8.

SERGS
PRODUCTS,
INC.,
and
SERGIO
T.
GOQUIOLAY,petitioners, vs. PCI LEASING AND FINANCE,
INC.,respondent.
[G.R. No. 137705. August 22, 2000]
PRINCIPLE:
After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable
property be considered as personal or movable, a party is
estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise. Hence, such
property is a proper subject of a writ of replevin obtained by the
other contracting party.
FACTS
On February 13, 1998, respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc.
(PCI Leasing for short) filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for sum
of money with an application for a writ of replevin.
On March 6, 1998, judge issued a writ of replevin. On March 24,
Sheriff then proceeded to petitioners factory and seized one
machinery.
On March 25, 1998, petitioners filed a motion for special
protective order invoking the power of the court to control the
conduct of its officers and amend and control its processes,
praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the
writ of replevin.
This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing on the ground that the
properties [were] still personal and therefore still subject to
seizure and a writ of replevin.
Petitioners went to the CA via an original action for certiorari. CA
held that the subject machines were personal property, and that
they had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners.
ISSUE
whether the said machines are personal, not immovable, property
which may be a proper subject of a writ of replevin.
RULING: Not meritorious.

Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their

factory were not proper subjects of the Writ issued by the RTC,
because they were in fact real property in accordance with Article
415 of the Civil Code which numerates immovable or real
property as follows:
ART. 415. The following are immovable property:
x x x....................................x x x....................................x x x
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended
by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may
be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
Further, it cannot be the subject of a replevin because Section 3
of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are
issued for the recovery of personal property only.
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the
Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built on
their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal
elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although
each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of
them have become immobilized by destination because they are
essential and principal elements in the industry.[16] In that
sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines
are real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the
Civil Code.[17]
Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of the
petitioners that the said machines are not proper subjects of the
Writ of Seizure. The Court has held that contracting parties may
validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal.
[18] After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently
estopped from claiming otherwise.
In the case of Tumalad vs Vivencio, the SC held
parties to the contract so agree and no innocent
be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no
machinery, which is movable in its nature

as long as the
third party will
reason why a
and becomes

immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise

treated as such.
In the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that
the machines in question are to be considered as personal
property. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the Agreement reads as
follows:[21]
12.1 The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain,
personal property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part
thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed
or attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real
property or any building thereon, or attached in any manner to
what is permanent.
Clearly then, petitioners are estopped from denying the
characterization of the subject machines as personal property.
Under the circumstances, they are proper subjects of the Writ of
Seizure.
It should be stressed, however, that our holding -- that the
machines should be deemed personal property pursuant to the
Lease Agreement is good only insofar as the contracting parties
are concerned.[22] Hence, while the parties are bound by the
Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are not affected by
its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as personal.
[23] In any event, there is no showing that any specific third party
would be adversely affected.
9. TERLYNGRACE RIVERA, Petitioner,
VARGAS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 165895. June 5, 2009

vs. FLORENCIO L.

PRINCIPLE
the process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in
Section 4 of Rule 60 is unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of
the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the property, must
serve a copy thereof to the adverse party (petitioner, in this case)
together with the application, the affidavit of merit, and the
replevin bond.

Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line

with the constitutional guaranty on procedural due process and as
safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures.[38] If the
writ was not served upon the adverse party but was instead
merely handed to a person who is neither an agent of the adverse
party nor a person authorized to receive court processes on his
behalf, the service thereof is erroneous and is, therefore, invalid,
running afoul of the statutory and constitutional requirements.
The service is likewise invalid if the writ of replevin was served
without the required documents. Under these circumstances, no
right to seize and to detain the property shall pass, the act of the
sheriff being both unlawful and unconstitutional.
FACTS
Florencio Vargas filed a complaint against petitioner and several
John Does for recovery of a 150 T/H rock crushing plant located in
Sariaya, Quezon and with prayer for issuance of writ of replevin
and the necessary bond worth P2,400,000.00. In his complaint
and affidavit,[4] Vargas claims ownership of the said equipment,
having purchased and imported the same directly from Hyun Dae
Trading Co.
The equipment was allegedly entrusted to petitioners husband,
Jan T. Rivera, who died sometime in late 2002, as caretaker of
respondents construction aggregates business in Batangas.
According to Vargas, petitioner failed to return the said equipment
after her husbands death despite his repeated demands, thus
forcing him to resort to court action.
Summons[7] dated February 24, 2003 was served upon petitioner
through her personal secretary on April 28, 2003 at her residence
in Paraaque City. But the writ of replevin was served upon and
signed by a certain Joseph Rejumo, the security guard on duty in
petitioners crushing plant in Sariaya, Quezon
Rivera filed her
answer, manifestation, and motion for the
acceptance of petitioners redelivery bond. RTC denied
petitioners redelivery bond application for failure to comply with
the requirements under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60 of the Rules

