the
claim in this case that the CSB has a personality separate and
distinct from the City. The other fact that government officials
in the school board do not receive any compensation or
remuneration while NGO representatives merely receive
allowances underscores the absurdity of respondents
argument all the more. Indeed, such would not be the situation
if the school board has a personality separate and distinct from
the LGU.
(2) The Office of the City Legal Officer (OCLO), represented the
City in the expropriation case and now, all except one of the
individual respondents in the case at bar. The following are
manifestations which were relied upon by the lower court in
issuing the order on the motion to quash the Notice of
Garnishment over the funds of the City:
The Motion to Quash Notice of Garnishment was
heard by this court this morning and Atty. Joseph
Aquino appeared for the City and Atty. Federico Alday,
for Yujuico. Atty. Aquino manifested that the amount
P36,403,170.00 had been appropriated by the CSB
under CSB Resolution Nos. 613 and 623 for this
purpose.

Upon manifestation of the counsel for the

City that it is the City School Board which has the
authority to pass a resolution allocating funds for
the full satisfaction of the just compensation fixed,
the said body is hereby given 30 days from receipt of
this Order to pass the necessary resolution for the
payments of the remaining balance due to Yujuico.
The manifestation was made by the same counsel now
claiming that it is actually the City which should be made liable for the
payment of its own obligations. This, after it trotted out the CSB as the
entity with authority to pass a resolution that would satisfy the obligation
it had vigorously pursued.

ISSUE 2
WON the enactment
of an ordinance to
satisfy the
appropriation of a
final money judgment
rendered against an
LGU may be
compelled by
mandamus

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
The members of the
CSB cannot be
directed to decide a
discretionary function
in the specific manner
the court desires

Petitioner and the courts acted in accordance with the Citys

own manifestations by running after the CSB. At this point, respondents
and the OCLO can no longer turn around and toss the obligation back
to the City. After all, it was the legal counsel of both the City and
respondents who made a big production out of showing that the liability
incurred by the City will be borne by the CSB.
Supreme Court
Yes, mandamus lies. The question of has already been settled
in Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals:
Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason,
to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the
claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the
enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and
the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds.
Mandamus is a remedy available to a property owner when a
money judgment is rendered in its favor and against a municipality or
city, as in this case. Moreover, the very ordinance authorizing the
expropriation of petitioners property categorically states that the
payment of the expropriated property will be defrayed from the SEF.
The legality of the provisions of the ordinance is presumed. The
source of the amount necessary to acquire petitioners property having
in fact been specified by the City Council of Manila, the passage of the
resolution for the allocation and disbursement thereof is indeed a

ministerial duty of the CSB.

Furthermore, respondents had argued in the petition for
contempt filed against them by Yujuico that her failure to invoke the
proper remedy of mandamus should not be a ground to penalize them
with contempt. In their haste to have the contempt petition dismissed,
respondents consistently contended that what petitioner should have
filed was a case for mandamus to compel passage of the
corresponding resolution of the CSB if she wanted immediate payment.
Having relied on these representations of respondents and having filed
the action they adverted to, petitioner cannot now be sent by
respondents on another wild goose chase to obtain ultimate recovery of
what she is legally entitled to.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the trial court dated 25 June 2004, granting respondents Petition for Relief from
Judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and its Decision dated 9 October 2002, ordering respondents to immediately pass a resolution for the
payment of the balance of the court-adjudged compensation due petitioner, is REINSTATED.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Court of Appeals for its information and guidance in relation to CA-G.R. No. 86692 entitled
Teresita M. Yujuico v. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., et al.

Digester: Lacas
CARPIO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET. AL GR No. 96409

1992 Feb 14, Petition for declaration of unconstitutionality with TRO

Doctrine:

Placing the PNP under the DILG does not constitute and encroachment on the power of the President. In fact, the police,
as a civilian force, is placed under the executive power and control of the President.
Powers exercised by local officials over the PNP are merely in the nature of delegates to the NAPOLCOM.

Petitioner:

Antonio Carpio
(citizen, taxpayer, and member of the Philippines Bar sworn to defend the Constitution)

Respondent:

The Executive Secretary, Secretary of Local Governments, Secretary of National Defense and National Treasurer

Facts:
1. Congress passed RA 6975 which established the PNP under a reorganized DILG. It was approved by Pres. Cory Aquino and published.
2. Petitioner seeks to declare the said Act unconstitutional.
3. (Trivia) Brief history of Phil police force and Art. XVI, sec. 6 of Constitution
a. Commonwealth period: Philippines Constabulary (PC) of Phil Ground Force (PGF, now AFP). Even if PC was part of PGF,
administrative, supervisory and directional control was under the Dept of Interior. After war, it became National Police under Dept
of National Defense.
b. Integration Act of 1975: created Integrated National Police (INP) under Office of the President, with PC as nucleus and local police
forces as civilian component. National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) exercised administrative control and supervision, while
local executives exercised operational supervision and direction. Under command of PC (military component), civil component of
INP was eroded and gave rise to inequities since the military had more benefits. Multiplicity in governance of PC-INP resulted in
inefficiency.
c.

1986 Constitutional Commission: Accdg to Commissioner Teodulo Natividad, modern police organization is removed from the
military and allows civilian police to blossom into a full profession by removing military from key positions. Hence, the one police
force, national in scope, and civilian in character provision (Art XVI, Sec. 6 of 1987 Constitution).

Issue: WON RA 6975

is unconstitutional?

Petitioner: YES!
1. RA 6975 emasculated
NAPOLCOM by limiting its
power to administrative
control over PNP, thus
control remained with DILG
Sec under whom both the
NAPOLCOM and PNP were
placed.
2. In manifest derogation of the
power of control of the
NAPOLCOM over the PNP,
RA 6975 vested the power to
choose the PNP Provincial
Director and the Chiefs of
Police in the Governors and
Mayors, respectively; the
power of "operational
supervision and control" over
police units in city and
municipal mayors; in the Civil
Service Commission,
participation in appointments
to the positions of Senior
Superintendent to Deputy
Director-General as well as
the administration of
qualifying entrance
examinations; disciplinary
powers over PNP members
in the "People's Law
Enforcement Boards" and in
city and municipal mayors.
3. Section 12 of the said Act
constitutes an

Respondent (OSG): NO!

1. There is no usurpation of the
power of control of the
NAPOLCOM under Section 51
because under this very same
provision, it is clear that the
local executives are only acting
as representatives of the
NAPOLCOM. As such
deputies, they are answerable
to the NAPOLCOM for their
actions in the exercise of their
functions under that section.
Thus, unless countermanded
by the NAPOLCOM, their acts
are valid and binding as acts of
the NAPOLCOM.

Supreme Court: NO!

1. As a fundamentally accepted principle in
Constitutional Law, the President has
control of all executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. This presidential
power of control means "the power of [the
President] to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with
that of the latter."
a. Corollary rule to the control powers of
the President, is the "Doctrine of
Qualified Political Agency". As the
President cannot be expected to
exercise his control powers all at the
same time and in person, he will have to
delegate some of them to his Cabinet
members. Under this doctrine, "the acts
of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive."
b. The circumstance that the NAPOLCOM
and the PNP are placed under the
reorganized Department of Interior and
Local Government is merely an
administrative realignment that would
bolster a system of coordination and
cooperation among the citizenry, local
executives and the integrated law
enforcement agencies and public safety
agencies created under the assailed Act

"encroachment upon,
interference with, and an
abdication by the President
of, executive control and
commander-in-chief powers."
4. The creation of a "Special
Oversight Committee" under
Section 84 of the Act,
especially the inclusion
therein of some legislators as
members is an
"unconstitutional
encroachment upon and a
diminution of, the President's
power of control over all
executive departments,
bureaus and offices."

c. Such organizational set-up does not

detract from the mandate of the
Constitution that the national police
force shall be administered and
controlled by a national police
commission as at any rate, and in fact,
the Act in question adequately provides
for administration and control at the
commission level.
2. The Constitutional Commission intended
that the day-to-day functions of police work
like crime, investigation, crime prevention
activities, traffic control, etc., would be
under the operational control of the local
executives as it would not be advisable to
give full control of the police to the local
executives because, previously, this gave
rise to warlordism, bossism, and
sanctuaries for vices and abuses.
HOWEVER, this does not mean that the
Act went beyond the bounds of the
Constitution's intent.
a. Under the provisions, full control
remains with the NAPOLCOM.
b. Agrees with the OSG. In fact, the local
officials, as NAPOLCOM
representatives, will choose the officers
concerned from a list of eligibles (those
who meet the general qualifications for
appointment to the PNP) to be
recommended by PNP officials. The
same is true with respect to the
contention on the operational
supervision and control exercised by the
local officials.
c. As regards the assertion involving the
Civil Service Commission, suffice it to
say that the questioned provisions

precisely underscore the civilian

character of the national police force,
and will undoubtedly professionalize the
same.
d. The grant of disciplinary powers over
PNP members to the "People's Law
Enforcement Boards" (or the PLEB) and
city and municipal mayors is also not in
derogation of the commission's power of
control over the PNP. The Commission
exercises appellate jurisdiction, thru the
regional appellate boards, over
decisions of both the PLEB and the said
mayors. Furthermore, it is the
Commission which shall issue the
implementing guidelines and procedures
to be adopted by the PLEB for in the
conduct of its hearings, and it may
assign NAPOLCOM hearing officers to
act as legal consultants of the PLEBs.
The establishment of PLEBs in every
city, and municipality would all the more
help professionalize the police force.
3. Looking into the deliberations of the
ConCom, it thus becomes all too apparent
then that the provision herein assailed
precisely gives muscle to and enforces the
proposition that the national police force
does not fall under the Commander-inChief powers of the President. This is
necessarily so since the police force, not
being integrated with the military, is not a
part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
As a civilian agency of the government, it
properly comes within, and is subject to,
the exercise by the President of the power
of executive control.
a. It does not constitute abdication of
commander-in-chief powers. It simply

provides for the transition period or

process during which the national police
would gradually assume the civilian
function of safeguarding the internal
security of the State. Under this
instance, the President, to repeat,
abdicates nothing of his war powers. It
would bear to here state, in reiteration of
the preponderant view, that the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, is
not a member of the Armed Forces. He
remains a civilian whose duties under
the Commander-in-Chief provision
"represent only a part of the organic
duties imposed upon him. All his other
functions are clearly civil in nature." His
position as a civilian Commander-inChief is consistent with, and a testament
to, the constitutional principle that
"civilian authority is, at all times,
supreme over the military."
4. No interference with Presidents power if
control. The Special Oversight Committee
is simply an ad hoc or transitory body,
established and tasked solely with planning
and overseeing the immediate "transfer,
merger and/or absorption" into the
Department of the Interior and Local
Governments of the "involved agencies"
and once this is carried out, its functions as
well as the committee itself would cease
altogether. As an ad hoc body, its creation
and the functions it exercises, decidedly do
not constitute an encroachment and in
diminution of the power of control which
properly belongs to the President. What is
more, no executive department, bureau or
office is placed under the control or
authority, of the committee.

5. Lastly, Article XVI, Section 6, merely

mandates the statutory creation of a
national police commission that will
administer and control the national police
force to be established thereunder. This
commission is not in the same category as
the independent Constitutional
Commissions of Article IX and the other
constitutionally created independent Office,
namely, the Commission on Human Rights.
The three Constitutional Commissions
(Civil Service, Audit, Elections) and the
additional commission created by the
Constitution (Human Rights) are
all independent of the Executive; but the
National Police Commission is not. In fact,
it was stressed during the CONCOM
deliberations that this commission would be
under the President, and hence may be
controlled by the President, thru his or
her alter ego, the Secretary of the Interior
and Local Government.

Dispositive: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

Digester: John Michael Vida

CASE TITLE: SPO1 LEONITO ACUZAR vs. APRONIANO JOROLAN and HON. EDUARDO A. APRESA, PEOPLES LAW ENFORCEMENT
BOARD (PLEB) Chairman, New Corella, Davao del Norte
Date of Case: April 7, 2010
DOCTRINE: Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) Petitioner:
SPO1 Leonito Acuzar
Respondents:
Aproniano Jorolan
Hon. Eduardo Apresa, PLEB Chairman, Davao del Norte
FACTS:
On May 2, 2000, respondent Aproniano Jorolan filed Administrative Case No. 2000-01 against petitioner Acuzar before the PLEB charging
Acuzar of Grave Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with Jorolans minor daughter. Subsequently, the respondent also filed a
1
criminal case against petitioner before the MTC of New Corella for violation of RA 7610 (Section 5, Article III ). Acuzar, in response, vehemently
denied the accusations against him in a Counter-Affidavit. In support of his denial, Acuzar attached the affidavit of Rigma A. Jorolan, who denied
having any relationship with the petitioner or having kissed him despite knowing him to be a married person.
On July 24, 2000, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings before the PLEB pending resolution of the criminal case filed before the
regular court. The PLEB denied his motion for lack of merit and a hearing of the case was conducted. After due proceedings, the PLEB issued a
decision holding Acuzar guilty of grave misconduct, punishable by immediate dismissal.
The PLEB subsequently denied Acuzars subsequent motion for reconsideration. Immediately upon receipt of the decision, Acuzar filed a Petition
for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with the RTC of Tagum City.
Petitioner alleged that the decision was issued without giving him an opportunity to be heard. He likewise averred that the PLEB acted without
jurisdiction in proceeding with the case without the petitioner having been first convicted in the criminal case before the regular court. He pointed
out that under the PLEB Rules of Procedure, prior conviction was required before the Board may act on the administrative case considering that
the charge was actually for violation of law, although denominated as one (1) for grave misconduct.
On September 16, 2000, petitioner was ordered dismissed from the PNP by the Chief Regional Directorial Staff of the PNP, Police Regional Office
11, effective September 7, 2000.

The RTC later rendered a Decision annulling the Decision of the PLEB, as it was stated that Acuzar was not given his day in Court. The Board
could have scheduled the hearing for reception of Acuzars evidence and his failure to appear will be considered as a waiver to present his
evidence. It was only then that the decision could have been rendered.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTCs decision, stating that certiorari was not the proper remedy and that the petitioner should have appealed the
decision of the PLEB to the regional appellate board of the PNP before resorting to certiorari before the RTC.
SUPREME COURT:
RESPONDENTS
Issue 1:
PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
CONTENTION:
NO. SC agrees with CA decision.
WON
Acuzars
resort to certiorari NO,
certiorari
was YES, certiorari was an
remedy First, the Court disagrees with Acuzars contention that his offense
was
NOT appropriate because his inappropriate
appeal
was was that of violation of law as he was indeed charged with grave
warranted due to case falls under the because
the availability of exceptions to the rule on available and the issues misconduct for engaging in an illicit affair with respondents minor
the remedy of exhaustion
of raised were not pure daughter, he being a married man, and not for violation of law, as
appeal from the administrative remedies, questions of law but were petitioner would like to convince this Court.
decision of the the
decision
being questions of law and fact.
Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful
PLEB.
patently illegal.
The
existence
and conduct, motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional
Furthermore, he maintains availability of the right of purpose. On the other hand, violation of law presupposes final
that a conviction should appeal proscribes resort conviction in court of any crime or offense penalized under the
have been obtained first in to certiorari because one Revised Penal Code or any special law or ordinance.
the criminal case for child (1) of the requirements for
abuse against him before its availment is the The settled rule is that criminal and administrative cases are
the PLEB can acquire absence of the remedy of separate and distinct from each other. In criminal cases, proof
jurisdiction
over
his appeal or any other plain, beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative
or
adequate proceedings, only substantial evidence is required. As such,
administrative case. This speedy
administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal
was because, although remedy.
proceedings. And the PLEB, being the administrative disciplinary
the case filed before the
should
have body tasked to hear complaints against erring members of the
PLEB was captioned as Acuzar
Grave Misconduct, the appealed the decision of PNP, has jurisdiction over the case.
offense
charged
was the PLEB to the regional
actually for Violation of appellate board of the Second, Section 43 (e) of RA 6975 is explicit in stating that:
Law, which requires prior PNP before resorting to
conviction
before
a certiorari before the court. a decision involving demotion or dismissal from the service
may be appealed by either party with the regional appellate
hearing
on
the
administrative case can Also, while it is true that board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the
there are instances where decision.
proceed.
the extraordinary remedy
Therefore,
the
PLEB of certiorari may be Since appeal was available, filing a petition for certiorari was not
should have awaited the resorted to despite the apt. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are

resolution of the criminal

case before conducting a
hearing
on
the
administrative
charge
against him.
He also maintains that the
Boards decision was
reached without giving
him an opportunity to be
heard and his right to due
process was violated.

availability of an appeal,
Acuzar
failed
to
demonstrate any ground
to warrant immediate
resort to it.

antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of certiorari.

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires
that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court,
it is a precondition that he should have availed of the means of
administrative processes afforded to him. If a remedy is available
within the administrative machinery of the administrative agency,
then this alternative should first be utilized before resort can be
made to the courts. This is to enable such body to review and
correct any mistakes without the intervention of the court.
Third, contrary to Acuzars claim that he has not been afforded all
the opportunity to present his side, the SC found that Acuzar was
given the opportunity to be heard in the proceedings before the
PLEB. He was notified of the complaint against him and in fact, he
had submitted his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his
witnesses. He also attended the hearings together with his
counsel and even asked for several postponements.
Acuzar had more than enough opportunity to present his side and
adduce evidence in support of his defense, and therefore Acuzar
cannot claim now that he had been denied of due process.
Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.
The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.
In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of
due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based
solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence
submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the
place of direct testimony.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 23, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77110 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

Digester: Ivan
CASE TITLE: Ignacio v Banate, Jr.
Date of Case: August 31, 1987
DOCTRINE:
The appointee to a Sangguniang Panlungsod who sits there as a representative of the barangays must meet the qualifications required
by law for the position. An unqualified person cannot be appointed a member even in an acting capacity.
Petitioner: ROBERTO IGNACIO
Respondent: LEONCIO BANATE, JR., HON. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, in his capacity as Minister of Local Governments and Community
Development and the CITY TREASURER OF ROXAS CITY
FACTS:
On May 17, 1982: Ignacio was elected as Brgy Capt of Brgy Tanza, Roxas City for a 6 year term.
Subsequently Ignacio was elected as Pres of the Katipunang Panlungsod ng mga Brgy (KPB) in Roxas City, pursuant to then Local
Government Code.
In 1982, by virtue of his being the KPB Pres, he was appointed a member of the Sangg Panlungsod of Roxas City by Pres. Marcos.
On May 9, 1986, Minister of Local Government Pimentel designated Banate, Jr. as member of the Sangg Panlu of Roxas City, repacing
Ignacio.
Ignacio now comes to Court questioning Banate, Jr.s appointment
ISSUE
WON Banate,
Jr.s appointment
to replace Ignacio
is valid

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
Banate is not qualified to
replace Ignacio as
Ignacios membership in
the Sangg Panlu is
governed by Sec 173, BP
337 which requires that
the officer is the duly
elected Pres of the KPB in
order to be appointed as
officer in the Sangg Panlu
Banates appointment is
invalid as Sec 173, BP 337
requires that it is the Pres
who should appoint and
not the Minister of Local

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:

SUPREME COURT:

Under BP Blg. 337 LGC, the terms of

office of local government officials
commenced on the first Monday of
March 1980 and ended on March 28,
1986. The period was extended to
June 30, 1986 by the Omnibus
Election Code of 1985).
The petitioner, as an appointive local
government official who assumed
office under the 1973 Constitution, is
covered by the provisions of Section
2, Article III of Proclamation No. 3
issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino, which provides that:
"All elective and appointive officials
and employees under the 1973

We find the petition to be meritorious. It is true

that Minister Pimentel, as cabinet member, is
the alter ego of the President in appointing a
public officer. His authority to designate or
appoint local officials in an acting capacity has
been upheld by this Court.
The appointee to a Sangguniang Panlungsod
who sits there as a representative of the
barangays must meet the qualifications
required by law for the position. An unqualified
person cannot be appointed a member even in
an acting capacity.
It must be noted that the petitioner is an
elected barangay captain of Barangay Tanza,
Roxas City. As barangay captain, he was
subsequently elected President of the

Government.

Constitution shall continue in office

until otherwise provided by
proclamation or executive order or
upon the designation or appointment
and qualification of their successors,
if such is made within a period of one
year from February 25, 1986."
Under Section 2, Article III of
Proclamation No. 3, dated March 25,
1986, issued by President Aquino,
otherwise known as the Provisional
Constitution, the power to delegate
or appoint officers-in-charge in
replacement of local government
officials by then Minister Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr., as alter ego of the
President of the Philippines, has
been upheld by this Court in several
cases.

Association of Barangay Councils of Roxas

City. It was by reason of his being the
president of the Association of Barangay
Councils of Roxas City that the President of the
Philippines appointed him as member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod. This was pursuant
to Section 3, paragraph 1 of BP Blg. 51
Respondent not being a barangay Captain and
never having been elected president of the
association of barangay councils, cannot be
appointed a member of the sangguniang
panlungsod. He lacks the eligibility and
qualification required by law.
Section 2, Article III of the Provisional
Constitution of 1986, Proclamation No. 3 of
President Corazon C. Aquino provides:
"All elective and appointive officials and
employees under the 1973 Constitution shall
continue in office until otherwise provided by
proclamation or executive order or upon the
designation or appointment and qualification of
their successors, if such is made within a
period of one year from February 25, 1986."
The petitioner, as one who was appointed
under the 1973 Constitution continues in office
until the appointment and qualification of his
successor. Since the appointment of his
successor, respondent Banate, is not valid, the
tenure of petitioner Ignacio could not be
terminated on that basis alone.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The appointment/designation of private respondent Banate as
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Roxas representing the Katipunang Panlungsod Ng Mga Barangay is DECLARED NULL
and VOID. Petitioner ROBERTO IGNACIO is ordered REINSTATED as member of said Sangguniang Panlungsod.

Digester: Madarang
GALAROSA vs. VALENCIA
11 November 1993 / J. Davide
DOCTRINE: ABC presidents may continue to serve as ex-officio members of the sangguniang bayan because of the hold-over doctrine, which
states that unless holding over is expressly or impliedly prohibited, the incumbent may continue to hold over until someone else is elected and
qualified to assume the office.
Petitioner: Raul Galarosa, incumbent President of ABC Sorsogon
Respondent: Hon. Valencia (Presiding Judge of RTC Sorsogon), Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon and Rodolfo Salay (incumbent barangay
captain of Brgy. Gimaloto, and aspirant for the position of ABC Sorsogon President)
FACTS:
In 1992, Lasay filed in the RTC Sorsogon a petition for declaratory relief against the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon (SBS), seeking to clarify
the proper interpretation of Sec. 494 of the LGC, and to settle the issue of whether or not the incumbent ABC President can continue holding
office despite the termination of the term of office of the SBS members on 30 June 1992.
In its Answer, SBS asked for the dismissal of the petition because Lasay had no legal right to file the petition. He was merely an aspirant to the
position of ABC President, not the holder thereof.
RTC Decision: Galarosa had no right or legal basis to continue in office as ex-officio member of the present SBS. Since the term of the
sanggunian concerned expired on 30 June 1992, it stands to follow that the ex officio membership of the liga (or ABC) president in the said
sanggunian, by express mandate of law, likewise ended on the said date.
Issue
WON Galarosa can
continue to serve as a
member of the SB
beyond 30 June
1992, the date when
the term of office of
the elective members
of the SB of Sorsogon
expired

Petitioners Contention
Yes.
Pursuant to DILG
Memorandum Circular
No. 92-38 dated 29
June 1992, Sec. 494
LGC was reconciled
with Article 210 (d)(3),
Rule XXIX of the LGC
IRR which provides that
incumbent ABC
presidents shall
continue to serve as ex
officio members of their
respective sanggunians
unless sooner removed
for cause or the new
officers shall have been

Respondents Contention
No.
The term of office of
Galarosa as an ex officio
member of the SBS is
coterminous with that of the
said SBS which expired on
30 June 1992; hence there
was a need for the new
election of an ABC
representative.

Supreme Court
Yes.
Although the ABC presidents' term of office as members of the
sangguniang bayan has expired, they could serve in a holdover capacity.
Generally, the term of office of the ABC presidents as exofficio members of the Sangguniang Bayan is coterminous
with the term of the said Sanggunian.
There is no law which prohibits ABC presidents from holding
over as members of the sangguniang bayan. On the contrary,
the IRR of the LGC (prepared and issued by the Oversight
Committee upon specific mandate of Sec. 533 LGC) expressly
recognizes and grants that hold-over authority to ABC
presidents (Art. 210 pars. d and f).
The purpose of the hold-over is to prevent the hiatus in the
government pending the time when the successor may be

elected and qualified.

chosen and inducted into office. Sec. 494 could not have been
intended to allow a gap in the representation of the barangays,
through the presidents of the ABC, in the sanggunian.

Note on liga ng mga barangay or Association of Barangay Councils (ABC)

Sec. 494 LGC provides for the ex officio membership in the respective sanggunians of the duly elected presidents of the liga at the
municipality, city, and provincial levels, including the component cities and municipalities of Metro Manila. The liga referred to therein is the
liga ng mga barangay. Every barangay is represented in the liga ng mga barangay by the punong barangay, or in his absence or incapacity,
by a sanggunian member duly elected for the purpose among its members. The principal aim of the liga ng mga barangay is to promote the
development of barangays and secure the general welfare of their inhabitants.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the decision of the respondent Judge in the
RTC of Sorsogon. Costs against Lasay.

Digester: Mendoza
SB of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos v. Punong Barangay Severino Martinez
March 3, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO
R45 Petition for review on certiorari against the orders of Bayombong, Nueva Ecija RTC imposing upon Severino Martinez, the administrative
penalty of removal from office.
DOCTRINE: A Sangguniang Bayan is not empowered to remove an elective local official from office. Sec. 60 of the LGC conferred upon the
courts the power to remove elective local officials from office.
Petitioner:

THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BARANGAY DON MARIANO MARCOS, MUNICIPALITY OF BAYOMBONG

PROVINCE OF NUEVA VISCAYA represented by BARANGAY KAGAWAD JOSE CENEN SANTOS, MARIO BACUD,
WALTER FRANCISCO, ROSITA SEBASTIAN, LAURETA CABAUATAN, CECILIA ALINDAYU and MELY SIMANGAN

Respondent:

PUNONG BARANGAY SEVERINO MARTINEZ

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Sangguniang Barangay charged respondent Punong Barangay Martinez with Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act through the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan.
2. Martinez was placed under preventive suspension. Eventually, the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed upon
Martinez the penalty of removal from office.
3. Martinez filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for TRO and Preliminary Injunction before the RTC, questioning the validity of the
Sangguniang Bayan decision.
4. The RTC issued an order declaring the decision void.
5. Sangguniang Barangay now comes before the SC, seeking the reversal of the RTC order.

ISSUE

PETITIONER

RESPONDENT

SUPREME COURT

The pivotal
issue in this
case is
whether or
not the

YES.

NO.

NO.

Administrative
cases involving
elective

Under the law, a Sangguniang Bayan is not vested with the power to remove an elective local
official from office.

Sanggunian
g Bayan
may remove
an elective
local official
from office.

barangay
officials may be
filed with, heard
and decided by
the
Sangguniang
Panlungsod or
Sangguniang
Bayan
concerned,
which can,
thereafter,
impose a
penalty of
removal from
office. The
courts are
merely tasked
with issuing the
order of
removal, after
the
Sangguniang
Panlungsod or
Sangguniang
Bayan finds
that a penalty
of removal is
warranted.

1. The pertinent legal provisions and cases decided by the SC firmly establish that the
Sangguniang Bayan is not empowered to remove Martinez, an elective local official, from
office.
2. Sec. 60 of the LGC conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials
from office.
3. The legislative intent to confine to the courts (RTC, Sandiganbayan, appellate courts)
jurisdiction over cases involving removal of elective local officials was evident in the
deliberation of the Senate on the LGC.
4. Salalima v Guingona, Jr. (1996): The power to remove elected officials is exclusively
vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Sec. 60 of
the LGC. The SC in this case invalidated Art. 125, Rule XIX of the IRR of the LGC,
which provided that the disciplining authority has the power to remove elective officials.
Only the courts have this power.
5. Pablico v Villapando (2002): It is beyond cavil that the power to remove erring elective
local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. The peoples will must
not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority.
6. The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official
from office is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the
disciplining authority. Vesting the local legislative body with the power to decide whether
or not a local chief executive may be removed from office, and only relegating to the
courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not free the resolution of
the case from the capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Thus, the
petitioners interpretation would defeat the clear intent of the law.
7. Moreover, such an arrangement clearly demotes the courts to nothing more than an
implementing arm of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan. This would
be an unmistakable breach of the doctrine on separation of powers, thus placing the
courts under the orders of the legislative bodies of local governments.
8. Congress clearly meant that the removal of an elective local official be done only after a
trial before the appropriate court, where court rules of procedure and evidence can
ensure impartiality and fairness and protect against political maneuverings.

(The proper procedure for imposing the penalty of removal from office)
9. If the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a grave nature and, if found
guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office, the case should be filed with the
regional trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the
case even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than

removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme penalty that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective
barangay official is suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official from service is
warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court.

DISPOSITIVE: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Bayombong RTC in Special Civil
Action No. 6727 is AFFIRMED.

Digester: Ansis V. Pornillos

CASE TITLE: AMORA, JR. vs. COMELEC
Date of Case: January 25, 2011
DOCTRINE: Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the
electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice
of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
Petitioner: Sergio G. Amora, Jr. - the incumbent Mayor of Candijay and had been twice elected to the post, in the years 2004 and 2007.
Respondent: Arnielo S. Olandria - one of the mayoralty candidates of the Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPC) in the same municipality.
FACTS:
On March 5, 2010, Olandria filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria alleged that Amoras COC was not
properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out
that, in executing his COC, Amora merely presented his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty. Oriculo Granada (Atty.
Granada), instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity. Consequently, Amoras COC had no force and effect and should be
considered as not file
Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Amora from running for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol. Amora (petitioner) filed
an MR.
Meanwhile, on May 10, 2010, national and local elections were held. Amora obtained 8,688 votes, equivalent to 58.94% of the total votes cast,
compared to Olaivars 6,053 votes, equivalent to only 41.06% thereof. Subsequently, the Muncipal Board of Canvassers of Candijay, Bohol,
proclaimed Amora as the winner for the position of Municipal Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.
A week thereafter, or on May 17, 2010, in another turn of events, the COMELEC en banc denied Amoras motion for reconsideration and affirmed
the resolution of the COMELEC (Second Division). Hence this appeal.
Issue 1

PETITIONERS
2
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court:

W/N it is proper to
disqualify a candidate
who, in executing his

Olandrias claim does

not constitute a proper
ground for the

Amoras COC was not

properly sworn contrary
to the requirements of

Ruled in favor of Mayor Amora. Grave abuse of discretion on

the part of Comelec.

