A summary of Machiavelli, his life, and The Prince

Machiavelli and the context in which he wrote The Prince

In the sixteenth century, when Niccolo Machiavelli wrote The Prince,

Italy was not a unified country. Instead, it was a collection of city-states,
each with its own court and ruler, each attempting to gain power over the
others. In addition to being a place of domestic intrigue, Italy was also a
battleground for the power-hungry French, the Spanish, the Germans,
and the forces of the Catholic Church under the Popes (who were, in
essence, as powerful as secular kings at this time). One of the major
Italian city-states, the republic of Florence, had long maintained an
alliance with the French, and when Pope Julius II defeated the French in
1512, Florence was defeated too. Pope Julius declared that he would not
agree make peace unless Florence ceased to be a republic and accepted
the Medici family as their rulers.

These political developments had a serious impact on the life and career
of Machiavelli. Hardly a dyed-in-the-wool supporter of princes,
Machiavelli had actually served for the past thirteen years as a counselor
and diplomat for the former rulers of Florence, the anti-Medici
republicans (his first book, The Discourses, presents a theory of
republican government).

When Florence fell into the hands of his princely enemies, Machiavelli
narrowly escaped execution and found himself exiled instead. Formerly a
man who lived in the center of political power, Machiavelli was now
unemployed and disgraced (not to mention bored!) in the countryside
outside Florence. He began to write a series of letters, begging the new
Medici rulers in Florence to allow him to return to his beloved city. He
continued this unsuccessful effort for fourteen years, until his death in
1527.

We must read The Prince, written in 1513, as one of the first of the
documents that Machiavelli wrote in order to ingratiate himself with the
new Florentine prince, Lorenzo de Medici. Is Machiavelli insincere? Is
he a hypocrite? After all, his first book declared that a republic was the
ideal form of government, not a state governed by the authority of a

prince. And yet, we must note that Machiavelli never says anywhere in
The Prince that he likes the notion of government by princes. He merely
states that if a country is going to be governed by a prince, particularly a
new prince, he has some advice as to how that prince should rule if he
wishes to be great and powerful. In other words,

Machiavellis book is absolutely practical and not at all idealistic.

Leaving aside what government is best in an ideal world, The Prince
takes for granted the presence of an authoritarian ruler, and tries to
imagine how such a ruler might achieve success. It is, of course, also
entirely topical as well: Machiavelli offers Lorenzo an expert handbook
that deals with precisely the situation of Florence at the time. He seems
genuinely interested in using his political experience, as well as his wide
reading in history and philosophy, to help Lorenzo be the best prince he
can be. But he also obviously expected some personal gain from the
book as well Machiavelli clearly hoped that Lorenzo would find The
Prince so helpful that he would immediately bring its author back to
Florence where he could be a political counselor once again!

Unfortunately, Machiavellis cunning plan didnt work. Despite the lavish

praise for Medicis and Popes that continues throughout The Prince,
Lorenzo did not seem to like the book very much, and certainly never
called Machiavelli back from exile. Ironically, shortly before Machiavelli
died, Charles V of France defeated the Pope and removed the Medicis
from power. Florence became a republic once again, and Machiavelli
surely expected his long exile to end at last. There was one slight
problem, however: Machiavelli had written a short book dedicated to
Prince Lorenzo de Medici, advising him on how best to acquire and
maintain power not a very republican thing to do! And so, that very
book that Machiavelli had hoped would bring him back to Florence The
Prince finally kept him away for good.

Important Persons

List of Persons Mentioned in or Relevant to Machiavellis Prince

Lorenzo deMedici

Machiavelli dedicated the first printing of The Prince to this man, duke of
Urbino and ruler of Florence in 1516. He had originally dedicated the
book to Lorenzos uncle, Giuliano deMedici, but Giuliano died before the
book appeared. (Confusingly, Giulianos father, and Lorenzos
grandfather, was also named Lorenzo deMedici, and known popularly as
Lorenzo the Magnificent.)

Pope Sixtus IV

The first of three popes who figure prominently in Machiavellis

argument. Sixtus, whose real name was Francesco della Rovere, was
pope from 1471-1484. He led the papacy to unprecedented wealth and
power by waging wars against the Turkish Empire, and by fomenting
domestic wars within Italy. Sixtus was responsible for commissioning the
famous Sistine Chapel, with ceilings decorated by Michelangelo, in the
Vatican.

Pope Alexander VI

Originally named Rodrigo Borgia, this pope succeeded Sixtus and led the
Catholic Church from 1492-1503. Like Sixtus, Alexander increased the
power of the papacy and of the Church generally. He notoriously used
his wealth and power to advance his relatives (particularly his numerous
illegitimate children) into high offices in the religious and political
institutions of Italy.

Cesare Borgia

One of Alexanders sons, Cesare provided Machiavelli an ideal historical

example of a crafty prince. Pope Alexanders original plan was to send
Cesare into the church. Cesare actually became an archbishop at the
ripe old age of 17! -- because of his fathers influence. After several
years of this, Cesare left the religious life and entered the world of
politics, eventually rising to dominance by cunningly manipulating strife
among the Italian city-states.

Pope Julius II

This pope succeeded Alexander VI (after the hiccup of an eight-week

reign by another man), and ruled the Church from 1503-1513. Julius led
the papacy in a number of intimidation campaigns against Italian citystates, such as Venice and Florence, trying to get them to join him in his
war on the French. His policies were bold, but ultimately unsuccessful.
Eventually Julius ongoing feud with the Borgias contributed to the utter
collapse of most Italian alliances.

Agathocles of Syracuse

Machiavelli took the story of the cruel ruler Agathocles from the ancient
historians Justin and Diodorus Siculus. Agathocles was ruler of Sicily
from 361-289 BC, and his evil rise to power provided Machiavelli with an
example of a man who achieves political domination through unvirtuous
action.

Points to Ponder

Machiavellis political allegiances were a matter of some dispute in his

own time. After working for the Florentine republic, he attempted to
gain a political position at the court of the men who destroyed that
system. He wrote a treatise on republics, The Discourses, as well as his
handbook for single rulers, The Prince. Are there suggestions, even
within The Prince itself, that Machiavelli doesnt actually like princes
very much? If not, should we consider Machiavelli a hypocrite? If so,
then should the entire book be taken ironically?

From his time up until the present day, Machiavelli has often been
considered an immoral theorist, one who was prepared to suggest that
the ends always justify the means. But readers who wish to spare
Machiavelli from accusations of immorality cite his example of
Agathocles the Syracusan as an instance when the ends do not seem to
justify the means. Since Machiavelli presents Agathocles in such a
negative light, does this suggest that there is some political behavior that
is simply unacceptable on any terms? Does Machiavelli object to the
cruelty of Agathocles on ethical grounds? If so, does this destroy his
notion, expressed elsewhere, that there is no absolute standard for
judging political action?