of Court. RTC faulted petitioner for her failure to file the

application for redelivery bond within five (5) days from the date
of seizure as provided in the Rules of Court.
petitioner elevated the matter to the CA through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. This, too, was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner argues that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying her counterbond on the ground that it was
filed out of time. She contends that the mandatory five-day period
did not even begin to run in this case due to the improper service
of the writ of replevin, contrary to Section 4 of Rule 60.
ISSUE
What is the effect of a writ of replevin that has been improperly
served?
RULING: Petition is meritorious.
The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in
Section 4 of Rule 60 is unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of
the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the property, must
serve a copy thereof to the adverse party (petitioner, in this case)
together with the application, the affidavit of merit, and the
replevin bond.[37] The reasons are simple, i.e., to provide proper
notice to the adverse party that his property is being seized in
accordance with the courts order upon application by the other
party, and ultimately to allow the adverse party to take the proper
remedy consequent thereto.
Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line
with the constitutional guaranty on procedural due process and as
safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures.[38] If the
writ was not served upon the adverse party but was instead
merely handed to a person who is neither an agent of the adverse
party nor a person authorized to receive court processes on his
behalf, the service thereof is erroneous and is, therefore, invalid,
running afoul of the statutory and constitutional requirements.
The service is likewise invalid if the writ of replevin was served
without the required documents. Under these circumstances, no
right to seize and to detain the property shall pass, the act of the
sheriff being both unlawful and unconstitutional.

In the case at bar, petitioner avers that the writ of replevin was
served upon the security guard where the rock-crushing plant to
be seized was located.[39] The signature of the receiving party
indicates that the writ was received on April 29, 2003 by a certain
Joseph Rejumo, the guard on duty in a plant in Sariaya, Quezon,
where the property to be seized was located, and witnessed by
Claudio Palatino, respondents caretaker.[40]The sheriffs return,
[41] however, peremptorily states that both the writ of replevin
and the summons were served upon Rivera. On May 8, 2003, or
nine (9) days after the writ was served on the security guard,
petitioner filed an answer to the complaint accompanied by a
prayer for the approval of her redelivery bond. The RTC, however,
denied the redelivery bond for having been filed beyond the fiveday mandatory period prescribed in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60.
[42] But since the writ was invalidly served, petitioner is correct in
contending that there is no reckoning point from which the
mandatory five-day period shall commence to run.
The writ must also satisfy proper service in order to be valid and
effective: i.e. it should be directed to the officer who is authorized
to serve it; and it should be served upon the person who not only
has the possession or custody of the property involved but who is
also a party or agent of a party to the action. Consequently, a trial
court is deemed to have acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction with respect to the ancillary action of replevin if it
seizes and detains a personalty on the basis of a writ that was
improperly served, such as what happened in this case.
At the outset, petitioners proper remedy should have been to file
a motion to quash the writ of replevin or a motion to vacate the
order of seizure. Nevertheless, petitioners filing of an application
for a redelivery bond, while not necessary, did not thereby waive
her right to question the improper service.
10.
SPOUSES
NORMANDY
and
RUTH
Complainants, vs. ERNESTO L. SULA, Sheriff IV
A.M. No. P-04-1920. August 17, 2007

BAUTISTA

PRINCIPLES
Under the Rules of Court, the sheriff should not immediately
deliver the property seized under a writ ofreplevin to the plaintiff.
This is because defendants have every right to be respected in
their possession and may not be deprived of it without due
process.[43] The purpose of the five-day period in Section 6 is to
give defendants in a replevin case a chance to require the return
of the property by filing a counter-bond.