Personal attacks of petitioner against complainant ;)

(1) Olaivar, his opponent in the mayoralty post, and likewise a member of the NPC, is purportedly a fraternity brother and close associate of Nicodemo T. Ferrer
(Commissioner Ferrer), one of the commissioners of the COMELEC who disqualified him; and
(2) Olaivar served as Consultant for the COMELEC, assigned to the Office of Commissioner Ferrer.

Certificate of Candidacy
(COC), merely
presented to the Notary
Public his Community
Tax Certificate.

cancellation of the COC;

The COC is valid and
effective because he
(Amora) is personally
known to the notary
public, Atty. Granada,
before whom he took
his oath in filing the
document;
Atty. Granada is, in fact,
a close acquaintance
since they have been
members of the League
of Muncipal Mayors,
Bohol Chapter, for
several years; and

the Omnibus Election

Code (OEC) and the
2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.
Amora merely
presented his
Community Tax
Certificate (CTC) to the
notary public, Atty.
Oriculo Granada (Atty.
Granada), instead of
presenting competent
evidence of his identity.
Consequently, Amoras
COC had no force and
effect and should be
considered as not filed

Olandria petition is not based on any of the grounds for

disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory
3
provisions. Nowhere in Sec. 68 of Omnibus Election Code or
4
Sec. 40 of LGC did it specify that a defective notarization is a
ground for the disqualification of a candidate.
Moreover, competent evidence of identity is not required in
cases where the affiant is personally known to the Notary Public
5
(Sec. 2 of 2004 Notarial Rules) , which is the case herein. The
records reveal that petitioner submitted to this Commission a
sworn affidavit executed by Notary Public Oriculo A. Granada
(Granada), who notarized petitioners COC, affirming in his
affidavit that he personally knows petitioner.
The purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than
frustrate, the will of the voters. The people of Candijay, Bohol
has already exercised their right to suffrage on May 10, 2010
where [petitioner] was one of the candidates for municipal

SEC. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found
by the Commission of having: (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs
d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the elections laws.
4

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment,
within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the
effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

Sec. 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or document.

Ultimately, he (Amora)
sufficiently complied
with the requirement
that the COC be under
oath.

mayor. To disqualify [petitioner] at this late stage simply due to

an overly strict reading of the 2004 Notarial Rules will effectively
deprive the people who voted for him their rights to vote.
Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases
should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of
the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in
the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections.

Obiter:
OEM Section
Sec. 68
Sec. 78

Petition
Petition for disqualification

Effect
merely prohibited to continue as a candidate

Petition to deny due course to or

cancel a CoC

Certificate is cancelled/denied due course and would not treated as a

candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC

Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under
Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled
under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 10-046 (DC) dated April 29, 2010 and May
17, 2010, respectively, are ANULLED and SET ASIDE.

Court distinguished between the two since respondent filed for a petition for disqualification but based on Sec. 78. However, respondent never filed for the
cancellation of his opponents CoC but used Sec. 78 as his petitions basis, thus Court did not apply the effects of Sec. 78. (This part is only my opinion).

Digester: Geronimo
VALLES V. COMELEC
2000 August 09
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court
The mere fact that a person is a holder of a foreign passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an
effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against his/her claim of Filipino citizenship.
The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160, Section 40(d) and in RA 7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
For candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. A declaration in the COC that one is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will
support and defend the Constitution and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, which is under oath, operates as an effective
renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Petitioner:

Cirilo R. Valles
Position not mentioned; he questioned the qualification of Rosalind to run as governor

Respondents: COMELEC
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
She ran for governor; her citizenship was questioned
Facts:
1. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte,
and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. At the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
2. In 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen.
3. She continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but also as candidate. She served as Provincial Board Member
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental.
4. In the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections, she ran for governor. Her candidacy was questioned in the three elections on the ground that she is
an Australian citizen.
5. The COMELEC dismissed all three petitions for disqualification.
6. The third petitioner, Cirilo Valles, filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Petitioner:
1. Lopez had renounced her Filipino citizenship based on the admitted facts:
a. In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien
Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988
b. On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR)
c.

She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988

1. On COMELECs finding that Lopez had renounced her Australian citizenship and had her Australian passport cancelled, the said acts did
not automatically restore her status as a Filipino citizen. For her to reacquire Philippine citizenship, she must comply with the mandatory
requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171.
2. Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, she has effectively become a stateless person and as such, is disqualified
to run for a public office in the Philippines.
3. Even on the assumption that Lopez had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental, citing Section 40 of
RA 7160.
4. When citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not
considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same, citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration.
Respondents:
1. Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because:
a. Her father is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution
b. She was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473
c.

She renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia
and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila

d. There are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066 (two previous cases filed against her), declaring
her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor
Issue: WON Lopez is disqualified to run for local elective office for being an Australian citizen?
Held: No. Lopez is a Filipino citizen, hence, she is qualified to run for governor.
SC:

1. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. A child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
7
regardless of the place of his/her birth. Lopez was born to Telesforo Ybasco who, based on the organic acts existing at that time, is
8
considered a Filipino citizen .
2. The mere fact that Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an
effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the
loss of citizenship, the same must be express.
a. Aznar vs. COMELEC: an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or
repudiation of ones citizenship
b. Mercado vs. Manzano : the application for an alien certificate of registration and the holding of a foreign passport are mere acts of
assertion of foreign citizenship before it is effectively renounced.
c.

At the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

3. Under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground for
losing ones Philippine citizenship.
4. Mercado vs. Manzano: dual citizenship as used in the Local Government Code pertains to dual allegiance.
5. The fact that Lopez had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. It was ruled that for
candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their COC, to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship.
6. On January 15, 1992, Lopez executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private
respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila.
7. The principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs.
Republic, an exception to this general rule was recognized. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship if all of the following are
present: 1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or
his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and 3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Dispositive: Petition DISMISSED. CA Resolutions AFFIRMED.

Philippine Bill of 1902 and Jones Law

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens

Digester: Cagahastian

Moreno v. COMELEC
August 10, 2006
Disqualification
Person convicted by final judgment but placed on probation without serving sentence is not disqualified from running in a local elective
office (1) the suspension of service also suspends the accessory penalties i.e. disqualification (2) Probation Law (S.16) is an exception
to the LGC (S. 40a) a convict on probation is restored to all his civil rights.
Note: Designation of petitioner and respondent is based on the original complaint, and not on this petition for review.
Petitioner:

Moreno was disqualified by Comelec upon the petition by private respondent Mejes

Respondent:

Comelec disqualified Moreno upon petition by private respondent Mejes

Facts:
1. Mejes filed petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay in 2002 elections in Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar.
2. The ground cited for the disqualification of Moreno was his conviction for arbitrary detention. He was convicted by final judgment but
placed on probation instead of serving sentence. Later, trial court discharged Moreno's probation.
st
3. Comelec 1 division disqualifies Moreno.
4. Comelec en banc affirms the disqualification.

Petitioner

Respondents

SC

He was already given probation, thus no cause

of action.

Mejes says that Moreno was convicted by final

judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention
and was sentenced to imprisonment for (4 mos
one day to 2 years 4 months) by RTC
Catbalogan Samar, which also carries the
accessory penalty of disqualification.

Moreno is qualified to run.

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following

persons are disqualified from running for any

elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for

an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence; [Emphasis supplied.]
xxxxx

Baclayon v. Mutia imposition of sentence of

punishment, as well as accessory penalties,
was thereby suspended when Moreno was
placed on probation instead of serving his
sentence.

S.16 of Probation Law of 1976 final

discharge of probation granted by RTC to
Moreno restores to him all civil rights lost.
Thus, he may vote and be voted for.

Comelec says that S. 40(a) of LGC provides

that those convicted by final judgment of a
crime involving moral turpitude for an offense
punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment,
w/in 2 years after serving sentece, are
disqualified from running for any elective local
position. Probation merely suspended
execution of sentence but did not affect his
disqualification from running for an elective
local office.

Baclayon v. Mutia Probation not sentence

but suspension of imposition of sentence.
Thus, accessory penalties including perpetual
special disqualification were similarly
suspended. Moreno wasn't even disqualified
because of the suspension of the imposition of
the sentence.

Trial court discharged Moreno's probation.

Applying S.16 of Probation law, Moreno is
restored to all his civil rights. Even if we don't
apply S.40(a) of LGC to the letter, still Moreno
will be qualified because of S.16.

Nature of probation mere privilege, an act of

clemency or grace. Probationers a distinct

class of offenders NOT covered by

disqualification.

Against COMELEC argument LGC 40(a)

only applies to those who have served their
sentence and not to probationers since the
latter do not serve their adjudged sentence.
Thus: Probation law exception to LGC.

And even if disqualified, his subsequent

election as Punong Barangay constitutes an
implied pardon of his previous misconduct

Dispositive: Granted in favor of Moreno.

Probation law exception to LGC.

On pardon - it would be far better to err in

favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in
complex but little understood legalisms. - J.
Panganiban in Frivaldo v. COMELEC

Digester: RUIZ
EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC, BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ
July 24, 1996
Doctrine:
A fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has
already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed.
Parties: Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr. were protagonists for the gubernatorial post
of Quezon Province in the May 1992 & 1995 elections.
Facts:
Rodriguez (petitioner) won against Marquez (respondent) for the gubernatorial position in the 1992 elections.
Marquez filed a petition for quo waranto before COMELEC. The ground was that Rodriguez was a fugitive from justice, a ground for
disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the LGC. According to Marquez, there were pending charges, filed on November 12,
1985 in the US against Rodriguez, for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property.
Marquez petition: COMELEC dismissed the QW petition. Marquez filed a certiorari case before the SC (Marquez petition). In the
Marquez petition, the SC defined a fugitive from justice as not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The SC did not rule on whether or not the Rodriguez was a fugitive from justice but it
remanded the case to COMELEC to decide on this issue.
In the 1995 elections, Rodriguez and Marquez were again rivals for the gubernatorial position. Marquez filed a petition for disqualification
before the COMELEC on the ground that Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. During the filing of the disqualification case, the MARQUEZ
petition was still pending in the SC.
The COMELEC consolidated the QW petition [NB: At this point, SC had already remanded the Marquez decision to COMELEC] and the
disqualification case.
o COMELEC Consolidated Resolution: The COMELEC found Rodriguez to be a "fugitive from justice" based on 1. an authenticated
copy of the November 12, 1995 warrant of arrest issued by the Los Angeles Municipal Court against Rodriguez and 2. an
authenticated copy of the felony complaint. He is therefore disqualified from running for governor and his certificate of candidacy is
set aside.
Rodriguez won the 1995 elections.
COMELEC suspended the proclamation of Rodriguez. The COMELEC Consolidated Resolution and the resolution suspending his
proclamation gave rise to the instant petition for certiorari.
The COMELEC filed a report, in compliance with the order of the court, entitled xxx COMMISSION'S EVALUATION": Rodriguez is NOT a
"fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion of the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a 180-degree turnaround from its finding in
the Consolidated Resolution.
Petitioners arguments:
For Issue 1:

NB: The arguments of Rodriguez were not expressly mentioned in the SC decision. The following are his arguments in the other proceedings:
MR in the Marquez petition: In the MR, Rodriguez attached a certification from the Commission on Immigration showing that he (Rodriguez) left
the US on June 25, 1985 roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of the criminal complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles court.
The Court however denied this MR.
Answer in the COMELEC proceedings in the Consolidated QW and disqualification cases: Long before the felony complaint was allegedly
filed, Rodriguez was already in the Philippines and he did not know of the filing of the same nor was he aware that he was being proceeded
against criminally.
Respondents arguments:
For Issue 1:
NB: The COMELEC flip-flopped in the proceedings. The COMELEC initially declared Rodriguez as a fugitive from justice in the Consolidated
Resolution. It then changed its position in the xxx Commissions Evaluation.
Consolidated Resolution position: FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE
Rodriguezs allegation in the Answer was not even fortified with any attached document to show when he left the United States and when
he returned to this country, facts upon which the conclusion of absence of knowledge about the criminal complaint may be derived
The fact of arrest of respondent's wife on November 6, 1985 in the United States by the Fraud Bureau investigators in an apartment paid
for respondent in that country can hardly rebut whatever presumption of knowledge there is against the respondent.
Commissions Evaluation: NOT A FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE
Intent to evade is a material element of the MARQUEZ Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case because
evidence has established that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal charge was instituted in the
Los Angeles Court (November 12, 1985).
For Issue 2:
The definition of the term 'fugitive from justice' contemplates other instances not explicitly mentioned in the main opinion in the Marquez
petition.
From the rulings in King v. Noe and Hughes v. Pflanz, the objective facts sufficient to constitute flight from justice are: (a) a person
committed a 'crime' or has been charged for the commission thereof; and (b) thereafter, leaves the jurisdiction of the court where said
crime was committed or his usual place of abode.
Filing of charges prior to flight is not always an antecedent requirement to label one a 'fugitive from justice. Mere commission of a 'crime'
without charges having been filed for the same and flight subsequent thereto sufficiently meet the definition.
Attention is directed at the use of the word 'crime' which is not employed to connote guilt or conviction for the commission thereof.
Justice Davide's separate opinion in the Marquez decision: The disqualification for being a fugitive does not involve the issue of the
presumption of innocence, the reason for disqualification being that a person 'was not brought within the jurisdiction of the court because
he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted, he has successfully
evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped. The disqualification then is based on his flight from justice.

King v. US: It is not necessary that the party should have left the state or the judicial district where the crime is alleged to have been
committed, after an indictment found, or for the purpose of avoiding an anticipated prosecution, but that, having committed a crime within
a state or district, he has left and is found in another jurisdiction.
Therefore, it appears that the mere fact there are pending charges in the US and that petitioner Rodriguez is in the Philippines
make him a fugitive from justice.

Issue 1:
Whether Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice (No)
Held/Ratio:
Definition in Marquez decision: Includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And
obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations dated April
27 and June 26 of 1995, which arrival preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of
the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court, by almost five (5) months.
It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there
was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time.
The SC quoted pertinent portions from the COMELECs decision:
o

A voluminous copy of an investigation report on the alleged crimes committed, which led to the filing of the charges, was offered
for admission to show the intent of Rodriguez to evade the law. However, investigations of this nature, no matter how extensive or
prolonged, are shrouded with utmost secrecy to afford law enforcers the advantage of surprise and effect the arrest of those who
would be charged. The conclusion that it was impossible for Rodriguez not to have known of said investigation of such magnitude
is misleading.
That it was 17 days after Rodriguez' departure that charges against him were filed cannot overturn the presumption of good faith
in his favor. In fact, the evidence of petitioner Rodriguez sufficiently proves that his compulsion to return to the Philippines was
due to his desire to join and participate vigorously in the political campaigns against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. After
the EDSA Revolution, Rodriguez served as OIC-Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986. He was
elected governor in 1988, 1992 and 1995.
Having established petitioner's lack of knowledge of the charges to be filed against him at the time he left the United States, it
becomes immaterial under such construction to determine the exact time when he was made aware thereof. When, in good faith,
a person leaves the territory of a state not his own, homeward bound, and learns subsequently of charges filed against him
while in the relative peace and service of his own country, the fact that he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former
state does not qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice.
The criminal process of the United States extends only within its territorial jurisdiction. That petitioner has already left said country
when the latter sought to subject him to its criminal process is hardly petitioner's fault. In the absence of an intent to evade the

o
o

laws of the United States, petitioner had every right to depart therefrom at the precise time that he did and to return to the
Philippines.
Clearly, a person who is aware of the imminent filing of charges against him or of the same already filed in connection with acts he
committed in the jurisdiction of a particular state, is under an obligation not to flee said place of commission.
However, as in petitioner's case, his departure from the United States may not place him under a similar obligation. His
subsequent knowledge while in the Philippines and non-submission to the jurisdiction of the former country does not operate to
label petitioner automatically a fugitive from justice. As he was a public officer appointed and elected immediately after his return
to the country, petitioner Rodriguez had every reason to devote utmost priority to the service of his office.

Issue 2:
Whether one becomes a "fugitive from justice" by the mere fact that he leaves the jurisdiction where a charge is pending against him, regardless of
whether or not the charge has already been filed at the time of his flight (No)
Held/Ratio:
The "law of the case" doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded re-definition of "fugitive from justice" (which is at variance with the
MARQUEZ Decision)

People v. Pinuila: Whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same
case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
The same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice") are involved in the Marquez
Decision and the instant petition. The Marquez Decision was an appeal from Marquezs QW petition before the COMELEC. The instant
petition is also an appeal from the QW petition although the COMELEC resolved the latter jointly with the disqualification case.
Therefore, what was irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule in the Marquez Decision must govern the instant petition. And
we specifically refer to the concept of "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision which highlights the
significance of an intent to evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with their proposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize.

Dissenting opinion: J. Vitug

Congress must have intended for the ordinary connotation of the phrase fugitive from justice to prevail. It might be understood as
referring to one who, having committed or being accused of having committed a crime in one jurisdiction, cannot be found therein or is
absent for any reason from that jurisdiction that thereby forestalls criminal justice from taking its due course.

(M. Espinal)
Mercado v. Manzano/1990
Doctrine: The phrase dual citizenship in R.A. 7160 and R.A. 7854 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under the disqualification. By declaring in the certificate of candidacy that a person is a Filipino citizen, that he
will defend and support the constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto, that person (as far as the laws of this country
are concerned) has effectively repudiated his other citizenship.
Petitioner: Ernesto Mercado
Respondent: Eduardo Manzano
(Both are candidates to the Vice-Mayoralty post in Makati during the 1998 elections.)
FACTS:
Manzano was born in San Francisco, California to Filipino parents. Under the principle of jus soli, he is deemed to be a US citizen while being
likewise a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of his Filipino parentage.
In the May, 1998 elections, Mercado, Manzano and Gabriel Daza ran for the contested post where Manzano emerged as winner. His
proclamation was, however, suspended because of a petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril.
nd
COMELECs 2 Division granted the petition and ordered the cancellation of Manzanos CoC on the ground that he was a dual citizen and thus
disqualified from running for any elective local position pursuant to the LGC. COMELEC en banc, however, reversed and ruled in favor of
Manzano. Accordingly, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Manzano as Vice Mayor of the city of Makati.
The present case is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare Manzano disqualified to
hold the said office.

ISSUE
Right to bring suit

PETITIONER
Petitioner has a right to intervene

RESPONDENT
Mercado has no right to intervene
because he has no legal interest
in the matter in litigation nor does
he have an interest to protect, he
being a defeated candidate who
cannot be proclaimed Makatis
Vice Mayor even if Manzano be
ultimately disqualified

Dual citizenship as a ground for

disqualification

Sec. 40 of LGC specifically

commands in explicit terms the
ineligibility of persons possessing

Manzano had registered as a

voter and voted in the elections of
1992, 1995 and 1998, effectively

SUPREME COURT
At the time Mercado sought to
intervene, there had been no
proclamation yet, thus, he still had
an interest in ousting Manzano
from the electoral race. Moreover,
Mercados right as intervenor is
provided by the Electoral Reform
Law of 1987 which allows
intervention in proceedings for
disqualification even after election
as long as no final judgment has
as yet been rendered.
Dual citizenship is different from
dual allegiance. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual

dual citizenship to hold elective

office. Such provision is
incorporated in the Charter of the
City of Makati.
Merely taking part in Philippine
elections (1992, 1995, 1998) is not
sufficient evidence of renunciation
of Manzanos US citizenship and,
in any case, the alleged
renunciation was made when he
was already 37y/o rendering the
same ineffective, as it should have
been made when Manzano
reached the age of majority.
Moreover, Manzano holds an
American passport and is
registered in the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation as an
American citizen.

Dispositive: Petition for certiorari is dismissed.

renouncing his US citizenship.

allegiance is the result of an

individuals volition. What the law
frowns upon is dual allegiance
which is inimical to citizenship.
By filing a CoC when he ran for
the present post, Manzano
effectively elected Philippine
citizenship and renounced his
American citizenship.
[CoC bears the following
declarations: I am a Filipino
citizen....I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith ad
allegiance thereto...] With such
declaration, Manzano has, as far
as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated
his American citizenship. Such
oath of allegiance, when
considered with the fact that he
has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as artist
and taken part in past elections in
this country, leaves no doubt of
his election of Philippine
citizenship.
Further, no law requires that
election of Philippine citizenship
be made upon majority age.

Digester: Puguon
Case Title: ABELLA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL
Petitioners:
Benjamin Abella (second highest number of votes but not proclaimed as governor by COMELEC after Larrazabals
disqualification)
Respondents: COMELEC and Adelina Larrazabal (obtained highest number of votes for position of Leyte Governor, proclaimed governor, but
later disqualified by COMELEC for lacking both residence and registration qualifications)

Facts:
Abella Official candidate of Liberal party for position of provincial governor of Leyte
Emeterio V. Larrazabal - the original candidate of the Lakas ng Bansa-PDP-Laban who was disqualified by the Commission on Elections on
January 18, 1988, for lack of residence qualification.
Respondent Adelina Larrazabal wife of Emeterio. On January 31, 1988, the day before the election, she filed her own certificate of candidacy in
substitution of her husband.
Silvestre dela Cruz with Abella as intervenor filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify Adelina Larrazabal from running as governor. She
allegedly misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte, when in fact she was a resident of Ormoc City.
Silvestre T. de la Cruz raised two issues: Larrazabal's lack of legal residence in the province of Leyte and her not being a registered voter in the
province, as required by Title II, Chapter I, Section 42, B.P. Blg. 337, in relation to Article X, Section 12 of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 42. Qualification. (1) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election
day, a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected, a resident therein
for at least one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English, Pilipino, or any other local
language or dialect.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain
no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.

The COMELEC held that Larrazabal (who was already proclaimed as governor) was disqualified. Leopoldo Petilla, elected vice-governor was then
proclaimed as Governor. Abella, who gathered the second highest votes in the said area, filed this petition to take his oath as governor.

Petitioner: (Larrazabal)

Respondents Arguments:

Supreme Court

On the issue of Residence

On the issue of Residence

Larazabal claims that the ruling of

COMELEC based on the provisions of the
Family code that she lacks the required
residence to qualify her to run for the
position of governor of Leyte is incorrect.
She states that in the Election Law, the
matter of determination of RESIDENCE is
more on the principle of INTENTION, the
animus revertendi rather than anything
else." She believes that as long as she had
the ANIMUS REVERTENDI, which is
evidenced
by
her
continuous
and
continuous acts of returning to Kananga in
the course of the years, although she had
physically resided at Ormoc City, her
physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City
would not neccessarily erase or remove her
residence in Kananga.

From 1975 to the present, the

petitioner has established her
residence at Ormoc City and not
at Kananga, Leyte. The petitioner
purportedly
changed
her
residence by registering at
Kananga, Leyte one year before
the election for her to qualify to
run for the position of governor of
the province of Leyte which in
effect strenghtens the fact that
she considers herself already a
resident
of
Ormoc
City.
Furhtermore, the petitioner failed
to present evidence to show that
she resided at Kananga, Leyte,
separate from her husband
residing at Ormoc City."

ISSUE #1: WON the petitioner was qualified to run as

governor? (Does the prohibition to vote likewise prohibit
the voters to run for provincial offices)

Alternative Argument
The fact that she is a registered voter in
Ormoc is no impediment to her candidacy
for the position of governor of the province
of Leyte.
Section 12, Article X of the

No.

Section 12, Article X of the Constitution provides that aside

from highly-urbanized cities, component cities whose
charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials are independent of the province. The
same provision mentions other component cities within a
province whose charters do not provide a similar prohibition.

Therefore, component cities such as Ormoc City whose

charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials should be treated as highly urbanized cities
which are outside the supervisory power of the province to
which they are geographically attached. In effect, the
independece from the province also provides the prohibition
or mandate directed to their registered voters not to vote and
be voted for the provincial elective offices. The same
principle is applied in the resolution in G.R. No. 80716
entitled Peralta v. The Commission on Elections, et al. dated
December 10, 1987, where Olongapo City is classified as a
highly urbanized city

Constitution provides:
Cities that are highly urbanized, as
determined by law, and component
cities whose charters prohibit their
voters from voting for provincial
elective officials, shall be
independent of the province. The
voters of component cities within a
province, whose charters contain no
such prohibition, shall not be
deprived of their right to vote for
elective provincial officials.
Section 89 of Republic Act No. 179
creating the City of Ormoc provides:
Election of provincial governor and
members of the Provincial Board of
the members of the Provincial
Board of the Province of Leyte
The qualified voters of Ormoc City
shall not be qualified and entitled to
vote in the election of the provincial
governor and the members of the
provincial board of the Province of
Leyte.
Relating therefore, section 89 of R.A. 179 to
section 12, Article X of the Constitution one
can conclude that while Ormoc City was
organized and was not yet a highlyurbanized city but is was still considered
independent of the province of Leyte to
which it is geographically attached sue to
the fact that its charter prohibits its voters
from voting for the provincial elective
officials.

Independent of the constitutional provision, Section 89 of

Republic Act 179, prohibits registered voters of Ormoc City
from voting and being voted for elective offices in the
province of Leyte. Therefore the court is in agreement with
the COMELEC en banc that "the phrase 'shall not be
qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial
governor and the members of the provincial board of the
Province of Leyte' connotes two prohibitions one, from
running for and the second, from voting for any provincial
elective official."

And even if a Component City whose

charter prohibits its voters from participating
in the elections for provincial office, is
indeed independent of the province, its
independence is still not that of a highly
urbanized city;
rather it is limited to the administrative
supervision aspect, and it should not lead
one to the conclusion that said voters are
also prohibited from running for the
provincial offices."
ISSUE #2: WON the candidate who got the second
highest vote may be proclaimed as governor when the
candidate for such position was disqualified?

No. According to the Supreme Court, the fact remains that

Larrazabal was considered as a bona fide candidate in the
local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte
even if it is true that the first petition was to deny due course
to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and that it was
filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed. Larrazabal was
voted for and obtained the highest number of votes with the
belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of
governor. In effect Abella lost in the election and was
repudiated by the electorate.

It has been observed that those who recieve the highest

number of votes cast in the election would fill the position
and that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless it is through a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in an election. Furthermore,
that the candidate that obtained the second highest number
of votes is not necessarily declared as the winner of the

elective office.
Therefore, the Court does not find any reason to reverse and
set aside the questioned decision and resolution of the
COMELEC. The COMELEC has not acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion.

Digester: Flores
CASE TITLE: FRIVALDO v. COMELEC
Date of Case: June 28, 1996
DOCTRINE: LGC expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino
or any other local language or dialect; (b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or
mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on
election day.
Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation.
Citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Furthermore, Frivaldos repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application therefor, because PD 725 is curative and
remedial in nature.

PETITIONER: Juan G. Frivaldo (candidate for the Office of Governor in the May 8, 1995 elections)
RESPONDENT: COMELEC and Raul R. Lee (another candidate for the Office of Governor in the May 8, 1995 elections)
FACTS:
Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. Lee, another candidate, filed with the
COMELEC a petition to disqualify Frivaldo from seeking/holding any public office/position on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen.
nd
2 Division of COMELEC: Granted petition.
Frivaldo filed an MR which remained unacted upon until after the elections so his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections.
nd
COMELEC en banc: affirmed Resolution of 2 Division of COMELEC.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of election returns and a Certificate of Votes was issued showing the votes obtained
by the candidates for the position of Governor: Antonio Escudero, Jr. 51,060; Juan G. Frivaldo, 73,440; Raul R. Lee, 53,304; Isagani P. Ocampo,
1,925.
Lee filed a petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
COMELEC en banc (dated June 21, 1995 but promulgated June 29, 1995): Directed the Provincial Board of Canvassers to reconvene for the
purpose of proclaiming Lee as the winning candidate.
Accordingly, at 8:30pm of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the COMELEC a petition praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He
alleged that at 2pm on June 30, 1995, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippine after his petition for repatriation under PD 725,
which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN) in September 1994, had been granted. He received the June 21, 1995 Order of

the COMELEC at 5:30pm on June 30, 1995, hence, there was no more legal impediment to his proclamation as governor. In the alternative, the
Vice Governor, not Lee, should occupy said position of governor.
st
1 Division of COMELEC: Frivaldo, having garnered the highest number of votes, and having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on
June 30, 1995 Is qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon.
Both Frivaldo and Lee filed a petition with the SC (consolidated).
Lee: Special Civil Action under Rules 65 and 58 for Certiorari and Preliminary Injunction to Annul the last mentioned Resolution of the COMELEC
and the Resolution denying his MR. The judicially declared disqualification of Frivaldo was a continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to
run for, be elected and hold the Office of Governor. The alleged repatriation was neither valid nor was the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his
ineligibility.
Frivaldo (Petition to annul 3 resolutions of COMELEC): Under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC had no jurisdiction to issue
said Resolutions because they were not renered within the period allowed by law (not later than 15 days before the election), hence, the
COMELECs Resolutions are null and void.
MAIN ISSUE:
Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? YES.
If yes, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? YES.
If not, may it be given retroactive effect? YES ( see #4).
FRIVALDOS CONTENTION:
LEEs CONTENTION:
SUPREME COURT:
YES.
NO. Frivaldos repatriation is tainted YES. Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court as a non1. He tried to reacquire citizenship with serious defects:
citizen, it is incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired
by direct act of Congress but the
1. PD 725 had been effectively
citizenship; that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the
bill failed to materialize due to the repealed when Pres. Corazon
LGC.
maneuvers of his political rivals.
Aquino exercising legislative powers
Also his attempt at naturalization
under the Transitory Provisions of
1. Pres. Aquinos Memorandum cannot be construed as a law
was rejected by this Court
the 1987 Constitution, forbade the
authorizing a repeal of PD 725 as no express repeal was made therein
because of jurisdictional,
grant of citizenship by Presidential
and no categorical nor implied statement that PD 725 was being
substantial and procedural
Decrees or Executive Issuances, as repealed or being rendered w/o any legal effect. Neither can it be
defects. Despite his lack of
the same poses a serious and
regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of
Philippine citizenship, he was
contentious issue of policy which
the President under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution
overwhelmingly elected governor
the present government, in the
can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers.
by the electorate of Sorsogon,
exercise of prudence and sound
At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the
with a margin of 27,000 votes in
discretion, should best leave to the
SCN to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for
the 1988 elections, 57,000 in
judgment of the first Congress
repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the
1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over
under the 1987 Constitution, adding 1987 Constitution" might make (as regards the matter of repeal).
that in her Memorandum dated
the same opponent Lee. Twice,
he was judicially declared a
March 27,1987 to the members of
non-Filipino and thus twice
the SCN constituted for purposes of
disqualified. Now, he successfully PD 725, Pres. Aquino directed them
passed through the third and last
to cease and desist from

mode of reacquiring citizenship:

by repatriation under PD 725, with
the SolGen. He took his oath of
allegiance at 2pm on June 30,
1995.
Lee should not have been
proclaimed as the duly-elected
governor when the Provincial
Board of Canvassers met at
8:30pm of June 30, 1995, since,
clearly, he garnered the highest
number of votes in the elections
and since that time, he already
reacquired his citizenship.
2. He filed his application for
repatriation with the Office of the
President on August 17, 1994.
However, the SCN was
reactivated only on June 8, 1995,
when SCN started processing his
application. On June 29, 1995, he
filled up and re-submitted the form
that the SCN required.

undertaking any and all proceedings

within their functional area of
responsibility.