The word virtu, so prevalent in The Prince, never seems to mean the
same thing twice. How many definitions for this term can you find
implied in Machiavellis argument? Do any of these definitions contradict
each other? Why do you think that Machiavelli placed so much emphasis
on a word which resists stable definition? What implications does the
slipperiness of this term have for his larger argument? What is the point
of writing a how-to that avoids making concrete recommendations?

After leaving Florence, the banished Machiavelli wrote a letter to a friend

in which he described his evening activities alone in the countryside:
every night, apparently, he would take off his work clothes (remember, he
was living on a farm), and would put on the royal and curial robes he
used to wear at court. Only when he was so splendidly attired,
Machiavelli told his friend, did he feel ready to join in the company of
ancient kings and princes in other words, to sit down and write about
them in The Prince!

Renaissance dramatists frequently used a stock character in their plays

when they needed a villain. This character, meant to exemplify the
extreme of irreligious wickedness and immorality, was called the
machiavel. Shakespeares cunning Iago in Othello is one of his most
famous machiavels; the evil Richard III goes even further, declaring
onstage that his villainy will set the murderous Machiavel to school.

Machiavelli devotes a great deal of The Prince to praising powerful

popes. Rather than appreciating such flattery, however, the Catholic
Church considered Machiavellis book an enemy to religion from 1557
onwards, The Prince has been on the Catholic Churchs Index Librorum
Prohibitorum, or list of forbidden books!

Summary of the Argument

Machiavelli wrote The Prince in an attempt to ingratiate himself with the

Medici princes who had recently taken over the government of his native

city, Florence, in the early sixteenth century (see the rather overstated
flattery in the prefatory letter to Lorenzo deMedici). He intended this
book to be a kind of how-to: a short, pithy handbook for princes who
have gained power and wish to keep it. Accordingly, it begins by dividing
all governments into two kinds: republics and principalities (those
ruled by a prince, or single ruler). Machiavelli swiftly dismisses the
first kind of government as being outside the scope of his argument. He
then goes on to subdivide the latter kind. Principalities, he writes, are of
two kinds: there are those which have been ruled by a family for a long
time, and those which are newly conquered. It is this last kind, obviously,
that concerns Machiavelli most, and he spends the rest of The Prince
sketching ways in which the new prince can acquire and maintain the
greatest amount of power.

Machiavelli first considers mixed principalities, or new territories

annexed to older ones. The new prince of such a state, he writes, should
wipe out the family of his predecessors in the, and should take care not
to change the old laws if need be, he should live there himself, and learn
the customs of his new subjects, so they wont consider him a stranger.
He should also set up colonies of his own men in the new lands, and
should weaken any strong neighboring enemies so that he will have no
rival conquerors. In all things, Machiavelli writes (as he does many times
in the book), the new prince should not only keep an eye on present
dangers, but on possible future dangers a good example of this is the
Roman rule of new provinces.

When a new prince takes over a state governed by an absolute ruler, the
process of acquiring power is that much more difficult. However, once
such a kingdom is conquered, it is much easier to rule, since its subjects
are used to oppression. Darius, for instance, took over lands from
Alexander the Great, and was able to rule them without fear of revolt,
since his new subjects were accustomed to having no voice in
government. Republics, by contrast, are very easy for a new prince to
conquer, but almost impossible for him to rule. Once a new prince has
gained control over a former republic, Machiavelli implies that he really
has no choice but to destroy it entirely and rebuild it.

Machiavelli then proceeds to consider relationship between luck and skill

in the gaining and keeping of power. He introduces two key terms:
fortuna, which means luck, chance, accident, or fortune, and

virtu, which means, literally, manliness, and which can also be defined
as skill, cunning, power, ability, or strength. Which is more
important for a prince to have on his side? Machiavelli suggests, over
and over, that a prince is better off relying on virtu than on fortuna.
However, one of the key advantages of virtu is that it enables a prince
better to exploit and master fortuna.. He will say later that fortuna e una
donna (fortune is a woman) and must be dominated. Here, though, he
stresses the connections between fortuna and virtu as necessary for
successful rule. A prince must be able to seize opportunities through
skill in what Machiavelli calls a lucky shrewdness.

What kind of actions should a virtuoso (skillful) prince take? Well, he

avoids using other princes troops or hiring mercenaries to do his dirty
work such a reliance on outside help makes a prince the helpless victim
of fortune . He does not come into power through overt crime, nor does
he allow himself to gain a reputation for cruelty but he is able to use
crime and cruelty when he needs to, carefully concealing his guilt. A
virtuoso prince will not alienate the people he governs, but he will not let
the need to be loved by them take precedence over the necessity of being
feared by them. In order to maintain his power, a prince must earn the
loyalty of his subjects, and he can best do this by protecting them. And
any prince who shows himself to be strong enough to protect his subjects
must also show himself to be strong enough to be feared by them
though, of course, never gratuitously cruel to them. Above all (and
heres where Machiavelli got a little shocking for his Renaissance
readers), a virtuoso prince must acknowledge the fact that he does not
live in an ideal world. He should therefore learn not to be good when a
particular occasion (fortuna again!) renders it more advantageous to be
bad. In subsequent chapters, Machiavelli describes how a prince can
break promises, commit crimes, and generally behave nastily for political
advantage. But he also insists that a prince should learn to avoid the
hatred that would result from exposure of his bad behavior. He should
instead cultivate a reputation for goodness, even if that reputation is
false. In other words, for Machiavellis prince, its better to look good
than to be good.

According to Machiavelli, a prince learns such virtu by particular kinds of

study: first, and most importantly, the study of warfare. He should spend
lots of time strategizing, exercising, and preparing himself for battle.
Such training makes a man more likely to achieve power through
conquest, and less likely to succumb to laziness once he achieves it. In
addition, any prince who wishes to be powerful should also study

histories of successful princes, in order to understand what has worked

for men in the past and model his behavior on them. In a sense, The
Prince itself is a kind of history book, compiling short examples of good
(and bad) rulers throughout history for the edification of its princely
readers.