FACTS
Ruth Bautista borrowed P300,000 from Ceniza C. Glor (Glor). To
secure the loan, Ruth executed a chattel mortgage over her
Honda CRV in favor of Glor.
Despite the repeated demands, Ruth refused to pay her debt, or
surrender possession of the vehicle. Glor filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City (trial court), a civil case[3] for
judicial foreclosure of chattel mortgage with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of replevin.
RTC issued a writ of replevin dated 14 May 2004 and directed
Sheriff Ernesto L. Sula o take possession of the vehicle and keep it
in his custody for five (5) days. At the expiration of the said
period, Sula was directed to deliver, subject to the provisions of
Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, to Glor the
said property, provided that legal fees and all the necessary
expenses are fully paid.
Respondent enforced the writ on 17 May 2004. On 21 May 2004,
Spouses Normandy and Ruth Bautista filed a motion for entry of
appearance, urgent setting of hearing, and redelivery of the
vehicle to them. Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 60, Sps Bautista
equired the return of the vehicle to them by filing a counter-bond
and serving Glor a copy of the counter-bond.

Because the trial court failed to approve complainants counterbond within the five-day period provided in Section 6 of Rule 60,
Glor, in a letter[10] dated 24 May 2004, asked respondent to
deliver the vehicle to her. In a letter[11] dated 26 May 2004,
complainants asked respondent not to deliver the vehicle to Glor
because (1) pursuant to Section 5, they had required the return of
the vehicle to them and filed the corresponding counter-bond;
(2) the vehicles delivery to Glor was not justified under Section 6;
and
(3) there was no order from the trial court directing the
delivery to Glor.
On 26 May 2004, complainants alleged that respondent
approached them in the Quezon City Hall of Justice building
asking them to wait for him by the benches at the back of the
second floor. There, respondent told them that he was willing to
ignore Glors request in exchange for P20,000. With a little
hesitation, they offered him P3,000 and promised to give the
balance on the following day.
Respondent agreed and
immediately received the P3,000. On the next day, however,
complainants did not give the balance. They asked respondent if
he could give them more time to raise the money. Respondent
was irked by this.
On 27 May 2004, respondent filed a sheriffs manifestation asking
the trial courts guidance on whether he should deliver the vehicle
to Glor or keep it in custodia legi.
Without waiting for the trial courts instructions regarding the
vehicle, respondent filed his sheriffs return on 28 May 2004
stating that he had already delivered the vehicle to Glor
On 2 and 7 June 2004, complainants filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
respectively, a joint affidavit-complaint[17] against respondent.
OCA found that respondent erred when he released the vehicle to
Glor without waiting for the trial courts instructions on who had a
better right over the vehicle. The OCA recommended that the
case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that

respondent be held liable for grave abuse of authority and fined

P4,000. The OCA recommended that the charges for violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross ignorance of the
law, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE
Whether or not Sheriff properly delivered the property to Glor.
RULING: No.
In this case, plaintiff/applicant had posted a replevin bond duly
approved by the court. Nevertheless, one of the elements upon
which the property subject of replevin may be delivered to the
plaintiff/applicant is lacking. There appears to be no court order
issued yet for the release of the aforementioned property to the
plaintiff/applicant. The order dated 12 May 2004 issued by the
court only directed respondent to take into his custody the subject
motor vehicle. Further, respondent filed a manifestation seeking
guidance from the court on the disposal of the seized property.
Hence, respondents justification that the release of the seized
property to the plaintiff/applicant follows as a matter of course
because the applicant/plaintiff had already filed a replevinbond to
answer for any damage that may be suffered by complainants
may not be given weight.
It must be stressed that the prerogatives of Sheriffs do not
give them any discretion to determine who among the parties is
entitled to possession of the subject property. The appropriate
course of action should have been for respondent to wait for the
instructions of the court as to whom he will release the property
since he had already asked for its guidance through his
Manifestation which was submitted to the court virtually at the
close of office hours on 26 May 2004. Yet the following morning,
he suddenly decided to release the car to the plaintiff without
waiting for any court order on the matter. Such apparent haste
raised questions on his actions and leaves doubts as to his intent
or interest in the case.