2. Serious congenital irregularities

flawed the repatriation proceedings.
Frivaldo's application therefor was
filed on June 29, 1995 and was
approved in just one day (June 30,
1995) which prevented a judicious
review and evaluation of the merits
thereof.

2. Under the circumstances mentioned by Frivaldo, it could not be said

that there was indecent haste in the processing of his application.

3. The sudden reconstitution of the

SCN was intended solely for the
personal interest of Frivaldo.

3. According to the SolGen, there were many others who applied and
were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him
to the SC, through a Manifestation filed on April 3, 1996.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and
the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been
successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were
speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such was
necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under PD
725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and
cumbersome. In fact, it requires very little of an applicant, and even
the rules and regulations to implement the said decree were left to the
SCN to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization
where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in
repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is
merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship.

Frivaldo was a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his
country and his province prior to his naturalization in the US, which he
insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a
dictatorship he abhorred, and who, after the fall of the dictator and the
re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to
his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his
people.

4. Assuming the assailed

repatriation is valid, nevertheless it
could only be effective as of 2pm of
June 30, 1995 whereas the
citizenship qualification prescribed
by the LGC "must exist on the date
of his election, if not when the
certificate of candidacy is
filed," citing Republic v. De la Rosa
(1994) which held that "both the
LGC and the Constitution require
that only Philippine citizens can run
and be elected to Public office."

Any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have been

pursued before the SCN itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the
President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
4. Citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not
necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy.
What was cited was merely obiter as the only issue in said case was
the validity of Frivaldos naturalization and not the effective date
thereof.
Sec. 39 of the LGC does not specify any particular date or time when
the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (at
least 1 year's residency immediately preceding the day of election)
and age (at least 23 years of age on election day). Philippine
citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective
public office, and the purpose of such qualification is none other than
to ensure that no alien(no person owing allegiance to another nation),
shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to
begin.
Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on the very day the term of
office of governor began, he was therefore already qualified to be
proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. This is the liberal interpretation
that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications
consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. Even
from a literal construction, it should be noted that Sec. 39 of the LGC

speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of

candidates. Such qualifications, unless otherwise expressly
conditioned, as in the case of age and residence, should be
possessed when the elective/ed official begins to govern.
Furthermore, Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Code gives any voter,
presumably including the defeated candidate, the remedy/opportunity
to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate for
failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the
LGC. Quo Warranto can be availed of within 10 days after
proclamation of the winning candidate. And since, at the very moment
of Lee's proclamation, Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen,
having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same
day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he
unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes and such oath
had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence,
at such time, he was no longer ineligible.
To remove all doubts on the issue, the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETROACTED TO THE DATE OF THE FILING OF HIS
APPLICATION THEREFOR. This is an exception to the general rule in
the Civil Code that laws shall have no retroactive effect, because PD
725 is CURATIVE (undertakes to cure errors and irregularities,
thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public
officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not
produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory
disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement) and
REMEDIAL (relates to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not
create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance
of the remedy or confirmation of such rights) in nature. A reading of
PD 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also
provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. It
cures the defect in the existing naturalization law, CA 63, wherein
married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death
of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship
by naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing
the rigid procedures of CA 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by
naturalization. A remedial statute must be so construed as to make it
effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted. If the reason of
the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the

future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms
so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate
some constitutional guaranty.

5. The citizenship qualification

should be possessed at the time the
candidate/elected official registered
as a voter. Sec. 39, apart from
requiring the official to be a citizen,
also specifies that he be a
"registered voter." And, under the
law, a "voter" must be a citizen of
the Philippines. So therefore,
Frivaldo could not have been a
voter-much less a validly registered
one if he was not a citizen at the
time of such registration.

Issue 2:
Is Frivaldos judicially declared

While PD 725 was already in effect (June 5, 1975) at the time that
Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the
law itself which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the
repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to
be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor,
Aug. 17, 1994. It was the intent of the legislative authority that the law
should apply to situations and transactions existing even before the
law came into being in order to benefit the greatest number of former
Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship. There is nothing in the
law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part
of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or
prejudice to anyone. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the
impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested
right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
5. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior
to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter,
then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification.
The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the
law intended citizenship to be a qualification DISTINCT from being a
voter, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. Also, it is
required that the official be registered as a voter in the area or territory
he seeks to govern (the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province where he intends to be elected). The
LGC requires an elective official to be a registered voter.
Registrationnot the actual votingis the core of this qualification.
The law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the
prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to
govern, not anywhere else.
Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized, and Lee has not disputed, that
he was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a
voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration. In fact, he
has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992 and 1995.
YES. The first 2 COMELEC
NO. The first ruling disqualifying
Resolutions became final and
Frivaldo was rendered in

disqualification for lack of Filipino

citizenship a continuing bar to his
eligibility to run for, be elected to
or hold the governorship of
Sorsogon? NO.

executory after 5 days, no

restraining order having been
issued by the SC. Hence, before
Lee was proclaimed as the
elected governor, there was
already a final and executory
judgment disqualifying Frivaldo.
Also, the SCs 2 rulings declaring
Frivaldo an alien have also
become final and executory
before the 1995 elections.

Issue 3:
Did the COMELEC have
jurisdiction over the initiatory
petition considering that said
petition is not a pre-proclamation
case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case? YES.

NO. The only possible types of

proceedings that may be
entertained by the COMELEC
are a pre-proclamation case, an
election protest or a quo
warranto case. Since Lee was
proclaimed on June 30, 1995 and
Frivaldo only questioned this on
July 6, 1995, beyond the 5-day
reglementary period, Frivaldos
recourse was to file an election
protest or a quo warranto action.

Issue 4:
Was the proclamation of Lee, a
runner-up in the election, valid
and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence? Under Philippine

YES. Cited Labo v. COMELEC:

The rule would have been
different if the electorate fully
aware in fact and in law of a
candidate's disqualification so as

connection with the 1988

elections, while the second was in
connection with the 1992
elections. That he was disqualified
for such elections is final and can
no longer be changed. However,
as found by COMELEC, there was
no final judgment of
disqualification of Frivaldo as a
candidate in the 1995 elections.
Decisions declaring the acquisition
or denial of citizenship cannot
govern a persons future status
with finality because a person may
subsequently reacquire or lose his
citizenship under any of the
modes recognized by law for the
purpose.
YES. The Constitution has given
the COMELEC ample power to
exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of all elective
provincial officials. The SC has
invariably recognized COMELECs
authority to hear and decide
petitions for annulment of
proclamations. But such power
must be done within 10 days
following the proclamation.
Frivaldos petition was filed only 6
days after Lees proclamation,
hence, COMELEC correctly
acquired jurisdiction.
NO. The SCs ruling therein is
qualified by the next paragraph,
which is appropriate in this case
(presents an identical situation): It
has not been shown, and none

law, citizenship may be

reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization or by
repatriation. NO.

to bring such awareness within

the realm of notoriety, would
nonetheless cast their votes in
favor of the ineligible candidate.
In such case, the electorate may
be said to have waived the
validity and efficacy of their votes
by notoriously misapplying their
franchise or throwing away their
votes, in which case, the eligible
candidate obtaining the next
higher number of votes may be
deemed elected.

was alleged, that petitioner Labo

was notoriously known as an
ineligible candidate, much less the
electorate as having known of
such fact. On the contrary, Labo
was even allowed by no less than
the Comelec itself to be voted for
the office of the city mayor as its
resolution denying due course to
petitioner Labo's certificate of
candidacy had not yet become
final.
Furthermore, there is no sufficient
evidence showing that the
electorate of Sorsogon was fully
aware of Frivaldos alleged
disqualification.

Issue 5:
Did COMELEC exceed its
jurisdiction in promulgating the
assailed Resolutions? MOOT
AND ACADEMIC.

YES. The first 2 Resolutions

disqualifying him for want of
citizenship should be annulled
because they were rendered
beyond the 15 day period
prescribed by Sec. 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

If Labo has any relevance at all, it

is that the Vice-Governor and not
Lee who should be proclaimed,
since in losing the election, Lee
was obviously not the choice of
the people: The rule is that the
ineligibility of a candidate
receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate
receiving the next highest number
of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate
cannot be deemed elected to the
office.
MOOT AND ACADEMIC. The
resolutions are deemed
superseded by subsequent ones
issued by COMELEC upholding
his election. Sec. 78 is merely
directory as Sec. 6 of RA 6646
authorizes the COMELEC to try

and decide petitions for

disqualifications even after the
elections.

Dispositive Portion: Both petitions dismissed. COMELEC Resolutions affirmed.

Digester: Roddel Paraos

CASE TITLE: Labo v Comelec
Date of Case: July 3, 1992
DOCTRINE:
Labo was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the
possession of which is an indispensible requirement for holding public office (Sec 39, LGC)
In the absence of any official action or approval by the proper authorities, a mere application for repatriation does not, and cannot,
amount to an automatic reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine citizenship.
Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective office. As mandated by law: "An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines."
Frivaldo: . The qualification prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was
qualified.
Petitioner: Ramon Labo, candidate for mayor of Baguio City in the May 1992 elections
Respondent: Roberto Ortega, another candidate in the same elections, and the Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Ramon Labo filed his candidacy for mayor of Baguio , and 3 days after Ortega filed a disqualification proceedings before the Comelec on the
ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated in his certificate of candidacy that he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
When summons were issued, Labo failed to file an answer. Ortega filed a motion to declare Labo in default for failure to file his Answer. However,
the Comelec once again issued an order directing the Election Registrar of Baguio City to personally deliver the summons. A hearing was set for
reception of evidence, and Ortega presented the SC decision in Labo v Comelec (1989) declaring Labo not a citizen of the Philippines. Labo,
represented by counsel, did not present any evidence. It was only a day after such hearing that petitioner submitted his Answer claiming Filipino
citizenship.
On May 9, 1992, Comelec resolved the case in against Labo, ordering that his certificate of candidacy be denied due course and cancelled. On
the same date, Labo filed a motion to stay implementation of said resolution until after he shall have raised the matter before this Court. The next
day, Comelec issued an Order which resolved that the decision promulgated on May 9, 1992 shall become final and executor only after 5 days
from promulgation, hence Labo may still be voted upon as candidate for Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992. On May 13, Comelec resolved to
suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event that he wins the elections.
Labo filed with the SC a petition for review, praying that the order of the Comelec be set aside, to declare him as a Filipino citizen, and to direct
Comelec to proceed with his proclamation. Ortega, on the other hand, filed an urgent motion for implementation of the Comelec May 9, 1992
resolution. Comelec denied this motion by Ortega because of the earlier SC case. Hence, Ortega filed a petition for mandamus.

GR
No.
105111
(Labos
petition)
WON
the
proceedings
denied Labo
adequate
opportunity to
present a fulldress
presentation
of his case.

Petitioner: Labo

WON Vance
v
Terrazas
case should
apply

He cites the 1980 US

case of Vance v.
Terrazas, wherein it
was held that in proving
expatriation,
an
expatriating act and an
intent
to
relinquish
citizenship must be
proved
by
a
preponderance
of
evidence.
He is a Filipino citizen.

WON Labo is
a
Filipino
citizen

WON
Labo
can
be
proclaimed
the winner of

Petitioner
faults
Comelec
for
the
abbreviated
proceedings
which
denied him adequate
opportunity to present a
full-dress presentation
of his case.

Sec 72 of the Omnibus

Election Code operates
as
a
legislatively
mandated
special

Respondent:
Ortega

SC

No, the proceedings did not deny Labo adequate opportunity to present a full-dress
presentation of his case.
Records disclose that summons were issued by respondent Comelec as early as
March 27, 1992 followed by a telegram on April 1, 1992. But petitioner chose to
ignore the same. Came April 15, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a motion to declare
petitioner Labo in default. Over-extending him (Labo) the benefit of due process,
respondent Comelec, issued another order dated April 24, 1992, this time directing
the Acting City Election Registrar of Baguio to personally serve the summons. The
alleged delay in the resolution of SPA No. 92-029 can only be attributed to
petitioner Labo and no one else.
Respondent failed to adduce any evidence, and in fact he failed to file an answer.
No, the case does not apply.
Suffice it to state that petitioner has already pleaded Vance in his motion for
reconsideration in Labo v. Comelec (supra; Rollo p. 375). Having been previously
passed upon, the Court sees no pressing need to re-examine the same and make
a lengthy dissertation thereon.

No, he is not.
The fact remains that he has not submitted in the instant case any evidence, if
there be any, to prove his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship either before this
Court or the Comelec. On this score alone, We find no grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondent Comelec in cancelling his (Labo's) certificate of
candidacy and declaring that he is NOT a Filipino citizen pursuant to our ruling in
the 1989 case of Labo v. Comelec
No, Labo cannot be proclaimed the winner of the election.
Labos argument is untenable. Sec 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already
been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA 6646: If for any reason a candidate is not

the elections

repatriation proceeding
and that it allows his
proclamation as the
winning
candidate
since the resolution
disqualifying him was
not yet final at the time
the election was held

declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for

and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or the
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."
The provision clearly shows that Comelec can legally suspend the proclamation of
petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of votes notwithstanding,
specially since he failed to present any evidence before the Comelec to support his
claim of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
The SC, citing the old Labo case: "Under CA No. 63, as amended by PD No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the
petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these
methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization or to any statute
directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. x x x"

WON
Labo
has
reacquired
Filipino
citizenship

GR
No.
105384
(Ortegas
petition)
WON
the
Comelec
resolution
has become

He has re acquired
Filipino citizenship by
citing his application for
reacquisition
of
Philippine
citizenship
filed before the Office
of the Solicitor General
pursuant to PD 725
and Letter of Instruction
No. 270.
Petitioner: Ortega

Since the SC did not

issue
a
temporary
restraining order as
regards the May 9,

Labo was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does not
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an
indispensible requirement for holding public office (Sec 39, LGC)
No, he has not.
To date, however, and despite favorable recommendation by the Solicitor General,
the Special Committee on Naturalization had yet acted upon said application for
repatriation.
In the absence of any official action or approval by the proper authorities, a mere
application for repatriation does not, and cannot, amount to an automatic
reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine citizenship.
Respondent:
Labo

SC

Yes, the resolution has become final and executor.

At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition (GR No. 105111) on May 15, 1992, the
May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo's) certificate of

final
and
executory

1992
resolution
of
respondent
Comelec
cancelling
Labo's
certificate of candidacy,
said resolution has
already become final
and executory.

candidacy had already become final and executory a day earlier, or on May 14,
1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on the same day it
was promulgated.
Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: "Sec. 78. Petition to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy -xxx
"(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the
Supreme Court.
Sec. 3, Rule 39 of the Comelec Rules of procedure: "Sec. 3. Decisions final after
five days. --Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course
to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate
or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become
final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation, unless
restrained by the Supreme Court."
One of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be a citizen of the
Philippines. Thus, the Local Government Code provides:
Sec 39. Qualifications.(a) An elective official must be a citizen of the
Philippines;
Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the
contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding
an elective office. As mandated by law: "An elective local official must be a citizen
of the Philippines."
The issue here is citizenship and/or Labo's alienage - the very essence which
strikes at the very core of petitioner Labo's qualification to assume the contested
office, he being an alien and not a Filipino citizen. The fact that he was elected by
the majority of the electorate is of no moment.
The Court, citing Frivaldo v Comelec: "x x x. The fact that he was elected by the
people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting
public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualification
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of
the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was
qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack

WON
the
candidate
with the next
highest
number
of
votes should
be declared
Mayor

As a result of such
finality, the candidate
receiving
the
next
highest
number
of
votes, Ortega, should
be declared the Mayor
of Baguio City

of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must

owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
fidelity to any other state."
No, it is the vice-mayor who will be declared Mayor in this case.
The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega
as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to proclamation as the
mayor of Baguio City.
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office
of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will.
Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor
in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his
subsequent disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.
The SC, citing Abella v Comelec: What matters is that in the event a candidate for
an elected position who is voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is
disqualified for not possessing the eligibility requirements at the time of theelection
as provided by law, the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes
for the same position cannot assume the vacated position."
The ruling above applies squarely in this case. Like Abella, Ortega lost in the
election. He was not the choice of the people of Baguio.
In the old Labo case ruled that the rule in Geronimo v Santos should be followed.
The Court said: Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office,
and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can
be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
The rule, therefore, is the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does
not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to
the office.
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the
votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered NULl
and void. This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom
sovereignty resides.

The rule would have been different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of
a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In
such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of
their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes,
in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may
be deemed elected.
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown,
and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible
candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary,
petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution
dated May 10,1992 to be voted for the office of the city mayor.
As a consequence of petitioners ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested
office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor. Sec 44 of the
LGC: "SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, ViceGovernor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. - (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office
of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall
become the governor or mayor. x x x
Dispositive Portion WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioners both being ineligible for the Office of the City
Mayor of Baguio City and in view of the vacancy created in said office, the vice-mayor elect of said city in the May 11, 1992 elections is hereby
declared Mayor of Baguio City after proclamation by the City Board of Canvassers.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: concurring and dissenting
Since Mayor Labo never validly acquired Australian citizenship, he never lost his Philippine citizenship. His oath of allegiance to Australia was null
and void because he was not qualified to be an Australian citizen. This is clear from the certification of Australia's Embassy officials. To me, a null
and void act cannot have the positive and serious effect of stripping a Filipino of his natural-born citizenship.
Labo's taking an oath as citizen of a foreign country was based on his marriage to a citizen of that country. It turns out, however, that Labo's
marriage was bigamous and void because his Australian wife had an existing valid marriage when she tied the knot with him. Not being qualified
to become an Australian citizen, his oath of allegiance to that country was meaningless act.
I, however, concur in the Court's reiteration of the rule that it is the
vice-mayor elect who succeeds the disqualified mayor-elect and not the losing candidate for mayor. I have to be consistent with
my ponencia in Geronima v. Santos.

In deciding cases involving citizenship, I believe that the presumptions should be in favor of its retention and against its loss. We apply this
principle to cases involving civil liberties. We should also apply it to a sincere invocation of Philippine citizenship. We should not lightly strip a
person of his natural born status but should accord to him every possible interpretation consistent with the exercise of a right that was vested in
him from birth.

Digester: Justin Batocabe

CASE TITLE: Dominador Jalosjos v COMELEC; Agapito Cardino v Dominador Jalosjos
Date of Case: October 9, 2012
DOCTRINE: A sentence of prisin mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Section 40 of the Local Government Code and
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioner: Dominador Jalosjos
Respondent: COMELEC and Agapito Cardino
FACTS:
1) Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his
third term.
2) Cardino filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos
asserting that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the
Office of Mayor. Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been convicted by final judgment
for robbery and sentenced to prisin mayor but Jalosjos has yet to serve his sentence and was granted probation.
3) COMELEC First Division granted Cardinos petition and cancelled Jalosjos certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC First Division concluded
that "Jalosjos has indeed committed material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared, under oath, that he is eligible for
the office he seeks to be elected to when in fact he is not by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which he has not yet
served." MR denied

Issue

WON Jalosjos is
qualified to run as
candidate for

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

COMELEC committed
grave abuse of

Jalosjos certificate of
compliance of

Supreme Court

The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his

Mayor of Dapitan
City

discretion in
diaqualifying him to run
as a candidate.

Jalosjos relied in good

faith upon a previous
COMELEC decision
declaring him eligible
for the same position
from which he is now
ousted

probation was
fraudulently issued
and he has yet to
serve his sentence
there is simply no
basis for Jalosjos to
claim that his civil as
well as political rights
have been violated.
Having been convicted
by final judgment,

criminal conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving

eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos certificate of candidacy was void
from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at
the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a
candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a
result of Jalosjos certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino,
as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number
of votes for the position of Mayor.

Jalosjos is disqualified
to run for an elective
position or to hold
public office. His
proclamation as the
elected mayor in the
May 10, 2010 election
does not deprive the
Commission of its
authority to resolve the
present petition to its
finality, and to oust
him from the office he
now wrongfully holds.

A sentence of prisin mayor by final judgment is a ground for

disqualification under Section 40 of the Local Government Code and
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material
fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can file a petition under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code or under either Section 12
or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory
penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to
run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires
him to state under oath. As used in Section 74, the word "eligible"
means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having
all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for public
office. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the
false material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility."
One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to
run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special
disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that
"he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under
Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material representation that

is a ground for a petition under Section 78.

A candidate for mayor during the 2010 local elections certifies under
oath four statements: (1) a statement that the candidate is a natural
born or naturalized Filipino citizen; (2) a statement that the candidate
is not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country; (3) a
statement that the candidate is eligible for the office he seeks election;
and (4) a statement of the candidates allegiance to the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines. Jalosjos knew that he was ineligible

The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos certificate of candidacy. A

void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise
to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes

On Cardino who assailed the COMELEC ruling that succession determined the next mayor (SC declared he was the rightful winner):
If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in
the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a
first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing
jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the
elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the
more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of
candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.

Jalosjos petition is DENIED

Cardinos petition is Granted

Brion dissent,
Short Version: Cardino was a defeated second placer as Jalsojos was validly qualified in the 2010 elections. Rules of Succession should
apply
I dissent from the majoritys (i) position that the present case involves a cancellation of a certificate of candidacy (CoC) rather than a case of
disqualification and (ii) conclusion that Cardino, the "second placer" in the 2010 elections for the mayoralty post of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte, should be the rightful Mayor. I submit that while Cardino intended to cancel Jalosjos CoC, his petition alleged acts constituting
disqualification as its ground. Thus, the case should be resolved under the rules of disqualification, not from the point of a cancellation of a CoC.
In the denial of due course to or cancellation of a CoC, the ground is essentially lack of eligibility under the pertinent constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office; the governing provisions are Sections 78 and 69 of the OEC.
In a disqualification case, as mentioned above, the grounds are traits, conditions, characteristics or acts of disqualification, individually applicable
to a candidate, as provided under Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC; Section 40 of LGC 1991; and Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. As
previously discussed, the grounds for disqualification are different from, and have nothing to do with, a candidates CoC although they may result
in disqualification from candidacy whose immediate effect upon finality before the elections is the same as a cancellation. If they are cited in a
petition filed before the elections, they remain as disqualification grounds and carry effects that are distinctly peculiar to disqualification.
In order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein
pertain to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate the right to run for the
elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a "material
representation," the Court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions applying Section 78 of the Code.
xxxx
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer to qualifications for elective
office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation
in his certificate of candidacy are grave to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a
public office upon just any innocuous mistake. [emphases ours, citation omitted]
Thus, in addition to the failure to satisfy or comply with the eligibility requirements, a material misrepresentation must be present in a cancellation
of CoC situation. The law apparently does not allow material divergence from the listed requirements to qualify for candidacy and enforces its edict
by requiring positive representation of compliance under oath. Significantly, where disqualification is involved, the mere existence of a ground
appears sufficient and a material representation assumes no relevance.

Jalosjos validly stood as a candidate in the elections of May 2010 and won, although he was subsequently disqualified. With his disqualification
while already sitting as Mayor, the winning vice-mayor, not. Cardino as a mere defeated second placer, should rightfully be seated as mayor under
Section 44 of LGC 1991 on the law on succession.
Reyes dissent
I fully agree with the COMELECs ruling that Jalosjos cannot run for any public office by reason of possession of a ground for disqualification.
However, the COMELEC laid the predicate of said conclusion on a muddled discussion of the nature of the petition filed by Cardino and the effects
of a judgment on the same on the status of candidacy.
Reyes then just reiterates the arguments of Brion with the added novel concept of the doctrine of Rejection of the Secon Placer
The doctrine of rejection of the second placer was not conceived to suit the selfish interests of losing candidates or arm them with a weapon to
retaliate against the prevailing candidates. The primordial consideration in adhering to this doctrine is not simply to protect the interest of the other
qualified candidates joining the electoral race but more than that, to safeguard the will of the people in whom the sovereignty resides. The doctrine
ensures that only the candidate who has the peoples faith and confidence will be allowed to run the machinery of the government. It is a
guarantee that the popular choice will not be compromised, even in the occasion that the prevailing candidate is eventually disqualified, by
replacing him with the next-in-rank official who was also elected to office by the authority of the electorate.

Digester: Guangko
Mayor Barbara Ruby Talaga v. COMELEC and Alcala // Castillo v. COMELEC, Talaga and Alcala*
9 October 2012
*This is a consolidated case. For the purposes of this digest, please note which party makes the arguments.
DOCTRINE: The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a condition sine qua non in order for there to be a valid candidacy. In case of vacancy in a
position there is an order of succession provided for in the Local Government Code.
Petitioner: Barbara Ruby substituted her husband Ramon, the former mayor who had served three terms and as such was disqualified. Ramons
name was on the ballot on Election Day but Ruby won and was declared as Mayor by the City Board of Canvassers.
Castillo was the other candidate on the ballot. He lost.
Respondent: COMELEC proclaimed that the Vice Mayor was to assume the office of Mayor following the substitutes disqualification. Alcala was
the duly elected Vice Mayor; he contends that he should be the Mayor because the substitution of Barbara Ruby was invalid.
FACTS:
1. Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Phillip Castillo (Castillo) filed their COC for the position of Mayor of Lucena City for the election on May 10
2010. Ramon was the candidate of Lakas-KAmpi-CMD.
2. Castillo filed a Petition to Deny or Cancel the COC of Ramon on the grounds that he had already served three consecutive terms. Ramon
nd
rd
countered and said that Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office during the 2 and 3 term and so the three-term limit
rule did not apply (jurisprudence: involuntary separation from office amounted to an interruption of continuity of service for purposes of the
application of the three-term limit rule.)
3. However, the SC declared in Aldovino Jr. v. COMELEC that preventive suspension was not a valid ground to avoid the effect of the threeterm limit rule. Thus Ramon was disqualified to run as Mayor. Barbara Ruby Talaga (Barbara Ruby) filed her COC in substitution of
Ramon, with Certification of Nomination and Acceptance issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD.
4. On Election Day, Ramons name remained printed on the ballots but the votes in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his
substitute candidate. Barbara Ruby had the most votes vs. Castillo. However, it was only three days after the election that Barbara Rubys
COC was given due course by the COMELEC En Banc. Thus, the City Board of Canvassers declared her as the newly elected mayor.
5. Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation and Roderick Alcala, the duly elected Vice Mayor, sought to intervene, saying that
he should assume the post of Mayor because Rubys substitution had been invalid.
nd
6. COMELEC 2 Division denied the Petition and Petition in Intervention. However, COMELEC En Banc reversed and concluded that
Barbara Ruby could not have properly substituted Ramon and held that Vice Mayor Alcala was to succeed the position pursuant to
Section 44 of the LGC.
Issues:
Validity of
substitution

PETITIONER:
Substitution is valid.

RESPONDENT:
Substitution was
invalid.

Supreme Court:
SUBSITUTE IS VALID.

(Barbara Ruby:)
COMELEC En Banc
did not deny due
course or cancel
Ramons COC,
despite the
declaration of
disqualification
because there was
no finding that he
had committed
misrepresentation,
the ground for the
denial of due course
to or cancellation of
9
his COC. Sec. 12
of RA 9006 should
be applied, based
on which the votes
cast for Ramon
were properly
counted in her
favor.

(Castillo:) Barbara
Ruby cannot
substitute Ramon
because his CoC
had been cancelled
and denied due
course; and Barbara
Ruby could be
considered a
candidate because
the COMELEC En
Banc had approved
her substitution three
days after the
elections; hence the
votes case for
Ramon should be
considered stray.

In the event that a candidate is disqualified to run for a public office, or dies,
10
or withdraws his CoC before the elections, Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code provides the option of substitution.
Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or
disqualification of a candidate, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code
unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or
accredited party may be substituted.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy,
there can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
11

Ramons CoC was cancelled in line with Section 78 of the Omnibus

Election Code. To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions,
Ramon was absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor
of
Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid
and ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his
false declaration of his eligibility to run. The COMELECs declaration of his
disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all.
We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his
substitute. In all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably
filed is a requisite sine qua non.

Section 12. Substitution of candidates. In case of valid substitutions after the official ballots have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates
shall be considered votes for the substitutes.
10

Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official canadidate of
a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political
party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the
political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of
the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed
with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the
country, with the Commission.
11

Grounds for cancellation of or denying due course to a COC: material misrepresentation under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Who will assume

the contested
elective position

12

(Castillo:) The
doctrine on the
rejection of the
second-placer
should not apply to
him because
Ramons
disqualification
became final prior to
the elections. The
law expressly
12
declares that a
candidate
disqualified by final
judgment before an
election cannot be
voted for, and votes
cast for him shall
not be counted. He
is entitled to
assume the position
of Mayor for having
obtained the highest
number of votes
among the
remaining qualified
candidates.

(Alcala:) He should
assume the post of
Mayor because
Barbara Rubys
substitution had
been invalid and
Castillo had clearly
lost the elections.

ALCALA to be Mayor.
After Barbara Ruby substituted Ramon, the May 10, 2010 elections
proceeded with her being regarded by the electorate of Lucena City as a
bona fide candidate. To the electorate, she became a contender for the
same position vied for by Castillo, such that she stood on the same footing
as Castillo. Such standing as a candidate negated Castillos claim of being
the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes, and of being
consequently entitled to assume the office of Mayor.
Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer.
Labo, Jr. should be applied. There, the Court emphasized that the candidate
obtaining the second highest number of votes for the contested office could
not assume the office despite the disqualification of the first placer because
the second placer was not the choice of the sovereign will. Surely, the
Court explained, a minority or defeated candidate could not be deemed
elected to the office. There was to be no question that the second placer lost
in the election, was repudiated by the electorate, and could not assume the
vacated position. No law imposed upon and compelled the people of Lucena
City to accept a loser to be their political leader or their representative.
The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a
disqualified winning candidate is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b)
the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidates
disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but
the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. Under this sole exception, the electorate may be said to have
waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their
franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate
with the second highest number of votes may be deemed elected. But the
exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply because the second
element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least aware

Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987: Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

of the fact of Barbara Rubys ineligibility as the substitute. In fact, the

COMELEC En Banc issued the Resolution finding her substitution invalid
only on May 20, 2011, or a full year after the decisions.
On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara
Ruby from assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with,
there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to Ramons ineligibility.
Also, Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in
accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Lastly, she was
not an additional candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City because
her filing of her CoC on May 4, 2010 was beyond the period fixed by law.
Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a candidate.
A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted,
and such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined
13
in Section 44 of the LGC.