Prefatory Letter

Prefatory Letter to Lorenzo the Magnificent

Machiavelli begins his treatise on the ideal Prince with a dedication to an

actual prince, Lorenzo deMedici. He declares that courtiers who wish to
earn a princes favor do so by presenting the prince with items which
they themselves hold particularly dear: usually gold, jewels, horses, etc.
Machiavelli tells Lorenzo that, after racking his brain for an
appropriately valuable gift, he decided that what he felt was most
precious was his knowledge of great men, knowledge gained from history
books, as well as from current events. He will present Lorenzo with this
knowledge, in the form of the treatise to follow. Machiavelli claims to
worry a bit about whether Lorenzo will be pleased with such a gift, but
then reminds himself that any prince would be glad to receive, in short
handbook form, knowledge which the author has taken years to acquire.
Machiavelli promises that his will be a small volume, written not in
pretentious academic language, but in the common language of men. He
then excuses himself for having presumed to write about princes at all,
since he is simply an ordinary man; furthermore Machiavelli actually
suggests that being a commoner is actually an advantage to one who
wishes to write about princes, since that distance of rank gives the
commoner a perspective that princes themselves lack. Machiavelli, then,
is an outsider looking in offering deliberately common-sense
explanations for how particular men are able to become and to remain
great. Lest we forget, though, that the Prince was intended as a gift to
earn Lorenzos favor, this preface concludes with a specific, pointed
request: if his noble recipient likes the gift of this book, Machiavelli
gently suggests, then he might best show his appreciation by helping the
author return to court from his current position of exile and disgrace.
Rather than considering this simply a work of political theory written for

its own sake, we should realize that the suffering Machiavelli had some
very practical reasons for writing this book and dedicating it to Lorenzo!

Chapters 1 and 2

Chapter I: The Various Kinds of Government, and the Ways By Which

They Are Established.

Machiavelli begins The Prince with a crucial distinction of political

categories. There are, he writes, only two ways in which a state can be
organized: as a republic, or as a monarchy. After making this distinction,
Machiavelli immediately, without a pause or comment, simply drops the
discussion of the republic. This doesnt mean that Machiavelli doesnt
like republics -- republics, after all, are the subject of his other major
work of political theory, The Discourses. Rather than accuse Machiavelli
of anti-democratic bias, we should note that in this particular book,
which meant to describe the proper conduct of a prince, any discussion
of princeless republics would be entirely irrelevant. After bracketing the
idea of a republic, then, Machiavelli moves on to divide the category of
monarchy into further sub-categories. Monarchies, he writes, can be
either hereditary and governed by the same family for generations, or
recently founded. Again, Machiavelli follows one division with another.
Leaving aside hereditary monarchies for the moment, he distinguishes
two different kinds of recently founded monarchies those which are
entirely new, and those which are new annexations of territory added
onto pre-existing hereditary monarchies. As we might expect, within this
latter category (the annexed state), there are also two subcategories:
Machiavelli points out that some annexed states were previously subject
to another ruler, and some were formerly free. And finally, there is yet
another kind of subcategory within annexed states: those which were
conquered by a prince in war, and those which simply fall to him through
luck or skill.

Chapter II: Of Hereditary Monarchies

This chapter begins with Machiavellis apology for not discussing

republics in this book in what seems to be an explicit reference to
Discourses, Machiavelli notes that he has treated of them fully in
another place. After making that disclaimer, he moves ahead with his
discussion of how the various kinds of monarchies are best governed and
maintained. He starts off with the hereditary monarchy. This kind is
pretty easy to handle, according to Machiavelli, because political
circumstances in such a monarchy have been relatively stable for a long
period of time, and subjects are used to the way things are under a ruling
family. All a prince has to do, if he inherits his state, is not to change
anything too violently. Even if some exceptional and excessive force
were to disempower the hereditary monarch, the countervailing force of
political habit would soon restore him to power at the slightest
opportunity. Machiavelli gives the example of the Duke of Ferrara, who
was able to withstand attacks by Venice and Rome simply because he was
part of a long-standing family of Dukes. Unless such a ruler goes out of
his way to alienate his people, they will usually love and honor him as a
part of their own traditional way of life

Chapter 3

Chapter III: Of Mixed Monarchies

Problems arise, as you might imagine, in non-hereditary or new

monarchies, governments in which habit, or political inertia, cannot be
counted on to give stability. Take, for instance, the mixed monarchy, or
a state which has changed its ruler. Lets say that a prince has taken over
a kingdom with the support of some of the people in it. Since these
people have already proven themselves critical enough to abandon their
old ruler, Machiavelli reasons, they are very likely also to grow
dissatisfied with their new one. Moreover, when a new prince takes over
an existing state, he is inevitably going to alienate those subjects who
had been opposed to transition, creating a certain amount of ill will. In
other words, a new ruler, even if he successfully takes over a state, is

vulnerable to the anger of his new subjects his supporters as well as his
opponents. An example of this is Louis XII of France, who was able to
occupy Milan, but not to keep it.

What about rulers who reconquer a territory that has rebelled?

Machiavelli feels that such situations are less dangerous: when France,
for instance, took Milan a second time, Louis was in a much more stable
position, and lost it again only when virtually the entire world opposed
his rule. Still, he did eventually lose Milan again, and for good. Why? And
how could a prince in a similar situation avoid such a double loss? First,
Machiavelli suggests that it is easier for a conqueror to maintain control
over a territory which shares his language and nationality, and which is
used to being ruled in a similar way by previous rulers. If a man, like
Louis, were to take over a land which differs from him in language,
nationality, custom, and political organization, then his rule will be
difficult. One good way for a prince to deal with this, Machiavelli
counsels, would be to take up residence in his new territory thereby
learning the ways of his subjects, and making himself constantly aware of
the current state of their feelings toward him. Another solution would be
to plant colonies of loyal subjects from the princes original territory in
key parts of this new land, thereby maintaining surveillance as well as
destroying the unity and potential opposition of the newly acquired
territory. Finally, the new ruler should make himself out to be the
protector of the new territory, rather its conqueror. He should conciliate
with smaller powers within, while annihilating large rival powers that
threaten from without.

The Romans followed these rules when they conquered Greece,

Machiavelli points out. They established colonies of Romans there, they
befriended the Achaeans, and they defeated Greeces other enemies, the
Macedonians. Above all, the Romans were always able to take the long
view of their government of Greece, planning ahead to avoid difficulties.
Louis, by contrast, did none of these things, and lost Milan and his other
Italian holdings as a result. Machiavelli lists five crucial mistakes made
by Louis: 1) he crushed small powers rather than large ones, 2) he
allowed one man in Italy to gain power rather than dividing authority
among lower officers, 3) he allowed a very powerful foreigner to have
influence in Italy, 4) he did not live in Italy, and 5) he did not establish
colonies there.

Chapters 4 and 5

Chapter IV: Why the Kingdom of Darius, Occupied by Alexander, Did Not
Rebel Against the Successors of the Latter After His Death.