Moreover, under the Revised Rules of Court, the property

seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately
to the plaintiff. This is because a possessor has every right to be
respected in its possession and may not be deprived of it without
due process.
The purpose of the five (5) day period in Section 6, Rule
60 is to give defendants in a replevin case a chance to require the
return of the property by filing a counter[-]bond. Considering that
there was no court order to release the property to the
applicant/plaintiff and the complainants were able to require the
return of the property and file their counter[-]bond within the five
(5) day period required by the Rules, respondent should have
been more circumspect in releasing the property to the
plaintiff/applicant.
By hastily deciding to release the seized
property to the plaintiff/applicant without waiting for the courts
order, respondent patently abused his authority.
Under Section 5, complainants may require the return of the
vehicle by (1) posting a counter-bond in double the value of the
vehicle and
(2) serving Glor with a copy of the counterbond. Both requirements must be complied with before the
vehicle is delivered to Glor. Put differently:
If a defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the property
taken by the sheriff restored to him, he should within five days
from such taking, (1) post a counter-bond in double the value of
said property, and (2) serve plaintiff with a copy thereof, both
requirements as well as compliance therewith within the fiveday period mentioned being mandatory. x x x

Conformably, a defendant in a replevin suit may demand

the return of possession of the property replevinedby filing a
redelivery bond executed to the plaintiff in double the value of the
property as stated in the plaintiffs affidavit within the period
specified in Sections 5 and 6.[42]

Under Section 6, the vehicle shall be delivered to Glor only

under the following instances:
1.
If within five days after the taking of the vehicle,
complainants do not object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the
surety or sureties thereon;
2.
If within five days after the taking of the vehicle,
complainants object to the sufficiency of the bond and the trial
court affirms its approval of Glors bond or approves a new bond;
or
3.
If within five days after the taking of the vehicle,
complainants require the return of the vehicle and their bond is
objected to and found insufficient and they do not forthwith file an
approved bond.
In the instant case, complainants duly complied with all of
the requirements under Sections 5 and 6 for the return of the
vehicle. Respondent took possession of the vehicle on 17 May
2004. On 20 May 2004, complainants filed their urgent motion for
the return of the vehicle and submission of counter-bond and, on
21 May 2004, they filed a motion to withdraw the urgent motion
and change the same with an omnibus motion. Both the urgent
motion and the omnibus motion were filed before the delivery of
the vehicle to Glor and before the expiration of the five-day
period. Later, the trial court approved complainants counterbond.
Thus, respondent committed an irregularity when he
hastily delivered the vehicle to Glor.
Under the Rules of Court, the sheriff should not immediately
deliver the property seized under a writ ofreplevin to the plaintiff.
This is because defendants have every right to be respected in
their possession and may not be deprived of it without due
process.[43] The purpose of the five-day period in Section 6 is to
give defendants in a replevin case a chance to require the return
of the property by filing a counter-bond.

In Sebastian v. Valino,[45] this Court held that:

Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized
under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the
plaintiff. The sheriff must retain it in his custody for five days and
he shall return it to the defendant, if the latter, as in the instant
case, requires its return and files a counter[-]bond (Sec. 4, Rule
60, Revised Rules of Court).
The prerogatives of sheriffs do not include the discretion to
determine who among the parties is entitled to the possession of
the property. Even when placed in a difficult situation, they are
not called to exercise their own discretion.
11. OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ and NENITA P. FERNANDEZ,
petitioners, vs. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK,
now UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES; and PREMIERE
INSURANCE & SURETY CORP., respondents.
G.R. No. 131283. October 7, 1999]
PRINCIPLE
A writ of replevin issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay
City may be served and enforced anywhere in the Philippines.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the amount
of the claim alleged in the complaint, not by the value of the
chattel seized in ancillary proceedings.
FACTS
petitioners] purchased a Nissan Sentra Sedan through a financing
scheme of the private respondent, the International Corporate
Bank, now Union Bank of the Philippines, and the chattel
mortgage was executed in favor of the financing institution
Bank filed a complaint for sum of money with replevin before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 44, Pasay City.