*note that there are dissents by Brion, Mendoza, and Abad.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions in these consolidated cases; AFFIRMS the Resolution issued on May 20, 2011 by the
COMELEC EN BANC; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

13

Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor shall become the governor or mayor

Digester: Jel Gallego

CAYAT v. COMELEC
April 24, 2007; G.R. No. 163776
DOCTRINE: Sec 6, RA 6646 or The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final
judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted.
The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer applies only if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on disqualification remained
pending on Election Day; and (2) the decision on disqualification became final only after the elections.
Petitioner:
Respondent:
Intervenor:

Fr. Nardo B Cayat candidate for the mayor in Buguias, Benget

Commission on Elections
Thomas R. Palileng, Sr. Cayats opponent in the mayoralty post during the elections
Feliseo K. Bayacsan

FACTS:
1. Cayat and Palileng were the only candidates for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 local elections.
5 January 2004: Cayat filed his certificate of candidacy
26 January 2004: Palileng filed a petition for disqualification against Cayat before the COMELEC on the ground of misrepresentation.
2. Palileng argues that Cayat made misrepresentation and committed acts of perjury when he declared in his COC that he was eligible for
office when he was not because in fact, he was then serving probation after being convicted for the offense of acts of lasciviousness.
3. COMELEC granted the petition based on Sec 40 of the Local Government Code. COMELECs Resolution cancelled Cayats COC due to
disqualification. Cayat filed a filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for failure to pay the filing pay. Hencce, COMELEC Reso
became final and executory on 17 April 2004.
4. Despite this decision, Cayats name was still included in the ballot and he was later proclaimed winner on 12 May 2004; thus prompting
Palileng to file a petition for annulment of proclamation. COMELEC declared Palileng as the duly elected mayor and Bayacsan as the
duly elected vice mayor.
ISSUE: WON Palileng was validly proclaimed as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet
Petitioner/Intervenor: NO
Bayacsan argues that he should be declared as mayor because of the doctrine of rejection of second placer.
Respondent: YES
SC: YES
As to Cayat, he can no longer be proclaimed as Mayor because he was disqualified by final judgment for having been sentenced by final judgment
for an offense involving moral turpitude.
His proclamation is void because the decision disqualifying Cayat had already become final on 17 April 2004, 23 days before the election
day. There is no longer any need to ascertain whether there was actual knowledge by the voters of Cayats disqualification when they cast their

votes on election day because the law mandates that Cayats votes shall not be counted. There is no disenfranchisement of the 8,164
voters. Rather, the 8,164 voters are deemed by law to have deliberately voted for a non-candidate, and thus their votes are stray and shall not
be counted.
14

Sec 6, RA 6646 or The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election
cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. Provision covers two situations:
First, when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. (applies to the
case herein)
Sec 6 is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him
shall not be counted. Hence, all votes cast in Cayats favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate
Second, when the disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6. (applied in
Labo)
As to Bayacsan, the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer does not apply to this case.
1) The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, which triggers the rule on succession, does not apply in the present case because Palileng is
not a second-placer but the only placer. 23 days before election day, Cayat was already disqualified by final judgment to run for Mayor in the 10
May 2004 elections. Palileng was the only candidate, the sole and only placer, second to none.
2) There are specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer. The doctrine will apply
in Bayacsans favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the decision
on Cayats disqualification remained pending on Election Day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates
for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayats disqualification became final only after the elections.
Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC is inapplicable here. Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one
common essential condition the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition does not
exist in the present case. Labos disqualification became final 3 days after the elections so on election day, he was still a candidate while in this
case, Cayat was disqualified by final judgment 23 days before elections so on election day, his candidacy was legally non-existent.
Dispositive Portion:
14

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayats petitions and Feliseo K. Bayacsans petition-in intervention.
We AFFIRM the Resolutions & Orders of the COMELEC

Edward Dayog
Bautista v. COMELEC
October 23, 2003
J. Carpio
Petitioner Bautista ran as a candidate for Punong Barangay in Batangas. He won. The COMELEC En Banc later cancelled his certificate
of candidacy and revoked his proclamation after it ruled that he was not a registered voter at the time of the election. The SC ruled that
while the COMELEC exercised grave abused of discretion due to procedural lapses, inluding the fact that the order should have come
from a Division, not En Banc, Bautista cannot be proclaimed to the office of Punong Barangay for being ineligible. The SC also ruled
that the second-highest ranking officer, not the candidate with the second-highest number of votes, should replace Bautista.
Petitioner: Raymundo Oca Bautista, candidate for Punong Barangay of Brgy. Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas
st

Respondents: 1. COMELEC; 2. Election Officer Josefina Jareno; 3. Divina Alcoreza, 1 runner-up

FACTS:
- June 10, 2002: Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy (COC) for the July 15, 2002 barangay elections. Election Officer Jareno refused to
accept the COC because Bautista was not a registered voter in the barangay.
- Bautista filed an action for mandamus with the RTC of Batangas. The RTC held that his name should be included in the list of candidates until
the COMELEC rules otherwise. Jareno complied but referred the matter with the COMELEC Law Department.
- The COMELEC Law Department recommended the cancellation of Bautistas COC but the COMELEC En Banc failed to rule on this before the
Barangay Elections.
- Bautista won in the Barangay Elections, followed by respondent Alcoreza. He took his oath twice (once with
Rep. Ermita-Buhain and another with Mayor Apacible).
- July 23, 2002: COMELEC En Banc issued two resolutions: 1) cancelling Bautista's COC; 2) directing him to cease and desist from taking his oath
of office or from assuming his position.
- COMELEC Comm. Tancangco directed Jareno to delete Bautista's name from the list of candidates and to order the Board of Canvassers of
Lumbangan to reconvene. The Board of Canvassers proclaimed Alcoreza, having obtained the second-highest number of votes, as the Punong
Barangay.
Issue 1:
W/N the COMELEC En

Petitioner's
Contention: Yes.

Respondent's
Contention: No.

Supreme Court: Yes.

Garvida v. Sales: Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code

Banc committed GAD in

issuing the two
resolutions.

1. There was no
disqualification case
formally filed against
him.
2. Even assuming that
there was a case filed
against him, the
COMELEC sitting as a
Division shall have
jurisdiction over it, not
COMELEC En Banc.

Issue 2:
W/N the COMELEC
deprived Bautista of due
process when it issued
the resolutions.

The Constitution vests

the COMELEC with the
power and jurisdiction to
pass upon the
qualification of
candidates.

The Constitution (Article IX-C) provides that the COMELEC En Banc

can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers.
Meanwhile, that QJ powers of the COMELEC are subject of the
requirement that all election cases shall be decided by the COMELEC
in division.

Petitioner's
Contention: Yes.

Respondent's
Contention: No.

There was no notice nor

hearing prior to the
issuance of the two
resolutions.

1. Bautista had the

chance to be heard and
to present his side when
he filed a letter to the
COMELEC En Banc
requesting
reconsideration of the
resolutions.

Petitioner's

The COMELEC En Banc can only act on the case if there is a motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the Division. Thus, COMELEC
should have referred the case to a division for summary hearing.
The proceeding on the cancellation of a COC does not involve
administrative, but quasi-judicial (QJ) functions of the COMELEC.*

2. There was no need

for presentation and
evaluation of evidence
since the issue of
whether Bautista was a
registered voter is easily
resolved by looking at
the COMELEC
registration records.
Issue 3:

governs the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy. Under the rules of procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to
cancel a COC lies with the COMELEC sitting in a Division.

Respondent's

Supreme Court: Yes.

1. Sandoval v. COMELEC, citing Bince, Jr. v. COMELEC: Petitioner
cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law.
The fact that Bautista was able to file a letter with the COMELEC En
Banc requesting for reconsideration of the resolutions is beside the
point.
Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides for the
twin requirements of prior notice and hearing. A summary proceeding
does not mean that the COMELEC could do away with the
requirements of notice and hearing.
2. This reasoning fails to consider the instances where a voter may be
excluded through inadvertence or registered with an erroneous or
misspelled name.

Supreme Court: No.

Contention: No.
W/N Bautista was a
registered voter of
Barangay Lumbangan
when he filed his COC.

Contention: No.

1. (He actually admitted

in his affidavit that he
was not.)

1. Under the LGC of 1991, which took effect on Jan. 1, 1992, an

elective local official must be a registered voter.** The following are the
requirements: 1) Filipino citizen; 2) registered voter in the barangay; 3)
resident therein for at least 1 year; 4) able to read and write Filipino or
any local language; 5) 18 years old on election day.

2. His non-registration
as a voter was due to
the refusal of Jareno to
register him in January
2002.

Bautista admitted in his Aug. 24, 2002 affidavit that he failed to register
as a voter of the barangay because he was out of the country from
1995 to 2001.
2. There is no evidence of this allegation. Jareno alleges that she only
met Bautista in June 2002.
From the circumstances of the case, it becomes clear that Bautista
made false representations in his COC by delcaring that he was a
registered voter. Such false representation is a ground for cancellation
of the COC under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Issue 3:
W/N Bautista's
proclamation should be
rescinded.

Issue 3:
W/N Alcoreza should be
proclaimed as Punong
Barangay.

Petitioner's
Contention: No.

Respondent's
Contention: Yes.

The electorate cannot amend or waive the qualifications prescribed by

the law for elective office.

The people's choice

expressed in local
elections deserves
respect.
Petitioner's
Contention: No.
.

Supreme Court: Yes.

Alcoreza's Contention:
Yes.
Grego v. COMELEC
and Labo v. COMELEC:
First runner-ups may be
proclaimed as winners if
the electorate knew of
the disqualification of
the winning candidate
and voted for him/her
anyway thereby
invalidating their votes.

Supreme Court: No.

The factual circumstances in Grego and Labo are not to be found in
this case.
LGC provides that in case of permanent vacancy in the office of the
Punong Barangay, the highest ranking Sangguniang Barangay
member shall become the Punong Barangay.

Solicitor General's
Contention: No.

PETITION DENIED. Bautista's candidacy is cancelled and his subsequent proclamation is revoked.
Obiter
*Villarosa v. COMELEC, citing Justice Antonio's concurring opinion in University of Nueva Caceres v. Martinez: The term administrative pertains
to administration, especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of
persons or things. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard. While quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc.,
or public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
**Before the LGC, the rule is that candidates for local office need not be registered voters but only qualified electors which does not entail formal
registration in a list of voters.

Digester: Janine Bareo

BERNARDO et al v. ABALOS et al
Dec. 5, 2001
DOCTRINE: Petitioner did not exhaust all the remedies available to them. They did not seek a reconsideration of the assailed COMELEC en banc
resolution as required by Sec 1, Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Petitioners: Antonio Bernardo, Ernesto Domingo and Jesus Cruz
Respondents: Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Benhur Abalos, Dr. Eden Diaz, Romeo Zapanta, Arcadio De Vera and COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioners filed with the COMELEC a criminal complaint against respondents for vote buying in violation of Sec 261, paragraphs (a), (b), and
(j) of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec 28 to RA 6646 and Sec 68 of the OEC.
Petitioners allege that respondent Mandaluyong City Mayor Abalos and his son Benhur, a candidate for Mayor in the May 1998 elections
conspired with the other respondents Diaz (schools division superintendent), Zapanta (Asst. Superintendent), and De Vera (president,
Mandaluyong Federation of Public School teachers). They sponsored an all-expense free transportation, food and drinks affair for the
Mandaluyong public school teachers at the Tayabas beach resort in Quezon.
-

During the whole day affair (April 14, 1998), the background music loudly and repeatedly played the political jingle of Benhur to the
tune of the song Sha lala lala.
Some participants wore shirts with the name of Benhur printed in oversized colored letters
Mayor Abalos delivered a speech where he offered and promised the teachers and employees a hazard pay and increase in
allowances which they will get by the end of the month

The Director of the law department of COMELEC conducted a preliminary investigation and submitted his findings to the en banc recommending
the dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. COMELEC en banc dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence to
establish a prima facie case.
Petitioners without submitting a MR, filed the petition with the SC.

Issue/Held: WON the COMELEC erred in dismissing the complaint for vote buying. -- NO

Petitioners

The offers and promises to the

teachers who are members of the
Board of Election Inspectors and
voters were made a few weeks before
the election were to induce the
teachers and the public to vote for
Benhur.

The offers and promises of Mayor

Abalos
and
the
enthusiastic
acceptance
of
said
monetary
increases of allowances is a violation
of Sec 261 pars. (a), (b), and (j) of the
Omnibus Election Code against vote
buying and vote selling.

Respondents (COMELEC)

The complaint, being criminal in nature, must

have all its allegations supported by direct,
strong, convincing and indubitable evidence
and that the submitted evidence of the
complainants are mere self serving
statements and uncorroborated audio and
visual recordings and a photo. The evidence
of Abalos et al have more probative value
and more believable than the evidence of the
complainants.

The COMELEC en banc in dismissing

the complaint, acted with apparent
grave abuse of discretion.

Dispositive Portion:
Wherefore, the instant petition is dismissed.

SC
Petitioner did not exhaust all the remedies available to
them. They did not seek a reconsideration of the
assailed COMELEC en banc resolution as required by
Sec 1, Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.

The purpose of the motion is to give COMELEC an

opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. If the error
is immediately corrected, then it is the most expeditious
and inexpensive recourse. But if COMELEC refuses to
correct, then it commits a GAD justifying recourse to a
petition for certiorari.

Petitioners complaint expressly states that no supporting

affidavits were submitted by the complaining witnesses
to sustain their charge of vote buying. The absence of
such supporting affidavits shows the frailty of petitioners
complaint.

RZ Zamora
BAQUIT UNDA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HADJI ACMAD DITANGONAN RANGIRIS, Respondents.
(October 18, 1990)
Doctrine: The vice-mayor, who succeeded the deceased protestee-mayor in an election protest brought against the latter after his death, is the
real party in interest and should be substituted in the pleadings as the party-protestee.
Facts:
Hadji Minandang Guiling and private respondent Hadji Acmad Ditangongan Rangiris were the rival candidates for mayor of Masiu, Lanao del Sur
in the local elections. Guiling was proclaimed winner, along with herein petitioner as the duly elected vice-mayor. Both officials duly took their
oaths of office and entered upon the performance of their duties.
Private respondent filed in the COMELEC a petition questioning the said proclamation, which was dismissed by COMELEC without prejudice to
the filing of an election contest. Subsequently, Mayor Guiling passed away and, the following day, petitioner took his oath of office as mayor and
forthwith assumed and exercised the duties of said office.
Private respondent filed an election protest against the deceased Mayor Guiling with the RTC. The summons issued to Mayor Guiling was
returned unserved since he had already been dead for over a month. Thereafter, the protest filed by private respondent was brought to the
COMELEC on certiorari. The petitioner became a party to the election protest as an intervenor with the approval of respondent COMELEC.
Petitioner
Issue: W/N the
trial court has
jurisdiction
over an
election protest
filed against a
protestee who
had died prior
to the filing
thereof. YES

There is no law
which allows a
deceased person
to be sued as a
party defendant,
much less as a
protestee in an
election contest;
and that provided
each resulting
district will
represent a
population of at
least 250,000.

Respondent

RTC
to proceed with the trial of the case because the death of the protestee does not
divest the court of jurisdiction over the election protest

Supreme Court
Statutes providing for election
contests are to be liberally
construed to the end that the
will of the people in the choice
of public officers may not be
defeated by mere technical
objections. To that end,
immaterial defects in pleadings
should be disregarded and
necessary and proper
amendments should be allowed
as promptly as possible.
On the procedural aspect, it is
established that amendments to

 COMELEC
misapplied the
case of Vda. de
De Mesa, etc., et
al., vs. Mencias,
etc., et al. which
impliedly
suggested that
the procedure
would be to have
the case
dismissed
without prejudice,
to the case being
refiled against
the proper
protestee.

pleadings may be permitted by

this Court even for the first time
on appeal in order to substitute
the name of the real party in
interest, provided that such an
amendment would not involve a
change in the cause of action or
result in undue prejudice to the
adverse party.
It follows, therefore, that the
election protest filed by private
respondent can and ought to be
amended by striking out the
name of Hadji Minandang
Guiling, as the protestee, and
substituting, in his place,
petitioner Baquit S. Unda.
Vda. de De Mesa, as well as
the other cases invoked and
relied upon by public
respondent, do not present the
same factual situation obtaining
in the case before us. In the
decisions cited by public
respondent, the protestees had
been duly served with
summons and died either
during the pendency of the
election protest or on appeal.
However, we cannot allow
public interest to be fettered by
procedural lapses or
technicalities where the
circumstances demand and
warrant the adjudication of the
case on the merits as early as
practicable.
We can, however, for purposes
of the present case avail of the
ruling in the Vda. de De Mesa

case to the effect that Sec 17,

Rule 3 of the ROC, on
substitution of parties, applies
to election contests to the same
extent and with the same force
and effect as it does in ordinary
civil actions.
Now, under the LGC, the vicemayor stands next in the line of
succession to the mayor in case
of a permanent vacancy in the
latter's position. Upon the death
of the protestee mayor in the
case at bar, petitioner, as then
incumbent vice-mayor,
succeeded by operation of law
to the vacated office and is
ordinarily entitled to occupy the
same for the unexpired term
thereof. The outcome of the
election contest necessarily and
primarily bears upon his right to
his present position and he is
the person directly concerned in
the fair and regular conduct of
the election in order that the
true will of the electorate will be
upheld. His status as a real
party in interest in the
continuation of said case
cannot thus be disputed.
The pleadings in the election
protest should properly be
amended to substitute petitioner
as the party protestee, instead
of his being merely an
intervenor therein, and that the
proceedings be thereafter
conducted accordingly.

Digest by: Monica

Macalincag vs Chang (1992)
The Secretary of Finance has the power to preventively suspend municipal treasurers. Designation of the replacement is not a
requirement before the subject employee is deemed preventively suspended.
Petitioners:VICTOR C. MACALINCAG (Executive Director,Bureau of Local Government) and LORINDA M. CARLOS (Acting Secretary of Finance)
Respondent:ROBERTO E. CHANG (Makati Municipal Treasurer)
Facts
Lorinda Carlos (Executive Director, Bureau of Local Government) signed a formal admininstrative charge approved by petitioner Victor
Macalincag (Acting Secretary of Finance) against Makati municipal treasurer Roberto Chang for dishonesty, neglect of duty and acts
prejudicial to the best interest of the service (disbursement of funds during election, incurring overdrafts in public funds, and non-remittance of
collections to then Bureau of Treasury), based on a COA preliminary evaluation.
Oct 5, 1989 - Macalincag issued an Order of Preventive Suspension (OPS) against Chang. Macalingcag also sent a letter to the Governor of
Metro Manila Commission Finance Office seeking the implementation of the suspension and the designation of an OIC Treasurer. Said
Finance Office sent Chang the OPS via ordinary mail on October 6, 1989.
November 10, 1989 - Chang filed a petition for prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) in Makati RTC against Macalincag and
Carlos. The implementation was temporarily restrained but the court eventually denied the WPI, sustaining the power of the Secretary of
Finance to issue the OPS.
Chang filed MR, citing EO 392 ("Constituting the Metropolitan Manila Authority, providing for its powers and functions and for other
purposes."). The RTC set aside its previous decision and granted the WPI, ordering the Macalingcag and Carlos to permanently desist from
enforcing the OPS. It said that that in order that a preventive suspension will be implemented, there are two steps involved, viz: 1) service of a
copy of said order on the respondent and 2) designation of his replacement.
Issue
WON Sec of Finance has
jurisdiction to issue an
Order of Preventive
Suspension against the
acting municipal treasurer
of Makati

Petitioner
The OPS is effective upon
receipt of Chang and not
upon designation of an
OIC to replace him.
Said OPS was also
effective before EO 392
and thus cannot be
enjoined by the said law
(which provides for the
transfer of the power to
suspend from the
Secretary of Finance to the
President) and that the

Respondent
A government officer is not
suspended until someone
has assumed the post and
the officer subject of the
suspension order has
ceased performing his
official function
EO 392 enjoins the
implementation of the
OPS, because it created
the Metropolitan Manila
Authority

Supreme Court
PD 807 (Civil Service Law) Sec 41 governs
Preventive Suspension: The proper disciplining
authority may preventively suspend any subordinate
officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance
of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the
respondent is guilty of charges which would
warrant his removal from service
Under said law, designation of the replacement is
NOT a requirement to give effect to the preventive
suspension.

power to suspend and

remove municipal officials
is not an incident of the
power to appoint

The power to discipline is

vested solely on the
person who has the power
to appoint, in this case, the
President
(Sec 8, EO 392 which took
effect on January 9, 1990)

But, BP Blg. 337 (LGC) Sec 156 Art 5 Ch 3 Title II

provides for the automatic assumption of the
assistant municipal treasurer or next in rank officer in
case of suspension of the municipal treasurer. Sec
233(2) is the general repealing provision of the LGC
(nothing in this code shall be understood to amend
or repeal the pertinent provisions of all presidential
decrees and issuances relevant to Metropolitan
Manila )
The OPS then is effective upon receipt of Chang.
Such is presumed when he filed a complaint in the
trial court preventing the implementation of such
OPS.
If such was not allowed, the purpose of preventive
suspension will be rendered nugatory
Changs arguments based on EO 392 are not correct.
Prior to EO No. 392, the power to appoint the
aforesaid public officials was vested in the Provincial
Treasurers and Assessors of the Municipalities
concerned, under P.D. No. 477 and later transferred
to the Commissioner of Finance under P.D. No. 921,
but under both decrees, the power of appointment
was made subject to Civil Service Laws and the
approval of the Secretary of Finance. Thus, there is
an intent of the aforesaid legislations to follow the
Civil Service Laws.
The power to discipline is specifically vested under
Sec. 37 of PD 807 in heads of departments, agencies
and instrumentalities, provinces and chartered cities
who have original jurisdiction to investigate and
decide on matters involving disciplinary action.
The Office of the Municipal Treasurer is
unquestionably under the Department of Finance as
provided for in Sec. 3, PD 477. Hence, the Secretary

of Finance is the proper disciplining authority to issue

the preventive suspension order. More specifically
acting Secretary of Finance, Macalincag, acted within
his jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid order.
Assuming that the power to appoint is with the
President, Acting Secretary Macalincag acted as an
alter ego of the President and therefore, it is within
his authority, as an alter ego, to preventively suspend
respondent Chang.

Digester: Jam Marfil

CASE TITLE: Sandoval v. COMELEC
November 12, 2012, En Banc, J. Carpio
DOCTRINES:
1. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. However, the prohibited election
refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall
election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity
of service.
2. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of the people.
*The case is comprised of three consolidated petitions for certiorari seeking the reversal of the resolutions of the COMELEC as to the recall
election for the mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. Note that the preparatory recall assembly discussed in this case has already been
eliminated by RA 9244.
Petitioner for G.R. No. 154512:
Mayor Victorino Socrates of Puerto Princesa City
Respondents for G.R. No. 154512:
COMELEC, the Preparatory Recall Assembly of Puerto Princesa and other Philippine Recall Assembly officers
Petitioner for G.R. No. 154683:
Vicente Sandoval, Jr.
Respondents for G.R. No. 154683:
COMELEC
Petitioners for G.R. No. 155083-84:
Ma. Flores Adovo, Mercy Gilo, and Bienvenido Ollave, Sr.
Respondents for G.R. No. 155083-84:
COMELEC and Edward Hagedorn
FACTS:
On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened into a preparatory recall
assembly at the gymnasium of Barangay San Jose from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. The preparatory recall assembly was convened to initiate the
recall of Victorino Socrates who assumed office as Puerto Princesa's mayor on June 30, 2001. The members of the preparatory recall assembly
designated Mark Hagedorn, president of the Association of Barangay Captains, as interim chair of the preparatory recall assembly.

On the same date, the preparatory recall assembly passed a Recall Resolution which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his
recall. The preparatory recall assembly requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the
Recall Resolution. On July 16, 2002,
Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition to nullify and deny due course to the Recall Resolution. On August 14, 2002, the COMELEC en banc
promulgated a resolution dismissing for lack of merit Socrates' petition. The COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled
the recall election on September 7, 2002.
On August 21, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution prescribing the calendar of activities and periods of certain prohibited acts
in connection with the recall election. The COMELEC fixed the campaign period from August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002 or for a period of 10
days.
On August 23, 2002, Edward Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election. However, earlier, or on August 17, 2002,
Ma. Flores Adovo and Merly Gilo filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify Edward Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to
cancel his certificate of candidacy. On August 30, 2002, a certain Bienvenido Ollave, Sr. also filed a petition-in-intervention also seeking to
disqualify Hagedorn. On the same date, a certain Genaro V. Manaay filed another petition against Hagedorn alleging substantially the same facts
and involving the same issues. The petitions were all anchored on the ground that "Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth
consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to
the instant recall election for the same post."
In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The COMELEC also
reset the recall election from September 7, 2002 to September 24, 2002. On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of Adovo and Gilo. The COMELEC affirmed the resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to run in
the recall election.
ISSUES AND HOLDING:
*Note: In G.R. No. 154683 (Sandoval v. COMELEC), the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing a
campaign period of only 10 days has become moot. The SC Resolution of September 3, 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 5708 granted an
additional 15 days for the campaign period as prayed for by petitioner.
1.
W/N
the
COMELEC
committed grave
abuse
of
discretion
in
giving due course
to
the
Recall
Resolution
and
scheduling
the
recall election for

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
a. Petitioner Socrates argues that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in upholding the Recall
Resolution despite the absence of
notice to 130 PRA members and
the defective service of notice to
other PRA members.
b. Socrates also claims that the PRA

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
a. The COMELEC, however, found
that "On various dates, in the
month of June 2002, the
proponents for the Recall of
incumbent City Mayor Victorino
Dennis M. Socrates sent notices
of the convening of the PRA to
the members thereof pursuant to
Section
70
of
the
Local

SUPREME COURT:
a. No. This Court is bound by the
findings of fact of the COMELEC on
matters within the competence and
expertise of the COMELEC, unless
the findings are patently erroneous.
In Malonzo v. COMELEC,5 which
also dealt with alleged defective
service of notice to PRA members,
we ruled that "Needless to state,

mayor of Puerto
Princesa?

members had no authority to adopt

the Recall Resolution on July 2,
2002 because a majority of PRA
members were seeking a new
electoral mandate in the barangay
elections scheduled on July 15,
2002. This argument deserves
scant consideration considering that
when the PRA members adopted
the Recall Resolution their terms of
office had not yet expired. They
were all de jure sangguniang
barangay members with no legal
disqualification to participate in the
recall assembly under Section 70 of
the Local Government Code.

Government Code. Copies of the

said notice are in Volumes I and II
entitled Notices to the preparatory
recall assembly. Likewise, Proof
of Service for each of the said
notices were attached to the
Petition. Notices were likewise
posted in conspicuous places
particularly at the Barangay Hall.
Photos establishing the same
were attached to the Petition. The
proponents likewise utilized the
broadcast mass media in the
dissemination of the convening of
the preparatory recall assembly
(PRA). The City Election Officer
of Puerto Princesa City in her
Certification dated 10 July 2002
certified that upon a 'thorough
and careful verification of the
signatures appearing in PRA
Resolution 01-02, x x x the
majority of all members of the
PRA concerned approved said
resolution.' She likewise certified
'that
not
a
single
member/signatory of the PRA
complained or objected as to the
veracity and authenticity of their
signatures.'
The
Provincial
Election Supervisor of Palawan,
Atty. Urbano Arlando, in his
Indorsement, stated, 'upon proper
review, all documents submitted
are found in order.'
b. No discussion.

the issue of propriety of the notices

sent to the PRA members is factual
in nature, and the determination of
the same is therefore a function of
the COMELEC. In the absence of
patent
error,
or
serious
inconsistencies in the findings, the
Court should not disturb the same.
The factual findings of the
COMELEC, based on its own
assessments and duly supported by
gathered evidence, are conclusive
upon the court, more so, in the
absence of a substantiated attack
on the validity of the same." In the
instant case, we do not find any
valid reason to hold that the
COMELEC's findings of fact are
patently erroneous.
b. There is no legal basis in Socrates'
claim that respondents violated his
constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern. Socrates,
admits receiving notice of the PRA
meeting and of even sending his
representative and counsel who
were present during the entire PRA
proceedings. Proponents of the
recall election submitted to the
COMELEC the Recall Resolution,
minutes of the PRA proceedings,
the journal of the PRA assembly,
attendance sheets, notices sent to
PRA members, and authenticated
master list of barangay officials in
Puerto Princesa. Socrates had the
right to examine and copy all these
public records in the official custody
of the COMELEC. Socrates,

however, does not claim that the

COMELEC denied him this right.

2. W/N Hagedorn
is qualified to run
for mayor in the
recall election of
Puerto Princesa
on September 24,
2002?

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
Hagedorn
is
disqualified
from
running
for a fourth
consecutive
term,
having
been
elected
and
having
served
as
mayor of the
city for three (3)
consecutive full
terms
immediately
prior to the
instant
recall
election for the
same post.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
Not discussed.