After discussing the almost insurmountable difficulties in holding onto a

newly-acquired state, Machiavelli asks a logical question: How on earth
did Alexander the Great not only successfully subdue most of Asia in a
few years, but pass it on to his successors without any danger of
rebellion? By way of an answer, Machiavelli first distinguishes between
two kinds of government: the rule of a prince and his servants (who have
no power independent of the princes permission), versus the rule of a
prince and his barons (who have their own hereditary titles, lands, and
subjects). Machiavelli gives two examples of these two kinds of
government: on the one hand, the Turkish monarchy has one ruler and
many servants. On the other, the King of France governs with the help of
an ancient class of hereditary nobles. He concludes that, obviously, the
prince in the first kind of government has much more power located in
himself and it would be much harder to take power away the Turk than
it would be to oust the King of France. In Turkey, there would be no
possibility of using the nobles to assist a rebellion, and intrigue would
have to be abandoned in favor of sheer military force. However, though it
would be harder to take the Turkish kingdom away, it would actually be
much easier to maintain once a new prince was in, hed be pretty much
invulnerable since there would be no rivals to power, and no need to
share authority with petty nobility. By contrast, it would be much easier
to dethrone the King of France, but much harder to maintain this new
monarchy unless one had the unwavering assistance of the nobility not
a sure thing to rely upon!

Having set up this framework, Machiavelli concludes that Alexanders

conquering of Persia fell into the former category. Like the Turk, Darius
maintained absolute control over his kingdom. Once Alexander had
completed his conquest of that kingdom, there was virtually no way he,
or his successors, could be dislodged.

Chapter V: The Way to Govern Cities or Dominions That, Previous to

Being Occupied, Lived under Their Own Laws.

What if the people of a conquered territory had no king previously? What

if they are used to political liberty and government under their own laws?
In other words, what if a prince wishes to annex a republic? There are
three ways, Machiavelli argues, to govern a newly-conquered republic.
First, by utterly destroying it. Second, by going there to live. Third, by
allowing the pre-existing laws to continue, and creating allies among
those citizens who had been governing. Turning to examples, Machiavelli
contrasts the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans governed Athens
in the third way, allowing their laws to exist and attempting to rule
through them. The Romans, by contrast, took the first option, and utterly
devastated Carthage in order to control it. Machiavelli points out that the
Spartan conquest was a miserable failure, while the Romans did not lose
their territory. He concludes that the only way successfully to subdue a
newly conquered republic is to destroy it first. Republics, he argues,
because they are used to freedom, will never simply lie back and be ruled
by a prince. If a prince wishes to govern, then, he must do it by force. (It
is this kind of argument that gives Machiavelli a reputation for
ruthlessness!)

Chapter 6

Chapter VI: Of New Dominions Which Have Been Acquired by Ones Own
Arms and Ability

Machiavelli asks his reader to forgive his frequent use of examples from
history in matters of politics, he asserts, men usually follow the
examples of earlier men, whether they realize it or not. The key, then, is
to learn from precedent, imitating successful examples while avoiding
unsuccessful ones. If a prince attempts to follow examples that are

excellent, Machiavelli reasons, even if he fails he will certainly achieve

some tinge of greatness.

After discussing the need to aspire to greatness, Machiavelli suggests

that men who achieve dominion over states through skill and ability (the
famous Machiavellian concept of virt, meaning literally something like
manliness and not to be confused with virtue) have a greater chance
of successfully governing than do men who simply luck into their power
(relying on fortuna, which is the opposite of virt) . Those who rely on
fortuna the least, he argues, tend to govern best examples of this are
Moses in Israel, Cyrus in Persia, Romulus in Rome, and Theseus in
Athens. These men did not simply rely on fortune. Instead, they used
fortune to find opportunities to come to power (this notion of using
fortune rather than accepting fate passively is key to Machiavelli). For
instance, Moses had the fortune of finding the Israelites enslaved by
Egypt. Because they were oppressed, they were easily persuaded to
follow him as he led them out of servitude. Cyrus had the fortune of
finding the Persians discontented with the government of the Medes, and
had the additional fortune of finding the Medes weakened through
laziness. Given these circumstances, he was able to intervene and
become the new, powerful ruler of Persia.

All of these men Moses, Theseus, Romulus, and Cyrus had difficulty
obtaining their kingdoms, but were able to maintain them easily. Why?
Because, Machiavelli says, they were innovators. Innovators establish an
entirely new order of things, establishing laws, customs and ways of
governing. Because they wish to make so many changes, they are
inevitably feared and mistrusted at first. . . but once they succeed in their
plans, they have made themselves entirely secure. To achieve this
success, a would-be innovator must have not only a powerful vision, but
also the practical ability to compel obedience to his new order this is
Machiavellis figure of the armed prophet.

Chapter 7

Chapter VII: Of New Dominions Acquired by the Power of Others or by

Fortune

Machiavelli here returns to the stated aims of his book: to describe how a
prince may best both acquire and maintain power. The armed prophet,
as we remember, will have incredible difficulty acquiring power, but once
he has it, will be able to maintain it easily. By contrast, the ruler who
comes to power through the efforts of others (i.e. by buying or bribing
ones way into office), or the ruler who gets his position through sheer
fortune, or luck, has a very easy time acquiring power but will find it
almost impossible to maintain.

This latter way of coming to power results in a state with very shallow
roots, and usually means that the new prince has no native ability as a
ruler.

Machiavelli introduces two of his most famous examples in order to make

this contrast vivid: Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francesco came
to power in Milan by appropriate means and through great abilities. He
achieved power after many difficulties, but stayed there easily. By
contrast, Cesare Borgia became Duke because of the influence of his
father, Pope Alexander VI (apparently, vows of celibacy were not really
taken very seriously back then!). No political stability could be built on
such a flimsy foundation; once his father was out of the picture, Cesare
could not stay in power, as much as he tried to do so.

You would think that the introduction of the example of Cesare Borgia
would be meant purely negatively; after all, he is supposed to be an
example of how not to become prince. And yet, Machiavelli goes into
great detail describing both Alexander VIs actions in achieving power for
his son and Cesares own efforts to govern, not in order to condemn
these but to suggest that they are often admirable. For instance,
Machiavelli describes the incredible political savvy of Alexander as he
plotted the future success of his son by creating and manipulating
political intrigue and unrest in Italy. One of his most ingenious moves
(and one of the most famous passages in The Prince ) concerned the
government of the Romagna province. Alexander knew that weak
government had allowed all manner of crime and violence to flourish
there, and knew that it needed cleaning up so that he could govern it
more easily. He appointed a harsh deputy governor, Remirro de Orco, to
punish criminals and crack down on law-breakers of all kinds. Remirro
did his work well. Alexander, however, knew that his deputys harsh

measures were both necessary and hated by the people (no one likes a
cruel enforcer of the laws). So, after Remirro had successfully wiped out
most of the crime in the Romagna, Alexander had him cut in half, and
placed one morning in the public square. . . with a piece of wood and a
blood-stained knife by his side. In other words, Alexander used Remirro
to take care of his dirty work, then earned the thanks of the people by
executing him. Suddenly, Romagna was both free of crime, and welldisposed toward Alexanders rule.