petitioners contested the jurisdiction of the MeTC since the claim

was more than P200,000 and venue considering that the principal
office of the respondent bank [was] in Makati, while their
residence [was] in Quezon City. Petitioners also filed a motion for
the redelivery of the chattel.
Petitioners alleged that When the respondent bank filed its
complaint with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Replevin on
November 28, 1997, the monthly installments were almost fully
paid; [they] would have been fully paid on November 26, 1997.
They could not have been considered in default at the time the
complaint was filed, considering that: (a) they attempted many
times to pay the bank their installments for the months of August,
September, October, 1996, and up to the time of the filing of the
case, they ha[d] not received any statement of delinquency as
mandated by R.A. No. 3165, otherwise known as the Truth in
Lending Act.
Metc denied the petitioners motion. It held that Under the Rules of
Court, the defendant has a period of 5 days from January 7, 1997
to post a re-delivery bond, in order to secure the return of the
subject vehicle and to post a counter bond double the amount of
the chattel.In this respect, defendants failed to exercise his right.
CA affirmed the lower court. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay City had jurisdiction over
civil cases in which the amount of the demand did not exceed
P200,000 exclusive of interest, damages and attorneys fees. The
basic claim in the present case was P190,635.90; hence, the MTC
had jurisdiction.
The appellate court further held that the objection to the
impropriety of the venue should have been raised in a motion to
dismiss before the filing of a responsive pleading. The said issue,
however, was raised for the first time only in petitioners Answer.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals agreed with the MTC that the Writ of
Replevin could be validly executed anywhere in Metro Manila
because Section 27, Chapter III of B.P. 129, authorized the
establishment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila with
eighty-two (82) branches. Therefore, any branch in this case,
Branch 44 which was stationed in Pasay -- could issue writs and

processes that could validly be served and executed anywhere

within Metro Manila.
ISSUE
(1) May the Writ of Replevin issued by the MTC of Pasay City be
enforced outside the city? (2) Did the MTC have jurisdiction over
the Complaint? (3) Were petitioners entitled to the redelivery of
the subject vehicle?
RULING: Petition has no merit
First Issue: Territorial Enforcement of the Writ of Replevin
Under the Resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated
January 11, 1983, providing for the interim rules and guidelines
relative to the implementation of BP 129, a writ of replevin like
the one issued in the present case may be served anywhere in
the Philippines. Specifically, the said Resolution states:
3. Writs and processes. --(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may
be enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or
a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit
trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the
last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the
regional trial court.[10]
Thus, the Writ of Replevin issued by Judge Paas, which obviously
does not fall under item a of the above-cited Rule, may be
validly enforced anywhere in the Philippines. Petitioners confused
the jurisdiction of a court to hear and decide a case on the one
hand with, on the other, its power to issue writs and processes
pursuant to and in the exercise of said jurisdiction.
Second Issue: MTCs Jurisdiction Over the Complaint
Petitioners argue that the value of the property seized is in excess
of P200,000 and thus outside the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Court. This argument has no legal and factual basis. The
fundamental claim in the main action against petitioners, as

shown in respondent banks Complaint, is the collection of the

sum of P190,635.90, an amount that is clearly within the
jurisdiction of the MTC. Although the value of the vehicle seized
pursuant to the Writ of Replevin may have exceeded P200,000,
that fact does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over the
case. After all, the vehicle was merely the subject of a chattel
mortgage that had been used to secure petitioners loan. In any
case, private respondents are entitled only to the amount owed
them. Under Section 14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law, the
proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property shall be used
primarily to pay the costs of the sale, the obligation that has been
secured and other subsequent obligations; and the balance will be
turned over to the mortgagors, herein petitioners.
Third Issue: Redelivery of Subject Vehicle
Petitioners assail the MTCs refusal to release the seized vehicle
despite a Managers Check in the amount of P69,168 they issued
for the redelivery of the vehicle within five days from its seizure.
This argument is devoid of merit. As observed by the trial court,
petitioners failed to comply with the requisites for the redelivery
of the vehicle seized:
Under the Rules of Court, the defendant has a period of 5 days
from January 7, 1997 to post a re-delivery bond, in order to secure
the return of the subject vehicle and to post a counter bond
double the amount of the chattel. In this respect[,] defendants
failed to exercise his right.[16]
Indeed, a careful perusal of the records shows that petitioners
failed to comply with the requirements prescribed by Section 5
and 6 Rule 60 of the Rules of Court in effect at the time:
In their Petition for Review, petitioners plainly admit that they
issued a check for only P69,168 for the purpose of covering the
advance payments plus the redelivery bond. Clearly, that amount
was insufficient to cover even just the required redelivery bond
alone, which should be in an amount double that of the chattel.
Hence, the MTCs refusal to grant petitioners Motion for
redelivery was correct, and the Court of Appeals did not err in
upholding it.