SUPREME COURT:
We hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election
for mayor of Puerto Princesa because:
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive
terms as mayor which ended on June 30, 2001;
2. Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from
June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during which time he was a private citizen;
3. Hagedorn's recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be
made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because
factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the
right of the electorate to choose their leaders
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution, which states: "Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected."
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, which provides: "Section 43. Term of Office.
(a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official was elected."
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part
provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of
service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any
length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before
and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous
service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election
for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent
election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons.
First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection
after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following
three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent
reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end
of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third
consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the
third term. Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate
reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office.
What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The debates in the
Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election referred to by
the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third term, not
any other subsequent election.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor
of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was
simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity
of Hagedorn's service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but
because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorn's three consecutive terms ended on June
30, 2001. Hagedorn's new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is
not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One
cannot stitch together Hagedorn's previous three-terms with his new recall term to
make the recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An
involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which
broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorn's service as mayor.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec,17 the Court had occasion to explain interruption of
continuity of service in this manner: Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel
the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. x x x." In Hagedorn's case, the
nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term of
three years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as

mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full
term of three years. The clear intent is that interruption "for any length of time,"
as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local official's
continuity of service.
In the recent case of Adormeo v. Comelec and Talaga, a unanimous Court reiterated
the rule that an interruption consisting of a portion of a term of office breaks the
continuity of service of an elective local official. We held in Adormeo that the period
an elective local official is out of office interrupts the continuity of his service and
prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of
his previous two consecutive terms. In the instant case, we likewise hold that the
nearly 15 months Hagedorn was out of office interrupted his continuity of service and
prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of
his previous three consecutive terms. The only difference between Adormeo and the
instant case is the time of the interruption. In Adormeo, the interruption occurred after
the first two consecutive terms. In the instant case, the interruption happened after
the first three consecutive terms. In both cases, the respondents were seeking
election for a fourth term. One who wins and serves a recall term does not serve the
full term of his predecessor but only the unexpired term. The period of time prior to
the recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption
in continuity of service. Clearly, Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the
recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for
purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official's terms in office.
In the same manner, Hagedorn's recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in
office of Socrates. Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the September 24,
2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June 30, 2001, for only
then can the recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. But to consider
Hagedorn's recall term as a full term of three years, retroacting to June 30, 2001,
despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to ignore
reality. This Court cannot declare as consecutive or successive terms of office which
historically and factually are not.
Worse, to make Hagedorn's recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a legal
fiction that unduly curtails the freedom of the people to choose their leaders through
popular elections. The concept of term limits is in derogation of the sovereign will of
the people to elect the leaders of their own choosing. Term limits must be
construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of the
people. Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the
Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were

as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as

they were with preventing the monopolization of political power.
It should be noted, however, that an official elected in recall election serves the
unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for
purposes of counting the three-term limit. A local official who serves a recall term
should know that the recall term is in itself one term although less than three years.
This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in the recall election.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 and 155083-84 are DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court
on September 24, 2002 enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate for mayor of Puerto Princesa in the recall election of September 24,
2002 is lifted. No costs.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion (J. Davide):
The provision on the preparatory recall assembly in Section 70 of the Local Government Code of 1991 is unconstitutional. I also respectfully
submit that private respondent Edward S. Hagedorn is disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the recall
election in question.
The term of office covered by the May 2001 election is up to 30 June 2004. Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No.
7160 are clear in what is prohibited, which is the fourth term. Nothing can be clearer from the wordings thereof: "the term of office of elective local
officials ... shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more that three consecutive terms." In short, an elective local official who has
served three consecutive terms, like Hagedorn, is disqualified from seeking re-election for the succeeding fourth term. The provision bars the
holding of four consecutive terms. The ponencia is then correct when it holds that the three-term limit bars an immediate reelection for a fourth
term. But I disagree when it rules that in the case of Hagedorn he did not seek an immediate reelection for a fourth term because he was not a
candidate for reelection in the May 2001 election. It forgets that what would have been his fourth term by virtue of the May 2001 election was for
the period from 30 June 2001 to 30 June 2004. The flaw in the ruling results from an apparent confusion between term and election, the root
cause of which is the attempt to distinguish "voluntary renunciation" of office from "involuntary severance" from office and the term of office to
which it relates.
The voluntary renunciation referred to in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 is one that takes place at any
time during either the first, second, or third term of the three consecutive terms. This is very clear from the last clause of Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which reads: "shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." The
purpose of the provision is to prevent an elective local official from voluntarily resigning from office for the purpose of circumventing the rule on the

belief that the term during which he resigned would be excluded in the counting of the three-term rule. In short, the provision excluded is intended
to impose a penalty on one who flouts the rule or make a mockery of it by the simple act of resigning. Thus, applying it in the case of Hagedorn,
even if he voluntarily resigned on his third term, he would still be barred from seeking reelection in the May 2001 election.
Hagedorn cannot likewise avail of the ruling in Adormeo vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 147927, 4 February 2002) because in that case Talaga did not
win in his second reelection bid, or for a third term, in the May 1998 elections. He won in the recall election of 12 May 2000. Hagedorn, as earlier
stated, fully served three successive terms
A declaration that Hagedorn is qualified to seek reelection in a recall election to remove the Mayor who was elected for a term for which Hagedorn
was constitutionally and statutorily disqualified to be reelected to or, to hold is to subvert the rationale of the three-consecutive-term rule and make
a mockery of it. Worse, it abets destructive endless partisan politics and unsound governance. An elective local official who is disqualified to seek
a fourth term because of the three-term limit but obsessed to hold on to power would spend the first year of the fourth term campaigning for the
recall of the incumbent in the second year of said term. This would' not be a problem If the disqualified official has a solid following and a strong
political machinery. Interestingly, in this case, as stated on page 3 of the ponencia, the President of the Association of Barangay Captains of
Puerto Princesa City is one Mark David M. Hagedorn and he was designated by the Preparatory Recall Assembly as interim Chairman.
Concurring Opinion (J. Puno):
It is my respectful submission that the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 proscribe a local official who has been thrice
consecutively elected in regular elections and has served three full terms in the same position, from running in the regular election succeeding his
third consecutive term. It is this situation that is prohibited because it makes possible service of more than three consecutive and continuous full
terms, i.e., service of a fourth consecutive full term. We cannot overstress that it is this continuousness that the ConCom feared would open the
gates to the two evils sought to be avoided: the incumbent's use of his undue advantage to put up a political dynasty and limiting the people's
choice of leaders. It is in this context of regular elections that our obiter dictum in the Lonzanida case, which petitioners harp on, should be
understood. In that case, we opined that "[a]s finally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local government official should be barred from
running for the same post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again run for the same office."17 Indeed,
insofar as regular local elections are concerned, which were the elections involved in that case, there should be a hiatus of at least one full term of
three years.
On the other hand, in the case of a local official who assumes office through a recall election - whether after his first, second, or third consecutive
term- there is a break in his service caused by the election of the incumbent who was recalled. Even in the case of a local official who initially
assumes office via recall election, then wins the two succeeding regular elections and serves two full terms in the same post, he is not prohibited
from seeking another reelection and serving another full term. This is so because his service of the remainder of the incumbent's term via recall
election is not, in reality and in law, a full term continuing on to his three succeeding full terms. Local officials who assume office via recall election
serve only the unexpired portion of the incumbent's term and this service is not counted as a full term, despite the Constitutional mandate that the
term of office of elective local officials is three years. Such is the design because Art. XVIII, Secs. 2 and 5 of the Constitution also prescribe
synchronization of regular national and local elections beginning on the second Monday of May 1992,18 which is accomplished if the local official
who assumes office through recall election serves only the incumbent's unexpired term.

Digester: Marynette M. Gravador

CASE TITLE: Montebon v. COMELEC (Federico T. Montebon and Eleanor M. Ondoy v. Commission on Election and Sesinando F. Potencioso, Jr.
Date of Case: April 8, 2008
DOCTRINE: Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service.
The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the vacated post or not. Only if the highest-ranking
councilor is permanently unable to succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate succession.
Succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of a public duty
by a government official, the non-performance of which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of
dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions.
Petitioner: Federico T. Montebon and Eleanor M. Ondoy, candidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14,
2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.
Respondent: Commission on Election, and Sesinando F. Potencioso, Jr., also a candidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan,
Cebu for the same Elections
FACTS:
On April 30, 2007,Montebon, Ondoy and other candidates for municipal councilor filed a petition for disqualification against Potencioso with
the COMELEC alleging that he had been elected and served 3 consecutive terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004th
2007. Thus, he is proscribed from running for the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his 4 consecutive term.
In his answer, Potencioso admitted that he had been elected for 3 consecutive terms as municipal councilor. However, he claimed that the
nd
service of his 2 term in 2001-2004 was interrupted onJanuary 12, 2004 when he succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of
Vice Mayor Petronilo L. Mendoza. Consequently, he is not disqualified from vying for the position of municipal councilor in the 2007 elections.
Issue 1
WON Potencioso
is disqualified to
run in the 2007
elections.

COMELEC En Banc:

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
Potenciosos assumption of office as vicemayor in January 2004 should not be
considered an interruption in the service of
nd
his 2
term since it was a voluntary
renunciation of his office as municipal
councilor.
According to the law, voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for
which the official concerned was elected.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
A
local
elective
official
is
not
disqualified
from
th
running for the 4
consecutive time to
the same office if
there
was
an
interruption in one of
the previous 3 terms.

st

COMELEC 1 Division (June 2, 2007)

Denied the petition for disqualification.
Potenciosos assumption of office as
vice-mayor should be considered an
interruption in the continuity of his
service.
nd
His 2 term having been involuntarily
interrupted, Potencioso should thus not
be disqualified to seek reelection as
municipal councilor.

nd

Potenciosos assumption to the office of the vice-mayor of Tuburan in January 2004 during his 2 term as councilor is not a voluntary
nd
renunciation of the latter office. It operated as an effective disruption in the full service of his 2 term as councilor.
nd
In running for councilor again in the May 14, 2007 Elections, he is deemed to be running only for a 2 consecutive term as councilor of
st
Tuburan, the 1 consecutive term fully served being his 2004-2007 term.

Issue: WON Potencioso is is deemed to have fully served his 2

2004.

nd

term in view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12,

15

SC :
16
1987 Constitution bars and disqualifies local elective officials from serving more than 3 consecutive terms in the same post.
Lonzanida v. COMELEC: The 2 conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been
elected for 3 consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the 3-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at
the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the 3 term limit. Involuntary severance from office
for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC: The term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in
the same elective position. For the disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official has been elected 3 consecutive times; he must
also have served 3 consecutive terms in the same position.
Succession in local government offices is by operation of law.
17
Section 44 of RA 7160 provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member
shall become vice mayor.
Potenciosos assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor,
resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation
because it was by operation of law.
Dispositive Portion:
. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The June 2, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division denying the petition for
disqualification and the September 28, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
15

Sorry, there are no contentions mentioned in the SC level. SC merely disposed of the issue.
Section 8, Article X: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Section 43 of Local Government Code: Sec. 43. Term of Office. (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected.
17
SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor,
the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the
highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice
mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.
16

Digester: Rachel Diaz - Tacason

CASE TITLE: Mendoza v. Familara and COMELEC G.R. No. 191017
Date of Case: November 15, 2011
DOCTRINE: the three-term limit has been there all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987 Constitution
took effect; it was continued under the [Local Government Code] and can still be found in the current law.
Petitioner: Mendoza was a candidate for Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan, Oriental Mindoro in the 29 October 2007 Barangay Elections
Respondent: Senen C. Familara, a voter in the Barangay elections; COMELEC
FACTS:
Prior to the 2007 Barangay Elections, Mendoza had been elected as Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan for three (3) consecutive
terms, on 9 May 1994, 12 May 1997 and 15 July 2002.
18
19
Senen C. Familara (Familara) filed a Petition to Disqualify Mendoza averring that Mendoza, under Section 2 of RA No. 9164 ("An Act
Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections), is ineligible to run again for Barangay Captain of Barangay
Balatasan.
The COMELEC Assistant Regional Election Director of Region IV, Atty. Jocelyn V. Postrado, issued a Resolution recommending that
necessary action be filed against Mendoza for misrepresenting himself as a qualified candidate for the position of Barangay Captain.
Mendoza was able to forestall the implementation of the COMELEC Resolution. He won in the elections and was proclaimed the
Barangay Captain of Balatasan.
COMELEC First Division Resolution: agreed with the recommendation of the COMELEC Assistant Regional Election Director of Region IV
that Mendoza is disqualified from running as Barangay Captain of Balatasan under the three-consecutive term limit rule, and annulled the
Mendozas proclamation.
Mendoza filed a Motion to Recall Resolution, to Dismiss Case and Conduct Appropriate Investigation to Determine Criminal and
Administrative Liability before the COMELEC En Banc but the latter denied the Motion for lack of merit
Hence, the instant petition alleging GAD on the part of the COMELEC En Banc.
Issue 1:

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court

WON the retroactive

YES.

NO.

Citing COMELEC v. Cruz, G.R. No. 186616, 20 November 2009,

18

Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall be
reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.
19

Effectivity date March 19, 2002.

application of the threeconsecutive term limit

imposed on barangay
elective officials
beginning from the 1994
barangay elections is
unconstitutional

(I think this is the relevant

issue, but case didnt really
go into details on the
arguments of the parties for
this issue, especially since
petitioner only blithely
raised this issue.)

605 SCRA 167.

xxx the three-term limit has been there all along as early as
the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987
Constitution took effect; it was continued under the [Local
Government Code] and can still be found in the current law.
(See below for Courts discussion of this)

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The COMELEC Resolutions dated 18 September
2008 and 23 December 2009 in SPA (Brgy.) 07-243 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

[Still citing COMELEC v Cruz..]

The first law that provided a term limitation for barangay officials was RA No. 6653 (1988); it imposed a two-consecutive term limit. After
only six months, Congress, under RA No. 6679 (1988), changed the two-term limit by providing for a three-consecutive term limit. This consistent
imposition of the term limit gives no hint of any equivocation in the congressional intent to provide a term limitation. Thereafter, RA No. 7160 - the
LGC - followed, bringing with it the issue of whether it provided, as originally worded, for a three-term limit for barangay officials.
Section 43 is a provision under Title II of the LGC on Elective Officials. Title II is divided into several chapters dealing with a wide range of
subject matters, all relating to local elective officials, as follows: a. Qualifications and Election (Chapter I); b. Vacancies and Succession (Chapter
II); c. Disciplinary Actions (Chapter IV) and d. Recall (Chapter V). Title II likewise contains a chapter on Local Legislation (Chapter III).
These Title II provisions are intended to apply to all local elective officials, unless the contrary is clearly provided. A contrary application is
provided with respect to the length of the term of office under Section 43(a); while it applies to all local elective officials, it does not apply to
barangay officials whose length of term is specifically provided by Section 43(c). In contrast to this clear case of an exception to a general rule, the
three-term limit under Section 43(b) does not contain any exception; it applies to all local elective officials who must perforce include barangay
officials.
An alternative perspective is to view [Section] 43(a), (b) and (c) separately from one another as independently standing and self-contained
provisions, except to the extent that they expressly relate to one another. Thus, [Section] 43(a) relates to the term of local elective officials, except
barangay officials whose term of office is separately provided under Sec. 43(c). [Section] 43(b), by its express terms, relates to all local elective
officials without any exception. Thus, the term limitation applies to all local elective officials without any exclusion or qualification.
Either perspective, both of which speak of the same resulting interpretation, is the correct legal import of Section 43 in the context in which
it is found in Title II of the LGC.
xxx
All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the challenged proviso has been there all along and does not simply retroact the application
of the three-term limit to the barangay elections of 1994. Congress merely integrated the past statutory changes into a seamless whole by coming
up with the challenged proviso.
With this conclusion, the respondents constitutional challenge to the provisobased on retroactivitymust fail

Digester: Annie Ballesteros

CASE TITLE: Mayor Abundo vs. COMELEC
Date of Case: January 8, 2013
DOCTRINE: An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his
fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the officials service. He had become in the interim, i.e., from
the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen.
The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. While
he was declared winner in the protest, his full term may have been reduced by the actual service rendered by the ousted opponent. This is an
actual involuntary interruption where the winner in the electoral protest cannot be considered to have served his full term of office.
Ponente: J. Velasco
Petitioner:
Respondent:

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Municipal Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, private respondent (no mention in what capacity)

FACTS:
In four (4) successive regular elections, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections Abundo vied for the position of municipal
mayor of Viga, Catanduanes and won.
In the 2004 election, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner Jose Torres, who performed the functions of
the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres election and proclamation and was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral
contest and assumed office for a period of a little over one year and one month.
In the May 10, 2010 elections Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty
seat, Torres sought the formers disqualification to run, predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. The COMELEC First Division issued a
Resolution finding for Abundo, who bested Torres by 219 votes.
Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto action before RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes, to unseat Abundo on the same grounds
Torres raised in his petition to disqualify Abundo. RTC disqualified Abundo for having already served three consecutive mayoralty terms, to wit,
2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence, prohibited for his fourth, consecutive term. To the RTC, the year and a month service
constitutes a complete and full service of Abundos second term as mayor.
Abundo appealed to the COMELEC. The COMELECs Second Division ruled against Abundo holding that service of the unexpired portion of a
term by a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is considered as service for one full term within the contemplation of the threeterm limit rule. Abundo appealed to the COMELEC en banc.

nd

The COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the COMELECs 2 Division holding that there was no involuntary interruption of Abundos
2004-2007 term service which would be an exception to the three term limit rule as he is considered never to have lost title to the disputed office
after he won in his election protest and that what the Constitution prohibits is for an elective official to be in office for the same position for more
than three consecutive terms and not to the service of the term.
Abundo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the SC with a prayer for a TRO. While the matter is pending in the SC, the COMELEC en
banc issued an Order declaring its Resolution final and executory. Abundo was quickly dislodged from his post as incumbent mayor of Viga,
1
Catanduanes.

Issue
Whether the
service of a term
less than the full
three years by an
elected official
arising from his
being declared as
the duly elected
official upon an
election protest is
considered as full
service of the
term for purposes
of the application
of the three
consecutive term
limit for elective
local officials

Petitioners Contention
Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours
with the present case as the
former dealt with preventive
suspension which does not
interrupt the continuity of
service of a term.
Aldovino, Jr. recognizes that
the term of an elected official
can be interrupted so as to
remove him from the reach of
the constitutional three-term
limitation.
Instead, the holding in
lonzanida and Rivera III v.
Commission on Elections
governs in this case (see
summary of jurisprudence
below)

Respondents Contention
The ratio decidendi of Aldovino, Jr. finds application in the
case at bar. Abundo was the protestant who ousted his
opponent and had assumed the remainder of the term. He
was the winner during the election protest and was
declared the rightful holder of the mayoralty post.
Temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the
functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should
not be considered an effective interruption of a term
because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at
least an effective break from holding office; the office
holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from
exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided
by law.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only
to abrogate the "monopolization of political power" and
prevent elected officials from breeding "proprietary interest
in their position" but also to "enhance the peoples
freedom of choice." Per J. Mendoza, "while people should
be protected from the evils that a monopoly of power may
bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of
choice is not unduly curtailed.

Supreme Court Holding

No. The
consecutiveness of
what otherwise would
have been Abundos
three successive,
continuous mayorship
was effectively broken
during the 2004-2007
term when he was
initially deprived of title
to, and was disallowed
to serve and occupy, an
office to which he was
eventually declared to
have been the rightful
choice of the electorate.

The rapid turn of events following the issuance of the assailed COMELEC en banc resolution showed that the TROissued to maintain the status quo and
avert the premature ouster of Abundo pending the resolution of his appealappeared to the SC to have been trivialized.

RATIO:
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
The rule is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, thusly:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. x x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected. To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted
constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and,
(2) That he has fully served three consecutive terms.
The prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption are:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on
succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term
as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term limit
(Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said
position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth
term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the officials service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e.,
from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent
officials continuity of service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officers continued stay and entitlement to the office remain
unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino,
2
Jr.) .
2

Aldovino Jr.: The period during which a local elected official is under preventive suspension cannot be considered as an interruption of the continuity of his
service. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from

5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election
protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office
3
4
had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon ). The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for the
major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of
service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official had served the full term for said office,
then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full
service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the
5
expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera ).

Abundo, for the 2004 election for the term starting July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, was the duly elected mayor. The first requisite for the application
of the disqualification rule based on the three-term limit that the official has been elected is satisfied, whether or not there was an effective
involuntary interruption during the three three-year periods, resulting in the disruption of the continuity of Abundos mayoralty.

exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the
absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

Lonzanida: The Court, cited the two (2) conditions which must concur for the three-term limit to apply: "1) that the official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms." Lonzanida cannot be considered as having
been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections since his assumption of office as mayor "cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election
but by reason of a void proclamation." Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term having been ordered to vacate his post before the expiration
of the term, a situation which amounts to an involuntary relinquishment of office.
4

Dizon v. COMELEC: The Court found Mayor Morales (2nd case) as respondent in a disqualification proceeding when he ran again as a mayoralty
candidate. Having been unseated from his post by virtue of a previous ruling, Morales would argue that the three-term limit rule was no longer
applicable as to his 2007 mayoralty bid. The Court ruled in his favor, holding that for purposes of the 2007 elections, the three-term limit rule
was no longer a disqualifying factor as against Morales. The Court wrote: Our ruling in his previous case served as involuntary severance from
office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
5

Rivera III v. COMELEC: The fact of being belatedly ousted, i.e., after the expiry of the term, cannot constitute an interruption in Morales service of the full
term; neither can Morales be considered merely a "caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto officer" for purposes of applying the three-term limit rule.

An involuntary interruption occurred during the July 2004-June 2007 term. Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served
the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one month. He was not able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to
which he was otherwise entitled.
A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals, means, in a legal sense, "a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an
officer may hold an office. It also means the "time during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after
which the several incumbents shall succeed one another." It is the period of time during which a duly elected official has title to and can serve the
functions of an elective office. From paragraph (a) of Sec. 43, RA 7160, the term for local elected officials is three (3) years starting from noon of
June 30 of the first year of said term.
During the period from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a
matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said elective office. During that period, title to hold such office
and the corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Abundo held the office
and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May 2004
elections for only a little over one year and one month.
Since the legally contemplated full term for local elected officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007.
Abundo actually served less. The almost two-year period during which Abundos opponent actually served as Mayor is to be considered an
involuntary interruption of Abundos continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term cannot be considered as one term for purposes of
counting the three-term threshold.
When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to the continuance of the service by the
concerned elected official by effectively cutting short the service of a term or giving a hiatus in the occupation of the elective office. On the other
hand, voluntary renunciation of the office by an elective local official would mean to give up or abandon the title to the office and to cut short the
service of the term the concerned elected official is entitled to. Reference is to the term, not the actual length of the service the public official may
render. Actual service of term no matter how long or how short is immaterial.
The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. While
he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundos full term has been substantially reduced by the
actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be
considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term.
Pending the favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as presumptive
victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. For almost two years or from July 1, 2004 until May 9, 2006 or during which his
opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen awaiting the outcome of his protest. Even if declared later as having
the right to serve the elective position from July 1, 2004, such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election protest,
Abundo did not serve in the mayors office and had no legal right to said position.
The rule on preventive suspension (Aldovino Jr. ruling) does not apply to the instant case. Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the
mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to assume and serve such elective office.
Not having been declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot lose a title which he did not have.

Even if the belated declaration in the election protest accords him title to the elective office from the start of the term, Abundo was not entitled to
the elective office until the election protest was finally resolved in his favor. There was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and
effective interruption of his service, until he assumed the office and served barely over a year of the remaining term.
6

There were apparent similarities of Mayor Abundos case with the cases of Mayor Talaga in Adormeo and Mayor Hagedorn in Socrates as
Mayors Talaga and Hagedorn were not proclaimed winners since they were noncandidates in the regular elections. They were proclaimed winners
during the recall elections and clearly were not able to fully serve the terms of the deposed incumbent officials. Abundo also became a private
citizen during the period over which his opponent was serving as mayor.
If in Lonzanida, the Court ruled that there was interruption in Lonzanidas service because of his subsequent defeat in the election protest, then
with more reason, Abundos term for 2004- 2007 should be declared interrupted since he was not proclaimed winner after the 2004 elections and
was able to assume the office and serve only for a little more than a year after winning the protest. As stated in Latasa, to be considered as
interruption of service, the "law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise
power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit."
During the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the people of Viga, Catanduanes. The period
during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period or break in his service because, prior to the judgment in the
election protest, it was Abundos opponent who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation.
Abundos case differs from other cases involving the effects of an election protest because while Abundo was the winning candidate, he was the
one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his constituents. A contrary ruling would work damage and cause grave injustice to Abundo.
More than the injustice that may be committed against Abundo is the injustice that may likewise be committed against the people of Viga,
Catanduanes by depriving them of their right to choose their leaders.
Dispositive Portion: The Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc and the Decision of the RTC of Virac, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in
the May 2010 elections and is accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position.
6

Adormeo v. Commission on Elections: The Court held that the remainder of Tagaraos term after the recall election during which he served as
mayor should not be considered for purposes of applying the three-term limit rule. The continuity of Talagas mayorship was disrupted by his
defeat during the 1998 elections.

Socrates: Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and
1998-2001. Hagedorn did not to vie for mayoralty in the 2001 elections where Socrates ran and eventually won. In an ensuing recall election,
Hagedorn run for Socratess unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorns disqualification under the three-term limit rule. The SC
sustained Hagedorn. It ruled that the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term and any
subsequent election, like recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition.

DIGESTER: Mendoza
(Note: Mahaba yung digest kasi may prior series of events leading to the events in the case itself. Tapos nilagay ko rin yung sagot ng Main
Decision sa Dissenting. Sinama ko rin yung mga important provisions cited by the Supreme Court.)
MIRANDA v SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 154098. July 27, 2005
PETITIONER: JOSE C. MIRANDA (Mayor of Santiago City, Isabela)
RESPONDENT: SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, SEC. JOSE D. LINA, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the DILG and
FAUSTINO DY, JR. in his capacity as Governor of the Province of Isabela
FACTS:
1. July 25, 1997 to January 25, 1998 The Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) placed Mayor Jose C. Miranda (Miranda) under a 6-months
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION for violating RA6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
2. December 1, 1997 Vice-Mayor Amelita Navarro (Navarro) filed a Complaint with the Ombudsman against Miranda for allegedly committing the
felony of USURPATION OF AUTHORITY OR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for Mirandas acts on
November 24, 1997 assuming the authority of the City Mayor despite the continuance of Mirandas Preventive Suspension. The acts committed by
Miranda were the following:
a. Issuing a memorandum addressed to Navarro advising her that he was assuming his position as City Mayor;
b. Giving directives to the heads of offices and other employees;
c. Issuing Office Order No. 11-021 which authorized certain persons to start work;
d. Insisting on performing the functions and duties of Mayor despite Navarrros requests to desist from doing so without a valid court order
and in spite of the order of Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez directing him to cease
from reassuming the position.
Miranda filed a Counter-Affidavit stating that he reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer and in good faith. He contended that under Section
63(b) of the Local Government Code, local elective officials could not be preventively suspended for a period beyond 60 days.

On the same day that Miranda reassumed office, he received a memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to
vacate his office and according to Miranda, he immediately complied with the same. However, his counter-affidavit also stated that he left the
mayoralty post after coercion by the Philippine National Police.
3. October 28, 1998 the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan an Information against Miranda for violation of Article 177 of the RPC,
penalizing usurpation of authority.
4. November 20, 1998 the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of Special Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation of the case in light of the
manifestations made by prosecution and defense counsel.
5. September 14, 2000 - Special Prosecution Officer Rodrigo V. Coquia (Coquia) recommended the dismissal of the case in a Resolution. Coquia
held that Miranda reassumed his office in good faith and on mistake of fact due to the difficult questions of law involved. The Ombudsman
referred the recommendation of Coquia to the Chief Legal Counsel (CLC) of the Ombudsman for review, the CLC disagreed and the case was reraffled to Special Prosecution Officer Evelyn T. Lucero (Lucero) which followed the decision of the CLC. With Lucero, the prosecution filed an
amended Information with the Sandiganbayan, to which the Miranda interposed a negative plea.
6. November 28, 2001 - The prosecution filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to suspend Miranda pendente lite based on Section 13 of
RA3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
Miranda opposed the motion on the ground that the offense of usurpation of authority or official functions under Article 177 of the RPC is not
embraced by Section 13 of RA3019 which only contemplates offenses enumerated under RA3019, Title VII, Book II of the RPC or which involve
fraud upon government or public funds or property.
February 4, 2002 - The Sandiganbayan preventively suspended Mayor Miranda from office for 90 days. The anti-graft court held that a violation of
Article 177 of the RPC involves fraud which in a general sense is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts,
omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another or by
which an undue and unconscious advantage is taken of another. It further ruled that Mirandas act fell within the catch-all provision x x x or for
any offense involving fraud upon government.
Miranda filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied on June 17, 2002. Hence, this case.
ISSUE
WoN Section 13 of RA3019 applies only to fraudulent acts
involving public funds or property?

SUPREME COURT
No.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 covers two types of offenses:

(1) any offense involving fraud on the government; and

(2) any offense involving public funds or property.
Nothing in RA3019 evinces any legislative intent to limit Section 13 only to
acts involving fraud on public funds or property. The phrase any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is clear and
categorical. To limit the use of government as an adjective that qualifies
funds is baseless. The word public precedes funds and distinguishes
the same from private funds. To qualify further public funds as
government funds, as petitioner claims is the laws intent, is plainly
superfluous. A statute should be construed reasonably with reference to its
controlling purpose and its provisions should not be given a meaning that is
inconsistent with its scope and object. RA3019, commonly known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, should be read to protect the
State from fraud by its own officials.
WoN the crime of usurpation of authority or official functions
involves fraud upon government or public funds or property
found in Section 13 of RA3019?

Yes.
The Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion when it ruled that
petitioners act fell within the catch-all provision x x x or for any offense
involving fraud upon government. The term fraud is defined, viz.:
An instance or an act of trickery or deceit esp. when involving
misrepresentation: an act of deluding.
It is obvious to the eyes that the phrase fraud upon government
means any instance or act of trickery or deceit against the
government. It cannot be read restrictively so as to be equivalent to
malversation of funds as this is covered by the preceding phrase any
offense involving . . . public funds or property. It ought to follow that fraud
upon government was committed when the petitioner allegedly assumed
the duties and performed acts pertaining to the Office of the Mayor under
pretense of official position.
When accused Miranda, willfully and knowingly, during the effectivity of his

suspension barged into the City Hall, issued orders and directives and
performed functions as City Mayor, he was sending the unwritten yet visible
message that he was authorized to do and function as such. x x x. We
hold this as a fraud upon government resulting in the chaos or
confusion albeit temporary, as the employees would be in a quandary
whom to follow or obey.
When accused-mayor appointed persons in various positions, he
indirectly dealt with the citys funds as those persons appointed will
be given their respective salaries, benefits and other monetary
consideration which will be paid wholly or mainly out of the citys
funds. Additionally, when he performed acts pertaining to the Office of the
Mayor, i.e.[,] approval of vouchers, and payment of other expenses which is
subject to proof, he likewise indirectly dealt with the funds of the city.
WoN Miranda reassumed office under an honest belief that he
was no longer under preventive suspension?