After Pope Alexander died, Cesare his son took over and Machiavelli
has just told us that such a manner of achieving power is not to be
desired. However, Machiavelli asserts that the only thing that prevented
Cesare from successfully governing was his poor health and his bad
choice of pope, and tells us that he should be in imitated in most of his
actions. This is not the contradiction it seems, though. Machiavelli is,
after all, offering a handbook for all kinds of princes. While he
acknowledges that coming to power in the way the Cesare did is not
desirable, nevertheless Cesare is an example of the best a prince can do,
given such circumstances.

Chapter 8

Chapter VIII: Of Those Who Have Attained the Position of Prince by

Villainy

We have so far been presented with discussions of princes who have

come into power by skill (virt) and by luck (fortuna). There are,
however, other ways of gaining power. Machiavelli moves on to discuss
princes who come into power through villainy on the one hand, or
through election by fellow citizens on the other. Leaving aside election
for the moment, Machiavelli gives examples of power gained through
villainy. He declares that he will not discuss the merits of this method
and while Machiavelli explicitly omits any praise of villainy, what many
readers find shocking is his equal refusal to condemn villainy. Instead, he
simply notes that some men will find themselves obliged to use such
tactics a tremendously practical, and deeply amoral, vision of politics!

So, the examples. The first, from ancient history, is that of Agathocles the
Sicilian, who became King of Syracuse although he was born the son of a
potter (you cant really get much commoner than that!). From his earliest
childhood, Agathocles demonstrated a wickedness matched only by his
vigor of body and mind. He joined the militia, rose through the ranks, and
one day decided he wanted to be prince. One day, he called a meeting of
the Syracusan senate. Once all the people were assembled, he gave a
signal to his soldiers, who instantly killed all the senators and rich men of
the state. From that point on, Agathocles ruled without any serious
threat to his power. A success story? In terms of power, yes but
Machiavelli refuses to call Agathocles behavior virt. This is not because
Agathocles was a bad guy after all, virt has nothing at all to do with
Christian virtue. Rather, Agathocles did not act with virt because his
actions brought him greatness (grandezza), but not glory (gloria) which
is the main goal of acting with virt. While Agathocles achieved political
power, he did not achieve renown as a ruler, and so cannot be termed an
exemplary prince.

The second example Machiavelli offers comes from recent Italian history.
Oliverotto da Fermo was an orphan in the reign of Pope Alexander VI. He
was sent by his uncle to a military school, and eventually became a
leading soldier. Like Agathocles, however, Oliverotto decided he didnt
wish to serve, but to command. He and his allies decided to take over
Fermo. He wrote to his uncle, telling him that he wished to visit. When he
arrived in Fermo, his uncle greeted him with much fanfare. Oliverotto
invited the important men of the town to a feast, and entertained them
with stories of Alexander and his son Cesare Borgia. Mid-conversation,
however, Oliverotto pulled an Agathocles his soldiers rushed out of
hiding and killed all the guests. Oliverotto then besieged the town, killed
the magistrates, and seized power. He would have maintained it, too,
were it not for the superior political skill of Cesare Borgia himself who
eventually had Oliverotto executed.

How, Machiavelli asks, were such villains able to hold power so

successfully? The answer, he suggests, lies in whether they exploited
their crimes well or badly. A good cruelty is done all at once, and ends
no need for more supplementary crimes. A bad cruelty sets in motion a
need to repeat crimes, and makes ruling a rather messy business. Note,
again, that Machiavellis grounds for praising government has nothing to
do with morality and only to do with what seems to work most

efficiently. Its not that you shouldnt commit crimes, but rather that you
should commit them well.

Chapters 9 and 10

Chapter IX: Of the Civic Principality

Now we turn to the other alternative to the virt/fortuna method of

achieving power: election in a civic principality by which a private citizen
is made leader by his fellow citizens. Machiavelli describes this method
as a kind of cunning assisted by fortune, since such a leader is skilled
enough to make himself an appealing candidate, and then simply lifted
up by others to a position of power. There are two ways (as usual) by
which a man can be thus elected: by the nobles who wish the prince to
oppress the people, or by the people, who wish the prince to help them
avoid oppression by the nobles. According to Machiavelli, it is better for
a man to be put into power by the populace, since this usually means that
he will have no rivals to his power and will be generally loved by his
subjects. If he is elected by the nobles, he is obligated to them, and will
often be the victim of their intrigues. (See Chapter IV for a similar idea).
Regardless of how a prince is elected, Machiavelli argues, it is
indispensable for him to have the good will of the people the good will
of the nobles is much less essential. And in order to have the good will of
the people, it is necessary that the prince make himself indispensable to
them. In other words, here Machiavelli gives a theory of interdependence
between the people and the prince that differs dramatically from the
model of cruel exploitation often attributed to him.

Chapter X: How the Strength of All States Should be Measured

This chapter points out a different distinction between kinds of

principalities (states governed by a prince): there are those that have the
money and manpower to defend themselves against attack, and those
that do not, consequently needing to hide within their walls when they
are assaulted by an enemy. Machiavelli does not feel the need to discuss
the former case, which is obviously to be preferred. If a prince finds
himself in the latter case (without the power to fight back against
enemies), Machiavelli counsels him to concentrate his efforts on
fortifying his own town, and to forget about the outlying country, which
will be too difficult to protect. The cities of Germany, for instance, follow
this strategy and as a consequence are rarely attacked, since it would
be hard for any enemy to get past the urban fortifications. Machiavelli
concludes by affirming that strong walls around the city, and the good
will of the people within the city, are the two best protections a prince
can have. If a prince has both these things, it is almost guaranteed that
no enemy will be able to prevail against him.

Chapters 11 and 12

Chapter XI: Of Ecclesiastical Principalities

At the time when Machiavelli wrote The Prince, Italy did not simply have
dukedoms and kingdoms and cities, but also had territories governed by
the Pope and Catholic Church, or ecclesiastical principalities. This
chapter considers some of the difficulties of conquering and ruling such
territories. Machiavelli argues that a prince can gain power over an
ecclesiastical principality either by ability (virt) or chance (fortuna), but
he will be able to maintain it by means of neither of these. This is
because the subjects of such principalities are used to obeying ancient
religious customs, rather than ordinary political customs or laws. Such
religious customs are so incredibly powerful that princes dont really
need to do anything at all to keep their subjects in line. Nor does a prince
need to do anything to defend such a kingdom, because no one will
attack a holy state. In other words, ecclesiastical principalities are the
only truly secure states for a prince to govern, according to Machiavelli.
As soon as he says this, however, he cuts himself off since these states
are maintained and exalted by God, he says, it would be the work of a
presumptuous and foolish man to discuss them.