12. G.R. No. 127261

September 7, 2001
VISAYAN SURETY & INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JUN
BARTOLOME+ and SUSAN BARTOLOME and DOMINADOR V.
IBAJAN+, respondents.
Principle
Since the obligation of the surety cannot be extended by
implication, it follows that the surety cannot be held liable to the
intervenor when the relationship and obligation of the surety is
limited to the defendants specified in the contract of surety.
Facts
On February 2, 1993, the spouses Danilo Ibajan and Mila Ambe
Ibajan filed with the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, Bian a
complaint against spouses Jun and Susan Bartolome, for replevin
to recover from them the possession of an Isuzu jeepney, with
damages.
On February 8, 1993, plaintiffs filed a replevin bond through
petitioner Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation. RTC granted
the writ of replevin. The contract of surety provided thus:
"WHEREFORE, we, sps. Danilo Ibajan and Mila Ibajan and the
VISAYAN SURETY & INSURANCE CORP., of Cebu, Cebu, with branch
office at Manila, jointly and severally bind ourselves in the sum of
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) for the return of
the property to the defendant, if the return thereof be adjudged,
and for the payment to the defendant of such sum as he/she may
recover from the plaintiff in the action."3
On May 3, 1993, Dominador V. Ibajan, father of plaintiff Danilo
Ibajan, filed with the trial court a motion for leave of court to
intervene, stating that he has a right superior to the plaintiffs over
the ownership and possession of the subject vehicle.

On June 1, 1993, the trial court granted the motion to intervene.

On August 8, 1993, the trial court issued an order granting the
motion to quash the writ of replevin and ordering plaintiff Mila
Ibajan to return the subject jeepney to the intervenor Dominador
Ibajan.5
RTC issued a writ of replevin in favour of Dominador Ibajan but it
was returned unsatisfied. Thereafter, Dominador filed a motion for
application for judgement against plaintiffs bond.
RTC ordered Mila Ibajan and Visayan Surety to pay Dominador
P150,000. Both parties appealed but it was denied by the RTC.
Visayan Surety then appealed before the CA which affirmed the
RTC. Visayan Surety then appealed before the SC. Respondent
Dominador Ibajan asserts that as intervenor, he assumed the
personality of the original defendants in relation to the plaintiffs
bond for the issuance of a writ of replevin.
Petitioner Visayan Surety contends that it is not liable to the
intervenor, Dominador Ibajan, because the intervention of the
intervenor makes him a party to the suit, but not a beneficiary to
the plaintiffs bond. The intervenor was not a party to the contract
of surety, hence, he was not bound by the contract.
Issue
whether the surety is liable to an intervenor on a replevin bond
posted by petitioner in favor of respondents.
Ruling: Petition is meritorious.
An intervenor is a person, not originally impleaded in a
proceeding, who has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or
is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof.14
It is a basic principle in law that contracts can bind only the
parties who had entered into it; it cannot favor or prejudice a third

person.15 Contracts take effect between the parties, their assigns,

and heirs, except in cases where the rights and obligations arising
from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law.16
A contract of surety is an agreement where a party called the
surety guarantees the performance by another party called the
principal or obligor of an obligation or undertaking in favor of a
third person called the obligee.17Specifically, suretyship is a
contractual relation resulting from an agreement whereby one
person, the surety, engages to be answerable for the debt,
default or miscarriage of another, known as the principal. 18
The obligation of a surety cannot be extended by implication
beyond its specified limits.19 "When a surety executes a bond, it
does not guarantee that the plaintiffs cause of action is
meritorious, and that it will be responsible for all the costs that
may be adjudicated against its principal in case the action fails.
The extent of a suretys liability is determined only by the clause
of the contract of suretyship."20 A contract of surety is not
presumed; it cannot extend to more than what is stipulated. 21
Since the obligation of the surety cannot be extended by
implication, it follows that the surety cannot be held liable to the
intervenor when the relationship and obligation of the surety is
limited to the defendants specified in the contract of surety.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and sets aside the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 49094. The Court rules
that petitioner Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation is not
liable under the replevin bond to the intervenor, respondent
Dominador V. Ibajan.1wphi1.nt
RULE 61.
13. G.R. No. L-43794
August 9, 1935
LUIS FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO ZANDUETA,
Judge of First Instance of Manila, and EUGENIO LEOPOLDO
FRANCISCO, represented by his natural mother and
curator ad litem,
ROSARIO GOMEZ, respondents.
PRINCIPLE