No.
By petitioners own admission, he refused to leave his
position despite the memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez and left
only a few days after receipt thereof due to the coercion of the
Philippine National Police. This contradicts his assertion that he
immediately complied with the memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez.
Petitioners excuse for violating the order of preventive suspension is too
flimsy to merit even a side-glance. He alleged that he merely followed the
advice of his lawyer. If petitioner and his counsel had an iota of respect
for the rule of law, they should have assailed the validity of the order of
suspension in court instead of taking the law into their own hands.

(ANSWER TO DISSENTING OPINION)

No.

WoN the Ombudsmans authority to preventively suspend local

elective officials for 6 months is limited by Section 63(b) of the
Local Government Code.

It is plain that the provision of the Local Government Code was only meant
as a cap on the discretionary power of the President, governor and mayor
to impose excessively long preventive suspensions. The Ombudsman is
not mentioned in the said provision and was not meant to be governed

thereby.
Section 63 of the Local Government Code does not govern preventive
suspensions imposed by the Ombudsman, which is a constitutionally
created office and independent from the Executive branch of government.
The Ombudsmans power of preventive suspension is governed by
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of
1989.

Section 13 of RA 3019, as amended, provides:

Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in
court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any
law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has already received such benefits he
shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government.
Section 63 of the Local Government Code, provides:
SECTION 63. Preventive Suspension. (a)
Preventive suspension may be imposed:
(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city;
(2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component city or municipality; or
(3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay.
(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the
gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence: Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of local elective
officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an
elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds
existing and known at the time of the first suspension.

(c) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended elective official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice
to the continuation of the proceedings against him, which shall be terminated within one hundred twenty (120) days from the time he was
formally notified of the case against him. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect, or request, other
than the appeal duly filed, the duration of such delay shall not be counted in computing the time of termination of the case.
Section 24 of RA6770 (Ombudsman Act), provides:
SECTION 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from
the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months,
without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition
of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

Digester: John Michael Vida

CASE TITLE: ANTONIO M. BOLASTIG, petitioner vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Date of Case: April 7, 2010
DOCTRINE: Sec. 13 of RA 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information
charging violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property is filed.
Petitioner:
Antonio M. Bolastig
Respondents:
Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines
FACTS:
It was alleged that on June 24, 1986, in the Municipality of Catbalogan, Samar, Bolastig (OIC Governor), Pedro Ason (Provincial Treasurer) and
Prudencio Macabenta (Property Officer), all members of Bids and Awards Committee for the Provincial Government of Samar, entered into a
purchase contract with a certain Reynaldo Esparaguerra for the purchase of certain office supplies, namely: one hundred (100) reams of Onion
Skin at a unit price of P550.00, which was obvoiusly disadvantageous to the government as the prevailing unit price for said item was only P55.00.
As a result, on August 31, 1989, an information was filed against him and the two others in the Sandiganbayan for alleged overpricing of 100
reams of onion skin paper in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). Bolastig was subsequently arraigned on January 5,
1993, whereupon he entered a plea of "not guilty."
On January 25, 1993, the Special Prosecutor moved for Bolastigs suspension from office, citing Sec. 13 of RA 3019 which provides:
Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government
or public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation,
is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Bolastig opposed the motion, arguing that his suspension will deprive his constituents of a duly-elected public official, and that his suspension will
be contrary to the spirit and intent of the law for failure to show any public interest to be served, or injury to be prevented, or any other compelling
factual circumstance which justifies the preventive suspension of Bolastig.
Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan rejected Bolastigs argument and ordered his suspension from office for a period of 90 days. The SB held that
preventive suspension is mandatory under Sec. 13, of RA 3019, pursuant to which all that is required is for the court to make a finding that the

accused stands charged under a valid information "for any of the above-described crimes for the purpose of granting or denying the sought for
suspension." A subsequent MR by Bolanog was denied, hence the appeal to the SC.
ISSUE

PETITIONER
(Mr. Bolastig)

RESPONDENTS
(Solicitor General)

SUPREME COURT

1. WON the Courts may

mandatorily impose suspension of
a public official pendente lite,
upon filing of a valid information

NO.
Preventive suspension should be
ordered only when the legislative
purpose is achieved, that is,
when:

YES.
According to RA 3019, and as
held in several decisions of this
Court such as Bunye v. Escareal,
Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, and
People v. Albano, upon the filing
of a valid information suspension
pendente lite is mandatory.

YES.
It is now settled that Sec. 13 of
RA 3019 makes it mandatory for
the Sandiganbayan to suspend
any public officer against whom a
valid
information
charging
violation of that law, Book II, Title
7 of the Revised Penal Code, or
any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or
property is filed.

"the suspension order prevent(s)

the accused from using his office
to influence potential witnesses or
tamper with records which may be
vital in the prosecution of the case
against him."

(RATIO BELOW)
Corollarily, when the legislative
purpose
is
not
achieved,
preventive suspension is improper
and should not be decreed.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Supreme Court states that the court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to
prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office.
The presumption is that, unless the accused is suspended, he may be able to frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do
both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine
whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court.
As to the reason why some decisions such as Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan impose only 90 days preventive suspension, the Court states that the
period is assigned only for the purpose of emphasizing that the preventive suspension, if given for more than ninety (90) days, will already be
excessive and unreasonable.
It was also noted that the 90-day period of preventive suspension is not found in Sec. 13 of RA 3019 but was adopted from Sec. 42 of the Civil
Service Decree (PD 807), which is now Sec. 52 of the Administrative Code. This provision states:

Sec. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the administrative case against the officer or
employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after
the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the
service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the
period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
The duration of preventive suspension is thus contemporary with the period prescribed for deciding administrative disciplinary cases. If the case is
decided before ninety days, then the suspension will last less than ninety days, but if the case is not decided within ninety days, then the
preventive suspension must be up to ninety days only. As applied to criminal prosecutions under RA 3019, preventive suspension will last for less
than ninety days only if the case is decided within that period; otherwise, it will continue for ninety days. The duration will therefore vary to the
extent that it is contingent on the time it takes the court to decide the case, but not on account of any discretion of the court, taking into account the
probability that the accused may use his office to hamper his prosecution.
Also, given the case that the Sandiganbayan were given the discretion to impose a shorter period of suspension, it would lie in its power not to
suspend the accused at all, which would be contrary to the command of RA 3019.
Furthermore, the intention of the law is to prevent the possibility that the accused would intimidate witnesses or otherwise hamper his prosecution,
and also to prevent the accused from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.
Finally, the fact that petitioner's preventive suspension may deprive the people of Samar of the services of an official elected by them, at least
temporarily, is not a sufficient basis for reducing the prescribed mandatory period of preventive suspension. The vice governor, also elected by the
people of Samar, will act as governor.
It must be noted that even the Constitution authorizes the suspension for not more than 60 days of members of Congress found guilty of disorderly
behavior, rejecting the view expressed in the case of Alejandro v. Quezon that members of the legislature could not be suspended because in the
case of suspension, unlike in the case of removal, the seat remains filled but the constituents are deprived of representation.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.

Digester: Ansis V. Pornillos

CASE TITLE: OMBUDSMAN vs. RODRIGUEZ
Date of Case: July 23, 2010
DOCTRINE: In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body in which the
complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals
exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In this case, since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted to
assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan
exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
Petitioner: Ombudsman
Respondent: Rolson Rodriguez, punong barangay in Brgy. Sto. Rosario, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental
FACTS:
On 26 August 2003, the Ombudsman in Visayas received a complaint for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and
neglect of duty against Rolson Rodriguez, punong barangay in Brgy. Sto. Rosario, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. On 1 September 2003, the
sangguniang bayan (SB) of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, through vice-mayor Jose G. Yulo, received a similar complaint against Rodriguez for
abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty.
Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss the case filed in the sangguniang bayan on the ground that the allegations in the complaint were without
factual basis and did not constitute any violation of law. As regards the Ombudsman case, Rodriguez alleged complainants violated the rule
against forum shopping. He alleged that the sangguniang bayan had already acquired jurisdiction over his person as early as 8 September 2003.
When the sangguniang bayan case was called for hearing, complainants counsel manifested that complainants would like to withdraw the
administrative complaint filed in the sangguniang bayan on the ground that they wanted to prioritize the complaint filed in the Ombudman.
Rodriguez prayed for the dismissal of the case on the ground of forum shopping, not on the ground complainants stated. In their opposition,
complainants admitted they violated the rule against forum shopping and claimed they filed the complaint in the sangguniang bayan without the
assistance of counsel.
In his 4 November 2003 Resolution, the municipal vice-mayor dismissed the case filed in the sangguniang bayan.
The Ombudsman directed both parties to file their respective verified position papers. Rodriguez moved for reconsideration of the order citing the
pendency of his motion to dismiss. The Ombudsman stated that a motion to dismiss was a prohibited pleading.
In his position paper, Rodriguez insisted that the sangguniang bayan still continued to exercise jurisdiction over the complaint filed against him. He
claimed he had not received any resolution or decision dismissing the complaint filed in the sangguniang bayan. In reply, complainants maintained
there was no more complaint pending in the sangguniang bayan since the latter had granted their motion to withdraw the complaint. In a rejoinder,
Rodriguez averred that the sangguniang bayan resolution dismissing the case filed against him was not valid because only the vice-mayor signed
it.

Ombudsman:
Rodriguez is guilty of dishonesty and oppression. It imposed the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, disqualification
to hold public office, and forfeiture of civil service eligibilities.
Court of Appeals:
CA set aside the Decision of the Ombudsman for lack of jurisdiction and directed the sangguniang bayan to proceed with the hearing on the
administrative case. It reasoned that the sangguniang bayan had acquired primary jurisdiction over the person of Rodriguez to the exclusion of the
Ombudsman. When he was served notice on Sept 8, 2003. Ombudsman did so just two days later.

Issue (Issues were inter-related)

OMBUDSMANS CONTENTION:

RODRIGUEZS CONTENTION:

(1) Whether complainants violated

the rule against forum
shopping when they filed in the
Ombudsman and the
sangguniang bayan identical
complaints against Rodriguez?
NO
(2) Whether it was the
sangguniang bayan or the
Ombudsman that first acquired
jurisdiction?
The Ombudsman

Upon the filing of a complaint before a body vested

with jurisdiction, that body has taken cognizance of
the complaint. It maintains that summons or notices
do not operate to vest in the disciplining body
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent in an
administrative case. It concludes that consistent with
the rule on concurrent jurisdiction, the Ombudsmans
exercise of jurisdiction should be to the exclusion of
the sangguniang bayan.

When a competent body has acquired jurisdiction

over a complaint and the person of the respondent,
other bodies are excluded from exercising
jurisdiction over the same complaint. He cites Article
124 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 7160, which provides that an
elective official may be removed from office by order
of the proper court or the disciplining authority
whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion
of the other. He insists the sangguniang bayan first
acquired jurisdiction over the complaint and his
person. He argues jurisdiction over the person of a
respondent in an administrative complaint is
acquired by the service of summons or other
compulsory processes. He stresses that
complainants violated the rule against forum
shopping when they filed identical complaints in two
disciplining authorities exercising concurrent
jurisdiction.

RATIO:
The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee applies only in cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan. In cases cognizable by regular courts, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with other investigative agencies
of government. Republic Act No. 8249, otherwise known as An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, limits the cases that
are cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher. The Sandiganbayan has
no jurisdiction over private respondent who, as punong barangay, is occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14.

Under Section 61, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan
has disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official and its decision is final and executory.
Clearly, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the sangguniang bayan over administrative cases against elective barangay officials
occupying positions below salary grade 27, such as private respondent in this case.
In Laxina, Sr. v. Ombudsman, the Court held that the rule against forum shopping applied only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to
administrative cases. Thus, even if complainants filed in the Ombudsman and the sangguniang bayan identical complaints against private
respondent, they did not violate the rule against forum shopping because their complaint was in the nature of an administrative case.
In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body in which the complaint is
filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent
jurisdiction. In this case, since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over
the complaint, the Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan exercising concurrent
jurisdiction.
It is a hornbook rule that jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until
the case is terminated. When herein complainants first filed the complaint in the Ombudsman, jurisdiction was already vested on the latter.
Jurisdiction could no longer be transferred to the sangguniang bayan by virtue of a subsequent complaint filed by the same complainants.
As a final note, under Section 60 of the Local Government Code, the sangguniang bayan has no power to remove an elective barangay official.
Apart from the Ombudsman, only a proper court may do so. Unlike the sangguniang bayan, the powers of the Ombudsman are not merely
recommendatory. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to directly remove an erring public official other than members of Congress and the
Judiciary who may be removed only by impeachment
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 8 May 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00528. We AFFIRM
the 21 September 2004 Decision of the Ombudsman (Visayas) in OMB-V-A-03-0511-H.

CASE TITLE: Laxina vs. Ombudsman

Date of Case: March 22, 2007

Digester: RSG

DOCTRINE: the rule against forum shopping applied only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to administrative cases
Petitioner: Laxina, Barangay Chairman
Respondent: Belmonte (QC Mayor), & Office of the Ombudsman
FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel D. Laxina, Sr. was Barangay Chairman of Brgy. Batasan Hills, Quezon City. On 15 December 1998, Evangeline Ursal
(Ursal), Barangay Clerk of Batasan Hills, Quezon City, filed with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a complaint for attempted rape
against petitioner. Petitioner was subsequently charged with sexual harassment before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.[6]
On 13 March 2000, Ursal brought before the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) a complaint-affidavit charging petitioner
with grave misconduct for the alleged attempted rape. However, the DILG referred the complaint to the Quezon City Council (City Council)for
appropriate action. Said complaint was docketed as Adm. Case No. 00-13 before the City Council.[7]
Thereafter, on 30 March 2000, Ursal filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a similar complaint-affidavit charging petitioner with grave
misconduct, docketed as OMB ADM Case No. 0-00-0350.[8] Petitioner filed his counter-affidavit and attached thereto the affidavits of two
witnesses. On 15 August 2000, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman exonerated petitioner from the
charge, dismissing the complaint for lack of substantial evidence.[9] However, on 2 July 2001, upon review, and with the approval of the
Ombudsman, petitioner was found guilty of grave misconduct and meted the penalty of dismissal, with forfeiture of material benefits, per its
Memorandum Order.[10]
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the adjudication, alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman, but the motion was denied.[11]
Meanwhile, Ursal asked the City Council to waive its jurisdiction in favor of the Ombudsman.[12] The City Council merely noted Ursals
motion.[13]
On 20 August 2001, the AAB issued an order directing Quezon City Mayor Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. to implement the 2 July 2001Memorandum
Order and to submit a compliance report.[14] Mayor Belmonte issued an implementing order, notifying petitioner of his dismissal from service and
enjoining him to cease and desist from performing his duties as barangay captain.[15]
Petitioner sought the review of the Ombudsmans Memorandum Order before the CA, arguing that: (i) the Office of the Ombudsman did not have
jurisdiction over the administrative complaint; (ii) Ursals filing of the same administrative case before the Office of the Ombudsman and the City
Council through the DILG warranted the dismissal of both cases; and (iii) petitioner was denied due process in the proceedings before the
Ombudsman.[16]

In its Decision promulgated on 24 April 2002, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. According to the CA, petitioner participated in the
proceedings before the Ombudsman and questioned the Ombudsmans jurisdiction for the first time only in his motion for reconsideration, or after
the Ombudsman had found him guilty of grave misconduct. Thus, he is estopped from impugning the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over the
case.[17] The CA found the Ombudsmans assumption of jurisdiction justified since it became aware of the earlier case before the City Council
only when petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration.[18] In addition, the CA stated that the Ombudsman was justified in not dismissing the
administrative cases as a penalty for forum-shopping because petitioner and Ursal are in pari delicto.[19] Neither was petitioner deprived of
administrative due process since he was allowed to present evidence and said evidence were passed upon by the Ombudsman, the CA
added.[20]

Issue 1

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court:

I.
THE
PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS
COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR
OF LAW IN
REFUSING TO
DISMISS THE
CASES AGAINST
PETITIONER ON
THE GROUND OF
FORUM
SHOPPING AND
MISAPPLYING
INSTEAD THE
PRINCIPLE OF
ESTOPPEL.

Petitioner claims that

estoppel cannot apply
to him because he
never invoked the
jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman, much
less sought affirmative
relief therefrom.[22]
Arguing that he has no
obligation to disclose
the fact that there is
another identical case
pending before another
forum since he is not
the one who instituted
the identical cases,[23]
he reiterates the rule
that when two or more
courts have concurrent
jurisdiction, the first to
validly acquire
jurisdiction takes it to
the exclusion of the
other or the rest.[24]

In
his Comment,[31] Mayor
Belmonte substantially
reiterates the findings and
reasoning of the
CA Decision. He notes
that the injunctive reliefs
prayed for by petitioner
are improper as he had
already issued an
implementing order
dismissing petitioner from
service, and another
person has been sworn
into office as Barangay
Chairman of Brgy.
Batasan Hills, Quezon
City.[32]

At the onset, it must be stressed that the rule on forum-shopping

applies only to judicial cases or proceedings,[36] and not to
administrative cases. Petitioner has not cited any rule or circular on
forum-shopping issued by the Office of the Ombudsman or that of
the City Council. In fact, it was only on 15 September 2003 that the
Ombudsman, in Administrative Order No.17, S. 2003, required that
a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping be attached to the written
complaint against a public official or employee. Supreme Court
Administrative Circulars Nos. 04-94 and 28-91[37] adverted to by
petitioner mention only initiatory pleadings in a court of law when
another case is pending before other tribunals or agencies of the
government as the pleadings to which the rule on forum-shopping
applies, thus:

Meanwhile, the Office of

the Ombudsman, through
the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), while
advancing the same
reasoning as the
appellate courts

The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject

of this Circular are the original civil complaint, counterclaim, crossclaim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, or complaint-inintervention, petition, or application wherein a party asserts his claim
for relief.
Ursal filed identical complaint-affidavits before the City Council,
through the DILG, and the Office of the Ombudsman. A review of
the said complaints-affidavits shows that far from being the typical
initiatory pleadings referred to in the above-mentioned circulars, they
merely contain a recital of the alleged culpable acts of petitioner.
Ursal did not make any claim for relief, nor pray for any penalty for

additionally argues that

the City Councils
assumption of jurisdiction
over the case will not
deprive the Ombudsman
of its constitutional
mandate to give justice to
the victims of oppressive
acts of public officials and
to protect the citizenry
from illegal acts or
omissions of any
government official.[33]
Even assuming that there
was forum-shopping,
petitioner is estopped
from questioning the
technical defect.[34]
Besides, technical rules
of procedure should be
applied with liberality, and
at any rate, in
administrative
proceedings, technical
rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly
applied, the OSG
emphasizes.[35]

petitioner.
Petitioner claims that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the
case since the City Council had earlier acquired jurisdiction over the
matter. The Court is not convinced.
The mandate of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints against
erring public officials, derived from both the Constitution[38] and the
law[39] gives it jurisdiction over the complaint against petitioner. The
Constitution has named the Ombudsman and his Deputies as the
protectors of the people who shall act promptly on complaints filed in
any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
government.[40] To fulfill this mandate, R.A. No. 6770, or the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, was enacted, giving the Ombudsman or
his Deputies jurisdiction over complaints on all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance[41] against officers or employees of
the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
therefor, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and the disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials, except those who may be removed only by impeachment or
over members of Congress and the Judiciary.[42] On the other
hand, under R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, the
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary
authority over any elective barangay official.[43] Without a doubt,
the Office of the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Quezon City Council over administrative cases against elective
officials such as petitioner.
The Ombudsman was not aware of the pending case before the
Quezon City Council when the administrative complaint was filed
before it. There was no mention of such complaint either in the
complaint-affidavit or in the counter-affidavit of petitioner. Thus, the
Ombudsman, in compliance with its duty to act on all complaints
against officers and employees of the government, took cognizance
of the case, made its investigation, and rendered its decision
accordingly.
As explained quite frequently, a party may be barred from raising
questions of jurisdiction where estoppel by laches has set in.
Estoppel by laches is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time to do what, by exercising due diligence,

ought to have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it has either abandoned it or has acquiesced
to the correctness and fairness of its resolution. This doctrine is
based on grounds of public policy which for peace of society
requires the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute
of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally an
issue of inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or espoused.[44]

Petitioner is also estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the

Ombudsman. A perusal of the records shows that he participated in
the proceedings by filing his counter-affidavit with supporting
evidence. Neither did he inform the Ombudsman of the existence of
the other administrative complaint of which he is presumably aware
at the time the proceedings in the Ombudsman were on-going. It
was only when the Ombudsman rendered an adverse decision that
he disclosed the proceedings before the Quezon City Council and
raised the issue of jurisdiction. Thus, it has been held that
participation in the administrative proceedings without raising any
objection thereto bars the parties from raising any jurisdictional
infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them.[45]
Issue 2

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

II.
THE
COURT OF
APPEALS
COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR
OF LAW WHEN IT
REFUSED TO
PREVENT
PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS
FROM
PREMATURELY
IMPLEMENTING

On the second
assignment of error,
petitioner claims that
he is entitled to the
injunctive relief as
prayed for in his
petition before the CA.
He asserts that Adm.
Order No. 7, as
amended by Adm.
Order No. 14-A of the
Office of the
Ombudsman,

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court:

THE
MEMORANDUM
ORDER
DISMISSING
PETITIONER A
DULY ELECTED
OFFICIAL
DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE
ORDER IS NOT
YET FINAL AND
EXECUTORY
CONTRARY TO
THE DOCTRINE
LAID DOWN BY
THE SUPREME
COURT IN LAPID
VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 329
SCRA 771.

decreeing that all

administrative orders,
directives and
decisions rendered by
the said office are
immediately executory
notwithstanding the
perfection of an appeal
unless a temporary
restraining order shall
have first been
secured, is contrary to
the expressed mandate
of R.A. No. 6770.
Moreover, citing the
case of Lapid v. Court
of
Appeals,[25] petitioner
claims that an appeal if
timely filed stays the
immediate
implementation of a
decision, and that the
fact that the
Ombudsman Act has
given the parties the
right to appeal should
carry with it the stay of
said decision pending
appeal.[26]

Issue 3
III.
THE
RESPONDENTS
AND THE COURT
OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR
OF LAW IN

Lastly, petitioner
maintains that he was
deprived of
administrative due
process when the
Ombudsman refused to
consider his evidence

Petitioner was accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was

required to answer the formal charge and given a chance to present
evidence in his behalf. He was not denied due process. More
importantly, the decision of the Ombudsman is well supported by
substantial evidence.
A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be
sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that

VIOLATING THE
RIGHT OF
PETITIONER TO
DUE PROCESS
IN DECREEING
HIS DISMISSAL
OF PETITIONER
WITHOUT
SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE AND
WITHOUT
CONSIDERING
THE EVIDENCE
OF
PETITIONER.[21]

and rendered a
decision that is not
supported by
substantial
evidence.[27]
Questioning the
findings of fact made by
the Ombudsman,
claiming that these
were speculations,
surmises, probabilities,
half-truths and other
unfounded/unsupported
hearsay evidence,[28]
petitioner invokes the
principles employed in
a prosecution for the
crime of rape[29] and
points out that the
Ombudsman did not
adhere to these
principles.[30]

respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint or formal

charge.[49] Substantial evidence has been defined as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. This is different from the degree of proof
required in criminal proceedings, which calls for a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.[50] Petitioners reliance on the rules on
prosecution for the crime of rape is therefore misplaced. What is at
issue in the case before the Ombudsman is whether his acts
constitute grave misconduct, and not whether he is guilty of the
crime of attempted rape.
There is no basis for believing petitioners claim that the
Ombudsman had refused to consider his evidence. As properly
observed by the CA,[51] the Ombudsman passed upon petitioners
evidence which, however, was found bereft of credibility. In fact,
unfortunately for petitioner at that, the Ombudsman and the CA
discovered Ursals allegations more credible, supported and
corroborated as they were by the medical findings, the NBI reports
and the surrounding circumstances.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 April 2002 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

ESPIRITU V. MELGAR
1992 February 13
Petition for certiorari and prohibition; order for preventive suspension
As a general rule, the office or body that is invested with the power of removal or suspension is the sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of
the cause. Unless a flagrant abuse of the exercise of that power is shown, public policy and a becoming regard for the principle of separation of
powers demand that the action of said officer or body should be left undisturbed.
Petitioner:

Benjamin I. Espiritu
Governor

Respondent:

Nelson Melgar
Mayor of Naujan Oriental Mindoro
Hon. Judge Marciano T. Virola
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro

Facts:
1. Ramir Garang filed a letter complaint with Secretary Luis Santos of the DILG charging Mayor Melgar with grave misconduct, oppression,
abuse of authority, culpable violation of the Constitution and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the public service
a. Allegedly, at around 4:30 PM of March 26, 1991, Melgar attacked Ramir Garang and then ordered that Garing be arrested and
taken to the municipal jail without filing any charged until he was released the following day
2. Garing filed a similar complaint with Governor Espiritu, and asked that Melgar be placed under preventive suspension,
a. He filed another one with the Presidential Action center, Office of the President, which was forwarded to Governor Espiritu, with a
request for prompt action
3. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan required Mayor Melgar to answer
4. Melgar submitted an answer stating that he was giving a speech when he was rudely interrupted by Garing who suddenly started clapping
loudly
a. After his speech, Melgar instructed the police to investigate and found that Garing was drunk
b. Melgar alleges that Garing was unharmed as evidenced by the medical certificate
c. Melgar ordered Garing be placed under custody for his own protection; a balisong was taken from him
d. Melgar counters that Garing should have been charged with violation of RPC 153, and for possession and concealment of a
deadly weapon, but he instructed the police not to file charges
5. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution 55 recommending that Melgar be preventively suspended for 45 days
6. Governor Espiritu placed Melgar under preventive suspension contending that there was reasonable grounds to believe that Melgar
committed the acts stated by Garing, and which was corroborated by three witnesses: Lydia Garing, Nelson Tabor, and Javier Dagdagan
7. Melgar filed a Petition for Certiorari and Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Restraining Order in the RTC alleging that the order of
suspension was an arrogant, despotic and arbitrary abuse of power by the Governor

8. RTC issues a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the Order of suspension
a. RTC found the sworn statements of the public school teachers and members of the PNP to be more credible than the witnesses of
Garing
b. Also the medical certificate was corroborative of Melgars story
Issue: Whether or not the Provincial Governor had the authority to preventively suspend the municipal mayor
Held: Yes
PETITIONER GOV. ESPIRITU

RESPONDENT MAYOR MELGAR

SC

RTC Judge Virola acted without jurisdiction or

with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
write of preliminary injunction restraining him
from implementing the order of preventive
suspension, and in denying his motion to
dismiss the action of Melgar

The order of suspension was an arrogant,

despotic and arbitrary abuse of power by the
Governor, and was therefore within the power
of the RTC to review under Certiorari

There is nothing improper in suspending an

officer before the charges against him are
heard and before he is given an opportunity to
prove his innocence

The suspension was actually politically

motivated

Preventive suspension is allowed so that the

respondent may not hamper the normal course
of the investigation through the use of his
influence and authority over possible
witnesses

As the Provincial Governor, Espiritu is

empowered by Section 63 of the LGC to place
an elective municipal officer under preventive
suspension pending decision of an
administrative case against the elective
municipal officer
He did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
placing the mayor under preventive
suspension; if ever, this was an error of
judgment which is not correctible by certiorari
The RTC did not have jurisdiction as Section
61 of the LGC places complaints over any
elective municipal officer with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan
Section 19(c) of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980 withdrew from the RTC jurisdiction

As Melgar actually believed that the

suspension was politically motivated, he
should have first sought remedy from the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government
Melgar should not have sought recourse from
the courts without exhausting the
administrative remedies

As such, the RTC gravely abused its discretion

As a general rule, the office or body that is
invested with the power of removal or
suspension is the sole judge of the necessity

over cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of

another tribunal
Mayor actually had a remedy under Section 66
of the LGC

and sufficiency of the cause

Unless a flagrant abuse of the exercise of that
power is shown, public policy and a becoming
regard for the principle of separation of powers
demand that the action of said officer or body
should be left undisturbed.
Court notes, however, that the preventive
suspension was maintained by the TRO the
SC issued and so was already served; the
mayor should be reinstated already without
prejudice to the continuation of the
administrative investigation of the charges
against him

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The special civil action filed by the Mayor is annulled and set
aside

Digester: M. Espinal
Mayor Abraham Tolentino v COMELEC
Date of Case: April 7, 2010
Petitioner: Abraham Tolentino and Celso de Castro
Respondent: COMELEC, Arnel Taruc et al
FACTS:
(This is a consolidation of three cases.)
Tolentino and de Castro ran and won in the May, 2007 elections as Mayor and Vice Mayor, respectively, of Tagaytay City. Respondents contested
the results and file 3 election protests against Mayor, Vice Mayor and the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
COMELEC Second Div ordered City Treasurer of Tagaytay City to inventory the 116 ballot boxes being questioned and to turn them over to the
COMELECs Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) in Manila. Both petitioners exerted efforts to delay the transmittal of the boxes to
Manila. Further delay occurred because 44 of the 116 contested ballot boxes became involved in the election protest of candidate Aquilino L.
Pimentel III against Senator Juan Miguel F. Zubiri pending in the SET.
Because of this, the affected 44 boxes were delivered to SET and the other 72 to the ECAD office, with the ff. findings - some were without metal
seals on the outside while some seals were not properly locked.
COMELEC Div, upon receipt of the 72 boxes, ordered the constitution of four Revision committees to examine the ballots and recount the votes.
Tolentino and de Castro complained, saying there were no guidelines/procedure as to how the revision is to be conducted, especially since some
ballot boxes were at SET and that there were distinct protest issues under consideration --> Eventually, SET agreed to have the revision of all the
contested boxes within its premises.
[Revision: [Sec 6, Rule 20 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure] When the allegations in a protest or counter-protest so warrant, or when the
interest of justice so demands (general averment of fraud or irregularities), revision of ballots shall be ordered examination of the ballots and
recounting of votes.]
Issue: petitioners were assailing the order of COMELEC to proceed with revision for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
Tolentino: The Division should first resolve the issue of the inclusion or exclusion of the protested ballot boxes; that there must first be a
determination whether the ballots found in the ballot boxes (particularly those improperly sealed) were the same as the ballots cast and counted in
the elections.
In a supplement to his petition, Tolentino alleges that there was a violation of his right to due process by the non-observance of the cardinal rules
of due process in administrative adjudications and by piece-meal resolution of pending incidents. The case did not state how Tolentino supported
his allegation of non-observance of the cardinal rules except in the ratio where the court supported its finding that there was no denial of due
process.