Machiavelli does allow himself some space to discuss how the church
came to possess any temporal (political) power in the first place. How
was the Pope able to gain such great authority in non-religious matters
like government? Machiavelli explains that a long time ago, power in
Italy was divided among many potentates (princes and lords), and one of
them was the Pope, who controlled the Vatican City in Rome. As long as
there were many of these potentates, no single one of them was able to
have any greater power than any other. When Alexander VI became Pope,
however, things changed; as we have seen (in Chapter V), Alexander was
a supreme politician, and was able to manipulate both domestic politics
and foreign policy in such a way that his own political power increased,
along with that of his son, Cesare Borgia. Alexander was followed by
Julius, who increased papal wealth and territories. Machiavelli ends this
chapter by praising the current pope, Leo X, suggesting that since his
predecessors had increased the power and wealth of the papal office, Leo
might be able to add goodness so that the office of the pope will be
both great and venerated. In other words, Machiavelli describes the
power of the Pope without ever assuming that he is, as the servant of
God, necessarily a holy and good man another way in which The Prince
might seem remarkably controversial to religious readers!

Chapter XII: The Different Kinds of Militia and Mercenary Soldiers

After discussing how various states are best acquired and maintained,
Machiavelli moves on to consider methods of government. He declares
that in all governments, of whatever kind, the best foundation is a
combination of good laws and good arms i.e. political and military
strength. Machiavelli further asserts that the latter necessitates the
former. There cannot be good laws where there are not good arms, and
once there are good arms, there will inevitably be good laws. After
making this claim, he drops the discussion of laws, and spends the rest of
this chapter discussing military matters.

There are three kinds of armies a prince can maintain: an army made up
of citizens, an army of mercenaries (paid soldiers), or a mixed army.
Mercenaries, Machiavelli argues, are worthless and dangerous,

impossible to rely on. This is because they have no love or loyalty to the
prince, but are simply paid to fight for him and are therefore ready to
turn against the prince if anyone pays them more. Indeed, Machiavelli
points out that Italys current political ruin has resulted largely from the
fact that mercenary armies have been used there for many years. A
better idea would be for a prince to be captain of his own soldiers, and in
the case of a republic for citizens to lead the armies themselves.

Chapters 13 and 14

Chapter XIII: Of Auxiliary, Mixed and Native Troops

Machiavelli declares that auxiliary troops, or armies borrowed from

another prince, are as useless as mercenaries. In fact, auxiliaries are
even worse than mercenaries. Mercenaries, as we recall from the
previous chapter, are hard to motivate a paycheck is not enough to
make a man willing to fight and die for a prince they care nothing about.
In the case of auxiliaries, they are actually loyal to someone else and so,
even if they win the battle, they may hand the victory over to their actual
leader instead of the prince who has borrowed them. As Machiavelli
cleverly puts it, the danger with mercenaries is their cowardice, while
the danger with auxiliaries is their courage. It is always better to fight
with your own men Cesare Borgia, for instance, used a small troop of
his own men rather than a larger auxiliary army. . . and was victorious!

Chapter XIV: The Duties of a Prince with Regard to the Militia

In a rather bold piece of advice, Machiavelli counsels the prince to have

no other aim or thought than the proper conduct of war, and to study
nothing else besides military matters. The best way to gain and maintain
power is through this knowledge, he claims, and without it a prince is

sure to lose whatever he has. Again, Machiavelli brings up Francesco

Sforza (see Chapter ). Francesco became Duke of Milan because he was
well armed, but his sons saw no need to study warfare, and soon lost
their power. Machiavelli argues that no unarmed prince can ever be safe,
because no armed man ever obeys an unarmed one. Thus, an un-military
prince will always fail to have the support of his soldiers, his soldiers will
then fail to protect him, and soon he will be prince no longer.

For this reason, a prince must practice the arts of war even more
seriously in peace-time. Machiavelli describes the kind of training he has
in mind: a prince should hunt, he should become as physically fit as
possible, he should learn every detail of the landscape (so that he can
draw up battle plans better), and he should study military histories,
particularly of great commanders (Alexander the Great read about
Achilles, Caesar read about Alexander, Scipio Africanus read about
Cyrus).

Chapters 15 and 16

Chapter XV: Of the Things for Which Men, and Especially Princes, are
Praised or Blamed

Machiavelli begins this very notorious chapter by acknowledging that

what he is about to write might surprise, and even offend people.
However, he continues, it is better to give advice based on what the
world is actually like, and the way that politics actually works, than to
give idealized advice based only on what sounds nice. In a well-known
passage, Machiavelli declares that the man who abandons what is done
for what ought to be done, will rather learn to bring about his own ruin
than his preservation. Here, Machiavelli admits that he is a political
realist, and finds conventional standards of morality useless as practical
advice. Since so many people fail to act according to these standards in
reality, he argues, continuing to be good can only weaken a ruler.
Instead, he writes, it is necessary for a prince. . . to learn how not to be
good according to the circumstances.

He then lists a number of the qualities that can bring a prince praise
(liberality, mercy, trustworthiness, wisdom, etc.), or blame (viciousness,
greed, cruelty, lust, atheism, etc.). Obviously, he writes, it is better for a
prince to be praised than blamed, and a prince would be loved
completely by all his citizens if he actually possessed all of those
praiseworthy qualities. However, he writes, lets get real: no prince will
have every good quality, and most princes will have at least a few of
those bad ones. The key, then, is that the prince should hide from the
people those vices that he may have, and to make sure that he seems to
have as many virtues as possible.

Chapter XVI: Of Liberality and Niggardliness

Of course, always eager to shock, Machiavelli points out that quite a few
of those so-called virtues would be politically disastrous, while many of
the vices would actually benefit the state and if committing a vice is
ever necessary for the safety of the state, the prince should commit it
without shame. Machiavelli examines more carefully one of his
oppositions of virtue and vice: liberality (free giving) and niggardliness
(unwillingness to give, or miserliness). Every prince would love to be
considered liberal but if a prince were really to give up his possessions
freely, he would quickly ruin himself. In fact, the more liberal a prince is,
the poorer he will inevitably become and then hell have to tax his
citizens, making them hate him in the end anyway. Better, Machiavelli
writes, for a prince to be considered a miser for a while, so that he will
be able to govern better and give his subjects more in the long term. The
best case scenario, however, is for a prince to be miserly with his own
kingdoms wealth, but free and lavish with the money he steals from
other countries in wartime. That way, he can have the reputation for
generosity without breaking the bank! If a prince doesnt have that last
option, though, Machiavelli advises him to give up the ideal of liberality
in the interest of practicality. The people will understand.