There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support

to a person who claims to be a son in the same manner as to a
person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son. In the
latter case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law, while
in the former there is no presumption, there is nothing but a mere
allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue must not be
confounded with an established right recognized by a final
judgment. The civil status of sonship being denied and this civil
status, from which the right to support is derived, being in issue,
it is apparent that no effect can be given to such a claim until an
authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of
the cause.
FACTS
Eugenio Francisco, represented by his natural mother and
curator ad litem, Rosario Gomez, instituted an action for support
against petitioner Luis Francisco in a separate case, alleging that
he is the latters acknowledged son and as such is entitled to
support.
Luis denied the allegation, claimed that he never acknowledged
Eugenio as his son and was not present at his baptism and that he
was married at time of Eugenios birth.
Despite the denial of paternity however, respondent judge
Francisco Zandueta issued an order granting Eugenio monthly
pension, pendente lite of P30 per month. Luis moved for
reconsideration but was denied, hence the writ for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without
first establishing his status as petitioners son

RULING

Under article 143 of the Civil Code the following are bound to
support each other: (1) Husband and wife, (2) legitimate
ascendants and descendants, (3) parents and acknowledged
natural children and the legitimate descendants of the latter, (4)
parents and illegitimate children not having the legal status of
natural children and (5) brothers and sisters. In all these cases it
is a civil status or a juridical relation which is the basis of the
action for support, the civil status of marriage or that of
relationship.
In the present case the action for support is brought by a minor,
through his guardian ad litem, who alleges that he is the son of
the petitioner; therefore it is necessary for him to prove his civil
status as such son. His alleged civil status being in litigation, it is
evident that nothing can be taken for granted upon the point in
issue. There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of
support to a person who claims to be a son in the same manner
as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son.
In the latter case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law,
while in the former there is no presumption, there is nothing but a
mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue must
not be confounded with an established right recognized by a final
judgment. The civil status of sonship being denied and this civil
status, from which the right to support is derived, being in issue,
it is apparent that no effect can be given to such a claim until an
authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of
the cause. It is also evident that there is a substantial difference
between the capacity of a person after the rendition of a final
judgment in which that person is declared to be in possession of
the status of a son and his capacity prior to such time when
nothing exists other than his suit or claim to be declared in
possession of such a status. This status not appearing by a final
judgment, the respondent judge was without jurisdiction to order
the petitioner, as defendant in case No. 47238, to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P30, or any other amount as monthly
support, pendente lite.
The writ prayed for is granted and the order of the respondent
judge of May 2, 1935, ordering the herein petitioner as defendant

in case No. 47238 to pay the plaintiff in that case the sum of P30
monthly, as support,pendente lite, is hereby declared null and
void, without costs.

14. G.R. No. L-996

October 13, 1902

LUIS R. YANGCO, petitioner,

vs.
WILLIAM J. ROHDE, judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, respondent.
PRINCIPLE
There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of
alimony to a person who claims to be a spouse in the same
manner as to a person who conclusively establishes by legal proof
that he or she is such spouse, and sues for divorce or separation.
In this case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law; in the
former there is no presumption, there is nothing but a mere
allegation a fact in issue and a simple fact in issue must not
be confounded with an established right recognized by a final
judgment or based upon a legal presumption. The civil status of
marriage being denied, and this civil status, from which the right
to support is derived, being issue, it is difficult to see how any
effect can be given to such a claim until an authoritative
declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause.
FACTS
Petitioner Luis Yangco filed writ of prohibition in the Supreme
Court, alleging that complaint had been filed by Victorina Obin
against the petitioner praying that she be declared the lawful wife
of the said Yangco, and that she be granted a divorce, an
allowance for alimony, and attorney's fees during the pendency of
the suit. Complaint was filed before Respondent Judge Rohde, of
the CFI of Manila, who then overruled the demurrer filed by the
petitioner, stating he is of the opinion that petitioners marriage
with Victorina is valid although Judge Rohde expressed his opinion