 De Castro: That the obstinate refusal of the Division to issue an order setting forth the ground rules for the per case revision of the ballots was an
omission amounting to grave abuse of discretion and a denial of his substantive and procedural right to due process.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
That the boxes should be opened because the determination of the full integrity of the ballot boxes and their contents could only be made if the
status and conditions of the contents were also considered.
That the COMELEC issued sufficient and adequate rules of procedure for the revision of the questioned boxes ballots for as mandated, the
normal procedure of revision should be followed, implying that the procedure in previous revision of ballots will be maintained.
Supreme Court
COMELEC orders were proper. In the present case, what was at issue was the authenticity of the election returns and the veracity of the counting
of the ballots, the examination of the ballots are thus called for.
The synchronized revision of ballots by the SET and the Division is allowed under Section 3 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2812, which provides:
Section 3. The Tribunals, the Commission and the Courts shall coordinate and make arrangement with each other so as not to delay or interrupt
the revision of ballots being conducted. The synchronization of revision of ballots shall be such that the expeditious disposition of the respective
protest cases shall be the primary concern.
Moreover, no ruling could be had as to the inclusion/exclusion of the boxes found with defective seals precisely because it is only after a revision
and full trial that the existence of defects/ballot tampering can be confirmed with finality.
[RELEVANT TO THE TOPIC] : On the contention of Tolentino of violation of his right to due process by the non-observance of the cardinal rules
of due process in administrative adjudications and by the piece-meal resolution of the pending incidents, the SC reiterated the cardinal rules for
procedural due process in administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal as enunciated in Ang Tibay v CIR:
1.

The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence in support thereof;

2.

The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

3.

The decision must have something to support itself;

4. The evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion;
5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected;

6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate; and
7. The tribunal or body should render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved and
the reason for the decision rendered.
The same was distilled further in Air Manila, Inc. v. Balatbat which simplified the foregoing into four basic rights, to wit:
1.

The right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a persons legal right;

2.

The right to a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor;

3.

The right to a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and

4. The right to a finding or decision of that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the
records or disclosed to the parties.
Dispositive Portion: Petition dismissed. COMELEC Second Div ordered to resolve with dispatch the three protests before it.

Digester: Flores
CASE TITLE: MAYOR TOLENTINO v. COMELEC
Date of Case: April 7, 2010
nd

DOCTRINE: Rights of respondents in administrative cases (See 2

issue)

2 (Consolidated) Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction or status quo ante
nd
order seeking the nullification of the Order of the 2 Division of COMELEC formally requesting the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) to allow the
conduct of the revision within the SETs premises.
1. PETITIONER: Mayor Abraham N. Tolentino
RESPONDENTS: COMELEC; Jocelyn Ricardo, Arnel Taruc, Marlene Catan, Maria Theresa Mendoza Costa, Fidela Rofols Castillo, Dominador
Bassi, Roberto Malabanan Hernandez, Nerissa Manzano, Leonidez Maglabe Hernandez, Tagumpay Reyes, and Elino Fajardo
2. PETITIONER: Vice-Mayor Celso P. De Castro
RESPONDENTS: COMELEC; Arnel Taruc
***all parties ran for elective local offices in Tagaytay City
FACTS:
In the May 14, 2007 local elections in Tagaytay City, Tolentino and De Castro were proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor and Vice-Mayor,
respectively. Respondents contested the election results in 116 ballot boxes by filing 3 separate election protests (EPCs) against the proclaimed
winning candidates for Mayor, Vice Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
nd

COMELEC 2 Division (Sept. 7, 2007): After finding the protests sufficient in form and substance, required the City Treasurer of Tagaytay to
inventory the protested ballot boxes and to turn them over to Election Officer of Tagaytay for delivery and submission to the COMELECS Electoral
Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) in Manila.
The delivery and submission took place only on Dec. 17, 2008 due to the moves of Tolentino and De Castro of taking turns to suspend the
transmittal of the ballot boxes to ECAD:
Tolentino: Moved to defer transmittal of ballot boxes to ECAD as he still had to complete the photocopying and verification of the contested ballots
denied
petition for certiorari
dismissed for lack of merit (Sept. 16, 2008)
De Castro: Moved for reconsideration of the Sept. 7, 2007 Order of the COMELEC
denied
COMELEC (March 6, 2008): re-directed the City Treasurer and Election Officer of Tagaytay to implement the Sept. 7, 2007 Order.
Further delay occurred because 44 of the 116 contested ballot boxes became involved in the election protest of candidate Aquilino L. Pimentel III
against Sen. Juan Miguel F. Zubiri pending in the SET.
De Castro again sought the suspension of the revision proceedings, asserting the SETs preferential custody pursuant to Sec. 2 of COMELEC
Resolution 2812 over the ballot boxes, election documents and election paraphernalia in connection with the SET case.

COMELEC resolved not to suspend the revision proceedings and instead directed the Election Offier of Tagaytay to deliver the affected ballot
boxes to the SET, with the remainder to be deposited in the ECAD Ballot Box Storage Area in Manila. In his Compliance Report, the Election
Officer certified that 116 ballot boxes were contested in the EPCs; 44 were delivered to the SET for being simultaneously involved in the SET
case; 72 were delivered to ECAD; 16 of the 44 boxes delivered to the SET were set aside with appropriate remarks No metal seal outside or
Metal seal not properly locked; 24 of 72 boxes delivered to ECAD were set aside with the same remarks.
Tolentinos MR: Order was premature due to unresolved pending issues, absence of guidelines or procedure and that not all the involved boxes
were in the COMELECs custody.
De Castros MR: Sought to clarify the dispostiions in the Order, reminding that there would be a simultaneous revision for the 3 EPCs and to
suspend the proceedings until after all pending incidents were resolved pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 19 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
COMELEC (Jan. 12, 2009): Suspended revision proceedings until all the contested ballot boxes were already in the custody of the COMELEC.
Later on it lifted the suspension upon private respondents manifestation, considering that the SET, through a letter, had meanwhile agreed to
accommodate the COMELECs request to conduct the revision proceedings in the SETs premises from March 2-13, 2009.
COMELEC (May 8 and 25, 2009, assailed orders): Formally requested SET to allow the revision to proceed within its premises in order to facilitate
the resolution of EPCs considering that barely a year is left of the contested term of offices. Further denied Tolentinos MR, stating that the
deferment of the revision was due to the unavailability at that time of the ballot boxes. To address the situation, COMELEC, under its plenary
powers, can avail of alternative methods to failitate the disposition of cases pursuant to the rule that EPCs should be resolved with dispatch,
hence, coordination with other tribunals for purposes of revision of ballots subject of simultaneous protests is the usual course of action taken by
COMELEC. Also directed the constitution of 4 Revision Committees (RCs) and commencement of the revision of the 44 ballot boxes within the
SET premises on June 3, 2009.
De Castro: Omnibus motion requesting COMELEC to formulate first the mechanics, guidelines and procedure for the simultaneous revision of the
ballots for the 3 electoral protest cases and to defer revision proceedings until after all pending incidents had been resolved.
COMELEC (June 2, 2009): No need to suspend the scheduled revision. There is no need for specific rules regarding revision because the RC will
conduct the same in the SET premises per case and not simultaneously. The normal procedure shall be followed.
Tolentino (supplement to the petition): Events had transpired subsequent to the filing of his petition. Revision proceedings concerning an EPC
conducted within the SET premises involved only 28 ballot boxes because the RC suspended the revision of the set aside 16 balot boxes.
It appears that COMELEC likewise ordered the RC to verify the condition of the ballot boxes and to submit a report thereon upon the termination
of the revision proceedings; to submit a consolidated report on all the set-aside ballot boxes; not to open the set-aside ballot boxes so that the
COMELEC would not be pre-empted in resolving whether the ballot boxes found to have defective security devces should be included in the
revision of ballots and, instead, to authorize the RC only to verify the condition of such boxes and submit areport thereon to become the basis of
the COMELEC to resolve the pending issue.
ISSUE #1: Whether COMELEC committed GAD amounting to lack/excess of jurisdiction when it ordered the revision of the 44 ballot boxes with
the SET without first resolving whether the 16 ballot boxes thereof which were set aside should be included in the revision and without resolving

how the revision proceedings would be conducted in the election protest cases, in line with the Rosal doctrine and due process.
PETITIONERS: YES
RESPONDENTS: NO
TOLENTINO: COMELEC should first resolve the issue of inclusion or
exclusion of the protested ballot boxes, considering that the
verification, investigation and examination of hteir condition had
already been terminated by the Election Officer of Tagaytay. Under the
doctrine of Rosal v. COMELEC (March 16, 2007), COMELEC should
provide a reasonable procedure in view of a vital threshold issue of
whether the ballots found in the ballot boxes during the revision
proceedings were the same ballots cast and counted in the elections.
The assailed issuances totally overhauled, amended and altered the
final and executory ruling that deferred any revision proceedings until
all the protested ballot boxes were in the custody of COMELEC.
DE CASTRO: The refusal of COMELCEC to issue an order setting
forth the ground rules for the per case revision of ballots was an
ommision exemplifying GAD and a denial of his substantive and
procedural right to due process. Also, the caption of the orders show
that the 3 protest cases were consolidated but COMELEC still chose to
conduct the revision piecemeal starting with the position of Mayor, then
Vice-Mayor, and finally City Councilors, separately.

The Rosal doctrine does not mention any requirement for the
suspension of revision of ballots or for the stoppage of the opening of a
ballot box in a revision proceeding. The set-aside ballot boxes should be
opened. A full determination of the integrity of the ballot boxes and their
contents could be made only if the status and condition of the contents
were also considered. The disallowance of the opening of the set-aside
ballot boxes pre-empted the parties right to examine, present and argue
upon the condition of the ballot boxes and their contents. COMELEC
could not be bound to maintain a strict adherence to its Order of
suspending the revision because the SET had already allowed the
revision to be conducted within its premises. COMELEC had issued
sufficient and adequate rules of procedure for the revision, for, as
mandated in its own order, the normal procedure would be followed.

SUPREME COURT: NO. The order of revision and the revision of ballots synchronized with that of the SET were proper.
RE: TOLENTINOS PETITION:
1.
In regular election contests, the general averment of fraud/irregularities in the counting of votes justifies the examnation of the ballots and
recounting of votes justifies the examination of the ballots and recounting of votes. This process of examination is called REVISION of the ballots
pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 20 of 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure: Revision of Ballots. When the allegations in a protest or counter-protest so
warrant, or whenever in the opinion of the Commission or Division the interest of justice so demands, it shall immediately order the ballot boxes
containing ballots and their keys, list of voters with voting records, book of voters, and other documents used in the election to be brought before
the Commission, and shall order the revision of the ballots.
The protests involved herein assailed the authenticity of the election returns and the veracity of the counting of the ballots. In that regard, the
ballot themselves are the best evidence. As stated in Miguel v. COMELEC, when there is an allegation in an election protest that would require the
perusal, examination or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to order the opening of the ballot oxes and the
examination and counting of ballots deposited therein.
The only means to overcome the presumption of legitimacy of the election returns is to examine and determine first whether the ballot boxes have
been substantially preserved in the manner mandated by law. Hence, the necessity to issue the order of revision.

2.
The synchronized revision of ballots by the SET and the COMELEC is allowed under Sec. 3 of COMELEC Resolution 2812: The
Tribunals, the Commission and the Courts shall coordinate and make arrangement with each other so as not to delay or interrupt the revision of
ballots being conducted. The synchronization of revision of ballots shall be such that the expeditious disposition of the respective protest cases
shall be the primary concern.
Mendoza v. COMELEC: COMELEC does not lose jurisdiction over the provincial election contest by reason of the transmittal of the
provincial ballot boxes and other election materials to the SET, because its jurisdiction over provincial election contest exists side by side with the
jurisdiction of the SET, with each tribunal being supreme in its respective areas of concern, with neither being higher than the other in terms of
precedence; hence, the jurisdiction of one must yield to the other.
COMELEC made the Request although it had suspended the revision proceedings through a previous order on account of the then
incomplete number of ballot boxes in ECADs custody. In this connection, the contention that the Divisions suspension order became immutable
cannot be upheld; such an order, being essentially interlocutory in character, could not attain finality. Such order was only adopted as an auxiliary
means necessary to carry its jurisdiction into effect. There was no irregularity in the lifting of the suspension for nothing prohibited COMELEC from
undertaking the appreciation of ballots in tandem with the SETs own revision of ballots for the senatorial electoral protest.
3.
Under Sec. 11, Rule 20 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure, one of the most indispensable informations that should appear in the revision
report relates to the conditions of the ballot boxes. The integrity of the ballots and therefore their probative value, as evidence of the voters will,
are contingent on the integrity of the ballot boxes in which they were stored (Rosal v. COMELEC). Any defects in the security locks/seals of the
set-aside ballot boxes, as predetermined by the Election Officer, could not yet satisfy the requirement of the rule: COMELEC was not bound by the
report because the defects still needed to be confirmed during the process of the actual revision. Moreover, the presumption that the ballots
reflected the intent of the voters (Sec. 6[c][2], Rule 13 of AM No. 07-4-15-SC) should not be done away with solely on the basis of the report of the
City Election Officer. More than such report, there should be a full blown trial in which all the parties concerned should be allowed the opportunity
8
to present their own evidence, to raise their objections, and to pose their claims before reaching a finding of ballot box tampering .
Since the proceedings were still in the hearing stage, the guidelines set forth in the Rosal case (see footnote) were inapplicable and the
COMELEC deemed the determination of the physical conditions of the ballot boxes as a necessary measure for its final determination of whether
or not to give probative value to the ballots contained in the set-aside ballot boxes. Before the deliberative stage of the protests (when it would
decide based on the evidence presented during trial), deciding on the propriety of relying on the results of the revision of the ballots instead of the
elction returns did not yet arise.
What Rosal forbids is not the revision of the set-aside ballots but the blind adherence to the result of the recount without taking into
consideration the proof of any likelihood that the integrity of the ballot boxes was compromised. Election contests would not end with the result of
the revision. Revision reports, being evidentiary, should still be scrutinized like any other evidence presented before the COMELEC.
Rosal v. COMELEC: Comelec must first ascertain, after due hearing, whether it has before it the same ballots cast and counted in the elections. For this purpose, it must determine: (1) which
ballot boxes sufficiently retained their integrity as to justify the conclusion that the ballots contained therein could be relied on as better evidence than the election returns and (2) which
ballot boxes were in such a condition as would afford a reasonable opportunity for unauthorized persons to gain unlawful access to their contents. In the latter case, the ballots must be held
to have lost all probative value and cannot be used to set aside the official count reflected in the election returns. Guidelines in settling the issue in an election protest of who among the
parties was the real choice of the electorate: (1) the ballots cannot be used to overturn the official count as reflected in the election returns unless it is first shown affirmatively that the
ballots have been preserved with a care which precludes the opportunity of tampering and all suspicion of change, abstraction or substitution; (2) the burden of proving that the integrity of
the ballots has been preserved in such a manner is on the protestant; (3) where a mode of preserving the ballots is enjoined by law, proof must be made of such substantial compliance with
the requirements of that mode as would provide assurance that the ballots have been kept inviolate notwithstanding slight deviations from the precise mode of achieving that end; (4) it is
only when the protestant has shown substantial compliance with the provisions of law on the preservation of ballots that the burden of proving actual tampering or the likelihood thereof
shifts to the protestee and (5) only if it appears to the satisfaction of the court or Comelec that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved should it adopt the result as shown by the
recount and not as reflected in the election returns.

RE DE CASTROS PETITION:
COMELEC in its Order stated that the revision of ballots in the above-entitled cases be conducted in such a way that when a ballot box is
opened, its contents shall be revised in all 3 cases before proceeding to the next ballot box considering that the same precincts are contested in all
3 cases. Such procedure was ideal under the circumstances and the practical and most expeditious manner of recording observations in the
minutes of the proceedings, the segregation according to vote per candidate, and the validation and registration of all objections or contests on the
votes and claims on the same. All objections and claims of each partys revisors would later on be collated on a per case basis and submitted to
the Chairperson of each RC to aid in the preparation of the revision report for the precincts/clusters of precincts assigned to such committee.
There is no incompatibility between the Jan. 6, 2009 Order and the June 2, 2009 Order. The purpose of the latter order was to preserve
the distinction of each position - by keeping the data for each of the positions separate despite the process of data-gathering being done
simultaneously for all three positions. The 3 EPCs involved 44 ballot boxes in the custody of the SET and 72 ballot boxes in the custody of the
COMELEC, all concerning the several elective positions. The task of the four RCs entailed the preparation of per-precinct revision reports for each
of the three positions. The only logical solution to the need for systematic proceedings was to do the revisions on a per-case or per-position
approach, closing the ballot box only after all the data required, and the objections and claims relevant to each position had already been
recorded. It would become significant especially during the stage of the segregation of the votes per candidate, at which time the votes for each
candidate would be given to the opponents revisors who would then validate the ballots, or register objections, or claim votes for the candidates
they represented, or contest the votes of their principals opponents.
In an election protest, the electoral tribunal has an imperative duty to promptly ascertain by all means within its command the candidates
the electorate have chosen. In the exercise of the plenitude of its powers to protect the integrity of the elections, COMELEC must not be
straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes.Thus, its of measures that especially respond to or address unique situations was
incidental to the COMELECs general authority to adopt all the means to effect its powers and exercise its jurisdiction. The nature of election
protests cases often makes the COMELEC face varied situations calling for the exercise of its general authority to adopt means necessary to
effect its powers and jurisdiction. The COMELEC, in its performance of its duties, must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means and
methods that would insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The
choice of the means by the COMELEC should not be interfered with, unless the means were clearly illegal or the choice constituted grave abuse
of discretion.
Moreover, the pleadings of Tolentino even showed that the ground rules and guidelines for the revision of ballots were issued to the
parties a day before the revision proceedings
ISSUE #2: Whether COMELEC committed GAD amounting to lack/excess of jurisdiction when it violated the cardinal rule in administrative cases.
TOLENTINO: YES. His rights to due process was violated by the non-observance of the cardinal rules of due process RESPONDENTS: NO
in administrative adjudications and by the pice-meal resolution of the pending incidents.
discussion.
SUPREME COURT: NO
Ang Tibay v. CIR: Cardinal rules for procedural due process in administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence in support thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself;

4. The evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion;
5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected;
6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; and
7. The tribunal or body should render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved and the reason for the decision rendered.
Air Manila, Inc. v. Balatbat: simplified the rules in Ang Tibay:
1. The right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a persons legal right;
2. The right to a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor;
3. The right to a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent
jurisdiction; and
4. The right to a finding or decision of that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained
in the records or disclosed to the parties.
COMELEC had required Tolentino to provide the names of his revisors whose tasks included the raising of objections, the claiming votes
for him, or the contesting of the votes in favor of his opponent. He has neither alleged being deprived of this opportunity, nor indicated any
situation in which his revisors were denied access to the revision proceedings. He could still raise his legal and factual arguments in his
memorandum should he choose to. During the revision stage, he should raise all objections, present his evidence and witnesses, and file his
memorandum before the case would be submitted for resolution. Tolentino was afforded ample opportunity to ventilate his claims, raise objections,
claim votes and contest votes of their opponents through their duly designated revisors.
Stayfast Phils. Corp. v. NLRC: The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trialtype hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing
Dispositive Portion: Petitions dismissed for lack of merit. COMELEC directed to proceed with dispatch on the revision of ballots in the election
protest cases.

Digester: Justin Batocabe (modified from Pauline Gairanods digest)

CASE TITLE: Republic of the Philippines v. Rambuyong
Date of Case: 2010
DOCTRINE: Section 446 of the LGC provides that the sangguniang bayan, the legislative body of the municipality, shall be composed
of the municipal vice mayot as the presiding officer. Under Section 90(b)(1) of the Local Government Code, Sanggunian members are
prohibited to appear as counsel before any court wherein any office, agency or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party.
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: Richard Rambuyong
FACTS:
1) Nature: Petition for review assailing a decision of the CA which dismissed the petition before it and denied MR
2) Alfredo Y. Chua filed a case for collection of a sum of money and/or damages against the National Power Corporation (NPC) in RTC Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. Atty. Richard Rambuyong, then incumbent Vice-Mayor of Ipil, appeared as his counsel.
3) NPC filed a Motion for Inhibition of Atty. Rambuyong, arguing that under Section 90(b)(1) of the Local Government Code, Sanggunian members
are prohibited to appear as counsel before any court wherein any office, agency or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party. NPC
contended that, being a government-owned or controlled corporation, it is within the term instrumentality.
4) RTC: GOCCs are excluded in the aforementioned section of the LGC because other provisions in the law include the phrase including
GOCCS but that does not, showing the intent of the framers of the law MR denied Petition for certiorari with the CA CA dismissed the
petition MR denied

Issue 1

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:

Supreme Court

WON NPC is
an
instrumentality
of the
government
such that
Rambuyong
should not
appear as
counsel before
it.

Courts are not allowed to distinguish

where the law makes no distinction.
- RTC acted beyong its scope of
jurisdiction when it constricted the
definition of insrumentality to exclude
GOCCs.
- The governments challegne against
Atty. Rambuyongs appearance is
directed against him alone to the
exclusion of his client whose ight to
prosecute his claim as party litigant is
beyond question.

The party who would be benefited or injured by

the compulsory inhibition of plaintiffs counsel is
the plaintiff who is the real party in interest in the
original case. Rambuyongs inclusion in the
present petition is erroneous.

Rambuyong should not

appear

(see below)

Petition is granted. Rambuyong is disqualified to appear.

- Relevant provisions in law:
o Administrative Code of 1987: SECTION 2. General Terms Defined. Unless the specific words of the text, or the context as a whole, or a
particular statute, shall require a different meaning: xxx (4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government,
including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit
therein xxx (10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework vested with
special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled
corporations.
o Local Government Code: Section 5. Rules of Interpretation. - In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
xxx (e) In the resolution of controversies arising under this Code where no legal provision or jurisprudence applies, resort may be had to the
customs and traditions in the place where the controversies take place.
- Aparri v. Court of Appeals: It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and phrase of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous, its
meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed, and, where there is no ambiguity in the words, there
is no room for construction. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words. The reason for the rule
is that the legislature must be presumed to know the meaning of words, to have used words advisedly and to have expressed its intent by the use
of such words as are found in the statute.
- Section 2 of the Administrative Code is clear and unambiguous so there is no room for construction. It is clear that NPC is a government
instrumentality.
o Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr. : NPC is a government instrumentality with the task of undertaking the development of hydroelectric generation of

power and production of electricity from other sources as well as transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis.
- Given the categorical words of both law and jurisprudence, to go to extraordinary lengths to interpret the lawmakers intention is grave abuse of
discretion.
- Section 446 of the LGC provides that the sangguniang bayan, the legislative body of the municipality, shall be composed of the municipal vice
mayot as the presiding officer. Thus, pursunt to Section 90(b)(1) of the LGC, Atty. Rambuyong as sanggunian member cannot appear as counsel
of a party adverse to the NPC.

P v. Sandiganbayan and Alejandro Villapando

23 July 2008
(Digest adopted from a2015)
DOCTRINE: Sec. 6, Art. IX of the 1987 Consti and Sec 94 (b) of the LGC of 1991 prohibit losing candidates, within one year after such
election, to be appointed to any office in the GOCC or in any of their subsidiaries. A losing candidate has to wait one year before
assuming any appointed position.
Petitioner: Petition for Certiorari by the Ombudsman on behalf of the People
Respondent: Alejandro Villapando was Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan and hired Orlando M. Tiape as Municipal Administrative and Development
Planning Consultant in the Office of the Municipal Mayor. Tiape had just lost the election for Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte. Villapando was
9
accused of the crime of unlawful appointment under Article 244 of the RPC. Sandiganbayan granted Villapandos Demurrer to Evidence.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari filed by the Ombudsman through its Special Prosecutor. They assail the Sandiganbayan decision which
granted the herein private respondent a Demurrer to Evidence and which acquitted the said respondent of the crime of unlawful
appointment uner RPC Art. 244.
Respondent Villapando ran for municipal mayor of San Vicente, Palawan and won. He designated a relative of his wife, Mr. Tiape who was
also a mayoralty candidate in another province Agusan del Norte, as Municipal Administrator in San Vicente. Tiape, thus, became an
administrative consultant under the Mayors office and was receiving salary of P26,953 per month.
They were both charged in the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for violating Art. 244 of the RPC on unlawful appointment. The
Ombudsman ruled against the accused and resolved to charge them in the Sandiganbayan.
Tiape died before arraignment so case was dropped against him. Meanwhile, Villapando pleaded not guilty.
After the prosecution rested its case, the defendant therein Villapando filed a demurrer to evidence. The Sandiganbayan found the
Demurrer to be with merit. According to the Sandiganbayan one of the elements of crime is that the person appointed in a public office did not
have legal qualifications.
According to the ruling, legal qualifications over a public office must be provided by law.
Section 480, Article X of the Local Government Code provides for the qualifications for the position of Municipal Administrator: he is a
citizen of the Philippines, a resident of the local government unit concerned, of good moral character, a holder of a college degree preferably
in public administration, law, or any other related course from a recognized college or university, and a first grade civil service eligible or its

Article 244. Unlawful appointments.' Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any person lacking the
legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

equivalent. He must have acquired experience in management and administration work for at least five (5) years in the case of the provincial or
city administrator, and three (3) years in the case of the municipal administrator.
The prosecution did not allege that the appointee Tiape lacked THESE legal qualifications but merely anchored their allegation on the
one-year temporary prohibition on appointments imposed against losing candidates. As such, the Sandiganbayan granted the Demurrer and
acquitted Mayor Villapando.
However, the one-year prohibition provision says: no candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries.
Hence this petition by the Ombudsman on behalf of the People.
Issues

PETITIONER:

RESPONDENT:

Supreme Court:

W the
Sandiganbayan
acted with
GADLEJ in
interpreting that
the legal
disqualification
in Article 244 of
the RPC does
not include the
one year
prohibition
imposed on
losing
candidates, as
enunciated in
the Consti and
the LGC.

Petitioner argues that the

Sandiganbayan, acted with GADLEJ
because its interpretation of Article
244 of the Revised Penal Code does
not complement the provision on the
one-year prohibition found in the
1987 Constitution and the Local
Government Code, particularly
Section 6, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution which states no
candidate who has lost in any
election shall, within one year after
such election, be appointed to any
office in the government or any
government-owned or controlled
corporation or in any of their
subsidiaries. Section 94(b) of the
Local Government Code of 1991, for
its part, states that except for losing
candidates in barangay elections, no
candidate who lost in any election
shall, within one year after such
election, be appointed to any office
in the government or any
government-owned or controlled
corporation or in any of their
subsidiaries. Petitioner argues that
the court erred when it ruled that

The Sandiganbayan, held

that the qualifications for a
position are provided by
law and that it may well be
that one who possesses
the required legal
qualification for a position
may be temporarily
disqualified for
appointment to a public
position by reason of the
one-year prohibition
imposed on losing
candidates. However,
there is no violation of
Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code should a
person suffering from
temporary disqualification
be appointed so long as
the appointee possesses
all the qualifications stated
in the law.

There is no basis in law or jurisprudence for this

interpretation. On the contrary, legal disqualification in
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code simply means
disqualification under the law. Clearly, Section 6, Article
IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing
candidates within one year after such election to be
appointed to any office in the government or any
government-owned or controlled corporations or in any
of their subsidiaries.
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be
circumscribed lexically. Legal disqualification cannot be
read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to
exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under Section 6,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of
the Local Government Code of 1991.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in
disregarding basic rules of statutory construction, acted
with grave abuse of discretion. Its interpretation of the
term legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal disqualification
cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification
in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under
the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code
of 1991. We reiterate the legal maxim ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is the rule

temporary prohibition is not

synonymous with the absence of
lack of legal qualification.

in statutory construction that where the law does not

distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There
should be no distinction in the application of a law where
none is indicated.
(Tiape is NOT qualified.)

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 20, 2004 of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in Criminal Case No. 27465,
granting private respondent Alejandro A. Villapando's Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the crime of unlawful appointment under Article
244 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby declared NULL and VOID. Let the records of this case be remanded to the Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division, for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

Digester: Jel Gallego

PATRICIO E. SALES, ROGER R. SARIMOS, AL B. BUSICO, MARIMEL S. SAGARIO, CAMILA B. BAGCOR, JONAS C. SALON, LILIBETH O.
OBERES, NOEL E. MAWILI, MARIO C. PAUSAL, JAMES D. TUGAHAN, MARIBETH C. DANGCALAN, CAMILO P. RECAMARA, ANDRO H.
AGDA, GERALDINE S. CARIN, MYRNA G. SAGARIO, OSCAR E. MONCOPA, LOURDIRICO E. GUDMALIN, EUFEMIO A.
MONTEDERAMOS, JR., CORNELIO E. JUMAWAN, JR., ELBA R. CASALANG, MERLA E. CAIDIC, RESTY C. SOCOBOS, JOSE DARRY O.
SAGARION, MARIA LUZ S. SIENES, BOB C. HAYAG, RONIE L. LABISIG, FRANNIE M. ANTIVO, RONILO B. RUIZ, ANASTACIA A.
PAILAGA, LERNIE S. FREJOLES, ROMILO D. BAJAS, ISIDRA T. GALLEPOSO, LEAH S. AUSTER, JOIEVELYNN E. HERRERA,
JOELYALLUZ C. DOSIDOS, GLADYS M. ADAZA, NICARATA A. GALLEPOSO, MARIA LIEZEL S. CUARESMA, ARLO B. CAGATAN,
JOSEPHINE S. CABILIN, LEA C. ALAG, PILAR A. JAMOLOD, and BENJAMIN M. SUMALPONG, vs. HON. RODOLFO H. CARREON, JR.,
and THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF DAPITAN CITY, represented by its Mayor, Hon. RODOLFO H. CARREON, JR.
G.R. No. 160791; February 13, 2007;
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
DOCTRINE: The CSC has the authority to take appropriate action on all appointments, including its authority to recall appointments
made in disregard of the applicable provisions of Civil Service Law and regulations.