Chapters 17 and 18

Chapter XVII: Of Cruelty and Clemency, and Whether it is Better to be

Loved or Feared

Every prince, Machiavelli points out, would rather be considered merciful

than cruel. However, cruelty can have its advantages: Cesare Borgia,
after all, committed numerous cruelties but the end result was a united
and strong principality. Machiavelli concludes that what seemed like
Cesares cruelty was, in fact, actually his clemency (mercifulness),
since by that cruelty he spared his people the worse fate of political
turmoil. A prince who cruelly punishes is not cruel if these punishments
help to create political stability; a prince who is merciful is not really
merciful if he allows disorders and crime to flourish, injuring everyone.

What about the difference between being feared and being loved?
Obviously, every prince would prefer to be loved than to be feared.
Taking the realistic view, Machiavelli says that it is best to be both feared
and loved, but the two do not often coincide. If one had to choose, he
argues, it is better and safer to be feared than to be loved. If a prince is
feared, he is much less likely to have his subjects revolt; Machiavelli is
not afraid to say that men are generally selfish, and will not hesitate to
break the obligations of love when it is to their advantage. Fear, however,
keeps people in check. It certainly also possible for a prince to be feared
and not hated, Machiavelli also points out, particularly when the prince
uses his power to protect his citizens and does not interfere too often in
their lives. Since love is too insecure a foundation for government, this
fear without hatred is the best a prince can hope to have from his
citizens.

Chapter XVIII: In What Way Princes Must Keep Faith

Like the previous two chapters, this one begins with a platitude: it is
good for princes to keep their word. Again, though, Machiavelli writes
this commonplace down only to question it. Yes, obviously a prince

should not lie or act hypocritically and should also live with integrity.
However, it is also the case that many princes who have not kept their
word have accomplished great things, and have even conquered other
princes who have kept their word faithfully.

Machiavelli points out that there are two kinds of fighting: according to
the law and according to force. The former is the way of men, the second
the way of beasts but the best princes know how to use both the man
and the beast in order to achieve political goals. The prince, he writes,
should be able to imitate the cunning fox and the mighty lion able to
defend himself against attack, but also sneak around traps. If a prince is
to be fox-like, he must not be afraid to break his promises when keeping
them would be harmful to him. Machiavelli knows that this advice doesnt
sound too noble but, he says in his own defense, men are not all good. If
they were, it would always be best to keep ones word. Since they arent,
it is sometimes necessary to lie and cheat because otherwise, youll be
tricked yourself. It is not only a good idea to cheat and lie like the fox,
but it is also crucial that the prince be able to disguise the fact that he is
doing so. Men are easily deceived, Machiavelli writes, and gives the
example of our friend Pope Alexander VI: he was so willing to break his
promises when he needed to, that he was the most outspoken promiser
there ever was. He had a reputation for making promises, and always
took care so that he wasnt caught breaking them.

This chapter ends with one of the most striking passages of political
realism in the entire book: Machiavelli claims that a prince should always
seem to have virtues, even if he doesnt actually have them. Moreover, he
asserts that seeming to have virtues is actually better than really having
them, since a prince is therefore not tied by the bonds of morality. If he
does not feel any constraint of virtue, a prince is better able do what he
needs to do in any given situation. He must, Machiavelli writes, have a
mind disposed to adapt itself according to the wind, able to do good
when he can but also do evil when he must. Still, even though on the
inside he is able to scheme, he should be mercy, faith, integrity,
humanity, and religion on the outside.

Chapters 19 and 20

Chapter XIX: That We Must Avoid Being Despised and Hated

A prince should above all avoid being hated, Machiavelli repeats. He can
guard himself against the hatred of his citizens by never seeming
frivolous, changeable, or shallow, and instead seeming to follow certain
unwavering principles of upright morality (exactly what Machiavelli
warned the prince not to do in the previous chapter!). By behaving in this
way, a prince will avoid the greatest political danger: revolt from within.
Machiavelli argues that conspiracy and internal unrest is much more
dangerous to a prince than attacks from external enemies. If a prince
does not take care to avoid the hatred of his citizens, then, he will live in
a state of constant fear. In contrast, if a prince manages not to be hated,
he can count on the goodwill of the citizens and ensure political stability.

Machiavelli offers the example of France, where the parliament acts as a

buffer between the king and the people, as well as a buffer between the
king and the nobles. By placing a certain amount of power in the
parliament, and by making the parliament take over many of the most
unpopular duties of rule, the king of France ensures that he never earns
the hatred of the nobles or the people himself. He then moves on to
discuss the examples of various Roman emperors -- all of whom, he
claims, prove his point: that rulers are most in danger when they are
hated by the people. Machiavelli reiterates that avoiding hatred should
be a rulers main goal. This means, as we have seen, avoiding the
reputation for doing evil deeds (even though the prince will need, in
actuality, to do such deeds). Here, he adds another tricky point: that
sometimes doing good deeds can also result in being hated by the people
(for example, being nice to a cruel army leader who is popularly loathed).
Typically, Machiavelli has moved from what appears to be a stable,
simple rule avoid being hated the people and then qualifies and
redefines that rule so that it becomes almost impossible to understand
without reference to particular circumstances.

Chapter XX: Whether Fortresses and other Things Which Princes Often
Contrive are Useful or Injurious

Is it a good idea for a prince who comes into power in a state to take
arms away from the citizens there? Surprisingly, Machiavelli says no. By
taking arms away from the people, he reasons, a prince will make himself
look cruel and harsh, encouraging discontent among his subject. By
doing the opposite giving arms to the people the prince will actually
make himself safer, since the people will be grateful and more loyal.
However, as usual, there are some exceptions to this rule. When a prince
adds a new territory to his old state, he must disarm all the citizens in
that annexed territory, except those who helped him to gain power and
he must also make sure that his own soldiers are more powerfully armed
than any of his new subjects.

Machiavelli offers some additional advice about governing a newlyannexed territory. A prince in such a position, as we remember, can never
be entirely safe. There are, however, some ways in which he can make
himself more secure. For instance, he might try to provoke an enemy
attack intentionally that way, by defeating the enemy, he can make
himself look like a great leader. He might also try to earn the friendship
of those who were his greatest opponents when he came into power
(friends who used to be enemies, he argues, are often more trustworthy
than others, because they wish to compensate for their earlier hostility).
The flip side of this, of course, is that the prince must always suspect
those men who rebelled against their previous ruler to help him gain
power, since they are usually the kind of men who will always be
dissatisfied with their prince.