that the question of the alleged marriage is not clear no free from
doubt.
Respondent then ordered petitioner to pay the plaintiff, in
advance, a monthly allowance of 250 Mexican pesos from and
after the 11th of March last past, and to pay on the 1st day of
August following all accrued allowances, in addition to the
allowance for the said month, amounting to the sum of 1,500
pesos.
Petitioner claims that he would be unable to earn back the sum
hes being compelled to imburse, and that hes been deprived of
right of appeal or any plain, speedy, or adequate remedy. He
prays to reverse respondents
judgement, and to prohibit
respondent from compelling him to pay Victorina the said sum.
Respondent files a demurer on the following ground: (1) That this
court is without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action;
(2) that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Rohde correctly held that Victorina Obin is entitled
allowance of alimony pendent lite
RULING: Petition is meritorious.
Under article 1591 of the old Code any person believing himself
entitled to that provisional alimony or support was required to file
with the complaint documents proving conclusively the title by
virtue of which the same was sued for. If the title was based upon
a right created by law, it was necessary to present the documents
establishing the bond of relationship between the plaintiff and
defendant or the circumstances which gave a right to the
alimony, such evidence to be completed by the testimony of
witnesses if necessary. The judge, under article 1592, could not
admit the complaint unless the documents referred to in the
preceding article were submitted. It is evident from this that
under the provisions of the law then in force a suit for alimony
could not prosper upon the mere opinion of the judge expressed,

not in a final judgment causing status, but in an interlocutory

order which has no other purpose than to facilitate the
continuance of the trial.
The necessity of founding the action for support or alimony on a
title, and a title supported by documentary evidence, is a
consequence of the precepts of article 143 of the Civil Code cited
by the respondent judge himself. In this article the right to
support is granted (1) to spouses inter se; (2) to legitimate
descendants and ascendantsinter se; (3) to parents and certain
legitimated and acknowledged natural children; (4) to other
illegitimate children, and (5) to brothers and sisters. In all these
cases in is a civil status or a juridical relation which is the basis of
the action for support the civil status of marriage or that of
relationship.
In the present case the action for the support or alimony is
brought by a woman who alleges that she is a wife; therefore it is
necessary for her to prove possession of the civil status of a
spouse that is, a marriage, without which one has no right to
the title to husband or wife. Marriages celebrated before the
adoption of the Civil Code must be proven by the means
established by the former laws (art. 53).
This evidence being lacking, and the civil status of marriage being
in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken for granted
upon the point in issue. There is no law or reason which
authorizes the granting of alimony to a person who claims to be a
spouse in the same manner as to a person who conclusively
establishes by legal proof that he or she is such spouse, and sues
for divorce or separation. In this case the legal evidence raises a
presumption of law; in the former there is no presumption, there
is nothing but a mere allegation a fact in issue and a simple
fact in issue must not be confounded with an established right
recognized by a final judgment or based upon a legal
presumption. The civil status of marriage being denied, and this
civil status, from which the right to support is derived, being
issue, it is difficult to see how any effect can be given to such a
claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the

existence of the cause. It is evident that there is of necessity a

substantial difference between the capacity of a person after the
rendition of a final judgment in which that person is declared to
be in possession of the status of marriage and his capacity prior
to such time when nothing exists other than his suit or claim to be
declared in possession of such status of marriage. Any other view
would render useless all the legal effects which flow from the
authority of res adjudicata.
The court below had jurisdiction to try the divorce suit, but he was
without jurisdiction to grant alimony when the right to claim
alimony had not accrued in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code. This Code only grants the rights to alimony to a wife.
This status not appearing by a final judgment, the court is without
jurisdiction
to
make
any
order
in
the
matter.
Therefore mandamus is the proper remedy upon the facts related.