Petitioners are public officers appointed by out-going Mayor Ruiz Respondents are incumbent Mayor Carreon and the city government of Dapitan
City
FACTS:
1. During the May 2001 elections, then Mayor Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz of Dapitan City, running for re-election, was defeated by respondent
Rodolfo H. Carreon, Jr.
2. In his last month in office (June), then Dapitan City Mayor Ruiz issued 83 appointments, including those of herein petitioners.
3. When he assumed office, Mayor Carreon issued Memorandum Orders Nos. 1 and 2 revoking the 83 appointments on the ground that the
Mayor Ruiz violated CSC rules which imposed a ban on issuing appointments in the civil service during the election period. Carreon also
prohibited the release of the salaries and benefits of the 83 appointees.
4. Patricio Sales, in his capacity as president of the Dapitan City Government Employees Association, wrote the CSC Regional Office No. IX
requesting its ruling on the matter.
5. Carreon in a position paper justified his action, contending that the questioned appointments were not only "issued in bulk" but that there
was no urgent need to fill those positions.
6. CSC Regional Office No. IX: (1) 83 appointments are NOT mass appointments and are VALID & EFFECTIVE;
(2) Memorandum Orders by Carreon are NULL & VOID;
(3) LGU-Dapitan directed to pay salaries and emoluments of appointees.
7. On appeal, CSC En Banc REVERSED, ratiocinating that the positions in question were published and declared vacant prior to the
existence of any vacancy.
8. On petition for review, CA sustained the CSCs finding that the positions to which the petitioners were appointed were already reported
and published even before they had been declared vacant, in violation of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7041; and that there

was no first level representative to the Personnel Section Board who should have participated in the screening of candidates for vacancy
in the first level.
ISSUE: WON the Mayor Ruiz appointments are valid
HELD/RATIO: NO, appointments violated Section 2, R.A. No. 7041, CSC Memorandum Circular No. 18, as amended, and Section 20, Rule VI of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V-A of the Administrative Code of 1987.

This case is a typical example of the practice of outgoing local chief executives to issue "midnight" appointments, especially after their successors
have been proclaimed.
On validity/invalidity of midnight appointments
Note that not all "midnight" appointments are invalid. Each appointment must be judged on the basis of the nature, character, and merits of the
individual appointment and the circumstances surrounding the same.
It is only when the appointments were made en masse by the outgoing administration and shown to have been made through hurried maneuvers
and under circumstances departing from good faith, morality, and propriety that this Court has struck down "midnight" appointments.
Appointments herein are NOT valid for two reasons (as correctly pointed out by the CA):
1) The publication of vacancies were made even before the positions involved actually became vacant; thus violating Sec 2 of RA
7041
In order to ensure transparency and equal opportunity in the recruitment and hiring of government personnel, RA No. 7041 was enacted. Sections
10
2 and 3 of RA 7041 are clear. The CSC is required to publish the lists of vacant positions and such publication shall be posted by the chief
10

SEC. 2. Duty of Personnel Officers. It shall be the duty of all Chief Personnel or Administrative Officers of all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and local government units, to post in three (3)
conspicuous places of their offices for a period ten (10) days a complete list of all existing vacant positions in their respective offices which are authorized to be
filled, and to transmit a copy of such list and the corresponding qualification standards to the Civil Service Commission not later than the tenth day of every
month. Vacant positions shall not be filled until after publication: Provided, however, that vacant and unfilled positions that are:
a) primarily confidential;
b) policy-determining;
c) highly technical;
d) co-terminous with that of the appointing authority; or
e) limited to the duration of a particular project, shall be excluded from the list required by law.
SEC. 3. Publication of Vacancies. The Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission shall publish once every quarter a complete list of all the existing
vacant positions in the Government throughout the country, including the qualification standards required for each position and, thereafter, certify under oath to the
completion of publication. Copies of such publication shall be sold at cost to the public and distributed free of charge to the various personnel office of the
government where they shall be available for inspection by the public: Provided, That said publication shall be posted by the Chief Personnel or Administrative
Officer of all local government units in at least three (3) public and conspicuous places in their respective municipalities and provinces: Provided, further, That any
vacant position published therein shall be open to any qualified person who does not necessarily belong to the same office with the vacancy or who occupies a
position next-in-rank to the vacancy: Provided, finally, That the Civil Service Commission shall not act on any appointment to fill up a vacant position
unless the same has been reported to and published by the Commission.

personnel or administrative officer of all local government units in the designated places. The vacant positions may only be filled by the appointing
authority after they have been reported to the CSC as vacant and only after publication.
Here, the publication of vacancies was made even before the positions involved actually became vacant.
2) The CSC found that there was no first-level representative appointed to the Personnel Selection Board, which deliberated on the
11
appointments to first-level positions as required by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 18, series of 1988 .
Petitioners admitted that when Faconete, then first-level representative to the Personnel Selection Board, retired in 2000, no one was chosen to
replace him. Yet, the city government Personnel Selection Board proceeded to deliberate and recommend the appointments of applicants to the
43 first-level positions.
Petitioners: Although there was no such representative, the action of the Board is still valid.
SC: NO! Section 20, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V-A of the Civil Service Law provides
SEC. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled on any of the following grounds:
a) non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agencys Merit Promotion Plan;
b) failure to pass through the agencys Selection/Promotion Board;
c) violation of the existing collective bargaining agreement between management and employees relative to promotion; or
d) violation of other existing civil service laws, rules and regulations.
In deliberating and recommending to former Mayor Ruiz the appointments of petitioners to the vacant positions sans the required representation,
the Board violated the above CSC Rules. Hence, the appointments he issued are not valid. They may be recalled.
7

In Mathay, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, this Court upheld the authority of the CSC to take appropriate action on all appointments, including
its authority to recall appointments made in disregard of the applicable provisions of Civil Service Law and regulations.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
755151.

11

Personnel Selection Board shall be composed of the following:

a. Official of department/agency directly responsible for personnel management;
b. Representative of management;
c. Representative of organizational unit which may be an office, department, or division where the vacancy is;
d. Representative of rank-and-file employees, one (1) for the first-level and one (1) for the second-level, who shall both be chosen by duly
registered/accredited employees association in the department or agency. The former shall sit during the screening of candidates for vacancy in
the first-level, while the latter shall participate in the screening of candidates for vacancy in the second level. In case where there is no employees
association in the department or agency, the representative shall be chosen at large by the employees through a general election to be called for the
purpose.

Edward Dayog
Quirog v. Aumentado
November 11, 2008
J. Leonardo-De Castro (En Banc)
In cases where the CSC disapproves an appointment, both the incumbent appointing authority and the appointee, being a real party-ininterest, have standing to appeal such disapproval.
Petitioners: Liza M. Quirog, appointee; Rene L. Relampagos, former governor of Bohol
Respondent: Eric B. Aumentado, incumbent governor of Bohol
FACTS:
- May 28, 2001: The Personnel Selection Board (PSB) of the Human Resource Management and Development Office of Bohol certified that
Quirog is one of the 2 candidates qualified for the position of Provincial Government Department Head of the Office of the Bohol Provincial
Agriculture. On the sam day, Relampagos permanently appointed Quirog as such.
- June 01, 2001: Quirof took her oath of office.
- June 04, 2001: CSC Resolution No. 010988

12

took effect. It provided for guidelines regarding appointments near or during the election period.

- June 28, 2001: The Director of the CSC Regional Office VII (CSCROVII) invalidated Quirog's appointment upon finding that the same was part of
bulk appointments issued by Relampagos, which he considered as midnight appointments.
12
3. All appointments, whether original, transfer, reemployment, reappointment, promotion or demotion, x x x which are issued AFTER the elections,
regardless of their dates of effectivity and/or date of receipt by the Commission, x x x shall be disapproved unless the following requisites concur relative to their
issuance:
a) The appointment has gone through the regular screening by the Personnel Selection Board (PSB) before the prohibited period on the
issuance of appointments as shown by the PSB report or minutes of its meeting;
b) That the appointee is qualified;
c) There is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately in order not to prejudice public service and/or endanger public safety;
d) That the appointment is not one of those mass appointments issued after the elections.

- Both Quirog and Relampagos moved for reconsideration of the Director's order. In denying this motion for reconsideration, the Director held that
only the appointing officer may request reconsideration of a disapproval of an appointment s/he made, it being a challenge to the latter's authority.
However, in this case, since Relampagos is no longer the incumbent, he too cannot question the initial decision.
- Upon the joint appeal of Quirog and Relampagos, the CSC reversed the Regional Director's decision.
- The CA, upon appeal by Aumentado, reversed the CSC's decision and reinstated that of the Regional Director.

Issue 1:
W/N Quirog and
Relampagos have the
legal standing to file a
motion of
reconsideration of, or
appeal from, the
decision invalidating the
former's appointment.

Petitioners'
Contention: Yes.

Respondent's
Contention: No.

The use of the word

'may' in Sec. 2 of the
MC indicates that such
authority is not
exclusively vested in the
appointing officer.

CA: Sec. 2, Rule VI,

CSC MC 40-98
provides: Requests for
reconsideration of, or
appeal from, the
disapproval of an
appointment may be
made by the appointing
authority and submitted
to the Commission
within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the
disapproved
appointment.

Furthermore, and more

importantly, Quirog is a
real party-in-interest
because such
disapproval will
definitely affect her
rights and material
interest in the position.
She had already taken
her oath of office,
thereby acquiring a
legal, not merely
equitable, right to the
office.

Issue 2:
W/N Quirog's
appointment violated

Supreme Court: Yes.

Abella v. CSC: Both the appointing authority and the appointee are
equally real parties in interest who have the requisite legal standing to
bring an action challenging a CSC disapproval of an appointment.
Said case also pointed out that the discussion in the Mathay case
regarding legal standing was an obiter.

Aumentado: Mathay v.
CSC: Only the
appointing authority can
request for
reconsideration of a
CSC-disapproved
appointment.

Petitioners'
Contention: No.

Respondent's
Contention: Yes.

The appointment of

Basically, he argued

Supreme Court: No.

The Resolution cannot be applied retroactively, there being no clear
showing that the purpose and intention of the issuing authority is to

CSC Resolution No.

010988.

Quirog was processed

by the PSB and
approved by
Relampagos on May 28,
2001. Quirog took her
oath of office on June
01, 2001. The
Resolution took effect
on June 04, 2001. It
cannot be applied
retroactively.

that since it is a
midnight appointment, it
violated the Resolution.

give it retroactive effect.

Issue 3:

Petitioner's
Contention: No.

Respondent's
Contention: Yes.

Supreme Court: No.

Quirog had been

discharging the duties of
her office in an acting
capacity for over a year
even before her
permanent appointment.

It was one of the 97

(CSCROVII said 46)
appointments made by
Relampagos during the
election period.

W/N Quirog's
appointment is a
midnight appointment.

PETITION GRANTED. Quirog's appointment is valid.

1. It must be clarified that the constitutional prohibition on midnight

appointments only apply to presidential appointments. However, this is
not to mean that the raison d' etre (as sourced from Aytona v. Castillo)
does not apply to non-presidential appointments. In such cases,
whether or not such appointments should be invalidated would depend
on the circumstances.
2. Quirog's appointment cannot be deemed a midnight appointment
because: a) she had already been discharging the duties of her office
before the appointment was made; b) there were no signs of hurry on
the part of Relampagos; c) her appointment would not adversely affect
the policies or administration of Relampagos' successor, Aumentado.

Digester: Janine Bareo

NAZARENO et al v CITY OF DUMAGUETE
Oct. 2, 2009
Del Castillo
Petitioners: Leah Nazareno and 51 other petitioners; appointed by outgoing Mayor Remullo
Respondents: City of Dumaguete represented by Mayor Agustin Percides
Facts:
The case stemmed from CSC Field Offices invalidation of petitioners appointments as employees of the City of Dumaguete, which was affirmed
by the CSC Regional Office, by the Commission en banc and by the Court of Appeals.
Outgoing Mayor Remollo sought reelection in the May 2001 elections, but lost to respondent Mayor Perdices. Mayor Remollo promoted 15 city hall
employees and regularized 74 city hall employees including the 52 petitioners. Mayor Perdices announced in a flag ceremony in the city hall that
he will not honor the appointments made by Remollo. He instructed the city administrator to direct the city asst. treasurer from disbursing
petitioners salary differentials based on their new positions.
st

Petitioners filed in the RTC a petition for mandamus with injunction and damages. RTC dismissed. The SC affirmed the RTC (1 case)
nd

(2 case) The CSC field office in Dumaguete city also revoked and invalidated the appointments made because it was in violation of CSC
resolution 010988. It was made by the losing candidate and the 89 appointments were all issued after the elections and when the new city mayor
was about to assume office. The petitioners MR to the CSC Region VII Office in Cebu was denied because it should have been filed in the office
of the director in Dumaguete.
The petitioners asked the CSC regional office to treat their MR as an appeal. The CSC regional office denied their appeal. The CSC en banc also
denied their appeal and affirmed the invalidation of their appointments on the ground that these were mass appointments made by an outgoing
local chief executive. CSC en banc denied their MR. CA affirmed the CSC en banc and also denied the subsequent MR.
Issue: WON the CSC resolution was valid -- YES
Petitioners

Respondents

Supreme Court

CSC Resolution No. 010988 is invalid because the Commission

The appointments violated civil service rules

The Civil Service Commission

is without authority to issue regulations prohibiting mass

appointments at the local government level.

and regulations other than CSC Resolution

No. 010988.

Outgoing or defeated local appointing authorities are authorized

to make appointments of qualified individuals until their last day
in office, and that not all mass appointments are invalid. Finally,
petitioners claim that because Dumaguete City had been
granted authority to take final action on all appointments, the
Commission did not have any authority to disapprove the
appointments made by outgoing mayor Remollo.

The Commission is authorized to invalidate

the petitioners appointments, because the
CSC accreditation program carried with it the
caveat that said exercise of authority shall
be subject to Civil Service law, rules and
regulations.

has the authority to issue CSC

Resolution No. 010988 and
that the invalidation of
petitioners appointments was
warranted.

They are guilty of forum shopping.

Ratio:
The CSC has the authority to establish rules to promote efficiency in the civil service
The Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government, has statutory authority to establish rules and regulations to promote
efficiency and professionalism in the civil service.
The Reasons behind CSC Resolution No. 010988
It is true that there is no constitutional prohibition against the issuance of mass appointments by defeated local government officials prior to the
expiration of their terms. Clearly, this is not the same as a midnight appointment, proscribed by the Constitution, which refers to those
appointments made within two months immediately prior to the next presidential election.
It is not difficult to see the reasons behind the prohibition on appointments before and after the elections. Appointments are banned prior to the
elections to ensure that partisan loyalties will not be a factor in the appointment process, and to prevent incumbents from gaining any undue
advantage during the elections. Appointments within a certain period of time are proscribed by the Omnibus Election Code and related issuances.
After the elections, appointments by defeated candidates are prohibited, except under the circumstances mentioned in CSC Resolution No.
010988, to avoid animosities between outgoing and incoming officials, to allow the incoming administration a free hand in implementing its
policies, and to ensure that appointments and promotions are not used as a tool for political patronage or as a reward for services rendered to the
outgoing local officials.
Not all Mass Appointments are prohibited

it must be shown that the appointments have undergone the regular screening process, that the appointee is qualified, that there is a need to fill up
the vacancy immediately, and that the appointments are not in bulk.
Mayor Remollo issued the 89 original and promotional appointments on three separate dates, but within a ten-day period, in the same month that
he left office.[23] Further, the Commissions audit found violations of CSC rules and regulations that justified the disapproval of the appointments.
The absence of evidence showing careful consideration of the merits of each appointment, and the timing and the number of appointments,
militate against petitioners cause. On the contrary, the prevailing circumstances in this case indicate that the appointments were hurriedly issued
by the outgoing administration.
The Accreditation of Dumaguete City did not remove the CSCs authority to review appointments
The authority granted by CSC Resolution No. 992411 to the City Government of Dumaguete to take final action on all its appointments did not
deprive the Commission of its authority and duty to review appointments.
Petitioners have not engaged in forum shopping
Although the factual antecedents of the cases brought before this Court are the same, they involve different issues. The petition for Mandamus
st
with Injunction and Damages (1 case), docketed as Civil Case No. 13013, and raised before this Court as G.R. No. 177795, challenged
respondents refusal to recognize petitioners appointments and to pay petitioners salaries, salary adjustments, and other emoluments. The
nd
petition only entailed the applications for the issuance of a writ of mandamus and for the award of damages. The present case (2 case) involves
the merits of petitioners appeal from the invalidation and revocation of their appointments by the CSC-Field Office, which was affirmed by the
CSC-Regional Office, CSC en banc, and the Court of Appeals.
Dispositive:
The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00665 dated August 28, 2007 affirming CSC
Resolution No. 040932 dated August 23, 2004 and CSC Resolution No. 050473 dated April 11, 2005, and its Resolution dated January 11, 2008
denying the Motion for Reconsideration are AFFIRMED.

MELANIE P. MONTUERTO, petitioner, versus HONORABLE MAYOR ROLANDO E. TY and

THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN , represented by HONORABLE VICE-MAYOR RICHARD D. JA GUROS, all of the Municipality of Almeria,
Biliran, respondents. (2008)
Doctrine: The head of a department or office in a municipal government such as the municipal budget officer shall be appointed by the mayor with
the concurrence of the majority of all Sangguniang Bayan members through a resolution.
Facts:
1. On March 17, 1992, Montuerto was issued an appointment as Municipal Budget Officer by then Mayor Sabitsana of the Municipality of Almeria,
Biliran. Her appointment was approved as permanent on March 24 by the Actining Civil Service Commission (CSC) Field Officer.
2. In 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Almeria, Biliran passed a Resolution requesting the CSC to revoke the appointment of Montuerto as
Municipal Budget Officer for failure to secure the required concurrence from the Sangguniang Bayan.
3. The Municipality submitted the 201 file of Montuerto showing that the appointment lacked the SBs concurrence to the CSC Regional Office VIII
while Montuerto submitted a Joint-affidavit by the majority of SB members stating that the concurrence on Montuertos appointment was not
highlighted during the March 1992 session and was inadvertently omitted from the Minutes but they can still fully recall thatthere was a verbal
concurrence during said session.
4. The CSCRO ordered Montuertos appointment recalled. Montuerto filed a motion for reconsideration. To resolve the motion, the incumbent SB
secretary was ordered to submit evidence showing that Montuertos appointment was submitted to the SB for concurrence. The SB secretary
issued a Certification that there is no record that Montuertos appointment was submitted for concurrence however the presence of Montuerto was
noted in the Minutes of the March 1992 session.
5. The CSCRO denied the Motion for Reconsideration. The CSC Central Office dismissed Montuertos appeal. The CA affirmed the CSC
resolution in toto. Hence this petition for certiorari.
Petitioners argument/s:
1. Per the Joint-Affidavit by the majority of the SB members, there was a verbal concurrence on Montuertos appointment.
Respondents argument/s:
1. Petitioners 201 file showed that her appointment lacked the required concurrence of the local sanggunian
.

Issue: Whether the appointment of petitioner as Municipal Budget Officer, without the written concurrence of the Sanggunian, but duly approved
by the CSC and after the appointee had served as such for almost ten years without interruption, can still be revoked by the Commission.
Held/Ratio:
YES. Petition is denied.
1. Under Section 443(a) and (d) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, the head of a department or office in the
municipal government, such as the Municipal Budget Officer, shall be appointed by the mayor with the concurrence of the majority of all
Sangguniang Bayan members subject to civil service law, rules and regulations.
2. The verbal concurrence allegedly given by the Sanggunian is not the concurrence required and envisioned under R.A. No. 7160. The
Sanggunian, as a body, acts through a resolution or an ordinance. Absent such resolution of concurrence, the appointment of petitioner failed to
comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 443(a) and (d) of R.A. No. 7160. Without a valid appointment, petitioner acquired no legal title
to the Office of Municipal Budget Officer, even if she had served as such for ten years

Digester: Jam Marfil

CASE TITLE: Uy v. Contreras
st
September 26, 1994, 1 Division, J. Davide
Petitioner
1. Felicidad Uy (Beauty parlor owner sub-leasing from private respondent Susanna Atayde)
Respondents
1. Judge Maximo Contreras (MeTC Judge of Makati)
2. Mauro Castro (Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig)
3. Susanna Atayde (Lessor of Petitioner Uy in a sub-lessor capacity)
4. Winnie Javier (Employee of Susanna Atayde)
DOCTRINES:
1. PD 1508 has already been expressly repealed by the LGC. However, jurisprudence built on PD 1508 regarding prior referral to the lupon
as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable because PD 1508 provisions on prior referral were substantially
reproduced in the LGC.
2. Non-compliance with that condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Felicidad Uy was a sub-lessee of private respondent Susanna Atayde. Uy subleased from Atayde half the area of a 2nd floor of
a building located in Makati where she (Uy) operated and maintained a beauty parlor;
2. The sublease contract expired on April 15, 1993. However, Uy was not able to immediately remove all her movable properties at the
expiration of the contract.
3. Thus, when Uy sought to remove her remaining movable properties two days after the expiration of the contract, an argument ensued
between her and Atayde. The argument between the two worsened into a scuffle, which subsequently involved Ataydes employees
(including private respondent Winnie Javier).
4. On April 23, 1993, Atayde and her employees filed a complaint with the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati alleging that they were
injured by Uy during the scuffle. However, on the scheduled confrontation between the parties in the barangay, only Uy appeared. The
confrontation was reset to another date.
5. However, before the scheduled confrontation of the parties, two informations for slight physical injuries were already filed against Uy with
the MeTC of Makati.
6. In her counter-affidavit, Uy alleged the prematurity of filing the criminal cases due to the undergoing conciliation proceedings between the
parties.
7. Uy later on filed a motion to dismiss for non-compliance with the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa as well as that of Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Uy also attached the certification of the
barangay captain, attesting to the existence of an ongoing conciliation proceedings between the parties.

8. The MeTC denied the motion to dismiss, explaining that the offense was about to prescribe or be barred by the statute of limitations and
further, that Uy had already waived her right to reconciliation proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati considering she and
Atayde are residents of different barangays.
13
9. The motion for reconsideration by Uy was denied, hence the filing of Uy with the Supreme Court of the special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUES: AND HOLDING
1. WON prior referral to the Lupon for conciliation of the parties was a condition precedent to the filing of an action in court against Uy?
(YES!)
Petitioners Contention
Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when he denied the motion to dismiss considering
that the private respondents failed to comply with the mandatory
requirement of P.D. No. 1508, now embodied in Section 412 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 and further required under the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

Respondents Contention
The denial of the MTD is proper because prior referral of the dispute to
the lupon is not applicable in the case of private respondent Javier
since she and the petitioner are not residents of barangays in the same
city or municipality or of adjoining barangays in different cities or
municipalities and that referral to the lupon is not likewise required if the
case may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover,
even assuming arguendo that prior referral to the lupon applies to the
case of private respondent Atayde, the latter had, nevertheless,
substantially complied with the requirement.

Office of the Solicitor General: (Appearance was made since action involves validity of law)
- OSG agrees with the petitioner that the criminal cases should be dismissed for non-compliance with Sections 408, 409, 410, and 412 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Section 7, Rule VI of the Rules Implementing P.D. No. 1508.
Supreme Court:
- The petition is impressed with merit.
- It must first be noted that P.D. No. 1508 (Establishing a System of Amicably Settling Disputes at the Barangay Level), which was enacted
on 11 June 1978 has already been expressly repealed by the Local Government Code pursuant to Section 534(b) of the LGC.
- Book III, Title I, Chapter 7 of the Local Government Code (Secs. 399-432) is now the law on the katarungang pambarangay. (Title of
1313

NOTE: Procedurally, going from METC to SC is utterly wrong. However, at the outset of the case, J. Davide already said: were it not for the importance of
the issue to be resolved in the light of the revised law on katarungang pambarangay provided for in the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160)
which took effect on 1 January 1992, this Court would have declined to accept the invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ prayed
for. We have already ruled that while it is true that this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, such concurrence does not accord litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor may be directed. There is a hierarchy of courts determinative of the venue of appeals which should also serve as a general
determinant of the proper forum for the application for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for this judicial hierarchy by the petitioner and her lawyers
ought to have led them to file the petition with the proper Regional Trial Court.

Chapter 7 is Katarungang Pambarangay)

However, while P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the jurisprudence built thereon regarding
prior referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable because its provisions on prior
referral were substantially reproduced in the Code.
In Peregrina vs. Panis, the Court stated: "P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for the
filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition precedent could [a]ffect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of
action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. The condition is
analogous to exhaustion of administrative remedies, or the lack of earnest efforts to compromise suits between family members, lacking
which the case can be dismissed.
Such non-compliance is not, however, jurisdictional. This Court said so in Garces vs. Court of Appeals: "In fine, we have held in the
past that prior recourse to the conciliation procedure required under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with
which would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant. Where, however, the fact
of non-compliance with and non-observance of such procedure has been seasonably raised as an issue before the court first taking
cognizance of the complaint, dismissal of the action is proper. The precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement
of P.D. 1508 where applicable is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies; the complaint
becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss."
There were, of course, cases where this Court ruled that the failure of the defendant to seasonably invoke non-referral to the appropriate
lupon operated as a waiver thereof. Furthermore, when such defect was initially present when the case was first filed in the trial court, the
subsequent issuance of the certification to file action by the barangay, which constituted substantial compliance with the said requirement,
cured the defect.

2. WON venue is jurisdictional in barangay conciliation cases? (NO!)

Petitioners Contention
Respondents Contention
Same as above.
Prior referral of the dispute to the lupon is not applicable in the case of
private respondent Javier since she and the petitioner are not residents
of barangays in the same city or municipality or of adjoining barangays
in different cities or municipalities.
Supreme Court:
In a deliberate effort to be cunning or shrewd, which is condemnable for it disregards the virtue of candor,
private respondents assert that the said law is not applicable to their cases before the court a quo because (a) the petitioner and
respondent Atayde are not residents of barangays in the same city or municipality;
Having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents
are estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they themselves had sought.
nd
o
NOTE ALSO: LGC Sec. 409, 2 par. states that: Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation
proceedings before the punong barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may
confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice or
his duly designated representative whose ruling thereon shall be binding.
Neither are we persuaded by the reasoning of the respondent Judge that the petitioner "had already waived

the right to reconciliation proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati, considering that the accused and the complainant are
residents of different barangays." The petitioner did not waive the reconciliation proceedings before the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati; she
submitted to it and attended the scheduled conciliation on 28 April 1993 and invoked the pre-condition of referral to the lupon in her
counter-affidavit.
3. WON the action is about to be barred by the statute of limitations, and thus, parties may directly go to court as per LGC 412(b)(4)? (NO!)
Petitioners Contention
Same as above.

Respondents Contention
Referral to the lupon is not required if the case may otherwise be barred
by the statute of limitations.

Supreme Court:
- Since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, the
prescriptive period therefor would have expired two months thereafter. Nevertheless, its running was tolled by the filing of the private
respondents' complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April 1993 and automatically suspended for a period of sixty days, or
until 22 June 1993. If no mediation or conciliation could be reached within the said period of suspension and, accordingly, a certification to
file action is issued, the private respondents would still have fifty-six days within which to file their separate criminal complaints
for such offense. Evidently, there was no basis for the invocation by the respondent judge of the exception provided for in
paragraph (b), Section 412 of the Local Government Code.
4. WON Atayde has substantially complied with the requirement of prior resort to the lupon for conciliciation? (NO!)
Petitioners Contention
Same as above.

Respondents Contention
Even assuming arguendo that prior referral to the lupon applies to the
case of private respondent Atayde, the latter had, nevertheless,
substantially complied with the requirement.
.

Supreme Court:
- The request for a certification to file action from Barangay Valenzuela is dated 23 June 1993, or nearly one and a half months after
Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were filed with the court a quo. Evidently, this was done to support private respondents
contention in the said court that, in any event, there was substantial compliance with the requirement of referral to the lupon. It must be
stressed that the private respondents, after failing to appear at the initial confrontation and long after the criminal cases were
filed, had no right to demand the issuance of a certification to file action.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Orders of respondent Judge of 2 July 1993 and 5 August 1993 in Criminal Cases Nos.
145233 and 1452334, both entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Felicidad Uy" are hereby SET ASIDE and the respondent Judge is hereby
DIRECTED to DISMISS said cases within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this decision.

Digester: Manet M. Gravador

CASE TITLE: Carlito D. Corpuz vs. CA and Juanito Alvarado
Date of Case: June 19, 1997
ROMERO, J.:
DOCTRINE: The proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the
jurisdiction which the lower court had already acquired over the subject matter and the parties therein.
Failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with the Barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a
waiver of that defense.
Petitioner: Carlito Corpuz alleged buyer of the property
Respondent: Juanito Alvarado - tenant
FACTS:
1. Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer against Juanito Alvarado with MetTC Manila, for recovery of possession of the room being
occupied by Alvarado, which Corpuz' children allegedly needed for their own use.
2. Alvarado and Corpuz were 2 of the tenants of Lorenzo Barredo who, in May 1988, decided to sell his property to the tenants.
3. Due to economic difficulties, Alvarado and the other lessees executed an "Affidavit of Waiver" granting Barredo the right to sell his house
to any person who can afford to purchase the same.
4. Barredo sold his house to Corpuz for P37,500.00. As a result of the sale, a tenancy relationship was established between Corpuz and
Alvarado.
5. In Oct 1991, Corpuz sent a written notice to Alvarado demanding that he vacate the room. Alvarado refused to vacate the room as
demanded, prompting Corpuz to seek his ejectment.
Alvarado: (1) alleged "Affidavit of Waiver" executed between him and Barredo was a forgery; and (2) dispute was not referred to the Lupong
Tagapayapa.
MTC Manila: Alvarado to vacate the room.
RTC: in effect reversed MTC's decision
1. Purported sale between Corpuz and Barredo was the subject of a controversy pending before the NHA which must be resolved first by
said agency.
2. The "Affidavit of Waiver" executed by Alvarado and Barredo was a forgery.
3. Unlawful detainer dismissed, and Alvarado cannot be legally expelled from the subject premises.
MR denied for lack of merit.
CA: no reversible error: affirmed the same in its entirety
MR: denied

Issues:
1. WON Corpuz' unlawful detainer suit filed before MTC against Alvarado should be suspended until the resolution of the case lodged in
NHA impugning the sale of said property. NO
2. WON case should be dismissed since it was not first referred to Lupong Tagapamayapa.
SC:
1. Corpuz: mere assertion challenging his ownership over the said property is not a sufficient ground to divest MTC of its exclusive
jurisdiction. MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment cases. The only issue to be resolved in forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases is the physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto. Suits or actions for the annulment of sale,
title or document do not abate any ejectment action respecting the same property.
The controversy pending before NHA for the annulment of the Deed of Sale and assailing the authenticity of the "Affidavit of Joint Waiver"
cannot deter MTC from taking cognizance of the ejectment suit merely for the purpose of determining who has a better possessory right
among the parties.
2. Defense of non-referral to the Lupon was only stated in a single general short sentence in Alvarado's answer. In Alvarado's answer, no
reason or explanation was given to support his allegation, which is deemed a mere general averment. The proceeding outlined in P.D.
1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court had already
acquired over the subject matter and the parties therein.
Dui v. CA: Failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with the Barangay conciliation procedure
constitutes a waiver of that defense.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision dated July 14, 1994, of CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
the judgment of the MetTC Manila, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. 138532-CV dated Aug 11, 1992, is hereby REINSTATED.