What about fortresses? Should a prince build them around his state?
Machiavelli begins by saying yes, since many rulers in history have
become strong by building strong fortresses. However, he also points out
that some rulers have actually become more powerful after destroying
their fortresses. Once again, the best strategy is to do what works best in
a particular circumstance. But as a general rule, Machiavelli argues that
princes who fear foreigners most should not have fortresses, while
princes who fear their own people most need fortresses. Doesnt that
seem backward? What does he mean? Well, he argues that if a prince has
the support of the people, he will have no need of fortresses against the
enemy, since the people will help him fight. If the prince does not have
loyal subjects, he must then use fortresses to protect himself against
attack, since he cannot rely on the peoples help.

Chapters 21, 22, and 23

Chapter XXI: How a Prince Must Act in Order to Gain a Reputation

This chapter begins with a seemingly obvious point: a prince gets a

reputation for greatness by doing great things. King Ferdinand of Spain,
for instance, turned himself into a famous and powerful king by
undertaking extraordinary projects: he attacked the Islamic Moors, and
by building up his military and waging a holy war, he augmented his own
power and reputation for greatness. Other rulers have given
demonstrations of greatness in their conduct of domestic politics. As a
general rule, Machiavelli advises the prince to avoid neutrality in
domestic and foreign affairs neutrality often leads to weakness, and it is
better to support one side or the other. Nor should a prince ever join
forces with another prince more powerful than himself such a tactic
nearly always results in the more powerful princes domination.

Chapter XXII: Of the Secretaries of Princes

A princes reputation has a lot to do with the character of his officers. If

he has competent and fair secretaries and ministers, he will usually be
thought of as wise and good himself. How can a prince know who to
choose as a minister? Machiavelli offers a rule of thumb: if a man is
selfish and seeks his own profit above all things, he will probably not be a
good minister. Good ministers must be willing to think of the prince first,
always and in every case. This works two ways, however; the prince, if he
wishes to keep his good minister, must always be willing to give the
minister honors, riches, and other kinds of gratification. Like the prince
and his people, the prince and his ministers should exist in an ideal
interdependence, since each needs the other.

Chapter XXIII: How Flatterers Must Be Shunned

A prince should take care to choose as ministers men who love him above
themselves but not men who are flatterers. The court, writes
Machiavelli, is full of flatterers, and it is hard for a prince to avoid them.
One way to guard against flatterers is for the prince to encourage all men
to tell the truth without fear of giving offense but if all men are
permitted to speak the truth to the prince, they will no longer respect
him. Better, then, for the prince to allow certain wise men in his council
to speak freely but only these men. That way, the prince will
demonstrate his willingness to listen to men who do not flatter him, but
will be in no danger of losing the respect of the rest of his people .
Moreover, the prince should only allow people at court to give him advice
when he asks them for it although he should ask for advice frequently.

Chapters 24, 25, and 26

Chapter XXIV: Why the Princes of Italy Have Lost Their States

If a new prince follows all of the advice in this book, Machiavelli claims
that he will not only seem like the ancient ruler of a state, but will
actually be more secure than an ancient ruler would have been. This is
because more people have their eyes on a new prince, expecting him to
make mistakes. If a new prince is a good ruler, he will actually impress
many more people than a hereditary prince would. He will also have what
Machiavelli calls a double glory: the glory of founding a kingdom and
the glory of governing it well. In contrast, a prince who is born into
power and loses his state earns a double shame.

Why have princes (such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, etc.)
lost their thrones? Either they lacked military strength, did not have the

good will of the people, or did not have a loyal nobility. Machiavelli insists
that men should never blame fortune for their loss of power. Fortune is
never an adequate explanation; princes lose power not because they have
bad luck, but because they did not have enough skill to deal with the
circumstances that fortune presented.

Chapter XXV: How Much Fortune Can Do in Human Affairs, and How it
May Be Opposed

Machiavelli ended the previous chapter by declaring that princes must

never blame fortune for the loss of political power. He begins this
chapter by acknowledging how many people believe in a universal
fortune that rules all things (or in an all-powerful God, a belief which he
says amounts to pretty much the same thing once again, Machiavelli
comes close to an atheistic position!). While admitting that circumstances
do change frequently in ways that are outside human control, Machiavelli
does not see this as a reason to reject free will. Fortune, he says, rules
half our actions and the other half is determined by our skill and ability.

After making this statement, Machiavelli offers some metaphoric

descriptions of fortune. Fortune, he says, is like a mighty river when it
is at its fullest, no one can cross it or stop it from flooding. When the
river is calm and the water is low, however, men can do things like build
bridges and dams which will make the floods easier to deal with. This is
how we should regard fortune: although we cannot control it, we can use
our ingenuity to better handle what it brings. In terms of princes,
Machiavelli argues that it is foolish for a ruler to base his power entirely
on fortune; such a man cannot hold power once fortune changes. The
man who skillfully handles fortune, however, will prosper. This is
Machiavellis crucial point: the prince must be willing to adapt to fortune,
altering his behavior with skill in order to exploit circumstances. This
means that an action that is successful on one day will be unsuccessful
on another day it all depends on the circumstances.

This is why Machiavelli is so reluctant to give strict rules for the princes
behavior; what matters is not following the rules, but being willing to

break them when necessary. He counsels the prince to resist caution,

since the cautious man is often reluctant to deviate from the safe path,
even when his fortune requires it. Better to act swiftly and suddenly,
according to the moment. An example of a prince who acted in this way is
Pope Julius II. Julius always succeeded in his endeavors because he
always acted quickly and boldly. By making war when others were not
ready either to assist him or to oppose him, Julius ended up extremely
powerful. Had he waited until his friends and enemies were ready to
fight, Machiavelli points out, Julius would have either lost his war, or else
had to share his victory with allies. Machiavelli concludes, in one of the
most often quoted passages of the book, that fortune is like a woman (the
word fortuna, in Italian, is a feminine noun, so this makes a little more
sense in the original); if you wish to master her, you must conquer her by
force. Moreover, she is more willing to be conquered by forceful men of
ability than by timid cowards (remember that the word virt means,
literally, manliness).

Chapter XXVI: Exhortation to Liberate Italy from the Barbarians

Nearly all of the previous chapters have concentrated on advising the

new prince who has recently come into power in a territory. This is no
accident. In the final chapter of the book, Machiavelli addresses his
reader, presumably Prince Lorenzo de Medici, urging him to wage war
against the barbarians (the forces of Islam), and to reclaim Italy as his
own. Machiavelli assures Lorenzo that Italy is ready to follow a new
leader, if only one would appear who is bold enough to seize power. He
tells Lorenzo to bear in mind the examples he has just read about, and to
follow the counsel given in The Prince, so that he might acquire and
maintain power in Italy. Lorenzo should raise troops (his own men, not
mercenaries or auxiliaries, of course), and strike swiftly against the
barbarian rule that stinks in the nostrils of every one. In the end, The
Prince has a very practical, and very specific, goal in mind.